

Space and radical planning: Linking protest action and local community self-development

vorgelegt von
Arch. M.Sc.
Ignacio Castillo Ulloa

an der Fakultät VI – Planen | Bauen | Umwelt
der Technischen Universität Berlin
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Doktor der Ingenieurwissenschaften
– Dr.-Ing. –

genehmigte Dissertation

Promotionsausschuss:

Vorsitzender: Prof. Dr. Dietrich Henckel
Gutachterin: Prof. Dr. Angela Million
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Simon Güntner

Tag der wissenschaftlichen Aussprache: 28. August 2017

Berlin 2020

Table of contents

Abstract	iii
Zusammenfassung	vi
Resumen	v
Foreword — What's the overarching point?	vi
Acknowledgements	vii
List of figures, tables and acronyms	viii
Chapter 1 — Introduction: «Researching counter-intuitively»	
1.1. From <i>delusional</i> to <i>creative</i> aphopenia: <i>What this research is and how it came about</i>	2
1.2. One amongst many tiny very pertinent efforts: <i>What doing this (type of) research for?</i>	3
1.3. A snapshot of the research's backbone	5
Chapter 2 — Methodology: «Deconstructing the way from the <i>certainties</i> to the <i>anxieties</i> of the analytical method»	
2.1. Not necessarily from head to toes: <i>An anatomy of the investigation's phases</i>	8
2.2. Seeking discovery rather than affirmation: <i>A synopsis of the research methods</i>	10
2.2.1. Delving into diverse theoretical relays between practices: <i>Bibliographical research</i>	11
2.2.2. 'Splitting hairs': <i>General and concrete subjective co-constructions of accounts – Semi-structured interviews</i>	12
2.2.3. Drilling through walls: <i>'Carefully-engaged' case-study research</i>	13
Chapter 3 — Theoretical framework: «Seeing through theory to grasp something practical»	
3.1. Space: <i>Crafting an analytical lens</i>	17
3.1.1. Space and place, two sides of the same coin? <i>A somewhat overlooked disambiguation</i>	18
3.1.2. A reifying and heterotopological purview: <i>Lefebvre's spatiology and Foucault's surreptitious space</i>	29
3.1.3. From thinking space to thinking and 'following' spatially	37
3.2. Planning: <i>Radically from below and spatially political</i>	39
3.2.1. Cracking conventional planning's hard kernel: <i>From societal guidance to socio-spatial transformation</i>	41
3.2.2. How is planning spatialized? <i>From neutral container to ever-changing reification</i>	47
3.2.3. What might planning yet be(come)? <i>Radical(izing) spatial(ly) planning</i>	58
3.3. Urban social movements: <i>Decoding urban and spatial protesting</i>	63
3.3.1. Urban social movements: <i>From the rise of civil society to spatial(ized) struggles</i>	66
3.3.2. Not ruptures, but unexpected continuities: <i>Protest actions' infrapolitical precursor/aftermath and radical planning practices</i>	68
3.3.3. Protesting <i>in, on</i> and <i>from</i> space: <i>Urbanity, political action and infrapolitics</i>	71
3.4. Community Development: <i>Autonomous and transformative</i>	76
3.4.1. Deconstructing community participation: <i>An unremitting dilemma</i>	78
3.4.2. A differential politics of community organizing: <i>From induced to produced (spatial) difference</i>	82
3.4.3. Local community self-development: <i>Superseding 'self-help' as 'self-improvement'</i>	84
3.5. Discussion: <i>Reading and grasping, through space, reflections for planning</i>	87

3.5.1. Space, where planning politics is to ‘take shape’	87
3.5.2. Socio-spatial dialectics of urban protest action	88
3.5.3. Local and communal space – <i>The realm of engagement</i>	89
Chapter 4 — Case study: «A tale of a <i>locale</i>: Navigating, practically, through theoretical points»	
4.1. The case study as a <i>locale</i> : <i>The (spatio-temporal) puzzle of structures, institutions and human agency</i>	93
4.2. Not spontaneous generation: <i>Urban social movements and community organizing in Costa Rica – A historical background</i>	94
4.3. The totalizing urban planning project: <i>The GAM as a bogus space of political universality</i>	99
4.4. Antagonistic political confrontations as constituents of the GAM’s urban growth	105
4.5. The Comités Patrióticos: <i>Community-based and inter-scalar mobilization</i>	107
4.5.1. From <i>abstract</i> global to <i>concrete</i> local: <i>The Comités patrióticos as inter-scalar and urban protesting</i>	109
4.5.2. When enthusiasm has waned, not everything goes back to be the same	111
4.6. A sudden change of scope: <i>A renaissance of ‘socially rebellious’ local community development</i>	112
4.6.1. Coming back to the barrio and turning into an ‘insurgent’ space	113
4.6.2. Taking advantage of oxymoronic power: <i>Furthering counteraction in the loose ends of (spatialized) power</i>	116
4.6.3. Spatial and political autonomy is not without costs: <i>Facing top-down bigotry and excess of inter-scalar fluidity</i>	121
4.6.4. Reactivating an autonomous ‘unscripted’ and ‘liminal’ space	126
4.7. Carving a space of radical openness: <i>Inter-subjective and multi-logic democratic struggle</i>	132
4.8. Discussion: <i>Phronetically speaking, what is to be done? Drawing lessons from bridge to bridge</i>	138
Chapter 5 — Overall appraisal: «Challenging traditional sequiturs to not fall on stony ground»	
5.1. Protesting may start things off, but won’t take them all the way through	144
5.2. The twofold character of space: <i>Shedding light on a double-edge sword</i>	147
5.3. Rather than making a theoretical planning assessment up, planning actions are what in actuality makes the difference	150
5.4. Discussion: <i>Disentangling a Gordian knot</i>	151
Chapter 6 — Outlook: «How anagrammatic are planning <i>theoretical</i> and <i>practical</i> research?»	
6.1. Digging further into explanation: <i>Reconsidering planning research’s language and discursivity</i>	154
6.2. At issue is not how you call it, rather what you make of it: <i>Going beyond the label</i>	155
6.3. Seeking the ever-changing meaning of action: <i>Towards a ‘critical-hysterical’ planning research</i>	156
6.3.1. Outlining a possibility: <i>A critical-hysterical view with organized communities and their protest actions</i>	157
References	160
Appendixes	182

Abstract

Space and radical planning: Linking protest action and local community self-development

The project researches how protest action of urban social movements may aid to underpin wider and more inclusive local community self-development processes. To that end, the discussion is circumscribed by the notions of space and radical planning. Space, thereupon, constitutes both a 'reifying' (after Lefebvre) and 'heterotopological' (after Foucault) spatial lens as well as an integrating grid, with which to crosscut across the diverse topics and disciplines that the research comprises: urban research, (urban) planning, (urban) social movements and community organizing/development. Their inherent 'contradictions' and complex interactions among them are therewith spatially examined. Furthermore, radical planning alludes to the theory and practice of planning that react to — and somewhat counteract — the consequences of an urban development largely spelled out by a global market rationality, safeguarded by top-down state-led planning mechanisms and that directly impacts dynamics of local community development. Along with that, a case study is incorporated to test, refine and further develop, upon concrete phenomenology, some of the main findings derived from the literature review. The account of Paso Ancho, an urban community in southern San José, Costa Rica, is analyzed throughout the autonomous political organization and actions of its dwellers, which triggered a process of self-steered and inclusive participation by advancing a local development agenda aimed at improving social and spatial conditions. All in all, it is believed that direct community action, in the long run, helps to create a more equal environment — in both social and spatial terms — for it also enhances local participatory democracy within and even beyond official (urban) planning processes.

Zusammenfassung

Raum und radikale Planung: Protestaktionen und kommunale Selbstentwicklung verknüpfen

Im Projekt wird es erforscht, wie Protestaktionen der urban-sozialen Bewegungen offenere und inklusivere kommunale Selbstentwicklungsprozesse unterstützen können. Zu diesem Zweck wird die Diskussion durch die Begriffe Raum und radikale Planung abgegrenzt. Raum konstituiert daraufhin sowohl einen »reifizierenden« (nach Lefebvre) und »heterotopologischen« (laut Foucault) analytischen Umfang als auch ein umfassendes Gitter, um quer über die verschiedenen Themen und Disziplinen (Stadtforschung, (Stadt-)Planung, (Stadt-) soziale Bewegungen, *Community-Organizing* und kommunale Entwicklung), die die Forschung enthält, zu gehen und ihre inhärente ‚Widersprüchlichkeiten‘ und komplexen Interaktionen räumlich zu untersuchen. Des Weiteren bezieht Radikale Planung sich auf die Planungstheorie und Planungspraxis, die auf und gegen die Auswirkungen einer Stadtentwicklung reagieren und angehen, die weitgehend beeinflusst von einer globalen Marktrationalität und abgesichert von staatlichen Planungsinstrumenten wird und die die Dynamiken der kommunale-lokale Entwicklung direkt beeinträchtigt. Außerdem ergänzt ein empirisches Teil die Forschung, um einige der wichtigsten Erkenntnisse von der theoretischen Debatte, nach konkreter Phänomenologie, zu testen, zu verfeinern und weiter zu entwickeln. In diesem Sinne wird die Fallstudie von Paso Ancho, eine städtische Gemeinde im südlichen San José, Costa Rica ausgewertet. Die Bewohner/innen von Paso Ancho haben den Umfang ihrer politischen Aktion verändert und autonom eine lokale Agenda auf kommunale Entwicklungsaspekten basiert (z.B., Sanierung von verlassenen öffentlichen Räume, Abfallwirtschaft, Förderung von kulturellen Aktivitäten, u.a.) entworfen. Zusammenfassend wird es angenommen, dass direkte Aktion der Gemeinschaften auf lange Sicht hilft einem gerechteren Umfeld — sowohl in sozialer und räumlicher Hinsicht — zu gestalten, da sie die lokale und partizipative Demokratie, nicht nur innerhalb aber auch außerhalb der offiziellen (städtischen) Planungsprozessen, erhöht.

Resumen

Espacio y planificación radical: Uniendo acciones de protesta con un desarrollo local-comunal autónomo

El proyecto investiga la forma en que las acciones de protesta de los movimientos sociales urbanos pueden llegar a fomentar procesos de desarrollo local-comunal autónomo más amplios e inclusivos. Para ello, las nociones de espacio y planificación radical enmarcan la discusión. Espacio, a este respecto, constituye tanto un lente «cofiscante» (siguiendo a Lefebvre) y «heterotopológico» (según Foucault) de análisis, como un entramado integrador de los diversos temas y disciplinas que la investigación abarca: estudios urbanos, planificación (urbana), movimientos sociales (urbanos) y organización y desarrollo comunal. Esto con el fin de examinar, en términos espaciales, sus inherentes contradicciones y complejas interrelaciones. Por otro lado, la formulación «planificación radical» se refiere a la teoría y práctica de la planificación que reacciona y, en cierto modo, contrarresta las consecuencias de un crecimiento urbano que es dictado, en gran medida, por una racionalidad de mercado global; salvaguardado por mecanismos verticales y estatales de planificación; y que altera, directamente, dinámicas de desarrollo local-comunal. La investigación se complementa con un caso de estudio, con el fin de probar, refinar y seguir desarrollando, en una fenomenología concreta, algunos de los principales resultados derivados del debate teórico. El caso de Paso Ancho, una comunidad urbana ubicada en el sur de San José, Costa Rica, se analiza a través del cambio de escala y ámbito de acción política que sus pobladores realizaron con el fin de producir, de manera autónoma, una agenda local con un enfoque en aspectos de desarrollo comunal: rehabilitación de espacios públicos abandonados, manejo de desechos sólidos, promoción de actividades culturales, entre otros. Se cree, en líneas generales, que la acción comunal directa contribuye a la creación de un medio ambiente — social y espacialmente — más equitativo, dado que se aumenta la democracia local participativa dentro e, incluso, fuera de los procesos de planificación (urbana).

Foreword

What's the overarching point?

Writing, or actually, completing *this* doctoral dissertation, besides the obvious purpose of obtaining an academic grade, was, first and foremost, a personal ride filled with frustrations as well as satisfactions — those, respectively, cul-de-sac and aha moments! It has also been a sort of self-indulgence, given that I was trying to make sense of something that, at best, could be superficially regarded as logical and, at worst, unfathomable: *why and how people get together, agree on something and take action*. To make things more difficult — and yet more fun — I decided to add up possible implications for planning practice, drawing on my own, very much empirical and limited, experience. Almost inescapably, that led me to (re)consider theoretical formulations that I knew already were little practicable and, at the same time, test some progressive and imaginative proposals (at least in their application for doing research). Towards the 'official' end (at some point everyone that has been, to a greater or lesser extent, affected by and/or involved in this project was pressuring me to finally finish it!), I began wondering about possible planning education ramifications — where, I truly believe, improvement can be furthered.

It goes without saying that I wound up producing more open-ended assessments and no conclusive answers; let alone a whole bunch of new questions. But that's unsurprising, provided that I've always considered research to be, above all, an exploratory, rather than a confirmatory, task.

Acknowledgements

In no order whatsoever of priority

A mis padres, Irene y William, les agradezco, profundamente, todo el apoyo emocional y material que me han brindado para, una vez más, conseguir lo que, más que una realización personal y académica, es, ante todo, la consecución de un sueño.

A Marcela, mi afectivo e intelectual complemento, por toda su paciencia y también (su muy necesaria) impaciencia, le tengo la mayor de mis gratitudes. Asimismo, ella desempeñó un papel esencial para poder llevar a cabo este proyecto, el cual, lejos de haber sido personal, resultó ser un esfuerzo familiar-colectivo.

Estoy también muy agradecido con quienes dispusieron de una parte de su invaluable tiempo para reunirse conmigo y conversar sobre mis inquietudes de análisis. Sobre todo, a los activistas de Paso Ancho, quienes, en lugar de estar en charla amena, bien pudieron haber estado entregados a la iterativa tarea de mejorar su comunidad. Además, a don Héctor Ferlini, le doy las gracias tanto por compartir sus incisivos puntos de vista, como por ponerme en contacto con otros valiosos pareceres.

A Dennis Arias, quien, quizás sin saberlo del todo, fue fundamental para tomar la decisión de «lanzarme al vacío» y realizar mi doctorado, le brindo un afectivo abrazo a la (insalvable) distancia.

To my supervisors, Angela and Simon, I am indebted for, above all, letting me have all the 'necessary freedom' (as in, rather than telling me what to do, had me finding it out myself) to carry out this work. While that, at times, was indeed a bit of a hassle; I was, in the end, able to learn a lot more than I could've ever foreseen about my 'dormant' analytical capacity.

Finalmente, este trabajo está dedicado a Agustín, mi hijo, quien significó la más bella «interrupción» que, el llegar al final de este camino, pudo haber tenido.

Berlin, July 6th, 2017

List of figures, tables and acronyms

Figures		
Figure 1.1. Graphic representation of hypothetical and analytical elements of the research's 'official' point of departure		6
Figure 2.1. 'Ideal' vis-à-vis 'actual' anatomy of the research		9
Figure 2.2. Intersection zone (blue) and positioning along a 'theoretical-abstract—empirical-factual' axis of the four main concepts that make up the theoretical framework		11
Figure 3.1. Space as a 'following' <i>means</i> and <i>object</i> of analysis		38
Figure 4.1. The case study as a <i>locale</i>		94
Figure 4.2. Localization of Costa Rica in America and localization of the <i>Gran Área Metropolitana</i> (GAM) at the heart of the country		101
Figure 4.3. Urban expansion of the GAM between 1986 and 2005		103
Figure 4.4. Urban land use within the GAM in 1986 and in 2012		104
Figure 4.5. The GAM's 'macro-zoning' proposal contained in the Plan GAM 2013-2030		104
Figure 4.6. Diverse socio-spatial realities within the GAM		105
Figure 4.7. Massive demonstrations against the CAFTA-DR in the capital city of San José		109
Figure 4.8. Localization of the San José canton in the GAM, the district of San Sebastián within the San José canton, and the Paso Ancho (cluster of neighborhoods) center within the district of San Sebastián		114
Figure 4.9. Demonstration to demand the construction of the pedestrian bridge, freeway 39, and the actual bridge/Diverse instances of deliberation		115
Figure 4.10. Localization in the center of Paso Ancho of the three communal assets targeted		119
Figure 4.11. <i>Parque de los Héroes</i>		120
Figure 4.12. The <i>Identidad Pasoancheña 2015</i> (Paso Ancho's identity 2015) project (...)		129
Figure 4.13. The <i>Emma Gamboa</i> public library (...)		130
Figure 4.14. Scales and processes-time of collective and autonomous actions (selected) of Paso Ancho inhabitants		131
Figure 5.1. 'Out of the wave of mobilizations'		149
Figure 6.1. The analytical cycle <i>with</i> organized communities		158
Tables		
Table 2.1 Research method, input and knowledge type according to the investigation's phases		15
Table 3.1 Correlation between concepts in planning and philosophical traditions together with their inclination to planning as societal guidance or socio-spatial transformation		62
Table 3.2 Correlation between criteria in planning and philosophical traditions together with their inclination to planning as societal guidance or socio-spatial transformation		62
Acronyms		
CAFTA-DR: Central America Free Trade Agreement plus the Dominican Republic		
CBO: Community based organization		
GAM: <i>Gran Área Metropolitana</i> (Great Metropolitan Area)		
ICE: <i>Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad</i> (The Costa Rican Institute of Electricity)		
ICTs: Information and Communication Technologies		
INVU: <i>Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo</i> (National Institute of Housing and Urban Development)		
NGO: Non-governmental organization		

Plan GAM 83: *Plan Regional para la Gran Área Metropolitana 1983* (Regional plan for the Great Metropolitan Area 1983)

Plan GAM 2013-2030: *Plan Regional para la Gran Área Metropolitana 2013-2030* (Regional plan for the Great Metropolitan Area 2013-2030)

PNDU: *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano* (National Urban Development Plan)

TLC: *Tratado de Libre Comercio* (Free Trade Agreement)

TSE: *Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones* (Supreme Electoral Court)

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Researching counter-intuitively

1.1. From delusional to creative aphopenia: *What this research is and how it came about*

Aphopenia, first coined by German scientist Klaus Conrad as *apophanie* in 1958, refers to a subtle stage of schizophrenia characterized by the capacity to link and render meaningful unrelated details and identifying patterns where there are none (what in statistics is called a Type I error or false positive) (Poulsen, 2012). As opposed to an epiphany (the intuitive capacity to accurately perceive the world's interconnections), an apophany constitutes, *allegedly*, a deceitful way of comprehension (Waldman, 2014). While it is (hopefully) self-explanatory that this research isn't about apophenia in and of itself (as if going into its details), it has a, so to speak, 'apophenic genesis'. I'll explain myself: the way I first began to be interested in doing this research had to do with noticing a particular phenomenon and, thenceforward, perceiving connections and patterns where there were seemingly none. As a sort of *constructive* dissipation, I was constantly asking myself how such connections and patterns were cropping up and, eventually, I sat down and put together a research draft. In so doing, another detail (closely related to apophenia) became clear, namely that the research, to be carried out (or, better, enacted), could only follow one path: *counter-intuition*.

Between 2003 and 2007, in Costa Rica — my home country — there was a gradual, intense and profound process of social mobilization and polarization, which revolved around the '(in)convenience' of endorsing a free trade agreement, in conjunction with the rest of the Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic, with the United States (the so-called CAFTA-DR¹). Debate had, for over a decade, only taken place institutionally and information about the process wasn't publicly circulated. It was not until a referendum, as a result of lobbying and social pressure, was announced, that discussion reached civil society and spread throughout public opinion; making the issue quickly socially dividing — you were either for or against the 'TLC' (Spanish acronym for free trade agreement). The whole process, ostensibly, culminated on October the 7th, 2007², the day the referendum (the very first one in Costa Rica's democratic history) was held to tilt the balance (polls were, shortly prior to the referendum, foretelling a technical tie³). As one of the encountered social blocs, the 'NO Movement' was an unprecedented phenomenon, given that it comprised nationwide a wide array of social actors (even with divergent political stances and without any prior political affiliation and/or participation). Furthermore, its organization was multilayered, without hierarchical articulation or interdependence (except for certain logistic aspects and material support for public protests). The most thought-provoking facet of the 'NO-Movement' were the *Comités Patrióticos* (Patriotic Committees) a set of local and territorial(ized) instances that came into existence via a "network of networks" (Salas, 2010: 21). About 150 committees spread through different regions and agglutinated local(ized) concerns and tied them, in both a pedagogical and critical manner, with the global issues the CAFTA-DR entailed.

To date, most of the analyzes about the *Comités Patrióticos* emphasize their role during the 'rupture' marked by the public debate on the CAFTA-DR in terms of, for example, the limits of representative democracy vis-à-vis citizenship construction (Raventós, 2008b), gender-like political participation (Morales, 2012) and political participation rights from a social

¹ Given that negotiations, originally, encompassed only five (out of seven) Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), the treaty was called 'CAFTA' (Central America Free Trade Agreement). As of 2004, the Dominican Republic started to take part of the negotiation process and the name was thus changed to CAFTA-DR. Panama formulated a bilateral free trade agreement, The Panama-US Trade Promotion Agreement, which has been in effect since October 2012. Belize doesn't have a free trade agreement; however, it receives preferential treatment in accordance with the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act. The CAFTA-DR, furthermore, is the first trade agreement the United States has ever negotiated with a group of developing countries.

² The referendum was supposed to be held on September 23rd, 2007, but on June 5th it was decided to delay it until the *Sala Constitucional* (Constitutional Chamber) had revised the treaty's text and decided whether or not the legislative procedure (that is, the fact that treaty was initially to be approved by the *Asamblea Legislativa*, Legislative Assembly) was unconstitutional. The magistrates of the *Sala Constitucional* found no arguments to claim any unconstitutional action, and, on July 12th, the *Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones* (TSE, the Costa Rica Supreme Electoral Court) made the official announcement that the referendum was to take place on October 7th, 2007.

³ Polls carried out during April, July and August 2007 signaled a majority favoring the CAFTA-DR; whereas a poll from June indicated a majority against it.

movement perspective (Alvarez and Hintjens, 2009). Within these as well as other studies, almost no attention is directed to what could've eventually happened (or actually did occur) with the committees, once the referendum had been held and, particularly, given that the result did not match their efforts and aspirations. That's when I, so to speak, began to feel a bit research-wise 'schizophrenic'. By attending meetings of various 'local instances' I was able to perceive a growing sentiment of defeat and disenchantment among participants, due, chiefly, to having lost in the referendum (I too attributed this to the lack of success of two general assemblies organized to discuss, precisely, the future of the committees). However, there were (and still are) a few exceptional cases, in which committees decided to change the scope of action and the communities on which they were based became their priority (consequently, issues regarding the CAFTA-DR were slowly left aside) (Rayner, 2008; 2014). Given that what drove political engagement in the first place (the defense of the welfare state against neoliberal incursion) had, directly and explicitly, almost nothing to do with was later on buttressing action in these communities, purportedly meaningless details were suddenly making more sense to me and 'hidden' action patterns started to surface. I, thus, began to gather questions in order to interpret what could've transpired in people's political subjectivities and identities that allowed them to go from fighting the CAFTA-DR to jointly improving the living conditions of their barrios; in spite of the fact that both the 'NO movement' and the vast majority of the *Comités Patrióticos* had ceased to exist.

In time, I polished my 'apophenic' and, by all means, still raw elucidations and designed the draft for this research. Focusing, all the while, on not-so-obvious aspects (counter-intuition) and suggesting 'wild' links between fields of thought and action (apophenia), I settled that my research was going to be about **finding out** what effect collective protest action has on furthering an autonomous and local community development. Admittedly, that sounds offbeat, let alone fairly schizophrenic, but that's how this research came and is about. (In a less personal note and in a 'classical' style, the content of the research is in the section after next outlined). All in all, I do think apophenic and counter-intuitive reasoning holds great research potential. On the one hand, apophenia, as aforesaid, is the spontaneous perception of connections and meaningfulness of (apparently) disconnected phenomena and, given that such propensity "most closely links psychosis to creativity", "apophenia and creativity may even be seen as two sides of the same coin" (Brugger, 2001: 205). On the other hand, counter-intuition is what renders research transformative, since, whereas "[d]ata-driven optimization [...] derives solutions from a predetermined paradigm", "transformational or counterintuitive ideas" are what truly "propel humanity forward" (Ratti and Helbing, 2016).

1.2. One amongst many tiny very pertinent efforts: *What doing this (type of) research for?*

This investigation offers diverse inputs. Academically speaking, it is a contribution to ongoing debates in urban studies, fueled prominently by geographers, that promote for questions of space and spatial practice (or, actually, to deploy *spatial thinking*) to be (re)asserted into social movement theory and research (Martin and Miller, 2003; Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2009: 37). There is, for instance, a marked spatial view on the "geographies of resistance" (Pile and Keith, 1997), movements pushing for global justice that 'converge spatially' (Routledge, 2003), the "spatiality of transnational resistance to globalization" (Featherstone, 2003) and the formation of oppositional political identities in "spaces of resistance" (Pile, 2007). This wave of spatial perspectives attempts to connect the conventional taxonomic sociological approach to social movements (largely determined by Charles Tilly's work) with a dialectical and relational analysis based on socio-spatial representation (Martin and Miller, 2003; Marston, 2003; Wolford, 2003). More specifically, in the light of hasten urbanization processes, there's a need to deploy a dialectical method that comprises social and spatial relations and dynamics — that is, "a socio-spatial dialectic" (Soja, 1980). In that regard, planning theoretical and practical research, which profits significantly from social movement theory (and other akin subfields), echoing pursuits to push the boundaries among disciplines 'via' space, ought to test and expand the possibilities

of **analyzing spatially** the **contentious** and **extra-institutional politics of social movements**. This research constitutes a (by all means limited) endeavor to undertake such task; after all, “there is an inverse relationship between what is known in a field and the number of books written about it” (Krauss, 2016).

By the same token, the research argues for a deeper understanding of the space/place distinction at the *theoretical* level and, more relevantly, to seek for ways of comprehending how spaces and places, in their *concrete* dimension, impact our daily lives and interactions. Examining the way concrete spaces and places shape our everyday routines may animate theoretical as well as practical planning research and, in the long run, the *praxis* of planning (as a way of calling all undertakings concerned with bridging the ever-evolving gap between planning theory and practice). Incidentally, while in planning literature there is more than enough cognizance of the necessity to incorporate socio-spatial perspectives of urban and regional phenomena (though there aren't that many distinct examples), there's a hindering nescience prompted by a lack of a more thorough conceptualization of the space-place polarization⁴. Insofar as the **space/place** both **distinction** and **relationality** are head-on dealt with, certain aspects of urban planning, management and administration (for instance, financial technical and human resources) could be better allocated, if their designation to spaces and places were not responding to a simplistic synonymic usage of both terms (as it is usually to come across in leaflets and reports issued by local governments, ministries, NGOs and other of that ilk).

For actual practical terms, a spatial viewpoint on urban social movement turns out to be pivotal, if urban social movements are to become critical and autonomous planning agents, capable of not only criticizing and opposing state-led 'formal' planning practices, but also of enhancing them by crafting and enacting planning practices of their own. To that end, the research emphasizes 'moments', instances and means of epistemological and methodological 'singularity' (that is, non-traditional), which may well inform planning practitioners in, first, becoming responsive to claims and actions of, and, then, (potentially) working hand in hand with, urban social movements and organized communities. Moreover, research's results can eventually constitute a general frame of reference (a kind of 'introduction') for, principally, local urban planners to, gradually, amplify their professional mentality and scope of action. Planners, then, realize that urban social movements' politics of discontent (embodied by their collective tactical actions), far from being an irrelevant — or even undesirable — condition, might turn out to be a strategic and prolific asset (to, for example, implement local community projects and democratize policy-making processes). The research, thus, delves into and discusses, constructively, the recurrent technocratic-scientific character of planning theory and, as a result, of practice that depoliticizes both the object and process of planning (the so-called 'scientific' politics of planning). Through a critical and imaginative spatial thinking at the heart of planning practice, it is believed that both epistemologies and methodologies underpinning mobilized social blocs and organized communities are incorporated, articulated and made operative (instead of deploying co-optation and furthering tokenistic participation).

Ultimately, new, alternative and autonomously *invented* participatory spaces and mechanisms (or at least useful preconditions for them to thrive) are detected and fostered (as opposed to occluded or worse dismantled), which, in turn, could help render local governments and their institutions more accountable and transparent. Likewise, rather diffused adjectival constructions such as 'participatory' (in comparison with 'representative') and 'local' (*vis-à-vis* 'national') democracy, which are commonly instrumentalized through powerful planning discourses⁵, could be superseded, if local community self-development cases — like the one the research analyzes — are recognized

⁴ See, amid others cases of planning literature that don't distinguishing substantially between space and place (though they deal with one or the other as well as both interchangeably): Friedmann (2010) (place over space); Graham and Healey (1999) (diffuse and confusing discussion while advocating relational approaches); and Davoudi and Strange (2009) (exhaustive discussion on the historical evolution of both place and space in planning, also pointing out shortcomings in case studies; however, the distinction is not at all included).

⁵ By way of clarification, 'discourse' — a term I use here and there — doesn't designate “an infrastructure and is not either another name for ideology”; rather, “discourses are the eyeglasses through which, in each epoch, men have perceived things, have thought and have acted” (Veyne 2014 [2008]: 36/37; my translation from a Spanish edition).

as a legitimate and material(ized) instance of citizenship (as such; with no need to call it 'democratic', 'rightful', 'just', and the like). Planning practitioners, hence, intercede and manage to strengthen this type of collective efforts or, leastways, simply let them be, which does not mean to obviate both the state and the market — as the two 'counterparts' of civil society — and their concomitant responsibilities and duties.

1.3. A snapshot of the research's backbone

All too often, within theoretical cogitations about planning, a call for planners to become more receptive and sensitive to claims of social movements is to stumble upon. This, nevertheless, seems to find little resonance in planning practice; particularly in urban areas, for they are fraught with a mix of interests, tension, conflict, power asymmetries and convoluted decision-making processes. Oddly enough, while the dissatisfaction of people is, to a certain extent, bound to (unjust) spatial outcomes caused by 'top-down' and official planning practice, self-orchestrated tactics of mobilization and action, specifically at the local-community level, evidence the possibilities for people to, first, imagine and, subsequently, further a different social, political and spatial reality as attainable — instead of trying, futilely, to change the one orthodox planning tries to assert.

The research project, on such account, focuses on initiatives that go beyond 'conventional' planning practices — led almost exclusively by professional technocratic practitioners — and open up to processes that unfold informally to bypass, counteract and even resist traditional state-led regulatory frameworks. To that end, the investigation builds on John Friedmann's (1987) formulation of "**radical planning**", which argues that planning, rather than being understood and exercised as *societal guidance* (mainly involving technocrats and dominant elites when it comes to decision-making), ought to be a process of *social transformation* (comprising common people's needs, expectations, desires and so on together with their active participation — mainly of those suffering from exclusion and disempowerment). The claims of disenfranchised groups of any society lie at the core of (anyone attempt to promote) radical planning, because they seek to reaffirm the political community into civil governance. Thus, unbalanced power relations are challenged to prevent the production and reproduction of inequalities; not only in deindustrialized urban contexts but also — and quite differently — in cities throughout the developing world.

The notion of **space** also frames the research project by problematizing it from a broader perspective that criticizes a Cartesian-jigsaw absolute space derived from a category of extension. Instead, space is seen as "socially produced and [as having] historical conditions of existence" as well as being "one of the universal forms of social practice" (Stanek, 2011: 133). Such far-reaching conception of space, for planning purposes, entails the recognition that a 'critical analysis' is required to decode two primordial aspects: (1) the strategies and logics influencing the production of space, and (2) the 'contents' of space, that is to say, the people using, occupying and shaping space and that may well be against either its use or material arrangement. Eventually, such critical analysis of space leads to a substantial epistemology of planning, since the main concern of planning action is no longer exclusively centered on the pure physical form of space (Lefebvre, 1976 [1970]: 31).

Finally, the research is circumscribed by the topics of **urban social movements** (notably, their collective protest actions and their everyday 'generative' dimension) and **community development** (in an autonomous and subversive form). People mobilize, as it was mentioned lines above, to alter unequal living conditions and this, correspondingly, is thought to help triggering radical planning processes. Protest action, too, can target the hegemony deployed by political and economic ruling elites over the production/configuration of space. It is therefore necessary to look into the potential input of protest actions of urban social movements to planning practice and theory, by testing the extent to which a series of skills — gained and deployed, respectively, before and after, 'rupture events' — may actually be re-steered towards different goals, namely an autonomous scheme of community self-development (which is no other thing than radical planning in practice). The local community level, moreover, is chosen for the analysis, given that it is the most successful and suitable

dimension for radical planning to take place (Friedmann, 1987; 1989; Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Peattie, 1968a; 1968b, inter alia). Moreover, the specific milieu of communities is where traditional, state-led and technocratic planning practices are more likely to 'retract' and be superseded by 'unconventional' initiatives started off by organized and mobilized people.

The 'formal' and 'polished' point of departure — Research questions and hypothesis

Within the aforementioned succinct theoretical range of investigation, the overall aim of the research is delimited by a main research question — supplemented by two additional inquiries — together with a hypothesis. On the whole, the questions and the hypothesis mark the research's 'formal' outset and have, thus, direct bearings on the analysis structure (see Figure 1.1).

The main research question reads:

- How can protest action of urban social movements aid to develop participatory skills, which in turn enable local community self-development processes?

And is complemented by the two following secondary inquiries:

- What role does space play within such process?
- What understanding and exercise of planning would be required for this to happen?

The hypothesis of investigation is as follows:

People, while engaging in protest events of citizen mobilization, acquire, develop and deploy skills (e.g., organization, leadership, discussion of priorities, etc.) that may well be used to orchestrate local community self-development schemes. A spatial perspective is required to analyze social and political practice (mobilization, identity, cohesion, actions) of urban social movements in order to state how people engage and act. In addition, a critical/radical variation of (urban) planning is needed to render communities autonomous, resourceful and reliable enough to manage their own development, that is to say, to steer the (social) production of (their) space.

While the questions as well as the hypothesis will be revisited in the overall appraisal (chapter 5), no final or closed answer shall be given; nor is the hypothesis to be plainly proven right or wrong. Going back to the departing point, instead, does not resemble a circular, tautological movement; it is more like a spiral that recognizes wherefrom this work came, but it aims, above all, to what lies ahead and looks outwards to the land of possibilities, *the future*. In short, rather than 'what must be', this research counter-intuitively seeks to find out 'what might yet be'. About the latter, there is already an overwhelming amount of literature, in which knowledge is forcefully constructed, rather than discovered.




Figure 1.1. Graphic representation of hypothetical and analytical elements of the research's 'official' point of departure. Source: own elaboration.

CHAPTER 2

Methodology

*Deconstructing the way from the certainties to the anxieties
of the analytical method*

2.1. Not necessarily from head to toes: *An anatomy of the investigation's phases*

The research project has a general *anatomy* — that is, an organizational structure — composed of diverse phases that, to varying degrees, were determined by the tools that make up the research design (though the investigation was, as I explained in chapter 1, sparked by a specific phenomenon and is therefore more **problem-** than **method-driven**). The purpose of structuring the work in such manner is to create a synergic and dynamic axis along which partial considerations and 'experimentations' are inscribed (for example, testing interviews' results in the light of the hypothesis and/or vis-à-vis theoretical interpretations 'stumbled-upon'). These 'by-products' (conference papers, presentations, essays or even 'informal' discussions) are, too, means whereby the diverse phases are progressively interlaced. Finally, everything converges on a final (neither circular nor tautological and certainly open) overall assessment together with a (prospective and speculative) outlook. Notwithstanding the 'smoothness' and 'neatness' with which the anatomy of the work could be described and visually portrayed, it actually does not — indeed, did not — unfold in such an organized way (see Figure 2.1). Thus, the completion of this research has been nothing but '**an untidy course of discovery actions**', trial and error, difficult rule out and so on, which underwent 'surgery' for it to read coherently, as it were, 'from head to toes', given that "[d]espite all the myths about how research is done, it's actually a messy process that's cleaned up in the reporting of results" (Bernard, 2006: 69).

The research's 'body'

The investigation comprises four 'official' general sections, which has been preceded by a 'prehistoric' moment: the 'noticing' of a particular phenomenon and early theoretical assumptions to start framing the analysis (see Figure 2.1). From an 'ideal' perspective, stages A to C are intimately intertwined and, gradually, create the basis for the overall assessment and outlook (phase D). The work, then, begins with an in-depth literature review — including past and recent debates — on the main (and related) subjects: space, radical planning, urban social movements and community development. Diverse approaches, historical evolution of conceptualization and criticisms are pointed out to delve into the dynamic **theory and practice interplay**, bearing in mind that,

At one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a consequence; at other times, it had an opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical forms. In any event, their relationship was understood in terms of a process of totalization [...] however [...] The relationships between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary. On one side, a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance. Moreover, from the moment a theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls, and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it eventually passes to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall, and practice is necessary for piercing this wall (Deleuze, 1977 [1972]: 205-206).

Following what Gilles Deleuze insightfully sustains, the focus of phase A is finding those critical points of intersection between theory and practice and figuring out the extent to which theories encounter "obstacles, walls, and blockages" when they move out of their "proper domain" and are, consequently, in need of another (practical) discourse to move on to another realm (namely, when theoretical postulates of every topic cut across one another). The intention is, amid other things, to contrast viewpoints as well as to look into transitions in paradigms and blind spots (for instance, in the field of planning). A discussion then draws general reflections aimed at assessing how theory relates, though *not all that* explicitly, to research questions and/or hypothesis and, in so doing, detecting theoretical gaps and/or limitations.

'Ideal' anatomy of the research: Linear and progressive

	A	B	C	D	
Phase	'Prehistoric' (Exposé stage)	Theory	Theory vis-à-vis Practice (Transitional stage)	Case study problematization	Overall assessment and Outlook
Overview	Identification of the particular phenomenon of investigation. First attempt at problematizing the (potential) object of analysis and possible(s) purviews	Review of academic debates focusing on: (a) diverse approaches to main topics; (b) aspects and concepts to be utilized (historical evolution, philosophical foundations, etc.) and; (c) criticism and lessons to be drawn.	Seeking firsthand experiential knowledge and going through case studies to contrast 'what ought to be' with 'what actually is'.	It reflects—doesn't mirror—outcomes of the phases A and B while critically analyzing the peculiarities of the in-depth case study.	Return to both main and secondary research questions, and hypothesis to state the 'so what?' While reviewing the aim of the research, pinpointing benefits, constrains and 'future horizons'.

Actual anatomy of the research: Non-linear and helter-skelter




Figure 2.1. 'Ideal' vis-à-vis 'actual' anatomy of the research. Although the end product (namely this written dissertation) can be structurally and sequentially depicted; in actuality, the whole process (the blue dashed line as the 'structural axis') was fairly chaotic and went back and forth the different phases and by-products (papers and preliminary reflections). All phases and by-products, furthermore, interacted the whole time with one another (thus the thin black lines). Source: own elaboration.

The subsequent section of the research (Phase B) is a 'transitional' step before digging into the generalities and singularities of the case study (Phase C). To that end, it entails a critical analysis of theoretical findings in the light of practical experiences: both first-hand (interviews) and secondary (literature concerned with akin empirical cases). Collecting experiential accounts of local officials, activists, community organizers, amid others, enables to look back on theoretical debates consulted through a 'pragmatic' lens, on the one hand. On the other hand, similar case studies signal possibilities to not only combine theoretical and empirical upshots, but also fieldwork strategies. Some information from this section, in retrospective, has been discarded and that which remained has been fused in the broad reasoning of the work. Be that as it may, literature as well as talks with activists (and, more 'informally', opinions and arguments swapped with colleagues and other researchers during conferences) allowed to better forerun the next phase, the problematization of the empirical analysis (remarkably, the preparation of the fieldwork).

Section C, the case study problematization, builds on by-products obtained in the two previous phases and underscores the comparison of still partial results, while breaking down the contextual peculiarities of the case study (that is, creating a frame of reference). In that regard, some of the interviewees may well be based in the same context of the case study (Costa Rica, in general; Paso Ancho, in specific) or in a similar/near milieu (from another Latin American country to an urban community in Costa Rica or elsewhere that underwent a phenomenon akin to what happened in Paso Ancho). Moreover, interviewees are, academically, professionally or voluntarily, concerned with one or various themes the research deals with (community development and organizing, citizen participation, planning, social mobilization, among others) (see Appendix 1).

The last step, the overall assessment and outlook (section D), revisits both the research questions and hypothesis and sets out (latent) contribution(s) of the investigation as well as possible future paths of research. Through somewhat circling and iterative reasoning (that is, by going backwards 'from the toes to the head'), answers to the research questions are elaborated in, by no means, a closed or definitive manner. In a similar vein, the hypothesis is

not tested as though it was either right or wrong and an axiom could be therefrom derived. While certain aspects of both the research questions and hypothesis are granted, there are no truisms; nor a final point to the discussion. Thus, the ‘anatomy’ of the research finishes by, rather superficially, pointing out plausible ways to extend the analysis (see section 6.3) and succinctly outlines a suggestion (see subsection 6.3.1).

2.2. Seeking discovery rather than affirmation: *A synopsis of the research methods*

Choosing research tools isn’t a lightweight issue, if long-established inquiry traditions and mechanisms aren’t going to be uncritically, respectively, followed and employed. “Surely the scientific study of any phenomenon is factual and objective, paying no regard to normative assumptions, values and biases”, because that’s what, allegedly, distinguishes ‘science’ from any other explicative, speculative and airtight mumbo-jumbo (West, 2013: 158). That is, precisely, the kind of misleading mystification research is all too often subject to. Researchers, therefore, have to apply careful judgement to choose what tools might best capture the singularities of the phenomena they shall interpret (as opposed to simply, descriptively, explain them).

For instance, the case of social movements, “makes clear that normative assumptions persist in purportedly empirical social sciences”, but such persistence, however, underwent an analytical shift from deeming social movements as *collective behavior* (seen as “social deviance”) to considering social mobilization as *collective action* (seen as a “valid form of political action”) (West, 2013: 159). Consequently, the notion of ‘social movement’ arose in replacement of ‘collective behavior’ and spearheaded the inception of a whole new domain of theoretical and empirical analysis, which, to a greater or lesser extent, ‘de-formalized’ the ubiquitous scientific factuality and objectivity. Such ‘**de-factuality**’ and ‘**de-objectivity**’ is perceptible in, for example, Charles Tilly’s (1978) “resource mobilization theory” that highlights the influence diverse political systems has on social movements’ cycles; the “rational choice theory”, based on the *Homo economicus* principle as a means whereby asserting the internal organizational functioning of social movements as a distinctive form of political activity (Hindess, 1988); and in studies concerned with processes of both individual and collective identity formation and transformation (della Porta and Dianni, 2006 [1999])⁶.

Out of these alternative theories and analyses of social movements came a number of research techniques aimed at grasping participants’ feelings and emotions: analysis of activists’ writings and speeches (trying to spot rhetorical devices); participant observation; interviews (to comprehend protesters’ motivations and potential actions); and even active participation (to, afterwards, apply introspection and see if the researcher’s own feelings and calculations match or not with those of the movement’s participants). Finally, and perhaps more recurrent than the previously mentioned methods, case-study research began to be more and more utilized — an “*engaged research*” tool that faces the danger of being strained to the limits of biasedly championing social movements (thus flaws and shortcomings aren’t acknowledged) or looking into such a detail the singularities of the case that comparison is not viable (Jasper, 2014: 72; italics in the original).

Investigation in the fields of planning and community development, markedly influenced by research qualitative traditions and mechanisms of social science (though quantitative analysis is ever-present), also frequently deploys interviews, participant observation and case-study (yet with nuances as to approaches and ultimate purposes of research). Thus, I designed the research strategy based on these three inquiry instruments, all the while considering partial theoretical remarks gathered during the ‘prehistoric’ stage (that is, back when I conceived the exposé). Such decision, more specifically, following Robert K. Yin (2003: 1) was linked to three main factors: (i) the sort of research question(s) I had devised; (ii) the amount of control over behavioral events I could foresee I would have; and (iii) whether the focus of the work was on contemporary — as opposed to historical — phenomena. With that in mind, I realized case-

⁶ More details about theoretic-analytic approaches and how they’ve informed the interpretation of collective protest action of social movements are discussed in chapter 3 (see section 3.3).

study research, complemented by interviews and participant observation, would comply well with (first) the ‘how’ and ‘what’ research questions I came up with; (second), the fact that I was not going to be able to steer circumstances, for, (third), the phenomenon is rooted in a current ‘real-life’ environment. Furthermore, prior research experiences played (somewhat subconsciously) a role to decide which research tools to use. And, finally, given that this project was inspired by a primal interest in trying to fathom out what triggers social mobilization and its collective protest actions and how they could be turned into (or redirected towards) something else, inquiry tools were selected in accordance with social movement theory and research (as it can be deduced from the brief overview, lines above, of theoretical streams and techniques).

In the following, each of the research tools are, in a nutshell, described and how they became operative within every phase, according to both the input and type of knowledge (see Table 2.1). In addition to that, a few critical observations are provided (difficulties, mishaps, limitations, serendipities), in an effort not to ‘idealize’ both the research design and devices thereof.

2.2.1. Delving into diverse theoretical relays between practices: *Bibliographical research*

As seen in Table 2.1 and as pointed out in the preceding section, the bibliographical research is mainly carried out during phase A and, partly, during phase B. (Already in the ‘prehistoric’ stage certain ‘hypothetical’ information had been processed, but not in-depth examined). In actuality, nonetheless, theory, far from confined to a precise time frame, is constantly present throughout the development of the research (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, given the large amount of texts available and to dwindle, as much as possible, the hassle of defining what counts and what doesn’t, the ensuing procedure was employed: (1) creation of a closed categorization system; (2) arrangement of texts accordingly; (3) browsing the texts seeking relevant pieces of information and; (4) grouping such data sticking to the already defined classifications — that is to say, ‘decoding’ the texts (Gläser and Laudel, 2006: 191). Through the review of literature ‘rational’ visions of the core subjects of inquiry are addressed and reflected upon in a **non-teleological** manner (in chapter 3 the ‘reporting’ on the theoretical appraisal’s outcomes is ‘neatly’ presented). Additionally, each concept (and ramifications) isn’t dealt with independently. By contrast, the four overlap and traverse each other. Consequently, more attention is placed on their intersecting zone, because that is where ‘theoretical knowledges’ (see Table 2.1) soak into a different domain and require, therefore, a ‘discursive’ intermediation (see Figure 2.2). (Stages B and C, generally speaking, comprise an ‘articulation’ for the revised ‘theoretical points’ to become ‘a relay between practices’).




Figure 2.2. Intersection zone (blue) and positioning along a ‘theoretical-abstract — empirical-factual’ axis of the four main concepts that make up the theoretical framework. Source: own elaboration.

In principle, the bibliographical research constitutes a general, abstract, objective and cognitive body of knowledge (see Table 2.1). However, as hinted at in Figure 2.2, the notions of urban social movements (and, particularly, ‘the contentious spatiality’ of their protest actions) and community development (notably when deemed as an autonomous and ‘informal’ endeavor) are thought to be of an empirical-factual lean (after all, it is human agency what underpins their theoretical, if not hermeneutical, constructions). The notions of space and radical planning, on the other hand, while tinged with an experiential character, perform conspicuously in a theoretical-abstract mode. Realizing this detail was pivotal to critically conduct the literature review, because theory, as Gilles Deleuze (1977 [1972]: 205-206) puts

it, can't be developed substantially without the aid of practice (that is, without acknowledging its latent, relational and factual dimension). Doing bibliographical research, in that regard, is, again in Deleuzian terms, delving into diverse theoretical relays amid various practices.

2.2.2. 'Splitting hairs': *General and concrete subjective co-constructions of accounts — Semi-structured interviews*

Interviewing means, by and large, gathering opinions, critics, proposals, emotions, etc. about a particular or a few subjects that are connected with research questions (however, not seeking to answer them directly by way of interviews). It is thus very important to recognize that interviews are 'co-constructions of accounts'. Traditionally and analytically, not only the role of the interviewer has been given little relevance, regarding the production of the talk during the questions-answers exchange, but also the "local interactional contingencies", wherefrom speakers come and co-construct broader social norms (Rapley, 2001). From semi-structured interviews either general or concrete and certainly subjective and even emotional knowledge is obtained (see Table 2.1), provided that through "interviewing, particularly semi-structured interviewing, you get to talk to people in order to find out about what they have experienced and what they think and feel about something that you are interested in" (Fylan, 2005: 65).

Although semi-structured interviews require the preparation of a set of questions according to the topic(s) to be addressed, they're prone, along the way, to vary and most likely change significantly from one interviewee to another. On such account, semi-structured interviews could be carried in a fairly controlled way, so that the order and intention of questions are easily adhered to. Or, conversely, questions are so open that the conversation is broken up and takes, as a result, many unforeseen directions (which, in turn, impedes to cover all expected areas). What tilts the balance in one way or the other, is the type of research questions and the method that will be used to analyze the collected data. Hence, the more complex the questions, the less structured the interview should be (Fylan, 2005: 66) and, whereas less rigidity is well suited to a social and constructionist subsequent interpretation, a coding frame needs much more structured and ordered questions (Elliot and Timulak, 2005). Semi-structured interviews, overall, apply to 'why' (as opposed to 'how much' or 'how many') research questions and due to their versatility, they help "to develop a much deeper understanding of the research question by exploring contradictions within" interviewees' accounts (Fylan, 2005: 67) (which, it is worthwhile underscoring, are jointly, with the interviewer, created).

Since the interviews' interpretation is qualitative and given the kind of formulated research questions, the stringency of the semi-structured interviews I carried out was fairly low. By way of clarification, the input of interviews is fused into the case study overarching reflection (chapter 4), the research's global assessment (chapter 5) and the outlook (chapter 6). There isn't, therefore, a precise section that deals with interviews; nor are there any direct quotes. Refraining from directly quoting interviewees has to do, on the one hand, with my own ethical stance: before every interview I always asked for permission to record it and made explicitly clear that none of the information, that would eventually be discussed, were going to be literally or outside academic boundaries made public⁷. On the other hand, I've always judged interviewees' direct quotes to be quite problematic, because the context out of which they come remains unknown to everyone but, of course, the interviewer and interviewee(s). On top of that, direct quotes are, at a later moment, placed into a new and different context, which inevitably downplays their 'directness' and, correspondingly, made them susceptible to misinterpretation — unless the 'new' context actually fixes its meaning (which is a weird thing to do).

⁷ In general, having the interviewee feel comfortable and confident is quintessential to have a fruitful and flowing interview (although it is still plausible to profit from difficult, not so effective, interviews). Furthermore, transmitting trust is, too, a gesture of gratitude for the time interviewees are devoting to meet and discuss matters that are, in the end, of the primal interest of the interviewer (however, that doesn't necessarily keep interviewees from gaining something from the interview).

During fieldwork I conducted semi-structured interviews with Paso Ancho activists, an activist, and academics/researchers (working on social mobilization as well as community development/organization and one, in a particular, defined himself as a 'community activist'). I also was able to talk to a significant number of local officials at the municipality of San José, which has jurisdiction over the neighborhoods that comprise the urban community of Paso Ancho. (In Appendix 1 it is shown how interviewees and topics are correlated and the scope of the issue addressed — from the 'barrio' to country as whole⁸). Additionally, I met with activists in Berlin and, during conferences, I had the opportunity to share opinions and comments with researchers engaged with similar topics and, at one time, with a local urban planner from the city of Gothenburg, Sweden. These conversations (for they, strictly speaking, weren't semi-structured interviews) 'outside' the case study functioned as a point of reference (not of comparison!) that provocatively led me to reassess certain theoretical and practical aspects (for instance, whether an autonomous community development should be 'formally' institutionalized, how local planners are or aren't to work with organized communities, among others). They, too, prove how decisive contextual circumstances are to comprehend social mobilization, community organizing, planning practices, and the like. Insights gained from these 'casual' talks were blended into the case study 'final' narrative (chapter 4) and, more accentually, in the overall appraisal (chapter 5).

In retrospective: 'Lapses and accuracies'

Interviewing is a learning-by-doing task. As such, it requires iteration and the acceptance that, no matter how much one beforehand prepares, there is an inherent contingent factor in every single interview: *human communication is, by nature, imperfect*. After every interview, I kept track of things that were fine and, more prominently, things that could've been, say, different. There is no such thing as a *flawless* interview. Hence, some of the 'not-so-positive' aspects I encountered were: sudden deviations in relation to the subject I was trying to discuss; 'longer-than-expected' silences between questions (which led me to, over and over, after interviews, revise questions); and odd answers/comments most likely attributable to a faulty question. More specifically, one of the interviews turned into a 'group' interview, for the interviewee I initially got in touch with decided, unilaterally, to invite three colleagues of his. While the conversation was lively and I certainly did profit from it, I wasn't at all prepared to handle questions and answers from four persons, rather than just one. Further, I experienced difficulties to have people make room for an interview; for example, a Paso Ancho activist declined by saying that, given that I had already talked to one of his peers, I should then have already a pretty good idea of what they've done, do and are thinking of doing. Persuasion, when first approaching potential interviewees, is therefore decisive. On the upside, the 'snowball effect' to arrange future interviews functioned — to my very own surprise — quite well along the internal hierarchy of the San José municipality. After my first interview with a high-tier official at the department of urbanism, I was successively referred to someone with whom I could be interested in talking to.

2.2.3. Drilling through walls: *'Carefully-engaged' case-study research*

Case-study research is a **definitional morass**. However, there seems to be general agreement on certain of its main characteristics: it is predominantly qualitative, small (in sample terms) and it uses an 'in-the-field' approach (drawing, for instance, on ethnographic research techniques) (Yin, 2003). It may too feature process-tracing (turning a historical event into analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables) (George and Bennett, 2004). Also, case-study research deals with properties of a single case, instance, example or phenomenon (Eckstein 1992 [1975]; Gerring, 2004). And, since it is an in-depth analysis of a single unit, case-study research can cast light on certain aspects and dimensions of larger phenomena; though not aiming at oversimplification, for the "case study method is [...] a particular way of defining cases, not a way of analyzing cases or modeling causal relations" (Gerring, 2004: 341). In addition to that, analysis by way of a case-study aids triggering research, because it provides basis for hypothesizing (Abercrombie et al., 1984: 34).

⁸ For more details, see section 4.1.

About case-study research there are, as well, recurrent misunderstandings that, as Bent Flyvbjerg (2004a) thoroughly discusses, obfuscate its far-reaching capacity. Case-study research is usually mistaken and belittled, on the assumption that: (i) general, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge; (ii) there is no possibility to generalize based on a single case (i.e., no input to scientific development); (iii) it is, as has been noted, only useful to generate hypotheses and thus not suitable to test them and build theory; (iv) it is biased to verify preconceived ideas and; (v) it is insurmountable to establish general propositions and theories departing from a case study (Flyvbjerg, 2004a: 421). When not carefully read, such misconstructions may well be validated. Yet, almost the exact opposite is true for each of the statements, if case-study research, as any other inquiry tool, is deployed within its intrinsic limitations. Equally important, when using case-study, is to remain critically distant from and at the same time engaged with the phenomenon being analyzed. To neither champion the situation, nor to, de facto, render it useless. This is a fundamental principle, when social movements or community organizing is at the core of the study. As aforesaid, case-study, within the tradition of social movement research, is seen as an ‘engaged’ technique — and it is indeed; the thing is figuring out how much engagement is adequate and from how far to analyze it.

As seen in Table 2.1, case-study research, in sum, serves to concretize and frame in practice the general and abstract information obtained through bibliographical research; but not to affirm or rebut theoretical postulations. Rather, the key is to ‘extend’ the theoretical points of view through empirical analysis. To put it another way, case-study research problematizes and contextualizes theory; as Gilles Deleuze sustains it, theory then is able to break through the walls it inevitably encounters as it develops. As a result, theory, after moving onto another realm, it gets ‘grounded’ — that is, “inductively founded upon concrete phenomenology” (Flyvbjerg, 2003: 319). After all, theory isn’t some sort of phlogiston forever transcending our cognitive capacity; it has an origin, it comes from somewhere and it is via practical research that its source can be traced. As Helen Liggett and David C. Perry (1995: 2) sharply observe, “theory and practice are relational, depending for their continued viability on mutual referral. Theory, then, does not flow above everyday life in a detached way: It comes from some place, and it is the responsibility of analysis to return it there”.

Furthermore, case study, on the whole, within the research is twofold: it is both a research tool (‘case-study’) and the way the phenomenon empirically analyzed (through case-study together with bibliographical research and semi-structured interviews) is called (that is, ‘*the case study*’)⁹. Likewise, two more succinct (yet relevant) clarifications: firstly, while participant observation was intended to be utilized as a means to decode how the core of activists steering organization in Paso Ancho operated, there was a ‘timing’ issue: just when I was doing fieldwork, actions pertaining the development agenda were in a standstill and meetings were not held either. At the time, the focus was on joining other ‘extra-community’ causes (see Figure 4.14). As amelioration, not replacement, I asked activists during interviews about it. When I did use participant observation, as seen in Table 2.1, was as I commenced to draft the research project: I attended various *Comités Patrióticos*’ meetings (mostly after the referendum had taken place) to get a firsthand impression of what could next happen with the committees; above all, because their ‘ultimate’ purpose hadn’t been met and dissolution was a latent threat. Secondly, storytelling, though is not deployed, in itself, for the analysis (i.e., I do not perform narrative analysis), it is instrumental in presenting and developing the case of Paso Ancho as, precisely, a story, a tale of a ‘locale’, a narrative of what Andy Merrifield (2015) aptly called “amateur urbanism” (see Chapter 4).

Why, in particular, this case?

Very seldom is one to come across the whys and wherefores (which don’t have to be exhaustive) of a case study selection. I often believe that sometimes cases have become so recurrent that, somewhere along the way, they began to be, de facto, taken for granted and, as such, it is wrongly assumed that explaining (which, it must be noted, isn’t justifying) their

⁹ In that regard, it mimics the role of space as a *means* and *object* of inquiry (see subsection 3.1.3).

pick is no longer necessary (if it ever was!). Getting to know the reasons behind *this* or *that* case study offers (at least) a glimpse at personal and academic idiosyncrasies that, inevitably, permeate research endeavors, choices and preferences. That, in my opinion, may well aid to comprehend the research en masse as well as some of its components (the functioning of other research tools and techniques, theoretical background, assessments). Also, this could eventually help discerning why certain cases are far more persistent than others and whether that is pertinent or not.

Reasons why I chose ‘the case study’ (motives for ‘case-study’ have been already made known) can be gathered into two groups: an ‘academic-objective’ and a ‘personal-subjective’ one (both, in actuality, are intertwined). As to the former, I deemed using the case of Paso Ancho (as a juncture within the larger phenomena of the social mobilization around the CAFTA-DR and the *Comités Patrióticos* as a pivotal element of the opposing bloc), for I considered it as an example of the engrossing role ‘local’ and ‘autonomy’, sometimes fused into *autogestión* (self-management), have been playing within both analyses and discourses of contemporaneous Latin American social movements (Souza, 2000; 2006; Zibechi, 2000; 2003; 2007). (Expressly, those movements that resist institutionalization or decline). Similarly, the urban community of Paso Ancho and, specially, the collective effort of, autonomously, putting together and implementing a development agenda, attracted my attention, because I saw such phenomenon as a somewhat different manifestation of the long-standing and widespread tradition of community organizing and local participatory development in Latin America, which is largely influenced by Paulo Freire’s work. However, I was never interested in confirming whether what has happened — and continues to happen — in Paso Ancho complies with Freire’s ideas (as if that’s how he believed they must be materialized) or how akin it was to other Latin American studied cases. Contrariwise, I perceived that the kind of community development the people of Paso Ancho were advancing had singularities and nuances that deserved to be more carefully examined.

At a later point — that is, once I had ‘officially’ begun to do this research — I realized that both Latin America and Costa Rica are under-criticized contexts regarding the ‘planning paradox’; that is to say, there has been little analysis of the consequences the divergence between planning theory and practice has brought (and still brings) about. That being so, Paso Ancho turned out to be a fitting case study to ‘locate’ the planning paradox in an underexplored milieu. Moreover, there seems to be a ‘void’ in Latin American academic circles, when it comes to understanding social justice struggles within the production/transformation of urban space. And, by extension, ‘situated’ socio-spatial (after Lefebvre, Foucault, Harvey, Soja, and others) research is overtly limited. With a more personal tinge, the case study I selected responds to my innate knowledge of cultural and social codes and languages (though localisms and regionalism are immanent in every society). In other words, I knew I was going to be ‘comfortable’ approaching people from the community and expected no major problems in interpreting the contextual (social, historical, political and spatial) peculiarities of Paso Ancho (yet, I ended up discovering a whole lot more than I could’ve foreseen). In sum, I was driven by a look from ‘within’ the case study (however, I am not suggesting that a look from outside would not be as useful; to the contrary, when there’s no previous knowledge of the circumstances that frame the case study, the researcher brings in, for sure, a fresh purview).

	A	B	C	D	
Phase	‘Prehistoric’ (Exposé stage)	Theory	Theory vis-à-vis Practice (‘Transitional stage’)	Case study problematization	Overall assessment and Outlook
Research method	Bibliographical review/Participant observation	Bibliographical review	Semi-structured interviews	Case-study/Participant observation	‘Nuanced guesswork’
Input	Research’s ignition	Non-teleological rational visions	Opinions, critics, proposals	Concretization and frame in practice	Non-circular general reflections
Knowledge type	Hypothetical	General, abstract, objective, cognitive	Concrete/general, subjective, emotional	Contextual, practical, concrete	Non-tautological, open, speculative and prospective

Table 2.1. Research method, input and knowledge type according to the investigation’s phases. Source: own elaboration.

CHAPTER 3

Theoretical framework

Seeing through theory to grasp something practical

The following theoretical framework is to be read in ‘practical terms’; that is, as “a practical means of going on” to promote “relational rather than representational understandings” (Thrift, 1996: 304). The target, thus, is to spot practical implications while delving into theoretical formulations (and their interrelations). Far from seeking and anticipating validation for the questions and hypothesis of investigation, this conceptual scheme is to be tested against the background of empirical findings — namely those derived from the case study (chapter 4). To that end, core concepts are not theorized on ‘in isolation’ to then come up with a definitive and rigorous definition. Nor are they teleologically elaborated. As a matter of fact, some passages of this theoretical framework might as well be, to some degree, contested and reconsidered in the light of the empirical analysis. Equally, the objective is not dissecting theoretical and practical research results, but, as it were, gravitate between them. In so doing, theoretical clarity is as much as possible provided to pre-empt ambiguity and highlight the **specific analytical capacity** of the theoretical notions drawn upon to carry out the research.

Moreover, the discussion of each of the four main subjects addressed (space, planning, urban social movements and community development) is left, most definitely, open for further debate. The reason for that is not only to avoid circularity and latent tautological outcomes, but also to acknowledge that,

No theory ever solves all the puzzles with which it is confronted at a given time; nor are the solutions already achieved often perfect. On the contrary, it is just the incompleteness and imperfection of the existing data-theory fit that, at any given time, define many of the puzzles that characterize normal science. If any and every failure to fit were ground for theory rejection, all theories ought to be rejected at all times (Kuhn, 1970 [1962]: 146).

Following Kuhn’s felicitous insight, it is the **“incompleteness and imperfection”** of theory what constitutes a sort of ‘raw material’ that helps putting together the **puzzles of practice**. In the field of planning there have been attempts to close such gap by, systematically and linearly, forestalling the way planning is, first, to be thought of and, consequently, exercised. Paradoxically, much of these attempts — as extraneous as they are to an actual contribution to the ever-lasting planning theory-practice conundrum — have not imploded and seem to be constantly replaced by a new, uncanny one. Proceeding in such an oxymoronic manner appears to, figuratively, echo that “there is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the universe is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable. There is another theory which states this has already happened” (Adams, 2005 [1980]: preface). Time and again, everything is therefore taken impetuously back to square one, for a yet more ‘strange’ theoretical paradigm to emerge and close, for once and for all, the gap between planning theory and practice.

3.1. Space: *Crafting an analytical lens*

Space is a multifaceted and intriguing concept and, as such, it could be written almost endlessly, and even sometimes passionately, about it. A wide range of authors from quite heterogeneous disciplines, over the past thirty years or so, have given way to what came to be determined as a ‘spatial turn’. Comprising assorted explorations of space as **‘representational strategy’** (let alone metaphorical), this ‘movement’, while offering informative insights, does not go without constrains and dilemmas. As Mike Crang and Nigel Thrift (2000: 1) point out “the problem is not so much that space means very different things — what concepts do not — but that it is used with such abandon that its meanings run into each before they have been properly interrogated”. A proper ‘interrogation’ surpasses, by far, the boundaries of this theoretical framework; but suffice it to say that the intention is, above all, to outline **space as an analytical lens**.

Such perspective is located somewhere in between, or, better, within (and perhaps momentarily without) the immensity of conceptual possibilities. Intending neither to produce a “hyperobject” (for it then would not be constitutive of our knowledge function) (Morton, 2013: 1), nor to fragmentarily amalgamate a bundling of associations (after Hume) with presumptive synthetic judgements (after Kant), space is debated taking into account its

inescapable relationship with 'place' and its varied applications (from semantic and literal to more ample slants to the significance of spatiality). In brief, to provide a scaffold to substantiate that a 'spatial angle' "matters, not for the simplistic and overly used reason that everything happens in space, but because *where* things happen is critical to knowing *how* and *why* they happen" (Warf and Arias, 2009: 1).

3.1.1. Space and place, two sides of the same coin? *A somewhat overlooked disambiguation*

Space is a society of named places (Lévi-Strauss, 1966 [1962]: 168).

Whatever is true for space and time, this much is true for place: we are immersed in it and could not do without it. To be at all — to exist in any way — is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some kind of place (Casey, 1997: ix).

What if we refuse that distinction, all too appealing it seems, between place (as meaningful, lived and everyday) and space (as what? the outside? the abstract? the meaning/ess)? (Massey, 2005: 6; italics in the original).

Although the distinction between space and place does require a thorough discussion, it must not be overlooked (as, for example, when they're used interchangeably). In fact, it is on their disambiguation where the analytical potential of either one actually relies. Yet, this is not to suggest that by way of a definitive and metaphysical theorization, space and place would cancel one another out and any dispute about the primacy of one over the other be resolved (As Massey provocatively puts it). Nor would any fanciful equalization of the terms resolutely settle the issue. The critical point is realizing that they're mutually dependent for framing one, among many other of their possible connotations. For instance, Yi-Fu Tuan (2001 [1977]: 6) sustains that "[t]he ideas 'space' and 'place' require each other for definition. From the security and stability of place we are aware of the openness, freedom, and threat of space, and vice versa". Though the interdependence is clearly stated, Tuan (2001 [1977]: 6) ends up favoring place, given that, for him, the meaning of space is experientially preceded by place, which in turn confers space a more abstract character. At any rate, it is in the conceptualization of the **space-place interface's opposite nature** where a deeper challenge resides (Wainwright and Barnes, 2009: 971), if space or place is going to be deployed for critical qualitative analysis. All the while, it must, too, be recognized that conceptualizing is not an 'innocent' act — knowingly or not, such process is deeply instilled with ideological and political clashes of heterogeneous powers (as Foucault put it) within the intricate process of knowledge production.

There is vast literature on both space and place that encompasses various disciplines (sociology, anthropology, geography, linguistics, etc.) and that miscellaneously establishes a *precise* relationship between the terms. Even when only space is being addressed and place overtly omitted (and the other way around). Doing a comprehensive review is, by all means, an impossible task. Thus, the intention here is to be indicative of, at least, three major modes in which the space-place differentiation is understood. Incidentally, much of these arguments stems from geographical academic circles, which have traditionally nurtured planning debates that revolve around and advocate for renewed conceptions of space- or place-based/oriented planning. Such debates, furthermore, though they exhibit variegated and nuanced definitions of space and/or place, share a clear **uncartesian and dialectical character**¹⁰. Antithetically, Cartesian thought has had (and still has) a profound impact on planning practice, as Stephen Graham and Patsy Healey (1999: 624; italics in the original) observe: "[t]he first problem is that many planners in practice continue to maintain the reductionist assumption that cities and places can be considered unproblematically as single, integrated, unitary, material *objects*, to be addressed by planning instruments". But before digging any deeper into such inconsistency (to which I will return throughout the following pages), a closer look into the space-place distinction is much needed, to shed light on the adamant effort of planning practice to enforce a Cartesian, stringent spatiality and, then, suggest possible ways to overcome it. (I do personally consider the lack of conceptual clarity and inconsistency, when

¹⁰ Cartesian-butressed conceptualizations of space and place (notably the former) "tend to separate out and 'thingify' different aspects of social reality, treating it as consisting of 'discrete objects' without any sense of relational interconnectivity" (Merrifield, 1993: 518).

addressing space and place — and their interrelation — within the planning theory-practice interplay, to be a hindering aspect that keeps a theoretically well-founded, either space- or place-based, planning practice from flourishing).

According to John Agnew (2005: 89) there are three main approaches to, *mutatis mutandis*, tell space and place apart: (a) place outdoes space; (b) space outdoes place; and (c) any distinction is superseded by uniting both terms. Joel Wainwright and Trevor Barnes (2009) notice that the last attitude is more recurrent and characterized by an oversimplified contention that space and place are mutually, dialectically or relationally constituted; in order to bypass or downplay any supposed dichotomy. However, in accordance with the authors, I will stress, subsequently, that neither fusing together space and place, nor championing either one, functions well to make the transition **from thinking space to thinking spatially** (or from thinking place to, as it were, thinking 'placeably').

From lifeless abstraction to lively particularity: Place reigns over space

The reassertion of place to, implicitly or directly, displace space was developed by humanistic geographers during the 1970s. The general critique was aimed at a spatial science founded on a 'callous' and purely geometric representation of space that disdained, by ignoring, qualitative aspects of human experience, which the idea of place is thought to carry (Wainwright and Barnes, 2009: 968). Grounded in both Euclidean geometry and Kantian intellectual intuition, space was predominantly understood as something unitary, three-dimensional and infinite. These three characteristics, moreover, are the fundamentals for space to become the frame of reference within which objects are perceptually located; that is to say, space as an unbounded container independent of whatever objects are occupying it (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 12; Agnew, 2005: 83). However, 'the geometry of the world' cannot be appropriately portrayed without taking into account the forces acting both *in* and *on* it.

Through a phenomenological conception of the forces that act (and that are also counteracted) in and on the different places that compose the world, Edward Relph (1976) assesses that place, as opposed to space, holds a deeper meaning for human existence. Everyday actions, he claims, are the pillars of a practical knowledge of place, which we deployed to create a framework in which to enact our lives (comprising feelings of kinship, nostalgia, familiarity and even possession, for we could defend 'our' places against outsiders' interruptions). Furthermore, Relph (1976: 8; italics added) correlates place to space, only to understate the character of space,

Space is amorphous and intangible and not an entity that can be directly described and analysed. Yet, however we feel or explain space, there is almost always some associated sense or concept of place. In general it seems that space provides the *context* for places but derives its meaning from *particular places*.

Underlying Relph's proposition is a continuum that, by posing place at one end and space at the other, joins, respectively, experience and abstraction together (Creswell, 2004: 21). Close to Relph's position in favor of place (though still conceding its relative dependence on space), is the ground-breaking work of Yi-Fu Tuan (2001 [1977]), wherein several thinkers found common ground to adduce that space comes before place only in the extent that the former is a sort of raw material for the latter — but it's place, in any event, what is 'alive'. Propositions therewith started to emerge acknowledging that space, via place, has history and location (Ley, 1974) and that people, rather than living in a world configured and delimited by geometrical relationships, construct **collectivities full of manifold meanings** (Hubbard et al., 2004; Thrift, 2006). In other words, people are capable of rendering space, that inert and supple matter, meaningful, because they developed assorted emotional connections to it. Tim Creswell (2004: 7) explains, building on John Agnew (1987), that the most straightforward and commonsensical definition of place is "a meaningful location", whose primary features are location, locale and sense of place. This last character, **sense of place**, the way people subjectively and immanently relate to a place (by, for instance, naming it, which in turn, as sustained by Lévi-Strauss, spatializes the whole of a society) is precisely what renders place 'superior', because,

Space, then, [is] seen in distinction to place as a realm without meaning — as ‘fact of life’, which like time, produces the basic coordinates for human life. When humans invest meaning in a portion of space and then become attached to it in some way [...] it becomes a place (Creswell, 2004: 10).

Thus, both the “power of place” (Agnew and Duncan, 1989) and its supremacy are hinged on its capacity to furnish meaning to space. This assumption largely emerges from pointedly humanistic frameworks, which derived from a research genealogy that combines **place with lived experience** — after all, “nothing we do is unplaced” (Casey, 1997: ix). Equally, a wave of cultural geographers, under the umbrella of Martin Heidegger (1971) phenomenology’s cornerstone *Da-Sein* (roughly, ‘dwelling’) and incorporating social theory (Feld and Basso, 1996: 3), have a significant quota in upholding that place trumps space. Heidegger (1971: 157-158) designates the notion of *Da-Sein* as the very quintessence of human existence and, using as an illustration a farmhouse in the Black Forest, depicts in detail the way humans interact with and thereby adapt, through their labor, everyday actions and traditions, their physical surroundings. He writes, “[t]he nature of building is letting dwell. Building accomplishes its nature in the raisings of locations by the joining of their spaces. *Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build*” (p.157; italics in the original). To conceive place as dwelling is, thus, “a spiritual and philosophical endeavor that unites the natural and human worlds” and a proper and authentic human existence has to then be founded on place (Creswell, 2004: 22). Place, to put it differently, is an intrinsic character of human beings, or, as Heidegger calls it, of “being-in-the-world”. Place is not something we need, it is something we are, because “one does not first have a subject that apprehends certain features of the world in terms of the idea of place; instead, the structure of subjectivity is given in and through the structure of place” (Malpas, 1999: 35).

So, within the space-place gamut, there seems to have been an urge to move away from space and closer and closer to place in “a fairly short stretch of time” (Casey, 1996). Be it by dint of a descriptive, social-constructionist or phenomenological approach (Creswell, 2004: 51), place, though always having been around, is to be taken out of ‘obscurity’, given that whatever applies for space and time, also does for place (Casey, 1997: ix). Or, as John Agnew (1989: 25) contends, to counteract the “intellectual devaluation” that place has undergone in several, particularly orthodox, (sociological, political, amid others) social sciences, and induced by “antithetical” (especially Marxism) currents of thought. Consequently, instead of taken for granted that place is irreversibly “associated with the world of the past and location/space with the world of the present and future”, and that “place is therefore nostalgic, regressive and even reactionary, and space is progressive and radical” (Agnew, 2011: 319), it would be possible to (at least) lessen the ‘weakness’ or ‘defectiveness’ ingrained in the perception of place. And therewith reinstate place where it’s always been — above space.

Furthermore, the fact that place ‘catalyzes’ space indicates that “by always foregrounding the [fixed] spatial distribution of hierarchical power relations, we can better understand the process whereby space achieves a distinctive *identity as a place*” (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 8; italics in the original). But, to what extent is this relationship so unilaterally ubiquitous? Could it not also be that space is, without having to ‘convert’ into place, already meaningful and lively? Strangely enough, space has been somewhat running parallel to place in efforts to unravel the complexities of “the different histories of human subjects and [...] the production of cultural phenomena” (Warf and Arias, 2009: 1). What is more, the basic dualism between space and place has been, here and there, rendered somewhat tangled by Henri Lefebvre’s (1991[1974]) notion of **social space**; that is, space as socially produced, “which, in many ways, plays the same role as place” (Creswell, 2004: 10). Let’s now consider that place, on the one hand,

Is constituted through reiterative social practice — place is made and remade on a daily basis. Place provides a template for practice — an unstable stage for performance. Thinking of place as performed and practiced can help us think of place in radically open and non-essentialized ways where place is constantly struggled over and reimagined in practical ways. Place is the raw material for the creative production of identity rather than an *a priori* label of identity. Place

provides the conditions of possibility for creative social practice. Place in this sense becomes an event rather than a secure ontological thing rooted in notions of the authentic. Place as an event is marked by openness and change rather than boundedness and permanence (Creswell, 2004: 39; italics in the original).

And social space, on the other hand,

Is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity — their (relative) order and/or (relative) disorder. It is the outcome of a sequence and set of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or 'ideal' about it as compared, for example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others [...]. Social space [too] implies a great diversity of knowledge [given that] [f]rom the point of view of knowing (*connaisance*), social space works (along with its concept) as a tool for the analysis of society [...] [and] to eliminate the simplistic model of one-to-one or 'punctual' correspondence between social actions and social locations, between spatial functions and spatial forms (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 73/34; italics in the original).

Both explanations, though they have their nuances, do resemble one another (say, if place and space swapped positions within their respective definitions, they'd still read pretty much consistently). This, notwithstanding, must not be interpreted as invitation for an indiscriminate swapping between concepts. They may well, given the circumstances, come pretty close to each other, but they're not the same. On that note, I move on to see what happens when (social) space comes ahead — but without ever forgetting that it's *not* identical to place.

Turning the table: Space have always been first — and kicking!

While space, during the different stages of its conceptual evolution, has not been directly at odds with place, it had to rise above the crippling effect that time inflicted on it (which is the basis for the so-called 'spatial turn') (Massey, 1992; Soja, 2009). Michel Foucault (1980: 70-71) clearly portrays the subjugation of space by time, when he assesses that,

Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the other hand, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic. For all those who confused history with the old schemas of evolution, living continuity, organic development, the progress of consciousness, the use of spatial terms seems to have an air of anti-history. If one started to talk in terms of space that meant one was hostile to time. It meant, as the fools say, that one 'denied history', that one was a 'technocrat'. They didn't understand that to trace the forms of implantation, delimitation and demarcation of objects, the modes of tabulation, the organisation of domains meant the throwing into relief of processes — historical ones, needless to say — of power. The spatialising description of discursive realities gives on to the analysis of related effects of power.

Space, on such account, ironically, was clamped down because it lacked 'sense of place'. Its use also represented a threat to historical interpretation, as though there were going to be "a substitution of spatial for historical determinism" (Soja, 2009: 12). The occlusion of space, moreover, pervaded modern philosophical thought, which is based on seventeenth-century intellectual inquiry that applies inductive logic to scrutinize the world and its phenomena (Agnew, 2005). The influence of Cartesian inquiry (and ramifications), for instance, created a marked schism between questions about *why* the world exist and questions about *how* it works (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 11-12). It was during the nineteenth century when time more strikingly outshined space. As the industrial revolution dawned, a space-time compression, through a historicism that depicted the past a set of consecutive layers that linearly unfold (Soja, 1993), created a "**despatialized consciousness**" (Warf and Arias, 2009: 2). Thus, there was no room for any sort of "spatial imagination", for historicism was infused, "with the creation of critical silence, an implicit subordination of space to time" (Soja, 1989: 15).

Precisely against this narrow-minded perception of the world's innate complexities are Foucault's criticism and advocacy directed. Against "sweeping teleological accounts that paid little attention to space, human consciousness, or the contingency of human life" (Warf and Arias, 2009: 2). (Conditions that, again, bear dazzling resemblance with those of place previously discussed). Thus, space, not surprisingly, first appeared re-conceptualized in more pragmatic urban analyses (particularly, the Chicago School of Sociology) that, in studying everyday dynamics, defied simplistic notions of class, gender and power. Space, though not overtly as such, was employed to look into ideological, experiential and subjective dimensions of life in cities. However, it was not until the 1960s, building on the seminal ideas of both Foucault and Lefebvre, that space was more critically re-theorized. Yet, the 'rediscovery of space', during the 1970s, turned away from Foucauldian and Lefebvrian spatial postulates — specially the accent on **urban spatial causality** — given the growing influence, in urban studies, of Marxism (prominently via the works of David Harvey and Manuel Castells) (Soja, 2009: 20). Space began thereupon to be increasingly regarded as vital to critically discern the new ways in which capitalism was functioning. While the micro level of daily routines and trajectories were not necessarily left 'out the loop', the 'local' upshots produced by capitalism were more closely associated with the idea of place (though as some sort of 'by-product').

Within such shift of emphasis, space (or, as Foucault declares it, spatial language) had to be profoundly reconsidered to tackle the *question of power* — incidentally, a keystone of Foucault's prolific legacy. Space, therefore, rather than bringing the eventualities of human life to the fore (the purpose of place), became a mechanism through which to deconstruct the intricacies of power relations that were shaping novel ways of capital production and accumulation. Consequently, space gained more importance, somewhat at the expense of place, in radical geography and, to a greater or lesser extent, went hand in hand with the advent of Structuralism. Structural thought is, by and large, characterized by its rationalist approach to scientific knowledge — that is, the search for "hidden structures and forces, whether psychological or social, which are seen as determinant of human behaviour" (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 26). This idea is largely reflected on Claude Lévi-Strauss pioneering anthropological research that, simply put, determines that, underlying cultural diversity, there is a causal structure (Murdoch, 2006: 5). There are, in other words, veiled mechanisms that generate and steer cultural phenomena, which, ultimately, alter the built environment (Smith, 2001: 97). These alterations, as Foucault insisted, are to be spatially interpreted to properly grasp their far-reaching impacts.

Be that as it may, spatial inquiry, as aforementioned, had followed another path and Structuralism, through Marxist structuralist theory, permeated various disciplines also concerned with space, pointing out that space had only an illustrative function when figuring out what really spans and underpins social formations. As Marx (1904 [1859]: 11-12) felicitously assesses it, the crux of the matter lies elsewhere,

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society — the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men what determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.

Marxism, in broad (and hasty) synthesis, states that any explanation of socio-spatial processes has to be bound to social change described in economic terms (i.e., material production and material intercourse). Additionally, through its dialectical reasoning, the center of attention need not be things in and of themselves; but instead the ways they are interrelated (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 27; Henderson and Sheppard, 2006: 59). Out of this principle, scholars like Doreen Massey, David Harvey, Manuel Castells, amid many others, formulated nuanced conceptualizations of space (to varying degrees, echoing Lefebvre's social space). By deploying space in empirical research (e.g., on labor division, income inequality, feminism, amid

other) an enabling capacity of space was demonstrated for sorting out both the construction and transformation of social life. Space was hence seen as socially produced, power- and conflict-ridden, entangled within the wider background of political economy and mirroring the inner contradictions of capitalism.

Although place was not completely out of the picture, it played a minor, secondary role. In David Harvey's (1982) early work on the creation of spaces of capitalist economic circulation and accumulation, Joel Wainwright and Trevor Barnes (2009: 969) identify that, while space is described as full of vibrancy, because that's where the action transpires, places are "only staging posts for spatial transformation". Further, Harvey (1985: 126) refers to places, not as such, but as "structured coherences" that are ordered by technological means of production and consumption as well as class relations. In time, he coined the term "spatial fix" to explain, capturing the essence of Joseph Schumpeter's (1975 [1942]) "creative destruction", how the capitalist system channels, incessantly, through fixed assets of infrastructure its periods of overaccumulation (Harvey, 2010: 85). To put it another way, Harvey's spatial fix is the visible, tangible, proof that capitalism does not resolve its internal crises and contradictions. Quite the opposite, they're merely moved around from one *place* to another. Somewhere in between, Harvey (1996: 316) has, too, sustained that space and place must be comprehended in dialectical tension (as opposed to downplaying place as in the previously mentioned cases): "what goes on in a place cannot be understood outside of the space relations which support that place any more than the space relations can be understood independently of what goes on in particular places". Yet, again, space ends up a rung higher, for places are subjected to "perpetual perishing" (Harvey, 1996: 261) inasmuch as they constitute the "effects of the spatiality of capital circulation within which they are produced" (Wainwright and Barnes, 2009: 969).

Place, within the structuralist tradition of spatial analysis, is therefore blatantly belittled, for it is the materialist — rather than the dialectical — feature of Marxism that is most stressed (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 28). This bent is also recognizable in the initial Marxist analyses of Manuel Castells (1978 [1972], 1983) on cities and collective consumption. In these groundbreaking works, Castells deals with "the urban question" by means of deciphering the structural layout supporting the laws that determine the productive and performative characteristics of the diverse spatial formations. For him, actually, "there is no theory of space, but quite simply a deployment and specification of the theory of social structure, in order to account for the characteristics of the particular social form, space, and of its articulation with other, historically given, forms and processes" (Castells 1978 [1972]: 124). Within these static spatial 'overlays' of historical and social processes, space (let alone place) are locations that, at best, are "incidental (if necessary) to more profound non-spatial processes such as class struggle, perceptual capacity and orientation, capital accumulation, or commodification" (Agnew, 2011: 321).

Since the late 1980s onwards, Castells shifted his investigations towards the rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the power they exerted on both capitalism's behavior and cities' urbanization together with the concomitant social and cultural changes therewith produced (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998). ICTs, as Castells conspicuously describes, quickly triggered a transition from *information* societies (organized around energy and product transformation) to *informational societies* (centered on knowledge and information exchange). Still evidencing a 'Marxist tinge', Castells affirms that we have "entered a new age, the Information Age" in which "spatial transformation is a fundamental dimension of the overall process of structural change" (Castells, 2004: 83)¹¹. In depicting such structural change, Castells came up with his well-known binary formulation of "space of flows" and "space of places" (Castells, 1996).

Whereas "space of flows" allows to comprehend the way social practices concurrently occur without having the need of territorial contiguity, "space of places" is a signal of the persistence that "most people live, work, and construct their meaning around places" (Castells, 2005

¹¹ Ian Buchanan (2005), similarly and yet distinctly, discusses, drawing on Marc Augé (1995), "space in the age of non-place".

[1999]: 364-365). Space clearly dominates Castells' analytical purview and, for the most part, space annihilates place, given that "the world of places — consisting of bounded and meaningful places, such as the home, city, region, or nation state — has been superseded by spaces characterised by velocity, heterogeneity and flow" (Hubbard, 2006: 43). Nevertheless, Castells (2005 [1999]: 366) contends that "while the space of flows remains the space in which dominant activities are spatially operated, it is experiencing [...] the growing influence and pressure of the grassroots, and the insertion of personal meaning by social actors". Both bottom-up 'interruptions' and meaning-making are, of course, place-based actions. Hence, space and place are dialectically connected — though the notion of place is linked with latent possibilities and space, on the other hand, with an overarching and overriding reality. In a way, space is 'conquering' place (Friedman, 2005), for technological innovations are thought to be making places obsolete (Agnew, 2011: 318).

It can be argued, all things considered, that '**structuralist space**' is shaped by immense and multifarious relations (or flows) among heterogeneous and multiple '**humanistic places**'. As Foucault (1986 [1984]: 23) sustains, "our epoch is one in which space takes for us the form of relations among sites" — the site, though, can refer either to formal networks comprising proximity interactions between elements and points; or, more concretely, to the very "human site or living space"¹². As a possibility to break out of the 'space vis-à-vis place' predicament, I next explore approaches that, so to say, do not take sides and depart from the idea that space and place are, in effect, in an indissoluble relationship.

Neither better, nor worse, simply not synonymously relational: From mere isomorphism to a critically conceptualized opposition

Understandings of space and place, as it has been briefly reviewed, are multiple and, at times, even zigzagging. In fact, it is their metaphorical and conceptual 'openness' what makes them appealing for analysis (though that alone does not grant efficacy). Generally speaking, place, on the one hand, carries ideas of specificity, location, social forms and practices and the affective experiences lying underneath them (the same applies to space qua 'location' or as socially produced). Space, on the other hand, is, antipodal to time, abstractly perceived as universalizing, boundless and permanent (Gieseking and Mangold, 2014: xx). However, neither perspective is absolute or operates in isolation. There are, contrariwise, many somewhat messy juxtapositions that end up in obfuscating or inverted significations — as in, for example, de Certeau (1997 [1984]), Augé (1995) and Friedmann (2010) — which, in turn, undermine their empirical usefulness (Agnew, 2011: 318).

The fundamental quandary is that space and place are all too often (and sometimes rather inadvertently) reduced to a neutral grid, in which any one phenomenon is solely inscribed. As a result, space and/or place, though they are regarded as an important organizing principle, tends to disappear from, pushed into the background of, the analytical lens (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 7). Doing otherwise could prompt the risk of a space/place 'fetishism' that does not comply with the abstract realities (social, economic, psychological, political) of pure and pristine determinism (Agnew, 2011: 321). Hence, space and place are cast aside because, once portrayed as intrinsically abstract, they discourage any form of experiential explorations (Casey, 2001: 683). Furthermore, the prioritization of space over place (and vice versa) "depends broadly on what is made of the nature of" one *in relation* to the other: a distinction that is determined, in large part, by a spatial conceptualization that has historically relied on either a Newtonian or Leibnizian intellectual tradition (Agnew, 2011: 319).

The idea of **relational space** can be traced back to Leibniz's philosophical work, for whom space is not an entity existing independently of objects and events, but rather resulting from the interaction among them. For Leibniz, spatial properties are relational, and the spatial

¹² And, to add yet a little more of complexity, Edward Casey (1997: x) notes that space assimilates place and thereby scales it down to "a modification of space" which "aptly can be called a 'site', that is, leveled-down, monotonous space for building and other human enterprises". It must be noted that in the *Diacritics* translation of Foucault's original lecture *Des Espaces Autres*, which he didn't revise or edit for publication, the terms *l'emplacement* and *la localisation* are translated, indistinctively, as 'site'. Other translations use 'emplacement', which, it goes without saying, conveys a different idea as that of 'site' (see note 22).

positioning of objects is therefore determined by their interactions with other objects (Scruton, 1996: 362). In other words, “space must consist in the totality of spatial relations between objects” (Scruton, 2002 [1981]: 75), which, in Leibniz’s (1991: 24) view, accounts for the totality of the cosmos, since the “[i]nterlinkage or accommodation of all created things to each other, and of each to all the others, brings about that each simple substance has relations that express all the others, and is in consequence a perpetual living mirror of the universe”. It is precisely this perspective of the internal relations among all substances and things what makes Leibniz’s relational space to differ radically from the Newtonian assumption that both time and space “existed in their own right, that they were content neutral containers indifferent with respect to whatever it was that was placed within them” (Harvey, 1996: 251). Leibniz, furthermore, in sustaining that space was enduringly contingent on matter, develops his relational outlook on time and space, which “are nothing apart from the things ‘in’ them” and are derivatives from “the ordering relations that obtain among things” (Rescher, 1979: 84). Thus,

Space is the order of *coexistence* — that is, the order among the mutually contemporaneous states of things; while time is the order of *succession* — that is, the order among the various different mutually coexisting states of things which (because they are mutually) coexisting must, of course, have some sort of “spatial” structure (Rescher, 1979: 86-87; italics in the original).

Put in those terms, within the Leibnizian system neither space nor time prevails, for they mutually coexist and relate, and “are coordinate as ordering principles of substances such that *both* are contingent” (Harvey, 1996: 252; italics in the original). Moreover, Leibniz, by dint of the fairly ambiguous idea of the world as ‘systematic appearance’, does hint at deeper implications within the relations between objects in space, provided that “when we perceive things spatially organised, we do not perceive them as they really are” (Scruton, 2002 [1981]: 75). Leibniz, however, does not suggest that space projects a misleading image of a ubiquitous (spatio-temporal) structural order that we are incapable of fully grasping. Rather, through his emphasis “upon creativity of the spatiality of coexistence and temporality of succession”, he sustains that there are “multiple possible spatial worlds” (Harvey, 1996: 253). This postulate, notwithstanding, still does not fully capture the ways in which relations between objects trigger complex processes that don’t use space as though it were a *tabula rasa*, and that do not necessarily stick to a linearity of time. Space, in other words, while not having underlying unchangeable structures, the relations from which it emerges are of assorted natures, because they are prompted by social, economic, cultural, political and physical processes, which, in turn, consist of “relations established between entities of various kinds” (Murdoch, 2006: 19). Hence, there’s indeed more than the eye can meet within the spatialities of the world — even to the point of, as in the current era of globalization and hyper-normalization, going beyond our cognitive capacities (Jameson, 1991: 44).

By distinguishing between absolute (Newtonian) and relational (Leibnizian) space, space and place could also be told apart: an absolute approach deems space and place “as either synonymous or binaries, whereas a relational view considers them as internally related to one another” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 14). Isomorphic usages of space and place abound in literature and have, as common denominator, a constant exchange between space and place with no conceptual considerations¹³. Either dismissing both at once through an unequivocal definition or by muddying interchanges between them, space and place are treated as two sides of the same coin. By contrast, ‘internal relationalities’ between space and place offer much richer and motley opportunities for analysis (thus the growing interest of diverse disciplines in space and place). (That’s too where I locate the potential to clarify how space functions as analytical tool in this research).

Moving along a continuum that runs from “nomothetic (generalized) [...] at one end to idiographic (particularistic)” meanings of space and place at the other, several authors have attempted to bring these two meanings together in the frame of four theoretical currents:

¹³ I am not only saying that there is no elaboration on the way space and place are theoretically construed, but also that the lack of conceptual clarity does hinder the analytical capability to comprehend (or render less abstract) the particularities of the phenomena being researched.

Neo-Marxist, humanistic (agency-based), feministic and performative (Agnew, 2011: 324)¹⁴. Henri Lefebvre's oeuvre constitutes the spearhead of Neo-Marxists space-place relationality (curiously, he never actually addresses place directly). His main focus is located on the mechanisms and manners whereby social spaces are produced in the framework of social life and everyday practices (Elden, 2004; Lefebvre, 2009). Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), on the whole, sees the abstract space of capitalist production (what he calls "the representation of space") in complete opposition to concrete spaces that people create through their daily routines ("spaces of representation") and whose colonization by the former are contested by 'counter-discourses' that are spatially performed ("spatial practices"). Andy Merrifield (1993: 520), drawing on Lefebvre's 'trialectics', advances a dialectical 'reconciliation' between space and place (which is akin to Harvey's previously mentioned 'dialectical tension'),

The material landscape and practices of everyday life occurring in different places under capitalism are inextricable embedded within the global capitalist whole. To this extent, the global capitalist system does not occur solely in some abstract sense; it has to ground itself and be acted out in specific places if it is to have any meaning [...]. The space of the whole thus takes on meaning through place; and each part (i.e. each place) in its interconnection with other parts (places) engenders the space of the whole.

Underscoring such dialectical space-place interconnection is the recognition that space is not (to be) theorized in a higher level of abstraction that do not admit any degree of identifiable social agency, which, of course, would materialize (in) a place. Merrifield (1993: 520), further explains that, in order to overcome this absolute divide of theorization, it must be recognized that "both space and place have a real ontological status since they are both embodied in material processes — namely, real human activities". Oddly enough, he, too, fairly underrates place: whereas space takes the form of unremitting streams of capital, money, commodities and information (Castells' "space of flows"), "place comprises the locus and [...] specific moment in the dynamics of space-relations under capitalism" (p.523). However, such objectification of place is only ostensible, because inasmuch as place gets 'thingified' by preponderant capitalist spatial flows, it is shaped by the clash between the physical and social form capitalism takes and counteracting social and class struggles. Place, thus, is not just an abstraction of capitalist space; it is, on the contrary, lived and acted out. It is the outcome of 'clatters' "between a consumption of space which produces surplus value and one which produces only enjoyment — and is therefore 'unproductive'. It is a clash, in other words, between capitalist 'utilizers' and community 'users'" (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 359-360). These combatted amalgamations, furthermore, are not only variable (given the asymmetries of power relations), but also, as Harvey (1996: 261) notes, 'flickering permanences',

A 'permanence' arises as a system of 'extensive connection' out of processes. Entities achieve relative stability in their bounding and their internal ordering of processes creating space, for a time. Such permanences come to occupy a piece of space in an exclusive way (for a time) and thereby define a place — their place — (for a time). The process of place formation is a process of carving out 'permanences' from the flow of processes creating spaces. But the 'permanences' — no matter how solid they may seem — are not eternal: they are always subject to time as 'perpetual perishing'. They are contingent on the processes that create, sustain and dissolve them.

Close to Lefebvre's (and followers) insistence on asserting space (or place as social space) as the outcome of social practice, humanistic views pinpoint the human agency as the relational factor between space and place. From this point of view, space and place are not so inextricably condemn to be constantly produce and reproduced (though they may be said to be continuously experienced and re-experienced). Robert Sack (1997: 16), following Tuan's (2001 [1977]) writings, creates a framework founded on the experiential relationships among space, place, home and world,

¹⁴ As it will be easily noticeable, among these paradigms there are not dissonances of perspective, but rather incisive meeting points.

Place implies space, and each home is a place in space. Space is a property of the natural world, but it can be experienced. From the perspective of experience, a place differs from space in terms of familiarity and time. A place requires human agency, is something that may take time to know, and a home especially so. As we move along the earth we pass from one place to another. But if we move quickly the places blur, we lose track of their qualities, and they may coalesce into that sense that we are moving through space.

That being so, the relationality between space and place operates in terms of movement and the experiential references throughout. Those 'anchoring points' would range from places which with we have deep feelings of belonging and attachment (such as the home and city we grew up and/or live in) to 'unknown' spaces that are discovered as we, either slowly or rapidly, move from one place to another and that we would eventually 'come to know' depending on how long we decide to stay around. This 'getting-to-know' is actually a place-making process infused with people's "forces, perspectives and selves" (Sack, 1997: 5). These 'ingredients', moreover, fall back on space, since it delivers both resources and lattices for places to be made (e.g., space as a 'compendium' of named places). Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear the extent to which individuals have an actual stake therein (Agnew, 2011: 325).

Consequently, place-making (or, to use Lefebvre's phrase, the "production of space") is not as smooth as Sack suggestively describes it. Conversely, it is interwoven with tensions, differing interests and power unevenness. Doreen Massey, whose works stand up for (though not exclusively) a critical feminist approach, offers painstaking analyses of exclusionary (and even preventive) practices of place-making/space production. Her ever-present focuses are on hamstringing and overpowering effects, exerted by globalization and patriarchal systems, on different social groups (from women to ethnic minorities). Space, she (1999: 288) claims, needs be rethought in terms of multiplicity and dislocation and places "as open articulations of connections". Relations and movements between spaces and places are therefore essentially permeated with power, whose command make that "some alignments come to dominate, at least for a period of time, while others come to be dominated" (Murdoch, 2006: 20). Space, as a result, becomes a "**meeting place**" (Massey, 1991), where consensual and conflict relations emerge along a differential spectrum of scales. Though such a graduated system could ostensibly be taken for a hierarchical structure (local, regional, global) — say, from a Neo-Marxist angle — it actually accounts for the "length of relations" wherein spaces and places are "nodes in relational settings" (Amin, 2002: 391). This relational understanding of space follows Gilles Deleuze's and Félix Guattari's (1987 [1980]) 'schizophrenic-rhizomic' reconceptualization of (postmodern¹⁵) space constructed around notions of velocity, movement and constant flux freed from the constraints of typical and classical coordinates of both distance and direction. "The metaphor of the rhizome", further, "so different from the transparent spaces of Euclideanism, offers a view of space as inherently and interconnected sets of networks, non-hierarchical in nature, in which connections among locales rather than their absolute positionality is the dominant characteristic" (Warf, 2009: 70).

Thus, "the significance and composition of the relations defines the significance of scale" (Murdoch, 2006: 21) and simultaneously a "power-geometry" emerges, once relations of sundry entities meet, to either coalesce or clash, in space, proving that,

Different social groups and individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to [...] flows and interconnections. This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who doesn't, although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation to the flows and the movement. Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway differentiated mobility: some people are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movements, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it" (Massey, 1991: 25-26).

¹⁵ Distinctions pertaining historic/philosophical 'labels' (such as 'Modernism', 'Positivism', etc.), though have been tangentially mentioned, are not expressly made part of the discussion, for the take, here, is not emphasized on the historical evolution of the space-place distinction through the diverse stages marked by philosophical paradigms. I pay somewhat more attention to that in subsection 3.2.3 (on the spatiality of planning paradigms).

As explained by Massey, the means whereby people are positioned — or even if they have the ability to do so themselves — within a set of given relations determine their capacity to control them: if flows can be triggered, towards which direction, or if simply there is no other alternative than succumbing to the impetus of the flow. The fact that space is relational, open and never-ending (Massey, 2005), does not keep restrictions and confinements from thriving, because “relations are inevitably double-edged: they can facilitate movement and access; equally they can entrench confinement and exclusion [...]. [After all] spatial relations are also power relations” (Murdoch, 2006: 22-23). Massey (1999: 288), furthermore, incisively observes that “identities of subjects and identities of places constructed through interrelations not only challenge notions of past authenticity but also holds open the possibility of change in the future”. Be it at the fringes, or in frontal defiance, of all-encompassing powers, ‘alternative’ modes of power can produce daily life spaces whereby identities of place can be constructed. And this, first and foremost, is a political enterprise, because the making of “the spaces and places through which we live our lives [...] is thoroughly ‘political’, in the widest sense of the word” (Massey, 1996: 123). According to Massey’s view, reasserting space, place and their interrelations is as much an **intellectual move** as a **political necessity** (Agnew, 2011: 325). For Massey, it is worthwhile noticing, any space-place distinction is pointless, insofar as both stem from the relations they’re entrenched in. There is, then, neither a dualism nor an essential difference between space and place in her writings (Wainwright and Barnes, 2009: 970).

Very similar to Massey’s position, is Nigel Thrift’s (1999) ‘associational’ call to bridge the gap between representation and practice, so frequently taken for granted (as, for instance, Neo-Marxists do), when space and place are conceived as relational. According to Thrift (1999: 317) place weaves together “all manners of spaces and times”, yet incompletely for there will always be the need for further works of ‘place association’. Echoing Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory, though remaining shrewdly critical of its incapacity to realize how networks, in going back and forth, are *emplaced* or *spatialized*, Thrift (1999: 313) asserts that places, through practices, are only recognizable “in their passing” (analogous to Harvey’s “perpetual perishing”). Places, on such account, do not subsume to the narratives of grand theory, for they’re the outcome of time-space arrangements made up of constants and compound encounters among people and things (or, like he calls them, “actants”) (Agnew, 2011: 325). Places, therefore, mirror “practical means of going on rather than something concerned with enabling us to see, contemplatively, the supposed true nature of what something is” (Thrift, 1999: 304). This viewpoint on the relationality between space and place is, accordingly, “as much **epistemological** (concerned with how we know) as **ontological** (concerned with what exists)” (Agnew, 2011: 325).

In a similar vein, yet quite more radical, Marcus Doel (1999: 7) proposes to drop, altogether, the space-place differentiation, provided that space and place are in ceaseless fluidity “unfolded across a myriad of vectors” (configuring Massey’s “power-geometries”) and as performed events are “verbal rather nounal, becoming rather being”. Moreover, “[t]aken to the extreme Doel (1999) follows Deleuze and Guattari in emphasizing the origami-like nature of space as it is repeatedly folded and refolded, fissured, cracked, and fractalized through a series of difference-producing repetitions” (Warf, 2009: 75). Within such steady assembly of varying distinctions, there’s neither space nor place, as Doel (1999: 9; italics in the original) sustains “one must [...] be incredulous about the polarization of place and space, which hinges on the glaciation of events in perpetual process” there is then “nothing but *splace*, taking splace — *splacing*”. Although glaringly convincing, such a view is problematic and flummoxing, since it is only a circumvention of, and not a strategy to deal with, the space and place distinction (Wainwright and Barnes, 2009: 971).

In brief, all the hassles of conceptualizing the diametric relationship between space and place can be erased, by obviating that they’re *not* the same (i.e., a synonymic vacuous use), ‘taking sides’, or coining a ‘catchy’ neologism (e.g., Doel’s “splace”). Alternatively, one can recognize that, at issue, is how to critically conceptualize the space-place opposition to, then, address either one for conducting analysis. Each of the diverse positions (be it ‘space > place’, ‘space < place’ or ‘space ≠ and ~ place’) offer their own routes out of the space-place puzzle and, since everyone comes from different intellectual traditions, they cannot outdo one another,

when trying to state the dominance of either space or place, or when thinking of their differentiation. However, much more troublesome (and where the focus should be on) is that “the most significant shared problem is the failure to show the relevance, except in the most casual way, any has for the substantive empirical agendas of contemporary” (Agnew, 2011: 326) research within fields that deal with space and/or place.

To depict a clearer understanding of the **spatial analysis** (not the ultimate definition of space!) I deployed for this research, I address next the philosophic genesis of the two main spatial theories I have recourse to: Henri Lefebvre’s ‘**spatial trialectics**’ and Michel Foucault’s ‘**heterotopias**’ (pointing out potentialities as well as limitations). This, it must be noted, does not mean that place, in the following, will be merely left aside. As I have hitherto maintained, I draw on space to, critically and from an alternative perspective, scrutinize the phenomena entailed in my investigation. To that end, it became necessary, right from the scratch, to tackle the space-place dilemma to render the work consistent enough in, so to say, ‘spatial terms’. Using space, thus, doesn’t inevitably mean that place is useless; to the contrary, it is about, first, giving the research conceptual coherence (as in not employing space and place both interchangeably and indiscriminately) to, then, delve into the theorizations and usages of space in the different areas of research that my work touches (for instance, a spatial understanding of social movements’ protesting and the way planning is, in theory and in practice, ‘spatialized’). Equally important was the recognition that space, as it was previously reviewed, has carried a conspicuous weight in critical studies on social phenomena that either bring spatial causality to the fore or and/or utilize space as a cognitive mode of analysis. Such analyses, moreover, have largely been influenced by both Lefebvre’s and Foucault’s oeuvres. Against the backdrop of the space-place quandary together with Lefebvre’s ‘reifying spatiology’ and Foucault’s ‘surreptitious space’, I calibrated, as it were, an analytical spatial lens to, theoretically and empirically, support my arguments.

3.1.2. A reifying and heterotopological purview: *Lefebvre’s ‘spatiology’ and Foucault’s ‘surreptitious space’*

The social unrest experienced during the 1960s marked an era of intellectual revolution, in which cogent spatial imaginations found expression in a Lefebvrian and Foucauldian galvanic, and yet ephemeral, theoretical upsurge. Both Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault, in contrast to the majority of thinkers at the time (above all, Neo-Marxists), insisted that it was by means of space that the functioning and reproduction of the capitalist system could actually be decoded (and thus reverted). To that end, a conceptual shift was most necessary for social theory to reposition “the understanding of space from given to produced, calling attention to its role in the construction and transformation of social life and its deeply power-laden nature” (Warf and Arias, 2009: 3). More concretely, Edward Soja (2009: 18) sustains that it was the “ontological parity of space and time” what underpinned what was later on labelled ‘spatial turn’, since each is “formative of the other at a most basic existential level, with neither being intrinsically privileged” (further arguments down this line have been already, in the preceding subsection, discussed). Lefebvre and Foucault, in their distinctive ways, believed that (back then) existing and predominant modes of spatial imaginations and theorizations were, significantly, falling short in bridging the ontological and epistemological gap between space and time,

Both shared the view that spatial thinking in the past has been fundamentally and, to some degree, restrictively, bicameral. Spatial discourse was dominated by two alternative modes, one emphasizing material conditions, mappable spatial forms, things in space (Lefebvre’s perceived or spatial practices) and the other defined by mental or ideational imagery, representations, thoughts about space (Lefebvre’s conceived space). Both would also praise the best work using this bicameral duality and urge continue application, but at the same time Foucault and especially Lefebvre would discuss the critical limitations of each mode (Soja, 2009: 19).

Deconstructing spatialities through space: Lefebvre’s “spatiology”

Henri Lefebvre, intriguingly, wasn’t always interested in space. As a matter of fact, Guy Debord, the lead thinker of the *Situationists* and whom Lefebvre befriended for many years,

seems to have sparked Lefebvre's interest in space. Andy Merrifield (2006: 35) identifies such decisive point in Lefebvre's thinking in the assessment Debord made on Lefebvre's "theory of moments". First introduced in *La Somme et le Reste* and revisited in the last chapter of *The Critique of Everyday Life Volume II*, Lefebvre (2002 [1961]: 348; italics in the original) explains that "the moment" is "*the attempt to achieve the total realization of a possibility*". The possibility (what eventually gave way to his "urban revolution"), Lefebvre continues, "offers itself; and it reveals itself. It is determined and consequently it is limited and partial". Debord, who studied carefully Lefebvre's theory of moments and compared it to his own formulation, "the situation", found a key distinction: he considered Lefebvre's "moment" to be "initially temporal (zone of temporality). The impure yet dominant situation (strictly articulated in a place) is completely spatiotemporal" (Debord, 2009 [1999]: 336)¹⁶. Thus, in accordance with Debord's claim, a revolution cannot obviate the spatial conditions that not only may propel it, but also substantially thwart it — space, in effect, "could as much hinder political possibilities as it could engender them" (Dikeç, 2009). Gradually, Lefebvre's works started to resonate more and more with space till he delivered what many Lefebvrian scholars avow as his *magnum opus*, *The Production of Space*.

Lefebvre continuously refined his research on 'the urban' and crafted, in detail, spatial questions in the period between 1968 and 1974. Within that time span, highly influenced by the students' revolts of May 1968, he produced various precursors articles (e.g., *Reflections on the Politics of Space* (1976 [1970])) and books (e.g., *The Urban Revolution* (2003 [1970]), *Le Manifeste Différentialiste* (1970), *Le Droit à la Ville* (1968), amid others) of the *Production of Space*. Lefebvre's main goal was to push Marxist analysis to its limits and thereby brings it to another level. He wanted to create a "new reading of Marx" — though not as a mere (re)interpretation — "but first and foremost [as] an attempt to reconstruct Marx's original thought" given "the divergencies and contradictions that have marked the development of 'Marxist' thought in our time" (Lefebvre, 1982 [1966]: 3). And, certainly, "through the introduction of spatial considerations in political economy, marxism is taken to a higher ground" (Gottdiener, 2000: 94). More specifically, the fulcrum of Lefebvre's theory of production of space is constituted by his perspicacious spatialization of Marx's *fetishism of commodities* (Merrifield, 1993: 520; 2000: 171)¹⁷. In the first volume of *Capital*, Marx (1992 [1867]: 163ff.) explains that production relations are not among people, but among money and commodities in constant trade. Commodities, once they have been exchanged in the marketplace, acquire an uncanny 'thing-like' character, which strips them out of their subjective valuation and transform them into objective, real things that are thought to have an intrinsic value. Precisely to this "special 'mystical' and 'mist-enveloped' quality" of commodities is what Marx refers to as *fetishism*, which, in turn, impedes to appropriately "apprehend the social relations, activities and exploitations occurring in the productive labour process" (Merrifield, 2000: 172). Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 89-90; italics in the original), therefrom, propounds that,

[I]deologically dominant [professions] [...] divide space up into parts and parcels in accordance with the division of labour. It bases its images of the forces occupying space on the idea that space is a passive receptacle. Thus, instead of uncovering the social relationships (including class relationships) that are latent in spaces, instead of concentrating our attention on the production of space and the social relationships inherent to it — relationships which introduce specific contradictions into production, so echoing the contradiction between private ownership of the means of production and the social character of the productive forces — we fall into the trap of treating space as space 'in itself', as space as such. We come to think in terms of spatiality, and so fetishise space in a way reminiscent of the old fetishism of commodities, where the trap lay in exchange, and the error was to consider 'things' in isolation, as 'things in themselves'.

¹⁶ For a complete and painstaking tale about the intellectual influence that Debord and Lefebvre had on each other, woven sharply with personal affairs, see Merrifield (2006: 30ff) and, particularly, (2008).

¹⁷ Incidentally, Isaak Illich Rubin (1990 [1928]: 5), regarded as the preeminent thinker of his time on Marx's theory of value, considered the concept of commodity fetishism to be basis of not only Marx's entire economic system, but also, and in particular, his theory of value. Furthermore, Rubin, points out that both "Marxists and opponents of Marxism have praised the theory" and the way it expanded to other fields outside political economy as a "brilliant sociological generalization, a theory and critique of all contemporary culture based on the reification of human relations".

Lefebvre's impetus to focus on *production* reverberates Marx's call to be utmost radical and to always go the 'root of things'. Moreover, this was a clear defiance to the narrow and inadequate predominant notion of a flat and static space, which was fueled by (back then) popular Marxist theorists (principally, Althusser via Castells). Space was, hence, reduced to a passive surface that allow (and in no way intervened) reproductive activity, commodity transactions and labor power reproduction (Merrifield, 2000: 172; 2006: 107). In point of fact, given the linguistic metaphors employed by structuralists (e.g., base, superstructure, etc.), space is rendered a somewhat ambiguous Euclidean condition describing a "reality of discrete entities of different sizes contained within discrete and very often homogenous social spaces" (Law and Urry, 2004: 398). Against this reductionism of space, Lefebvre directed his argumentations, provided that "space — urban space, social space, physical space, experiential space — isn't just the staging of reproductive requirements, but part of the cast, and a vital, productive member of the cast at that [...] [and, as such, space is] an 'active moment' in expansion and reproduction of capitalism" (Merrifield, 2000: 173).

Centered around the underestimation that space is subject to within the capitalist system, Lefebvre devised his **heuristic 'spatial triad'**, which comprises the whole epistemological base for his overall project of a "**unitary theory of space**", he coined "**spatiology**" (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 404). Such undertaking, for Lefebvre, does not seek to become a "completed 'totality' [...] 'system' or 'synthesis'"; conversely, "it implies discrimination between 'factors', elements or *moments*" and "aims both to reconnect elements that have been separated and to replace confusion by clear distinctions; to rejoin the severed and reanalyse the commingled" (p. 413; italics added). To that end, Lefebvre deemed fundamental to reconsidered profoundly the interconnections between material space (that of the natural environment), mental space (formal/technical abstractions or reifications) and, accentually, social space (that is, "logico-epistemological space, *the space of social practice*, the space occupied by sensory phenomena" [p.12; italics added]).

Lefebvre firmly believed that fragmentation and conceptual dislocation of these 'spatial fields' were at the service of specific (and concealed) ideological ends. By bringing them together, he aspired to "*expose and decode* space, to update and expand Marx's notion of production, to leave the noisy sphere where everything takes place on the surface" (Merrifield, 2006: 104). Lefebvre, once and again in *The Production of Space*, recurs to his 'trialectics' to push space forward. Composed of three intermingled — with quite blurry distinctions — *spatial moments*, he created a fluid, active dialectical simplification made of: **representations of space** (highly scientific abstractions, unconcerned about human life aspects, *conceived spaces*); **spaces of representation** (directly, daily and collectively constructed *lived spaces*); and **spatial practices** (the actions whereby space is secreted and deciphered; the ways people, through their usage of space, appropriate and carve *perceived spaces*)¹⁸. Relations among **conceived, lived and perceived spaces**, as Lefebvre so emphatically averred it, "aren't ever stable, nor should they be grasped artificially or linearly" (Merrifield, 2006: 111). Rather, they must remain open, because should the triad be deployed abstractly, it would lose its political and analytical weight, for "it needs to be *embodied* with actual flesh and blood and culture, with real life relationships and events" (Merrifield, 2000: 175; italics in the original). Ultimately, Lefebvre deemed crucial not to separate the domains of perception, symbolism and imagination, which, although distinct to one another, are framed within both physical and social space (Merrifield, 1993: 523).

'Surreptitious space': Foucault's heterotopological spatial thinking

Although not that commonly conceded, the works of Foucault and Lefebvre have a certain parallelism. In fact, both were well aware of each other; though their paths never really intersected. Lefebvre, moreover, did concisely criticize Foucault's work, while any Lefebvrian influence on Foucault is, if anything, indirectly and diffusely perceptible via the work of authors concerned with both thinkers. In the first pages of *The Production of Space*, as Edward Soja¹⁹

¹⁸ I shall return to Lefebvre's 'trialectics' (and in next sections and chapters expand its functioning).

¹⁹ Edward Soja is credited for reinserting Lefebvrian and Foucauldian 'spatial imaginations' into critical social theory (especially with the publication of *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*). Yet, Stuart Elden (2007: 115) sustains that Soja (as well as other authors who follow him closely in dealing with the 'spatiality'

(1996: 146) notes, Lefebvre disapproves Foucault's incapacity to deal properly with "the collective subject", his lightweight use of spatial metaphors and, in particular, his power/knowledge formula. More concretely, Lefebvre believes that Foucault dismisses "the antagonism between a knowledge [*savoir*] which serves power and a form of knowing [*connaissance*] which refuses to acknowledge power" and, what is more, "Foucault never explains what space it is that he is referring to, nor how it bridges the gap between the theoretical (epistemological) realm and the practical one, between mental and social, between the space of the philosophers and the space of people who deal with material things" (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 10/4).

While it is true that Foucault never fully carried out a, so to say, formal theorization of space (at least he did not get to it), his treatment of space is not as superficial as Lefebvre claims. Instead, space *in* and *for* Foucault seems to operate in a furtive manner (and, of course, not without its pitfalls), for his writings, while traversing a surprising number of diverse themes, almost undeviatingly read spatially,

In contrast to Lefebvre, Foucault never developed his conceptualizations of space in great self-conscious detailed and rarely translated his spatial politics into clearly defined programs for social action. It can nevertheless be argued (and Foucault would, when prompted, agree) that a comprehensive and critical understanding of spatiality was at the center of all his writings from *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (1961) to the multivolume work on the history of sexuality [...]. And, even without prompting, he would infuse a spatial politics into these writings that ranged from "the great strategies of geopolitics" played out on a global scale to "the little tactics of the habitat," his own preferred milieu (Soja, 1996: 147-148)²⁰.

The (nuanced) disparity between Foucault's and Lefebvre's take on space as well as the conceptual deployment of space each does, may well be found in the triggering motivation upon which one and the other, ultimately, drew to elaborate their assessments. Just as Lefebvre saw a penetrating 'intellectual wound' in the fetishism of space, Foucault put a significant effort to challenge the ubiquity of time to assess historical evolution and pursued thereby to spatialize history (Elden, 2001)²¹. Furthermore, similar to, and yet distinct from, Lefebvre, Foucault, "utilizing Nietzsche and Heidegger, developed an alternative approach to questions of time and space that, crucially, is temporally and spatially aware *right from the beginning*" (Elden, 2007: 114; italics in the original) — whereas Lefebvre, as formerly mentioned, internalized space at a later moment in his career. Since Foucault's 'spatial questions' reached their peak in his lecture *Of Other Spaces*²², that's where his **heterotopological spatial thinking** can be best grasped. Additionally, Foucault, "with some fleeting attempt at a systematic directedness, present[s] his particular views about space and, as more than an aside, time, about the relations between space and time" (Soja, 1996: 154). In that regard, Foucault's advocacy to infuse space, vis-à-vis time, with its justified significance, is laid out, right away, in his opening observations,

The great haunting obsession of the nineteenth century was, as we know, history: with its themes of development and stagnation, themes of crisis and cycle, themes of the accumulation of the past, the big surplus of the dead and the menacing cooling of the world. The present epoch would perhaps rather be the epoch of

of Foucault) focuses excessively on Foucault's lecture *Of Other Spaces* (his one and only direct and fairly rough theorization of space), "rather than giving due attendance to the spatial histories throughout his works".

²⁰ Passages between quotation marks are from Foucault (1980: 149).

²¹ Lefebvre's oeuvre, as Stuart Elden (2007: 114) observes, bears the question of whether it "spatialize[s] history, historicize[s] space, or simply spatialize[s] sociology". While Elden sees the three constantly relating to one another throughout Lefebvre's body of work; he, too, claims that, overall, it appears he was "writing a *history of space*, and not *spatial history*" (p.114; italics in the original).

²² There are divergences among translations of the original French title *Des Espaces Autres* that has to do with the meaning (or, actually, interpretation of) *Heterotopia* — the concept Foucault elaborates in the lecture. Thus, "different spaces" is to come across as an alternative considered more accurate, given that: (i) the particle 'hetero', derived from the Greek, means 'different' and not 'other'; (ii) the fact that '*Autres*' appears after, rather than before, '*Espaces*' favors a translation into English as 'different'; and (iii), more at the interpretative level of Foucault's ideas, the spaces and places that are referred to as heterotopias are *not* simply "other than the spaces of ordinary life" (DeCauter and Dehaene, 2008b: 22). This conundrum extends to the translation of *espace* (space), *lieu* (place), *la localisation* and *l'emplacement* (both translated as 'emplacement' or, even more confusingly, as 'site') (see Johnson, 2006: 76-77).

space. We are in the epoch of simultaneity; we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a great life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein. One could perhaps say that certain ideological conflicts animating present-day polemics take place between the pious descendants of time and the fierce inhabitants of space. [...] [T]he space that appears today on the horizon of our concerns, of our theory, of our systems, is not an innovation. In the experience of the West, *space itself has a history; and it is not possible to disregard this fatal intersection of time with space.* (Foucault, 2008 [1984]: 14; italics added).

Livien De Cauter and Michiel Dehaene (2008a: 4), reading between the lines, observe how Foucault already hints at “an insight into a simultaneously archaic and modern way of organizing space” that points out explicitly to “the rise of network space [...] the ‘space of emplacement’, the grid, the network”. This ‘new’ spatial order, which Foucault develops during the first part of the lecture, may well be seen as a direct evocation of what later would become known as “the network society” (Castells, 1996) (De Cauter and Dehaene, 2008b: 23). As Foucault goes on, he introduces the spatiality of sites — or, of ‘emplacements’ (see note 22) — and creates, thus, a sudden turning point in the lecture’s course (a ‘trademark’ of his). “The site”, he expounds, “is defined by relations of proximity between points or elements; formally we can describe these relations as series, trees, or grids” or, in a more concrete manner, in demographic terms that ultimately alludes to “the human site or living space” (Foucault, 1986 [1984]: 23). Foucault’s construction of a contemporary spatiality based on sites and relations between them, is what actually characterizes his “**heterotopology**”. Although his spatial scheme remains rather raw and is much “less infused with allusions to the production process, the sites and situations of Foucault take on insights that reflect Lefebvre’s critique of everyday life in the modern world and his trialectics”; however, it lacks an “assertive foregrounding of an explicit political project” (Soja, 1996: 156). Moreover, Foucault, in his quest to undermine the seemingly ‘eternal’ import of time, places it, within the complexities of spatial relations, “only as one of the various possible operations of distribution between the elements that are spread out in space” (1986 [1984]: 23; 2008 [1984]: 15).

Before outlining the constitutive elements of his “heterotopology”, Foucault stresses the peculiarities of the space of everyday interaction to create a general frame of reference for the ‘utopia-heterotopia’ devising. Mentioning, as a homage, Gaston Bachelard’s *Poetics of Space*, he affirms that, regardless of how abstract, technocratic, unchanging and inert the spatial compositions of relations among sites may seem to be, we do not inhabit an empty and homogenous space. On the contrary,

The space in which we live, which draw us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us, is also, itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live inside a void, inside which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another (Foucault, 1986 [1984]: 23).

Such much more personal and intimate notion of space cannot help resembling Lefebvre’s “spaces of representations”. Underscoring its inherent heterogeneous character, Foucault drafts here a rather chaotic, still clearly contoured, ‘physiognomy’ of the wide array of both qualitative and quantitative facets that make up our spaces of daily, personal and human interaction. Thereupon, Foucault presents the utopia-heterotopia dichotomy, intersected and unified by characteristic, ‘reversely shared’, elements. They’re therefore mutually constitutive and inversely correlated by dint of the metaphor of the mirror (as a sort of ‘non-zero constant’). Ergo: ‘utopia u and n heterotopia’, provided that ‘utopia = (mirror/heterotopia)’,

First there are the utopias. Utopias are emplacements with no real place. They are emplacements that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of society. It is society itself perfected, or else society turned upside down, but in any case, these utopias essentially are fundamentally unreal spaces. There are also, and this probably in all culture, in all civilization, real places, effective places, places that are written into the institution of society itself, and that are a

sort of counter-emplacements, a sort of effectively realized utopias in which the real emplacements, all the emplacements that can be found within culture, are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted; a kind of places that are outside all places, even though they are actually localizable. *Since these places are absolutely other than all emplacements that they reflect, and of which they speak, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias.* And I believe that between utopias and these absolutely other emplacements, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, in-between experience, which would be the mirror. The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a place without place [...]. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does really exist (Foucault, 2008 [1984]: 17; italics added).²³

Therewith, Foucault sets the stage to come up with a “systematic description [...] of these different spaces, of these other places” of the heterotopias whereby and into which utopias materialize (1986 [1984]: 24ff.; 2008 [1984]: 18ff.). Through six “principles” heterotopias are, by and large, characterized: (i) heterotopias are ubiquitously specific: every society produces its *own* heterotopias; (ii) while heterotopias become operative in a precise manner, within time, that may vary; (iii) heterotopias, in a “real place”, can comprise several, incompatibles spaces; (iv) heterotopias are, by nature, hetero-chronicled: they “begin to function at full capacity when men arrive at a sort of absolute break with their traditional time” (1986 [1984]: 26); (v) heterotopias are ambivalently open and close at the same time, they may repel inasmuch as invite (they, too, once inside, induce certain behavioral patterns); and, finally, (vi) heterotopias enact one of two specific functions: to either “create a space of illusion that exposes all real space [...] as even more illusory” or “another space, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as our is disorderly, ill construed and sketchy” (2008 [1984]: 21).

Heterotopias, or, actually, heterotopology, can be (applied to virtually) anything. Ironically, that’s as much its strength as its weakness. But maybe Foucault — as in Lefebvre’s triad — tellingly wanted to leave room for further elaboration, for the principles to be tested in contextual, specific circumstances; instead of supplying a definitive, complete ‘analytical recipe’ or exhaustive heterotopic categorization. Further, **thinking ‘heterotopologically’**, as it were, means thinking spatial formations that are aporetic, given that heterotopias reveal and represent the contradictions societies inevitably produce and cannot resolve. Foucault, in this respect, creates a two-fold introduction to seeing the world heterotopologically: on the one hand, heterotopias as “the antipode of utopias, the latter being imaginary, heterotopias being real arrangements”; on the other hand, and at the same time, heterotopias “as ‘heterotopos’ as the other of normal places, common places” (Dehaene and De Carteu, 2008b: 25). Consequently, the heterotopia-utopia interrelation, whereas it offers an alternative viewpoint to analyze spatially social phenomena, it falls short due to its innate ambiguous, undecided, character. The way in which Foucault explains (and exemplifies) heterotopias cannot help but to raise questions of ambivalence, “whether heterotopia is a world of discipline or emancipation, resistance or sedation” (Dehaene and De Carteu, 2008b: 25), that, in one way or another, may end up in a standstill.

A possible way of working around these dilemmas is by not focusing excessively and exclusively on the conception of heterotopia. Rather, one should attempt to think, as Foucault himself did, heterotopologically — and, in so doing, embrace any conceptual fragility to, then, extend it further. For instance, one of the weak points caught up within the utopia-heterotopia dualism, is figuring out how and where we enact our daily routines, our daily lives. Do they take place in utopia and are immediately reflected back upon us in heterotopia to either create an illusion or amend us for something we lack thereof? Or, else, somewhere in-between? The discourse of everyday life was extensively recomposed, based largely on Lefebvre and de

²³ It is worthwhile pinpointing the incautious indistinctive use of space and place and the confusion it creates when associated with emplacement (‘site’ as it reads in the *Diacritics* translation). Moreover, Foucault outlined the notion of heterotopia at three different moments. It first appeared “in the preface to *Les Mots et les choses* (*The Order of Things*) published in 1966 [...]”; second, in the same year, within a radio broadcast as part of a series on the theme of utopia and literature; and finally, in a lecture presented to a group of architects in 1967” (Johnson, 2006: 75; italics in the original). While in the two first occasions Foucault was talking about *textual spaces*, in the last one, he, undoubtedly, was concerned with *social spaces*. Additionally, there’s a kind of ‘unresolved’ allegation that Foucault borrowed the term from medical jargon (Sohn, 2009: 41); however, Foucault neither seems aware of the existence of the term in medicine, nor did he ever use it in a medical allusion (De Cauter and Dehaene, 2008b: 25).

Certeau, as a critique of its trivialization triggered by the undermining effects of pop culture and alienating consumerism. Also, such 'reinvention' of the everyday has been assessed as a counterargument of Foucault's emphasis on the 'extraordinary' as the locus wherefrom to alter the 'ordinary' dimensions of life (McLeod, 1996). From this standpoint, heterotopias are vital and constitutive elements of our everyday actions — and any revolutionary potential they may embody. Lefebvre (2003 [1970]), interestingly enough, sees a utopian urban dimension of everyday life emerging by uniting coexisting differences and prompted by the clash of heterotopy. What is more, Lefebvre's utopic spaces are somewhat attuned with Foucault's heterotopias, for he sees the utopic as a "non-place and real place, 'half-fictional and half-real', closed and open, concentrated and dispersed, near and far, present and absent" (Johnson, 2006: 83-84).

However, Lefebvre, unlike Foucault, did delineate the way space, in the particular setting of the 'urban', is quintessential to further a political revolutionary project. In space, Lefebvre visualizes an array of differences converging. There is always something going on, something is constantly being produced in a heterogeneous and subversive manner, for it stands against any technical, superimposed and purely functional division of urban space. In short, through creative encounters, "contrasts, oppositions, superpositions and juxtapositions replace separation, spatio-temporal distances", which cripple collective and substantial transformations of urban life (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 125). The constant clashes that, with many twists and curves, condenses everyday life may, in actuality, be heterotopias (or take place heterotopologically), and their analysis should therefore be heterotopological. Any (latent) political revolutionary capacity heterotopias may hold could be thereby better comprehended.

Furthermore, while Foucault's 'Of Other Spaces' is, in effect, his only direct entanglement with a theorization of space and does read incomplete, his spatial thinking was not, at all, limited to it. Throughout interviews with architects, geographers and anthropologists not only is his commitment with spatial problems and praxis traceable, but also when his 'spatial thinking' was most evidently at work (Soja, 1996: 148). As Foucault (1980: 69) himself puts it,

People have often reproached me for these spatial obsessions, which have indeed been obsessions for me. But I think through them I did come to what I had basically been looking for: the relations that are possible between power and knowledge. Once knowledge can be analysed in terms of region, domain, implantation, displacement, transposition, one is able to capture the process by which knowledge functions as a form of power and disseminates the effects of power. There is an administration of knowledge, a politics of knowledge, relations of power which pass via knowledge and which, if one tries to transcribe them, lead one to consider forms of domination designated by such notions of field, region and territory.

The knowledge-power dialectical linkage is, almost undeniably, granted as the cornerstone of Foucault's intellectual work, and a closer examination offers some clues as to how to render less ambiguous the heterotopia-utopia convolution. As it may well be inferred from the lines above, Foucault was never thinking solely and strictly in terms of knowledge and power, for their relationship was actually "embedded in a trialectic of power, knowledge, *and space*. The third term should never be forgotten" (Soja, 1996: 148; italics in the original), because it is the actual intermediary between one and the other. Heterotopias are therefore metaphors but not in a mere figurative sense, they represent and symbolize points in which concrete forms of knowledge and power intersect. The singular shape such intersections take is indelibly spatial and to seize it one has to think not only spatially, but also heterotopologically.

Rediscovering and reapplying critical spatial analysis

Lefebvre and Foucault, each in their respective way, believed that it was of paramount importance to rebalance spatiality with sociality and historicity (Soja, 1989; 1996; 2003). In order to achieve that, a "more comprehensive and combinatorial mode of spatial thinking, one that built upon traditional dualities (material-mental, subjective-objective, empirical-conceptual)" was most necessary to open new ground for practical knowledge to be applied (Soja, 2009: 20). By witnessing the state of agitation sparked by the events of May 1968,

Lefebvre and Foucault were able to decode how spatial formations were constraining emancipatory movements. As a reaction, they detected — again, each in their own manner — the potential of a consciously spatial praxis embodies to assume the overarching task of translating theory into practice (something which cannot be reduced to a series of incremental steps or the like) (Soja, 2010b: 632). Additionally, it became clear to both “the necessity to lead spatial thinking in a new direction, for the old ways had too many dead ends” (Soja, 2009: 20).

Notwithstanding, the ideas of Lefebvre and Foucault were significantly resisted and fiercely condemned. A majority of back then leading Marxist thinkers (e.g. David Harvey and Manuel Castells) found unviable to place so much emphasis on urban spatial causality (Soja, 2009). For example, by the time Lefebvre culminated *The Production of Space*, the “timing couldn’t have been worse: by then Althusser’s reputation was formidable and his structural Marxism was de rigueur” and, on top of that, a book about a space that dares shaking the hard kernel of structural Marxist thought, could not avoid being overlooked and misconstrued (Merrifield, 2006: 101). Manuel Castells, whom Lefebvre had mentored, with *The Urban Question* replete with attacks on him, paved, two years previous, the way to the common (mis)understanding that the city was only a container of social and class relations (Merrifield, 2000: 169). Moreover, Castells believed that “Lefebvre had strayed too far, had *reified* space” and, by putting spatial over social determination, had fetishized it (Merrifield, 2006: 101). Besides those ‘untimely’ controversies that did hinder the circulation of his ideas, Lefebvre’s work, as extensive and thought-provoking as it is, proved within time to have limitations. Issues of gender and ethnicity, for example, aren’t part of his intellectual agenda (probably because he was so much bound to time and space) and, similarly, “Lefebvre was also an excellent analyst of ideology, but he did not spend much time on the semiotic aspects of space” (Gottdiener, 2000: 96). Nonetheless, these ‘curbs’, instead of downplaying his writings, have been picked up by followers to carry out spatial research on disenfranchised sectors (homeless, race minorities, etc.) as well as to look into the way gender and sexuality crisscrosses space production (to name just a few).

Foucault, by the same token, “was simply ignored by his presumed de-radicalized personal politics” (Soja, 2009: 20). Moreover, his work has always been complex to ‘map’: it resists to be cast within the boundaries of ‘something in specific’. Such extreme mutability gave him the label of “political defeatist” since he “did not offer foundational grounds for taking positions, or (even more problematically) that the grounds he did offer were irredeemably defeatist (in that power is seen everywhere)” (Crampton and Elden, 2007: 9). Not surprisingly, ‘hardcore’ Marxists, like in the case of Lefebvre, were apprehensive of Foucault’s political fuzziness. They did not like the notion of freedom as constant practice or process, that is not something granted from above; nor something you aim for and, once reached, nothing else is to happen. Yet, Foucault’s ideas do have systematic blind spots that, in one way or another, turn out to be “politically disabling” (Thrift, 2007: 53).

In spite of the ire of oppositional criticism, neither Lefebvre’s nor Foucault’s views were jettisoned or relegated to intellectual obscurantism; but their theoretical deflections were substantially hamstrung. Critical spatial analysis, as a result, would not develop any further for decades to come (Soja, 2009: 20). Since more or less the turn of the past century, there’s been “a significant sea change in critical social thought, marked by a still incomplete rebalancing of the critical perspectives based on” questions revolving around the production of space (Lefebvre), the making of history (Marx) and the constitution of society (Giddens) (Soja, 2003: 272). Lefebvre (particularly among Anglo-Saxon geographers) and Foucault still animate a lot of debate, their shortcomings have been incorporated more productively seeking to expand their (inevitably incomplete) writings. Lefebvre’s spatial trialectics, critique of everyday life, and urban revolution (to name only a handful of his works) are constantly subject of rich and sharp interpretations (see Goonewardena et al., 2008) and, at the same time, has suffered strange appropriations that twist his theoretical foundations (see, Gilbert and Dikeç, 2008 and Souza, 2010 for sharp discussions²⁴). Foucault, similarly, has been internalized

²⁴ For instance, “the right to the city”, Marcelo Lopes de Souza (2010: 316; italics in the original) writes, “should be regarded (at least by emancipatory social movements and radical intellectuals) as a kind of ‘*contested territory*’, since

prominently by geographers concerned with his power ‘gymnastics’, governmentality and heterotopology and the way Foucault’s texts can be read anew in the light of present-day social, political, cultural and spatial phenomena (see Crampton and Elden, 2007).

The amount and diversity of works building on ‘renovated’ perspectives of space are overwhelming. During almost the past two decades, an intellectual “spatially lifeless periphery [...] [is] becoming actively spatialized, rather superficially in some areas but much more deeply energizing in others” (Soja, 2009: 24). Be that as it may, it has become very clear that spatial thinking or spatial analysis, if critically carried out, is not to adhere to an already established spatial methodology — let alone a ubiquitous conceptualization of space. By contrast, responding to the particular phenomenon to be researched, both the conceptualization and use of space has to be, correspondingly, determined and implemented. This, I truly believe, means moving between two dead ends: different theoretical variations of space and space randomly subjected to different theoretical variations. Any substantial in-between spatial apprehension would be a dignifying heir of Lefebvre’s and Foucault’s heritage.

3.1.3. From thinking space to thinking and ‘following’ spatially

Pivotal to undertake spatial analysis and go beyond vacuous metaphorical allusions and/or static-superficial descriptions of social phenomena, is the conceptualization of the space-place polarization. Precluding that space and place are, mutually and conceptually, interrelated leaves out a whole dimension of analytical relationality, because alternative ranges of cognizance are, at once and de facto, occluded. What one might examine *in* and *through* space is not equivalent to *in* and *through* place, since any spatial/place consideration has a direct implication for either space or place that is not to be merely overlooked. What space allows one to see might as well be absolutely out of sight from a place perspective. Hence, bearing in mind the interface between space and place gives consistency and nurtures the conceptual intelligibility to the narrative of a space/place analysis. Additionally, it recognizes that varying interpretations, out of one same phenomenon, arise in accordance with the ‘type’ of lens that one would be zooming in and out — in this case, *the spatial one*.

Space can, in fact, mean anything or nothing at all. Space, in this respect, ought to be a ‘tracking’, as opposed to ‘repetitive’ and ‘circular’, means of research. It breaks the futile cycle of reiteration, for it also constitutes and expands the elusive object of analysis within a ‘following-spatial’ scientific procedure; as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987 [1980]: 372; italics in the original) argue,

A distinction must be made between two types of science [royal and nomadic], or scientific procedures: one consists in “reproducing”, the other in “following”. The first involves reproduction, iteration and reiteration; the other, involving itineration, is the sum of the itinerant, ambulant sciences. Itineration is too readily reduced to a modality of technology, or of the application and verification of science. But this is not the case: *following is not all the same thing as reproducing*, and one never follows in order to reproduce [...]. Reproducing implies the permanence of a fixed point of *view* that is external to what is reproduced: watching the flow from the bank. But following is something different from the ideal of reproduction. Not better, just different. One is obliged to follow when one is in search of the “singularities” of a matter, or rather of a material, and not out to discover a form [...] when one engages in a continuous variation of variables, instead of extracting constants from them [...]. And the meaning of the Earth completely changes: with the [...] [“reproducing”] model, one is constantly reterritorializing around a point of view, on a domain, according to a set of constant relations; but with the ambulant model, the process of deterritorialization constitutes and extends the territory itself (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987 [1980]: 372; italics in the original).

To conduct my research, I, fundamentally, have not concentrated on exhaustive theorizations of space, to then, by bending them to comply with practical circumstances, test them. Or, even more audacious, propose a praxis. (Having done that would’ve inevitably ended up in

the danger of a *vulgarization* and *domestication* of Lefebvre’s phrase by status-quo-conform institutions and forces is a real one”.

tautological, fruitless assessments). Nor was my aim to portray causes of actions linearly and stagnantly, in non-dialectic and rigorously two-dimensional way — that is to say, ‘staging’ agency, actions and their interactions in a *plane manner* and from an *immobile standpoint*. Using space as an analytical lens is, building on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “ambulant model”, unique, in the sense that it avoids “reproduction”. It is a detective-like task that involves “following”, with as much care as possible, the spatial causalities of the phenomena that is subject to analysis, without ever stating *why* and *how* exactly something happens (beyond the most necessary contextualization, that is). Rather, a ‘following spatial analysis’ is carving a singular, **heterotopological** and not definitive interpretation out of a sea of compound interpretations.




Figure 3.1. Space as a ‘following’ *means* and *object* of analysis. Research examines the spatial underpinnings that influence social relations, which in turn transform spatial underpinnings and gives rise to a constantly changing arrangement of spatial formations that are to be explained and criticized (that is, the way space is produced). Source: own elaboration based on Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 404) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 372).

Moreover, space is both a *means* and an *object* of analysis. As Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 404; italics in the original) sustains: “social relations, which are concrete abstractions, have no real existence save in and through space. *Their underpinning is spatial.* In each particular case, the connection between this underpinning and the relations it supports calls for analysis. Such an analysis must imply and explain a genesis and constitute a critique of those institutions, substitutions, transpositions, metaphorizations, anaphorizations, and so forth, that have transformed the space under consideration”. For sure, it is quite a task to craft, at a double level, an operational concept from a term, such as space (or place), that’s embedded in our daily vocabulary and conveys a number of (sometimes mutually exclusive) meanings (Friedmann, 2010: 152). Indeed, comprehensions of space may come from a distinctive inventiveness: technical-scientific, philosophical, esoteric, hermeneutic, amid others, that stand in opposition or juxtapose one another (as summarized in previous subsections). That proves, on the one hand, that knowledge is **spatially and temporally situated** (is produced somewhere and sometime) and thereupon **circulates specifically** (it moves somehow). Wherefrom and whereto are questions through which to demarcate a potential understanding of space as a means and object of research. Conceptualizing space thusly requires stating its sources and remaining porous and traceable enough: space can’t mean everything, nor anything — *it has to mean something*. On the other hand, aside from the ‘formal’ spatial and temporal coordinates that may set the origin and movement of knowledge and whereby space is signified, theoretical formulations of space and their use in analysis is, by all means, transcendental for both the abstract and concrete dimensions of our worldly lives. In other words, a meaningful analysis of social relations cannot be but spatial (as Lefebvre, expressly, and Foucault, tacitly, developed it).

Precisely in the particularities of the social relations that buttress the case study I analyzed is wherefrom, ultimately, the definition of space took its shape: it is the concrete, far more than the abstract, effects of space that matter (see figure 3.1). Thinking spatially the diverse

aspects into which I deconstructed the case study, accounts for both an attempt to define what exists (ontology) and a particular way of discovering, apprehending and, limitedly, interpreting the world (epistemology). Thus, space is not only an 'object' of investigation that is, first, observed, examined (even dissected) and then written about, but also, and perhaps more importantly so, it has an integrative character that powers the way we see, research and write about social phenomena. (By extension, existing works, even those generated in other fields, might as well be 'spatialized' or read spatially). Spatial analysis, as Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 12) contends, does not go about by subduing the material to the mental, given that the perceptions, symbolizations, significations and imaginations we produce, though can be told apart, aren't detached from physical and social space.

So, what about 'spatial' research in planning? "The relational conception of spatiality, developed in other disciplines, has been rarely discussed in planning arenas and seldom influenced planning content. Hence, planner's conceptual interpretations of the socio-spatial processes have remained surprisingly similar to the ones formed in the mid-twentieth century by a positivist view of the world" (Davoudi, 2009: 243). (Therefore, spatial analysis in planning has fairly more frequently to do with quantitative, GIS-based, approaches, rather than with philosophical, ethnographic qualitative research perspectives). That being so, the analytical use of space I turn to subscribes to both Lefebvre's and Foucault's elaborations — but only to a certain extent and not exclusively. That is to say, I do not intend to mimic their theoretical formulations or to encase them into a practical instance (as in validating them). I, primarily, employ their '*spatial thinking's tactics*' to delve into the other concepts I rely on (e.g. community development). And, in particular, to discover and interpret the singularities of the case study (chapter 4) — echoing Deleuze's and Guattari's words, space as re-territorialization and expansion of the analytical viewpoint.

All things considered, it isn't that space is, by way of some metaphysical character, better than place. I, as the research's 'agent', just happen to consider (of course, rather subjectively²⁵) space more suitable to engage with both the theoretical and empirical aspects of the investigation. As already stated, the understanding of space I apply goes beyond the Kantian perspective of space as an a priori and absolute category towards "*space as process and in process* (that is space and time²⁶ combined in becoming)" (Crang and Thrift, 2000: 3; italics in the original). Moreover, through *thinking and 'following' spatially*, redundant theorizations (either definitive ones that exclude everything else or malleable enough that they apply to anything) are avoided, by acknowledging space as inherently embedded in social practice (as Lefebvre and his cohorts pertinently demonstrate). Furthermore, grasping spatially key elements from the diverse areas the investigation comprises, does enable to more cogently and alternatively study the empirical case. (Thus, the tendency to subject empirical conditions to conceptual assumptions is circumvented). More specifically, to spatially reflect on the politics of protesting of urban social movements, collective local community self-development actions and the radicalism of extra-institutional planning practices, opens up a whole range of elucidation to, then, draw **un-tautological and non-circular interpretations**. Finally, while I remain sympathetic to inputs to planning literature based on the notion of place (or derivatives such as 'place-making'), using explicitly space is meant to give as much as possible analytical as well as textual consistency and clarity to the research.

3.2. Planning: *Radically from below and spatially political*

There are countless treatises about planning. Some discuss theoretically, even at high level of abstraction, what planning must be and how to practice it. Others build on sharp criticism of

²⁵ A purely objective discourse, that in which language is masterly employed by placing the 'magical' prefix 'meta' to whatever is being talked about, is nothing but mere trickery. The reasoning and thereby theoretical constructions and interpretations as well as methods of research I employed respond to a rather circling, iterative style.

²⁶ Despite the fact that 'time' has thus far been occasionally addressed, it is not, by way of clarification, expressly included in the conceptual discussion, for that surpasses the pragmatic limits of the investigation. Moreover, although time undoubtedly still remains widely underestimated or simplified (by reducing it to a Newtonian linear conception) in planning practice and theory, and relational theories on time-space do offer interpretive depth to potentially improve the epistemic and methodological dimension of planning (Graham and Healey, 1999), the time-space relationality proved eventually inadequate when framing the phenomenon of investigation.

planning practices to, then, call for a reconsideration of theoretical aspects (together with moral and ethical implications). There are, too, adjectival formulations of planning: justice, environmental, smart, sustainable, postmodern, and *this* and *that* (denotation of) planning. Although these considerably trendy 'expressions' of planning may contain edifying elucidations, they, more often than not, read substantially disconnected from the on-the-ground reality — where those planning theoretical principles are, at the end of the day, to materialize. There's indeed a sea of possibilities that seem to suggest that theorists and practitioners of planning have been overwhelmed by planning. Planning can now be subject to so many characterizations and connotations that its meaning and implementation, while relativized, can also be easily manipulated to comply with specific sets of interests and goals (the so-called 'planning flexibilization'). Moving along a gamut determined by 'too complex' on one side and 'too simplistic' on the other, "planning protrudes in so many directions, the planner[s] can no longer discern its shape" (Wildavsky, 1973: 127).

In any event, planning, like space, resists definitive theoretical subjugations — in fact, the more planning theory behaves like that, the better it'd be for its practice. However, there exists extensive planning literature abounding with 'guide-design', unidirectional, theoretical formulations of planning. And, though they're doomed to failure if implemented, they're, startlingly, not necessarily outdated. On the other hand, a prolific body of work has, time and again, propounded that planning ought not to be the outcome of (preconceived) procedures and plans, and advanced an enhancement of theoretical and practical scopes. John Forester (2015), who through storytelling has steadily accentuated the importance of fostering planners' communicative skills, draws adventurously an intriguing analogy between planning and cooking. A planner, he says, as much as a cook, has to constantly and creatively reconsider their methods and actions to find out what planning and cooking are and what they might yet become. Thus, both cooking and planning are practices always 'in-the-making' and solely through constant iteration progress can be achieved — yet, any qualification of 'progress' will be troublesome. But the point lies elsewhere: planning would be better comprehended through its practice and critical reflections on how theory and practice never match and, what is more, should never do (akin to the hassle that the space/place disambiguation entails). Research of the theory-practice imbroglio, moreover, ought to be "followed" from an outer and, in particular, inner viewpoint. Practitioners are to be encouraged to reflect on their decisions, actions and concomitant upshots (Castillo, 2016b).

In this respect, Forester (2013: 8), drawing on Donald Schön's (1983) "power of pragmatic analysis", notes that underlying planning is the precept of 'trial and error' which shows "that a practical move (an artist's sketch, a counselor's question, a planner's proposal) can not just express some intention, but it can produce, for better or worse, practical consequences: it can alter in some way the situation at hand". Furthermore, results prompted by planning decisions and actions are very likely to be unexpected. Planning, therefore, may well be seen as the attempt to control the effects caused by 'planning moves' or, to put it differently, to forecast the future through current acts. And that's the core issue: planners (or those partaking in the exercise of planning), rather than searching fate in the future, plan for the future to take the form they intend — all the while overseeing (or, for some reason, choosing not to see) that "the present may be reluctant to give birth to the future" (Wildavsky, 1973: 128). Such paradoxes are deeply entrenched in conventional, institutional or formal planning (the one that 'experts', in its most common sense, carry out) and are the generative factor that broke the ground for other 'informal', 'extra-institutional', 'unconventional' modes of planning to be taken into consideration.

These 'renovated' perspectives argue that planning no longer has to be exclusively generic, bureaucratic and technical. Emphasizing predicaments of decision-making, democracy, citizen empowerment and state limitations, they cut across the policy-making process and seek to re-theorize planning through examining unorthodox practices and rendering them epistemic. Eventually, a way out of the 'traditional' planning's vicious circle is to be found. In sum, these progressive re-conceptualizations of planning aim to rearrange the relationships between the political and technical, the epistemological and normative, dimensions of planning. But, in so doing, a blind spot has been produced and reproduced: critical planning (and related disciplines) theorists, time and again, either fail to seize or enclose within a too abstract

discussion the significance of space (not to mention the absence of the space-place distinction). As a result, planning theory is kept from a more substantive engagement with the arena in which planning actually becomes operative: space — be it in neighborhoods, cities, regions, rurality, towns and all the in-between ‘spatial interstices’ (a grey area of research). In the light of this shortcoming, I shall next revisit the foundations and evolution of “**radical planning**” (Friedmann, 1987), that comprises ‘unusual’ views on planning and whose analytical ‘territory’ I seek to ‘follow’ and expand by addressing the way space is conceptualized within different planning paradigms. Finally, I explore a possible path whereby asserting space into the radical planning discourse by dint of the space-politics nexus and the notion of “dwelling as the production of space” (Castillo, 2013b: 264).

3.2.1. Cracking conventional planning’s hard kernel: *From societal guidance to socio-spatial transformation*

Planning, as aforementioned, is very much entrenched in the theory-practice interplay, which far from being a lax continuum where the former serves the latter, empirical evidence has widened planning thought’s scope significantly. Thus, planning is not an abstract construction easily and universally turned into action, for the characteristics of the milieu — political, ideological, socioeconomic, historical — do influence not only theorizations and practices of planning, but also their interaction. For over the past twenty years or so, there’s been a wave of advocacies putting forward that planners should be(come) ‘deliberative facilitators’ (Forester, 1999; 2001), rather than ‘instrumental rationalists’. That is to say, planners aren’t (allegedly) neutral advisers to decision-makers on how to, rationally and unbiasedly, justify (whatever) decisions (Campbell, 2006: 103). Further, the questions ‘*who is a planner*’ and ‘*what counts as planning*’ have entered other domains of knowledge production that are embodied and enacted by way of alternatives strategies and a different ‘breed’ of planners.

There are a number of contributions that have shown, including context specific examples, that planning could actually be performed in a *radical* way — that is, *not* in a conservative, state-led, top-down and/or scientific manner. And, what is more, both in ‘liberal democratic non-repressive’ contexts and where confrontations with state power are not that successful and viable (see, *inter alia*, Friedmann, 1987; 1989; 1992; Beauregard, 1991; Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Holston, 1999; Beard, 2002; 2003). These contributions criticize the modernist planning paradigm by pointing out its failure to effectively engage local citizens in decision-making processes; provide significant outcomes at the local level; and appreciate as well as incorporate the manifold range of interests, wants and needs in cities and even regions. Moreover, these visions advocate tackling unbalanced power relations producing and reproducing inequalities in regard to ethnicity, gender, sexuality and class (for the most part in ‘post-industrial’ cities) as well as diverse struggles (e.g., shortages of public infrastructure and public goods, evictions, etc.) taking place in urban areas of developing countries (Leavitt and Saegert, 1990; Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992; Friedmann, 1992). Such claims lie at the heart of (any attempt to carry out) *radical planning*, for they seek to reassert the political community in civil governance. However, reaffirming the political community is not only achievable by means of political struggle, it also requires a set of radical reforms and social learning to be set into motion in every realm of public action (Friedman, 1987).

Planning from below: Outside and against formalism

Planning, according to John Friedmann (1987: 36), was for many years understood and applied as rational decisions and actions that steer social collectivities (Robinson, 1972; Faludi, 1973). More specifically, planning was a process whereby scientific knowledge and methods were brought in to render legitimate decisions buttressing policy-making. Planners, consequently, were serving as rational advisers to decision-makers “coming into the game *at* [their] *pleasure*” (Faludi, 1973: 2; italics in the original). In reaction to this ‘synoptic’ mode of planning, which employs rationality as the cornerstone to reach decisions, Charles E. Lindblom (1959; 1979) elaborated his “muddling through” model to argue that decisions must be incrementally and consensually made. Planners, within such scheme, were to mediate and handle conflicts for decisions to continue ‘muddling through’. However, both the ‘synoptic’ and ‘muddling through’ decision-making did not defy the market model rationality, for their

theoretical content proved non-pragmatic and thus ineffectual. Indeed, their “implementation [...] would leave things precisely as they were” (Friedmann, 1987: 37). Despite extensive critique (see, Wildavsky, 2007 [1979]), both continued to be rather popular until new elaborations began pinpointing that planners did not necessarily have to play a role as either an ‘instrumental rationalist’ or ‘mediator’. Also, the ‘formal’ origin of planning practices, which legitimize them, was called into question. Hence, both planners’ nature and repertoires were reassessed by considering the asymmetry of power relations; level of democracy; state representation and accountability; existence and efficacy of citizen participation instruments; and, particularly, the kind of knowledge (resulting from the power-knowledge link) that supports decision-making (Flyvbjerg, 1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2002; 2003). Thus, it became evident that solely through scientific rationalization or communicative facilitation, public policies could not be rendered reliable enough, planners accountable and development more controlled and equal (above all in cities where conflict of interests and disenfranchisement tend to be greater).

There are two distinctive ‘radical(izing)’ elements amid these works. On the one hand, an **epistemological** changeover from only accepting as valid the judgment of official planners and their scientific knowledge to receptiveness to alternative knowledge (e.g., indigenous, local, and gender-specific). On the other hand, a **methodological** shift that recognizes informal processes happening out of traditional, state-led, top-down, planning frameworks. Ideally, planners would therewith value and integrate both the sapience and active input of ‘common’ people (which may be qua urban social movements and/or community organizing). In other words, through such epistemic and methodological variation, civil society could be brought more vigorously and efficiently into the decision-making arena. Based on case-study research and personal interpretation, the incorporation of people in planning decision-making started to be named more precisely: ‘insurgent’, ‘community-based’, ‘grassroots’, ‘bottom-up’ (Castells, 1983; Clavel, 1983; Friedmann, 1987; Leavitt, 1994; Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Douglass, 1999; Beard, 2002; 2003; Souza, 2006). Citizen engagement in planning processes could then take place via formally established procedures and, progressively, people would gain more power through a single set of institutions (Arnstein, 1969). Or, empowerment and know-how are gained to put together and implement planning proposals autonomously — be it “*together with the state, despite the state, [or] against the state*” (Souza, 2006: 327; italics in the original). Such proposals — antagonistic or not — are directed towards formal planning methods and societal structures (Beard, 2002: 15).

‘Daring to bite hand that plans you’: Superseding guidance, furthering transformation

John Friedmann (1987: 75ff.) explains, on the basis of how knowledge and action should be properly interlinked, that planning can be a “societal guidance” or a “social transformation”²⁷. There are, furthermore, four major traditions of planning thought that determine the political ideology of planning action. Hence, in societal guidance by means of *policy analysis* (conservative) and *social reform* (radical) knowledge is turned into action. While in social transformation, *social learning* allows conservatively and *social mobilization* radically to exercise planning (Friedmann, 1987: 76). Thus, radical planning is planning as **social transformation**, no longer concerned with systematic change and based upon the political practices that set social transformations off. Likewise, radical planning, under the social mobilization tradition, seeks to assert “the primacy of *direct collective action ‘from below’*” and stands in clear opposition to the role of the state as the major planning agent using ‘scientific politics’ to legitimate decisions and actions (Friedmann, 1987: 83; italics in the original). Radical planning, therefore, includes all efforts occurring at a variety of scales that seek to alter the social, political and economic structures that originate and safeguards the status quo (Beard, 2003: 16). In practice, the local-community²⁸ level appears to be the most

²⁷ Pointing out the difference between these two converse planning’s conceptualizations (as societal guidance and as social transformation) by means of a continuum, is useful to link the overall notion of knowledge and action in the public realm (Beard, 2003). Nevertheless, Friedmann (1987: 391) himself admits that the knowledge’s source in each of the two variations — respectively, scientific-technical and indigenous, subjective and experience-based — happens to be so unlike, that they should, logically, not be placed into one same continuum.

²⁸ The ‘local-community’ refers to neither a geographical scale nor a politico-administrative division of the territory. It designates a group of people interacting in spatial proximity, with well-established social bonds of cooperation and solidarity and with a marked sense of belonging.

successful dimension (though not without snags and tensions) in which radical planning has, with shadings, been implemented (Friedmann, 1987; Sandercock, 1998a; Peattie, 1968a; 1968b). These examples, it must be noted, are not experiments, they're not preconceived pilot projects 'official' planners implemented. Rather, they represent interpretations of unusual practices that 'non-planners' put together and carried out. Additionally, contextual conditions (from derelict city centers in developed/postindustrial countries to informal settlements in Latin America and Southeast Asia) signal that radical planning, in practice, neither responds to a specific method, nor does it flourish under particular circumstances. It is as though radical planning came about, in fact, by a sort of situated 'spontaneous generation'.

Moreover, between these two encompassing appraisals of planning (as societal guidance and social transformation) conflict, inevitably, emerges due to the clash of interests and mindsets between a bureaucratic state and a rebellious political community. Planners, who are absolutely caught up in the middle of this collision, are thought to turn their view from 'master visions of the city' to actions being suddenly performed in the streets (Piven and Cloward, 1979 [1977]). In reality, planning is to find middle ground somehow and somewhere, since planners are,

[E]nmeshed in a complex of political institutions that are already changing in response to the urgings of civil society and to pressures from the corporate sector. It is planners, and local planners in particular, who must make room for active citizen participation in deliberations, allow for difference in the construction of the built environment, and cooperate with local groups and communities for increasing their access to the bases of social power. Planners are no longer exclusively concerned with "the central guidance" of market forces, or planning regulation. *The new planning is more entrepreneurial, more daring, less codified.* It is participatory, concerned with projects more than with the whole system of relations in the city [...]. Planning in these terms moves ever closer to the surface of politics as a mediating hand within society as a whole. In this role, its expertise is increasingly sought not only by the state, where planning powers formally reside, but also by the corporate sector and even by groups within organized civil society itself [...] [Consequently,] as a profession, planning has already begun to relocate itself in the nexus of the interplay of state, civil society and corporate economy [...]. Whatever direction is taken, it will no longer be centered on the idea of professionals having privileged knowledge of what constitutes the public interest. *And, as it is more difficult to define as state-based process of intervention, planning itself will become less identifiable, but will instead find expression through a variety of forms, including social mobilization and community activation for citizen rights* (Friedmann and Douglass, 1998: 3; italics added).

While 'conventional' planning, put into effect via technocratic-scientific tangled mechanisms and enacted by official planners might as well still be practiced, it will not constitute the single, exclusive and legitimate mode of planning. Claims of social mobilizations, which draw on fairly contrasting mainstreams (social anarchism, historical materialism and utopianism), are to shake the ever-lasting theory-practice conundrum to its foundations and give way to not only different manifestations of planning, but also unorthodox kinds of planners (Friedmann, 1987: 225). Planning would then "find expression" as an enduring process of transformation collectively conceived and implemented. Yet, as "less codified", "daring" and "participatory" the route there might be, it is also full of curves, blind spots and dilemmas.

The democratic puzzle: who, how, and whose behalf actually rules?

The fundamental question of any democracy is: what is the relation between public interest and the most vulnerable? (West, 2011).

How democratic the planning decision-making process is, represents, nearly unquestionably, one of the most difficult and persisting quandaries that the practice of planning deals with. And all the more so, if planning is to be radically practiced and trigger a process of social transformation. Within the frame of elective political systems, it is believed that popular elections not only assure political equity, but also hold public judgment and political decisions (Klausen and Sweeting, 2005). In other words, in elected representatives enough trust is invested for them to reach decisions as they believe is best to safeguard the common good.

In a similar vein, the relationship between decision-makers (for the most part, political and private sector representatives) and advisers (e.g., planners) is depicted as that between master and servant (Faludi, 1973: 2). This somewhat explains why planners have been, habitually, providers of scientific intelligence for decisions to be made, rather than acting defiantly and acknowledging that community aims should only be stated through open public discussion (Altshuler, 1965). Consequently, planners have been highly criticized and accused of being undemocratic for obviating the opinion and concerns of, notably, those who most directly undergo the effects of their 'moves' (Fainstein, 2005).

If planning, among other things, is about making choices, which demands the ability to tell right from wrong, good from bad, and so on, it must not be treated lightly how decision-making end up affecting people's socio-spatial living conditions (Campbell, 2006: 92). Therefore, planners have to tackle delicate questions such as: 'good' or 'bad' for whom? And, according to which interests are cities to be socio-spatially transformed? 'Conservative' planners, as aforementioned, recourse to scientific knowledge to support decisions and to thereby break 'neutrally' free from these predicaments. Such demeanor of planners is sustained insofar as there is the prevailing perception — and somehow the acceptance — that the state is the sole (or, leastways, the most powerful) planning agent. "There are 'good' (importance and centrality of the state apparatus as a regulatory institution, access to public resources) and bad (ideology, 'state-centrism', the myth of the state as a guarantor of 'common good' and 'public interest') reasons for that" (Souza, 2006: 328). Whether for good or bad reasons, the state is, misleadingly and persistently, taken for granted as the only one 'calling the shots', due to not only its capacity to enact and control development (e.g., land use through urban law) but also its resources to foist decision upon citizens (Souza: 2006: 328). In addition to that, in whose best interests the (local) state operates, is neither a clear nor a simple question.

Democratic societies, not surprisingly, are met with issues of inclusion in decision-making, because either elected representatives do not have enough supremacy to reach decisions or mechanisms of inclusion have become too selective (Klausen and Sweeting, 2005: 224). On such account, Robert Dahl (1961; 1989) contends that hierarchical and centralized control — i.e., representative hegemony — is no longer viable due to the complexity and fragmentation prevailing in modern societies²⁹. Hence, in order to achieve *governability*, collective actions need horizontal coordination between public and private actors (Dahl, 1989). However, this pluralistic model of civic governance, based on the idea that 'no one in particular governs', has been contradicted by the "elite theories of urban politics" (Parker, 2004: 122). Given that ruling establishments, generally and strategically, share both identities and aims that are manifested in voluntary associations and policy groups, they can, covertly, influence and cox decision-making (Domhoff, 1970; 2010 [1978]; Logan and Molotch, 1996 [1987]: 199). Furthermore, even if corporate officials appear to be absent from local politics, that does not mean that they do not hold any power. Conversely, that is a tactic to still be able to manipulate the local agenda without having to be actively involved in decision-making³⁰ (Logan and Molotch, 1996 [1987]: 221). All in all, critics of the pluralist model tend to coincide that, at stake, is the ability to decide what is set aside and what is included in the decision-making agenda, which largely determines the power structure in any given community (Parker, 2004: 123) and, thus, the dynamics of (local) politics, administration and planning. Consequently, the intricate definition of the *public interest* is less and less perceptible and find constantly unexpected expressions that, time and again, exclude marginalized sectors — which, paradoxically, amounts to a voting majority. Power, too, takes heterogenous forms (Foucault's

²⁹ Already in his most reckoned work *Who governs?*, Robert Dahl (1961) argues, on the basis of an extensive fieldwork in New Haven, Connecticut, that the leadership of the city, formerly dominated by an oligarchic and elitist polity, had become pluralistic and diverse. Furthermore, Dahl claims that, despite the still existing inequality at the level of the individual, pluralism allows group mobilization. By means of the creation of coalitions, a wider range of people could compete for power and prevent thus its monopolization (Parker, 2004: 123). Notwithstanding, Dahl's accounts have been, ever since its publication, subjected to critics. G. William Domhoff (2010 [1978]) conducted a detailed review of Dahl's work (including his personal notes) and states that in New Haven there is in fact a ruling class largely composed and influenced by an organized business community.

³⁰ Though this apparent 'absence' of corporate managers is regarded as a proof of their skills, capacity and effectiveness, there are circumstances in which they can no longer 'work through others' and have to jump into the urban politics arena, such as the opening of a good investment opportunity or when ordinary ruling systems fail to secure their interests (Logan and Molotch, 1996 [1987]: 221).

“powers”) enabling dominant and resourceful minorities to thwart the pluralistic principle, in which democracy (representative and participative) rests on and without drastically disrupting the status quo.

Is participatory democratic planning, then, pure fabrication? Embracing, rather than pre-empting, conflict

In the case of planning — and urban planning in particular — it is to wonder how ‘horizontal coordination’ can be attained and how governments can overcome the issues of (effective) representation and narrowing of inclusion. Also, producing a *real* public agenda, that conflates all distinctive interests of civil society, market and state, cannot help to seem but a pipe dream. Ever since the switch from “managerialism” to “entrepreneurialism” (Harvey, 1989) and in the wake of “urban-neoliberalism” (Souza, 2006), prominently local governments devote all efforts to capture investments and increase competitiveness. To that end, private developers, transnational companies, amid other ‘global actors’ are given exceptional privileges through processes of de- and re-regulation. By, for instance, increasing flexibility in land use regulation, controversial concessions are granted without ostensibly altering the existing state of affairs. As a result, the production of space in cities, competing with each other in global ‘rankings’, is mostly dictated by a free-market economy logic, which suffocates and excludes large sectors of societies (not only specifically in cities where global flows of capital are poured into, but also elsewhere in distant locations) (Massey, 1991; 1996). Planning, then, is instrumentalized to advanced ‘blueprint’ schemes, normally implemented through public-private partnerships, to upgrade derelict quarters, promote cultural landmarks, built mega-projects, amid others.

Bent Flyvbjerg (1998a; 1998b; 2000; 2002; 2003) sustains that, if planners are to find margins to maneuver within such ‘straitjacket’ scenarios, they’ve got to tactically tackle and tangle the power-rationality relationship. Be it in ‘formal’ or ‘informal’ planning, a ‘right’ amount of power ensures the capacity to state what counts as valid knowledge and reality (an exemplification of Foucault’s knowledge-power ‘gymnastic’ relation). The crucial difference is whether power is exercised to *determine*, rather than *discovering*, what reality is. According to the stability of power relations, reality can be either established (when rationality becomes rationalization) or revealed (when rationality is collectively, locally and endogenously construed). Power relations are both dynamic and reciprocal and, for that reason, quarrels might emerge from steady as well as rickety conditions. Moreover, in “so far as power relations are an unequal and relatively stable relation of forces, it’s clear that this implies an above and a below, a difference of potentials” (Foucault, 1980: 200-201). Therefore, antagonistic confrontations tend to be far less recurrent since they are, as soon as possible, converted once more into constant power relations (which nevertheless may well preserve an uneven distribution of power and potentials). Planners, given these circumstances, have to grasp how power and rationality relate with one another in such a way that they can spot instances where to implement ‘tactical moves’. In so doing, they are to appraise how power relations are produced and maintained through power(ful) discourses. As Foucault (1979: 139-140) explains,

What rules of law set into motion power relations that produce discourses of truth? Or, what type of power is susceptible to produce discourses of truth that are, in a society like ours, endowed with such powerful effects? [...] [Moreover,] in a society like ours, but in the end in any society, multiple power relations traverse, characterize, constitute the social body; and these power relations can neither be dissociated and established, nor become operative, without a production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of discourse. There is no possible exercise of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth [...]. We are subdued by the production of truth through deploying power and we cannot deploy power by no other means than the production of truth.³¹

Disputes that affect decision-making in planning are more frequently shaped by stable power relations, rather than by confrontations amid parties involved (Flyvbjerg, 2003: 322). Power, thus, is withheld and utilized to generate the most necessary discourses of truth whereby

³¹ My translation from a Spanish edition.

ascertaining, creating and validating concrete physical, ecological, social, economic realities (Flyvbjerg, 2003: 320). To put it another way, inasmuch as the economy of planning's discourses of truth manages to accumulate potentials, a particular epistemology and methodology gives rise to particular spatial formations. Since the upshots of the power-rationality interconnection are indelibly spatial, planners need to consider not two, but three elements interacting: **power, knowledge and space**. (Planning theory that stresses its 'political' dimension, though replete with insights into the power-knowledge intercourse, neglects, for the most part, the third element).

In 'formal' planning, power relations are normally unwavering and unequal, which enables planners to go about technocratically, because conflict is considerably evaded. Alternative discourses on planning have therefore turned to other sources of knowledge (and, certainly, of rationality) to underpin planning strategies, instead of futilely antagonizing 'formal' planning decisions and actions. Such decision-making planning processes, nonetheless, are not automatically conflict-free. Notions utilized to indicate 'what is to be done' and, especially, 'what is actually done', either inside or outside official planning frameworks, are permeated with dissent, dispute and even violence (Campbell, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 1998a; 1998b; 2002; 2003; Watson, 2003; Yitfachel, 1998; 2009). On such account, challenges in planning decision-making processes cannot be successfully addressed through mechanisms that hinge exclusively on consensus-seeking: power and conflict, with all their implications, are, instead, to be brought to light³². After all,

Forms of participation that are practical, committed and ready for conflict provide a superior paradigm of democratic virtue than forms of participation that are discursive, detached, and consensus-dependent, that is, rational. [...] [Furthermore,] in order to enable democratic thinking and the public sphere to make a real contribution to democratic action, one has to tie them back to what they cannot accept in much of modern democratic theory: conflict, power and partisanship (Flyvbjerg, 2003: 326).

Furthering, pragmatically, democratic participatory planning does require the recognition that conflict is intrinsic to it. Although it could be alleged that, by dint of scientific politics, conflict is tempered; that only happens at the expense of un- or misrepresented parties. Equally deceiving is the idea of taming conflict through consensus-seeking participatory mechanisms and tools. Without accepting conflict, understanding power relations dynamic behavior, bias, coexistence of antagonistic interests and tensions, perverse and naïve notions of democratic planning decision-making are irremediably fed and reproduced. Planners need (to learn) to plan *with* and *through* conflict and, by extension, disabuse themselves. To that end, planning practice is to distance — without necessarily detaching completely — itself from state-led interventions and turn into a key ally of organized groups within civil society (something that, while easily said, isn't that readily attainable). Additionally, planning practitioners must make room for other epistemic practices that cut across indigenous as well as gender-, ethnic and sexuality-specific modes of knowledge production.

Eventually, organized groups within civil society could even, to a certain extent, do without planning expertise (at least in its most conventional acceptance) and autonomously prepare and enact their own planning strategies (as some case-study based research shows; see, inter alia, Sandercock, 1998a; 1998b; Holston, 1999; Beard, 2002; 2003). (This broaches the subject of the level of self-sufficiency citizens may actually acquire, in order to manage their own development, which for a hard core of planning expertise may well tend to zero). Social movements, for example, are not only thought to embody alternative sorts of knowledge but

³² Collaborative and communicative approaches to planning (see, e.g., Forester, 1999; 2001; Healey, 1997; 2003) are proven insufficient to address the questions of power and conflict in pluralistic democracies. Following a Habermasian tradition, collaborative planning reduces the matter of planning — in terms of policy and planning theory as well as the convoluted interaction between power and conflict — to creating a consensus depending on an ideal assignation of roles and the achievement of, a quite unlikely, neutrality. Therefore, planners rather than change agents, become normative experts on communication safeguarding what Giovanni Ferraro (1996) aptly called the "book of good manners" (Flyvbjerg, 1998a; 1998b; 2002). Generally speaking, the shortcomings of collaborative/communicative planning result from the (sometimes excessive) devotion planning theorists pay to normative models, which, according to Howell Baum (1996), is utilized as a 'comforting' device through which somehow everyday reality (of those being affected by planning) could be denied and replaced by something more reassuring.

are also regarded as 'critical agents' of radical planning and counterparts of societal guidance planning — especially in the specific context of urban areas (Souza, 2006). Overall, the shift from planning as societal guidance to social transformation can, in effect, follow diverse paths, which can be simultaneously a feeble and strong trait. Likewise, radical planning discourse, in underscoring that planning decision-making is in want of an epistemological and methodological variation, underplays, somewhat inadvertently, a key element: space. Again: it is knowledge, power *and* space that are at play. In view of this threesome, I next look into the spatial conceptualizations that have, by and large, animated planning theory and practice. Since spatial imaginations aren't, at all, dispassionate, they lean — and accordingly drive planning — to societal guidance or social transformation. What is more, the conceptualization of space is "central to the construction of a particular form of power/knowledge" (Massey, 2005: 69). Thus, the hard kernel of conventional planning is to be cracked out by spatially radicalizing the political and technical dimensions of planning — which, instead of mediated, are kept apart by specific formulations (and even occlusion) of space (Castillo, 2013b: 262).

3.2.2. How is planning spatialized? *From neutral container to ever-changing reification*

Planning theory abounds with spatial conceptualizations, which have had divergent informative impacts on its evolution. Paradoxically, the practice of planning continues to be primarily influenced by Euclidean-Positivist notions of space that fall back on "a Cartesian atomized ontology" which "posits an essentially mechanical and mathematical representation of reality" (Merrifield, 1993: 518). Consequently, planners predominantly treat space commonsensically and imprint on it a static character and containing function. As a matter of fact, the application of 'critical spatial analysis' that, as formerly reviewed (see subsection 3.1.2), has been happening in various intellectual fields, seems to have somewhat bypassed planning, given that "at the time when the centrality of space in social theory and in disciplines such as sociology, cultural studies and economics was on the rise, planning was slow to respond to this renewed enthusiasm for spatiality, despite the fact that space and place are at the centre of its disciplinary focus" (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 9).

Although there is a substantial difference between space and place and their mutual constitution isn't always entirely engaged with (see subsection 3.1.1), both concepts have permitted to supersede theoretical and analytical stringencies. Thus, formulations like 'urban', 'regional', 'local', 'global' and others of that ilk, usually employed as some sort of spatial unit in diverse areas (most notably in geography and planning), commenced to straggle behind (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 11). (However, they're not out of the spectrum and haven't completely turned into platitudes). The spatial turn, as a general philosophical 'movement' and within every encompassed field, "is hardly the product of a few ivory tower intellectuals. Rather this shift in social thought reflects much broader transformations in the economy, politics and culture of the contemporary world" (Warf and Arias, 2009: 4-5). In planning, for example, due to economic, political and cultural transitions that cities and regions have undergone over the past twenty-five years, governance apparatuses are faced with the challenge of creating, anew, forms of both integration out of fragmentation and 'spatial coherence' in the midst of a reigning inconsistency (Madanipour, 1995; Davoudi and Strange, 2009). In other words, "the new ways of 'doing governance' need to be linked to new ways of thinking about space, place and territory" (Madanipour et al., 2001: 3). Such linkage would require, amid other things, a movement from "analyses of modern space [that] tend to cluster around the planned city as the emblem of modernity" to "postmodern readings [that] tend to emphasize the chaotic and anomic experience of [...] [modern] space [...], or the possibilities of resistance to the centralizing, 'striating' forces of modernity" (Gilbert, 2009: 105). This type of effort, yet tardy, is quite needed if space is to be reasserted far more into planning practice (where an unvarying conceptual ubiquity of space reigns) than into planning theory (where there's a lively and assorted conceptualization of space).

In that regard, Simin Davoudi and Ian Strange (2009) show, thoroughly, how the conception and usage of space³³, within different planning paradigms, can be identified according to three

³³ The authors explicitly include place in their work too. And, while they see place different from space, they don't deal with their distinction, nor their mutual relationship. Be that as it may, their retrospection comprehensively encircles a wide range of spatial imaginations (more than of place or of territory) that have permeated planning theory and practice.

major philosophical currents: **positivism, structuralism and post-structuralism/postmodernism**³⁴. Further, under these three overarching traditions, other key concepts (spatial organizing principles, time and future) as well as criteria (planners' role, knowledge and skills, mode of implementation, amid others) of planning behave somewhat consistently (see tables 3.1 and 3.2). With that in mind, I will revise, in more detail, the spatiality of planning when space is positivist, structuralist and post-structuralist/postmodern and underscore, in each case, the role every 'spatial imagination' plays within the planning 'in theory' vis-à-vis 'in practice' inconsistency. Afterwards, I examine how planning can be radically (re)spatialized as a means whereby exploring an alternative to deal with such dichotomy (though not seeking for a solution, but an equilibrium).

Positivist space: The process follows the object of planning

Positivism in spatial thinking is closely bound to "evidence-based planning" (Davoudi, 2006), whose cornerstone is Patrick Gedde's aphorism "survey before plan" (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 17). Likewise, and perhaps more prominently, imprints of a positivist spatial thinking are found in the reformist ideas of the *Garden City Movement*, initiated by Ebenezer Howard. Though he wasn't, sensu stricto, a physical or urban planner, his visionary ideas were trying to provide suitable answers to problems incited by industrial urbanization (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 17). Howard's garden city, furthermore, served as inspiration to other subsequent projections, with certain nuances, of how cities ought to be: Arturo Soria Mata's *Ciudad lineal* (Linear city), Georges Benoit-Lévy's *Le Cité Jardin* (Garden city), Theodor Fritsch's *Die Stadt der Zukunft* (The city of the Future) and well-renowned Charles Édouard Jeanneret's *La Ville Radieuse* (Radiant city) (Hall, 2002 [1988]: 118-120). Although these utopian visions of urban futures were subjective and far from systematic and analytical, they all exhibit, to a greater or lesser extent, a positivist spatiality (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 17).

The bedrock principle of this positivist spatiality is that space is a neutral and static container of human activity (Hubbard et al., 2004). Such elucidation of space reached its peak with the rise of the Modern Movement (Tony Garnier's and the *Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne* functionalism). Modern postulates of urban development dogmatically state that, through a rigorous spatial ordering, social problems in cities could be not only reversed but also avoided. All it takes is a 'flawless' geometrical form and the establishment of certain limits (of both population and area). As Le Corbusier (1971 [1924]: 220, italics in the original) fervently writes: "*the city of to-day is dying because is not constructed geometrically. To build on a clear site is to replace the 'accidental' lay-out of the ground, the only one that exists to-day, by the formal lay-out*". Furthermore, conceiving space as a limited entity, susceptible to physical and perceptual delimitation, underlined much of the orthodoxies of the post-war planning systems, specifically the aim of restricting and comprising urban growth (Hall et al., 1973; Ward, 2004). Planning, consequently, was meant to impede the uncontrolled expansion of cities and keep the 'urban way of life' from creeping into the surrounding 'immaculate' countryside (Davoudi and Stead, 2002).

The representation of positivist space (one of Lefebvre's simultaneous dimensions of space) was dominated by architectural, engineering and surveying discourses, which were best captured in the Modern Movement's manifesto, *La Charte d'Athènes*. As a result, land uses and associated (demographic, social, economic, etc.) data were scientifically depicted in two-dimensional abstract maps (Strange and Davoudi, 2009: 19). This form of spatial representation operated as "an inscription that translated space into diagrammatic form, thereby reducing spatial relations to a single sheet of paper" (Murdoch, 2006: 134). Such form of spatial representation is inherently flawed, because, while trying to delineate the city in a legible way, a spatial formation emerged holding "some things [increasingly] constant (notably, buildings and streets) and removed others from view (notably, the movement and

³⁴ There is sweeping debate about the suitability of these designations. However, the ultimate purpose of drawing on them is to provide a guiding principle to the different modes of spatial thinking. There are, in any event, overlaps: ideas aren't restricted to each of the intellectual streams. Moreover, since I never attempted to come up with, say, something like 'post-structuralist/postmodern spatial planning' (or the like), it'd be fairly pointless to discuss what is considered as post-structuralism/postmodernism or not, and so on and so forth. Likewise, these philosophical paradigms, when reviewing conceptions of space in diverse theoretical elaborations of planning, are not seen as thresholds, for they, rather than having disappeared or cancelled each other out, are very much concurrent.

fluidity of urban social interaction” (Murdoch, 2006: 134). During the 1950s, out of this physical design approach came the master planning tradition characterized by the Geddesian ‘survey-analysis-plan’ premise. In addition to that, utopian spatial visualizations of cities needed take the form of blueprints for them to be materialized by way of a resourceful and powerful state planning apparatus (Davoudi and Strange, 2009; Ward, 2004). Planners, then, played an ostensible apolitical role, for they were the experts, imaginative and visionary enough, to bridge the gap between the analysis of the survey and the actual making of the plan, given that,

Plan and planning decisions were made largely on the basis of intuition or, rather, on the basis of simplistic aesthetic conceptions of urban form and layout which embodied physical determinism assumptions about how best to accommodate the diverse economic and social life (Taylor, 1998: 15).

The prevalence of such deterministic, empirical-physical conception of space was, in time, challenged by the emergence of divergent offshoots of the positivist spatial science. Accordingly, a schism took place, wherefrom two planning mainstreams, in the beginning of the 1970s, sprang. On the one hand, the ‘system view’ of cities (connected to ‘substantive’ planning theory and concerned with **the object of planning** — *what to plan*). And, on the other hand, planning as a rational process of decision-making (which deals with ‘procedural’ planning theory and focuses on **the process of planning** — *how to plan*) (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 20). Consequently, “planners were urged to move away from simple descriptive physical surveys represented in detailed maps and blueprints towards developing general hypotheses about spatial distribution that could be tested against the reality” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 21).

From this incursion of both systems’ theory and rationalism, a ‘cybernetic model’ of planning was derived, according to which “a system [...] can best be organized by being subordinated to a directive intelligence” (Giddens, 1994: 8). Planning, thus, started to be comprehended on the implicit assumption that linear history equates to progress, and that objective reason was sufficient to manage urban development (Madanipour, 1995: 22). However, the cybernetic planning model was constrained by the fact that “many decisions, to be taken effectively, have to be made ‘on the ground’ through the use of tacit knowledge and practical skill” (Giddens, 1994: 66). It therefore became, in due course, evident that planning, on such a comprehensive scale — cities and regions — was an **“epistemic impossibility”** (Giddens, 1994: 66). Further, such systematic and rationalist view of planning intended, in the very end, to formulate and enact ‘spatial laws’ (à la CIAM) that would arrange human activities, which returned primacy to the *object*, over the *process*, of planning. Two crystal clear attempts to achieve such aim are Walter Christaller’s “central place theory” and Constantinos Doxiadis’ “Ekistics theory” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 22). The former proposes that, by means of a uniform hexagonal organization of service hubs, a hierarchical spatial structure is obtained, and chaotic urban dynamics are, in consequence, thoroughly contained and ordered. The latter, based on the supposition that human settlements are prone to systematic inquiry, propels that an ideal dynamic growing city must be “uni-directional [...] and built on the basis of a rectangular grid network of roads” (Doxiadis, 1968: 365).

Space was thereupon conceived as a “surface on which the relationships between (measurable) things were played out” (Hubbard et al., 2004: 4) and regular patterns, existing in the relationships between objects, can be both mapped and modelled in terms of direction, distance and connection (Wilson, 2000). Thus, a “new language of spatial physics where human activities and phenomena could be reduced to movements, networks, nodes or hierarchies” (Hubbard et al., 2004: 4) emerged as the foundation for the forecasts planners relied upon to predict and control future patterns of urban expansion (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 22). The planning process (subject to the object of planning: the flat socio-spatial parcels on maps) was regarded as a logical progression of decision-making. Guided by the rational-scientific advice of planners, it was based on five consecutive steps: (i) definition of problems/goals, (ii) identification of alternative plans/policies, (iii) evaluation of these alternatives, (iv) implementation of chosen plans/policies, and (v) monitoring and reviewing of implemented plans/policies. However, the application of technical rationality to the planning process, whose aim was to pave the way to progress, ended up being pricy and unpractical

(Ward, 2004). Not only the conjecture “that complex political and socioeconomic processes could be technicised, commanded and controlled” proved wrong, but also “the incapacity of the state to turn planners’ ‘imagined places’ into physical reality” became evident (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 24).

Thus, procedural planning theory and its positivistic conception of space were highly criticized and seen as ‘empty’ (Taylor, 1998: 96ff.). The core issue was that procedural planning theory, with its ‘spatial physics’, rather than pinpointing planning’s defects and trying to correct them, was aimed at defining planning and space anew. It remained at a purely formal and abstract level without ever substantially having enhanced planning’s praxis (Taylor, 1998: 97). More specifically, Allen J. Scott and Shoukry T. Roweis (1977: 1098) argue that procedural planning theory goes about reducing planning to an “abstract analytical concept” instead of viewing it as a “sociohistorical phenomenon”. Similarly, Marios Camhis (1979: 5-6) sustains that procedural planning theory, in insisting that “the right form of the planning process will inevitably determine the right content or what the real problem is”, dismisses that “too much preoccupation with procedure or method in the abstract tends to push aside the real issues”. Michael Thomas (1982 [1979]: 20), likewise, stresses how planning ought to turn its attention to the actual content of planning: the particular spatial changes in the environment effected by planners. Moreover, procedural planning depoliticizes planning (and, by extension, space), since “the political process will be substantially replaced by rational planning as the principal means through which people communicate with each other about the society they live in. Politics [consequently] appears as an adjunct to planning” (Thomas, 1982 [1979]: 21). To put it another way, procedural planning theory, implicitly, conveys the idea that rational planning is to supplant politics (Taylor, 1998: 97). All in all, dissensions about the effectiveness of procedural planning point out that the theory of planning has to stem from planners’ practical experiences, instead of trying to precisely define what a rational(ization of) decision-making has to be like. It was therefore a calling “for planning theory to be grounded in the empirical investigation of the real world” (Taylor, 1998: 110). This, in turn, revealed the incapacity of planners to grasp the (further) implications of the spaces they were planning for. Planning theory, consequently, is rendered abstract, general and detached from substantive matters, given the

Definite mismatch between the world of current planning theory [...] and the real world of practical planning intervention. The one is the quintessence of order and reason in relation to the other which is full disorder and unreason [...] Planning theory set itself the task of rationalising irrationalities [...] bringing [...] a set of abstract, independent and transcendent norms (Scott and Roweis, 1977: 1116).

There is, too, in such unrealistic task, a remarkable lack of any sense of the specificity or prevailing role of power — an aspect highly determinant for decision-making. Procedural planning theory’s unassailability, furthermore, says almost nothing about the way the empirical dimension of planning is, as formerly discussed, convolutedly entrenched in the production of space and colliding forces thereof. This disavowal, as Jane Jacobs (1992 [1961]: 440) notes using a system analysis approach, is due to the propensity (if not incompetence) of planners not to regard cities as bundles of interacting and interdependent processes intermeshed in complex ways. Planners, operating deductively, should then go from the particulars to the generals “to seek for ‘unaverage’ clues involving very small quantities, which reveal the way larger and more ‘average’ quantities are operating” (Jacobs 1992 [1961]: 440). Therefore, planners could eventually overcome their view of cities as simple zones in a map. Overall, there was a need to, on the one hand, inject into planning theory experiential accounts of planners when faced with problems unfolding ‘on the ground’. On the other hand, the ‘fetishism’ of positivist space was to be superseded, in order to not only recognize and embrace the density of spatial patterns, but also how they originate and may change over time and the role all this plays within social, political, economic and cultural processes. This, ultimately, led the way of structuralism into spatial thinking (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 26).

Structuralist space: The process continues to follow an ‘unmasked’ object of planning

The introduction of structuralism in both planning and geography took place via structuralist Marxism (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 27). Yet, space was mostly ‘referred to’ via various

metaphors such as base, superstructure, layer, and the like; which, in one way or another, bear some resemblance to positivist space. Such posture was an effort to not get carried away by a ‘fetishism’ of space; that is,

The creation in the structure of spatial relationships of an autonomous determinant to history and human action separated from the structure of social relations and the production process that generates it (Soja, 1980: 208).

It was, thus, not until Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) developed his theory on the production of space, that a turning point towards a wider understanding of the Marxist dialectics applied to spatial thinking was marked (though not without fierce disapproval). Already in preceding works of his — such as *Espace et politique* and *La survie du capitalisme* — Lefebvre had begun his spatial theorization as a dichotomy between mental and social as well as ‘ideal’ and ‘real’ space (Schmid, 2005: 205). Within his theory of space, as being produced out of ‘three coinciding moments’, Lefebvre sustains that both *social time* and *social space* are integrative part of social practice: they are thus **social products**. As such, far from being universal they must be comprehended in their innate context, for every society and every mode of production construct a space of their own. In other words, the diverse processes that unfold in each society create “their own forms of space and time” because they “do not operate *in* but *actively construct* space and time and in so doing define distinctive scales for their development” (Harvey, 1996: 53, italics in the original).

In spite of the analytical ‘quantum leap’ Lefebvre’s theory meant for Marxism, other contemporaneous Marxist readings of cities were reluctant to give too much importance to space — at least in the manner Lefebvre was putting it forward. David Harvey (2009 [1973]), one of the introducers of Lefebvre’s ideas into English-speaking academic circles, evidenced, for a while, skepticism about his analysis on urbanism, Marxism and, above all, space (Soja, 1980: 207). In Harvey’s (2009 [1973]: 304) early writings on the *organization* (vis-à-vis Lefebvre’s *production*) of urban space, the process of urbanization, he explains, need “[b]e regarded as a set of social relationships which reflects the relationships established throughout society as a whole. Further, these relationships have to express the laws whereby urban phenomena are structured, regulated and constructed. We then have to consider whether urbanism is (1) a separate structure with its own laws of inner transformation and construction, or (2) the expression of a set of relationships embedded in some broader structure (such as the social relations of production)”.

Harvey, Castells and followers of theirs believed that Lefebvre was bending towards the former condition of space and had, accordingly, fetishized it. Nevertheless, they couldn’t see that Lefebvre, in the end, rather than space in itself (*contextual* space), was addressing “the concrete and subjective meaning of human spatiality” (socially *created* space): while the former may well primeval, the former “is a product of social translation, transformation and experience” (Soja, 1980: 210). The Achilles’ heel of structuralist Marxism was, in effect, its incapacity to grasp that space is neither a self-governing entity, nor the mere manifestation of class structure. What is more, “[r]ather ironically, the primary source of misunderstanding over the relationship between social and spatial structures may lie in the failure of Marxist analysis to appreciate the essentially *dialectical* character of this relationship and that of other relationships which are structurally linked to it, such as that between production and consumption” (Soja, 1980: 208; italics in the original).

Consequently, in structuralist Marxist theory space is, for the most part, both underplayed and underestimated, since it is seen subject to other, more relevant, structural interactions. Space is thus regarded as socially produced and consumed, but in a non-dialectical manner. Moreover, it is in space where other kind (social, economic, political) relations intersect (or are fixed) following (and embodying) asymmetrical power geometries (Massey, 1991). Space appears not only detached and independent, but also, and simultaneously, intermeshed in structural relations. In brief, some sort of ‘positivist spatial fetishism’³⁵. Due to such ambivalence and inconsistency in structuralist Marxist spatial thinking, very little was altered

³⁵ For further details about what characterizes ‘structuralist’ space, see subsection 3.1.1 (particularly, in the part called *Turning the table: Space have always been first — and kicking!*).

in the practical realm of planning and “at least not fundamentally, the way in which practicing planners produced plans. Neither did it change the content of planning” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 29). Notwithstanding, Marxist analysis strip planning from its alleged ubiquitous character of ‘agent of change’. Moreover, the role of the state (as the most powerful actor) and its relationships with planning systems and market (as the rationality supporting the ‘right’ type of urbanization) were exposed as mistrustful. Planning, therefore, was considered not only as an integrative power of an unequal urban development (and its material distributive effects), but also as “necessary to the ruling class in order to facilitate accumulation and maintain social control in the face of class conflict” while, at the same time, “managing the contradictions of capitalism manifested in urban form and spatial development” (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1979: 148).

Structuralist Marxism, in general, brought to the fore the judgmental as well as the political dimension of planning (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 30). However, the technical and objective nature of planning theory and practice was not significantly modified, because its Marxist reassessment revolved mostly around the need for planners to behave differently within the planning process (leaving the object of planning basically untouched). Hence, planners were thought to become either advocates, mediators, disjointed incrementalists or informed and technical catalysts in decision-making. Paradoxically, all these prescribed roles reveal, in one way or another, the acceptance of logical positivism (Hall, 2002 [1988]). In sum, while the perverse dynamics dictating urban development (the object of planning) were revealed and contested, the implementation of planning strategies (the process of planning), though intended to improve, remained sterile. Insofar as Marxist analyses of the urban phenomena stuck to an undialectical perspective that did not acknowledge the general relations of production as both social and spatial, the incursion of space, as socially produced, was held off. Once a divergent stance on urbanization began to develop, the debate shifted from people and things ‘in’ space (i.e., the physical arrangement of things) to a more comprehensive theory of spatialization. Correspondingly, a hermeneutic understanding of socio-spatial reality (namely Lefebvre’s fundamental contribution) made an incursion into social sciences — and eventually into debates on planning and space. Lefebvre’s “three-dimensional dialectic” (Schmid, 2008: 27), actually, spearheaded the transition to a post-structuralist spatial thinking and might as well be regarded as “the early manifestation of relation thinking about space” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 29).

Post-structuralist/postmodern space: Planning for the future, when the future is no longer what it used to be

Poststructuralist/postmodern discourses render space *relational* in an intricate ‘**hyper-manner**’. Therefore, space and its production, as integral parts of social reality, are better grasped through an interpretative, rather than explicative approach, based on the premise that the,

Social world must be understood from within rather than explained from without. Instead of seeking the causes of behavior, we are to seek the meaning of action. Actions derive their meaning from the shared ideas and rules of social life, and are performed by actors who mean something by them. Meanings [...] range from what is consciously and individually intended to what is communally and often unintendedly significant (Hollis, 2003 [1994]: 16-17).

Post-structuralism/postmodernism, thus, differs from both positivism and structuralism because it refuses the way modern social science *explains*, in a definitive manner, the truths about the social world’s nature — those “grand narratives of social theory offered by positivism and particularly structural Marxism” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 31). To put it another way, post-structuralist/postmodern theorizations, despite differences amongst them, have, as common denominator, the rejection that social action is determined by underlying superstructures. More specifically, post-structuralism begat a turn to representation and a call for identifying and interpreting the meaning of both individual and collective action. To

that end, ‘culture’³⁶ was placed at the heart of inquiry allowing a close connection with the postmodern disbelief in the modernist metanarratives about social life (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 32). All in all, “there is no sharp difference between poststructuralist and postmodern philosophies” provided that “poststructuralist philosophy criticizes the certainties of modern knowledge [...] its claim to coherence, neutrality and truth, while postmodern philosophy carries this further to an alternative discourse based on oppositional modes of understanding” (Peet, 1998: 208)³⁷.

According to Michael J. Dear and Steven Flusty (2002a: xi), postmodernism may be characterized as stylistic, epochal and methodological, for it deals with three distinguishing — yet interrelated — matters: first, “a series of distinctive cultural and stylistic practices”; second, “the totality of such practices, viewed as a cultural ensemble characteristic of the contemporary epoch”; and third “a set of philosophical and methodological discourses that are antagonistic to [...] the hegemony of any single grand theory”. To put it differently, postmodernism is a *style* (the use of language to generate new subjectivities that supersede the persistency of modernism), *epoch* (to state that modernism has been ‘left behind’) and *method/philosophy* (ontological positions that rebut universal truths like the metanarratives of modernist rationality and the Enlightenment). Out of this last third postmodern trait, developed a post-structuralist/postmodern spatiality, most notably in the field of human geography. As Jonathan Murdoch (2006: 13/14) sustains,

Post-structuralism allowed new theoretical openings to be made; it enabled the creation of new spatial imaginaries, which seemed to stem from outside the closed worlds of spatial science and structuralist Marxism [...]. These spaces could all be seen as ‘disruptions’ of, ‘commotions’ in, the spatial orders that had been established by earlier geographical approaches (such as spatial science, with its distances, lines and surfaces, and Marxism, with its carefully layered social strata). They therefore helped to undermine taken-for-granted notions of robust and enduring spatial structures, forever imposing strict patterns of spatial ordering throughout given societies.

On such account, post-structuralist human geography aims at disentangling the complexity of a given *locale*, which is “a complex synthesis of objects, patterns, and processes, derived from the simultaneous interaction of different levels of social process operating at varying geographical scales” (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3). The emerging prominence of space, within postmodernist/poststructuralist discussions, became then a reaction against the primacy of time within modernist inquiry (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 34). However, the point was not to replace time with space, rather “*to understand the simultaneity of time and space in structuring social behaviors [...] the study of the contemporaneity of social process and spatial pattern over time and space*” (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3, italics in the original). By “social process”, moreover, it is meant the political, economic and sociocultural processes that structure the time-space fabric and allude to “the mechanisms of conflict, production and exchange, and human interaction that characterize every society to varying degrees” (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3).

Underlying this characterization of society is the notion of identity, which is so much social as it is spatial. As Doreen Massey (1991: 28) notes, “if it is now recognised that people have multiple identities then the same point can be made in relation to” spaces and, it must be acknowledged that, “such multiple identities can either be a source of richness or a source of

³⁶ Culture is, for sure, a multifaceted concept. Zygmunt Bauman (1999: xiv) provides a felicitous elaboration that helps to comprehend the import of culture within post-structuralist/postmodern spatial thinking. He writes: “the sense-given ambivalence, the genuine foundation on which the cognitive usefulness of conceiving human habitat as the ‘world of culture’ rests, is the ambivalence between ‘creativity’ and ‘normative regulation’. The two ideas could not be further apart, yet both are — and must remain — in the composite idea of culture. ‘Culture’ is as much about inventing as it is about preserving; about discontinuity as much as about continuation; about novelty as much as about tradition; about routine as much as about pattern-breaking; about norm-following as much as about the transcendence of norm; about the unique as much as about the regular; about change as much as about monotony of reproduction; about unexpected as much as about predictable”.

³⁷ Although post-structuralism and postmodernism, properly speaking, aren’t synonymous, they do seem to be two sides of the same coin (hence, I use the ‘post-structuralist/postmodern’ expression for consistency and to not employ them interchangeably). In any case, their distinction needn’t be further elaborated for the purpose of discussing post-structuralist/postmodern spatial thinking and its influence on planning theory and practice.

conflict, or both”. Therefore, the idea of space being culturally produced (the outcome of cultural politics) and the ways “in which identity and difference [are] articulated across space” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 35) come to the fore in poststructuralist/postmodernist spatial thinking. That being so, space is the upshot of multiple relations that encounter and intersect one another, which, in turn, allows new relations to be constantly created together with new spatial identities. This fluidity renders space open and vibrant — that is, *ever-changing*. Its distinctiveness, furthermore, comes from the “constellation of relations that meet and weave together at a particular locus” (Murdoch, 2006: 22).

The ‘**relationality**’ of poststructural/postmodern spatiality, moreover, states that space is neither fixing nor containing social practice, for it, rather than be embodied by individuals, is performed collectively on the base of a relational structure (Thrift, 2004: 87). In consequence, spaces, drawing on Foucauldian and Deleuzian versions of poststructuralism (more engaged with embodied practices and object worlds than with language alone) are “territories of becoming that produce [constantly] new potentials” (Thrift, 2004: 87). These potentials are materialized given the openness of space and the constant combination and intersection of spatial and social interactions. Space, thus, “is practised and performed in the same way that social identity and belonging are practised and performed” (Murdoch, 2006: 17). As Nigel Thrift (2004: 91) puts it, the world turns out to “be a kaleidoscopic mix of space-times, constantly being built up and torn down. These space-times normally co-exist, folding into one another, existing in the interstices between each other, creating all manner of bizarre and unexpected combinations [...]. Some space-times are more durable [...] [while others] flicker into and out of existence”.

Such instability of poststructuralist/postmodern space refutes, straightforwardly, the “ambivalence of the idea of order-making, that hub of all modern existence” (Bauman, 1999: xiv). Space, then, cannot be ordered, it cannot be tamed — a ubiquitous spatial reality, one that cannot be resisted, cannot be asserted. Post-structuralist/postmodern spatial thinking happens, therefore, in terms of: **unpredictable interactions** (from the global to the local), **multiplicity** (the various relations that traverse space and thus materialize spatially) and **openness and dislocation** (wherefrom new spatial assemblages continuously spring) (Massey, 1999: 27-28; Murdoch, 2006: 20). Moreover, the relational production of poststructuralist/postmodern space entails both consensus and dispute. Entities reach agreements and align forces to then jointly steer the making of space and, in so doing, exclude and force other entities and their concomitant relations.

The post-structuralist/postmodernist conceptualization of space explains, on the whole, the way social and spatial relations interlink and focuses on points of contact and juxtapositions. Space, thus, instead of being composed of layered structures, results from encountering, diverse and complex relations, whose *contextual* spatial origins may well be far apart from each other (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 36). Further, the relationality of poststructuralist/postmodernist spatial thinking alters the perception of both cities and regions, for they “are seen as sites of heterogeneity juxtaposed within close spatial proximity, and as sites of multiple geographies of affiliation, linkage and flow” (Amin, 2004: 38). Such paradigmatic change of scope should, at least in principle, impact the way planning is theorized and practiced.

Despite the prolific debate, mainly led by geography scholars, that has taken place about post-structural/postmodern space, little of it has resonated in the field of planning. What is more, the limited amount of literature that has tackled the issue of planning and post-structuralism/postmodernism — without necessarily addressing space — stays at a high level of abstraction (see, e.g., Allmendinger, 2001; Beauregard, 1989; Dear, 1986; Soja, 1997); with a few exceptions, though, that deal with empirical research (Sandercock, 1998a) or specific research aimed at showing the connection with planning practice (Hirt, 2002; 2005). In general, these works are structured around the idea of how planning has to cope with ‘post-structuralist/postmodern’ times to, then, reinvent itself. In such (potential) reinvention, the commonly accepted origin of planning as a modernist institution must be superseded to give way to a post-structuralist/postmodernist planning project (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 36-37). Planning, hence, is to forsake those utopian, grandiose and transcendental narratives of

cities, those carved-into-stone theoretical foundations, and those dreams of homogeneity, impartiality and totalizing order. Planning, under those circumstances,

Rather than [...] reasserting old epistemological truths [...] must attempt to meet the opposition head on, on its own grounds, by creating a critical and progressive postmodernism of resistance and reconstruction, by opening up the possibility for a planning process and a planning theory that are radically in and for postmodernity rather than outside and against it — or else perilously suspended between (Soja, 1997: 245).

Furthermore, Edward Soja (1997: 245-247), explains that, for such a paradigmatic shift in planning to happen, three aspects must be taken into account: first, a flexible and open epistemology that prevents planning theory from, one more time, falling into the trap of a 'planning manifesto'. Second, the openness of planning is to embrace, understand, encourage and incorporate into the planning process the social reality as it is; with its inherent fragmentation, multiplicity and difference. Third, post-structural/postmodern planning theory should entail a politics of the body, further the production of non-domineering built environments (as well as counteracting the existing ones)³⁸, and new cultural politics that highlight concepts such as location, positionality, place, site and context (Allmendinger, 2001: 160-161) — which advocates for the acceptance of the innate heterogeneity through which societies are constituted. In sum, “the text of a postmodern planner, in fact, should be consciously fragmented and contingent, non linear, without aspiration to comprehensiveness, singularity or even compelling authority” (Beauregard, 1989: 385).

Michael Dear (2002 [1986]: 166; italics in the original), perhaps the author who first tackled the question of planning theory in the frame of a post-structural/postmodern era, through a deconstructive genealogy of previous planning traditions³⁹ (from 1945 to 1985), explains that every discourse carries its own technologies, codes, texts, and epistemologies, which in the end become “*a pastiche of practices*” in which planning theory “has been isolated as a babel of languages, most of which are voluntarily ignored by practitioners” and planning practice “has developed into a ritualized choreography of routines”. In view of such disparity, Robert Beauregard (1989, 1991) suggests a reconstruction of planning theory that includes the post-structuralist/postmodernist’s critique of institutional planning, while, at the same time, keeping normative justification — an evident modernist feature — for planning action. In a way, the idea of a post-structuralist/postmodern planning cannot help to appear abstruse (if not far-fetched), given that post-structuralist/postmodern “social theory at worst precludes planning or at best cannot be easily interpreted as a basis for planning” (Allmendinger, 2001: 27). Post-structuralist/postmodern planning theory shall therefore be **eclectic** and **non-syncretic**, which could even mean the upsurge of variegated planning theories (just as Dear demonstrates). A miscellaneous range of planning treatises should ideally stem from the specificity of contexts and situations; that is to say, out of planning practices (particularly those that take place out of, and against, institutional and professionalized planning traditions). Eventually, a “postmodern utopia” may be achieved with “the minimum foundations necessary to create a new order of urban civility out of the current new world disorder, and link these to the debates about urban governance and planning” (Sandercock, 1998a: 183). From this cogent practical point of view, post-structuralist/postmodern planning is to, first, be set into motion and materialized to, then, fully grasp what it is about (the ‘inevitable’ trial and error principle). A post-structuralist/postmodern planning has still to undergo more discussion, which will require “openness, the opportunity to challenge and expose the status

³⁸ Both the “politics of the body” and the oppression exercised through the built environment are connected to the ambivalence that permeates the idea of ‘order-making’ as the core of all modern existence. As Zygmunt Bauman (1999: xiv, italics in the original) contends: “[m]an-made order is unthinkable without human freedom to choose, human capacity to rise imaginatively above reality, to withstand and push back its pressures. But inseparable of the idea of man-made order is the postulate that freedom is to result in the end in establishing a reality which cannot be so resisted; that freedom is to be deployed in the service of its own cancellation. That *logical* contradiction in the *idea* of order-making is in its turn a reflection of the genuine *social* contradiction constituted through the order-making *practice*”.

³⁹ In his “social history of planning knowledge”, Dear (2002 [1986]: 163) begins with technocratic physical planning and, from then onwards, creates an evolving parallelism between systems approach (both substantive — design modelling — and procedural — rational decision-making — planning theory) and choice theory (advocacy, transactive, creative, hermeneutic, radical planning theory). The former results in “reconstituted physical planning”, whereas the latter ends in “social theory of planning”.

quo and existing power relations, and the need for constant reflection” (Allmendinger, 2001: 240).

One of the loose ends of such debate is, precisely, space. Michael Dear (2002 [1986]), somewhat superficially, points out that, in one way or another, future planning discourse must incorporate the evolving notion of post-structuralist/postmodern “**hyperspace**”. This proposition entails, for planning purposes, a high level of intricacy, given that post-structuralist/postmodern hyperspace is characterized by its capacity not to let the individual human body to locate itself, not to be able to perceptually arrange its direct milieu, nor to cognitively map its position in a mappable external world. Such post-structuralist/postmodern spatial condition — the disconnecting seam between the body and its built environment — serves as a symbol and analogue of “the incapacity of our minds, at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects” (Jameson, 1991: 44). The physical environment of cities, in the face of post-structuralist/postmodern hyperspace, is resulting in an atomized “pastiche of built environments in unsynchronized, aesthetic-functional disharmony” (Dear, 2002 [1986]: 167). It is thus overriding the modernist project of cities, which was meant to simply reproduce “the logic of the system itself at a greater level of intensification, running on ahead and transferring its spirit of rationalization and functionalism, of therapeutic positivism and standardization, onto built space not yet even dreamed of” (Jameson, 1991: 163).

Overall, a marked difference may be stressed between spatial thinking in, on the one hand, positivism and structuralism and, on the other, post-structuralism/postmodernism: whereas under positivism the aim is to transform (at once, anew and in spite of its current condition) the built environment and structuralism ‘uncovers’ the economic and social contradictions through space, post-structuralist/postmodern spatial thought, following a theoretical non-figurative reading, can be best understood as the production of a (new) concept of space, rather than as the production of some form of emancipatory utopian space⁴⁰ (Jameson, 1991: 164-165). Given such particularity of a ‘hyper’ post-structuralist/postmodernist spatial thinking, it is, indeed, a quandary to assert how planning theory and practice must be redefined, in order to deal more effectively with the challenges of fragmented, multiple, relational and differential contemporary societies. The prospect, again, is nothing but bewildering: planning literature does not entirely engage with such spatial implications, nor are there many epistemic practical reflections on them — it does appear as though planning has to come to terms with a spatial future that is no longer what it used to be.

From positivist societal guidance to post-structuralist/postmodern socio-spatial transformation

As seen in tables 3.1 and 3.2, while positivist and post-structuralist planning concepts and criteria are discernable as, respectively, societal guidance and socio-spatial transformation, structuralist ones might go either way (perhaps because of its narrow influence on planning theory and practice). Incidentally, divisions among currents of thought are only figurative (though they read in the tables neatly separate), given the overlays between the spatial imaginations, modes of implementation, types of citizen participation, envisioned role of planners, etc. that therefrom emanate and that have animated planning theory and practice. (After all, positivist, structuralist and post-structuralist/postmodernist ideals in planning theory and practice are coincident, rather than consecutive). Further, a transition from societal guidance to socio-spatial transformation, as graphically suggested in both tables, isn’t an unproblematic and linear movement from one end to the other (Friedmann also sees this impossibility [see note 28]). Contrariwise, it would be a somewhat ‘chaotic’ and erratic assembly that may well appropriate, reinterpret and deploy elements from all of the three ‘waves’ of thought (Dear’s “pastiche”). Also, it constitutes a process of **discovery**, rather than of **affirmation** (which does not exclude the use of conceptual assumptions). There is, as well, a gray area that must be conceded: almost everything that can be said from a post-

⁴⁰ This, by way of clarification, does not have anything to do with the visualizations of unbuildable projects done by contemporary architects showing grotesque and parodic buildings and/or urban complexes.

structuralist/postmodern perspective is still raw and hypothetical — though not for that useless. Moving towards socio-spatial transformation, thus, requires a great deal of imaginative iteration and ‘critical pragmatism’.

A possible explorative path, in that regard, could begin with underscoring the aspects with which post-structuralist/postmodernist planning is concerned: an increasing participation (particularly of disenfranchised minority groups; though not in a classic Marxist sense); identifying and integrating cultural specificity and spatial identity; a growing valorization of historical authenticity; counteracting the modernist zoning principle in favor of a mixed and flexible land use; and furthering compact and more ‘human’ cities (Hirt, 2005: 28). These ideas are, by far, not new — they are traceable in previous planning paradigms and critiques. At issue, then, is rethinking all these interests in the light of a post-structural/postmodern theoretical and spatial shift and see the extent to which the content and process of planning may be substantially changed.

Regarding the content of planning, space as culturally produced should infuse the way planners reinterpret the spatiality of planning — that is, the object of planning. Planning practice, eventually, may well mirror Henri Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974]) triad of dialectically interconnected dimensions of space, by simultaneously exposing perceived (mental), conceived (social) and lived (physical) space in concrete action (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 38). To this end, the input of local identities turns out to be vital, for they hold the cultural dimension of space production and, thus, enough capacity to alter the interaction between the three dimensions of space in clear defiance of the (all too modernist) hegemony of space ‘conceived’ and safeguarded by ‘conventional’ planners. Correspondingly, furthering lived spaces goes hand in hand with seizing, imaginatively through storytelling (Healey, 2007: 215), the spatial narratives that embody everyday life experience, senses of belonging and co-existing identities.

The treatment of time, additionally, ought to open up to the rhythms of everyday life — as Henri Lefebvre (2007 [1992]) contends in his *Rhythmanalysis* — to highlight ‘present’ and ‘real’ time; in contrast to a ‘perfectly’ and linearly planned future time. “The study of rhythm (of rhythms)”, Lefebvre (2007 [1992]: 6) explains, “can proceed in two ways”,

One can study and compare cases: the rhythms of the body, living or not [...]. This remains close to practice; in confronting the results, the scientific and/or philosophical spirit should arrive at general conclusions. Not without risks: the leap from particular to general is not without the danger of errors, of illusions, in a word, of ideology. The other procedure consists in starting with concepts, definite categories. Instead of going from concrete to abstract, one starts with full consciousness of the abstract in order to arrive to the concrete.

Both possibilities are not mutually exclusive, they complete each other. For planning purposes, an inclination towards the second way of ‘rhythmanalysis’ could enable planners to get a grip with people’s everyday trajectories and encounters, by using, “with its attendant risks”, “speculation in the place of analysis, the arbitrarily *subjective* in the place of facts” (Lefebvre, 2007 [1992]: 6; italics in the original). In a similar vein, John Friedmann (1993: 482, italics in the original), in defining how space and time are to be assumed for them to underpin a “non-Euclidean form of planning”, states that “the time of such planning is the *real time* of everyday events rather than imagined future time [...] it is only in the evanescent and still undecided present that planners can hope to be effective”. Yet, the notion of future is not to be discarded at once, but redefined embracing the idea of “uncertainty and risk, with policy developing in unexpected ways into an unknown and disordered future” (Davoudi and Strange, 2009: 38). In synthesis, theoretical struggle continues, practical efforts, irrespective of how wide or reduced their span might be, are to be spotted. In short, planning as socio-spatial transformation need a radical spatialization of both its *object* and *process*. I will next outline a possible path.

3.2.3. What might planning yet be(come)? *Radical(izing) spatial(ly) planning*⁴¹

From a broad point of view, planning has two main dimensions: a *technical* and a *political* one. On the one hand, there is the '**technocratic-scientific**' feature of planning, which deals with all the requirements (information availability, time frames, technical resources, level of uncertainty, etc.) that constitute the 'rational programming of planning'. On the other hand, there is the '**political**' facet of planning whose cornerstone is the ethical dilemma of legitimizing (certain) means to (certain) ends, within the always convoluted process of decision-making (Mäntysalo, 2005: 31; Forester, 1993: 9). Planning, as has been hitherto widely discussed, has to do with space and its conceptualizations (spatial thinking) have, indeed, had varying bearings on planning theory and practice. Space, furthermore, is where, in one way or another, the political and technical side of planning seem to clash and coalesce. There have been, for instance, essays to de-politicize planning, by way of a positivist spatialization of the planning's *object* and/or a technocratic rationalization of the planning's *process*. But, time and again, such initiatives have proven inadequate and the outcomes of their implementation have been, to say the least, far from what was intended. Spatial thinking in planning has normally been subject to whether planning theory and practice are more of a political or technical bent. Thus, theorizations on space (as succinctly assessed in subsections 3.1.1 and 3.2.2) range from 'absolute' (more technocratic-scientific like) to 'relational' (more political like) approaches. From 1950 onwards an **absolute spatiality** — largely influenced by Euclidean and Newtonian thought — has resounded in almost all of the planning praxis and ideas (Graham & Healey, 1999), in such a profound way, that to have considered another planning model — which would have implied a different mode of spatial thinking — could have meant the abandonment of planning as a whole (Friedmann, 1993: 482; Davoudi & Strange, 2009: 13).

This, to a greater or lesser extent, explains the consolidation of technocratic physical-design planning, whose understanding of space followed closely the vision of architectural and engineering discourses — with their delirious 'blueprints of the future' — were material, tangible and fix elements are, over social interactions, prioritized (reality as intended versus as it is). While the ideas buttressing this mode of planning flourished mostly in Western Europe and North America, they were rarely put into effect there. Soon they began to be implemented in other, distant contexts, with no need for acclimatization, due to its alleged 'universality', since "its notion of alternative futures is based on absent causes and its methods on a theory of total decontextualization" (Holston, 1999: 158). Furthermore, far from fading in the midst of a chaotic myriad of disparate planning ideas and practices, technocratic physical-design planning seems to have refurbished itself (Dear, 2002 [1986]: 163). Be that as it may, space is as much practiced as technocratically conceived. There is, moreover, enough empiric evidence that 'conventional' physical-design planning epistemic and methodological **strategies** and unwanted upshots have been defied and counteracted, from both within and outside formal-institutional planning frameworks by way of alternative **situated tactics** (embodying 'other' forms of reasoning and performing planning). These experimental practices — what Leonie Sandercock (1998a: 129) pertinently calls "a thousand tiny empowerments" — comprise, to varying degrees, experiences of radical planning. However, much of what is reflected upon recurrently misses the role of space. Insofar as radical planning practices are indelibly spatial, a spatial reading cannot help to be but appropriate. Thus, as a way for radical planning practices not to end up 'suspended' in their innate ephemeral nature, I suggest that planning is to be radicalized through a political-like re-assertion of space, which, ultimately, places *lived* and *enacted* space at the heart of planning theory and practice.

Beyond a (continuously reconstituted) fixed spatiality of planning

Space, as aforementioned, responds to the dominant dimension that determines the praxis and theorization of planning, and this, in turn, is bound to a question of either **ambiguity** or **uncertainty**. When planning is theorized and exercised, predominantly, as a scientific task,

⁴¹ Some of the ideas contained in this subsection have been, within another framework, earlier developed in Castillo (2013a; 2013b).

planners face problems of uncertainty, because there is not, perhaps, enough or adequate information (i.e., they seek evidence). When issues of legitimacy arise together with divergences between values and interests, planning becomes more political and planners are in need of practical judgment to deal with ambiguity (i.e., they look for justification) (Forester, 1993: 88ff.). To put it differently, uncertainty is concerned with the 'content' derived from the planning method, while ambiguity reacts to questions of the 'context' of the planning method. Legitimacy, additionally, is at stake when certain choices have to be justified over others and whether or not 'what works' can be standardized (Mäntysalo, 2005: 31).

The spatiality of planning is thus affected by both dimensions of planning and their concomitant dilemmas — ambiguity and uncertainty — and, ideally, encompasses the content as well as the context of the planning method. In practice, though, planners are not likely to envision space in such a way that recognizes its capacity to be, simultaneously and variously, **'abstract'** and **'concrete'**. As Łukasz Stanek (2011: 133) explains: "space appears to be a general means, medium, and milieu of all social practices, and yet it allows accounting for their specificity within the society as a whole". By contrast, the predominant Cartesian static and neutral spatiality of planning has reduced issues of ambiguity to uncertainty and the political dimension of both space and planning has been, consequently, suppressed. This clampdown of the 'political' in space and planning is based on the naïve assumption that the complexity of economic, cultural, social — let alone political and spatial — processes could be steered and controlled solely by means of a scientific planning method.

For Henri Lefebvre (1976 [1970]: 30), such mode of planning praxis reveals that there is not an epistemology of planning, for it places the emphasis on the 'pure' physical form of, and not on people living in, cities. Moreover, contends Lefebvre, inhabitants shall very likely have to adapt their lifestyles to the proposed spatial scheme, since their needs, views, opinions and desires are not part of the planning process. To overcome this narrow sense of planning and space, the 'political' in them has to be stressed. Provided that the political dimension of planning goes hand in hand with ambiguity, planners must accept, as a given, that social and political judgements are inherently part of decision-making (Forester, 1993: 9). Equally important is to go beyond positivist fixed space as the cornerstone of planning practice, which can be achieved by delving into the dynamic relationship between space and politics.

Space and politics: Towards a more pragmatic spatiality of planning

Spatial thinking has to be re-conceptualized in planning theory and practice in a way that, as proposed by Mustafa Dikeç (2011), is not only an apprehensible manifestation of things available through the senses (after Rancière) — that is, *concrete/contextual*/space. Also, avers Dikeç, space is a "domain of experience", which conjugates space as the sensible manifestation of things and as a system of relations (that is, contextual and relational space intermingled in perennial 'becoming'). This combination allows, through various boundary-making practices, to form identities through either separation or relation. On the whole, space is to be seen as "a mode of political thinking"; that is to say, "thinking concepts in our experience of the world spatially [...] a way of engaging with the world, a way of making worlds spatially through and in action" (Dikeç, 2011). For such an 'unorthodox' view of space to fit into the planning theory and, what is more, practice, a "critical analysis" is required along with what Henri Lefebvre refers to as "the science of space", which would have to be twofold, since,

Like anything else, space is a historical product in the classical sense of the term. The science of space, therefore, must be asserted at several levels. It can be viewed as a science of formal space, that is to say, close to mathematics; a science which employs such concepts as construction density, network analysis, critical path analysis and program evaluation and review techniques. The science, however, cannot only be situated at this level; it cannot remain formal. Critical analysis defines how and according to what strategy a given space has been produced. Finally, there is the study and science of the contents of a given space, or in other words, the people using this space, people who perhaps are opposed to the physical form or purpose of the space (Lefebvre, 1976 [1970]: 31).

The “science of space”, it could be argued, may well help to harmonize the dual condition (technical/political) of planning, as long as it does not restrict itself to the ‘formalities of space’ and opens up to the complexities of the (social) production of space, where “an indefinite multitude of spaces, each one piled upon, or perhaps contained within, the next: geographical, demographic, sociological, political, commercial, national, continental, global [...] nature’s (physical) space, the space of (energy) flows, and so on” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 8) are constantly being produced and shaped. Eventually, both the construction and modelling of space are the resulting interaction of natural and historical elements, that planners come to see as — and thus work with — myriad socio-spatial processes that crisscross politics and ideologies (Lefebvre, 1976 [1970]: 31). Space, accordingly, is conferred a **political** and **strategic** import.

Still, it must be clarified that space is not political in just one unambiguous way. In that regard, Lefebvre’s (1976 [1970]: 33) equation of space and politics (“I repeat that there is a politics of space because space is political”), though clearly states the tension- and conflict-ridden nature of space, should not be taken literally, because space is “contested and it is imbued with conflict as a product of a multitude of processes and dynamics with material effects” (Dikeç, 2012: 674). Hence, deeming space ‘politically’ is “thinking spatially [...] precisely about making possible such spatial variety — establishing new relations, exhibiting new connections, imagining different forms, leaving room for still another form or pattern to be spatialised” (Dikeç, 2012: 674). In sum, a far-reaching political conceptualization of space is about grasping what renders space political, rather than crafting a new and ultimate meaning of space (Dikeç, 2012: 671).

A situation in which such political spatial thinking could become operative in planning is the deconstruction of rationalities and logics of action (undergirding systems of governance and domination) that superimpose and establish a particular, or several, spatial orders — for instance, through the “clean sweep” philosophy of planning (Ravetz, 1980: 23). Moreover, these spatial orders reflect the dynamic linkage between rationality and power, which, in the frame of planning, means the argumentations supporting the ‘right’ kind of knowledge to reach/enforce decisions. The issue is that power, as assessed by Michel Foucault (1984; 1989; 1979), is not necessarily an ‘outer distortion’. It is, conversely, very much entrenched in the mechanisms of bureaucratization and commodification — both to which space is subjected to — of each society; to the point that power prominently determines much of the cultural and social framework that people use to define their societal roles and identities — what Pierre Bourdieu (1995 [1984]: 15) calls the constituent of the ‘*habitus*’⁴². Thus, as Foucault’s shows through his ‘heterotopological’ spatial thinking, power, knowledge and space combine carefully with one another to give way to *certain* spatial arrangements that keep *others* from thriving — yet, any given spatial ordering is inherently transformation-prone.

That being so, space operates as an integrative lattice that might as well be at the service of politically and economically dominant groups (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]: 9). Yet, the hegemony over the configuration of space can be challenged, contested and, ultimately, reconfigured, according to Saul Newman (2011: 345), by considering the question of space as the realm of **radical politics** and coupling the notion of ‘political space’ with the project of **autonomy**. One possibility whereby furthering such linkage would be through the direct and active inclusion of “spaces of representation” into, above all, the practice of planning to defy the persistence of the mere “representation of space” — those distorted mixtures of knowledge and ideology expressed in blueprints (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 45). To that end, planners are to become ‘thinkers of dwelling’ and focus their ‘moves’ also on the epistemic “spatial practices” (as opposed to only on statistical data) that join together “daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and

⁴² Habitus are those socialized norms and tendencies that steer our behavior and thinking, which stem from the interplay between structures and free will (Bourdieu, 1984: 170). Moreover, Bourdieu (1995 [1984]: 15) calls the habitus the “acquired dispositions, the durable ways of being or doing that are incorporated in bodies”. “Habitus” Bourdieu (1977: 95) previously wrote, “has an endless capacity to engender products — thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions — whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production”. And, “as the product of history, habitus produces individual and collective practices, and thus history, in accordance with schemata engendered by history” (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]: 91).

leisure)” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 38). In other words, reconsidering, radically, the *object* and *process* of planning.

Dwelling as the production of space

Lefebvre’s theory of the production of space is structured around a ‘**triple dialectic**’ consisting of three simultaneous spatial moments: perceived, conceived and lived space — which can be reformulated as: spatial practices, representation of space and the spaces of representation (Stanek, 2011: 128). For Rob Shields (1996: 161, italics in the original) the spatial practices are, “with all its contradictions of every day life, space perceived”, representation of space are “discourses *on* space” that form space conceived, and spaces of representation “might be best thought of as the discourse *of* space [...] this is space *as it might be*, fully lived space’.

More specifically, the *representation of space* comprises the abstract theories and philosophies of planners, geographers, architects, engineers, developers, and others of either a scientific or bureaucratic bent (Merrifield, 2006: 109). In the representation of space conceptual spatial depictions, interconnected with product relations, express the logic and form of knowledge, power and ideology, in order to impose a particular (spatial) order (Shields, 1996: 163-164). To that end, planners, as technocratic sub-dividers of space and social engineers, “identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 38). The representation of space is thus the dominant space of any society, the space of capital, state and bourgeoisie (Merrifield, 2006: 109). It is a central factor within the production of space and materializes, for example, in physical landmarks (monuments, towers), in traditional (factories) and contemporary (office complexes) industrial hubs, and in “bureaucratic and political authoritarianism immanent to a repressive space” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 49).

On the other hand, the *spaces of representation* are defined by the practice of appropriation aimed at seeking change and taking over space. They, too, “receive meaning from symbolic objects, attendant imaginary, and mythic narratives” that enable the individual, as a result, to relate to the community due to a historical and experiential tie (Stanek, 2011: 131). These ties are established because “space as directly *lived* through its associated images and symbols [...] overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 39, italics in the original). The spaces of representation may well be a café around the corner, a hangout in a park or square, a lively and noisy street where rules of cohesiveness or consistency do not fit (Merrifield, 2006: 110). They are therefore *alive*, in constant changing and vibrancy, they “embrace the loci of passion, of action and of lived situation” and may well be varyingly categorized as “directional, situational or relational” provided that they’re “essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 42).

The *spatial practices*, moreover, allude to the creation of a specific spatialization and, what is more, “the ability and freedom to do so is the prime index of quality of social life” (Shields, 1996: 162). In other words, the spatial practices are the ‘space of dwelling’ that tells the mental abstract space of planning (i.e., the representation of space) from the actual lived space of people (i.e., the space of representation), since the former is always “systematic and coherent (‘subordinated to a logic’)” (Stanek, 2011: 131) and rests upon a system of verbal signs, while the latter “need obey no rules of consistency or cohesiveness” and “tends towards more or less coherent systems of non-verbal symbols and signs” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 41/39). The spatial practices can come to the fore by ‘deciphering’ space, by digging into the *perceived* space — that is, “people’s perception of the world, of their world, particularly in its everyday ordinariness” (Merrifield, 2006: 110). Spatial practices hence unfold at the specific spatial ‘ensembles’ that respond appropriately to the social formation (Shields, 1996: 162), as they operate as a framework for lived reality, all those interactions and patterns that join people and places, images and realities, work and leisure together (Merrifield, 2006: 110).

To sum up, it is by **freely dwelling** that space is actually produced in such a fashion that lived space may overcome conceived space — or, leastways, impact profoundly its conception. Such is the predicament that planners have to translate into the *object of planning*. Instead

of secluding social life from their spatial imaginations, the latter must result from the former. While planners may well still resort to ‘classical’ instruments to represent space, the contents of those representations are to describe a gamut of opportunities wherefrom unexpected and untamable spatial orderings would flourish time and time again. In the long run, spaces of representation are fostered: those ‘popular’ (re)appropriations from the space ‘dominated’ by hegemonic forces of either the state or the capital and that, in due course, become “the site of possible emergent spatial revolutions” (Shields, 1996: 165). As a result, the *process of planning* is spatially re-politicized, because the space, which with planners would be concerned, is “political in the sense that it generates a peculiar relationship to the order of things as a medium, it makes manifest the partitionings of the established order, and it provides a domain of experience for the constitution of political identities” (Dikeç, 2012: 675). In essence, planning theory and practice are to undergo a spatial radicalization, out of which no specific mode of planning would come, but rather it’d provide the basis for a whole new domain of spatial experience in cities and regions (not to mention all the intermediate spaces).

		SOCIETAL GUIDANCE		
Inquiry tradition		POSITIVISM	STRUCTURALISM	POST-STRUCTURALISM/ POSTMODERNISM
Concepts				
Space		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Euclidean neutral container Objective and fixed Measurable Mappable Self-contained Tamable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socially produced and consumed (in a non-dialectical sense) Intersection of multiple (social, economic, political) relations Locūs of (asymmetrical) power geometries A ‘positivist’ spatial fetishism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Culturally produced ‘Spatial trialectics’: perceived, conceived and lived space Created through imagination and action Underpins expression of identity and belonging Subject to diverse space-time subjectivities Ever-changing reification
Spatial organizing principles		Distance, direction, connection, distance decay and proximity theories	Zoning	Multiple and overlapping flows and systems
Time		Linear and (‘logically’) ordered	Time-space compression, annihilation of space by time	‘Present’ and real time, importance of everyday rhythms and routines
Future		Able to be forecasted, achieved (by means of the plan), controlled and ordered	Known and ordered, a social utopia to be fought for	Uncertain, risky, unpredictable, unknown, disordered, unstable
		SOCIO-SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION		

Table 3.1. Correlation between concepts in planning and philosophical traditions together with their inclination to planning as societal guidance or socio-spatial transformation. Source: own elaboration; adapted and extended from Davoudi and Strange (2009: 40).

		SOCIETAL GUIDANCE		
Inquiry tradition		POSITIVISM	STRUCTURALISM	POST-STRUCTURALISM/ POSTMODERNISM
Criteria				
Perceived role of planners		Predicting future development trends as a basis for controlling and creating order Producing blueprints	Advocacy, community activism, defending ‘localities’ against ‘global’ spatial forces, assist in producing ‘people’s plan’	Exploring shared notion of live space, continuous and <i>imperfect</i> consensus-seeking <i>with and through</i> conflict
Epistemic and methodological basis		Expert scientific knowledge, skills in quantitative modelling	Community empowerment, skills of social activist	Expert and experiential knowledge, visioning and mediation skills
Methods of engagement (citizen participation)		Top-down tokenistic consultation	Adversarial/public inquiry	Discursive and iterative deliberation
Institutional structures/Governance/Power relations		Hierarchical, formal government systems, enforcing power over private property rights, privileging technical knowledge	Counteracts corporative structure of power	Multi-level governance generating power to enable private and public action, power of agency, power of autonomously organized groups
Modes of implementation		Command and control through land use regulation	State-managed redistribution of resources and relocation of activities	Implementation through conjoint (between planners and people) practices, social learning, autonomous production and implementation of plans
		SOCIO-SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION		

Table 3.2. Correlation between criteria in planning and philosophical traditions together with their inclination to planning as societal guidance or socio-spatial transformation. Source: own elaboration; adapted and extended from Davoudi and Strange (2009: 41).

3.3. Urban social movements: *Decoding spatial and urban protesting*

A social movement is, by and large, characterized, and thus distinct from other 'political actors' (such as parties and interest groups), by its: (i) variable structuring; (ii) transversal discourses; and (iii) capacity to act in a non-institutional — yet formal — scenario through social and political unconventional methods (Vallès, 2001). With respect of this third feature, James M. Jasper (2014: 5) explains that, "in common usage", social movements "are sustained, intentional efforts to foster or retard broad legal and social changes, primarily outside the normal institutional channels endorsed by authorities". Thus, social movements can be seen as lasting socio-political configurations that flourish outside, and perform their actions against, an official politico-institutional framework (Pakulski, 1991: xiv; West, 2013: xv). "Politics and society", as a result, "can change in all kinds of unforeseen ways", in spite of the fact that the extra-institutional domain of politics in which social movements operate, though it exists alongside, is usually ignored and constrained by "the regular politics of established institutions" (West, 2013: xiv). Social movements, while not being the only source or agency of social, political, economic, cultural, and (as I will stress in this section) *spatial* change, they do it uniquely, because "they are guided purposively and strategically by the people who join them" (Johnston, 2014: 1) — that is to say, the *protestors*, who "are not some inherently distinct subspecies of human; any of us might end up in a social movement" (Jasper, 2014: 6). Although there's no definitive way to declare what a social movement is (in comparison to political parties, interest groups and the like), all social movements have in common their capacity to move, if not redirect, history along with their actions, sometimes more discretely and situated, some others much more visibly and profoundly. There are, accordingly, various possibilities to read how and to what extent history is 're-written' by social movements.

*From categorizing social movements to interpreting their collective actions*⁴³

David Aberle (1966: 317ff.), in his study of the long-continued resistance to preserve peyotism in the Navaho country, formulated four 'general' types of social movements based on two main premises: (1) who is the social movement trying to engage and (2) how wide or narrow is the scope of the intended change. Thus, there are: *alternative social movements* (very specific population is targeted and limited change is sought), *redemptive social movements* (fairly selective parts of population are reached out to and radical change is advanced), *reformative social movements* (aimed at society as whole and advance a certain change) and *revolutionary social movements* (everyone is called upon to transform society anew). Each of these kinds of social movement is, sooner or later, confronted with either a *victory* or *failure* crisis. The former is when the main goal has been obtained and participants of the movement have no further interest in partaking; whereas the latter occurs when a movement dissolves due to disenchantment and frustration for not having reached envisioned aims. From a 'not-so-extreme' and non-binary point of view, social movements are thought to undergo different stages between their inception and eventual decline. To put it succinctly: after having originated (whatever the incipient reasons are), a movement will gain enough coalescence to put forward their claims and, in parallel, gain new supporters. The movement, then, is to experience a sort of bureaucratization that may even end up in 'formal' institutionalization, at which point a range of possible future paths may emerge: co-optation, repression, going mainstream (Blumer, 1969; Tilly, 1978). Threaten by fragmentation or losing any traces left of the motivations that initiated the movement in the first place through institutionalization, quite seldom are social movements able to continue operating as they do during the coalescence stage. Also, some movements, though are seemingly considered disappeared, hardcore activism is capable of blowing off the dust and rekindle the movement and, from then on, may follow a different path. In a way, 'categorizing' and 'staging' comply better (though not exclusively) with analyses of movements during the 'industrial society' era (often

⁴³ This succinct summary is not meant as a comprehensive and detailed insight into the study of social movements. Rather, the aim is to create a general theoretical framework of reference to, then, argue how the protest action of urban social movements is here understood and further elaborated in the light of space, planning and community development. For much more thorough and meticulous reviews see, amid others, Johnston (2014: 25-48) (with a certain historical emphasis), West (2013: 153-200) (pinpointing the nature of the analysis: normative, rational, irrational, cognitive, etc.) and Jasper (2014: 1-38/72) (view on diverse theoretical streams building on their use of 'culture' (or lack thereof) and some research techniques).

associated with working-class movements) and, in time, proved limited when alternative forms of social and political mobilization began to transpire.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a wave of 'new social movements' emerged as a result of changing social, economic and social interactions, in postindustrial⁴⁴ western societies, between public and private spheres (Lentin, 1999). Moreover, new social movements, rather than seeking to dismantle the existing political and economic system, advance structural transformation and are characterized by a 'moderate' radicalism (that is, *reformative* rather than *revolutionary*). Thus, new social movements are usually conceived as progressive, for "they are expected to contribute to the further development of western societies towards greater wealth, human rights, freedom and social justice" (West, 2013: 179). Neo-Marxist perspectives, on such account, regard new social movements as outcomes of the welfare state crisis (Offe, 1985; 1987) as well as of the reorganization of capitalist modes of production and distribution (for example, the 'alter-globalization' movement) (Lash and Urry, 1987). New social movements, to varying degrees, gave way to new analytical assessments, beyond 'categories' and 'evolutionary stages', which incorporate the "point of view of the identity of the actors, of their relationship to culture, to their adversary, to their subjectivity, or to their framework for action" (Wieviorka, 2005: 1), among other aspects.

Not social deviation, but legitimate political and collective action

For the ultimate purpose of this research (finding out how community development is informed by **spatial** and **urban** protesting), instead of assigning labels or delimiting developmental stages, what is crucial is deciphering *the ways of doing protest* and the *meanings* they embody. (Notwithstanding, categories and stages of social movements remain as a relevant backdrop against which examining their sense- and meaning-making communal actions). Hank Johnston (2014: 3-25), building on Charles Tilly (1978: 8-9), in that regard, proposes an analysis composed of three basic dimensions: (1) organizations and groups embedded in the social fabric that embody and enact actions jointly (*structural* approach); (2) the common ideas that provide cohesion and guidance to mobilizations (ideational-interpretative approach); and (3) the events that make up the social movement's political repertoire (*performative* approach). (For Tilly, Johnston observes, studies of social movements usually focus on just one of the three approaches). Further, three somewhat separated theoretical currents of analysis may be broadly identified (Johnston, 2014: 4-5)⁴⁵.

First, '**structural**' theories that emerged during 1970s and took the place of then-prevalent psychological models⁴⁶ that were used to cognize social movements. Structural theories, leaving aside individual motivation (central to the psychological models), "assume that there is always enough discontent in a population that, given the opportunity [...], people will mobilize together" (Jasper, 2014: 28). Moreover, it is believed that groups and organizations don't 'float' in isolation within societies, but are, conversely, interrelated through membership overlaps, leadership contacts, experience swaps, and the like (Diani, 1992; Diani and McAdam 2003; della Porta and Diani, 2006 [1999]). Out of these interconnections a "structural sphere" develops that "captures the relatively fixed networked relations among groups, organizations and individual participants that characterize social movements large and small" (Johnston, 2014: 4). The "structural sphere", as analytical approximation, allows to understand how

⁴⁴ Daniel Bell (1974), who is thought to have popularized the term 'postindustrial society', sees post-industrialism as an extension of industrialism, as opposed to the actual emergence of a new type of society altogether, as Alain Touraine (1971) had previously proposed it.

⁴⁵ In a non-chronological order, paradigmatic social movement theories are: of class conflict-historical determinism (Marxism), of collective behavior, of resource mobilization, of political process, of framing, of identity and, still fairly undeveloped, of space and place (which I will address in the next subsections). Except for the last one, these theories are present, in diverse intensities, within the three theoretical currents.

⁴⁶ For example, the 'crowd' and 'rational choice' theory. Crowd theory revolves around the assumption that when people gathered together, in a crowd or mob, they would be prone to do things than individually wouldn't, which eventually might end up in the 'mob rule'. Building on Freud's psychoanalytic theoretical framework (maybe a bit too figuratively and literally), readings of social movements in the 1960s assessed that people were trying to come to terms with their oedipal complexes by associating the 'mother' movement with good, positive feelings, while all negativity was transferred onto the 'father' oppressive image of the dominant state apparatus. Rational choice theory, drawing largely on economic and mathematical models, attempts to explain how decisions of people partaking was aimed at maximization of satisfaction, by using, unlike Freudianism (inwards), a focus on behaviorism (outwards) (Jasper, 2014: 28).

resources are deployed to encourage mobilization (getting people to protest and pressure politicians) and the extent to which a social movement solidifies its unity and continuity, since “a general movement is characterized by temporal persistence beyond the fate of just one group” (Johnston, 2014: 4). John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1977), within the structural current of “resource mobilization theory”, assess that social movements, in the end, are in blunt (and sometimes fierce) competition for funds, which, in turn, shapes the internal and external actions of social movements (Jasper, 2014: 28). Instead of giving so much preeminence to financial resources, the “**political opportunity theory**” (McAdam 1982, Tarrow, 1998) highlights the ‘openings’ that any politico-institutional structure cannot help producing and that enables antagonistic mobilization.

Second, ‘**ideational-interpretative**’ theories “include the time-tested and widely studied notions of ideologies, goals, values and interests” (Johnston, 2014: 4). Marx’s historical determinism offers a mechanistic view of how social mobilization is to be interpreted. He believed that, just in the same way that feudalism was taken over by capitalism, socialism and, in due course, communism was meant to overthrow the capitalist model of society. By way of decoding the ‘iron laws of historical development’, defined by technological advancement, Marx thought that the course of history could be not only construed, but also enacted anew. Marx’s proposal of successive stages of history, though structural and too rigid and difficult to grasp for the proletariat (for whom he had created it), inspired other thinkers that incorporated a ‘**cultural factor**’ (Jasper, 2014: 31). For instance, Alan Touraine (1981) saw the struggle over material production to be progressively replaced “by a struggle over symbolic understandings in a ‘postindustrial society’ where universities, the media, and other symbol-makers” become determinant (Jasper, 2014: 32). Other propositions of ‘big theories of history’ see social movements caught in other dichotomies such as modernism pitted against postmodernism or colonialism vis-à-vis post-colonialism (Dabashi, 2012; Jasper, 2014: 32). Eventually, the perspective of “**collective action frames**”⁴⁷ (Benford and Snow, 1988; 1992; 2000) helped de-structuralize, as it were, the study of social movements, by providing “cognitive schemata that guide the interpretation of events for movement participants, bystander publics, and political elites, and are distinct from systematic ideology or vaguely defined cultural values and norms” (Johnston, 2014: 4).

Thirdly, and finally, ‘**performative**’ theories place at the heart of social movement analysis the notion of culture as a hermeneutical lens through which examining movements’ (means of) actions. The turning point here is that theoretical interpretations actively incorporate people’s point of view, as humans facing choices and constantly engaging with one another. As opposed to structural theories, which obviate cultural and psychological processes, performative analyses take place at a “micro-level” and “are *theories of action*, not of structure” (Jasper, 2014: 34; italics added). They, additionally, focus on all the elements that make up social movements’ **tactical and strategical repertoires**, the way they’re enacted and provoke reactions. Social movements’ collective performances, understood as “any goal-directed activity jointly pursued by two or more individuals” (McAdam and Snow, 1997: xxiv), have, by definition, both a physical embodiment and a conveyance of meaning (Jasper, 2014: 34-35). Thus, “just as in other forms of social behavior, typical movement performances — street protests, demonstrations, strikes, marches, and so on — are strongly symbolic in the sense that they are making statements beyond just the content of their songs, chants, placards, and speeches” (Johnston, 2014: 5).

These three theoretical methods, on the whole, recognize that “social movements operate beyond any simple distinctions between rationality and irrationality. Social movements are not [...] pathological phenomena defined by their irrationality, disorder and tendency to violence [...] neither can social movements be explained as the predictable outcome of rational choice [...]. Rather, social movements are distinctive precisely because they are *innovative and creative in unpredictable ways*” (West, 2013: 167; italics added). Then, an understanding — not a description — of the innovation, creativity and unpredictability of collective protest

⁴⁷ Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (1992) have developed their analysis of discursive framing processes in order to explore the motivations wherefore people decide to participate in social movements. They, by and large, contend that social movement leaders manage to ‘gain’ people’s support inasmuch as they succeed to frame the object (reason) for mobilization in an attractive way.

action, is not to adhere to *only* one of the three previously summarized analytical takes. (Even if the emphasis is on one in particular; the other two shouldn't be out of sight). All the more so, if the physicality — if not, spatiality — and symbolism of protesting is going to be analyzed in terms of their (latent) contribution to trigger an autonomous local community (as an inventive, imaginative and unexpected upshot of protest). In what follows, I will concentrate on the performative dimension to discuss social movements in the specific context of cities — that is, urban social movements. Subjectivity and identity formation are recognized as happening at the 'infrapolitical' level and embedded in everyday routines of 'common people'. Space, furthermore, is underlined as a central trait of urban social movements: the spatiality of their struggles (from collective consumption to fighting a globalizing alienation) composes an assortment of 'spatial cognitive practices' that reveal a powerful spatial thinking in social mobilization.

3.3.1. Urban social movements: *From the rise of civil society to spatial(ized) struggles*

Since more or less the 1960s ground-breaking mobilizations in the United States and Western Europe, which were partly inspired, and then painstakingly reflected on, by influential thinkers like Henri Lefebvre and Michel Foucault (see subsection 3.1.2), there's been an increasing (yet neither consistent, nor widespread) academic concern on social movements in urban areas. (This is partially bound to the aforementioned surfacing of 'new social movements'). Thus, the notion of *urban social movement* started to be employed to denote not only **a specific type of mobilization**, but also **contextual circumstances** that were provoking discontent as well as openings to alternative ways of social mobilization. Several scholars have, accordingly, crafted their own formulations, in order to shed light on urban social movements' formation and political repertoires and, in so doing, underscoring certain features. For instance, Manuel Castells' (1983) "grassroots movements" alludes to the most basic level of citizen action whereby altering what he calls "collective consumption". John Friedmann (1998) talks about "the rise of civil society" to stress how the interaction among state, market and civil society could be leveled off by way of urban mobilizations. Moreover, Edward Soja (2009; 2010b; 2010c) sees movements in urban areas through a socio-spatial dialectic lens and points out the (not so widely acknowledged) ambivalent role of space in either hindering or advancing significant (political, social, cultural, economic and, *spatial*) transformation.

Growing dissatisfaction (due to marginalization and disempowerment) gave rise to contentious citizen mobilization in urban areas as a result of the gradual retraction of the welfare state from the production sphere. Claims revolved mainly around the evident shortcomings and pitfalls of the new — no longer managerial — practices to deliver public services or to transfer payments (Castells, 1978 [1972]; Pickvance, 2003: 103). More specifically, Chris Pickvance (1985), through a 'linked-submodels' framework, identifies four types of urban social movement according to their demands and actions: (1) movements involved with the provision of housing and urban services; (2) movements seeking access over housing and urban services; (3) movements trying to control and manage the urban environment; and (4) movements opposing environmental and/or social menaces. Urban social movements, then, showed to hold enough potential to put across the structural contradictions that were unfolding (notably, the 'entrepreneurialization' of urban local governments' managerial procedures) and provided strategic assistance in pursuing progressive changes in regard to political power. Such view contradicted orthodox and structural Marxist accounts that did not recognize the input of social actors who aren't directly part of the production process. This marked a juncture in the way political and social power and its unbalanced distribution was considered in the particular context of the modern city (Castells, 1978 [1972]; Pickvance, 2003; Susser, 2002). Urban social movements, therefore, are told apart from other types of social movements, because of their ability to create "new spaces for political contestation" redefining citizenship and challenging power relations (Parker, 2004: 131). Moreover, there need to be local(ized) political processes (which occur both in and out of the institutional 'formal' domain) and spatial proximity for urban social movements to thrive (Pickvance, 1985). For John Friedmann (1998), urban social movements are the expression of a different political subjectivity that is constructed/reshaped in cities — that is to say, the relationship between **urbanity** and **citizenship** (Boudreau, 2009). There are, according to Friedmann (1998), four different and yet overlapping and intermeshed spheres of action and valued social practices

(being the latter the set of individual and collective norms of social behavior that constitute both the cultures and subcultures within each sphere of action): the civil society, the state, the market and the political community. This last sphere constitutes, precisely, the arena of political conflict and social struggle, where social movements, political parties, clubs and the like compose the “public face of civil society”, which is “as a social construct, necessary [...] for our common understanding of democracy where civil society reasserts its sovereignty from the state” (Friedmann, 1998: 22). While Friedmann’s view sounds structural and close to revolutionary movements pursuing historical determinism, he also accentuates the manifold ways through which diverse and co-existing societal blocs reclaim their autonomy and freedom (civil rights, sexual preference, gender equity, amid others).

Although urban social movements did provoke upheavals leading to ‘alternative’ ways of (doing) politics in cities; they, too, were constrained and faced several shortcomings in their efforts — preeminently their disjointed character. Given that struggles came from diverse fronts: working-class, ethnic groups, groups of women, gays and lesbians, among others, it wasn’t feasible to orchestrate mobilization under one general umbrella (Friedmann, 1998). Likewise, for Manuel Castells (1983) citizen movements, despite being locally situated and organized and hence gained considerable support, had several limitations to pull off their actions and materialize claims in the emerging world order of empires and computerized bureaucracies (Hamel et al., 2000). However, this apparent ‘fragility’ of urban social movements weakens neither their capacity to act nor their social pertinence. As other movements, they are distinguished by their conviction to rearrange socio-spatial reality (that is, to ‘change what’s wrong with the world’). In so doing, urban social movements (as other movements do) define new contents and find new expressions within plural, dispersed and fragmented sets of meaning that permeates societies all over the world (particularly since the intensification of global interactions) (Dubet and Martuccelli, 1998; Hamel et al., 2000). Urban social movements might not have altered the world as they intended to, but do have, notwithstanding, seized certain level of control over and influence upon “**the social production of urban space**” (Gottdiener, 1994 [1985]), which, in the midst of complex processes of urban restructuring⁴⁸, is a remarkable achievement (Soja, 2000).

Since (re)arrangements in cities, especially with the advent of “actually existing neoliberalism”⁴⁹ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002), have marked unequal and unjust spatial results, movements reacting to these trends are seen as happening both *in* and *for* space (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1997). Therefore, by conceiving cities as ‘**just spaces**’, a political and moral leverage may well be obtained whereby urban social movements reorganize the dynamics between the state and the market (Brodie, 2007). To that end, urban social movements, whose framing discursivities expose the city as ‘spatially unjust’, can actually “empower urban residents to more effectively make claims about access to space and the provision of collective resources” (Connolly and Steil, 2009: 12). Urban social movements’ repertoires, in this respect, ought to emphasize the right to both *use* and actively — and even radically — *participate* in, as aforesaid, the social production of urban space. Thus, urban social movements operate in the interface between **the social production of urban space** (where oppressing dynamics unfold) and **contextual space** (where unjust outcomes materialize and wherefrom they’re fought back). This duality, actually, goes back to a sharp criticism of and resistance to the functional approach and (re)conceptualization of the city during the 1960s and 1970s, which more and more focused on the *exchange*, rather than the *use* value of urban space (Merrifield, 2002).

Over the past years, analytical views on urban social movements have gradually assessed and

⁴⁸ ‘Restructuring’, since more or less the 1990s, became a recurrent concept to describe the disorderly political, economic and spatial changes prompted by globalization (Brenner and Theodore, 2005: 101). Edward Soja (1987: 178; italics in the original), in a ‘pioneering’ manner, conceives restructuring as follows: “*Restructuring* is meant to convey a break in secular trends and a shift towards a significantly different order and configuration of social, economic and political life. It thus evokes a *sequence of breaking down and building up again, deconstruction and attempted reconstitution*, arising from certain incapacities or weaknesses in the established order”.

⁴⁹ Cities are pivotal (if not, ‘climactic’) to the functioning of neoliberalism, for they “are not merely localized arenas in which broader global or national projects of neoliberal restructuring unfold. On the contrary, [...] cities have become increasingly central to the reproduction, mutation, and continual reconstitution of neoliberalism itself” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002: 375).

stressed the intrinsic **spatial nature** of social mobilizations in urban areas. It is thus believed that by spatial means of action more effective results could be attained (Bertho, 1999; Dikeç, 2001; 2013; Soja, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Souza, 2006). In fact, a triggering reason to deem the extra-institutional contentious politics of urban social movements *spatially* is that order — both spatial and temporal — is advanced and imposed by systems of governance and command, which instrumentally deploy space “as a means of control and domination — the tool of closure *par excellence*” (Dikeç, 2012: 671; italics in the original). Notwithstanding the manipulation of space as a mechanism of control, it is, in due course and because of this very reason, where resistance can be best carried out (Creswell, 1996). Urban social movements embody such dual character of space and, as such, raise awareness, via their general discursive frameworks (Benford and Snow, 1992), that there is indeed an alternative way of living in cities; in spite of how painstakingly challenging the local-global interactions appear to be. To put it another way, by dint of the ‘spatiality’ of urban social movements’ collective actions of protest, a common denominator may be established to steer and align forces and, eventually, generate the necessary platform to reassert civil society into civil governance instances (which include planning processes). This, however, is not to be misinterpreted as a kind of homogenizing discursive replacement of the diverse interests that urban social movements try to advance with their struggles (e.g., recognition of minority rights). Nor does it suggest that urban social movements are unstructured reactions to objective disparities or deprivations, and that by means of a ‘general encompassing goal’ the political context could be obviated. On the contrary, political contextual circumstances do determine their tactical and strategic moves and, accordingly, the level of success (Pickvance, 2003: 105).

Moreover, if collective protest actions of urban social movements are to animate planning theory and, above all, practice, they must not be reduced to a vacuous normative content (that, in the end, would be a form of domestication). Planners working in urban areas ought to create articulating conditions for urban social movements to enter substantially (as opposed to symbolically) the political arena. In consequence, claims and demands (let alone actions that ‘take care of things’) are infused with enough clarity and concreteness, for they, far from ‘social abnormality’, constitute a **legitimate collective political performativity**. Urban politics, though they might continue to be entrepreneurial, are substantially head-on rearranged by an alternative non-conformable politics of spatial emancipation, which “sets out to defend people’s life spaces against the rapaciousness of capital and bureaucratic fiat” (Friedmann, 1987: 408). In the long run, the ubiquitous idea of the city as a site of socio-spatial exclusion, where domination is legitimated, reproduced and carefully ‘disguised’, could be defied. To capture the essence of such ‘**spatial insurrection**’, is compulsory to not see urban social movements protesting as isolated irruptions of the status quo, but as, notwithstanding their apparent brittleness, *sustained* and *evolving* efforts.

3.3.2. Not ruptures, but unexpected continuities: *Protest actions’ infrapolitical precursor/aftermath and radical planning practices*

It’s relatively easy to have a big enthusiastic public event, hundreds of thousands of people [...] but my fear is — and anxiety goes to — what happens after, as we say, things return to ‘normal’ [...] that the situation will simply get normalized [...] so the measure of the revolution are not those enthusiastic moments but what really changes when things return to normal (Žižek, 2015).

In order to see how planning theory may envisage and planning practice articulate, as key agents, urban social movements and, as a valuable asset, their protest collective actions, the following argument is stressed: a palpable usefulness can be found by focusing on transitions before and after ‘**rupture events**’ — those “enthusiastic moments” — rather than on the junctures marked by specific actions of protesting (demonstrations, rallies, occupations). Traditionally, social movement theory emphasizes the **extraordinariness** of political events and the ‘breaks’ they provoke in everyday life. Although this aspect of political mobilization is certainly central to understand the type and range of change social movements might bring about, there exists other elements, usually left aside analysis, which may well be as relevant, provided that “[i]n order to understand how people construct themselves as political actors and the impact such events have in transforming society, it is important to reflect on the bridges from the ordinary to the extraordinary and back to the ordinary” (Boudreau, 2009:

344). In that regard, protest actions of urban social movements aren't solely a precise irruption in everyday life, they're, too, very much embedded in social structures and constitute the other 'hidden' side of public resistance. Hence, daily routines and acts (travelling throughout the city, modes of commuting, understanding of micro-local codes of public behavior, among others) impact substantially political subjectivation and engagement, for they are catalyzed by the "[p]olitics in the *here and now* of daily rhythms, which is the invisible face of organized mobilization" (Boudreau, 2009: 338; italics added).

Deeming both the formation/shaping of a political subjectivity and performance of collective protest actions through an everyday life 'lens' brings to the fore abilities that protestors acquire and deploy, which may help them enter, if not significantly modify, planning processes. Such acknowledgement, moreover, would only be plausible within radical planning discourse — that is, planning as *social (and spatial) transformation* — since "radical planning, [is] always based on people's self-organized actions, [and] stands in necessary opposition to the established powers and, more particularly, the state" (Friedmann, 1987: 407). Thus, civil society — through urban social movements — "does not only [have to] *criticize* (as a '*victim*' of) state-led planning, but also can directly and (pro)actively conceive and, to some extent, implement solutions independently of the state apparatus" (Souza, 2006: 327; italics in the original). To put it differently, people taking part in urban social movements are to, eventually, develop and perform radical planning practices that are both disruptive and spatial (Castillo, 2013b: 279). To that end, urban social movements must think and act more autonomously and steadily apply criticism to their own as well as state actions — in other words, they have to learn how to 'harmonize' "The Janus dilemma"⁵⁰. In due course, the tendency of the state to further a capitalist and heteronomous status quo can be (more) properly curbed. Accordingly, protest collective actions (how they come about and what happens thereafter) and their potential sweeping impact on spatial organization and social relations in cities, deserves closer attention to assess how urban social movements may come up with alternative planning schemes, which, ideally, falls back on an epistemological base resulting from a synergic interaction between local and endogenous (urban social movements) and professional yet unimposing (radical-like planning) knowledge.

Sparking a mutual learning process

Manuel Castells (1978 [1972]: 246-275), in his first work on mobilization in cities, *The Urban Question*, uses 'urban social movements' in a restrictive manner. He categorizes citizen action according to three successive levels that, increasingly, ascertain the social and political effect of protest actions and possible changes they are able to produce (Pickvance, 2003: 103). First, *participation*, which alludes to symbolic and limited political alterations (following Sherry Arnstein's (1969) "ladder of participation", this might mean, for planning decision-making purposes, a rung higher over the consultation level). Second, *protest*, which refers to slight modifications that, in any case, do not entail structural transformations (within a planning framework, this could be seen as 'little conquers' via negotiation). And, third, *urban social movement*⁵¹, which means deep and visible reorganization of power at urban and societal levels, for an urban social movement constitutes,

A system of practices resulting from the articulation of a conjuncture of the system of urban agents and of other social practices in such a way that its development tends objectively towards the structural transformation of the urban system or towards a substantial modification of the power relations in the class struggle, that is to say, in the last resort, in the power of the state (Castells, (1978 [1972]: 263).

Urban social movements, seen like that, it goes without saying, represents an ideal scenario to set off radical planning practices. However, inasmuch as social movements haven't revolutionized societies anew, it'd be wrong to derive from Castells' definition (which he

⁵⁰ The Janus dilemma explains, based on the metaphor of Janus the Roman god in charge of gates, that social movements direct actions inward (i.e., to the movement's own members) as well as outward (i.e., outside players like, for instance, the state, media and bystanders); this is an intrinsic feature of social movement, "every moment does both, and must find the right balance" (Jasper, 2014: 3).

⁵¹ It is noteworthy that Castells utilizes *urban social movement* to designate a 'level' of effect, rather than a form of social organization. Furthermore, for Castells that is a rare instance (Pickvance, 2003: 103).

fashioned to suit his overarching Marxist analysis of urban phenomena) that urban social movements can replace 'official' planning — they may do without it, but their aim isn't its annihilation. Furthermore, the 'substantiality' in power relations and the extent of 'structural change' of the urban system have to be reinterpreted, in the light of more pragmatic and situated achievements, through radical planning practices of urban social movements. As a matter of fact, Castells (1983), in his next examinations of grassroots movements, replaced his restrictive approach with a more generic one that encompasses "any and all citizen action irrespective of its actual (or potential) effect" (Pickvance, 2003: 103). Thus, what actually counts is the *potentiality*, rather than the *outcome*, of collective protest action. Consequently, the second level, protest, may well be re-read, as a cognitive force that raises consciousness among people taking part, which, in turn, might trigger ensuing 'refined' protesting (Pickvance, 2003: 103). By way of this shift, the idea of 'cognitive process', that urban social movements participants undergo, goes beyond simply "becoming aware' of an already defined condition [...] as the more or less inevitable by-product of the experience of life under capitalism and participation in struggle" (West, 2013: 168). Protest actions, instead, are "forms of activity by which individuals create new kinds of social identities" and provide "the breeding ground for innovations in thought as well as in the social organization of thought" (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 2). Urban social movements, through protesting, generate new and varied knowledge ('local', 'of *space*', of people's needs and wants, of 'language'), which radical planning, given its epistemological singularity, embraces and combines with technical knowledge of practitioners and academicians (Souza, 2006: 330) in a **synergic social learning process** from radical practice to critical consciousness (and vice versa) (Friedmann, 1987: 302). At the end of the day, urban social movements can think and proceed more creatively and strategically to not get stuck in bargaining with 'steady state' social systems (Souza, 2006; Parker, 2004: 135).

In triggering a 'social learning process', the articulation (without domestication) of urban social movements' (production of) knowledge is a tricky task, for its inception is located within the interface between 'normality' (continuities) of and 'upheavals' (rifts) in everyday life. Furthermore, "the right to be politically active brings to the fore the issue of *the possibility to act*" (Boudreau: 336; italics in the original). The possibilities and the reasons for acting are, therefore, bound together. According to Sidney Tarrow (1998), it is through the agency of a **"political opportunity structure"** that the gap between reason and action is bridged, for it allows people to, first, identify opportunities to act to, then, seize them and, ultimately, take action. A social learning process, therefore, has to deconstruct political opportunity structures (the way they emerge, 'lifespan', fragility and usage) and the anatomy of protest actions' **"cognitive praxis"** — that is, "the creative role of consciousness and cognition in all human action, individual and collective" (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 2). All in all, what planners have to come to terms with is that "political learning involves creativity, imagination and choice without any predetermined or predestined outcome" (West, 2013: 168). For sure, that's an unusual and, by far, thorny element to incorporate into an output-oriented discipline such as planning, but that's precisely wherein the challenge resides.

Everyday life and urban development: Towards a multifarious endeavor

Social and political mobilization, as has been noted, is, surreptitiously, also located in everyday life — in daily acts, frequented spaces (corners, sidewalks, bus stops, squares, etc.) and habitual social intercourse. People, gradually, decide to engage in as well as develop the skills to conjointly act on the world they inhabit — a practice that is more recurrent in (but not exclusive of) urban areas. Ever since the anti-capitalist 1960s movements, when critiques on socioeconomic exploitation were amplified by a 'new' cultural outlook (signaling the alienation of everyday life, commodification of consumption and grief of sexual and other types of oppression [Žižek, 2008]), the linkage between cities and protest actions gained more visibility, because these new claims (besides those inflicted by class differences) were — and still are — largely experienced in cities⁵². Thus, when dealing with every day practices, at issue, are the

⁵² Traces of this phenomenon, actually, go back a few decades. Walter Benjamin (1999), already in the beginning of the past century and in the tradition of historical materialism, identified dreams for an emancipated way of living in cities, which were not being materialized due to the way the logic of capital directly influenced and affected the urban everyday life. In so doing, Benjamin insisted on the utopian need to combine, dialectically, past and unrealized dreams with

“everyday forms of resistance” (Scott, 1985; 1990; Douglass, 1999; Dove and Kammen, 2001; Kelley, 1996) through which people constitute/reshape their political subjectivity and reinforce their citizenship qua the expression of alternative political identities.

Planning-wise, when people both develop a critical political view and are able to start, at least, with little — yet meaningful — actions, radical planning practices might range from participation within institutionalized mechanisms to a more self-sufficient command of the socio-spatial coordinates that define, for better or for worse, their livelihoods. In that regard, political action is not to be entirely gauged and understood following a single logic of interest-based calculations. In other words, “reactions to a situation cannot simply be guided by a measure of the impacts of an action” (Boudreau, 2009: 339). Moreover, protesters of urban social movements are driven by a ‘force of impulsion’ and not, necessarily and exclusively, by antagonism (although antagonism will always be a critical furthering factor). Dynamic processes of political action are, as well, sparked by (individual and shared) lived and felt intensities of, and unfold in, experiences of everyday life. As sustained by Pascal Nicolas-Le Strat (2008: 119), their oppositional and contradictory capacities do not entirely stem from the outside — that is to say, it isn’t about opponents within a dialectical ‘dominator-dominated’ reality. Political action is, too, steadily built upon mutual cooperation and alliances as well as through the intensification of everyday life activities — sharing, meeting, etc. — and coexistence of a wide range of singularities (Boudreau, 2009). Urban social movements, hence, must not be ineludibly read as challenging socially and spatially a marginalizing urban growth (that, incidentally, is not equal to urban development) and attempting to revert it (which is more in the direction of Castells’ restrictive sense), but as creating a new and alternative reality through dexterous artifices based on everyday tactical ‘moves’ and rhythms.

Cities, as opposed to rural areas, are characterized by spatial proximity, a feature that extensively encroaches upon culture of urban politics that, in turn, determines patterns of collective consumption (housing, public transportation, and the like) as well as the operational dynamics of social networks. Thus, social, economic and political forces collide in urban areas, giving rise to particular sites of conflict — that is to say, **the spatiality of contentious politics**, which is both *social* and *contextual*. Quarrels that urban social movements represent, as it was previously sustained, revolve around spatial matters and relate to state-led planning practices (competition over space to exploit a particular activity and inconsistency between comprehensive planning aims and preservation of community identities) (Parker, 2004: 134). From this perspective, while *urban growth* will most likely continue to be a contentious process fraught with tensions and conflicts; alongside, a less market-like, non-speculative, more humane and multifarious *urban development* may well find expression through urban social movements’ struggles; in particular, through their capacity to beforehand organize and afterwards endure, for that’s wherefrom radical planning actions spring. This, moreover, shall demand renovated views on social, political, economic and spatial dynamics taking place in cities, for planning practices to be constantly reassessed — a task that concerns planners, the academic community and civil society (particularly, in the ‘form’ of urban social movements and with a focus on, specifically, their *collective everyday protest actions*). That being so, the relationship between urban areas and political action and engagement is next further elaborated, to stress the urbanity in politics (and not the other way around).

3.3.3. Protesting *in, on* and *from* space: *Urbanity, political action and infrapolitics*

The interplay between the ‘urban’ and ‘everyday life’ in citizen mobilization is ever-present in the seminal work of thinkers like Walter Benjamin, Henri Lefebvre and Guy Debord, in which Marxism is reinterpreted as a direct critique of everyday life. Within the ‘social totality’, moreover, that is composed by a set of vibrant and interacting levels (supranational, national, regional, local), the ‘urban’ level, due to the social reality contained in everyday actions, offers a foremost mediating role (Lefebvre, 1993 [1968]). Given such articulation/mediation, it is in cities where the effects of economic and political logics, that bolster the social totality (be it neoliberalism, globalization, etc.), are mostly felt and exposed (Goonewardena, 2009). This, for

unconscious and current desires catalyzed by the use of new technologies, which, in consequence, would lead towards a better world.

instance, can be seen in the impact and resonance 'anti-neoliberal' and 'alter-globalization' social movements have gained worldwide, which have tied 'the global' with 'the local' and thereby exposed the furtive socio-spatial upshots of profound economic and political reforms. Cities, thus, are always subject to and result from contentious 'battles' that, simultaneously, are prompted and take place in their spatiality. As Engin F. Isin (1999: 165) points out, the city is not only the foreground and background of fights for collective rights, but also "[t]he battleground to claim those rights". Mustafa Dikeç (2001: 1790), in a similar vein, affirms that citizens in their struggles aren't just claiming "a right to urban space, but to a political space" and, by extension, redefine **"the city as space of politics"**, in which citizenship "does not refer to a legal status, but to a form of identification with the city, to a political identity".

Whereas it is clear that political mobilization has found — and continues to find — a fertile ground in urban areas⁵³ (as both a context and origin), urban struggles happen to be everlasting processes that are continually reinterpreted according to reigning circumstantial and historical conditions. Urban social movements, consequently, are, so to speak, 'fixed' in time and space⁵⁴, eroding any 'evolving' capacity (which, as aforesaid is where a great potential is located). Insofar as urban social movements are restricted to their flamboyant and specific displays of anger and discontent, the more their collective protest actions are likely to be debunked. However, given that there's an infra-level of unremitting political action entrenched in people's daily routines and actions, disputes over urban space are far from contained or finished. Further, the fact that the world has gone (and still goes) inevitably and unevenly 'urban', appears at the very core of any new way of understanding and delving into the dynamics of contemporary urban social movements and, in particular, their *everyday* collective protest actions, especially if it is considered that,

Everyday life [...] lies at the heart of radical politics, the locus of which is increasingly the city. As such, everyday life ought to be the central concern of any radical urban theory not simply content with offering us vivid descriptions of cities and capital, but also intent on producing a new concept of politics — beyond the exhausted attachments to party, state and parliament, not to mention 'social capital', 'civil society' or 'citizenship' (Goonewardena, 2009: 216).

Deconstructing everyday life to locate the 'infra-character' of (radical) political action in urban areas and, eventually, articulate it, in a novel and significant way, with the politics of radical planning practices, though it needs a multifaceted analysis, can be based on four fundamentals points (Boudreau, 2009: 338-339):

- Small acts may turn into political situations on both local and global scales, given the mutual relationships that characterize urbanity. The 'condition of urbanity' is historically situated in, and its mode of living is determined by, interconnections, mobility, uncertainty and speed. And, out of the global-local interface, largely established by economic uneven interdependency, social and spatial upshots arise (fragmentation, informality, entrepreneurial governance, convoluted processes of de- and re-regulation) (Sassen, 1990; van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997), which, to varying degrees, affect and are affected by people's everyday practices.
- Everyday political action isn't predictable and thus holds great creative potential. That is to say, unpredictability may help to engage and thus enable broad(er) collective actions, which are founded on the non-acceptance of vertical control. The idea of a centralized, totalizing and efficient city has been, time and again, proven unviable and actually pernicious, for such 'dystopic desires'⁵⁵, as Rana Dasgupta (2006) observes, have resulted in "[c]ounter-fantasies of insubordination, excess, and life-forms in chaotic variety"; particularly in cities of the world 'periphery'. The process through which the city

⁵³ This, by no means, is to say that in rural areas people neither have been nor are completely able to mobilize socially and politically. Among many examples of 'rural' social movements, the Zapatistas in Southeast Mexico and The Landless Workers' Movement in Brazil are enduring cases of social mobilization. Furthermore, the Zapatistas, particularly through their intellectual political discourse and 'translocal' initiatives, have influenced mobilization in other distant latitudes such as 'Los Piqueteros' movement in Buenos Aires, Argentina (see Holloway, 2005; Zibechi, 2000, 2003, 2007).

⁵⁴ Slavoj Žižek (2008), regarding the time- and space-specific character of urban social movements, sustains that, unlike the students' and workers' movement that took place in Paris during May 1968, the riots that happened in autumn 2005 in the outskirts of Paris were solely a violent "outburst with no pretense vision".

⁵⁵ This 'insistence', far from disappearing, dons constantly new disguises: 'sustainable', 'smart', 'green', 'just'...city.

came to be what it is, has been, exceedingly, from both political and economic stands elucidated, which leave aside any (in actuality innate) sociability cities have (let alone its everyday forms). These perspectives, not surprisingly, have been already rendered ineffectual in both saying what a 'good city' may actually be and outlining the transition from the "[c]ity that we have to the city that we love" (Goonewardena, 2009: 215). Thus, the need to turn the vision towards other ways in which cities are imagined and, what is more, *constantly re-enacted*.

- Political action, as aforesaid, isn't the 'logical' product of carefully calculated and crafted decisions. Therefore, to grasp people's reactions, prominently in their daily routines, to an oppressing or upsetting situation, their 'cognitive praxis' and artfulness to make use of political opportunity structures are to be underscored (as opposed to quantifying the reach of the transformation sought and/or achieved).
- Dynamic processes of political action and everyday life are intertwined as well as not utterly underpinned by antagonism. By contrast, they are propelled by political identities that break free from the hegemony-counter-hegemony deadlock and are built/reshaped on a daily basis through 'unexpected' political acts, which, in turn, define "what is understood as voice or noise, what is seen and heard, what is possible or impossible, thinkable or unthinkable" (Dikeç, 2013: 82).

Now, none of these premises discard other — strategic, deliberate and interest-based — forms of collective action, which also attach great importance to the political processes of cities. Instead, at issue, is acknowledging how urbanity does foster another kind of political action. In sum, everyday life, in urban settlements, can be deemed as a catalyst for collective protest action, given that "[r]ather than seeing ruptures as the element that can spark mobilization, it may very well be that political action is generated through continuity with daily routines" (Boudreau: 340). Political action, moreover, is performed according to emotions prevailing among participants: affect is built up and moods experienced through everyday life, which defines the level of readiness for political action as well as the capacity to react toward a political event. The question is how these emotions are translated (or not) into action (Boudreau: 342). There are four distinct 'dominant' kind of emotions that bolster political action: reflex emotions, moods, affects and complex moral emotions, which operate in accordance with a double-scale system (ranging from less to more cognitive processing and from more to less influence from the immediate physical environment) (Jasper, 2006; Boudreau, 2009). That being so, daily acts such as taking the bus, talking to neighbors, walking down the streets, normally perceived as 'non-political', may in fact be essential for visible and disruptive political actions, for they provide familiarity, skills and self-confidence, which are fundamental for people to fearlessly and politically act. Moreover, this transformation of emotions into actions, that takes place within people's routines, unfolds in one specific sphere: that of **'infrapolitics'**.

Infrapolitics: Hidden political codes scripted in everyday (en)act(ment)s

Social and political ideas could be either publicly circulated and enunciated or, conversely, be channeled by means that escape the gaze of existing political (surveilling) authorities (Shukaitis, 2009). The latter falls back on and takes place in the infrapolitics' realm, given that resistance is interwoven with "hidden transcripts of everyday life" (Shukaitis, 2009: 63) that both thickens and coalesces desires of political and radical actions (Scott, 1990; Kelley, 2002; Grossberg, 1992). Such "hidden transcripts", additionally, are usually produced by distressed social blocs and expressed by dint of cultural symbolism (songs, stories, anecdotes) in habitual social interaction (Shukaitis, 2009), which, altogether, forms a social fabric of everyday resistance and survival (Kelley, 1996). Further, infrapolitics, by blending in with everyday routines, goes beyond the visible end of the 'political' spectrum, but not by chance, because "[i]t should be invisible [...] is in large part by design — a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of the balance of power" (Scott, 1990: 183). Infrapolitics transpires in a space encoded in such a way that makes it less comprehensible to those flaunting ostentatiously power. It is, for instance, where the "spaces of insurgent citizenship" (Holston, 1999) originate. Struggle, thus, operates, for the most part, in the domain of infrapolitics, in order to escape recuperation — that is, the driving dynamics that prevent social insurgency to be integrated into the machinery of the capital and the state (Shukaitis, 2009). Additionally, policies,

symbolisms and strategies, applied by those holding power and using it coercively, can only be properly examined through the infrapolitics of those suffering oppression (Kelley, 1996: 9).

When examining urban social movements' protesting, one has to appreciate that infrapolitics and organized resistance do not compose two different fields of political mobilization and action that need, then, be compared. Rather, they are two sides of the same coin (Kelley, 1996: 33) or, as James C. Scott (1990: 199) argues, loud and public protest action finds in every type of camouflaged opposition — that is to say, infrapolitics — a vital counterpart. After all, “[i]nfrapolitics is ubiquitous, developed political movements are rare” (Reed, 2000: 4).

Spatial(izing) infrapolitics: Intimate and local vis-à-vis dislocating and global

Space, or “location”, plays a significant role in shaping resistance, identity and, generally, infrapolitics (Kelley, 1996: 25). Location alludes to social spaces (of, for example, both work and community) wherein “imagined political spaces” (Brodie, 2000: 117) are ‘concretized’. In that regard, Warren Magnusson (1996: 10) explains that the ‘mental’ construction of the political space ascribed to the notion of ‘municipality’, allows to have a more material and real understanding of what a political space is, than by means of the artificial notion of the ‘state’, because ‘municipality’ gives rise to an “[e]nclosure for popular politics” (Magnusson, 1996: 10). Similarly, public spaces such as streets, parks and plazas, where social interaction come about and are of express *free* access, are the cornerstone of city politics (Young, 1990: 240). Raising issues and discussing them to define how both social and institutional relations should be coordinated, largely depends on the availability of open spaces and forums. For example, the impact and success that public collective demonstrations have revolves around their capacity to bring issues and demands to public spaces and communicate them to other people who might actually avoid them. Thus, it is in public space where people gather and mingle and, in parallel, get in touch with other people’ issues, meanings, codes and expressions, which are not fully understandable and to which they cannot fully identify. Nevertheless, such interaction isn’t restricted to ‘traditional’ open public spaces, for infrapolitics actually happens in ‘non-traditional’ more, so to speak, ‘familiar’ public spaces (the sidewalk, while waiting for the bus, hanging out a barrio’s corner) that are, as well, not only imagined, but enacted as political spaces.

For Janine Brodie (2000: 117), these lines of reasoning that advocate for a reterritorialization of politics at the local level, “[r]eflect the growing spatial disorientations associated with globalization”, which keeps people from positioning themselves as fully adequate political actors within the fragmented and blurred spatiality of flows of capital and information. Such disabling effect occurs because “the incapacity to map spatially is as crippling to political experience as the analogous incapacity to map spatially is for the urban experience” (Jameson, 1991: 416). Hence, while “[t]he globalization of capital, trade, and the culture industries project a plethora of ‘identities’ of a society fully imbued with participatory possibilities and choice”, vast majorities end up, in practice, “lacking the kinds of ‘cognitive maps’ so necessary for effective political action and the reflective life” (Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2009: 40). Thus, the advocacy for tightening the (mental and material) relationship between the notions of ‘political space’ and ‘local’ is meant to render the political experience, at the urban level, more tangible, well-known and compatible with as well as attuned to people’s everyday distress and wants (Giddens, 1990; Young, 1990). In the ‘local’, then, ‘communal’ (as opposed to ‘individual’) ideas of both ‘space’ and ‘the public’ together with common interests and concerns are much better furthered (Fraser, 1993). As Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 25) observes, public place is where norms are discussed, concerns shared, values brazen out and conflicts talked over. Janine Brodie (2000: 118), however, warns that, though the space-local-public linkage is clear, it would be wrong to visualize the local as public space alone. According to Hannah Arendt’s (1998 [1958]: 199) formulation of “public space”, rather than (merely) the physical, it is, above all, the discursive elements of interaction within space that confers it the quality of being ‘public’. Hence, there is always the possibility that wherever people meet to discuss, the public sphere comes into existence — yet not automatically and not perennially.

Within these argumentations on the spatialization of politics at the local (urban) level, there is no explicit reference to infrapolitics, since most of the discussion is centered on *evident* and *visible* city 'popular' politics. Also, they find common ground in the assumption that the public sphere only materializes "[w]hen actors gather together for the purpose of discussing and deliberating about matters of public concern and it disappears the moment these activities cease" (D'Entreves, 1992: 147). Infrapolitics, then, could be said to begin when 'public' meeting and discussion cease. However, it may be so that infrapolitics had already begun beforehand or, actually, it never even concluded — it is always lying underneath (Reed, 2000). In short, both politics and infrapolitics develop in public space: visible and organized protest action within 'extraordinariness' and infrapolitics within the 'ordinariness' of everyday life. Infrapolitics, then again, goes far beyond the public sphere given its 'disguising' tactical nature, which allows it to flow from public to private and back to public space.

'Infrapolitical spaces' are thus not sizeable and easily identifiable; they're ever-present, they may disappear instantaneously and, a second later, reemerge. Political subjectivity and identity formation and political action follow, then, a similar logic: they aren't confined to the 'formality' of open public encounter and demonstration (in fact, were there not infrapolitics, 'open-public' politics, as such, wouldn't exist). More specifically, via a myriad of everyday acts, such as: moving constantly around and gaining thereby an orientation (mapping oneself) in the city; using the public transportation system; understanding the ethnic geography of the city; reading diverse and coexistent landscapes; and managing micro-local codes of public behavior as well as various rhythms (internal-, work- and family-rhythms), **political subjectivation** and **engagement** are directly influenced (Boudreau, 2009). All these actions, additionally, are crisscrossed, as aforementioned, by a set of emotions and feelings that are determined by, and, simultaneously, can alter the perception of, the built physical environment (Goodwin et al., 2001; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004).

To sum up, the research of urban social movements and their collective protest actions (considered as radical spatial planning practices), has to go beyond a perspective that bases the study of citizen mobilization on a series of antagonistic interrelations, in order to expound domination dynamics. Rather, a wider perspective, which asserts infrapolitics as constitutive of public and visible political action, would, in turn, shed light on the way claims along the lines of 'race', 'identity', 'sexuality', 'gender' and so on, are constructed *in* and *with* everyday actions. Hence, there are not only new logics (no longer based on class struggle) of action, but also new *spaces* and mechanisms of resistance, that largely impact on reasons wherefore people engage politically. Alternative views to interpret them are correspondingly required. 'Thinking spatially', arguably, is a means through which to explore the intricate anatomy of protesting in urban areas and, all the more so, at an (infra)political level.

The spatiality of (infra)political action

Doreen Massey, who has prolifically written about the political 'weight' of space, in accentuating the interplay between space and power (which, by extension, includes knowledge production), sustains that "[t]he way in which space is conceptualised, in intellectual work, in social life, and in political practice, *matters*" (Massey, 2009: 16; italics in the original). For Massey, three key traits of space are 'inescapable', if it is going to be thought of in a politically relevant way. First, space is the *outcome* of manifold (and even the lack of) relations; second, those relations render space the dimension of multiplicity, to the extent that space and multiplicity "are mutually constitutive"; and, third, space is never finished, it is constantly being made and re-made, and, as such, it is always open to both the future and the political (Massey, 2009: 16-17).

Kevin Lynch (1960), in his classic *The Image of the City*, sustains that an alienated (and to some extent an alienating) city is a space whose configuration impedes people to mentally map their own individual position or the urban entirety they are embedded in. Thus, Lynch thesis, "expounds how the realm of perception conditions a person's spatial practice in the city" (Merrifield, 2006: 184). Disalienation, in that regard, must involve a conceptual and practical spatial reappropriation of the city through "the construction or reconstruction of an articulated ensemble which can be retained in memory and which the individual can map and

remap along the moments of mobile, alternative trajectories” (Jameson, 1991: 51). This ‘remapping’ is, too, a cognitive ‘tool’ with which people can politically and socially produce their own *differential* spaces, for space in cities is, as Massey puts it, always incomplete, always making room for new political imaginations and projects to materialize. Cognitive mapping, then, can be said to be an everyday, socio-spatial and *(infra)political* practice, instrumental for claims embodied in collective protest actions and to the assertion of protesters as legitimate political actors. In other words, protesters, by dint of their cognitive spatial praxis, prompt a **‘new and future cartography’** of the cities they inhabit, for it is a mode of *multiple* and *relational* spatial thinking that seeks,

Not to trace out representations of the real, but to construct mappings that refigure the relations in ways that render alternative epistemologies and very different ways of world-making [...]. The new cartographers are the social movements who — across a wide spectrum of groups and locations — are rapidly expanding the scope of their spatial practices and their production of new mappings to render new images (and practices) and to render visible their geographies [...]. If traditional cartographies sought to represent the real, new mapping practices seek instead to unmask a new type of real. They produce it, either by rendering it visible as a form of socio-spatial practice and collective action, or by producing alternative imagined (even utopian) spaces to those being built by the state and other transnational actors (Cobarrubias and Pickles, 2009: 40).

In view of such epistemological shift (from the sheer representation of what exists to radical re-representation and actual embodiment of what might yet be), the cognitive mapping of urban social movements signals their political and spatial iterative experimentation. Furthermore, their repositioning in their *own* worlds occurs ‘(infra)politically’, in a fluid manner, with no exact predestinations, at three coinciding ‘spatial moments’:

- **‘from space’**: that is, people shift from material conditions of their space to alternative spatializations;
- **‘on space’**: either to, overtly or furtively, take over or dominate it, by utilizing a political group identity and;
- **‘in space’**: seeking opportunities to express their views, people mobilize and protest — even violently — or in habitual day-to-day interaction debate and display, *in space*, their concerns and demands.

On the whole, people, as a result, **‘make space’**, for they create the conditions through which the public political movement is enhanced by means of the link between metaphorical space and politics. People, then, ‘win’ the abstract-metaphorical grapple over the meaning of (their cognitively remapped and reconquered) space (Garber, 2000: 267-269). All things considered, protest collective actions, given their cognitive praxis, are spatial struggles based on critical spatial imaginations that spell out and assert the future as an unlimited system of political and social interactions, “for if the future were not open there would be no possibility of changing it and thus no possibility” (Massey, 2009: 17) of transformative (infra)politics. Such realization is of paramount importance, because, at present,

We live in socially produced spaces that are predominantly urban and almost entirely urbanized; [...] because they are socially produced rather than naturally given, these urbanized spaces are subject to being changed through social actions; [...] the urban geographies in which we live produce powerful negative as well as positive effects on our lives; [...] and the forces of injustice and oppression that are built into our geographies can become a strategic force for mobilizing and organizing innovative forms of spatial praxis [...] stretching across all the nested geographical scales in which we live (Soja, 2009: 32).

3.4. Community development: *Autonomous and transformative*

The practice, more than the idea, of *community development* is closely related to *community participation* — that is, the mechanisms and means whereby people in their communities have

a stake, enter actively the decision-making arena and, ultimately, implement their sense- and meaning-making actions⁵⁶. 'Community', moreover, is not to be understood as a geographically fixed unit of homogenous and plane governmental administration. Instead, community refers to groups of people in spatial proximity; organized around (a) communal (set of) interests and values; and sharing diverse identities (ethnic-, territorial-, gender-like). Collective features, moreover, may be derived from common origins (kinship, history, space); akin economic and social activities; and similar mindsets, behaviors and purposes (Davies and Herbert, 1993: 4). In addition to that, a community is defined by a '**degree of intensity**', since "[w]herever men live together they develop in some kind and degree distinctive common characteristics — manners, traditions, modes of speech, and so on [...]. It will be seen that a community may be part of a wider community, and that all community is a question of degree [...]. It is a question of the degree and intensity of the common life" (Maclver, 1924: 23).

From that viewpoint, community is at the center of social life. Thus, through the effective participation of any one community's members, it is possible to foster a development that sticks to the reality as it is (rather than inducing an intended one) and, ideally, begins with people's everyday practices. To that end, community development is triggered by "extraordinarily re-experiencing the ordinary" (Shor, 1992: 122) within a framework determined by asymmetrical distributions of power and concomitant socio-spatial effects, provided that,

In the stories of everyday life as told in the margins of society lie the theory and practice of community development, beginning in exposing the contradictions that result in discrimination, the power relationships that cleave divisions (Ledwith, 2016: 5).

Marginalization has been steadily growing, especially in cities, due to hasten and market-driven processes of urbanization. Large sectors of civil society are, more and more, kept from substantially entering decision-making processes, because 'traditional' governmental accountabilities (in both national and local issues) have been increasingly replaced by private entrepreneurial practices. Such transition, allegedly, would improve city management as well as ameliorate negative upshots (Carley, 2001: 3-4). Consequently, monolithic states are 'strategically' downsized to bolster efficiency and efficacy; but, in the end, by de- and re-regulating a complex framework of public policies, states end up being organized around a profit-oriented agenda that has no regard for managerial intervention (Harvey, 1989). To reverse such scenario, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) argue for broader decision-making in the midst of ever more cumbersome urban systems. It is believed that placing non-tokenistic community participation at the heart of action would heighten governmental management (Abbott, 1996; Carley, 2001). However, such a call bears the question of to what extent community participation can, in fact, be significantly encouraged within formal and traditional institutional decision-making (à la Arnstein's "ladder"). Thus, reasserting community development, particularly through the integration of disenfranchised sectors of societies, would require the invention of new and alternatives forms of participation, rather than retooling sanctioned 'old' ones.

Eventually, community participation turns into a dynamic and multidirectional **learning process** between all parties involved, which, to varying degrees, transfers control to community members and generates cohesion among community members (Pateman, 1970). To put it another way, community development rather than a 'method-program', becomes both a progression and a movement (Sanders, 1970). As a result, means-to-and-end and goal-attainment activities, that follow a technocratic rationale, as the 'classical' engine of community development, gives way to a process characterized by non-elitist decisions, extensive participation and with internal sources and devises for action. Community participation, in due course, is imbued with emotions and values derived from the particular social and political system (as opposed to the 'neutrality' of scientific-technical expertise). Seen like that, community development does resemble a radically spatialized mode of planning

⁵⁶ While it may be ostensibly obvious that community participation is citizen participation, I don't mean to coin any fancy neologism (there's anyway literature abound with the term 'community participation'). Rather, the point is to stress levels and instances in which people can more substantially participate.

that promotes a social and collective production of (communal) space. That is to say, it provides people with an opportunity to not only imagine a different reality, but also to construct it.

Community development practices can, indeed, become gradually autonomous and thereby forge an in-situ bottom-up progress. James Holston, for instance, deems self-directed community development actions as “**insurgent performances**” (2009: 250) aimed at self-construction of houses and public amenities in direct defiance of (if not despite) top-down overtly scanty housing policies (1999). Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 373), similarly, considers collective actions of residents in ‘excluded’ urban peripheries as “[d]ifferences [that] endure or arise on the margins of the homogenized realm, either in the form of resistances or in the form of externalities (lateral, heterotopical, heterological)”. More specifically, Lefebvre (1991[1974]: 373-374; italics in the original) observes that,

The vast shanty towns of Latin America (*favelas, barrios, ranchos*) manifest a social life far more intense than the bourgeois districts of the cities. This social life is transposed onto the level of urban morphology, but it only survives inasmuch as it fights in self-defence [...]. Their poverty notwithstanding, these districts sometimes so effectively order their space — houses, walls, public spaces — as to elicit a nervous admiration. *Appropriation* of a remarkably high order is to be found here. The spontaneous architecture and planning (‘wild’ forms, according to a would-be elegant terminology) prove greatly superior to the organization of space by specialists who would effectively translate the social order into territorial reality with or without direct orders from economic and political authorities.

These autonomous and located spatial ‘reappropriations’ — indeed, a compound of *spaces of representation* — can come to displace the governing spatialization superimposed from above (Shields, 1996: 164), by constructing other forms of knowledge and rearranging established spatial orders through other ‘tactical’ methods. Ultimately, community development, when autonomously carried out, may well counteract the hegemony over the configuration and production of space. In that regard, community development not only constitutes a mode of radical planning, but it is also spatially transformative in an intimately political manner, given that “space has to be associated in some way or other to change as a generative rupture in the order of things in order to have political pertinence” (Dikeç, 2012: 675). In the end, community development should “change itself into a radical activity committed to action for social justice rather than a placatory practice that attempts to make life just a little bit better around the edges” (Ledwith, 2016: 9).

3.4.1. Deconstructing community participation: *An unremitting dilemma*

Community participation, by the end of the 1970s, began to be recurrently mentioned as an integral component of development projects in countries of the South. Put forward by development theorists to condemn the excess of verticality in the implementation of community development initiatives, the major claim was the ineffectiveness to, at least, alleviate poverty (Midgley et al., 1986). Consequently, efforts were redirected towards the fulfillment of basic human needs. Achieving this aim prove to be at odds with “externally imposed and expert-oriented forms of research and planning”, which in turn enabled the introduction of participatory research and endogenous planning mechanisms into community development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 5). Community participation began to be deemed as essential to catalyze community development anew, by rendering decision-making more transparent and accountable. Be that as it may, it is also undeniable that community participation has a strong political and social character and its understanding is rather diffuse and thus constantly open to (re)interpretation,

For example, development professionals working in developing countries might see community participation simply as a way of mobilizing community support for projects; NGOs in the field, as well as CBOs, may see it as a vehicle through which local communities can take control of the development process and bring about sweeping political change; development agencies may see it as a method of improving project performance, whereas many governments and civil servants view it simply as threatening and subversive (Abbott, 1996: 4).

Community participation, thus, ranges from “a form of mobilization to get things done” (a ‘means’) to “a process whose outcome is an increasingly meaningful participation in the development process” (an ‘end’) (Moser, 1983: 3-4). It is worthwhile noticing that among these views on community participation, there is no reference whatsoever to how members of communities may actually regard their participation⁵⁷. In that regard, Michael Carley (2001: 4) contends that “[p]eople want to participate in something tangible, in improving their lives and having the satisfaction of self-development, and the confidence it engenders”. Likewise, Carole Pateman (1970: 22ff.) stresses three main arguments wherefore citizens would likely be interested/motivated to participate: (i) it is a multidirectional educational process; (ii) it transfers some control; and (iii) it fosters communal identity (which produces bonds of attachment and solidarity). However, there are, in actuality, various factors that either constrain or deform the extent to which community participation takes place within decision-making.

For instance, while certain aspects of community development may be said to be better handled at a citywide or city-regional scale (public transportation, waste management, large infrastructural projects), many other aspects might as well be more effectively devolved to the community-neighborhood⁵⁸ level (public goods and services, housing, public spaces). In other words, decentralizing and driving down functions to a (more) suitable spatial and social domain, aiming at a more effective management. Additionally, there ought to be an integrative development framework to link regional, city as well as local initiatives, which would acknowledge the impact decisions reached at upper levels have on those made at lower tiers (and, ideally, the other way around). As a result, the viability of community development schemes could be more pragmatically stated (Carley, 2001). Overall, not only is horizontality between government, market and civil society needed as prerequisite of a ‘down-to-earth’ community development, but also implications at all levels — from households to barrios to the nation as a whole — have to be properly combined (Carley and Kirk, 1998).

Nevertheless, such well-intentioned scenario has restraining obstacles: for starters, people having to change their attitude and behavior in a positive manner; which is rather improbable unless it becomes socially rewarding. Furthermore, politicians will not engage with wider processes of decision-making insofar as that does not turn out to be electorally worthwhile. Also, there seems to be little recognition (not necessarily due to a lack of empirical evidence) that major tasks of city development, to which communities are inevitably subject, should be broken down into more manageable sections — namely, neighborhoods (or clusters thereof). As to the interactions between levels, there are also impediments given that “[f]ailures of vertical integration are compounded by a frequent economic and cultural gap between a policy-making elite and the reality of life at the neighbourhood level, a reality which is often characterized by the drive for basic survival” (Carley, 2001: 12). Such cultural and economic divergence can, more specifically, be found in the incapacity of ‘traditional’ decision-makers to grasp and incorporate ‘common’ people’s daily routines and rhythms — to wit, to perform Lefebvre’s “rhythmanalysis”⁵⁹. Hence, a whole dimension of political action and political identity-formation is left aside, in which community members *in* and *through* their everyday practices develop skills, organize and eventually mobilize (Boudreau, 2009) against top-down decisions that may well threaten their livelihoods. Moreover, by way of disruptive community participation, people may go from just ‘opposing’ to ‘proposing’ an alternative community development, forasmuch as, “[t]op-down solutions very often fail because they are out of touch with the reality of life on the ground” (Carley, 2001: 14).

⁵⁷ Incidentally, that seems to be a recurrent issue in participation literature: the predominance of an ‘outer’ point of view that, at best, hypothesizes people’s sentiment about participation.

⁵⁸ This hyphenation should not read as an equivalence between ‘community’ and ‘neighborhood’, but rather stems from my recognition that a strong sense of community is easily recognizable in neighborhoods (this assessment comes from the research’s fieldwork as well as previous practical experience I gathered working in urban and rural communities). However, this is not axiomatically so — certain types of neighborhoods may well lack a sense of community, as it is here understood, altogether, given their socio-spatial configuration (e.g., gated communities, large apartment complexes, amid others).

⁵⁹ For further details about “rhythmanalysis” see subsection 3.2.2 (specifically, in the part entitled *From positivist societal guidance to post-structuralist/postmodern socio-spatial transformation*).

A semiotic and signifying (re)consideration: Geographically fixed community, a suspended in the local-global interface participation

For John Abbott (1996: 61ff.) there are, around the concept of community participation, certain theoretical connotations that also prevent it from delivering more substantial results. For example, whenever the term 'community' is in discourses replaced by 'primary stakeholder', the whole idea of community development is fraught with pitfalls. Such replacement is done because 'primary stakeholder' is thought to apply 'better' to participation, for it refers to specific *target* groups, rather than *interest-groups* (with which 'community' are misleadingly and *not* innocently likened). One can all the same debunk such conceptually convenient ambiguity with three arguments. Firstly, whereas the notion of community confirms that participation would revolve around 'the local' (which, by extension, impinges a certain spatial character to decision-making), stakeholder alone is a blurred term that has neither a spatial connection nor a common basis for its definition — who holds a stake and who doesn't is a tricky (metaphorical) question. Secondly, stakeholder does not address the issue of power and predominately sticks to a socio-economic logic, while community is faced with contextual socio-political realities. Thirdly, the categorization of stakeholders (primary, secondary, etc.) proves inefficient, for it not only creates, *de facto*, a hierarchical organization of decision-making, but also fails to capture, in an increasingly interactive global environment, the impacts of decisions (diluting thereby accountability). 'Community participation', as a notion, has to be brought anew to the fore and thus prevent conceptual manipulation. In so doing, it needs be critically rearticulated to promote a participation that is not solely restricted to issues of physical-infrastructure nature within administrative-geographic limits of municipal jurisdiction (Yap, 1990; Kaufman, 1997a). By contrast, it ought to find expression in debates that challenge power dynamics on subjects such as multiple land use, biodiversity preservation, uncontrolled/undesired urbanization patterns, and the like, (Abbott, 1996), whose inception and causes may well be located elsewhere (if not 'dissolve everywhere').

Switching from the traditional idea of a geographically fixed unit of bureaucratic administration to a more disperse, fluid and flexible notion of a system based on globalizing networks, brings about fundamental questions as to how both 'community' and 'community participation' could be conceptually (dis)arranged. Hence, the interdependencies of the 'local' and the 'global' (that is, the 'glocalization' sophism) together with power (un)balances in decision-making appear, once again, at the core of discussions. Michael Carley (2001: 13) points out that globalization, as a double-edged sword, draws policy makers closer to each other and facilitates the swapping of (un)successful experiences, but, at the same time, decision/policy makers and communities' members drift apart. Accordingly, top-down approaches are upheld regardless of their continuous shortcomings. That being so, it is to wonder how schemes orchestrated from above and responding to a global(ized) market logic can go about legitimately, in the face of people's lack of confidence in (local and central) governmental institutions and growing cynicism. Moreover, decision-making processes have become diffuse, polycentric and disjointed enough to wear down their legitimacy — the very principle collective institutions rest upon (Klausen and Sweeting, 2005: 214). Nevertheless, theorizations of community and community participation seem to still come from the 'outside' (either academic or institutional), rather than from 'inside' (the voices of activists and, in the long run, all community members). Hence, 'outer' conceptualizations of community and community participation are redefined to adapt to the present-day complex globalizing processes.

Anthony Giddens (1990: 64) describes globalization as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa". The concept of 'community', on such account, is imprinted with enough acquiescence to cope with readings of globalization such as the 'dissolution of territory and geography' (Ruggie, 1993; O'Brien, 1992), the 'obsolesce and redundancy' of politico-administrative borders (Ohmae, 1995), 'de-territorializing' of political and cultural identities' (Appadurai, 1996) and the emergence of supra-territorial 'ethereal' spaces composed of boundless and limitless interactions (Scholte, 1996). The idea of 'community', in the midst of this convoluted jargon is commonly referred to as 'the local' or 'localities' that are to counteract the destructive effects globalizing dynamics (for which

communities are, paradoxically, most necessary). In consequence, community and community participation are re-conceptualized around the need to 'secure' the identity, territory and commonality of communities (which also affects how community development is understood). Ironically, issues underscored go back to 'typical' community development visions — for instance, housing in the form of opposition to eviction. On the whole, there's a constellation of 'new' semiotic and signifying construes of community, community participation (which too touches the purport of community development) that, in way or another, implies that, while 'community' remains 'fixed' in territory, 'participation' appears much more blurred — and hence open to fruitless re-articulations.

Has community participation reached a dead end? Seeking to overcome sterile and circular proposals

There is, then, an apparent rising nonchalance to participation among communities — even worse, it is being normalized. This normalization, far from by chance, it is by design: local officials not only get rid of a hurdle but also no longer have to meet requirements imposed by third-party funders of community development projects (NGOs, international cooperation agencies, foundations, etc.). Diana Mitlin and John Thompson (1995: 241), in respect of such distortedly normalized stagnation of a 'no community participation', sustain that through a "participatory urban appraisal", community participation can be relaunched by combining urban and rural experiences. Thus, they deem daedal tools and techniques (for example, participatory mapping, collective modelling of new houses design, transect walks, seasonal calendars, institutional analysis) as helpful to revive community participation in neighborhood design programs, which, in turn, would mitigate institutional opacity (Mitlin and Thompson, 1995: 241-242). However, these instruments have manifest flaws: they are neither democratic nor representative and the odds to influence mainstream projects and programs are almost non-existent (Carley, 2001). In order to 'disguise' this structural fragility, communities are normally paid lip service by way of a chaotic mix of statutory and informal consultation. Likewise, the existing gulfs regarding expectations, distribution of power and interests, do actually intensify constraints in rendering policy systems and community participation more substantial. Hence, in order to carry out wider and substantial processes of community participation, it must be acknowledged that among people a notion that everything is considerably superficial and tokenistic prevails. Far from baseless, this distrusting outlook on community participation comes out of the all-too-common practice of asking people to give their opinion and input, once all 'transcendental' decisions have been made already (Carley and Kirk, 1998).

There are two contradictory aspects that need a sort of 'reconciliation'. On one side, community participation, specially of those marginalized and misrepresented social groups, is thought to assuage the acceptance of community development policies and projects, for they have, presumably, comprehended and accepted their implications (whether or not there's been active involvement in decision-making) (Pateman, 1970; Wolf 2002: 41; Castillo, 2010). On the other side, and more realistically, decision-making is, in point of fact, full of unforeseen complications, due to the interplay between power and rationality⁶⁰ and the epistemic divergence between experts/civil servants (technocratic-bureaucratic) and community members (experiential and even poignant). Thus, Francis Bacon's dictum *knowledge is power* is to be taken neither literally, nor for granted — it is not feasible to state what the *right* or *proper* kind of knowledge is to support 'objectively' decisions, when power relations and conflict in decision-making are, blatantly and 'scientifically', effaced (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 14ff.).

Furthermore, within vertical chains of decision-making systems larger institutions have a clear and evident lead, because of the amount of power, information and resources they have at their disposition (Carley, 2001: 13). This advantage turns out to be much more relevant when it is taken into account that "[p]ower defines not only a certain conception of reality", but also "defines physical, economic, social and environmental reality itself" (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 14). That being so, verticality and dominance over power relations allows for community participation

⁶⁰ This subject is further discussed in subsection 3.2.1 (in particular, under the subtitle *Is participatory democratic planning, then, pure fabrication? Embracing, rather than pre-empting, conflict?*).

to be instrumentalized within decision-making and implementation of projects and policies. Following Sherry Arnstein's (1969) citizen participation's continuum, communities are only brought in to, at best, help slightly shaping an 'end-product'. Under those circumstances, a two-dimensional understanding of the relationship between community participation and power is (re)produced, which ranges from 'confrontation' (where empowerment can be attained), going through 'manipulation', to 'community control' (where successful community development and management are supposedly obtained) (Abbott, 1989; 1996). In the end, what truly happens is that "whenever possible, hegemonic power is pursued through citizens' consent and [mis]perceptions of inclusion" (Miraftab, 2009: 33).

Community participation, all things considered, is strategically, time and again, rendered tokenistic by dint of 'renovated' participatory mechanisms (for instance those promoted by NGOs) that, in any event, prove to be sanctioned spaces of community participation. At issue, therefore, is not only the normalizing apathy pervading communities, but also the fact that "symbolic inclusion does not necessarily entail material re-distribution" and that "routinization of community participation depoliticizes communities' struggles and extends state control within the society" (Miraftab, 2009: 34). As ubiquitous as the community participation's impasse seemingly is, there are, too, loose ends that allows for alternatives to thrive: when, for example, people insurgently invent, or take over existing, spaces of community participation through **counter-hegemonic** (destabilizing the status quo), **transgressive** (through space and time) and **imaginative** (promoting a different reality) collective practices (Miraftab, 2009: 33; Castillo, 2013a: 7; 2013b: 272). Ultimately the politics of community development are significantly reshaped by people themselves, which enables them to alter *together* their communities both materially (rearranging the established spatial order of things) and symbolically (drawing on identities, values, kinship, and the like to re-signify *internally* what *their* community truly stands for).

3.4.2. A differential politics of community organizing: *From induced to produced (spatial) difference*

Autonomous social, political and, ultimately, spatial rearrangements people are able to imagine and, in due course, crystallize in their communities, don't override the existing socio-spatial reality. Rather, they exhibit the characteristic **spatial duality** that pervades urban areas (particularly in cities throughout the global South). As Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 374) points out, such spatial duality shouldn't be mistaken for an equal distribution of the political power that propels urbanization (in the direction of either growth or development). 'Duality', far from meaning that space and political power have 'two parts', implies,

Contradiction and conflict; a conflict of this kind eventuates in either the emergence of unforeseen differences or in its own absorption, in which case only induced differences arise (i.e. differences internal to the dominant force of space). A conflictual duality, which is a transitional state between opposition (induced difference) and contradiction/ transcendence (produced difference), cannot last forever; it can sustain itself, however, around an 'equilibrium' deemed optimal by a particular ideology (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 374).

For Lefebvre, the "particular ideology" was modern capitalism whose "process of *differential urbanization*" continually and creatively destroyed previously existing socio-spatial formations in accordance with its "broader developmental dynamics and crisis-tendencies" (Brenner and Schmid, 2015: 168; italics in the original). Put in those terms, it does look like *induced difference* is, by far, more recurrent than *produced difference*, for the 'conflictual duality', between one another, is permanently sustained, since "the differential moment of urbanization" of modern capitalism "puts into relief the intense, perpetual dynamism of capitalist forms of urbanization, in which sociospatial configurations are tendentially established, only to be rendered obsolete and eventually superseded" (Brenner and Schmid, 2015: 168). Within such a scenario, there is, in fact, virtually no room for community organizing to further and produce a particular *differential* community development. However, amid manifold existing interpretations of community development, Irwin T. Sanders (1970) argues, there are four dominating conceptual trends that, by and large, assess community development as process, method, program, or movement.

Community development seen as a **process** refers to a technocratic(ized) 'course of action', whereby decisions are made by an elite (that is, only a few participate) and resources as well as devices come from outsiders, who end up settling upon issues of others' common concern. Community development regarded as a **method** consists of a means-to-an-end practice (either a way of functioning or a part of it), in which everything revolves around a goal to be attained. Similarly, community development turned into a **program** are the set of activities (that is, the content of the preceding conceptualization) to reach a specific objective. And finally, when community development is understood as a **movement**, it is both triggered and sustained by the compromise and conviction of those willingly engaged in it. For them, community development is not neutral — like when deemed as a process, method or program — it is, by contrast, filled with emotional charge and seeks progress acknowledging that the set of values and targets will vary according to every political and social system where community development is being advanced (Abbott, 1996: 71-72).

Community development as movement, thus, seemingly resembles social mobilization 'cognitive praxis', because it requires that people partaking gain consciousness of both their reality and their capacity to change things around (as far-fetched as that, initially, might seem). Collective protest action, as has been noted throughout the previous section, does carry a refined level of organization and much of it takes place within people's daily routines where, incidentally, needs of communities are directly experienced and 'infrapolitically' discussed. Also, people engaged in protest action deploy a series of skills that might as well enable them to be a part of their community development, since the same level of commitment acquired while protesting, it could be contended, suits community development as a 'movement' as well. Essential to turn community development into a movement, moreover, is the notion of "conscientization", a concept deeply rooted in Latin America's community development 'popular' (as opposed to institutional) politics (analogous to Saul Alinsky's "community organizing"). Coined by Brazilian educator, activist and theorist Paulo Freire (1970: 15), conscientization "[r]efers to learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality". Conscientization, together with empowerment, are thought to be the first two stages of a gradual, effective and meaningful community participation. While conscientization may well find expression in urban social movements' collective protest actions, empowerment can be defined by the "political opportunity structure" protesters need to get a hold of to advance their claims.

A coupling of conscientization and empowerment, is, arguably, recognizable in actions performed by organized communities to either resolve, de facto, a basic need (land invasion) or dispute repressing situations (demonstrations against rent speculation or privatization of the provision of public services). This type of political repertoire, quite common throughout the developing world, is usually characterized by the apparent absence of a prominent leadership. Instead, dialogical elements like cooperation, solidarity and unity appear as stronger driving forces (in contrast with a core of activists framing issues and coordinating the movement). As a result, ensuing, more solution-oriented, actions can easily follow (for instance, promoting, after land invasion, the consolidation of settlements) and, given that leaders cannot be singled out, typical measures to break, erode and routinize mobilization are circumvented (Abbott, 1996). As local-interest groups, jointly trying to improve living conditions, organized communities as 'movements' somewhat mirror the tactical and strategic functioning of the so-called 'new social movements' (see section 3.3), which, besides social-class struggles, seek lobbying and burdening governments with developmental and social issues, for which they normally operate on *ad hoc* basis (Sachikonye, 1995). In other words, new social movements, rather than trying to gain state power, strive to influence policies regarding specific situations (Jenkins, 2001). This particularity is, too, echoed by Manuel Castells (1983) in his analysis of grassroots movements that thrive in urban areas and press for political self-management, improving collective consumption and furthering community culture, all along producing new 'urban' meanings. Both sense- and meaning-making actions, moreover, vary significantly when carried out in cities of the global(ized) South vis-à-vis the global(izing) North. Be it in the form of organized communities or urban social movements, social mobilization, in the developing world is, for the most part, considered as social organization holding a territorially-based identity, collectively advancing emancipation, and defying (not obliterating) power structures, in order to lessen, eventually, disenfranchisement

(Schoorman, 1989). On the other hand, in developed and de-industrialized countries, social mobilization emphasizes social reform and changing underlying economic structures as a goal and, in so doing, aspire to affect policies and reverse negative conditions at the local level (McCarney, 1996).

In either case, the dilemma of whether to become institutionalized into the 'formal' political process, or, else, remain outside and fairly independent of the system, must be confronted (Jenkins, 2001). Consequently, community development as a movement (just like urban social movements) faces the threat of being reduced to a specific and contained irruption unable to develop further, due to strained relationships with, and increasingly closer among, state and market and how, mainly in cities, such phenomenon profoundly re-shapes the cultural models that steer social and spatial practices. Global forces, over and above, detach, as it were, cities, more and more, from their 'local' and particular territoriality, while global linkages among them become stronger, all of this occurring in both the social and physical realm (Castells, 1996).

From flickering interferences to invented, autonomous and steady engagement

In one way or another, for community development to be thought of and exercised as a movement, a distinctive form of community participation has to be invented and sustained. In that regard, community development produces difference and work its way around the 'the conflictual duality' supported by whichever dominant ideology. To that end, it must be considered that,

[Community] participation does not exist in the abstract. *Participation is defined through specific institutions, processes, and ideological and cultural factors. It is defined through individuals involved (and not involved) in a participatory process.* Within any one participatory structure, overall forms of social inequality and oppression are usually reflected and maintained. The challenge we face is to develop not only participatory mechanisms of empowerment but the means to overcome the structured inequalities in social power. These *structured differences* in participation apply to many categories of social hierarchy and oppression — relating to class, sex, color, age, religion, nationality, physical well-being, and sexual orientation. These categories are often intertwined and mutually determinant (Kaufman, 1997b: 153; italics added).

Ultimately, community participation, instead of symbolically representing, actually embodies, somewhat inadvertently, *difference*. "[D]ifference in acts differs [...] from the difference merely thought or reflected. The thought and not-lived difference of philosophers and logicians is in opposition with non-thought and lived difference" for it "cannot be reduced to banalized representations: originality, diversity, variety, distinction, etc." (Lefebvre, 1970: 65-66; as cited in Dikeç, 2001: 1791). Thus, part of the fight of community development as a movement is pushing for the right to *produce* and *live* a spatial difference, for "differential urbanization" results from "various forms of urban struggle and expresses the powerful potentials for radical social and political transformation" (Brenner and Schmid, 2015: 168). At the end of the day, the politics of community development can be not only asserted as spatially and differentially lived, but also autonomously and self-rewardingly carried out.

3.4.3. Local and communal self-development: *Superseding 'self-help' as 'self-improvement'*

Mary FitzGerald (1980: 26), in her definition of community development, stresses the fact that people act together, because they hold a **sense of membership**. As a group, they act collectively towards the improvement of living conditions of every member of the community as a whole. Nowadays, and particularly in urban areas, much of the emphasis of community development is placed on *in situ* progress, which, in turn, brought the concepts of 'community development' and 'self-help' closer to each other. Nonetheless, in actuality, there is little (if not none whatsoever) freedom for people to act independently and improve their living conditions, due to bureaucracy of governments and pressure of external (chiefly economic) powerful interests. Thus, communities, and more particularly urban communities, are hindered in their attempts to promote development in a more self-determining way. Causes for such limitation are partly due to discussions being centered on the needs of communities as though they

were independent entities; dismissing thus the intricate relationships they have with governments as well as with other (neighboring and distant) communities (Abbott, 1996: 69-70).

That being so, communities need be seen not just as **geographically/territorially fixed units**, but also as **groups within society organized around common interests**. Communities, as such, are integral to the civil society as a whole. All the same, there is an implication in this 'geographical-territorial/interest-based' duality of community — namely, that the mixture and heterogeneity of coexisting interests renders communities tension- and conflict-ridden (Burns et al., 1994: 227; Castillo, 2010: 46). In dense and plural settlements, like present-day cities, it has become clear that states are incapable of politically representing and balancing the wide array of interests. Hence, they have to be counter-balanced by direct community action. This implies, amid other things, furthering local community self-development, “[w]hile in no way seeking to reduce the responsibility of the state, or the market, in serving society [...] that is development that is both socially determined and oriented — and not [merely] ‘self-help’ as ‘self-improvement’” (Jenkins and Smith, 2001: 18). Moreover, society should always guide the activity of the state and not encourage its retreat, but perhaps more importantly, society must make the market socially accountable (Jenkins and Smith, 2001: 18). To that end, interactions between the “three forms of social coordination” (Lechner, 1997) — the state, market and civil society — are to be rearranged, provided that current globalizing/globalized economic systems are less and less receptive to both social locally-based needs and mobilizations demanding effective mechanisms whereby balancing transnational economic interests and local equitable distribution. Civil society’s essential role, accordingly, has to be strengthened and, within civil society, communities appear as the “strongest potential actors” (Jenkins and Smith, 2001: 19).

Ehrling J. Klausen and David Sweeting (2005: 217) enhance this idea and explain that “community involvement” means the participation of two social segments. On the one hand, the “local public and its associations”, which includes all individuals and their locally based organizations (for instance, neighborhood committees). On the other hand, “the resourceful societal actors”, that is, public and private organizations and institutions together with their representative associations. Not surprisingly, the concoction of interests and clashing of unbalanced forces pressing towards a consensus are, predominantly, steered by the latter group. However, citizens, in the tradition of classic democracy, are, at least in principle, able to discuss public issues leading to political and communal agreements and decisions (Gyford, 1991: 18). Similarly, citizens are said to be “democratic agents” and thus are empowered when they defy the institutions and organizations that “shape their every day life” (Raco and Imrie, 2000: 2188). Such ‘empowerment’ through defiance, though it may happen via institutional instances, is far more recurrently expressed via ‘extra-institutional’ politics of social movements, whose claims, in order to gain more power over community development issues, are articulated through the idea of **autonomy**.

Moving beyond the representative/participative deadlock: Engaging head-on with autonomy

There is, indeed, an unmistakable necessity to rethink community participation processes, so that political representation can become significant. Therefore, the role, right and duty of communities ought to be reinforced, acknowledged and stated by means of long-term organizational mechanisms, which enable people to fully enter decision-making processes (allowing self-promoted and self-managed initiatives) that define the future development of their communities (Carley, 2001). As desirable as that would be, the reality indicates otherwise: state bureaucratic apparatuses, time and again, fail to provide effective and substantial mechanisms of participation. Community participation, consequently, ends up all too often being (not innocently) routinized. When confronted with such scenario, community development has no other alternative than to turn into **a movement** with a marked guiding axis: *autonomy* (as reaction to state’s heteronomy). Autonomy, furthermore, within community development as movement, has a twofold performance,

The idea of autonomy embraces two interrelated senses: *collective* autonomy, or *the conscious and explicitly free self-rule of a particular society*, as based on politico-institutional guarantees as well as the effective material possibility

(including access to reliable information) of equal chances of participation in relevant decision-making processes; and *individual* autonomy, that is *the capacity of particular individuals to make choices in freedom* (which depends both on strictly individual and psychological circumstances and on the political and material factors) (Souza, 2000: 188; italics in the original).

Through the strategic combination of these two levels of autonomy (which, in the first sense, may actually imply superseding “politico-institutional guarantees”, for they’ve proven futile), community participation is grounded on the community’s multifarious socio-spatiality reality, which is never complete and ever-changing — that is to say, open to an alternative *spatial* and *political* future. What is more, community participation invents its own spaces of deliberation, which range from visible, fairly organized and **open political spaces** (where people debate and eventually execute actions to improve their communities) to more intimate and **surreptitious infrapolitical spaces of everyday intercourse** (when the community is being *differentially* enacted). The ‘experience’ of community, while it may be “euphoric and fleeting” (when, for instance, protest collective actions of urban social movements are ‘appropriated’ for community development ends), there is a significant “pay-off”, namely,

On occasion or at such times members experience a centred and bounded entity that includes the self as such; they engage in exchanges and sharing that are personalized; the orientation to each other and to the whole engages the person [...]. It is from such occasions that ‘the spirit of community’ or ‘sense of community’ is achieved [...]. [T]he aspiration to community is an aspiration to a kind of connectedness that transcends the mundane and concrete tangle of social relationships (Frazer, 1999: 83).

By way of the collectively cherished ‘**sense of community**’, the double-level autonomy of community development is placed at the core of action. Additionally, two other essential features of autonomous community development are expounded: **educational** and **spatial**. Community development as educational (mutual among participants) experience has to do with “the cultivation of social networks and the associated concern with reciprocity, trust and tolerance” (Smith, 2001). Community development, as ‘education’, is also directly connected with the crucial practice of conscientization. And, as such, is a form of “critical pedagogy” (Ledwith, 2016: 7) whereby, gaining “control over the conditions under which we struggle with the challenges of life” (Bauman, 2001: 149). In view of increasing centralization of state government instances and permeation, via globalization, of market-thinking in numerous areas of social life, getting control over the “challenges of life”, almost undoubtedly, is a collective, transgressive, imaginative and *spatial* endeavor. In other words, community development as a movement is a compound of subversive “spatial practices” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]) that conceal communal space.

Therefore, community development, in the form of a movement and underpinned by joint spatial practice, “propounds and presupposes [...] [space], in a dialectical interaction, it produces slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 38). Consequently, the autonomous spatial conquering of their communities allows people to imping an **identity** and **sense of community** upon their living conditions, because, when space shows features such as ‘bounded’ and ‘self-contained’, either physically (walls) or symbolically (gender- or sexuality-specific delimitations), the construction of (spatial) identities emerge. Communal identities, hence, are not only prompted solely by cultural and language specificities, but also are “enhanced by carving out territories and sharply defining and protecting their boundaries” (Davoudi, 2009: 215-16). In short, that’s when development becomes ‘local’ and ‘communal’ and goes well beyond institutional- and expert-like ‘self-help’ as extraneous ‘self-improvement’.

3.5. Discussion: *Reading and grasping, through space, reflections for planning*

3.5.1. Space, where planning politics is to 'take shape'

The question of how democratic — or not — planning processes are, is, no doubt, a crucial issue with which planning theory and practice have been concerned. However, so much attention is given to the policy-making process that the arena — namely cities and regions — where planning becomes operative is considerably left out of sight (Yitfachel, 2007: 1; Castillo, 2013b: 262). Such 'omission' is clearly discernible in the way urban growth (for that isn't development) agendas are shaped by a new urban (local) politics that has straightforwardly 'de-socialize' "the production of urban space" (Gottdiener, 1994 [1985]). 'De-socialization', moreover, usually happens via neoliberal entrepreneurial practices demanding, in territorial competition, the creation of an 'eye-catching image' and, in policy-making and service delivery, the implementation of public-private-partnerships (Harvey, 1989; Jessop, 1994). Planning, therefore, does have to create and deliver new forms of substantial citizen participation (which, by no means whatsoever, must imply taking over those invented by people themselves). In so doing, no more 'spatial omissions' are allowed. Planners, contrariwise, have to reassert themselves "spatially" — that is to say, use space as "an encompassing viewpoint through which to make practical and theoretical sense of the complexities of the (post)modern world" (Soja, 2003: 272). In addition to that, planners should also internalize a different notion of politics, which "revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it, around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces and the possibilities of time" (Rancière, 2004 [2000]: 13).

Space, as Henri Lefebvre thoroughly remarks, isn't a sheer neutral object that planners may 'scientifically' manipulate and so bypass its innate ideological and political trait. Conversely, the constant interaction between historical and natural elements must be grasped, for it constitutes the process through which space is **socially, politically** and **contentiously** produced. More specifically, planning practice must sensibly capture the everyday practices whereby 'common' people create their *own* spaces in an (infra)political manner (Massey, 1996: 123), for they are at the heart of conflict and struggles '**over spatialized social power**' — a characteristic that renders them significant for planning decision-making. Yet, such undertaking isn't, by far, facile. Over the past decades there's been a series of economic and political rearrangements, at diverse spatial-geographical scales, leading to fuzzy and unequal processes of de- and re-territorialization (Brenner, 1998; 1999; Swyngedouw, 1997). As a result, (new) terrains, following a highly selective spatial structure, are formed to plainly favor powerful (global), at the expense of feeble (local), actors — a phenomenon that has profoundly impacted both national and local conflicts and citizen mobilizations as well (Köhler and Wissen, 2003). This re-composition, predominantly in cities, have come to the fore as a geography of polarization and social exclusion that has affected not only daily life of urban dwellers, but also has brought about a new political, social, and spatial order in cities (Swyngedouw et al., 2002; 2003: 13). Together with that, an emergence of new forms of governance (Healey et al., 1995) has taken place, which has, in turn, as aforementioned, visibly altered urban 'development' agendas. Accordingly, redistribution and regulatory considerations are supplanted by (the 'imminent' need to boost) economic growth and competitiveness (Rodríguez et al., 2003: 29).

In the face of such reality, planners do have an uphill task lessening a predatory urban growth and, at the same time, mitigating the consequences suffered, particularly, by disenfranchised societal blocs. Not to mention that planning practice has been justifiably criticized for both its oppressive spatial outcomes and having aligned, and worked closely, with private partners for the sake of entrepreneurial urban politics. Space, as a double-edge sword, is then pivotal: it may well propel inertia (and safeguard the status quo) or else embody a "politics of emancipation" (Dikeç, 2001; Amin, 2006) as a politico-practical means whereby rekindling planning; above all, as a profession. To that end, planning is to directly tackle and unravel the power interactions that have pervaded (and thereby spell out) urban space production, which, furthermore, are "at the same time material and imaginative, the two not simply mapping on to each other but intersecting and cross-cutting in complex ways" (Massey, 1996: 123).

Coming to terms with such hassle is for planners as much an **ethical and political stance** as an **analytical necessity**.

Moreover, planners have to 'learn' decoding and working hand in hand with community-based activism at the core of urban social movements. At least in principle, planning has the call to aid urban social movements coping with basic social problems, which, on the one hand, sometimes urge for major structural changes and, on the other, experience a lack of strength (Marcuse, 2009: 245). However, that is not a unilateral effort. Planners may provide urban social movements with critical input (for example, as to both policy- and decision-making or self-construction), inasmuch as urban social movements are to go beyond merely condemning state-led planning spatial stratagems and dare putting together proposals of their own (which do not necessarily have to comply with conventional means of representation or implementation). In other words, planning for and by themselves, with or without planners and fueled by a spatial politics enacted within the crannies institutional and formal planning frameworks cannot help producing. Ultimately, significant social, political and *spatial* changes could be incrementally advanced and contextually situated. To put it another way, turning planning into a steady and iterative process of socio-spatial transformation that, as Jacques Rancière (2004 [2000]: 13) points out, immanently embraces "spatial properties as well as time possibilities". 'Getting there' — or, at least, trying to — entails going back and forth a 'radical planning path', all the while moving (after Deleuze) among '**theoretical points**' and through '**practical relays**'. After all, "the central task of radical planning [...] is the *mediation of theory and practice in social transformation*" (Friedmann, 1987: 391; italics in the original).

3.5.2. Socio-spatial dialectics of urban protest action

An epistemological source, wherefrom planning practice may well profit to advance a more egalitarian urban development, is embedded in *collective protest actions* — yet, neither exclusively nor necessarily, those visible and disrupting ones. By contrast, there is a richer compendium of ontologies and epistemologies flowing constantly in everyday actions that are mistaken as 'non-political'. To grasp their far-reaching impact, to disclose their hidden scripts and to, eventually, unravel the way they may animate planning, a **socio-spatial and dialectical viewpoint** is needed, provided that social relations, including the ones underpinning protest actions, are *constituted* through, *constrained* by and *mediated* by space — the resulting "landscapes may be said to be a product of the *sociospatial dialectic*" (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3; italics in the original). Consequently, in decoding and interpreting the meaning of collective protest actions — above all, at the specific 'infrapolitical' level — their dialectical socio-spatiality must be acknowledged and examined, for it reveals the existence of structures within social life that produce and reproduce dynamics of exclusion and oppression both *in* and *through* space (Dikeç, 2001: 1788). In so doing, the focus, rather than be placed on space as reality in itself (that is, contextual space), has to be directed toward processes, structures, interactions, ruling logics that produce (Lefebvre)/organize (Harvey) it.

People, in their daily spatial practices (actions, routines, trajectories, rhythms), very much embody and thus expose the materializations (or material effects), for better or worse, of cultural, economic political intersecting processes (for example, gender- or sexuality-like spatial "permanences"). Following Edward T. Hall's (1968) "proxemics" (people's use of space as culturally inherent), protest actions affirm the importance of space to assert human orientation, construct a (political) subjectivity and render symbolic and significant the world in which we, spatially, dwell. Space, as Doreen Massey (1994: 251) puts it, "is one of the axes along which we experience and conceptualize the world". In that regard, the deconstruction of collective protest actions occurs in the interface between **individual** and **shared spatial practice**, "for people not only structure spaces differently, but experience them differently and inhabit distinct sensory worlds" (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, 2003: 4). Cities, therefore, as hodgepodes of distinctively experienced and structured spaces, intensify the contentious nature of urban space and evidence the way "complex structures and differentiated social entities" constantly "collude and compete for control over material and symbolic resources" (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, 2003: 19).

A wide range of analytical possibility opens up — from the actual individual human body to the present-day global network of instantaneous interconnections — when spatial relations are rooted in transdisciplinary examinations of urban phenomena. Nonetheless, “research on social movements and contentious politics has generally downplayed the spatial constitution and context of its central concepts such as identity, grievances, political opportunities and resources” (Martin and Miller, 2003: 143). This manifest ‘aspatial’ character of (urban) social movement theory, in general, and of analysis of protest action, in particular, has limited (latent) contributions to planning theory and practice. (The work of Edward Soja, while it represents an exception, still remains at times too abstract and only tangentially deals with the specificities of protesting). Moreover, understanding contentions for physical curb on urban space, cannot do, as Lefebvre thoroughly insists, without “conceptualizations of space which legitimize and naturalize sociospatial relations and which are manipulated in conflict situations” (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, 2003: 20).

While there exists a handful of somewhat pioneering works that have delved into the spatial constitution of dispute (Castells, 1983; Routledge, 1993; Miller, 2000), a widespread and engaged use of a spatial imagination/spatial thinking to shed light on urban social movements’ collective actions is still awaiting. A socio-spatial dialectic approach could, indeed, enlighten “how and why groups make claims to territory, the relationship between the spatial constitution of daily life and collective identity formation, the means by which transnational social movement organizations negotiate tensions between locally based constituencies and global institutions” (Martin and Miller, 2003: 143-144) amid other integrative dimensions of social mobilization in urban areas (and elsewhere). Lefebvre’s renowned ‘spatial trialectics’ has, for over more than two decades (at least to English-speaking scholarship), offered a powerful insight into the spatial nature of urban struggle. ‘Lived space’, the realm of material and symbolic experience, is particularly useful to zoom in on ‘spatial tactics’ that craft terrains “for the generation of ‘counterspaces’, spaces of resistance to the dominant order” (Soja, 1996: 68), which is often articulated and materialized through planning.

Space, all things considered, within the dynamic of contentious politics that permeates collective protest action in cities, “is not just an outcome; it is also part of the explanation” (Massey, 1984: 4). Hence, the socio-spatial dialectics of urban protest action is realized and explained spatially, for the “contradictions of space [...] make the contradictions of social relations operative. In other words, spatial contradictions ‘express’ conflicts between sociopolitical interests and forces; it is only *in* space that such conflicts come effectively into play, and in doing so they become contradictions *of* space” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]: 365; italics in the original). What is more, for planning purposes, the crucial point is that,

The planning, design, and construction of the city are processes of social production responsible for shaping the urban environment, encoding it with intentions and aspirations, uses and meanings that are often themselves contentiously produced. For instance, professional designers and political elites together negotiate competing future images of the city, but these are rarely consistent with the daily spatial experiences of urban residents and workers. Interventions that physically shape the urban landscape attract opposition because they reproduce key symbolic forms that reference deep and still unresolved or unresolvable conflicts among social actors and collectivities (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, 2003: 20).

3.5.3. Local and communal space — *The realm of engagement*

In *State, Space, World*, Lefebvre (2009: 135; italics in the original) writes “[e]ach time a social group [...] refuses to accept passively its conditions of existence, of life, or of survival, each time such a group forces itself not only to understand but to masters its conditions of existence, *autogestion* is occurring”. In a way, *autogestion* is a spatially and collectively practiced autonomy that seeks to proclaim and situate, cognitively and differentially, a particular (or even various) social bloc’s political and material existence within the totality of the city (and often against its totalizing urbanization). It is, too, a critical and pedagogical process that finds much better expression at the infrapolitical realm of everyday practices. *Autogestion* is, in fact, the essence of local community self-development carried out in urban

areas and as a movement. Actually, *autogestion* signals the mutual relation there is between community development and social mobilization as well as hints at the most suitable 'scale' of action (namely, the 'local'), since "[g]rassroots collective action offers a transformative moment for social change, which is why community development needs to be [seen as an integral] part of social movements" (Ledwith, 2016: 140). Further, an aspect to be accentuated is the *transformative* capacity of protest actions, which aren't restricted to those visibly performed during 'rupture' events. As I already argued, it is the **compound of infrapolitical subversive actions**, which form a valuable epistemological and methodological platform attuned to a local and autonomous community development, what deserves closer attention. In this respect, it is by sustaining enthusiasm and engagement, once rupture events have taken place, what enables the political repertoires of urban social movements to evolve and be redirected towards new aims. These new targets are much more concrete and tangible, than claims urban social movements usually put forward (which, no matter what, remain absolutely pertinent).

By being, so to say, 'close at hand', goals are easily incorporated into a time- and space-specific discursive framework, which renders engagement enthralling. This is a central singularity of local community self-development, for it refers to both *socially* and *spatially* produced (instead of induced) change. Prompted socio-spatial transformations, rather than revolutionary (as if a brand new utopian community were to be attained), are sited and incremental and, though most likely fraught with internal tensions and conflicts (as almost every other social and collective endeavor), are, by far, much more rewarding, given that people experience directly the satisfaction of taking actively part and palpating the outcome of their actions. Their autonomous development, thus, makes their communal space politically relevant, for it breaks the status quo, transgresses the pervading notion that 'there's no need to bother' and, particularly, because, "[i]n order for space to have political import, it has to be associated in some way with change in the established order of things, leading to new distribution, relations, connections and disconnections (which could eventually be a change for the better or worse)" (Dikeç, 2012: 671). Given that local community self-development could indeed give way to spatial alterations, "for the better or worse", engagement has to be constantly kept alive so that changes are **produced** (prone for the better) and **not induced** (prone for the worse).

From the (wider) perspective of planning, one's tempted to say that planners (and other practitioners dealing with community development) should perhaps stay out of sight. At least in principle (that is, 'detached' from any contextual particularity), such assumption is too simplistic. Planners do have to come to grips with finding out how to approach and cooperate with organized communities. The autonomy of communities isn't absolute; they may well need and profit from 'outer' assistance. Likewise, planners have to balance the (powerful) interests of the market with the (feeble) conditions of urban communities and realize that "planning finds its validation in the intuitive recognition that a burgeoning market society cannot be trusted to produce spontaneously a habitable, sanitary, or even efficient city, much less a beautiful one" (Bookchin, 1986 [1973]: 101). To put it another way, planning must hinder an "urbanization without cities" (responsive to the market expectations and demands) (Bookchin, 1992) and incorporate into the construction of the built environment, demands advanced along (assorted) lines of 'difference', 'identity', 'race', 'gender' and the like that constitutes the social fabric upon which an **urbanization with cities** (that is, founded on *urbanism*) should rest. Hand in hand, at times, in clear contrast, at others, planners and autonomous communities redefine the politics of urban (in general) and community (in specific) development. The bases of social power, accordingly, crack and give rise to political openings, which, planning-wise, means that,

Planning needs to engage not only the development of insurgent forms of the social but also the resources of the state to define, and occasionally impose, a more encompassing conception of right than is sometimes possible to find at the local level [...]. Above all, planning needs to encourage a complementary antagonism between these two engagements. It needs to operate simultaneously in two theaters, so to speak, maintaining a productive tension between the apparatus of state-directed futures and the investigation of insurgent forms of the social embedded in the present. In developing the latter as the counter of the former,

planners [...] engage a new realm of the possible with their professional practice (Holston, 1999: 171-172).

* * *

As pointed out in the methodology (chapter 2) and easily noticeable, I haven't elaborated on the four key concepts that comprise the theoretical framework in a separate manner. By contrast, the crux of the matter was to look into intersections and overlaps among them (see Figure 2.2) considering (but not limiting it to) both the research questions and hypothesis. In so doing, I've encountered, as Gilles Deleuze 1977 [1972]: 205-206) sharply observes, walls in trying to move theories to other domains. This has been, by all means, a partial effort, for practice is much required to 'theoretically' (and more suitably) move among domains. As such, this theoretical framework is about «*seeing through theory to grasp something practical*» in which theory constitutes a toolkit that, according to Michel Foucault (1980: 145; italics in the original), has two main premises: "(i) the theory to be constructed is not a system but an instrument, a *logic* of the specificity of power relations and the struggles around them; (ii) that this investigation can only be carried out step by step on the basis of reflection (which will necessary be historical in some of its aspects) on given situations". With that in mind, and once more to return to Gilles Deleuze (1977 [1972]: 205-206), I move from gravitating among theoretical points, in the search of 'something practical', to navigating, through theoretical points, a practical relay in the next chapter, the case study. In so doing, no theoretical formulation is to be validated; to the contrary, they're to be challenged and extended. Some others, it must be conceded, may well be left momentarily behind and, again, picked up in the overall appraisal (chapter 5).

CHAPTER 4

Case study

A tale of a locale: Navigating, practically, through theoretical points

4.1. The case study as a *locale*: *The (spatio-temporal) puzzle of structures, institutions and human agency*

As explained in the methodology (see Chapter 2), the case study within the research has a twofold function: it is as much a *research method* as an *object of inquiry*. In that regard, the case study mimics the role of space and, in its double task, extends the 'analytical territory' of the *locale* (that is, the phenomenon I looked into). Thus, this chapter conflates both traits of the case study into a *story*⁶¹ that recounts my empirical take critically interwoven with theoretical passages derived from the previous chapter. In so doing, I rely on three general guidelines: structure, institution and agency that compose a 'tapestry' whose two main axes are defined by space and time and "upon which are inscribed the processes and patterns of human existence, including political, socio-cultural, and economic activities" (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 2). Consequently, the traditional interpretations of human behavior, framed only in terms of agency and structure (see, for instance, Giddens, 1984), are enhanced and transmuted into "a fluid duality, in which individuals, forming their biographies in time and space through the routines of everyday life, reproduce and transform their social worlds primarily without meaning to do so" (Warf and Arias, 2009: 4). Similarly, Ed Soja (1993; 1996) proposes a 'space-time-social structure' triangular analytical foundation, in which every element contingently makes, and is made up by, the others. Provided that "human landscapes are created by knowledgeable actors (or agents) operating within a specific social context (or structure)" and that the two are "mediated by a series of institutional arrangements, which both enable and constrain human action", the case study's narrative, as abovementioned, cut across three interpretative 'levels' (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 2):

- **structures (S)** (social practices that govern daily life; for instance, law, state, family);
- **institutions (I)** (phenomenal forms of structures; for instance, government apparatuses) and;
- **human agents (A)** (individual or collective actions that determine the outcomes of social processes).

From constant S-I-A relations unpredictable outcomes occur, for contexts may well both determine and be altered by human action. Hence, analysis has to be delineated by a "particular economic, political and sociocultural history" out of which comes "recognizable locales according to a (sometimes opaque) logic of spatial diffusion" (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 2). As shown in figure 4.1, the S-I-A relationships, besides constituted through space and time in a tapestry-like mode, are affected by diverse (geographical) scales ranging from the 'global' to the 'local' along which processes of human life operate at macro, meso or micro levels. Thus, a *locale* is,

At once a complex synthesis of objects, patterns, and processes, derived from the simultaneous interaction of different levels of social process operating at varying geographical scales. Many levels and scales of process are distilled or crystallized into a single *locale*; it is as though a multitiered sequence of multiply determined events had been telescoped onto a single plane. Just as importantly, over time, the various horizons of each *locale* accumulate like sediments over earlier planes of human activity. The *locale* is thus a complex amalgam of past, present, and newly forming archaeologies that coexist simultaneously [...]. The intellectual challenge posed [...] is to unravel a *locale*'s complexity into its constitutive elements (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3).

These "constitutive elements" are discernable in the social processes (be it economic, political, and/or sociocultural) that characterize every society's mechanisms of conflict, production and exchange. So, in taking up the "intellectual challenge" it must be recognized that grasping the way(s) social processes "become operational in any *locale* is a matter of **empirical determination**" (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3; bold added). Thus, in figure 4.1, the *Comités*

⁶¹ It must be noted that I haven't used storytelling as part of the research's method (though semi-structured interviews are, arguably, a form of storytelling). Nor is the aim, in this chapter, to recourse to 'a storytelling style' as a means to critically analyze the case study (although it might as well, here and there, read somewhat like that). In any event, I do believe that storytelling offers analytical possibilities that could've enhanced the interpretation of the case study I examined, had it been integrated into the research design.

Patrióticos (a barrio-based network of ‘political pedagogy’ against the United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR) are depicted as embodying social processes (more specifically, political, economic and cultural) that unfolded upward and downward diverse geographical scales. And, for the purpose of this research, those particular social processes ‘materialize’ at (or are ‘telescoped’ onto) the specific neighborhood-level. Therefore, **Paso Ancho**, a cluster of barrios, is a locale embedded in a socio-spatial ‘tapestry’, whose *structural* and *institutional* forms are determined, predominantly, by citizen mobilization and local state apparatuses, and whose *agency* is mostly performed by neighborhood communal organizations vis-à-vis municipal government. Its deconstruction, moreover, ‘follows’ the relationship between its spatial underpinning and social interactions and critically examines the spatial formations that arose therefrom (see Chapter 3, subsection 3.1.3).




Figure 4.1. The case study as a *locale*. Source: own elaboration based on Dear and Flusty (2002b: 4) and Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 404).

*The tale of Paso Ancho, the locale — Adjusting the kaleidoscope and zooming in*⁶²

The analysis of the case study, as I have pointed out in the methodology (Chapter 2), while it works in conjunction with the theoretical discussion comprised in the previous chapter, it did not depart from it. Instead, it originated in an (sudden) interest in a particular phenomenon (see Chapter 1) that I, eventually, came to believe to be best understood through case-study research in parallel with pertinent-to-interpretation theory (that is, the research is problem-driven, rather than predetermined by the method). The analytical account, moreover, has an inevitable ‘personal tinge’, because stories don’t and, what is more, shouldn’t, as it were, tell themselves. And I, as ‘the chronicler’, had therefore to make critical choices about where to begin and end, what to accentuate, what to leave out, etc. (Flyvbjerg, 2004b: 299). Thus, the ‘title’, *the case study as a locale*, and the S-I-A triad, first, set the stage for the story to unfold and, thereafter, remain tacitly present throughout the narrative (since the case study is not used to prove them — or anything else for that matter — right or wrong).

4.2. Not spontaneous generation: Urban social movements and community organizing in Costa Rica — A historical background

Mobilization in and from the city: From ensuring collective consumption to fighting neoliberalism’s incursion

⁶² Some passages about, and analytical examinations of certain aspects of, the case study have been previously elaborated, from other distinctive (yet nuanced) perspectives and within rather different theoretical frameworks, in Castillo (2013b; 2015; 2016a and 2016b).

In Costa Rica, between 1950 and 1980, a political system was configured, whose policies were primarily directed at meeting the basic need of marginalized sectors of the population — above all, those settled in the *Gran Área Metropolitana* (GAM), the country's largest urban agglomeration⁶³. Such achievement was substantially possible because of the organization and resistance given by urban social movements (Valverde and Trejos, 1993). Therefore, the process of consolidation of the modern *Estado Benefactor* (welfare state), did not go smoothly down. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there were several clashes between the state and civil society, in which urban social movements had a multidimensional political posture; while, for instance, claiming for the nationalization of the water provision system and opposing a foreign monopoly on electricity. Their “discursive framing processes” (Benford and Snow, 1992), moreover, revolved primarily around the need to raise awareness of the expansion — that is, the centralization — of the state, which would, inevitably, constrain the negotiation capacity of the civil society, given the growing bureaucratization of the state apparatus (Alvarenga, 2005: 302).

Traditionally, citizen mobilization in urban areas of Costa Rica sprang from neighborhoods of middle-income classes, to which the majority of left-leaning activists and participants of movements belonged to. Moreover, the middle class was essential for the modernizing project of the state back in 1949⁶⁴ (Cordero, 2005). However, a severe economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically rearranged the relationships between civil society, state and market and directly impacted the stability and cohesion of the middle class (Smith and Valverde, 2001; Valverde and Trejos, 1993; Alvarenga, 2005). The crisis reached its climax between 1979 and 1982, when the weaknesses of an incipient neoliberal structural reform were exposed — mainly because of the external debt outburst. Consequently, major setbacks were experienced in socioeconomic indicators that during the previous years of growth and social welfare kept the country above average in Latin America (Barahona, 1999). The government, initially, responded to the crisis with the financial aid of the United States, which allowed stabilization measures to come into effect. Specifically, in 1982, when then Costa Rican president, Luis Alberto Monge, executed the first Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), neoliberal policies explicitly began and, as a result, the middle class and their living conditions declined (Cordero, 2005: 161; Valverde and Trejos, 1993: 9). Actions and aims of social mobilization, nevertheless, did not change dramatically.

Together with an atomized middle class, disenfranchised sectors, living under the poverty line in urban areas, gave rise to mobilizations that tackle issues like the provision of public services and, particularly, housing. People in neighborhoods, where electricity payments were being arbitrarily augmented, organized to not only publicly and fiercely demonstrate, but also to deploy precise tactics, such as reconnecting themselves the service in the houses that had been cut off (Alvarenga, 2005: 196-197). By combining this “principle of very small-scale tactical dynamism” (Johnston, 2014: 103) with more ‘classical’ elements of social movements’ repertoires (like marches and meetings), claims were blatantly conveyed, reaction from state authorities obtained and, in due course, a solution granted. The housing shortage, on the other hand, was confronted, more sophisticatedly, through the formation of housing committees that “emerged as an innovative tool of grassroots organization and community-based

⁶³ Costa Rica's four main cities are located within the GAM: *San José* (the capital), *Alajuela*, *Heredia* and *Cartago* and their respective metropolitan areas (namely, adjacent urbanized zones around each city). Due to conurbation, official limits are no longer recognizable (see figure 4.2). Costa Rica's politico-administrative territorial division is as follows: provinces, cantons and districts (at the municipal level every district is divided into barrios). The GAM covers 2044km² (3,8% of the country's territory) and, according to the 2011 census, has a population of 2,268,248 residents (52,7% of the population nationwide). Its population density is of 1109,7 inhabitants per square kilometer. There are, inside the GAM, 31 cantons and 164 districts (some cantons at the fringe aren't entirely part of the GAM, only some of their districts). The GAM concentrates the majority of the country's economically active population (57%), services, infrastructural projects and governmental institutions.

⁶⁴ From March 12th to April 24th, 1948 the Costa Rican Civil War took place. The conflict was triggered by the decision of the *Asamblea Legislativa* (Legislative Assembly), dominated by pro-government representatives, to nullify the results of the presidential elections held in February alleging that the candidate of the opposition had won fraudulently. A rebel army, under the command of José Figueres Ferrer, rose up and quickly defeated the government. Once the war ended, a provisional government board, headed by Figueres Ferrer, ruled for a year and a half and oversaw the election of a Constitutional Assembly, which in 1949 delivered a new constitution. Subsequently, power was handed over to Otilio Ulate, the victorious candidate of the allegedly fraudulent elections of 1948. The civil war marked a turning point in the country's history and gave rise to the “Second Republic” and gradual consolidation of the welfare state project.

struggle”, which, though spontaneous, kept an informal, simple, non-bureaucratic internal functioning, so that anyone could join in (Lara and Molina, 1997: 27). Collective actions taken to secure housing provision (from protests and rallies to self-construction) became, as in the case of the electricity fees, a means to an end, which, in turn, led to gradual demobilization, provided that ‘victory’ had been achieved⁶⁵. These citizen mobilizations, happening *in* and *from* the city, were, in that regard, *alternative movements* and despite their limitations they were “successful in meeting objectives, new communities were created, and there was a tangible experience in the value of collective struggle” (Kaufman, 1997a: 14). In addition, the repertoires of these social movements gained the necessary strength, so that “participants in contention are enacting available scripts” (they know, to a significant extent, what they’re doing) and their collective actions “acquire causal and symbolic coherence” (Tilly, 2008: 59-60).

Changing the scope of protesting: The welfare state relinquishes and neoliberalism steps in

These two urban social movements (against electricity fees’ arbitrariness and housing dearth) are examples within a growing debate on social movements in Latin America, which was motivated by the rise of new actors (youth, women, indigenous people) who were at the front of collective protesting in various Latin American countries during the 1980s (Lara and Molina, 1997: 28). In fact, some scholars believed that social movements were, in effect, to become alternative social actors embodying a new kind of political force (Guido and Fernández, 1989; Evers, 1984, Canel, 1997). However, the arrival of neoliberalism drew attention to other claims⁶⁶. In Costa Rica, as aforementioned, the SAPs, three intensive reform plans imposed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, plus four letters of intent, were meant, amid other things, to downsize the state and promote (if not enforce) de- and re-regulation processes. Such deep and structural reforms were fostered under the misleading assumption that public administration’s effectivity and efficacy together with the national economy would, by default, boost. Thus, “in Costa Rica a process of economic, social and institutional adjustment began, as a consequence of the international development of a new model of accumulation, although with certain specific traits, especially in relation to decentralization and community participation” (Smith and Valverde, 2001: 123).

As both central and (to a lesser degree) local governments became more and more entrepreneurial, social unrest again, though somewhat dispersedly, came down the pike. Social mobilization in urban areas had been extensively disarticulated through the strategic demobilization (furthered, partly, by state authorities) of community organizations (such as the housing committees). Nevertheless, urban social movements were formed to demand improvement of living conditions, expressly in the GAM’s outskirts. Issues like street lighting, an eroded public transportation system, expansion of the road network, need of health and communal centers, lack or poor quality of open public spaces, amid others⁶⁷ were pinpointed to frame mobilization (Valverde and Trejos, 1993). Demands, strangely enough, were, either directly or indirectly, addressed to the central government, when local governments were (and still are), at least in principle, to be held accountable for this kind of concerns. Bypassing municipalities, as the nearest form of government to ‘common’ citizens, also accentuated the gradual schism between the state and the civil society (Alvarenga, 2005). Eventually, this led to a short period of certain ‘stability’, due, chiefly, to co-optation and further dislodgment of popular organizations (including CBOs) (Valverde and Trejos, 1993).

By the mid 1990s, after almost two decades of neoliberalism and a standstill of social upheavals, two social movements took over the streets, but this time around, with quite

⁶⁵ All social movement are, sooner or later, faced with either a victory or failure crisis. The former is when the main goal has been obtained and participants lose interest, whereas the latter occurs when a movement dissolves due to disenchantment and frustration for not having attained anticipated goals (see section 3.3).

⁶⁶ By the late 1980s, actually, almost all Latin American countries had undergone market-oriented neoliberal reforms, in spite of the existence of well-documented and researched cases of faulty implementation and concomitant disastrous results (Biglaiser and Derouen, 2004).

⁶⁷ These aspects have, to varying degrees, a spatial feature and are thus embedded in the process of spatialization. However, there is neither emphasis on this distinctiveness, nor a real understanding of the entailed “socio-spatial dialectic” (Soja, 1980; 2010a) in the domestic literature I consulted.

different objectives⁶⁸. First, the *Huelga del Magisterio Nacional* (The National Magisterium strike), which, in 1995, organized the largest social mobilization in Costa Rican history thus far. At the core of the movement was the demand not to alter the teachers' retirement system and protest actions were aimed at defending institutionalism and working conditions throughout the public sector. Civil service employees in general (that is, not only teachers) joined the movement to antagonize budget cuts in public institutions and their potential privatization as well as to denounce unjustified layoffs (Mora, 2009: 152; Leandro, 1995: 4). A few years later, at the turn of the century, manifold multitudes, defying the state's intention to privatize the electricity and telecommunication system, resulted in mass resistance to what became known as the '*Combo del ICE*'⁶⁹. These two mobilizations were distinct from those unfolding in preceding decades, for two foremost reasons concerning, respectively, both the aims and organization of mobilization. First, they were, essentially, reactions to neoliberal upshots threatening high-regarded collective goods (also deemed as historical social achievements): public education⁷⁰ and state-run provision of electricity and telecommunications. Goals then pursued were much more overarching than those previously sought out (housing and improvement of public services provision). Second, whereas back in the late 1970s and 1980s the opposition had an extensive middle-class and community-based organization and leaders from the Left played a significant role; particularly in the opposition against the '*Combo del ICE*', there wasn't a centralizing organizational axis (in the *Huelga del Magisterio* that wasn't the case, for there was a cluster of leaders steering the movement). By contrast, a myriad of fronts triggered engagement and widened the discursivity of the frames for mobilization (that is, not restricted to the state privatization attempt, but rather to stand against neoliberalism as a whole). Consequently, other 'causes' were fused together; for instance, farmers' struggles against neoliberal reforms that were stripping them off long-standing incentives were incorporated into the larger agenda of the anti-'*Combo del ICE*'-movement (Alvarenga, 2005).

In broad perspective, urban social movements in Costa Rica, before and shortly after the turning point the economic crisis of the late 1970s-early 1980s marked, centered their efforts around topics related to community development (basic public services, infrastructure, housing) and dealt with them through community organizing. (However, as I shall next explain, there is a much older tradition of community development and organizing in Costa Rica). Afterwards, mobilizations mostly sought to reverse and/or mitigate neoliberal reforms and were, thus, framed within the defense of the 'national' — as opposed to the 'local' — against the 'global' (Alvarenga, 2005). However, it is clear that the 'local' was being directly impacted by the new and evolving global economic order (see, inter alia, Sassen, 1990; van Kempen and Marcuse, 1997), but this was, curiously, repelled resorting to a patriotic discourse. Furthermore, both the *Huelga del Magisterio Nacional* and the opposition to the '*Combo del ICE*' are somewhat *reformative* (rather than *revolutionary*) movements (see section 3.3), whose repertoires have been examined, almost exclusively, in terms of the disruption they caused, conflict resolution and the extent to which neoliberal reforms were kept from materializing (see Mora, 2009; Sojo, 2004; Solís, 2002; Clark, 2001). Very little is known about the formation/transformation of political identities and subjectivities, let alone the fact that these mobilizations are indelibly urban — they sprang *from* and unfolded *in* the city — and, as such, space has an import that is commonly overlooked (I will return and emphasize both aspects later on; see also the discussion section of chapter 3).

From Furthering bottom-up progress to strategic and inconspicuous political control: Juntas (Patrióticas) Progresistas vis-à-vis Asociaciones de Desarrollo

Community development in Costa Rica goes back to the 1920s, when committees were appointed by municipalities (local governments) in every district to look after sanitarian conditions (Mora, 1991). In time, committees started to take care of other matters and,

⁶⁸ There were, without doubt, other movements during this time, but they were not as big and thus rapidly contained.

⁶⁹ 'ICE' stands for *Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad* (The Costa Rican Institute of Electricity) the autonomous institution founded in 1949 that supplies electricity and communication services nationwide.

⁷⁰ When the army was abolished in 1949, after the civil war had ended (see note 55), military expenses were, thenceforth, allocated for strengthening the public educational system. Public education, despite evident deteriorations (from infrastructure to teachers' qualification), has ever since been seen as one of the Costa Rican society cornerstones.

increasingly, gained administrative independence. Thus, the *Juntas Patrióticas Progresistas* (Patriotic Progressive Boards) were formed and granted a noteworthy amount of autonomy; in spite of various attempts by the central government of doing otherwise (to, then, be able to seize control over them). Far from giving up, the state kept trying to limit the internal configuration and self-rule character of the *Juntas Patrióticas Progresistas*. Out of the clash between government authorities and members of the *Juntas Patrióticas Progresistas*, came the *Juntas Progresistas* (Progressive Boards), a parallel version of the previous boards that were, in the end, able to operate much more independently than the central government intended to. The *Juntas Progresistas* flourished throughout the country (both in urban and rural areas) and, whilst fostering community development, usually combined efforts with organizations engaged in syndicalist (in cities) and farmers' (in the hinterland) struggles (Mora, 1991; Alvarenga, 2005).

Eventually, the autonomy of the *Juntas Progresistas* was threatened by the centralizing process of the state (1950 onwards). Though decision-making power at the local level visibly dwindled, the *Juntas Progresistas* still managed to fulfill some of the necessities communities faced and that municipalities, allegedly, could not keep up with. Amid other aspects, the *Juntas Progresistas* ameliorated the eroding quality of the road network; improved public transportation services; and built houses, sewage systems, bridges, schools and health centers (Alvarenga, 2005: 13). However, the central state, yet again, feared the self-determination the *Juntas progresistas* were still withholding and, in 1967, created the *Dirección Nacional de Desarrollo Comunal* (The Community Development National Directorate) whose main mandate, according to the law that enforced its creation, was to supervise and coordinate all existing forms of community organization. In practice, such type of institutionalization signified the disappearance of the *Juntas progresistas*, for they were little by little replaced by the *Asociaciones de Desarrollo* (Community Development Associations, whose members are popularly elected). These associations, though they were community-based and for a while continued to engage in social mobilizations, they were progressively absorbed by the homogenizing project of the central state. Such form of political demobilization was actually part of the reformist programs the United States was, at the time, testing all over Latin America (Mora, 1991; Alvarenga, 2005: 29). Ultimately, the central state as well as traditional political parties were able to, correspondingly, assert a top-down community development and deploy politico-ideological control (via clientelism). Consequently, not only were the *Juntas Progresistas* and their autonomy eradicated, but also community organizing was blatantly co-opted (Smith and Valverde, 2001; Rojas, 1989; Vega, 1987). Nevertheless, as it was previously noted, community organization was kept alive — informally and extra-institutionally by dint of urban social movements.

Re-instrumentalizing community development through decentralization — what does the future hold?

Processes of centralization throughout the developing world (the now so-called global South), while they were purportedly aimed at including communities in nationwide (urban) development plans, the exercise of political control through community development was a direct attempt to turn local activism away from leftist mobilizations (Campfens, 1997; Abbott, 1996: 16; Voth and Brewster, 1989). In Costa Rica, such trend, was followed by the irruption of the (fuzzy) notion of 'decentralization' into the community development national agenda. The central state and political parties framed decentralization as a means whereby broadening citizen participation (even beyond community development). In reality, however, almost nothing has occurred, given that decentralization, on the one hand, as a process supposed to devolve power, duties and resources onto lower governmental tiers, has not yet taken place⁷¹ (Rivera, 1998). On the other hand, "[c]hannels for negotiation and consensus have been closed [and] one of the sectors most affected by this is the community" (Smith and Valverde, 2001: 125). Such strategic way (for it wasn't, at all, by chance) of maintaining the status quo is also

⁷¹ As of 2006 the Costa Rican government has expressly accelerated and promoted decentralization with the ultimate goal of making municipalities, once again, accountable for matters that still pertain to the central government. What is more, a 'Decentralization Ministry' was created and a bill has been passed in congress, which actually states that by 2011 the transfer of financial resources and hence of responsibilities ought to be initiated. The process, nonetheless, has been highly criticized and faces important setbacks due to apparently unexpected financial cuts.

clearly observable in various 'socially-compensatory' plans executed during the 1990s, like the 'The National Plan Against Poverty' and the *Triángulo de Solidaridad* (Triangle of Solidarity). This kind of initiatives neither (as to the former) alleviated poverty, nor (regarding the latter) managed to effectively integrate communities into development schemes (Alfaro, 1999; Camacho, 1999). Given the actual lack of decentralization, the tokenistic character of decision-making processes and the absence of, or very limited, participation of local actors in project design, implementation and evaluation, top-down schemes to improve living conditions in communities were doomed to failure (Valverde, 1998; Alfaro; 1999; Camacho, 1999; Smith, 2004).

From this succinct historical account of urban social movements and community organizing, a few general remarks can be outlined. First, urban social movements did not only struggle for issues directly bound to community development, but also responded to community organizations' loss of autonomy and active participation in decision-making. Second, urban mobilizations during the late 1980s and 1990s were reactions, initially, to neoliberal policies, which were afterwards followed by discontent over flawed state-led programs of community development. And, third, the interplay between state, civil society and the market has been indeed influenced and rearranged by the turn of events provoked by the financial crisis of the late 1970s-early 1980s, which, in consequence, altered the organizational basis of urban social movements (no longer finding expression, exclusively or primarily, in communities). Thus, mobilizations (particularly after the movement against the '*Combo del ICE*' in 2000) are usually read by domestic scholarship as 'rupture events' in everyday routines of people participating in 'waves of mobilization'; rather than a steady process of political activity and subjectivation. Be that as it may, it cannot be unequivocally affirmed that people engaged in such struggles did actually return to their 'normal' life without any ontological alteration as to how they situate themselves within their daily reality and how they act politically in it. What is more, both urban social movements and community organizing, as two sides of the same coin, have, in fact, been constituents of the process of urbanization (contesting it and promoting a different kind). As such, political identities and subjectivities, far from only being every now and then flamboyantly expressed, are in constant re-production and don't ever grind to a halt. Furthermore, they're inherently spatial: repertoires (marches, rallies, demonstrations, meetings, etc.) of urban social movements and community organizations do not solely happen *in* cities, they emanate *from* them and react back *upon* (and certainly transform) their spatial configuration. All in all, these briefly reviewed "struggles in response to state-imposed spatial regimes emphasize how space is constitutive of power, and how resistance takes the form of social movements and local activism" (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga, 2003: 20). In the following section, I delve into this interaction between urbanization and cycles of political contestation, to see 'what the future might hold'. There seems to be a distinctive form of community organizing exercising "resistance and politics", again and in 'revamped' fashion, "from the basements" (Zibechi, 2007: 67)⁷².

4.3. The totalizing urban planning project: *The GAM as a bogus space of political universality*

Cities throughout the now so-called 'global South' (globalized/South would be a more apt term) often exhibit a paradoxical condition: on the one hand, they have, as basis for their inception, a neatly envisaged spatial topology aimed at taming all dynamics unfolding within it and, simultaneously and almost helplessly for this very reason, a set of unexpected — let alone undesired — social, cultural, political, economic and, of course, spatial outcomes that contradict the all-encompassing logic of the flawlessly intended spatial configuration. For Henri Lefebvre (2003 [1970]), such oxymoronic circumstance was, first and foremost, prompted by the modernist rationality, whose Cartesian worldview (articulated by means of urban planning, policy and design), "negated all that was not readily capable of broad-brush quantification in social life, particularly the everyday materialized practices that constitute social reality in the built environment" (Gunder, 2005: 178). More specifically, modernist (as well as its contemporary 'deformations') instrumental rationalism belies "daily life, immediate

⁷² My translation from the original in Spanish.

relations, the *unconscious* of the urban, what is little said and of which even less is written”, in its faulty attempt to establish a definitive ‘*metalanguage of the city*’⁷³ (Lefebvre 1996: 108; italics in the original).

In most of the urban growths (as opposed to developments) Latin American cities have undergone, the determination to capture and fix the multiplicity of societies is best exemplified in their (still pretty much) modernist master plans’ metanarratives. Embodying an ideal future to be achieved and that, correspondingly, is to wipe out (and eventually preempt) all problematic situations being faced⁷⁴, unequal and actually ‘dystopic’ processes of urbanization continue to be, in practice, furthered. In consequence, the mismatch between what is *imagined* (by planners, designers, architects) and what is actually *lived* (by city dwellers) (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]) evidences the impossibility of a ‘one-to-one’ translation of master plans into socio-spatial reality. Conversely, due to this overtly contradictory gap, master plans, seen as a myriad of codes, don’t ever effectively represent an existing (and ever-evolving) social reality. What they, instead, portray is a totally new one, a one ‘too-perfect-to-be-real’, a *hyperreality* (after Baudrillard and Eco⁷⁵) that is to descend and be unconsciously accepted (though we could not properly connect to it⁷⁶). Thus, master plans, following Guilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987 [1980]: 141-142), constitute a diagrammatic “abstract machine”, with semiotic content and physical implications, that far from representing is, in actuality, delivering a specific sort of (hyper)reality⁷⁷.

Planning as post hoc fallacy: When (ir)rational ambition ends up being deranged urbanization

Despite this evident disparity, urban growth in Costa Rica has been — and still continues to be — fostered via master plans (which, in the end, are the product of combining blueprint planning instruments with synoptic planning methods). Of a marked procedural and rational-comprehensive character, planning in Costa Rica is also highly statutory. As such, planning practice follows a positivistic premise that regulations, once they’ve been designed, due to their ‘flawless’ scientific-technical nature, are easily implemented. Space, in that regard, since it is believed to be a container of human activities, can be, by the same token, ‘strategically’, ordered, divided, and demarcated. Most of the planning efforts, furthermore, have dealt primarily with land use regulation complemented by, as aforesaid, a blatantly legal planning

⁷³ Lefebvre (1996: 108), in proposing to view the city as a semiological system derived from linguistics (that is, “urban language or urban reality considered as a grouping of signs”), remarks that, in order to decipher the actual metalanguage of the city, one has to recourse to the context — that which lies beneath the inhabited spaces and that seldom “confronts itself”. At the same time, what lies above the city (institutional, ideological and political structures) have to be deemed too, if any one ‘urban language’ is to be figured out.

⁷⁴ Interestingly enough, the idea of imposing a clear-cut spatial arrangement in Latin American cities could be traced back to the colonial era and the birth of the *Ciudad Hispanoamericana* (the Hispanic American city) whose inception was based on the Spanish grid (see, de Terán 1989). From a much more overarching point of view, it may well be said that all attempts at asserting a definitive spatial and social order are underpinned by the very nature of mankind, provided that “the creation of order in a mutable and finite world is the ultimate purpose of man’s thoughts and actions” (Pérez-Gómez, 2000 [1983]: 468).

⁷⁵ Baudrillard in *Simulacra and Simulations* (1994 [1981]) states, according to Mark Poster (2001 [1988]: 6), that “simulations are different from fictions or lies in that the former not only present an absent as a presence, the imaginary as the real. They also undermine any contrast to the real, absorbing the real within itself. Instead of a ‘real’ economy of commodities that is somehow bypassed by an ‘unreal’ myriad of advertisements, Baudrillard [...] discerns only a hyperreality, a world of self-referential signs”. Umberto Eco (1986 [1967]: 6) in his essays entitled *Travels in Hyperreality*, in which he criticizes American pop culture, sustains that “[t]o speak of things that one wants to connote as real, these things must seem real. The ‘completely real’ becomes identified with the ‘completely fake’. Absolute unreality is offered as real presence”. For Eco, hyperreality emerges when the “imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must fabricate the absolute fake; where the boundaries between game and illusion are blurred” (1986 [1967]: 7).

⁷⁶ This incapacity to connect to the hyperreality master plans embody is, arguably, prompted by the hyperspaces produced, which create a split between the body and the built environment (see subsection 3.2.2, in particular the passage regarding ‘poststructuralist/postmodern space’).

⁷⁷ Deleuze and Guattari (1987 [1980]: 141-142) argue: “We define the abstract machine as the aspect or moment at which nothing but functions and matters remain. A diagram has neither substance nor form, neither content nor expression. Substance is a formed matter, and matter is a substance that is unformed either physically or semiotically. Whereas expression and content have different forms, are really distinct from each other, function has only ‘traits’, of content and of expression [...]. The diagrammatic or abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality”. In a similar vein, Baudrillard (1994 [1981]: 1) writes: “[t]he territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive to it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory — precession of simulacra — that engenders the territory, [...] today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map. It is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges persist here and there in the desert [...] of the real life itself”.

framework (containing specific regulation pertaining building construction, property segregation, urban upgrading, among other topics) (Castillo, 2013b: 272). Although the reasons for the prevalence of such mode of planning (notably, urban) space are multifarious (strong political influence, real estate market speculation, surreptitious processes of de- and re-regulation, inter alia), at its very core lies the fact that planning discourses and practices are inherently ideological and political, and, consequently, “visions and ideals shaping the fantasies of the future city are often reflective of hegemonic desires of conflicting, but dominant, privileged minorities” (Gunder, 2005: 174) with sufficient resources.




Figure 4.2. Localization of Costa Rica in America [1] and localization of the *Gran Área Metropolitana* (GAM) at the heart of the country [2]. As seen in the pictures, the GAM has consolidated ‘horizontally’ following a typical urban sprawl pattern. Thus, land is steadily ‘predated’ (due to peripheralization), monofunctional land uses prevail, car-dependency is widespread as well as culturally and socially rooted, and there is a low-density rate (see note 54). Source: own elaboration (images taken from: see Appendix 3).

Moreover, the specificity to control cities and, in so doing, define the always-intricate notion of ‘general’ or ‘public’ interest, goes up- and downwards diverse physical scales, which, in turn, respond to a politico-administrative hierarchical axis determined by the official territorial division of provinces, cantons, districts and barrios (see note 54). According to the *Ley de Planificación Urbana* (urban planning law), master plans must be envisaged to work at four geographical-administrative scales: nationwide, regional (a level that responds to principles of economy, geography, land use, investment programs, but do not match the national physical-administrative division of the country), sub-regional (grouping adjacent cantons that have similar geographical, social, economic and developmental conditions that may, simultaneously, make up one or more regions), and local (operative at the municipal level of cantons) (INVU, 2006: 2-3). Master plans have been, accordingly, formulated for the nation as a whole (*Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano*, PNDU, National Urban Development Plan), regions (*Plan GAM*

83⁸ and *Plan GAM 2013-2030*⁹, master plans envisioned to ‘order’ and thereby bolster the country’s most extensively and disorderly urbanized territory [see figure 4.2]) and cantons (*planes reguladores*, local normative plans that each municipality is to produce and enact). All these master plans follow a thorough process of creation, in which a lot of prominence is given to the accuracy and amount of technical data and that, to a large extent, sets itself the goal of “bringing disarray into order”; which is nothing other than “planning as post hoc fallacy” (Castillo, 2016b: 25). The actual outputs of such deceptive planning mode (texts containing regulations, maps, diagrams and the like, which make the master plans up) have a common denominator: the chasm between what is abstractly anticipated and intended (that is, what planners and others experts involved in the planning process stipulate as ‘desirable’) and the current as well as future condition of reality.

To sidestep the fact that whenever and however desires are portrayed, as Lacan (1998 [1973]: 108) explains, “reality appears only as marginal”, planners present, as the master plans’ essential aspiration, the achievement of an environment of control, security, functionality and harmony. Furthermore, given that for planners and other experts partaking “the planning map, or computer representation, simplifies and illustrates what is wanted of the planned public” (Gunder, 2005: 178), **concrete** space must be replaced by **abstract** space, because

Concrete space is the space of habiting: gestures and paths, bodies and memory, symbols and meanings [...], contradictions and conflicts between desires and needs, and so forth [...] [and] [t]he architect who draws and the urbanist who composes a block plan look down on their ‘objects’, buildings and neighborhoods, from above and afar. These designers and draftsmen move within a space of paper and ink. [...] They are convinced they have captured [...] [concrete space] even though they carry out their plans and projects within a second-order abstraction. They’ve shifted from lived experience to the abstract, projecting this abstraction back onto lived experience. This twofold substitution and negation creates an illusory sense of affirmation: the return to ‘real’ life (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 182-3).

This return to ‘(hyper)real’ life is most evidently found in the regional master plans aimed at taming the GAM’s urban chaos: particularly their effort to wear down everything that is qualitative, because of their “self-justifying nature (ideo-logic), [...] [and their] apparent scientificity” (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 185). Yet, such mode of planning, by means of master plans, “abstracts, misrepresents and overtly simplifies the complexity of social reality in built space and consequently fails” (Gunder, 2005: 178). The GAM, hence, experienced from 1986 onwards an unrestrained and atomized expansion (see figures 4.3 and 4.4), which was caused mostly by an ambitious state-driven social housing project, whose implementation required a ‘state of exception’ whereby circumventing existing regulations (chiefly those stipulated within the *Plan GAM 83*) (Retana and Sura, 1998). Thus, ‘restricted’ sectors (such as environmentally fragile, susceptible to natural disaster, public land reserves, and the like) were gradually urbanized putting pressure on, and eventually surpassing, the ‘ring of urban growth containment’ (see figures 4.3. and 4.4). Existing residential areas, as a result, saw their infrastructures and services promptly collapsed, for the ‘perfectly-rational’ vision of the *Plan GAM 83* was twisted and its implementation weaknesses exposed, as soon as (spatial) planning aims were faced with a set of political (need of electoral support) and economic (pushing de-regulation to augment land market speculation) interests (Retana, 2000).

In broad synthesis, the GAM has had, over the years, no clear, harmonious or secure expansion. It may even be said that, while it has grown, it has not, at all, developed. The resulting urban (dis)configuration (a convoluted mixture of different housing types, overlapping zoning schemes, a (currently) collapsed transportation system, scarcity of public

⁷⁸ The urban planning law grants financial support for the creation and operation of the *Oficina de Planeamiento del Área Metropolitana* (OPAM, the Planning Office of the Metropolitan Area), for it to cope with the mandates included in the *Plan GAM 83*. However, the OPAM was never fully recognized as the authority responsible at the regional scale and in charge of articulating the local and the national levels. Thus, it was constantly bypassed and, consequently, the implementation of the *Plan GAM 83* experienced steadily setbacks.

⁷⁹ This plan is intended as an update of the *Plan GAM 83*. It is noteworthy the express time boundary of the plan, 2030 — the future vision has, so to speak, an ‘expiration date’. Admittedly, this is an unintended pragmatism: the plan, it is in its very title acknowledged, would not last forever.

spaces, among others) reflects socio-economic differences that crystallized into a socially and spatially fragmented mix of residential areas (from gated communities to social housing projects to informal settlements); a road network that favors the privately own automobile; and the lack of, restricted access to, or low quality of public services, goods and infrastructure (see figure 4.6). In sum, diverse urban (hyper)realities have been simultaneously consolidating along a continuum between a **'well-ordered/intended'** and **'chaotic/unintended'** organization of space, given that spatial arrangements have an inherent factor of 'order' and of 'chaos' (Massey, 1992: 81). The space of the GAM can, indeed, be 'ordered' because all phenomena taking place in it are, so to say, 'spatially traceable' and their causes (for instance, migration fluxes, economic crises, natural disasters, housing policies, among others) can therefore be explained. Furthermore, there's an element of spatial order within the GAM, given the existence of spatial systems "in the sense of sets of social phenomena in which spatial arrangement (that is, mutual relative positioning rather than 'absolute' location) itself is part of the construction of the system[s]" (Massey, 1992: 81). On the other hand, the GAM's spatiality is chaotic, since, despite the fact that originators of social phenomena can be explained and situated, their relationships aren't therefrom directly prompted. Such interactions are, by nature, accidental and arise from juxtapositions, divisions, sudden combinations and the like among social phenomena's spatial underpinnings, which, in turn, gives rise to new 'chaotic' spatial formations. Hence, the interplay between the GAM's social relations and spatiality may well "vary between that of a fairly coherent system (where social and spatial form are mutually determinant) and that where the particular spatial form is not directly socially caused at all" (Massey, 1992: 81).




Figure 4.3. Urban expansion of the GAM between 1986 and 2005 (the green areas represent the urbanized land by 1986 and the red ones the urban growth until 2005). The built area within the GAM almost doubled between 1982 and 2013 (Estado de la Nación, 2015: 275). Source: https://www.mivah.go.cr/Biblioteca_PlanGAM.shtml.

Yet, the illusion that it is still feasible to obtain the 'dreamy not-socially-caused GAM' still persists, due to the dominance and capacity of hegemonic groups to, continuously, assess that there is something always missing, something that escapes the imagination of experts behind the master plans. Thus, a relentless restructuring of the GAM is advocated and, in fact, carried out, which "is meant to convey a break in secular trends and a shift towards a significantly different order and configuration of social, economic and political life. It thus evokes a *sequence of breaking down and building up again, deconstruction and attempted reconstitution*, arising from certain incapacities or weaknesses in the established order which preclude conventional adaptations and demand significant structural change instead [...]. [The GAM's] [r]estructuring implies flux and transition, offensive and defensive postures, a complex mix of continuity and change" (Soja, 1987: 178; italics in the original). Time and again, powerful blocs have imposed their anticipated solutions to restructure the GAM, as though they have an intrinsic universal acceptance (see figure 4.5).

bogus space of political universality, given that “the space of political universality is one of ideological struggle” and “[f]or a hegemonic group to establish itself at the expense of the others, it needs to colonize this space in its own interests. The political universal is thus usually the exact opposite of what one might think it to be: not an abstraction from a set of particulars, but the manifestation of the express interests of a particular group” (Kay, 2003: 151). Notwithstanding the ostensible success of prevailing blocs in spelling out the urban future of the GAM, opposition has been, sometimes fiercely, carried out (as it has been noted in the previous section). I will next explore the weight social mobilizations have had in the GAM’s urbanization. Collective protest actions, as I shall highlight, were buttressed by a political subjectivity and identity that were intimately shaped and reshaped by a fierce reappropriation of space and a counter-hegemonic logic of action.



Figure 4.6. Diverse socio-spatial realities within the GAM: at the ‘well-ordered’/intended’ extreme of the GAM’s spatiality continuum, the proliferating — especially on its outskirts — *condominios* (gated communities) [1], where residents have their own private amenities such as swimming pool, landscaping, fitness center, amid other. Somewhere in ‘the middle’, the ‘typical’ social housing projects [2]; whereas basic public infrastructure and services as well as leisure facilities are provided, their location is often far away from, and with a poor connection to, urban centers. At the opposite ‘chaotic/unintended’ extreme of the GAM’s spatiality, the so-called *precarios* (slums) [3] where living conditions are quite dicey. A recurrent traffic jam of the GAM’s collapsed road system [4] and the eroded condition of public infrastructure (every raining season streets are flooded due to either inefficient or inexistent storm sewer systems) [5]. Source: own elaboration (images taken from: see appendix 3).

4.4. Antagonistic political confrontations as constituents of the GAM’s urban growth

As previously discussed, what the city, as a totalizing urban planning project, advances, is an “urbanism as ideology and institution, representation and will, pressure and repression, because it establishes a repressive space that is represented as objective, scientific, and neutral” (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 181). Likewise, the ‘experts-authors’ of totalizing projects, such as the *PlanGAM 83*, the *Plan GAM 2013-2030* or the *planes reguladores* haven’t

“succeeded in locating the intersection of the following two principles: (a) there is no thought without u-topia, without an exploration of the possible, of the elsewhere; (b) there is no thought without reference to practice (here the practice of habiting and use, but what if the inhabitant and the user remain silent?)” (Lefebvre, 2003 [1970]: 182; italics in the original). This shortcoming of the GAM’s ‘totalizing’ master planning, in particular the second principle, is quite perceptible in the plan’s manifest comprehensive and technical nature, in which citizens’ input is, if anything, tokenistic. The plans, thus, seem to have taken for granted that the users of the GAM were to ‘remain silent’, for they were already given a voice.

However, as a sort of ‘follow-up’ to mobilizations that took place until the beginning of the 1980s (previously revised in section 4.2), during the 1980s and 1990s ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ of neighborhoods located south of the GAM — deprecatorily called *Barrios del Sur*⁸⁰ and where Paso Ancho is located — decided to raise their voice and fight back the social, economic, cultural, political and spatial asymmetries propelled by the *Plan GAM 83* (and somewhat echoed by the *planes reguladores* and also discernible in the *Plan GAM 2013-2030*). A cluster of disenfranchised urban dwellers mobilized demanding for better access to, and improvement of the quality of, public services (electricity, water, social housing, public transportation) as well as common goods (parks, roads, sidewalks) (Valverde and Trejos, 1993; Alvarenga, 2005). Such discontent reflected, in large part, that the masterly and ‘hyperreal’ visions of the proposed and only partially implemented plans fell short in capturing and subduing the multiple space-time subjectivities that emerged from neighborhoods throughout the GAM. Master plans, both in general (for example, zoning schemes) and specific (for instance, restrictions to build upper levels or expand houses) ended up being at odds with relational orientations and aspirations, and space-time parameters of inhabitants (Harvey, 1996; Graham and Healey, 1999: 641), who, recurrently, had to realize themselves ‘informal’ solutions, for their everyday socio-spatial reality couldn’t wait for that of the master plans to, one day, ‘magically’ pop up. To put it another way, there was an express refusal to accept, as a given, the sensible socio-spatial order, with policing upshots, that master plans sought to impose from above. People, moreover, became aware that hierarchical structures, which allocate people, functions, places, authorities, activities and, thus, generates a seemingly ‘natural order of things’, could be, any minute, overturned, since “policing effects can be produced as much by intentional state apparatus as by spontaneous social relations” (Dikeç, 2013: 82).

The mobilizations, whose organizational base found expression in middle- and middle-low-class neighborhoods with a Leftist tinge, as ‘spontaneous social relations’, took shape in a concrete realm: **space** — that of streets, squares and plazas. These ‘traditional’ public spaces⁸¹, rather than constituting a neutral platform for demonstrators to perform their unsettling collective actions, had to be both disputed and fought over. Protesters, as Judith Butler explains (2011), were then, while advancing their prerogatives and exercising “the politics of the street”, demanding their right to take over public spaces, since “[p]ublic space and the public sphere represent conjoined arenas of social and political contest and struggle” (Low and Smith, 2006: 12). In so doing, participants were able to constitute themselves as political actors and defined their political subjectivity essentially against a hegemonic outer counterpart, the state. There were, for sure, internal discrepancies (that’s an innate character of social mobilization), but it was the recognition that the state had to provide a solution, which operated as the common ground and gave the mobilization a necessary level of cohesion. In the end, through decisive political actions and interventions (mass demonstrations, rallies, petitions and, when no response was obtained, getting things done autonomously) a ‘**counter-hegemony**’ emerged aimed at “producing and keeping alive a certain alternate ‘idea’ of space, the urban, daily life, and the like” (Jameson 2000 [1985]: 454).

While there were some victories here and there, there was not, as in earlier struggles for social housing and against electricity and water fees’ arbitrariness, a general sentiment of success.

⁸⁰ Roberto Blanco (2015) elaborates on the socio-historical elements that led to both social control and (territorialized) stigmatization of the *Barrios del Sur*.

⁸¹ The notion of ‘public space’ (and its characterization as ‘traditional’) is here overtly simplified, because its elaboration, as the vast existing literature on public space evidences, does deserve a broader discussion — let alone that doing so would inevitably divert the scope of the analysis.

Hence, 'organizational kernels' (that is, the group of people steering mobilizations) either lost momentum and dissolved or got more and more involved in anti-neoliberal struggles (like the '*Combo del ICE*') that were, concurrently, starting to take place. As a result, urban communities, wherefrom the 'counter-hegemony' sprang, were increasingly routinized and hence rendered susceptible of clientelism deployed by both the central state and traditional political parties. The potential and enthusiasm to orchestrate citizen mobilization, demand to have a stake in the urbanization processes and, given the circumstances, take matters in their own hands were thereupon visibly dwindled (Mora, 1991; Valverde et al., 1989; Alvarenga, 2005). By ensuring electoral support, both political control was reestablished and the politics of urban growth overrode the local(ized) politics of urban development. Local governments (municipalities) and, more concretely, the *Asociaciones de Desarrollo* started to spell out the way communities were to grow in accordance with the technicalities contained in the *planes reguladores* whose pitfalls were politically concealed by resorting to clientelistic tactics. On the other hand, given that mobilizations were not only directed to improve collective consumption, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to develop an endemic community culture and political self-determination (Castells, 1983), contestation did not cease (though it did visibly dwindle). All the same, an organizational 'sediment' persisted, and, in time, it evolved among residents of some of the *Barrios del Sur*, markedly those that compose Paso Ancho, into something different and out of something fairly unanticipated.

4.5. The *Comités Patrióticos*: Community-based and inter-scalar mobilization

The *Comités Patrióticos* (Patriotic Committees) flourished in the light of the first referendum held in Costa Rica's democratic history. Such direct mechanism of citizen consultation was, in the end, resorted to as a way to decide whether or not endorsing a free trade agreement between the Central American countries (with the exception of Panama and Belize), in conjunction with the Dominican Republic, and the United States, the so-called CAFTA-DR. Free trade was not a new topic in Costa Rica and Latin America in general. As pointed out in section 4.2, since the 1980s there have been steady government efforts to deregulate markets and attract foreign investment as well as to further economic integration with other Central American countries. The United States, in parallel, had also encouraged the creation of free trade zones, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas, but due to both fierce resistance and complications experienced, pursued more direct agreements with countries (or clusters thereof). In Central America, where trade with the United States amounts to 43% of all international transactions, negotiations began in 2003 (Salas, 2010: 14). By 2004, all countries, but Costa Rica, had subscribed to the agreement, which meant the conclusion of negotiations and acceptance of the treaty's terms. Between mid 2006 and beginning of 2007, again with the exception of Costa Rica, the CAFTA-DR was ratified and started to be implemented in the rest of the Central American countries and the Dominican Republic.

In Costa Rica, the then president, Óscar Arias Sánchez (2006-2010), whose political campaign had included the CAFTA-DR endorsement and enactment as one of his government's key aims, pressed for the agreement to be approved by the *Asamblea Legislativa* (Legislative Assembly)⁸², drawing on article 41 bis — known as *vía rápida* (fast procedure) — to speed up the whole process of ratification and implementation. On the other hand, on February 26th, 2007, a massive demonstration (involving trade unions, religious groups, students and 'common' citizens) took place signaling the growing opposition to the CAFTA-DR (see figure 4.7). Amid the groups resisting the agreement, the one led by former deputy and presidential candidate José Miguel Corrales, formally presented a petition to the *Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones* (TSE, the Costa Rica Supreme Electoral Court) to organize a non-compulsory referendum to set the ultimate 'fate' of the CAFTA-DR. Although there was a reigning skepticism that such petition would be adopted, on April 12th the TSE, rather surprisingly, announced that the referendum could be organized as long as 133,000 signatures were collected. As a response, the government issued an executive order to organize the referendum without having to comply with the signature requirement. The TSE,

⁸² The *Asamblea Legislativa* is the unicameral legislative branch of the Costa Rican government in charge of approving new, and amendments of, laws. It is composed of 57 deputies, who are popularly elected for a four-year term.

thus, once a judicial challenge to the referendum's call had been resolved, announced, on July 12th, that the referendum was going to be on October 7th⁸³.

Anti-neoliberalism strikes again: A brief account of the NO movement formation

From the perspective of the social movement opposing the CAFTA-DR, there were four basic process-formation phases: (i) *Prior to the signing of the treaty* (there was an opinions' schism between those rejecting altogether and those asking to amend — so it won't be that damaging — the free trade agreement. During this time, there was little access to information, for a 'commercial secret' was decreed); (ii) *Between the treaty's signing and the 2006 presidential elections* (information began to be made public and more careful assessments signaled dangers and inconsistencies. Division decreased and unification to reject the CAFTA-DR slowly coalesced); (iii) *After the 2006 presidential elections* (provided that then president-elect Óscar Arias' agenda was clearly pro-CAFTA-DR, opposition gained strength, spread throughout the country, incorporated a wide array of social actors, coordination forms were developed and large and visible demonstrations were carried out); and (iv) *The call for a referendum* (while some sectors were skeptical about the efficacy of the referendum, the movement against the CAFTA-DR consolidated. In this last phase, social mobilization peaked, largest demonstrations were organized, and a significant number of local, cultural and *territorial* expressions gave rise to new forms of political action) (Trejos, 2008: 91-93).

Although social sectors and actors agglutinated to oppose⁸⁴ the CAFTA-DR (labeled as the "NO movement") had already fairly amalgamated before the referendum (that is, second and third phase), its institutional approval was rather surprising and demanded that actions had to switch from protesting on the streets to the hunting for votes. This, too, was quite challenging, given that, by the time the referendum was about to take place, the already profoundly divided debate had polarized civil society (Raventós, 2008b). Despite the lack of economic resources, there was a high level of organization that managed to mobilize large amounts of people⁸⁵, by means of intense canvassing, which eventually led to the formation of the *Comités Patrióticos* nationwide. It is believed that between 150 and 180 committees were put together that continued the electoral proselytism and took care of logistics, supervision and control in the day of the referendum (Raventós, 2008b: 22; Salas, 2010: 17). Additionally, at least 25 locally based groups against the CAFTA-DR were formed, which cooperated closely with the *Comités* (Salas, 2010: 17).

The formation of the *Comités Patrióticos* was autonomous and followed diverse processes according to specific circumstances of each community. And, as aforesaid, it was the consent to carry out the referendum what drove their sudden appearance between April and May 2007. Moreover, "the many local initiatives and many forms of 'participatory' or popular power that started to emerge and joined forces were the most important quality of the NO campaign, which substantiates the claim that this [the opposition against the CAFTA-DR, in fact] was a movement" (Alvarez and Hintjens, 2009: 45). More specifically,

These associations and networks [the *Comités Patrióticos*] spread from inter-linked local organizations and individual initiatives to form more coordinated campaigns and inter-organizational networks capable of campaigning and loosely coordinating. However, the web of inter-institutional connections that emerged outpaced the capacity of any central organization to coordinate them. To ensure some level of coordination, the proliferating local network of the NO movement

⁸³ Out of the 1,514,998 Costa Ricans who voted, 51.62% (805,658) did it in favor of the CAFTA-DR, while 48.38% (756,814) rejected it. There were, in total, 2,654,627 registered voters out of which 59.2% participated (according to official data published by the TSE). Overall, voting happened without any considerable incidents and the whole experience was regarded by authorities as admirable. The sectors opposing the CAFTA-DR were nevertheless somewhat reluctant to accept the result of the referendum and demanded a 'one-by-one' recount of all votes. The result, however, remained the same. After a series of laws pertaining the CAFTA-DR implementation were amended, the agreement was decreed into effect as of January 1st, 2009.

⁸⁴ The movement against the CAFTA-DR fused an enormous variety of social sectors and actors, which were integrated into the struggle, out of either collective or particular (embedded in the agenda or vindications of a given sector or group) reasons. Moreover, some of them had for long existed, whereas others (like the *Comités Patrióticos*) were established as a response to the juncture the referendum meant (Salas, 2010: 16).

⁸⁵ This is reflected on the stretch margin by which the CAFTA-DR was finally approved to be endorsed: 3.40% (Raventós, 2008b: 16).

were organised within Patriotic Committees, which sprung up and were established in every part of the country. They mostly involved *neighbours associating themselves* with the NO campaign during the Referendum and getting together to discuss tactics and strategies for the campaign (Alvarez and Hintjens, 2009: 45; italics added).

Coordination to canvass and campaign, via the committees, was also fundamentally shaped by the input of already existing groups, whose members have gained vital experience in the frame of the mobilizations against neoliberal reforms during the 1990s (being the most important ones the 1995 *Huelga del Magisterio Nacional* and the mobilizations against the 'Combo del ICE') (see section 4.2). Likewise, the *Partido Acción Ciudadana* (Citizen Action Party), the then second political force with an anti-CAFTA-DR base, aided both the creation and work of the *Comités Patrióticos* (Rayner, 2008).



Figure 4.7. Massive demonstrations against the CAFTA-DR in the capital city of San José [1-3]. The NO movement designed slogans and logos to display opposition: on the bottom right, it reads “No in the referendum, no to the free trade agreement” [4] and “My heart says no, and yours?” [5]. On February, the 26th, 2007 approximately two hundred thousand people took the streets [3-4]. Source: own elaboration (images taken from: see Appendix 3).

4.5.1. From *abstract* global to *concrete* local: *The Comités Patrióticos as inter-scalar and urban protesting*

Although the NO movement had a manifold organizational base, it should not be read as a summation of diverse agendas and sectorial views, for its consolidation occurred along an articulating axis aimed at impeding the deepening of a socially excluding economic system — neoliberalism (Salas, 2010: 18). In that regard, the controversy about the CAFTA-DR reflects **a conflict about politics of scale** (Rayner, 2008). According to Neil Smith (1984; 1992), there is a range of scales — all the way from the globe to the human body — that are produced by differences among the spatial extension of both social and material processes. These scales and their interdependencies are dynamic, and its constant reconfiguration expresses power relations between classes. Power is thus measured in terms of the capacity to reach, act and alter relationships among scales (Rayner, 2008: 72). Several scholars (see, Smith, 1984; 1992; 2004; Purcell, 2003; Brenner, 1998; 1999; 2001; 2004; amid others) have contended the way governments have rearranged their scales and, as a result, the limits of their actions. This phenomenon puts into a new perspective the multiple levels at which both politics and economics currently operate — what Erik Swyngedouw (1996) has called “rescaling processes” — and through which established scale configurations are constantly remade and reorganized through intense sociopolitical struggles (Berndt, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2000). Such rescaling, it is argued, has made clear how sociopolitical mobilizations have found

at the municipal level a suitable battleground to resist neoliberalism and seek social justice (Connolly and Steil, 2009).

In the view of such inter-scalar dynamism, in which urban social movements are very much entrenched, the *Comités Patrióticos* managed to utilize the neighborhood (and even the household) scale to further their claims. This strategy enabled the creation of networks between people in communities based upon interpersonal trust. Such particularity became a central political asset for the mobilization against the CAFTA-DR (Raventós, 2008b), for it maintained engagement, once interest had been sparked, going; in fact, “being involved in the Patriotic Committee was [...] something most NO campaigners valued highly” (Alvarez and Hintjens, 2009: 45). Moreover, a political subjectivity, visibly counter-hegemonic-like, found first expression in public demonstrations that took place on October 23th and 24th, 2006 and, prominently, in much more massive public mobilizations on February the 26th and September the 30th, 2007 (both being the greatest marches to that date) (Raventós, 2008a: 9; Trejos, 2008: 92) (see figure 4.7). Once the committees started to flourish, political subjectivation was, too, constructed, but in a more space- and time-specific manner (as opposed to the more ephemeral and flamboyant ‘politics of the streets’), since participants, besides their animosity towards the neoliberal project (epitomized in the CAFTA-DR), linked to *their* territories (that is, their *barrios*) possible negative impacts the free trade agreement would bring about within the overarching anti-CAFTA-DR debate. Thus, the *Comités Patrióticos* centered their work, to a large extent, on trying to change, together, the **citizen culture** and its **scalar organization**. To that end, it was essential the way they “operated as decision-making bodies and fund-raising bodies” and “worked hard to democratize the whole CAFTA debate, by bringing up ideas from ‘below’” (Alvarez and Hintjens, 2009: 45).

Debate on the CAFTA-DR was highly complex and in public terms it, primarily, revolved around three issues: (1) conditions to access the market of the United States; (2) the capability of the Costa Rican state to manage national resources and domestic economy; and (3) the viability of the welfare institutions in the health, insurance, electricity, and telecommunications sectors. Within the wide and multifaceted assortment of arguments employed by both sides, a conflict of political scales can be identified, given that, in general, while the NO movement was defending the national scale (pro-welfare institutions and national markets), those in favor of the CAFTA-DR prioritized the regional and global scales of capital flow (emphasizing the need to enter the international market and foster deregulation) (Rayner, 2008). This split was also reflected on the profiles of the members of the *Comités Patrióticos* and the groups advocating for the approval of the Free Trade Agreement. For the most part, participants in the committees were workers and pensioners from the public sector together with a significant number of students of public universities and high schools (though these latter weren’t able to vote in the referendum). Additionally, there were also free lancers and people who either worked for or owned a small business oriented towards the national market. The private sector, on the other hand, was mainly dominated by the pro-CAFTA-DR groups, since only a handful of members of the *Comités Patrióticos* stemmed from enterprises with transnational interests (Rayner, 2008: 74).

Such internal configuration of participants in the *Comités Patrióticos* indicates the correspondence between the material interests being furthered and the defense of welfare public institutions as well as national markets. Moreover, it echoes the traditional correlation between the middle classes and urban social movements in Costa Rica (see section 4.2). Moreover, the internal composition of the committees exhibited very peculiar characteristics, which is reflected on the process whereby the *Comités Patrióticos* set their general discursive framework of resistance to the CAFTA-DR. Following Antonio Gramsci’s (1971: 131ff.) “formation of the intellectuals”, which demystifies the notion of ‘intellectual’ as a distinctive social category independent of class, the members of committees are, arguably, what he calls “organic intellectuals”. As opposed to “traditional intellectuals” (professional, literary, scientific), organic intellectuals are distinguished by their capacity to direct the ideas and aspirations of the class wherein they are, organically, intermeshed. According to Jeremy Rayner (2008: 74), the Patriotic Committees may be said to constitute the “organic intellectuals” of the welfare state project, for members (high school teachers, university professors, qualified public workers and professionals) actually conducted a process of

“**participatory political pedagogy**”, organizing talks and workshops; producing and distributing leaflets, newsletters, and websites; and knocking on doors and addressing neighbors directly. This, furthermore, was possible due to a ‘spontaneous’ organization that allowed to link actions at different scales within a decentralized network: whilst the committees problematized issues of national relevance with transnational background and repercussions, they operated at the much more lower scales of neighborhood and households (Rayner, 2008: 74).

The *Comités Patrióticos*, thus, emerged alongside and in interaction with the NO movement and, in so doing, participants (the actual ‘organic intellectuals’) created “their individual role at the same time as they create[d] the movement, as new individual identities and a new collective identity [...] [took] form in the same interactive process” (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991: 2). Such distinction turned out to be quintessential to those committees that were able to go beyond the CAFTA-DR debate and, specially, to overcome the jumbled ambient conditions, within the NO movement, subsequent to the referendum.

4.5.2. When enthusiasm has waned, not everything goes back to be the same

Hitherto the *Comités Patrióticos* have been outlined in the frame of the juncture (‘extraordinariness’) the referendum represented for the political life of Costa Rica. Yet, there’s more than meet the eye in the political repertoires of the committees, as an integral part of the NO movement, when one focuses on the transition back to the continuities of everyday life (‘ordinariness’). Once the whole process of the referendum came to an end, the NO movement held two ‘general assemblies’, in which, as a consensus, the result was not going to be accepted (Raventós, 2008b: 23). These gatherings, while properly structured and organized, when they were coming to an end “frustration was mounting. Some were unhappy with the results, and others were simply tired from hearing so many speakers” and, though some specific subjects were voted on and some agreements reached, “[d]espite the amount of talk, there was little actual deliberation” (Rayner, 2014: 262). In addition to that, in the assemblies, as chaotic as they were, there was “a shared conviction that important decisions needed to be taken by a smaller group of people, at the same time as there was extensive resistance to the delegation of authority to any representative body” (Rayner, 2014: 263).

As for the *Comités Patrióticos*, while the bitter taste of the defeat was still reigning, there were disordered and disarticulated meetings to decide how to go about with the opposition to thirteen, legally binding, projects⁸⁶ to be executed given the result of the referendum. In spite of the clamor to go back to streets, the legitimizing weight of the referendum process lessened the influence of protest, strikes and blockades done mostly in the capital city of San José. At the same time, there was also the idea of putting together a nationwide network that encompassed of social forces to fight Neoliberalism. Within such initiative, members of the diverse *Comités Patrióticos* were asking for more horizontal, participatory and democratic processes to be set into motion. However, efforts did not go very far⁸⁷. Overall, “[t]here were essentially two distinct responses to the frustrations of these attempts to coordinate on a national scale. One was to continue in the attempt to find a workable form of cooperation between the *Comités*, on national or more local scales. The second was to turn towards the engagement with specific communities on local issues, effectively abandoning the attempt to constitute the *Comités* as a distinct collective political force” (Rayner, 2014: 264). Thus, the experience of resistance to the CAFTA-DR (and, in particular, that of the Patriotic Committees) seems, in effect, to have had a dual aftermath, for,

[The NO movement] bequeathed an important return to the local, the immediate instance, community and barrio. At the same time, it enabled local struggles to become national struggles [...]. According to most of the actors, the experience of the movement has not been extinguished, and it [...] [was] a good historical moment for the socialization of that legacy and to strengthen communication channels

⁸⁶ These projects, referred to as the *Agenda de implementación del TLC* (the CAFTA-DR agenda of implementation), were, primarily, profound legal reforms to deregulate and privatize various sectors traditionally controlled by the state, such as social security, telecommunications, insurances, inter alia.

⁸⁷ For instance, it was, at some point, decided that ‘closed meetings’, to which *Comités* would send delegates, were to take place. Meetings nevertheless fell short (Rayner, 2014: 263-264).

between all the country's areas, sectors and social actors that partook. Other actors, however, argue[d] that the institutionalization of the movement, via the referendum, mediated and limited the possibility of a strategic discussion beyond the CAFTA-DR. This has kept some sectors from returning to the fight and a defeatist feeling arose thereafter (Salas, 2010: 27).⁸⁸

Participants of committees that valued their involvement in the NO movement, but all the same believed that it was pointless to continue disputing the referendum's result and its associated neoliberal reforms, saw a dormant potential in changing the political scale of actions and encouraged the formation of networks at lower ranks, such as the canton, district and, once more, the barrio territorial scale. 'Local(ized)' politics, as the referendum process proved, was thought to be more concrete and hence direct linkages with people were easier to establish than within the abstract national scale (Rayner, 2008; Magnusson, 1996). This line of reasoning, moreover, was much more recurrent in committees of urban areas within the GAM, in which participants assessed the whole experienced as "participatory, creative, without dogmas, plural and autonomous", all the while accentuating the weight of "political alphabetization" (Salas, 2010: 26/27).

Furthermore, by fostering a *demanding*, rather than simply a *requesting*, citizen political culture, with the aim of enhancing direct and autonomous participation at both the neighborhood and national level, a '**communitarian**' politics was prompted. On such account, the *Comités Patrióticos* constituted perhaps one of the most important variations of political participation in Costa Rica (Rayner, 2008: 72-73), one that devolved on to a much more tangible (and thus more susceptible to change) level of political intervention. As a matter of fact, according to a survey conducted in 2007 (Raventós, unpublished: 14) one of every three interviewees said to have taken part of a communitarian organization concerned with improvement and development within the last 5 years (which, to varying degrees, might've helped the creation and functioning of committees, since some of them emanated from already existing social interactions among neighbors). Furthermore, community based organizations (CBOs) (as reviewed in section 4.2) have played a significant part in urban social movements before the 1970s-1980s economic crisis and, to a lesser degree, in the anti-neoliberalism mobilizations during the mid 1990s-early 2000s. Therefore, the *Comités Patrióticos*, partially, revitalized the role communities have had in both their 'developmental fate' and in organizing protest action to fight matters entrenched along the local-global scale axis. All that potential combined created a fertile ground, which was about to be used for other purposes.

4.6. A sudden change of scope: A *renaissance* of a '*socially rebellious*' local community development

Trying to create/foster new spaces for alternative ways of politics is not an easy task. Although some *Comités Patrióticos* started, after the referendum, to slowly fade away, there were some cases in which committees engaged in the challenge of inventing and refining new local(ized) political spaces. One of them was the *Comité patriótico* "Juanito Mora"⁸⁹, which is based in a cluster of barrios in southern San José known as Paso Ancho and also embedded in the so-called *Barrios del Sur* wherefrom mobilizations to improve collective consumption emerged during the 1970s and 1980s (see figure 4.8 and section 4.2)⁹⁰. This patriotic committee was primarily composed by people with a working-class background together with professionals with higher education. Participants, moreover, shared, as a common denominator, a strong feeling of attachment to their living places as well as active participation in the mobilizations that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s (see section 4.4). After the

⁸⁸ My translation from the original in Spanish.

⁸⁹ The committee was thusly named after Costa Rica's former president (1849-1859) Juan Rafael Mora Porras (1814-1860) (also known as "don Juanito"), who has been officially awarded 'the national hero' title for having led the campaign against William Walker's (1824-1860) filibustering regime (that had already conquered Nicaragua, Costa Rica's northern bordering country) in 1856.

⁹⁰ Paso Ancho doesn't correspond to an 'official' politico-administrative division of the San José canton. It is actually more of a socio-historical reference; how residents, from early on, referred to the place they lived in. Thus, neither its population nor the number of barrios it comprises is precisely known; nonetheless, roughly 35000 people are said to dwell there in about 35 barrios (according to interviews with Paso Ancho activists).

referendum, a group of university students enlarged the committee, meetings were held on a more regular basis and 'symbolic' contributions collected to cope with minor administrative and logistic expenses (as stated by one of the Paso Ancho activists interviewed). The members of the committee also joined forces with other already existing CBOs and, gradually, commenced to divert attention and concern from what has transpired during the CAFTA-DR turmoil to what was going on throughout the different barrios in Paso Ancho regarding diverse issues (from public infrastructure to the quality of public education). By and large, the driving force behind organizing and mobilizing people, rather than resisting neoliberalism (which, as I shall point out later, didn't disappear completely from the political vindications), was triggering a process to alter and directly influence, socially and spatially, their living environment.

4.6.1. Coming back to the barrio and turning into an 'insurgent' space

The micro level of the barrios (as opposed to the macro level of the neoliberal restructuring the CAFTA-DR represented), within discussions of the committee, gained more and more prominence. As a way to frame and catalyze suggestions, intentions and worries people were expressing, it was decided to come up with a local development agenda — as a sort of road map. Neither creating, nor fulfilling the agenda was an easy and smooth endeavor. The whole process was instilled with tensions and divergences, for it was framed by "activities of actors endowed with differing amounts and types of resources and constrains, which can result in either controversies and conflicts or in the elaboration of collectively produced and shared social capital" (Dangschat 2009: 838). For starters, oddly enough some of the participants were, while the debate on the CAFTA-DR was ongoing, pulling in opposite directions. Likewise, a Paso Ancho activist, during an interview, highlighted how 'emotional' and 'off subject' (that is, the aim of jointly improving the community) disputes among participants could actually be superseded, when, for instance, a participant said that their participation had only one condition: not having to do with evangelicalism. Another participant — presumably practicing such religion — said that he could see no connection whatsoever between the common interest that had drawn them together and everyone's personal interests and practices (or at least no real reason wherefore assuming that one excludes the other). That was the one and only time individual worldviews interfered with decision-making, the activist observed concluding, then, the anecdote. Similarly, there were constantly divided opinions as to whether to pressure the local government (the municipality of San José) to get things done or, by contrast, taking care of issues themselves. Conflicts, of any kind, continued to be internally and constantly addressed and, eventually, surpassed in order to allow things to happen. This is a central element, for all too often people do easily lose interest and enthusiasm, if 'tangible' results are not sooner or later palpable.

Once the necessary — not unanimous — consensus was acquired, the agenda was launched stressing the eroded quality of both public infrastructure (sidewalks, roads, street lighting, parks) and public services (solid waste management, public library, education). One of the inaugural actions taken was a crusade of conscientization and, through canvassing, distribution of leaflets, workshops and gatherings, a significant number of people were reached and informed about the necessity of a pedestrian bridge⁹¹, given the increasing number of accidents that were occurring along freeway 39 — known as the *Circunvalación* — whenever residents of Paso Ancho tried to cross from one side to another (the freeway had long ago partitioned the barrios). More concrete actions to spark interest and raise awareness included a campaign called "black hearts" (to mark on the street where someone was killed by a car while trying to cross the freeway), numerous meetings to discuss measures, the formation of an *ad hoc* committee, and ultimately a demonstration carried out in the place where people often informally and riskily attempted to cross the *Circunvalación* (see figure 4.8 and 4.9). The pedestrian bridge, furthermore, was regarded as the greatest infrastructural dearth of Paso Ancho and its construction, in fact, had been pursued, for over two decades, by more 'traditional' means, such as lobbying and garnering letters 'promising' a prompt solution — thus, the need for more 'radical' and 'aggressive' methods.

⁹¹ The first of a series of meetings registered approximately 50 people; in its majority, elderly women of a markedly popular class composition (Rayner, 2008: 80).




Figure 4.8. Localization of (clockwise): the San José canton in the GAM [1], the district of San Sebastián within the San José canton [2], and the Paso Ancho (cluster of neighborhoods) center within the district of San Sebastián [3]. Neighborhoods in both San Sebastián and Paso Ancho are part of the so-called *Barrios del Sur*. Throughout Paso Ancho streets are narrow and do not conform to a regular quadrant layout [4-5], public infrastructure (sidewalks, street lightning, and the like) is of a regular-low quality [7] and there still exists local businesses that create dynamism in everyday life [6]. In Paso Ancho's aerial view [4]: (A) the *República de Haití* elementary school; (B) the *Emma Gamboa* public library; (C) *Parque de los Héroes* (park of the heroes); (D) point where neighbors believed the pedestrian bridge must've been built and where they demonstrated; (E) point where the pedestrian bridge was, in the end, constructed; and (F) bridge over the Tiribí river (the red dash line symbolizes freeway 39, the *Circunvalación*). Source: own elaboration (images taken from: see Appendix 3).

Despite the fact that the bridge was not immediately (nor where people held it must've been) constructed, residents of Paso Ancho realized that, by exercising civil disobedience to demand for solutions, they were able to “amass their resources to overcome their disorganization and gain the knowledge of where and how to use their resources” (Tarrow, 1988: 429) — that is, they made use of their “political opportunity structure” (Tarrow, 1998 [1994]) (see figure 4.9, picture 1). It also became clear the importance of revitalizing a ‘communitarian politics’ to advance new locally-situated claims (Rayner, 2008), since linkages with people are easier to establish, ideas are better conveyed, broader support may be attained and, eventually, a political space can be, first, invented and, then, enacted and opened.

Priorities, thereafter, were with less difficulty set because the “[s]pace and time of ‘the concrete’”⁹² put the neighborhoods first and it, thus, became the primordial political sphere of action (Rayner, 2008: 81). Additionally, the expression of a (spatially conveyed) identity was an underscoring aspect that captured the reality — both existing and perceived — of the community and placed it at the heart of the debate. Consequently, others joined the mobilization to, firstly, press for the bridge and, later, to actively take part in the **community development as a ‘movement’**. Bonds of **solidarity** and **cooperation** were thereupon nurtured and **feelings of attachment** to the barrios deepened (Pateman, 1970). Also, people partaking in this local(ized) political mobilization were, besides claiming the construction of the bridge, exercising another kind of citizenry characterized by demanding, instead of just asking, higher structures of the state to provide a solution (Alvarenga, 2005; Rayner, 2008). To that end, participants developed as well as deployed a set of dexterities that helped them pair their ‘daily personal rhythms’ and personal interests with those of the community. And, at the same time, they gained the emotional security to join the mobilization, given that “[t]he mechanism through which everyday practices influence the decision to participate could be synthesized as the deployment of skills, whereas the passage from everyday emotions to participation in a protest event can be understood as self-confidence” (Boudreau, 2009: 343).

⁹² My translation from the original in Spanish.

To put it differently, people getting involved in the mobilization were able to both overcome their own personal aspirations and make room for collectively decided ones (which resulted from intersecting points of interests). Alongside came the realization that there were, in fact, others having similar (or actually the same) preoccupations and, what's more, determined to act (that is, protest), which helps dwindle the sense of isolation and, to a certain extent, keeps apathy or cynicism from arising.



Figure 4.9. At the top: demonstration to demand the construction of the pedestrian bridge [1], freeway 39 [2], and the actual bridge [3] (in the end built elsewhere). At the bottom: diverse instances of deliberation: sometimes it can be 'intimate-private' (like a living room [4] or a garage [6]) or 'formal-public' (like the *República de Haití* elementary school [5]) infrapolitical spaces. Source: own elaboration (images taken from: see Appendix 3).

Equally important to craft the social capital required to go on with the agenda, as both activists and participants pointed out in interviews, was the spontaneous way in which residents started to express interest and eventually partook. More precisely, activists accentuated how a few times, when approaching people to discuss the initiative of the agenda, some of them knew already about it, because either relatives or friends had mentioned it. Similarly, several interviewees observed how they heard about the intentions to improve neighborhoods' living conditions in somewhat unusual circumstances — for instance, while waiting for the bus, someone complained about the eroded quality of the bus stop, and some other person said out loud that, now, there was going to be a chance to really do something to fix that problem as well as others, and gave a snapshot of the idea of generating a development agenda. In some other cases, it was whilst mingling after having shopped at a local store or simply hanging around at a barrio's corner, that opinions on certain issues taking place (non-existence or meager condition of sidewalks and roads; scarcity of recreational and cultural activities; mismanagement of solid waste, and others of that ilk) were expressed and that inhabitants could see, as aforesaid, that they were sharing pretty similar — if not the same — type of concerns.

It is worth remarking that all of this unfolded in somewhat '**unorthodox**' spaces (the bus stop, the sidewalk, the street corner, in front of a local store) and within the 'ordinariness' of 'hidden transcripts of everyday life', which both thickens and amalgamates desires of political and radical actions (Scott 1990; Grossberg 1992). In other words, people of Paso Ancho converted their barrios into the domain of infrapolitics and, as such, into "**spaces of insurgent citizenship**" that "are found both in organized mobilizations and in everyday practices that, in different ways, empower, parody, derail, or subvert state agendas" (Holston, 1999: 167)⁹³. People thereafter could make decisions and take actions regarding the development agenda, given that "the right to be politically active brings to the fore the issue of the *possibility to act*" (Boudreau, 2009: 336; italics in the original). Paso Ancho inhabitants

⁹³ "Citizenship", Holston (1999: 167) writes, "changes as new members emerge to advance their claims, expanding its realm, and as new forms of segregation and violence counter these advances, eroding it. The sites of insurgent citizenship are found at the intersection of these processes of expansion and erosion [...]. They are sites of insurgence because they introduce into the city new identities and practices that disturb established histories".

thus paired their possibilities and reasons for acting together and advanced endogenous values and local knowledges beyond formally sanctioned instances of participation (precisely the ones the creation of master plans entails) — provoking, in consequence, an epistemological and methodical break. Actions, furthermore, were (and most likely remain) underpinned primarily by bodily experiences and material practices (that is, space-time subjectivities) fashioned — in clear contrast to the technocratic logic of the master plans — by the numerous and coinciding life-trajectories of people, who were able to produce their own genuine space of political universality through what Michel de Certeau (1997 [1984]: 29ff.) designates as ‘tactics’, those “guileful ruses that operate from within the gaps of overarching spatial and social structures” (De Carli and Falletti, 2013: 2).

An instance where tactics of Paso Ancho’s dwellers coincided was the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere*⁹⁴. This initiative consisted, in the first place, of providing students of the *República de Haití* elementary school with progressive and non-traditional pedagogical methods as well as promoting Paso Ancho’s history and facts as part of the school’s teaching program. Also, speakers (‘freethinkers’, as a Paso Ancho activist referred to them) were invited to suggest alternatives to diversify the educational/learning process. Although this project underwent various difficulties to move forward (by the beginning of 2012 the *Escuela* had dissolved), it was pointed out during an interview, that it was quite beneficial in respect of organization-capacity building. It provided, as well as with the case of the development agenda, a kind of local and open ‘social forum’ where ideas, comments, preoccupations and fairly specific proposals, regarding the school’s education system and, occasionally, about other dimensions of the community, could be expressed, debated and, if possible, executed. Participants, therefore, began to feel more and more confident to tell what was going through their minds and realize that, despite criticism, all suggestions were welcome. Having the chance to speak and, preeminently, the realization of being listened to, a Paso Ancho activist I talked to stressed, is the first fundamental step towards a process of engagement and steady participation. Thus, the vital role of creating such deliberative, *invented* and autonomous space.

Pressing for the pedestrian bridge, the development agenda and the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere*, generally speaking, paved the way for a revival of (the long-standing tradition of) community organizing and self-organization in Paso Ancho — one that echoes that of the *Juntas Patrióticas Progresistas*. Further, this allowed for subsequent and precise actions to unfold, which uncovered a paradoxical (almost innate) condition of the urban growth propelled within the GAM and, by extension, in Paso Ancho.

4.6.2. Taking advantage of oxymoronic power: *Furthering counter-action in the loose ends of (spatialized) power*

Michel Foucault (2007 [1981/1982], in his lecture *Meshes of Power*, pinpoints that the key to grasp the complexity of power is to go beyond its conceptualization as negative, repressive and juridical — largely related to “government as sovereign”. Conversely, he asserts, the focus must be on “the technologies of power” — that is, the means whereby power is employed and closer to government as the “conduct of conducts”. Additionally, the term “governmentality” was coined by Foucault (1991 [1979]) to refer to a set of aspirations, aims, rationalities and mentalities that the state apparatus deploys to impose a particular conduct on the subjects (Huxley, 2007: 187). The governmentality, furthermore, is supported by “the production of truth” (Foucault, 1991 [1979]: 79); that is, all those “regimes of truth”, embodied by the “ways of speaking the truth, persons authorized to speak truths, ways of enacting truths [...] invention and assemblage of particular apparatuses and devices for exercising power and intervening upon certain problems” (Rose, 1999: 19).

⁹⁴ The name, “Pablo Presbere” (in Bribi language “Pabru Presberi”, meaning “chief of the macaws”) is from an indigenous king of the Suinse community (in south-eastern Costa Rica; nowadays known as “Talamanca”) who is thought to have led the so-called “Tierra Adentro” insurrection against the Spanish colonizers on September 29th, 1709. On April 9th, 1997 Pablo Presbere was officially declared “Benémerito de la patria” (roughly, “Meritorious of the homeland”) a distinction granted to those whose merits and/or acts are worth remembering and honoring. Incidentally, an initiative to coordinate Patriotic Committees in San José to share information and support, after it was decided not to oppose the CAFTA-DR agenda of implementation and favor more local engagement and autonomy amid committees, was named Pablo Presbere too (Rayner, 2014: 265-266).

Ultimately, the rationalities and mentalities of the government are crystalized *in* and *through* space. The deployment of power, accordingly, far from being the mere coercion of statecraft practitioners over “undifferentiated blocks of subjects fixed in absolute spaces” (Coleman and Agnew, 2007: 321), is asserted by a “series of overlapping and discontinuous spatialities of power” (Elden and Crampton, 2007: 12). Space, hence, plays a central role in the application of power and in the spatialization of governmentality, not only because space, as Foucault (1984: 252) notes, “is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power”, but also because spatial rationalities emerge bringing to the fore causal qualities of space that are integrative part of the operational dimension of government (Huxley, 2007: 194). Consequently, governmentality is “indelibly spatial, both in terms of spaces it seeks to create and in the causal logics that imbue such attempts with their rationality” (Huxley, 2007: 199).

As examined in section 4.3, urban planning (specifically by way of master plans) has been extensively instrumentalized to spatialize a distinct governmentality in the GAM — one that tries to create a harmonious, perfectly ordered and controllable (or governable) environment. The outcome, while not as ‘neat’ as planned, does have delivered the capacity to legitimize certain knowledges that, in turn, create constantly ‘new truths’. Nevertheless, there’s also been an unexpected upshot: inasmuch as control has been sought, resistance has historically been met (see sections 4.2 and 4.4) — after all, “[w]here there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1990 [1976]: 95). That being so, Foucault (2003 [1997]), while addressing and deconstructing power in the various ways it traverses ‘real’ societies, highlights the role of knowledge and discourse, predicating that it is at the ‘local’ that both are, at the same time, subjugated by hegemonic forces (Philo, 2007: 343). Nevertheless, “it is through the challenge of these counter knowledges and their local settings that alternatives can emerge” (Elden and Crampton, 2007: 12). In addition to that, there seems to be a rather puzzling outcome of the interaction between (the exercise of both) power and resistance: the persistent aspiration of power to pre-empt defiance results in a surfeit that cannot be restrained (Foucault, 1980; 1995 [1975]). In other words, “power itself generates resistance to itself, the excess it can never control, and the reactions [...] to its subjection to disciplinary norms are unpredictable” (Žižek, 2012a: 106).

The autonomous and collective organization of Paso Ancho residents is, arguably, one of various ‘**unpredictable reactions**’ there have been to the subjection master plans (from the PNDU to the *Plan GAM 83* to the *planes reguladores*) exert in their attempt to **spatialize an explicit governmentality**. Moreover, it is their excess of control, which creates a cranny, an opening, that allowed the actions in Paso Ancho to develop further. In that regard, three key assets of the community were targeted to continue increasing and spatializing a different kind of development: the *República de Haití* primary school (as a prolongation of the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere*), the *Emma Gamboa* public library and the *Parque de los Héroes* (park of the heroes, a derelict public space next to the library) (see figures 4.8 and 4.10). The decision to ‘intervene’ these three commons, as exposed by two activists, was strategically based on their location at the ‘heart’ of Paso Ancho (see figure 4.8). In addition to that, they’re easy to relate to (everyone knows where and what they are) and gaining visibility was a desirable result (by showing what can be done, more people would likely join in). Deliberating on these new actions, as well as on the development agenda, the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere* and pressing for the pedestrian bridge, didn’t go down without difficulties and took a while. According to interviewed activists there has always been an underlying principle of no exclusion (at least no premeditatedly⁹⁵) aimed at inviting anyone who would like to take part, which, invariably, adds to the complexity of reaching agreements, making decisions and turning them into actions.

⁹⁵ Absolute participation is, for sure, a pipe dream — there are always people who choose not to or cannot participate (though they might, should they be able to). Though hypothetical, it may well be that members of the *Asociación de Desarrollo* may have refrained themselves from taking part, for doing so could’ve signified a conflict of interests (they’re popularly elected and partisanship is thus at play). Further, as observed by one Paso Ancho activist, there are ‘unaccommodating neighbors’ who do nothing but complaint and criticize and have manifested their discontent with what was going on in the park and library (however, they didn’t do anything specific to oppose or hinder actions taken). There hasn’t been, as far as I was able to assess, any case of an under-represented group claiming to take part and not being allowed to or forming an opposition bloc to counter the mobilization.

The *República de Haití* elementary school was, as aforementioned, first used to host sessions of the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere*. As it gradually turned into a forum where to deliberate about future actions, the primary school became 'officially' the venue for meetings; though people would still get together elsewhere (for instance, private houses and the public library) (see figures 4.9 and 4.10). Essential to have access to the school's installations was the collaboration with members of the *Junta de educación*⁹⁶ (board of education), who facilitated the access during weekends and also agreed with both incorporating new pedagogical means and enhancing the teaching's program. As opposed to other settings where meetings were held, the school's building offered rooms of various sizes that complied well with diverse purposes (deliberation of projects and initiatives, carrying out workshops, focus groups, and others of that ilk). Accordingly, resources (such as electricity, toilets, kitchen, and others) together with the centrality (in terms of both the urban structure and symbolic imaginary of Paso Ancho⁹⁷) of the school helped refining the logistics of meetings. As long as the school could be accessed (in time, there were some issues) mobilization progressively solidified and the level of organization created suitable conditions for the "politics of small things" to unfold, whose power is "described, and, crucially, its potential as a normative alternative to the politics of discipline and coercion" (Goldfarb, 2006: 136). Eventually 'bigger' things could be achieved, showing that "a number of people have similar reactions to the same information and events" (Jasper, 2014: 93) and that not "all small-scale political activity provides a normative alternative" in its 'official' sense (Goldfarb, 2006: 136), since people in Paso Ancho haven't been interested in producing a 'classical' master plan (or something similar, for that matter) and their development agenda is far from it. Rather, the '**normative alternative**' in Paso Ancho appeared "when a space is opened in human interaction for a freedom that creates power" (Goldfarb, 2006: 136). Such '**power creation**', it must be noted, isn't directed towards overthrowing ruling institutions and structures. Instead, Paso Ancho residents' power has been used to collectively produce a *differential* communal space — one that would offer an alternative way of living in much more accordance with their worldviews and in clear defiance of the *spatial difference* master plans induce (see subsection 3.4.2).

A 'bigger thing', achieved by dint of such collective and creative power, were the series of actions taken to renovate the *Parque de los Héroes*. The park had been abandoned and significantly ravaged for various years and, I was able to notice through interviews, it was generally assessed as 'inexplicable' that the park had remained under such conditions for so long. At least in principle, the municipality of San José is responsible for the maintenance and upgrading of public spaces; however, the park became, over time, a kind of 'electoral bargaining token', from which particularly those wanting to be part of the *Asociación de Desarrollo* have learnt to skillfully profit. Thus, the park, as contradictory as it may be, needed to remain in a bad shape, so that promises of repairing it could be made. In order to encourage participation, this not-so-minor detail was stressed as way to break the vicious cycle, to which the park had been subject. Therefore, a rather modest, though enticing, process of renewal was launched that managed to recruit people from all the barrios throughout Paso Ancho (and not necessarily and predominantly from those in the park's immediate surroundings, whose dwellers, one might be prone to assume, should've been more interested in partaking because of their physical proximity to the park). By means of people's direct engagement and active input, there were, during a first phase of intervention (later on, as it will be noted, the park was taken up again after a lapse of scant mobilization and participation), not only physical improvements (painting a mural, mowing the lawn, repairing benches, restoring a basketball and soccer court, and the like), but also operative elements were addressed (such as establishing opening hours, secure free access and disambiguate 'proper' uses) (see figures 4.10 and 4.11). In regard to 'proper uses', in an interview with a Paso Ancho activist, it was underscored that possible 'misuses' of the park (for instance, drinking alcohol) and their concomitant users, rather than be banned (which, in reality, was deemed not realistic), were

⁹⁶ There is, in theory, a board for every school. The boards articulate, at the specific milieu of the schools, the vision of the Ministry of Education and, among other tasks, they're in charge of allocating funds that are directly assigned in the central government budget.

⁹⁷ The notion of 'center' in the urban (and partly rural) areas of Costa Rica is historically rooted in the physical presence of primeval institutions: ecclesiastical (namely, a church), governmental (town hall), educational (school), usually arranged around a public space (traditionally football fields, which increasingly started to be turned into plazas) (Woodbridge, 2003: 95).

taken into account and incorporated, to then prevent, to a degree, future conflicts. Until then⁹⁸, as stated by the interviewee, there hadn't been any significant problems.



Figure 4.10. Localization in the center of Paso Ancho of the three communal assets targeted [1]: the *República de Haití* primary school [2] where meetings, focus groups, workshops [3], amid other activities were organized; the *Parque de los Héroes* [4] where a basketball and soccer court have been restored [5]; and the *Emma Gamboa* public library [6] where cultural activities like theater plays [7] and meetings and presentations to, for example, discuss ideas about the park took place [8]. Source: own elaboration (imagen taken from: Appendix 3).

There were also ‘external’ suggestions and aid to renovate the park. A group of architecture students from the University of Costa Rica developed a rather ambitious plan to, physically, intervene and alter the park⁹⁹. In a similar vein, local officials from the municipality of San José made a series of presentations to explain the overall vision of the local government in regard to public spaces and, in the presence of councilors, meetings were arranged to discuss what to do with the park (as well as other community assets). As well-intentioned as both of these contributions and initiatives were, they ended up being visibly limited and, in the latter case, tricky and detrimental. A Paso Ancho activist recounted during an interview that the university students’ ideas were blatantly ‘out of touch’ with their local reality — both capacity- and resource-wise. It would’ve required, amid other things, skilled professionals to materialize their proposal; let alone an important amount of money. On the other hand, the approach by the local government, while welcome at the beginning, proved, in time, to have ulterior goals: the municipality wanted to state that the leading role was theirs, not the community’s. Eventually, this led to a progressive loss of engagement and enthusiasm (not only concerning the park, but also the whole idea of steering autonomously the barrios’ development) among people participating.

The park was too, but seldom, a site where gatherings, to tackle matters of the local development agenda, were organized. This reveals the key role public space plays (in Paso Ancho as well as in any given organized community) in permitting alternative means of citizen participation to flourish in political decision-making and, what’s more, in taking action. There was, indeed, in Paso Ancho a need for open spaces where bottom-up initiatives could “occur in interaction with the resources at hand. In this way, citizenship and governance [...] [were] blended and reconstituted” (Bollier and Helfrich, 2012). Furthermore, Peter Marcuse (2013)

⁹⁸ The interview was conducted in January 2013. The interviewee pointed out that, in order to explain people skeptic about ‘not prohibiting’ the entrance to the park, it was stressed that the best way to keep the park safe was by using it; by not letting it, once again, abandoned.

⁹⁹ The students carried out such proposal in the frame of their *Trabajo Comunal Universitario* (University Community Work), a graduation requisite.

sketches out five paradoxes about public space and sustains, as the first one, that “to have truly democratic public spaces, you have to have a truly democratic society. But to have a truly democratic society, you have to have democratic public spaces”¹⁰⁰. People in Paso Ancho arguably addressed this paradox when they took over public spaces (the park and the ‘unorthodox’ spaces such as sidewalks) and goods (the elementary school and, as it will be reviewed, the public library) and made them their own participatory and democratic forums where to exercise their insurgent citizenship and to perform their collective actions. An interesting nuance is also to be mentioned: while the *Parque de los Héroes* and all the ‘not-entirely-private’ space of the community functioned more as ‘encounter spaces’ (where meetings and discussions may take place rather spontaneously), the public library and the elementary school operated more as ‘convening spaces’ (where summoning, in order to stimulate political effectiveness, can be beforehand planned)¹⁰¹ (Marcuse, 2013). Further, in the case of Paso Ancho, ‘encounter spaces’ seem to have given way to ‘convening spaces’, for people, as mentioned earlier, first found out about the agenda while, for instance, mingling in a barrio’s corner and, then, decided to assist to a more ‘formal’ gathering.



Figure 4.11. *Parque de los Héroes*. A mural [1], at the park’s main entrance [7], depicting historic figures (writers, left-wing activists, intellectuals); some of them are ‘national heroes’ (for example, Juan Rafael Mora Porras, after whom the *Comité patriótico* was named). The mural is used as a symbolic reference to promote participation: a flyer invites people to take part in a meeting entitled “*Hacia el descubrimiento del espacio público*” (“Towards the discovery of public space”) [2]. First actions had to do with cleaning the park [6], mowing the lawn, restoring street furniture (benches, trash cans, etc.) [5] and repairing a basketball and soccer court. More recently, once the *Comité rescate parque y biblioteca* (committee for rescuing the park and library) was put together and managed to reopen both the park and library, a skateboarding facility was built (in collaboration with a private company) [3] and new murals, containing quotes of and information about the mural’s figures, have been collectively painted inside the park [4]. Source: own elaboration (images taken from: see Appendix 3).

The *Emma Gamboa* public library, echoing the aims of the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere*, was equipped with texts about the history, traditions and general facts (neighborhoods’

¹⁰⁰ “The connection between political democracy [and public space]”, Marcuse (2013) also observes, “is most obvious in the ways in which the state regulates public space, and the decision-making process by which its regulations are agreed upon”. In the view of the municipality of San José, as I grasped through interviews with local officials, the regulation of public space is largely administrative, and its benefits are exclusively framed in discourses related to leisure — there’s no allusion whatsoever to its political import.

¹⁰¹ This was precisely the situation in the sessions of the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere* as well as the meetings, workshops, roundtables and others of that ilk carried out in the primary school, public library and, on a smaller scale, private houses (see figures 4.9 and 4.10).

names, population structure, maps, and the like) of Paso Ancho. Additionally, the opening hours were extended, in order to make room for diverse cultural activities, such as theater plays, folk dance groups presentations, puppet shows, amid others. The crucial point, an activist explained, was to show that the library is far more than just some sort of books' depository; a 'dead' boring place where nothing ever happens. Moreover, the library, as aforesaid and as in the case of the elementary school, was used to deliberate on aspects of the agenda and coordinate potential actions. Altogether, the reappropriation of the library, the school and the park was fundamental to turn intentions into actions and, due to this, showing all the 'hidden' possibilities these communal assets offer to increase living conditions socially, culturally, politically and spatially. Moreover, with the creation of autonomous spaces of discussion, residents of Paso Ancho were able to mark a clear distinction between '**formal**' (normally coordinated, provided and controlled by the estate and/or NGOs — that is, top-down) and '**substantial**' (run and furthered by people themselves — that is, bottom-up) forms of citizen participation (Castillo, 2013b: 277). Notwithstanding how radical and disruptive the actions until then performed in Paso Ancho were (see figure 4.14) and the 'conquests' therefrom obtained, the municipality of San José, as I have previously pointed out, was not only directly approached (and even provided material aid, like tools and equipment to clean the park), but also started to carefully and strategically hinder mobilization in Paso Ancho. Eventually, the whole process, framed by the agenda, did lose momentum and, together with 'alternative' interests some of the activists of the *Comité Patriótico* started to further, actions came to a standstill (see figure 4.14).

4.6.3. Spatial and political autonomy is not without costs: *Facing top-down bigotry and excess of inter-scalar fluidity*

Paso Ancho's '**spatially practiced autonomy**' constitutes, by and large, a process through which vigorous political action of citizens turns public goods and public spaces, conventionally under state power and public administration, into collectively shared and (re)appropriated resources (Castillo, 2015: 140). Thus, the minute the social force of Paso Ancho influenced directly the education system, people gathered in the public park, the public library, the elementary school or any corner throughout the barrios, for that matter, to share their political views and demands, a **local community self-development** was set into motion by way of a **radical socio-spatial practice**. Such form of community development, moreover, shouldn't be regarded "as a particular kind of thing, asset or even social process, but as an unstable and malleable social relation between a particular self-defined social group and those aspects of its actually existing or yet-to-be-created social and/or physical environment deemed crucial to its life and livelihood" (Harvey, 2012: 73). In finding those 'crucial elements' Paso Ancho residents not only had to address internal issues, but they were also faced with the local government's (fairly antithetical) counteraction.

The municipality whimsically steps in: From 'lending a hand' to 'adroit deterrence'

The aid of the municipality of San José¹⁰², as previously mentioned, was at first sought and, to a certain extent, provided to recover the *Parque de los Héroes*. However, local officials only paid lip service and, increasingly, began to thwart actions. As Paso Ancho activists with previous experience, gathered during the 1970s and 1980s (see section 4.2), in community organizing explained, it was a naïve mistake, that must've been averted, to have asked the local government for assistance and to have 'invited' them to collaborate with ideas and suggestions. The greatest menace, recounted the activists, wasn't that people partaking would lose enthusiasm, but that the municipality would become a kind of 'adversary' that needed be defeated (as it has been the case in the past when people in the *Barrios del Sur* protested to demand an improvement of their collective consumption). Civil disobedience had already been

¹⁰² The name "San José" actually applies to different territorial divisions: the province, the canton and the city (and its surrounding metropolitan area) of San José (Costa Rica's capital city and seat of the national government). The municipality of San José administrates the canton of San José, which has a surface of 44,62 km² (0,9% of the national territory; 1,46% of the GAM) and a population of 349,152 residents (7,65% of the national population; 7,65% of the GAM's population). The municipality has under its jurisdiction eleven districts: El Carmen, Merced, Hospital, Catedral, Zapote, San Francisco de Dos Ríos, Uruca, Mata Redonda, Pavas, Hatillo and San Sebastián (where Paso Ancho is located) that comprise 309 barrios (Municipalidad de San José, 2011: 5-10). Although the social, economic and physical character of barrios is manifold, it is feasible to tell better off from divested neighborhoods.

deployed and its effects tested (regarding the pedestrian bridge) and resorting to other, more autonomous and action-oriented, means had proved more effective as well as socially rewarding. Therefore, the engine for taking action had relied on proceeding *without* the municipality, but they weren't ready yet to go about *in spite of* it.

The 'unconventional' uses (theater plays, assemblies of the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere*, meetings to discuss the agenda, workshops and focus groups) of the public library as well as of the elementary school were called into question by municipal authorities contending that they did not conform to established house rules and they were thus no longer permitted. According to Paso Ancho activists, the theater plays were, deep down, forbidden due to their alleged 'improper' political content — that is to say, ideological censorship. The municipality, building on **stilted arguments and jargon** (that is, its way to 'speak the truth'), claimed that the public library was not meant to be used for activities from which to profit (alluding to the symbolic donations people made after every theater, or any other cultural, performance, plus sporadic food and handicraft sales aimed at covering the committee's logistics expenses). In addition to that, assemblies and meetings were subtly suppressed by drastically changing the opening hours and days of the public library and the elementary school. Originally, the school was during the week, once school hours were over, shut down and, in time, access over the weekend was completely restricted. The library, by contrast, was forthwith closed; as a matter of fact, the closure lasted for over 500 days (see figure 4.13). Consequently, engagement and enthusiasm of people was, indeed, worn out, which created suitable conditions for the municipality (sometimes via the *Asociación de Desarrollo*) to reactivate and deploy clientelistic deterrent practices and devices, disseminating thusly a **'why-bother?' culture** and **passivity** amongst citizens. The status quo, correspondingly, could be restored as the municipality positioned itself as the single responsible for local development matters.

Such attitude is actually quite puzzling. On the one hand, it complies pretty well with the markedly technocratic vision high-tier local officials of the municipality of San José have regarding how the city and its components (districts and neighborhoods) are to 'develop' (incidentally, confusing *development*, by wrongly equating it, with *growth* was a recurrent condition among all the local officials I talked to)¹⁰³. As the head of the department of urbanism blatantly assessed it, the city has to follow a path determined by technical tools that, in turn, fall back on technical expertise. In other words, 'common' people have neither a stake nor any saying. Their (potential) involvement is, at best, an administrative requisite that one must adhere to; or, at worst, a subversive interruption that impedes a 'proper development' to take place. On the other hand, and perhaps more ambiguous, is the posture of the officials working at the department of neighborhood improvement. While I was told that almost all projects they carry out do involve local residents, it was constantly underscored, during interviews, that the municipality must have the leading position. This could range from interventions that are completely realized by municipal staff and that are delivered to the communities (meetings are supposedly held to discuss certain details) to projects that are incrementally implemented and in which people are given 'symbolic' functions (storing and keeping construction material safe; providing, if it were the case, manpower; and even devolvement of financial responsibilities pertaining both construction and maintenance). The catch, though, relies on the mechanism of selection for a neighborhood to be subject of improvement: there's a bureaucratic procedure that must be followed that, so to speak, secures the type of not only citizen involvement, but also (by extension) of 'development' that the municipality pursues to materialize in barrios throughout the San José canton.

This 'institutionalization' of community development, moreover, has a distinct form: in 2009 the *Instituto de Formación y Desarrollo Municipal* (Institute for Municipal Formation and Development) was created, given the recognition that the success of any given neighborhood's improvement relies on "the quality of the formation and development of both civil servants and community leaders"¹⁰⁴ (Municipalidad de San José, 2008: 4). More specifically, it is stated, as antecedents for the creation of the institute that,

¹⁰³ See appendices for a 'thematic mapping' of the interviews I conducted at the municipality of San José.

¹⁰⁴ My translation from the original in Spanish.

Out of the joint work between the Department of Neighborhood Development [...] and the barrios in the central canton of San José, the great potential the human capital, found throughout the neighborhoods, offers, is underlined as a valuable experience. Between the years 2003 and 2008, it is, as a central experience as well, stressed that, in order to achieve a sustainable community development, it is necessary to *train and instruct* the community organizations so that process sustainability is guaranteed. Moreover, such process must be *permanent and systematic*, provided that membership amid [community] organizations is ever-changing [...]. To improve, strengthen and ensure the available human capital, formation and development spaces must be opened where to encourage knowledge, abilities, dexterities, competences and aptitudes of social actors so that they perform their tasks in such a way that *organizational and municipal objectives* are met” (Municipalidad de San José, 2008: 5; italics added).¹⁰⁵

It is therefore not all that surprising that local officials emphasize the weight the municipality is to have when it comes to prompting community development; after all, project implementation is institutionally defined as “the development of a ‘bottom-up’ process, in which citizens involved, participate in decision-making for both programs and projects to be executed, under the guidance of the municipality’s technicians and professionals”¹⁰⁶ (Municipalidad de San José, 2006: 9). It is, then, quite clear what’s expected of communities’ members and, to a considerable extent, why the case of Paso Ancho represented a nuisance that needed be contained, rather than an opportunity to be expanded: Paso Ancho’s community leaders wouldn’t simply stick to standards set by the local government; let alone, wouldn’t accept ‘domestication’ in the guise of ‘training’ (that’s at least the impression I got from all the activists I met with). Furthermore, it is somewhat more bewildering that in a document entitled *Proceso de Participación Ciudadana para el Mejoramiento de Barrios* (Citizen Participation Process for Neighborhood Improvement) it is sustained that “within the process [of neighborhood improvement] capacity-building and citizen participation are given priority to further *community self-management [autogestión]* and are deemed as the elements that must be ever-present during the whole planning process to guarantee its sustainability” and, in addition to that, it is claimed that “citizen participation is conceived as a democratic process, since it arises as a product of consultation, consensus and local cultural characteristics, all the while respecting diversity and offering, accordingly, participatory spaces for a proactive citizen participation to permanently take place, which in turn would promote sustainability, community development and, therefore, the upturn of the neighborhoods’ quality of life”¹⁰⁷ (Municipalidad de San José, 2006: 3; italics added). All verbosity aside, these official statements can’t help reading self-contradictory vis-à-vis the actual means of project implementation the municipality deploys and, in particular, the bigoted measures taken in Paso Ancho. Why not, for instance, fostering the already ongoing self-management, as opposed to crippling it? And, what’s more, why hindering, head-on, cultural/artistic activities in Paso Ancho, if a project called “Art and Culture” is supposed to be “a transversal axis [...] to contribute to the construction of the cultural identity of neighborhoods as a basic and necessary aspect for residents to appropriate and lead development in their communities”¹⁰⁸ (Municipalidad de San José, 2006: 6)?

Although it isn’t feasible to, exactly, pinpoint the reasons for the municipality’s inconsistency, there’s a direct attempt to tame, by dint of a mannered — not all that innocent — discursivity¹⁰⁹, the whole canton’s development. To that end, citizens cannot simply be obviated, they, instead, have got to be placed inside a carefully crafted power relation, which would, in turn, legitimize hegemony over meanings and actions. In other words, the municipality (either via formal documents or local officials’ verbalization) embodies a discursive position that reflects a particular set of interests with which it tries to identify and that shapes its politico-institutional identity. Such identity, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001 [1985]: 86) argue, is “purely relational” and, in order to give way to its hegemonic practices,

¹⁰⁵ Idem.

¹⁰⁶ Idem.

¹⁰⁷ Idem.

¹⁰⁸ Idem.

¹⁰⁹ Here, it must be noted that “discourses impose themselves upon those who dominate as much as on those who are dominated; they aren’t lies invented by the former to dominate the latter and thus justify their dominance” (Veyne, 2014 [2008]: 37; my translation from a Spanish edition).

the municipality generates a system of relations that is neither fixed nor stable¹¹⁰. Hence, the formation of the municipality's hegemony over communities "involves not a simple speculative effort within a coherent context, but a more complex strategic movement requiring negotiation among mutually contradictory discursive surfaces" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 [1985]: 93). With that in mind, it isn't as astonishing that the municipality seeks to restate its legitimacy by, first, acknowledging that its lack of acceptability amid citizens in neighborhoods is due to "unfulfilled promises, broken compromises and unmet expectations" that have prompted that sentiments of frustration, cynicism, apathy and disinterest result in "little or no citizen participation whatsoever"¹¹¹ (Municipalidad de San José, 2006: 5). Then, the crucial 'discursive-hegemonic' point is made,

Given this situation it is determined, as one of the first methodological steps to be taken [to advance neighborhood improvement], a process of induction (promotion and motivation) in the barrio. This process consists in favoring a contact between the community and the municipality through projects and actions that would contribute to restore the municipality's legitimacy. The purpose of such process is to revert the current distancing by way of immediate actions: direct contact with community-based organizations or leaders thereof to, jointly in meetings and working sessions, prioritize infrastructural needs so that they can be immediately coped with. That is how the recovery of the municipality's legitimacy begins and confidence among participants re-emerges, which allows to spark the intervention process of community development" (Municipalidad de San José, 2006: 5).¹¹²

There's yet an intriguing implicit detail that deserves closer attention: while there's a somewhat prevailing perception amid local authority officials (planners included) that "neutrality is their main tool in dealing with the inherently political nature of their field of possible actions" and that such belief, time and again, leads to a dead end (Grange, 2013: 240), the municipality of San José is anything but 'neutral' and seems very weary of the various ways 'the political' cuts across communities under its jurisdiction. From the 'scientific politics' the high-tier local officials draw upon to justify their ways and means, to the 'concealed' indoctrinating mechanisms of co-optation aimed at community leaders, the municipality deviously wields 'the political' while trying to control the politics of community development, provided that 'the political' denotes

[T]he dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human society, antagonism that [...] can take many different forms and can emerge in diverse social relations. 'Politics' refers to the ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and to organise human coexistence in conditions which are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of the 'political' (Mouffe, 1995: 262-263).

The municipality, thus, needed to reposition itself by antagonizing the subversive manner in which people in Paso Ancho were defying both the 'order' and 'organization' the municipality wants communities to adopt and reproduce. By the same token, out of the many forms 'the political' may materialize, the autonomy exercised in Paso Ancho represented a peril for the municipality, if it is taken into account that "the greatest threat to bureaucracy, the most daring conspiracy against its order, comes from those who actually try to solve the problems the bureaucracy is supposed to deal with" (Žižek, 2012a: 95). In this view, People of Paso Ancho, oddly enough, in expanding the scope of their political actions, seem to have, though rather unintentionally, eased the counteracting incursion of the municipality.

Moving, once more, along scales

Little by little, the mobilization and self-organization in Paso Ancho did lose momentum, but it didn't, at all, cease to exist. Concrete actions pertaining the development agenda, once the municipality irrupted, were progressively put on standby. After a modest 'botanical garden'

¹¹⁰ "In a closed system of relational identities [...] there is no place whatsoever for a hegemonic practice [...]. It is because hegemony supposes the incomplete and open character of the social, that it can take place" (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001 [1985]: 134). Otherwise there wouldn't be anything to 'hegemonize'.

¹¹¹ My translation from the original in Spanish.

¹¹² Idem.

was created in one of the school's yards, there was a rather long hiatus (see figure 4.14). During this period, activists from the different organizations involved and, notably, from the *Comité Patriótico*, still met every now and then. In July-August 2011, I learned from interviewees, it was decided, after various meetings, to join struggles unfolding in regard to the national social security system's eroded condition. A wave of demonstrations was organized, in which activists of the *Comité* actively took part, to demand the national government to improve both financially and administratively the Department of Social Security. Although not directly, these protests somewhat echoed the call to defend the welfare state upon which the NO movement drew during the CAFTA-DR public debate (see section 4.5). Similarly, by the end of 2012, a controversy about the latent permission to grow transgenic corn caught the attention of the committee's members who, then, participated in a countrywide walk aimed at informing people, mostly in rural areas, about the possible implications, should such agricultural practice be allowed. The presidential elections of 2014 also provoked changes of scope to channel efforts and take actions. As shown in figure 4.14 (and in relation to figure 4.1), these actions' range goes from the 'meso' (national) to 'macro' (global) level, for they refer to issues with a transnational backdrop and with possible national (and even local) material implications and ramifications.

When asked about the motives and repercussions of moving 'among scales' and leaving, so to say, 'unattended' the micro-scale of the *barrios*' reality, activists of Paso Ancho with further experience in political militancy¹¹³, stressed, on the one hand, the importance of both not losing sight of problems happening at 'other scales' and raising awareness about them. In a way, they were revitalizing the 'participatory political pedagogy' employed to 'educate' people about the manifold effects of having a free trade agreement with the United States. In other words, the dimension of social movements as "educational spaces"¹¹⁴ (Zibechi, 2007: 29), so central during the mobilization against the CAFTA-DR, was again deployed to build opposition to new emerging subjects that went well beyond the realm of Paso Ancho's neighborhoods. On the other hand, it was acknowledged that there was some 'overconfidence' on the *ad hoc* committees created to keep up with activities concerning both the park and the library, as they began facing troubles (evidencing thus a lack of responsiveness) when the municipality started to place 'hurdles' along the way. In some measure¹¹⁵, I was able to sense that activists did believe that people (that is, all those who participated to create and implement the agenda) should've been able to cope with municipality's 'adroit deterrence', but, at the same time, there was an unspoken, indirect, recognition that they were quite amazed at how imposing and dexterous the municipality's actions actually were. Furthermore, members of the *Comité Patriótico* (and, to some degree, of the other CBOs involved) were struggling, in one way or another, with the "Janus dilemma"¹¹⁶, with which all social movements and community organizations, sooner or later, are confronted, provided that,

Some activities and arguments are aimed at a movement's own members, while others are aimed at outside players such as opponents, the state, and bystanders. Every movement does both, and must find the right balance. A movement can become overtly inward, having meetings to motivate its members, reinforce their collective solidarity, and help them enjoy themselves. At the other extreme it can focus exclusively on external interactions, letting its members follow along or not (Jasper, 2014: 3).

Mobilization remained, for a while, openly outward, since, after the involvement in the political campaign of the 2014 presidential elections, whose purpose was to support locally-based alternative parties, actions continued to gravitate towards the national or global scale (though they weren't directed against the municipality or any other 'opponent'). The *Comité* organized a series of small activities to express solidarity with a mass kidnapping of 43 male students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College in the city of Iguala of the southern Mexican

¹¹³ Some of the older members of the committee have connections, a past with or are even part of, broader political organizations (such as trade unions) that keep track of any 'political anomaly' that might develop out of state policies and measures.

¹¹⁴ My translation from the original in Spanish.

¹¹⁵ Though I did ask directly during interviews whether or not it was an error not to have kept closer track of actions, one activist, in particular, accentuated that dealing with difficulties is an inherent part of a learning process.

¹¹⁶ Janus is a "Roman god that is identified with doors, gates, and all beginnings and that is depicted with two opposite faces" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary) (see note 41).

state of Guerrero on September 26th, 2014¹¹⁷. Towards the beginning of 2015, some polemical actions of APM Terminals, a multinational company which had been given a concession to construct and run a new container terminal (close to an existing one under state administration) in the Caribbean coast, sparked a series of rallies, blockages and demonstrations to demand the corporation to comply with agreements (ostensibly binding according to the concession's negotiation) regarding employment policy, fees and load volumes. Involvement of the Paso Ancho's *Comité Patriótico* members was mostly focused on disseminating information about the apparent irregularities the company was committing (to counterbalance the 'disinformation' the press was believed to be carrying out) as well as being present at public protests.

Notwithstanding the evident social, political and spatial detachment of these actions from the community's actuality, as of approximately mid 2014, in parallel, a fundamental aspect of Paso Ancho's mobilization started to be relighted: *culture*. Formerly, putting together theater plays, puppet shows and even a cultural festival called the *Festi-PASS 2010*¹¹⁸ had helped spreading information about the development agenda and the actual existence of a group of people interested in doing something about what was going on in their barrios (a process that, as aforesaid, also followed an 'infrapolítico-spatial' path). Additionally, these cultural activities were vital to consolidate a sense of socio-spatial belonging with Paso Ancho and solidarity among its residents, which, in turn, constituted the very essence of their collective actions, provided that culture "is composed of shared thoughts, feelings, and morals, along with the physical embodiments we create to express or shape them" (Jasper, 2014: 7)¹¹⁹. Culture, thus, had been a creative means of communication (of, for example, the mutually created knowledge embodied by the agenda) and conscientization (a political, social and spatial 'contextualization' of what's happening and what shall be done about it)¹²⁰. Moreover, just as it was possible, after the referendum, to draw attention to local matters and national circumstances did gained, in time, weight; the 'communitarian (spatial) politics' was slowly repositioned 'at the top of the list'. On such account, the *Comité Patriótico*, reactivated initiatives to come up with ideas and proposals to surmount the social and spatial control the municipality had exerted as well as to reach out for empowerment — that is, triggering, again, "a process of conquering *autonomy* and overcoming *heteronomy*" (Souza, 2006: 329, italics in the original).

4.6.4. Reactivating an autonomous 'unscripted' and 'liminal' space

Because of the alternative agency of community development performed in Paso Ancho, "unscripted [political] spaces" (Sennett, 2012), where freedom of speech could be exercised, were gained and, in consequence, the community, as a whole, became a "liminal space; that is, space at the limits of control, limits that permits the appearance of things, acts, and persons unforeseen, yet focused and sited" (Sennett, 2013 [2006]: 53). Mobilization and organization in Paso Ancho, due to its '**liminality**', reappeared to tackle the problematic situations experienced with the *Parque de los Héroes* and the *Emma Gamboa* public library and, eventually, to bring about new changes in the community¹²¹. This time around, as it will be shown, new 'things' seem to have arisen from combining *alternative* and *traditional* 'acts'.

¹¹⁷ Together with other much smaller 'declarations of solidarity' (mostly in the form of digital posts in the Facebook Page of Paso Ancho or others linked to it), this type of actions display how the 'translocality', embedded at the heart of Paso Ancho mobilization, cut across diverse scales (connections with other locally-based organizations in and outside the country) (see note 121). This dimension, out of the research's analytical spectrum, does deserve closer attention for future investigation.

¹¹⁸ The name is an abbreviation of *Festival Cultural PASS (Paso Ancho-San Sebastián)*. The festival took place on November 27th, 2010 and was organized by the *Escuela Popular Pablo Presbere* and the *Comité Patriótico Juanito Mora* with support of, amid others, the elementary school's board, a councilor and the municipality. The 'support' of both the municipality and councilor is likely to have been no more than an 'official' endorsement of the activity.

¹¹⁹ See also note 36.

¹²⁰ Both the communicative and conscientizing feature of culture is grounded in the fact that "[i]t is through cultural processes — from singing to reading to marching together down a street — that we give the world meaning, that we understand ourselves and others" (Jasper, 2014: 7).

¹²¹ This set of actions occurred after I have completed the fieldwork. I kept in touch with some of the activists as much as I could, but communication ultimately was lost. In spite of that, I was still able to catch up with activities and initiatives, by way of updates, statements and pictures made public through, mainly, the Facebook Page of Paso Ancho and, ever since it was created to promote participation, the Facebook Page of the *Parque de los Héroes* (other organizations cooperating with actions in general also have pages where they publish constantly information about what has gone and

The park, while it was never actually left to chance, the possibilities to upgrade it had been widely limited by the municipality. In response, the members of the *Comité Patriótico* (by the way, at some point the name was changed to *Movimiento Patriótico*, patriotic movement¹²²) provided support to the *Parque de los Héroes* committee, in order to come up with ideas and devise new strategies. The committee, specifically created to carry on with the process of appropriation and renovation of the park and chiefly constituted by 'ordinary' neighbors (that is, they weren't activists or community leaders), proved to be impromptu and lacked both creativity and competence to cope with the municipality's irruption. In this respect, Paso Ancho activists of the *Comité Patriótico*, though somewhat tangentially, admitted during interviews that the municipality's reaction turned out to be quite hard to surmount to those appointed to the park's committee. Therefore, the members of the park's committee could have, hinted the activists, used more support and guidance to handle responsibilities and difficulties. In that regard, activists helped the park's committee to design a new strategy to intervene the park not only taking into account all snags thus far experienced, but also bearing in mind the importance of conveying a message that something was being, once again, done.

In order to directly alter the park ever since, trees were planted, a small skating rink built (with the sponsorship of a private company), garbage cans installed, benches painted, a fence placed at the sidewalk-boundary removed, an entrance at the south end of the park repaired, and, in a more symbolical sense, both quotations and biographical data of the historical figures — the 'heroes' — depicted in the main entrance's mural painted inside the park (see figure 4.11). In addition to that, the municipality has been compelled to install a playground for children (which was a personal donation) and the skating rink as well as to deliver maintenance services and provide new furniture (tables and benches). In order to keep engagement and enthusiasm thriving and to avoid being caught off guard again, mobilization's robustness has been amplified through both joining forces with other existing organizations and institutions (the elementary school, the local police station, among others) and, more recently, creating new organizations (notably, the *Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Paso Ancho Sur*, the Paso Ancho South integral development association). Furthermore, two campaigns called "*Volvamos al parque*" ("Let's go back to the park") and "*Amigos del parque*" ("Friends of the park") were launched to, first, animate people to take over the park and participate in the new process of renovation. As a follow-up, "Friends of the park" seeks that people 'adopt' the park as theirs and, in so doing, both the right to use and the concomitant duty to look after it are stressed¹²³ — that is to say, there's a need to accentuate that now it's as much about reclaiming as about keeping up with what the park requires. The 'novelty' of approaching a private company¹²⁴ for bettering the park, it is worth underscoring too; though small financial donations and the actual input of people is what still truly makes the difference.

The library, by contrast, posed a much more complex challenge. As already mentioned, the municipality managed to foreclose 'alternative' uses by shutting the library altogether down (the closure lasted for over twenty months). Therefore, accessing the library again required other means of counteraction and a somewhat abrupt modification of tactics. By mixing public forms of pressure (such as graffiti with messages aimed at the municipal authorities, contacting the press to denounce the situation, 'cultural protest actions'¹²⁵) (see figure 4.13) with 'formal' approaches to the local government (letters were sent asking for meetings and, if possible, have the opportunity to make a statement during a session of the city council), the

what will go on). Parenthetically, while the influence of social media and networks is an aspect into which I didn't delve, from what I could grasp and infer from interviews, it was the face-to-face interaction during canvassing and meetings what truly engaged people to participate. Nonetheless, it is almost undeniable the positive effect social media has had on organizational aspects (announcing meetings and cultural activities; requesting proposals for discussion topics; and collecting resources to carry out actions).

¹²² Though it is purely speculative, switching from *Comité* to *Movimiento* can be interpreted as signal of 'rupture' with the juncture marked by the CAFTA-DR debate as well as an intention to convey the notion that what's more important is the 'action' (that is, the *movimiento*) and not the 'agents' (that is, the *comité*).

¹²³ In some videos posted on the Facebook Page of the *Parque de los Héroes*, 'friends' of the park explain why they decided to participate and share a few concerns (for example, the absence of lamp posts, so that the park could be used during the evening; the lack of security; litter; and a host of others).

¹²⁴ This is most likely a case of 'corporate social responsibility'.

¹²⁵ The *Acciones Culturales de Protesta* are basically a combination of musical performances, theater plays, poetry readings and the like with demonstrations to denounce particular situations and demand/discuss potential solutions. This has been a tactical move deployed from the very beginning of Paso Ancho's revitalization of community development.

library was reopened. Moreover, in an effort to ‘not budge an inch’, a committee named *Rescate Casco Cultural de Paso Ancho* (rescue of the Paso Ancho’s cultural center) was established to coordinate all actions that relate to the library and the park. Eventually, the municipality ‘listened’ and on August 12th, 2016, during a ‘cultural communitarian action’¹²⁶, the mayor of San José, Johnny Araya Monge, showed up to, allegedly, reconcile the relationship with the organized community¹²⁷. As a gesture of ‘immediate’ good faith, public access to the library was granted four days later and, a day after that, routine maintenance measures (mowing the lawn, collecting garbage, etc.) were conducted by municipal staff in the park. Although the library’s opening hours were restored, its use has to adhere to established house rules. Thus, the *ad hoc* committee could neither convene meetings nor arrange for cultural activities to be held in the library (at least not as long as the municipality has something to do with it). Rather paradoxically, municipal representatives have been present during meetings to coordinate cultural activities such as resuming the *Festival Cultural PASS (Paso Ancho-San Sebastián)*¹²⁸. Despite the fact that this was a, so to speak, ‘partial victory’, confronting and demanding, in a more strategic and yet risky manner, the municipality by holding it accountable, seems to have paid off (nonetheless, it might as well be too soon to tell).

Now, people in Paso Ancho rather than solely engaging in a blunt power struggle with the municipality, they went on using their already deployed **autonomous capacity** to continue developing their barrios in other facets. As it can be seen in figure 4.12, the *Barrios limpios* (Clean neighborhoods), an undertaking to pick up garbage lying on streets, sidewalks and vacant lots, served, apart from the conspicuous purpose of cleaning the barrios, as a means whereby exposing to others that such type of ‘long-standing’ problematic situations, which have been rather normalized, can be taken care of directly. (Regardless that the municipality is, in effect, to deal with such issues; it is assumed that people would likely follow suit). Furthermore, given that the ‘cleaning crusade’ entailed several barrios throughout Paso Ancho, the attention the ‘cultural center’ had been receiving was, to a certain degree, spread out, proving thereby that the positive impacts of a self-steer community development could go well beyond what had transpired with the park, the school and the library.

In a similar vein, a fairly ambitious project termed *Identidad Pasoancheña 2015* (Paso Ancho’s identity 2015), which had the support of the *Ministerio de Cultura y Juventud* (Ministry of Culture and Youth), was conceived as a pedagogical process through which to reinforce a sense of identity and belonging by drawing on Paso Ancho’s history¹²⁹ and traditions (a much more resourceful continuation of a prior, far more modest attempt, when some texts, old pictures and magazines with historical content were donated to the library). Ultimately, a competition was set up to propose symbols (from flags to songs to poems) that would convey Paso Ancho’s identity and out of which ten were to be chosen through an open election. Interestingly, some of the symbols relied on images of or made allusions to completed projects, like a group of houses’ facades that were cleaned up, repaired and colorfully painted (which, as in the case of the park’s mural, is utilized in flyers and leaflets) (see figure 4.12). According to the August issue of *El Caminante del Sur* (the Southern walker), a reissue of a communitarian newsletter that used to circulate during the 1970s and 1980s, 682 people took part in the election of the ten symbols.

¹²⁶ The mayor, reportedly, said that he had come to end the ‘protest’. This indicates how divergent the interpretation of actions may actually be: while people in Paso Ancho are invited to a cultural activity where they can both enjoy themselves and raise their voice, the ‘institutional’ viewpoint sees through a lens of ‘revolt’ and ‘disobedience’.

¹²⁷ Whereas the ‘reconciliation’ was the ‘official’ reason the municipality alleged for the mayor to have taken time out of his busy schedule to then go and listen to what the ‘protesters’ had to say, it may be presumed that there could’ve been ulterior motives such as the need of preserving and expanding his electoral preference (as of May 2016 he’s taken again office after losing the race to become the president of the nation in 2014) and keeping up with his ‘political trademark’ of being an ‘executive mayor’ (that is, he gets things done, instead of just making promises). Either way, the fact that the attention of the mayor was caught was deemed amid activists of Paso Ancho as an advantage, which, nevertheless, has its perils.

¹²⁸ This almost can’t help to be interpreted, at worst, as an express attempt of the municipality to, again, take over the direction of actions or, at best, to monitor from within what people in Paso Ancho might be up to.

¹²⁹ A Paso Ancho activist is in a ‘personal quest’ to find out as much as possible about the history of Paso Ancho (date of foundation, origin of first residents, and the like). In so doing, he has collected a significant number of old pictures and data.



Figure 4.12. The *Identidad Pasoancheña 2015* (Paso Ancho’s identity 2015) project. An ensemble of facades that have been restored, vividly painted and voted as one of the ten symbols of Paso Ancho [1]. The facades are used in flyers [2] to invite to the activities of the *Peña Cultural* [3], a cultural club that either the elementary school or the public library hosts. Inauguration of the new bridge over the *Tiribí* river [5-7] (the banner reads “The bridge unites us” [6]). The *Barrios limpios* (Clean neighborhoods) ‘crusade’ [8-12] (the graffiti on the street reads: “A clean community means health” [8]; the inviting flyer resorts to the *Mascarada Tradicional Costarricense*, The Traditional Costa Rican masquerade, to draw attention by connecting active engagement with a cultural background [9]). Source: own elaboration (images taken from: Facebook Page of Paso Ancho).

The *Identidad Pasoancheña 2015* didn’t stop there: a website was created to gather ideas and seek ways of implementing them; the newsletter, *El Caminante del Sur*, was supported to appear on a more regular basis and has turned into a website whose thematic scope

surpasses the communities' domain (which can be seen as a sign of 'translocality'¹³⁰); and a *Peña Cultural* (a cultural club) was formed to coordinate and execute diverse activities such as forthcoming editions of the *Festi-PASS*, PasoanChINE¹³¹ (open-air cinema at the basketball and soccer court of the *Parque de los Héroes*), among others (the municipality, as aforesaid, tunes in to what the *Peña* does). Culture, overall, has certainly been a key ingredient of Paso Ancho's mobilization as well as for carrying out improvement collective actions. Drawing on cultural practices has, too, consolidated a sense of identity, solidarity and belonging, since "people construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent for their identity" (Cohen, 1985: 118).



Figure 4.13. The *Emma Gamboa* public library [1] remained for over 500 days shut. A graffiti painted in front of the main entrance reads "505 days closed, so?!" [3]. Current official opening hours are from 8am to 4:30pm (Monday through Thursday) and 8am to 4pm (Fridays); during the weekend is still not possible to make use of the library [4]. Similar to the case of the library, a graffiti, as means of pressure, at the entrance of the *Parque de los Héroes* denounces the unfulfilled promise of the municipality to install a playground (the text reads: "Municipality, 8 months without playground, so?!") [2]. An *ad hoc* committee was put together to deal with the library and the park issues; as a way to highlight the cultural factor, it was named *Rescate Casco Cultural de Paso Ancho* (rescue of the Paso Ancho's cultural center) [5]. Source: own elaboration (images taken from: Facebook Page of Paso Ancho).

In the midst of the '**cultural renaissance**' of Paso Ancho's local and self-steered community development, activists decided to target a rather defiant infrastructural problem: the exhausted functioning of the bridge over the Tiribí river. The bridge, built back in the 1930s and meant for carts, is located at the southern border of Paso Ancho with San Jerónimo de Desamparados (the neighboring community whose jurisdiction falls under a different municipality) (see figure 4.8). As in prior occasions, a committee was formed (*Comité S.O.S. Puente Tiribí*¹³²) and a Facebook page created to keep people informed. Since the bridge is actually categorized as 'national road', the municipality isn't (at least from a legal point of view) responsible for what happens with and along this type of roads. Therefore, high-ranking officials from the *Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Transportes* (the Ministry of Public Works and Transportation) and the *Consejo Nacional de Vialidad* (National Roadways Council, a branch of the aforementioned ministry) were contacted. In a series of letters, it was stated


¹³⁰ Like any other concept, 'translocality' doesn't have a ubiquitous meaning. As observed by Clemens Greiner and Patrick Sakdapolrak (2013: 375) a number of authors have sought "conceptual coherence" by placing translocality within broader social theories such as Pierre Bourdieu's "sociology of culture" and Anthony Giddens' "theory of structuration". On the other hand, translocality appears as an "umbrella term" to describe mobilities and multiple forms of spatial connectedness" (Greiner and Sakdapolrak, 2013: 375). Using the newsletter to refer to not only community-wise issues, but also national and international topics together with authors being based in Paso Ancho and elsewhere, signals a translocality as relations that "extend beyond the village community" (Tenhunen, 2011: 416). As such, 'translocality' is also very much recognizable in the *Comités Patrióticos*' actions.

¹³¹ The name is a play on words that combines *cine* (cinema) with Paso Ancho. This is, ostensibly, part of a wider strategy to reinforce, time and again, the sense of belonging and identity.

¹³² The committee had members of the *Movimiento Patriótico Juanito Mora*, *Asociación de Desarrollo Integral Paso Ancho Sur*, *Asociación de Barrio Santa Rosa* (a neighborhood-based organization), *Vocero de San Sebastián* (a local digital newspaper that covers matters happening within the San Sebastián canton) and *Comité Vecinas de San Jerónimo* (the Female Neighbors of San Jerónimo Committee, an organization from the barrios on the other side of the river).

that the bridge, according to a technical study done in January 2015 by the *Laboratorio Nacional de Materiales y Modelos Estructurales* (LANAMME, National Laboratory of Materials and Structural Models, a department of the University of Costa Rica), was in a 'critical' condition and needed to be replaced with a new two-way bridge.

Eventually a pledge was requested and a deadline of 75 days given for a concrete response; or else, partial blockages, at either end of the bridge, would begin. In addition to that, sit-downs were performed, in various evenings, directly at the bridge to raise awareness about the possible consequences of postponing, more and more, the provision of a new and adequate bridge. The combination of public demonstrations and blockages with lobbying was fruitful and the old bridge was removed and a new one constructed. And, as seen in figure 4.12, its inauguration was flamboyantly celebrated to catch the interest of people from both sides of the river. The experience of this bridge certainly resonates with that of the pedestrian bridge back in 2008; though, in this particular time, accumulated experienced paired with new insights (over those eight years that went by 'between bridges' a significant amount of young people have joined the various committees that have been created) have delivered better results. This also has injected confidence for future actions (mobilization, as I write this down, is very much active, has become more 'sophisticated' and resourceful and is going strong), since it isn't that easy to press and have high-ranking officials from the central government to react to specific and locally-sited demands. All things considered, the aptitude to, at 'the limits of control', execute new 'acts' and produce new 'things' and situate them in the socio-spatial process of community development, is perhaps one of the most remarkable characters of Paso Ancho's mobilization. Moreover, it is worthwhile remarking that Paso Ancho's autonomous and local community development isn't directed at resolving 'basic needs' (housing, water and electricity provision, and the like; such issues, in any event, had already been tackled); as it is usually the case of 'peripheral' societal blocs in urban areas throughout the global(ized) South.



● 'Extra-community' action

Notes:

- 1) The *mobilization pro social security system* were a wave of demonstrations organized to press the Costa Rican government to improve the eroded Department of Social Security. Demands were aimed at reducing waiting lists for surgeries and medical appointments as well as stopping budget cuts.
 - 2) The *mobilization against transgenic corn* was chiefly a walk throughout the country to inform people about the implications of seeding transgenic corn. A group of activists visited predominantly rural areas from November 24th to December 3rd, 2012. This action is placed between the meso and macro scale, given that material actions (the walk, radio and TV interviews, canvassing) took place at the national level, while (potential) ramifications and companies interested were transnational/global.
 - 3) The *solidarity with the Iguuala's mass kidnapping* were a series of small demonstrations to show support and empathy for the disappearance of 43 male students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College in the city of Iguuala of the southern Mexican state of Guerrero on September 26th, 2014.
 - 4) The *mobilization against APM Terminals* were a series of demonstrations, rallies and blockages to demand the company APM Terminals, in charge of building a new harbor in the Caribbean Costa Rican coast, to comply with employment, fees and load volumes agreements. Just like the mobilization against transgenic corn, this action is located between the meso and macro scales, for it involves nationwide actions with transnational repercussions.
 - 5) Actions during "rupture events" cut across the three levels (macro, meso, micro), due to the Patriotic Committees' inter-scalar dynamism (see section 4.5).
- * While involvement in the 2010 political campaign was ostensibly influenced by the sentiment of defeat prompted by the referendum's result (actions were directed at opposing the back then ruling government's candidate, which was regarded as the main promoter of the CAFTA-DR), in 2014 the objective was to support deputies' candidates from alternative, locally-based, parties.
- ** During the "hiatus" meeting were, every now and then, held, but to discuss matters regarding 'extra-community' actions.

Figure 4.14. Scales and processes-time of collective and autonomous actions (selected) of Paso Ancho inhabitants. Source: own elaboration.

Instead, mobilized people in Paso Ancho have dealt with (and have thus brought to the fore the intrinsic relevance of) other, not-so-commonly-addressed¹³³, aspects of community development. In particular, the way the notion of ‘culture’ has been reinterpreted and incorporated into the community organizing’s repertoire and discursivity, to not only make participation enthralling, but also to recognize it as a legitimate right for communities to build on their historical, social and political identities to spatially alter their livelihoods. On that note, Paso Ancho’s mobilization never intended to, first, take over power to commence transforming the barrios. Quite the contrary, Paso Ancho residents behave in a **socially rebellious manner** to craft their own kind of power and, from the bottom up, develop their neighborhoods — without getting into a futile competition over top-down control to, then, begin to bring about change, because,

A revolutionary thinks fundamentally about how to transform things from the top down, not from the bottom up, contrary to a social rebel. The revolutionary thinks: we’re going to organize a movement, grab power and from the top down transform things. The social rebel organizes the masses and from the bottom up brings about change without having to think about grabbing power (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001: 11).¹³⁴

4.7. Carving a space of radical openness: *Inter-subjective and multi-logic democratic struggle*

Returning to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987 [1980]: 372) idea of the territory of analysis always being expanded, ‘deterritorialized’, by way of a ‘following’ viewpoint (see subsection 3.1.3 and figure 3.1), in Paso Ancho, for it is an ongoing *locale*, social interactions and spatial underpinnings continue to intermingle with one another. As a result, spatial formations, produced by both people themselves and the institutional-technocratic apparatus, are constantly altered — though the latter does try to establish a specific type of spatialization. To put it differently, from the interplay between these two (somewhat antagonistic) modes of spatialization, a “**spatial diffusion**” springs, which is characterized by a set of “newly forming archaeologies” (Dear and Flusty, 2002b: 3) (see figure 4.1.) I will next revisit and discuss further, through some ‘theoretical points’, some of the ‘**constitutive elements**’ that underlined the creation of ‘new archaeologies’ in Paso Ancho.

The planning paradox: Planning in the Real theory, planning radically in practical reality

Planning, from a general standpoint, is about decoding the *right* kind of actions that will determine a yet-to-be-known future — that is to say, defining “what ought to be” (Gunder, 2004: 302). In order to fulfill this goal, planning discourses articulate a vision of the future by dint of “regimes of truth” — precise discourses that embody particular ideologies¹³⁵ — and advance, through technical planning tools (notably, master plans), the configuration of a new public sphere with brand new subjects and subjectivities. The issue here is that the ways planners typically describe the materiality of those new public spheres (that is, the intended spatialization of sociality) bear almost no relation to the *actual* condition of existing socio-spatial realities. What professional planners, usually working at the service of ‘hidden agendas’, actually attempt to do is imposing a scheme based upon a symbolic network made of unconscious fantasies and illusions that structure anew the social and spatial reality itself (Žižek, 2008 [1989]: 33). Consequently, dystopian narratives of the future, stemming from the knowledges and discourses backing-up planning instruments, are to overlay any existing reality. Here the Lacanian difference between ‘reality’ and ‘the Real’¹³⁶ is encountered, since

¹³³ In literature, which draws on case-study research, community development efforts often target questions of land tenure insecurity, access to basic services, improvement of connection with urban centers via public transportation, and a host of others. Further, self-construction is a very recurrent instance in which people themselves (that is, without much support of NGOs or government agencies) take up development in their communities.

¹³⁴ My translation from the original in Spanish.

¹³⁵ As indicated before (see note 5), discourse and ideology aren’t two sides of the same coin. “Far from being deceitful ideologies, discourses map what people actually do and think, and without being aware of it” (Veyne, 2014 [2008]: 37; my translation from a Spanish edition).

¹³⁶ The Real is one of Lacan’s most enigmatic contrivances. The Real, together with the Imaginary and the Symbolic, are the three registers of subjectivity, through which, by means of master signifiers, we are interpellated. Whereas the

the former “is the social reality of actual people in interaction and in the productive process”, while the latter “is the inexorable, ‘abstract’, spectral logic” of technocratic and professional planners that spearheads what *must* take place in socio-spatial reality (Žižek, 2012a: 102).

On such account, in the case of Paso Ancho ‘the Real’ is most clearly observable in the theoretical postulates that permeate the master plans that have affected, affect and will affect its development: the *Plan GAM 83* and the *Plan GAM 2013-2030* (operative at the regional level) and the *plan regulador*, called *Reglamentos de Desarrollo Urbano del Cantón de San José* (Urban Development Regulations of the San José canton) (whose territorial range is circumscribed by the politico-administrative unit of the canton). Yet, the ‘manuals’ that the neighborhood improvement department of the municipality of San José generates have, by far, a greater and much more direct influence. In such documents, ‘the Real’ resorts to a set of languages and beliefs — embodying the ‘**municipal governmentality**’ — that, due to its alleged convoluted, multifarious and conflicting nature, is normally encapsulated in a ‘catchy’ label — recurrently, ‘**quality of life**’ — that is thought to render ‘the Real’ accessible to the general public. These encompassing ideas are what Jacques Lacan calls “master signifiers” and function as nodal points within a larger net of supporting signifiers (Stavrakakis, 1999) that, though they are fixed and remained unchanged, “their descriptive features will be fundamentally unstable and open to all kinds of hegemonic rearticulations” (Laclau, 1989: xiv). Thus, local officials are able to state not only what quality of life is, but also how it is to be achieved (an aspect that, as aforementioned, was vital to erode mobilization in Paso Ancho and is still central to sustain the hegemony the municipality strategically enforces). Through slogans, captivating phrases and overarching methodologies, regional master plans as well as the barrio improvement projects manage to shape identities, create either positive or negative associations and, eventually, provide direction to action.

Moreover, both discourses and master signifiers are indelibly ideological (Žižek, 2008 [1991]). Within planning tools like regional master plans and schemes for neighborhood upgrading, the way master signifiers become operative in sweeping discourses is therefore crucial to forward the imposition of the ‘dystopian Real’ over the ‘utopian reality’ that Paso Ancho residents are trying to materialize through their collective “spatial practice” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]). People, actively participating in Paso Ancho’s local community self-development, have been able to ‘decipher’ and ‘secrete’ their own **differential space** in close affinity with their “perception of the world [...], particularly in its everyday ordinariness” (Merrifield, 2006: 110). To that end, citizen participation went beyond mechanisms sanctioned by authorities and found expression in alternative and autonomous spaces of more substantial deliberation people were able to invent. Through increasing deliberation and in spite of tensions and conflicts (which are inherently bound to it), there was an ‘insurrection’ of ‘subjugated local knowledges’ and action ‘within the cranny’ that the excess of ‘municipal power’ couldn’t help producing. Also, discourses of Paso Ancho’s dwellers have deployed, as ‘master signifier’, the expression of a **local identity** in terms of the **rich past, the present culture and the potential future of their barrios**. A clearer message has been (and continues to be) delivered, in contrast to the abstract notion of ‘quality of life’ (or the like), which pervades the municipality’s discursivity and is outspokenly declared by official planning practitioners.

Correspondingly, the irruption of the ‘regional’ (the *Plan GAM 83*¹³⁷) and ‘local’ (the *plan regulador* and the neighborhood renovation plans) governmentality’s means have been kept to a considerable limit (though with some ‘feeble moments’ here and there, which makes the situation, at present, rather baffling to assess). In so doing, people in Paso Ancho have utilized

Symbolic order alludes to the subjective dimension that is equated with language, “the Imaginary and Real refer, respectively, to [...] preverbal and postverbal aspects of the subject. The Imaginary is constituted by schemata of memory and cognition [...] while the Real [...] by those aspects of the subject’s being that have been excluded from the categories of language” (Bracher, 1993: 22-3). The Real, thus, “is a lack, or non-place, that language can never fill, but only approach through metaphor and metonym” (Gunder, 2003: 296). Moreover, the Real, as observed by Slavoj Žižek (2008 [1989]: 193/191; italics in the original) is defined by a set of “immediate coincidence of opposite or even contradictory determinations”; the Real, then, can be “the starting point, the basis, the foundation of the process of symbolization [...] which in a sense *precedes* the symbolic order and is subsequently structured by it when it gets caught in its network” yet the Real is “at the same time the product, remainder, scraps of this process of symbolization”; it is, in other words, “the excess which escapes symbolization and is as such produced by the symbolization itself”.

¹³⁷ The *Plan GAM 2013-2030* hasn’t yet become effective. It would, in any event, be rather soon to estimate the impacts the plan would’ve thus far had, had it already come into effect.

a myriad of 'spatial tactics', as their "ways of operating" (de Certeau, 1997 [1984]: xiv), whereby, in an everyday-basis, reappropriating and reproducing space throughout their barrios. Further, these spatial tactics constitute a reaction (and not a direct opposition) to the superimposed, 'deranged', objective of socio-spatial order (the 'space of political universality') that the governmentality, as aforesaid, regionally and locally via planning instruments seeks to assert in the GAM and its constitutive parts (for instance, clusters of neighborhoods like Paso Ancho). In other words, Paso Ancho's local community self-development has, through 'shortcuts' and 'furtive spatial moments', eluded the top-down and state-run 'spatial strategies' of division, control and classification (Creswell, 1997). On the whole, residents of Paso Ancho, arguably, have been practicing '**radical planning**' in the form of their **local autonomous community development**, for, on the one hand, endogenous language and knowledge pin down decisions and, on the other, actions are performed by people themselves in a 'extra-institutional' and 'informal' manner. However, it went — and goes — further than that: radical planning in Paso Ancho is too about a radical spatialization, about producing heterotopological spatial formations that, though somewhat counteract the 'official' forms of spatialization, don't seek to supplant them, given that they embody other, not-necessarily adversarial, political, social and cultural identities. Thus, Paso Ancho's 'radical spatialization' is "an active signage pointing to the outside world, conceived as an expanded field for experimental practices of intimacy, expression and collaboration — indeed, for the transformation of social [and spatial] reality" (Holmes, 2003). All in all, the account of Paso Ancho exposes the divergence there exists between planning in *the Real* theory and planning *radically* in practical *reality* and thereby signals the need for open-ended approaches to planning's antithetical nature — approaches that aren't only *radical*, but also *spatially rooted* in people's daily-practiced reality.

Constructing an alternative and situated political subjectivity

An element that has catalyzed mobilization and thus 'spatially radicalized' planning actions in Paso Ancho (that is, the collective actions reviewed in the preceding section) is a fairly **sui generis process of political subjectivation**. The specificity of the political subjectivity of Paso Ancho residents derived, immediately, from the 'NO movement' experience and, somewhat secondarily, from previous politico-organizational 'sediments'¹³⁸ (see sections 4.2 and 4.4). As noted before (see subsection 4.5.2 and section 4.6), the juncture that the debate around the CAFTA-DR signified was pivotal to a much broader process of political subjectivation (encompassing even people without previous political participation). Such process found its peak in the formation of the *Comités Patrióticos*, which began to disperse and disappear rather quickly once the referendum had taken place. Nevertheless, doing protest, as a means whereby informing and educating about why the CAFTA-DR were to be rejected, provided participants with a set of participatory skills that, in the case of Paso Ancho, as I have thus far demonstrated, have been used for other purposes.

It is fairly uncertain why, exactly, the transition from opposing the CAFTA-DR to a local community self-development was relatively successful (there have been, in effect, snags) in Paso Ancho; especially when fleetingly compared with other urban communities within the GAM where committees continued active for a while and concentrated on local issues¹³⁹. In an effort to extrapolate, fairly cursorily, a potential clarification, I talked to an 'academic-activist' — that's how he presented himself — who was a member of the *Comité Patriótico* of

¹³⁸ Some of the Paso Ancho activists I interviewed were engaged in the mobilizations that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s (see section 4.2). Moreover, the persisting ability of people to affirm, time and again, themselves as political subjects in spite of hegemonic exclusionary practices, can be partially explained by the fact that being "outside established and legitimate political structures is still to be saturated in power relations, and this saturation [...] includes dominant and subjugated forms, modes of inclusion and legitimation as well as modes of delegitimation and effacement" (Butler 2011).

¹³⁹ To my knowledge, other committees that shifted their attention and activities to their communities were: the *Comité Patriótico* "Clemencia Valerín" (also known as "Hatillo Patriótico") located in Hatillo (a district of the San José canton; some of its neighborhoods are part of the *Barrios del Sur*) and the *Comité Patriótico* "Félix Arcadio Montero Monge" located in Santo Domingo (a canton of the province of Heredia situated in the northern part of the GAM). In the former case, actions were primarily aimed at demanding the improvement of the services at the local clinic of the Costa Rican Department of Social Security "Solón Núñez". In Santo Domingo, the committee decided to create a cantonal political party, the *Movimiento Avance Santo Domingo*, and even won a seat at the city council. In both cases the committees are no longer active. Furthermore, Jeremy Rayner (2008: 81ff.) elaborates the case of a rural community in northern Costa Rica, where the patriotic committee, following the referendum, engaged in a long-standing local struggle: securing the access to water.

Curridabat, the main city of the equally named canton, located on the southeast edge of the city of San José. As I was explained, the committee, during the discussion about the CAFTA-DR, employed almost the same strategy than that of Paso Ancho to convey the message of opposition to the treaty: leaflets, walks throughout the barrios on weekends for canvassing, meetings at the community center and the city hall, and, unlike in Paso Ancho, social media and networks were intensely drawn upon to disseminate information (there was a large presence of university students who facilitated their use). Although there were a few attempts, making use of the achieved level of organization and participation, to come up with a development agenda, the interviewee sustained that the mayor played a key role in crippling those initiatives. Apparently, by way of a *caudillismo local*¹⁴⁰ coupled with financial aid, allegedly, from the central government (the mayor belonged to the then ruling party), any 'extra-institutional' efforts to steer development in neighborhoods were easily and quickly dissipated. In addition to that, the 'academic-activist' sustained that the socioeconomic (middle-high class) and territorial (fragmentation, a 'place of passage') structure of the city of Curridabat didn't help to take things further, for there's a patent lack of socio-spatial cohesion (a key feature in Paso Ancho). By the time some *Comités* were getting ready to engage in the electoral campaign of 2010 presidential elections, the committee in Curridabat had already ceased to exist (though its members, occasionally, continued to meet for a while, no concrete measure or action was ever taken)¹⁴¹.

In a more similar case of that of Paso Ancho, a group of *Comités Patrióticos* in the canton of Montes de Oca (east of the city of San José) came together under the guidance of the so-called *Comité Lomas*. Meetings, grouping representatives from the distinct committees, were weekly held right after the referendum (Rayner, 2014: 267). Maintaining the same meeting point used during the NO movement mobilization, a woodshop baptized *Casa Patriótica* (Patriotic House),

The *Comités* also established a common agenda related to the policies of the municipality: bus service, infrastructure, misuse of funds, and property taxes. They worked together, for example, to present complaints about the quality of sidewalks and other issues to the municipal government at town-hall assemblies, and to collect signatures and spread information about a proposed property tax increase, which, they argued, would price many lower income residents out of the community (Rayner, 2014: 267).

As it can be easily perceived, actions in Montes de Oca, in contrast to those carried out in Paso Ancho, were aimed at holding the local government accountable and having it cope with its mandates regarding community development. There was, to put it another way, no intention to get things done autonomously via 'unorthodox' mechanisms of collective participation and cooperation. Such course of action prevents, amid other things, the possibility to prioritize and bring to the fore other topics that don't fall into the category of 'official municipal obligation'. However, as Jeremy Rayner (2014: 267) observes, the "ability of *Comités* [in Montes de Oca] to work together on a common agenda over time reflects [...] the fact that they were all willing to pursue a politics of scale to which their degree of organization was well-suited: a municipal coalition focusing on municipal issues. No doubt, however, it helped that the municipality of Montes de Oca [...] [is] significantly smaller than that of San José, where the amount of influence that could be exercised by a small group of people, as well as the diversity of issues faced by residents, [...] [makes] engagement at the municipal scale significantly more complex and difficult". (Though people in Paso Ancho have, to greater or lesser extent, proven otherwise).

Whereas members of committees in Curridabat, Montes de Oca and Paso Ancho, I would contend, may have identified themselves as political subjects in the same way during the

¹⁴⁰ Here the interviewee makes a figurative allusion to *caudillismo* as autocratic leadership.

¹⁴¹ From a general standpoint, the interviewee believed that the 'failure' of committees to transition to local and community (or the like) matters, was due to the nostalgic message of 'yearning for a better past' that permeated the discursive framework of the NO movement. Hence, mobilizing people in a more prospective manner — that is, to have them look ahead — was quite burdensome. People, possibly, lost the enthusiasm that had them overcome the investment of time, resources and energy the mobilization against the CAFTA-DR signified, because they couldn't see that the future may actually be altered.

'rupture events' that the mobilizations against the CAFTA-DR represented, their political subjectivation circumstances changed dramatically once the referendum occurred. The NO movement offered a chance to build a political identity around the common understanding that the treaty wasn't a good idea and that there was a well-defined 'opponent'; namely, the YES movement (with which neoliberalism was directly associated). That is to say, the politicization of the subjects happened by dint of decisive political actions and interventions (from workshops of 'political pedagogy' to mass demonstrations) (Badiou, 2006 [1988]). Yet, "political events and interventions may consciously aim at and result in the de-politicizing, de-subjectivating [...] of the subject" (Calcagno, 2008: 1051), which was precisely the case of Curridabat, insofar as the hegemony of the municipality turned out to be insurmountable, causing thereby organization and engagement to fade. As to Montes de Oca, the issue is the entanglement with the local government, for it restricts the political subjectivation to a dominator-dominated logic, which keeps political identities from finding other expressions. Like the case of Paso Ancho shows, political agency must not necessarily become an event or intervention, in a 'traditional' or 'classical' sense, to be political: 'everyday acts' can also be political and, as such, influence the process of political subjectivation (Calcagno, 2008; Boudreau, 2009).

Moreover, the transformation (that is, after the referendum) of Paso Ancho residents' political subjectivity, rather than being "decided by negativity, defined strictly against a constitutive outside (which, of course, does not mean that there was no antagonism)", was sparked by "a will to take matters in hand as equal political actors" (Dikeç, 2013: 87). Additionally, Paso Ancho residents, as 'equal political actors', demonstrate that politics isn't hemmed in by already given identities (say, a councilor or mayor). Instead, politics in Paso Ancho is about "the opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the space where those of no account are counted, where a connection is made between having a part and having no part" (Rancière, 1999: 36). In sum, **the people of Paso Ancho that have engaged and continues to take part of the mobilization** (pensioners, housewives, teenagers, university students and professors, local businessmen; in short, all concerned neighbors) have redefined their political subjectivity in terms of their capacity to influence, directly, their barrios' development via alternative and situated (in their specific socio-spatial reality) political acts and interventions: from 'cultural protests' to jointly taking over the park, elementary school and public library. They, as political subjects, weren't created 'out of nothing'; they forged their political subjectivation and identification. They, too, have not only taken politics outside limits of conventional arenas and participatory mechanisms (town-hall assemblies and ballots), but also shown that politics "is in fact a space-making action that blurs — rather than abides by — divisions" (Dikeç, 2013: 88).

The politics of knowledge, a discursive clash: Community development versus urban growth

Between power and knowledge, there is, in effect, a symbiotic relationship. As Hans N. Weiler (2009: 486) sustains, such interdependence is perceptible in diverse forms from Karl Marx's to Max Weber's work. However, it was Michel Foucault who took the analysis of the power-knowledge 'binomial' to a whole other level by way of his, as Edward Said (2000: 239) writes, "highly wrought presentation of the order, stability, authority, and regulatory power of knowledge". For Weiler (2009: 486) there are four main dimensions that structure the ways power and knowledge interrelate: (i) the hierarchies that determine the existing knowledge order; (ii) the capacity of knowledge and power to legitimate one another; (iii) the transnational division of labor traversing contemporary knowledge; and (iv) the political economy of the commercialization of knowledge.

That being so, in the case of Paso Ancho, the politics of knowledge was, on the one hand, directly affected by the discursive hierarchy that the municipality of San José exerted to legitimate its 'technical-institutional' knowledge¹⁴² and thereby impose an 'adequate' type of

¹⁴² The knowledge's ordering is present in both extra- and intra-institutional hierarchical arrangements. For instance, the knowledge 'prestigious' institutions produce has, given its reputation, a de facto hierarchy and internal power relationships would prioritize one kind of knowledge over the other within a given institution (say, that of professors over that of students in a university). The municipality of San José hasn't had any important 'institutional competitors' (the input of the University of Costa Rica was barely discernible and it didn't challenge the municipality's knowledge) and,

community development (that is, 'urban growth'). On the other hand, Paso Ancho residents, though at some point tried to fight back the municipality's hierarchy over knowledge, commenced eventually to produce a knowledge of their own and to legitimate it by getting things done. Now, given that diverse "forms and domains of knowledge are endowed with unequal status" (Weiler, 2009: 486) there was a discursive clash between the 'institutional-technical' and 'local-grassroots' knowledge, due to the way either kind of knowledge defines and legitimates the notion of 'development'¹⁴³. While the municipality (be it through the utterance of local officials I interviewed or formal documents issued) propelled a definition of 'development' bound to the notion of physical expansion and necessity to cope with regional urban issues, which actually exceed the municipality's jurisdiction (this was prominently so among high-tier local officials), the understanding of development among people of Paso Ancho (reflected in both opinions expressed during interviews and, most notably, in collective actions aimed at improving their livelihoods) is rooted in everyday activities and needs, and tackles specifically-situated infrastructural as well as 'not-that-tangible' matters (for example, cultural activities). Such divergence, indicates how "[u]rban *growth* is quite often considered uncritically as a sign of urban *development*, in a way which corresponds to a banalisation of the idea of social development", when it, instead, should be grasped as "*the process of achieving more social justice through changes both in social relations (institutions laws and norms) and in spatiality (from the spatial structures in a material sense to the territoriality and the images of places)*" (Souza, 2000: 187; italics in the original). On such account, the municipality of San José is likely to keep on confusing and foisting urban growth with social community development, all the while hindering an *actual* community development that is both socially and spatially responsive. In sum, there's an encounter and a not-yet-defined relation between **two diverse modes of producing space**: one that is based on **the technical and ideological "representation of space"** (urban growth like) and another that draws upon **the everyday "spaces of representation"** (community development like) (Lefebvre 1991 [1974]).

A space of radical openness: From 'a millstone around the neck' to prospect

As I said before, mobilization in Paso Ancho is, even as I write this, ongoing. It's almost impossible to predict what might and might not happen in the future; let alone, there can't be an absolute interpretation of what transpired in Paso Ancho. However, one thing seems to be clear enough: the situation, far from imploding, is swelling. People in Paso Ancho, whose actions resist any sort of quantification, have managed to alchemize social, political, historical, cultural and spatial liabilities and weaknesses, with 'imperfections' here and there, into opportunities and strengths. To that end, the cluster of barrios was turned into a "space of radical openness" that "is simultaneously central and marginal (and purely neither at the same time), a difficult and risky place on the edge, in-between, filled with contradictions and ambiguities, with perils but also with new possibilities" (Soja and Hooper, 2002 [1993]: 383). Acting as "movement intellectuals" (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991) a handful of activists, combining their previous experience (even prior to the CAFTA-DR debate) and 'making time' out of their personal lives and responsibilities (a typical inherent feature of activism), managed to imbue with enough self-assurance people who were simply preoccupied with how their neighborhoods weren't actually developing and couldn't figure out individually what were to be done. As a result, enough enthusiasm and engagement was amassed to make, collectively, a difference and, in so doing, technical-professional and even political ways and means of community development (and, by extension, of planning) have been directly confronted. "Professionals", as Andy Merrifield (2015: 761) sustains, "need to be challenged by people power, by mass amateurism asserting its popular will, a will that also needs to be a collective political force".

internally, since there's an apparent disconnection between departments that, in varying degrees, have to do with community development, no specific hierarchical order of knowledge was identified. Notwithstanding, it is undeniable the sheer weight of the city council to approve (that is, legitimate) the 'technical' knowledge local officials generate (needless to say, this institutional dimension does require a separate analysis to deconstruct its genesis and behavior).

¹⁴³ There has been, over the past several decades, a lively debate on the conceptualization and political significance of 'development', which has directly addressed the issue of knowledge and power (Weiler, 2009: 490). For example, Guy Gran (1986) locates the failure of African development policies in the imposition of an extraneous knowledge system that pays no regard for endogenously- and locally-produced knowledge.

Furthermore, the clash between a ‘**generic**’ urban growth (furthered by the municipality of San José) and a ‘**specific**’ community development (that of Paso Ancho residents), gives rise to an “amateur urbanism” that is performed “in a different subversive way” and is meant “to be restless and questioning, sceptical and [...] caring for ideas that are ambiguous and contradictory, ironic and even comic” (Merrifield, 2015: 760). From the pedestrian bridge to the bridge over the Tiribí river, Paso Ancho residents have expanded their horizons, balancing individuality and commonality, succeeding and failing, mixing indefinite tactics with innovative actions, falling short at times, but getting up again. Paso Ancho is head-on in a multi-logic and inter-subjective democratic struggle that seeks to devolve both voice and action to socially and spatially marginalized blocs.

4.8. Discussion: Phronetically speaking, what is to be done? *Drawing lessons from bridge to bridge*

The singularities of the case of Paso Ancho (in the dimensions that I have, subtly and not so subtly, throughout underscored: space, planning, protest, community development) resist to be condensed in one single, univocal manner. After all, I have propounded a hermeneutic, instead of an explicative, reading of what has occurred in the interval ‘between bridges’ — which inevitably unfetters a sea of possible (and certainly debatable) interpretive significations. What is more, there is a relentless and ample scope for (seeking) meaning, provided that “[t]here is a land of meanings beyond past and present human consciousness — the land of the future” (Hirsch, 1984: 202). As a matter of fact, since mobilization and actions are still going strong in Paso Ancho, whatever interpretation I have thus far provided is imminently susceptible to reconsideration (not only in the light of future events in Paso Ancho, but also from other cogent analytical purviews). However, that may well end up being pointless — planning research, as I see it, has to ultimately shed some light on analyzed phenomena and thereby inform planning theory and/or practice (let alone education). I will therefore draw on Bent Flyvbjerg’s (2004b: 289-290) “four phronetic questions” as the compass of my overall reflection on the case study, given that “it is a basic tenet of phronetic planning research that practical examples are typically more effective vehicles of communication than are discussions of theory and methodology” (p.283). By way of clarification, I am not implying that this research is phronetic or that has deployed a phronetic method (which, as it will be explained, would actually result antipodal to the idea of phronetic research). Rather, I see the questions as a means whereby structuring the assemblage of reflections and interpretations derived from the case study.

What’s phronesis and what’s, then, phronetic planning research? — A snapshot

Following Aristotelian thought and in relation to both *episteme* (analytical and scientific knowledge) and *techné* (technical knowledge or know-how), Flyvbjerg (2004b: 284) argues that *phronesis* supersedes the two by considering values and finding expression in “the art of judgement” (Vickers, 1995), “that is to say decisions made in the manners of a virtuoso social actor” (Flyvbjerg, 2004b: 284-285). More specifically, Flyvbjerg (2004b: 288; italics in the original) writes,

Phronesis is that intellectual activity most relevant to praxis. It focuses on what is variable, on that which cannot be encapsulated by universal rules, on specific cases. *Phronesis* requires an interaction between the general and the concrete; it requires deliberation, judgement, and choice [...]. More than anything else, *phronesis* requires *experience*.

Essentially, phronesis is concerned, all the while situated in specific contexts, with ethics, value-laden deliberations, pragmatism and variability. Being both oriented towards action and based on practical value-rationality, planning research “practiced as *phronesis* would be concerned with deliberation about (including questioning of) values and interests in planning” (Flyvbjerg, 2004b: 287). Moreover, phronetic planning research is *not*, in and of itself, a prescription for a research method. In fact, it isn’t “method-driven, even if questions of method may have some significance”, because planning research, phronetically carried out, is

“problem-driven” and it is not viable “to be truly problem driven and at the same time committed to a certain method” (Flyvbjerg, 2004b: 291).

The questions and no definitive answers whatsoever

Recall the old story about a worker suspected of stealing: every evening, when he was leaving the factory, the wheelbarrow he was rolling in front of himself was carefully inspected, but the guards could not find anything, it was always empty — till, finally, they got the point: what the worker was stealing were the wheelbarrows themselves (Žižek, 2006: 138).

Flyvbjerg (2004b: 289-290) crafted four main “phronetic questions” whose principal aim is to “clarify values, interests, and power relations in planning as a basis for praxis”. Asking and (attempts at) answering them do not stick to a dichotomous, nominal or contingent question’s functioning. Nor are they used merely “as a mirror for planning to reflect on its values, but also as the nose, eyes, and ears of planning, in order to sense where things may be going next and what, if anything, to do about it” (Flyvbjerg, 2004b: 290). Moreover, those questions containing a ‘we’ refer to not only planning researchers, but also members of the community or planning organization under study (that is, people of Paso Ancho and local officials of the San José municipality). By the same token, whenever there is a ‘we’ there is too a ‘they’ that has to be considered, “especially when issues get constructed in adversarial terms, which often happens in the planning conflicts planning researchers examine” Flyvbjerg (2004b: 290; 2003). All in all, the questions are not to be treated **tautologically** or as a **mere self-reflective exercise**. By contrast, the crucial point is, as Slavoj Žižek’s caustic quote reads, to stop obtusely seeing the emptiness of the wheelbarrows and realize that a wider, phronetic point of view, is much needed to grasp far-reaching and fruitful assessments that are planning theory- and practice-wise pertinent.

(1) Where are we going with planning?

With the comprehensive (in theory) and technocratic-bureaucratic (in practice) planning mode the San José municipality embodies and exercises, the future appears, so to speak, ‘fixed in the past’. In other words, matters regarding city administration, provision of services, zoning plans, and the like will remain as they’ve always been within a traditional, top-down and institutional planning culture and framework that, time and again, resists (any type of) change. As defeating as such assessment sounds, there also seems to be a possible exception that, rather than proving the aforementioned ‘planning-inertia’ rule, it could actually challenge it: the mindset and engagement of the low-tier local officials working *directly* with communities in neighborhood improvement. Oddly enough, much of the room they have to maneuver, though limited, has been produced by a lack of communication and alignment among the different (vertically and hierarchically arranged) municipal departments that, to varying degrees, deal with planning (in general) and community development (in specific) issues. To put it another way, internal administrative discoordination has prompted the necessary conditions to reach out to people in barrios in an alternative way (that is, not trying to further ‘classically’ clientelism) and, in the long run, improve living conditions. Yet, there is an important ‘dormant’ hurdle: as I was able to notice during interviews with civil servants working in the conception and/or implementation (some of them don’t ever leave the office, because they don’t like working in the field) of neighborhood improvement projects, the input of community members is pretty much seen as affirmative rather than cooperative; which, in turn, keeps alive the smack of tokenistic participation. Similarly, the initiative to ‘train’ community leaders to enter ‘institutional’ politics by, for instance, gaining a chair in the city council, reflects the pervading skepticism of letting people loose, for it is, in effect, co-optation. Enthusiasm to help is much appreciated, zeal to get things done autonomously is downplayed (let alone feared).

On the other hand, planning outside and beyond formality (that is, extra-institutional) that people in Paso Ancho conceived and performed — what I consider to be a kind of ‘counter-planning’, for people’s collective actions have diminished the negative effects of official and professional planning — has a much more promising prospect. However, the

learning process (specially from difficulties caused by the municipality's coercive measures) has to be constantly revisited, to preserve autonomy, keep engagement flowing and resist pernicious outer incursion (particularly, those seeking to articulate clientelism to tame mobilization). Activism (in both urban social movements and community organizing) is quite a difficult task to endure (like all interviewees from Paso Ancho and elsewhere pointed out) and, while that is a blatant weakness of Paso Ancho's 'counter-planning', at the same time it represents its catalyzer: activism is self-rewarding. Thus, interest in participating and organizing is propelled by a genuine desire to improve living conditions collectively for everyone (including those who don't partake, though they would if they could and even those who simply can't be bothered to participate because they consider it to be a 'waste of time').

On the whole, planning is going in two increasingly divergent — not necessarily opposite — directions, which inexorably lessens the possibilities for a mutual social learning between Paso Ancho residents' cognitive praxis (their disruptive, collective and autonomous actions) and the 'not-so-detached-from-reality' expertise of local officials prompting neighborhood upgrading.

(2) Who gains and who loses, and by which mechanisms of power?

People in Paso Ancho enacting local community self-development, while they haven't substantially changed structural power relations, they have empowered themselves by an alternative means: breaking free the dominator-dominated logic of action and constructing themselves anew as political subjects and expressing different political identities in a non-adversarial manner. To put it differently, by stopping to frame the municipality as the 'enemy' to be defeated, both decisions are made and actions taken with less problems, given that the primary concern and driving force is the improvement of the community. In consequence, local community self-development in Paso Ancho constitutes itself a steady and iterative form of protesting that goes beyond protest cycles that are primarily aimed at demanding change.

The local government, through deploying clientelistic tactics and/or crippling more explicitly people's autonomous actions, proved effective to gain control over the course of development in Paso Ancho; though not permanently. From subtle 'moves' (like promising aid and never delivering) to more aggressive mechanisms of repression (shutting down the public library and the *Parque de los Héroes*), mobilization in Paso Ancho was considerably routinized. Likewise, the fact that, at times, the core of activists got involved in other 'extra-communitarian' issues (presidential elections, mobilizations against seeding transgenic corn, amid others) gave the municipality a suitable opening to interfere, as mobilization and organization in Paso Ancho were losing momentum. Further, 'traditional' mechanisms of power were invigorated, but still fell short of expectations to bring the whole of the barrios in Paso Ancho under control (after all, dwellers of Paso Ancho were able, in time, to again make use of the 'unscripted' and 'liminal' political spaces they had produced).

Local officials are, furthermore, missing a substantial opportunity to enlarge their work, hand in hand with organized communities, to improve neighborhood conditions socially, economically, culturally, politically and spatially, because they are, somewhat subconsciously, hindered by their 'institutional rationality'. Even when their 'personal rationality' acknowledges evident shortcomings and pitfalls of their 'formal' professional actions, they still continue to do things by the book. For example, during the interview with the head of the citizen participation division at the San José municipality, such inconsistency surfaced quite clearly, as the interviewee was explaining the overall achievements of a series of workshops and focus groups they, recently, had organized, in the frame of a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) project, in diverse communities throughout the canton. When asked about the methodology to implement the workshops, the local official explained that they had to comply with the UNDP parameters contained in the 'agreement' — a euphemism for contract — which stated both the conceptual framework and methodology of the workshops. Thus, the interviewee, though not all that explicitly, recognized how problematic that turned out to

be to not only make participation much more open (and, ideally, riveting), but also to gather much more practical insights in terms of future project implementation. Something that, almost without a doubt, could help harmonizing 'professional' and 'personal' rationalities and bridging the gap between the municipality and organized and demanding communities like Paso Ancho.

For that to happen, it would be vital to recognize that People in Paso Ancho do not seek to seize power and overthrow those who rule; in that sense, they aren't trying to revolutionize their barrios (as if producing a society from scratch). Rather, they're agents of a radically different social, cultural, political and *spatial* change aimed at opening up alternatives that can be set into motion within the existing overarching system. Their goal is not to obliterate the pervading logic of local community development (as understood and deployed by the municipality; namely, as 'urban growth'), but to further a different kind and, in so doing, they have crafted a particular sort of power: that of *collective, autonomous, creative and spatial* action. By the same token, "[i]f society is to reconsider the influence of local authority planners, then it is time to introduce to planning a new perception of 'the political' that not only focuses on how politics conditions planning practice but also takes account of the political dimension of power, that is, how power, through processes of identification, fundamentally structures human societies. This is not to say that planners should take on the role of politicians, but simply that there needs to be increased awareness that political power will always claim to speak in the agency of society and neutrality without awareness only helps reinforce such power" (Grange, 2013: 240).

(3) Is this development desirable?

Yes and no. As ambiguous as that answer may read, the thing is that there's an ideal development that isn't crystallizing — one that results from the synergic interaction between organized communities and local municipal officials. Therefore, it is, arguably, partially desirable the development carry out by Paso Ancho dwellers insofar as it reflects their everyday realities, aspirations, needs, wants and the like. Nevertheless, the fact that the municipality intrudes and hinders it, keeps Paso Ancho's local community self-development from refining itself and finding new expressions. People participating in improving their neighborhoods are thus forced to invest vigor and resources to circumvent the municipality's incursion, and not in actually developing their community (the ultimate reason why they've come to work together). Likewise, the municipality, instead of propelling a cooperative process of interaction between its civil servants and communities' residents, devotes resources to impeding that people take matters into their own hands. It is precisely this absurd contradiction what does not allow development to supersede urban growth or, worse, urban inertia (the normalized state in which nothing appears to ever change and upon promises of change are based). By tantalizing any effort to prove otherwise, urban development is rendered what authorities prefer it to, *far-fetched*. At the end of the day, community development is (intentionally) misconstrued as urban growth and people no longer recognize that the issue isn't that their communities' physicality changes, but rather losing the emotional capacity to relate to those material alterations.

(4) What, if anything, should we do about it?

This is, by far, the hardest question. It is extremely difficult to assess what should be done in the *specific* circumstance of the local community self-development of Paso Ancho vis-à-vis the technocratic-bureaucratic urban growth of the municipality of San José. From the perspective of Paso Ancho's activists and inhabitants engaged — as the 'we' — the answer looks seemingly direct and concise: keep things going, don't let go, don't stop improving their barrios, reminding the authorities and the whole of the community that change can be collectively imagined and enacted; that the point isn't to produce reality anew, but to (realize that it is plausible to) create a *different* one. The local municipal officials — as the 'they' — should give way to their personal rationality and leave aside institutional principles that are keeping them from fully engaging with the arenas in which their work, ideally, takes place: the barrios that make up communities throughout the San José canton. They also should radically transform their take on

organized communities (not a threat exposing institutional incompetence) and citizen participation (a mere requisite to conform with). To that end, the input of people — specially as organized as in Paso Ancho — has to be integrated into a mutual social learning process, wherefrom a broader epistemological base emerges and supports decisions as well as steer actions. The learning 'experience' is, too, of an intrinsic iterative character; it is never definitive, nor is it perfect. To the contrary, it must be constantly and creatively revisited and enhanced. Planning methods and tools will most likely never evolve as fast as reality does, but they have to do their best in keeping up with it (instead of trying to fix or tame it). Eventually, the seeming polarization between what organized communities (like Paso Ancho) and local (planning) officials (like those of the municipality of San José) do to further development could be reduced. In a more pragmatic 'note', though, local officials, at best, should leave activists and people partaking alone — if they're not interested in cooperating with and supporting autonomous initiatives like the ones carried out in Paso Ancho, the very least they could do is to not interfere (even in spite of the fact that local (planning) officials of the municipality of San José are, at the end of the day, working for, and somewhat subjugated by, partisan interests).

Finally, academics and researchers in general — as the 'we' — need step a little bit closer to their object of analysis and avoid explanatory and descriptive accounts of organized communities. Without becoming 'fanatics' of organized communities (or urban social movements, for that matter), planning researchers should continue to look for plausible ways to go about and eventually bring theory and practice closer together innovatively (yet imperfectly). 'They' — activists as well as local (planning) officials — should accordingly recognize in academic research an articulating ally; a means whereby finding, over and over, balance in the contentious and volatile relationship between technical expertise and everyday and subversive experience.

CHAPTER 5

Overall appraisal

Challenging traditional sequiturs to not fall on stony ground

5.1. Protesting may start things off, but won't take them all the way through

The analytical gist of this dissertation is discovering how participatory abilities, that people acquire by engaging in protest actions of urban social movements, may prompt local community self-development processes. Arguably, there is, at first glance, no apparent direct connection between the most visible, disruptive and collective practices of protesters and the actions that people carry out in the frame of an autonomous local community development. In other words, one thing is to participate in protests launched by an urban social movement, and another is to participate in an autonomous revamp of a given community. However, that does not imply that they are mutually exclusive forms of participation or that the latter cannot derive as well as profit from the former (and vice versa). Yet, going from taking part in demonstrations to engaging in local community self-development does not follow one ubiquitous and evident path (as though there were some sort of algorithm, recipe or methodology that could be universally applied). (Nor is there a precise and definitive explanation on how it is that people decide to — and actually do — protest or the way community members get organized to improve, by themselves, materially as well as symbolically their living conditions). It is, in any case, a spontaneous, organic, unforeseeable and *unplanned* process that responds more to human emotions and intuitions than to scientific and technical calculation. Nevertheless, some aspects can be emphasized as key elements that are likely to generate apt circumstances for organization, leadership, discussion, consensus-seeking and dissent-acceptance skills to shift from doing protest towards developing autonomously a community (which, as I will argue, does resemble the action of going from one side to the other of the same coin).

More concisely, there are three central factors that are successively and intimately interrelated:

- First, achieving an **enduring engagement** throughout the transition between the 'extraordinariness' (characterized by the diverse protest actions that marked the 'rupture events') and the 'ordinariness' of the everyday lives of participants in protest actions. Such engagement, furthermore, results from rethinking the way people place themselves within and relate, in a renovated manner, to their surrounding reality — *an ontological variation*.
- Second, and stemming directly from the previous one, is the reconsideration of how protesters become political subjects; that is to say, **the (re)shaping of their political subjectivity**. The crucial difference is moving from an oppressor-oppressed dialectic to an expression of a wider range of political identities that do not necessarily respond to an already identified counterpart that must be, as it were, defeated (though antagonism and resistance continues to be an integrative part of their political subjectivity but redirected towards other aims).
- Third, the crystallization of both the protesters' engagement and new forms of political subjectification in their immediate environment; that is, **their spatialization**, which provides a reassuring effect — nurturing, in consequence, commitment and sustaining the processes and means for political subjectifications and identities to endure as well as for new ones to flourish.

To the extent that determination, channeled through steady engagement, and aspirations, derived from a renovated understanding of what it is to be a political subject, acquire a spatiality that alter the very spatiality wherefrom they thrive, can community development be orchestrated through participatory skills acquired while doing protest. Everything begins with gaining the emotional security to join others in protesting; *yet it alone does not do the trick*.

Social movements are, for the most part, seen as joint efforts, unfolding outside of and often against institutional and legal apparatuses, to bring about social, cultural, political and (more recently acknowledged in social movement research circles; though not all that widely) spatial changes. Following a framing, emotional and narrative approach, people starting and arranging (activists at the core of the movement) a social movement and its protest actions are able to, first, identify and, then, mold (in an appealing and understandable manner to encourage participation of others) situations and dynamics that they have come to believe must be

transformed. Among the manifold claims that urban social movements have advanced, currently further and, most likely, will continue to put forward (in cities of either the *globalizing* North or *globalized* South and with their respective differences and quite pertinent nuances), some elements can be traced that might echo, to a greater or lesser degree, community development issues (e.g., basic services, social housing, public spaces, cultural activities, socioeconomic inequality, and the like). However, community development is not, in and of itself, to be thought of as a 'natural' outcome of protest action of urban social movements; but *doing* protest and the participatory skills obtained therefrom do play a role in possibly switching the scope and intention of action as well as people's commitment towards self-steered community development endeavours.

From this point of view, protest, in its most public and noticeable form, does somewhat contradict the fact that an urban social movement can be prolonged throughout time (without it becoming a bureaucratic interest group; or remaining suspended in an ever-lasting phase of revolt and violence; or, finally, dissolving due to feelings of disappointment and failure, experienced by participants, which results in apathy and, even worse, cynicism). Thus, it is the capacity to persist of people partaking what allows an urban social movement to mutate (even) into rather formal organizations that, most frequently, operate by means of social networks informally established in order to shun, amid other threats, co-optation (such was the case of those *Comités Patrióticos* put together, originally, to oppose the endorsement of the CAFTA-DR and that, afterwards, reorganized internally to pursue other type of goals). In that regard, the **preservation of the intentionality** of urban social movements is one of the elements that enable the crossover from protest action to community development (or any other different aim for that matter). People, or better, activists and participants, have (sometimes, very clear; at others, fairly diffused) notions about what they want and how to get it. Those ideas, the backbone of actions later on taken by means of a myriad of tactics and strategies, are, furthermore, permeated with cultural and psychological factors determined by specific spatial and temporal circumstances, which are not static. Purposes of protesting can therefore be redirected, given that the aforementioned cultural-psychological framework of action is malleable enough to allow change inwards and outwards of the urban social movement. Adjustments, in consequence, can either happen to members (attitudes and postures) or surrounding conditions (by dint of modifications of relationships with institutions, other organizations and movements, the media, and so on). To put it another way, participatory competences that foster an autonomous local community are obtained through the act of protesting insofar as those taking part in the demonstrations (and other forms of protest) withhold, once the act of visible protest has ceased, their organizational cohesion and reassess their determinations; all along learning to relativize how much within scope changes envisioned in effect are and setting then new, more pragmatic objectives.

The focus, moreover, in order to analyze the way protest actions of urban social movements become, so to speak, more down to earth, should be on **the shape that collective action takes** (the form of *doing* protest) and emotions arising therefrom (the bundle of feelings ranging from sentiments of satisfaction, jubilation and positivity to sensations of rout, despair and self-deprecation). They are closely intertwined: inasmuch as the form of protesting varies, so do emotions, opinions and attitudes of protesters. And the other way around: alterations in demonstrators' moods, viewpoints and beliefs will most likely spark alternative ways of protesting (or, if it were the case, the calling to a complete halt to protest actions). It is, in the long run, the most immediate outcomes of the protest (both those experienced in the protesters themselves and those regarding reigning situations), what makes the aftermath of the protest go down one way or the other.

Thus, the creativity of, for the most part, activists steering organization and participation to maximize "positive" and downplay "negative" upshots, is what keeps interest alive and engagement continuous. Doing so requires that mechanisms used initially to recruit and mobilize people (which normally maintain involvement and prevents the movement from being adrift) be reimagined, so that new claims can be made part of the agenda. Such endeavor is, by no means whatsoever, an easy one — activism requires a great deal of time, effort and commitment and it is, all too often, very little acknowledged (by participants of the protest actions and the movement in general alike). If they succeed, the door is open to divert the

deployment of participatory and organizational abilities towards autonomous local community development. To that end, the (cultural) **meanings** (comprised of messages aimed at enthralling those who might share the dissatisfaction with arbitrary and biased dynamics; which also serves as a warning to those favoring and reproducing them) together with **embodiments** (written and spoken words, artistic performances, etc.) of protesting are to be crafted anew. Additionally, the articulating role of the human body and, in particular, **the built environment**, as par excellence physical carriers, ought to accord with emerging forms of protest actions' meanings and embodiments that are synthesized in figurative conveyers (songs, slogans, narratives, frames, inter alia). Out of such conflation comes the spatialization of protest action, which can be as much ephemeral (when the human body is at the center of action) as (more) permanent (the material and symbolic transformations spaces suffer through political collective actions).

Moreover, there is an implicit educational process at work **iteratively and subconsciously**: learning to protest requires recurrence, because chances of success at a first attempt are highly unlikely. Protesting, likewise, cannot be conducted or driven from a distant objective position: protesters — their collective actions and, principally, their political subjectivity — are constituted as political subjects precisely over the course of the act of protesting and, unavoidably, through failing at it. This is the only way to refine tactics, strategies and, consequently, forms of protesting, whereby rendering objectives being sought out (more) plausible. Should demonstrators — especially activists — fathom out that they're bound to somewhat backslide in order to progress, the whole logic of protesting would immediately dissolve. Hence, interactions between meanings and embodiments together with the spatialization of doing protest are all the time inadvertently, over and over, carried out, for new forms of protesting to emerge and concomitantly different goals to be attained — which helps for issues associated with local community self-development to eventually be part of the purview of urban social movements and their protest actions.

Deeming demonstrations (as well as other types of protest such as rallies, lobbies, blockages, temporal physical occupations, etc.), therefore, as a 'rupture event' within the ordinariness of people's lives, following a classical line of research, not surprisingly leads to the assumption that protesters, once the disruption has come to an end, return to their 'normal' rhythms and routines and leave behind what(ever) just transpired (even regardless of what the protest and potential collateral damages could turn out to be). Be that as it may, speaking freely one's mind; sharing from worries and wants to convictions and ambitions (in spite of how far-fetched they might be); finding out that others out there feel similarly, facilitates a **new political ontology** to come into play and thereby signals that participants doing protest do not necessarily return prosaically, as though nothing ever happened, to their private affairs and everyday realities. They, instead, may have grasped that how they situate themselves in the world and how they politically act *in* and *on* it, isn't inevitably the same as before. This, furthermore, goes hand in hand with the capacity to pair reasons and possibilities for taking action — i.e., learning to identify and make use of, respectively, **political opportunity structures and windows of opportunity**.

By way of an (subsequent-to-the-protest) attachment to the cause (that which, in the end, compels people to step out of their comfort zone and do something about whatever it is that is triggering dissatisfaction), activists and participants of urban social movements veer from more 'traditional' means of doing protest (which, nonetheless, remain relevant as tactic) to more localized infra-political actions (that may well unfold within the domain of community development). They go from the joyous momentum of public disruptive demonstration to partaking, more constantly, yet dynamically, in a series of surreptitious and intentional acts of protest — which is helplessly a bit of a predicament. Though it is true that people joining urban social movements and, eventually, participating in protest actions are rarely aware of the potential both abilities and feelings, acquired through the act of protesting, have to offer to alter their livelihoods (particularly in the spatial and temporal scenery of their everyday life), it is feasible for them to make use of emotions and skills gained to move beyond the juncture that has sparked mobilization in the first place. For that to happen, the mode in which they regard themselves as **political subjects** and the reasoning (i.e., **the epistemological base**)

utilized to make decisions and, more importantly, take actions, as it has been hitherto pointed out, turns out to be crucial.

Among the various arenas in which protest actions of urban social movements take place, identities, interests and roles of players involved may vary greatly. They're all, in any event, contentious political arenas. What must be stressed is that players' — being protesters one of them — interests, roles and identities are defined by the political actions themselves (as opposed to being predetermined within a set of interactive negotiations). As a result, urban social movements can deploy different tactics and strategies (i.e., **a methodological break**) according to prevailing situations (either encouraging or hindering certain kinds of protest) and avoid thereby that enthusiasm and engagement of participants withers away, because protesters recognize that their fate, as political subjects, is not stagnant. In addition to that, reasons underpinning protest actions need to withdraw from a 'hegemony-counter-hegemony' logic. By insisting that a political status can only be achieved through overpowering any one hierarchical structure that attempts to impose any one (political, economic, social, cultural and spatial) order (a macro-social angle), urban social movements and their protest actions are prone to flop — let alone that they will not be able to reconsider their means and goals.

While antagonizing and contesting the current state of things are still to remain at the heart of protesting, the formation of a political subjectivity should not be defined in terms of a positive-negative interaction. Instead, a growing will to tackle matters by themselves (and not wait for counterparts to do what they're supposed to) is what radically reshapes the political subjectivity of activists and participants of urban social movements. *Autogestion* (after Lefebvre) is, thus, a decisive generative feature of protesting: it cherishes engagement and inaugurates an incessant process for people to discover new ways of transforming their everyday life trajectories and to enact them in the particular realm of community development. Hence, the autonomy, collectivity and authenticity of protesting, concatenated and exercised in the domain of **extra-institutional transformative politics**, excludes any form of unbiased and detached knowledge (stemming from personal and individual interests and identities) and makes it feasible to transcend typical and deep-rooted social, cultural, economic, political and spatial realities.

All things considered, protesting may start off and lead, to a certain extent, the way towards a local community development autonomously performed; but it will not take it all the way through. If, ultimately, impressions such as that everything is (pre)destined not to change permeate protesters, their engagement will not withstand, their political subjectivity shall remain stuck in a "good versus evil" (ir)rationality and, accordingly, any material effects will barely be consonant with their wants, desires, preoccupations and, what is more, envisioned alternatives. Correspondingly, protest action, while it may well vary, its organizational and participatory capacity will not evolve; nor could they be deployable for advancing a local community self-development. In a way, this means that local community self-development, as a whole, is to be at the same time a **continuous and ever-evolving form of protest** and the goal of utilizing the participatory skills acquired during such act of protest; that is to say, **making ends and means coincide**. (Politics of community development, seen like this, becomes, in an Arendtian sense, an end by and of itself). Now, this proposition, as it was previously mentioned, must materialize at some point; it must be rendered tangible. There is then a need of comprehending, in more depth, the spatiality of protest actions of urban social movements and the local community self-development potentially arising thereafter — which requires not a thorough definition of space, but a **critical aptitude to think in spatial terms**.

5.2. The twofold character of space: *Shedding light on a double-edge sword*

Space is neither a mere container of protest action of urban social movements, nor a tabula rasa in which members of a community dictate and implement their development. Furthermore, space, for analytical purposes, is not solely a vacuous metaphor (though employed meaningfully and wisely spatial metaphors offer vast exploratory potential), but rather a subjective condition (after Kant) that buttresses our cognitive and sensory faculties

in order to apply intuitive and (perhaps more insightful) counterintuitive analysis to any one phenomenon. (Hence, the key resides in **thinking and 'following', in both a heterotopological and spatial way**, rather than thinking space). Space, to rephrase, is, on the one hand, an important and intrinsic facet of the shift from protesting to local community self-development. And, on the other hand, an analytical lens that permits to interpret such changeover from a *distinctive* perspective — one that tracks spatial formations and the way they're transformed by social relations. Space analysis, thusly conceived, rather than reproducing examination from a single point of view, urges for space to be both the means and the 'analytical territory' (after Guattari and Deleuze) that is, over and over, extended further.

In broad terms, the spatiality, the material form, of societies is the outcome of the social forces (encompassing political, economic and cultural practices) that shapes it and, simultaneously, has a direct influence on them. Protest actions, on such account, are either hindered or encouraged by spatial arrangements that comprise different (domineering, homogenizing, counteractive, subversive, alternative) rationalities that, no matter how much at odds they could be with each other, concurrently coexist; though not evenly. Power relations, by nature asymmetrical, determine the predominance of one or several rationalities (habitually those of resourceful and powerful elites) that try to assert that allocations of functions, people, activities, behaviors, and so on be subtly accepted as naturally given. Such type of spatial orderings, with evident policing bearings, aims to configure a certain perception of the world, by pairing what and how is rendered sensible with mechanisms of both sense- and meaning-making. However, space, or better any one spatial assembling, is never complete, just as power relations are not always stable. Thus, spatialized power cannot help but to create openings that give way for other rationalities to spatially blossom, almost inevitably, in a bursting manner. Space, therefore, is fought over and, sometimes radically and visibly, sometimes not so much, materially and symbolically transformed. Emerging rationalities, together with their spatializations, are nonetheless not to be so readily assessed as counteractions stemming from resistance to an adversary upholding and deploying top-down power. They could also be non-oppositional attempts of ordinary people to exercise, in other ways and intensities, power (they are not entirely deprived of it, since, pretty much conversely, they are well embedded in power relations) and to devise their *own spaces — radically and autonomously*.

Urban social movements carve space through the agency of protest actions carried out within the spatial fissures of overarching social, political, economic and cultural structures and keep up, thereby, generating further crannies. **Heterotopological spatial formations** (after Foucault) arise that, at first (and mostly in the frame of mass and public demonstrations) are pitted and react against a dominant coding of space. However, due to their ambivalent otherness, the spatialization of protesting, in the midst of spatial organizations that are superimposed by what it appears to be a foreign, monolithic and ubiquitous power, may well attempt — all the while not kowtowing — to supersede them. This, furthermore, happens at three 'coinciding spatial moments':

- **In space:** it is in the actual spatial cracks prevalent powers ironically provide, where protesters, politically and infrapolitically, build a platform wherefrom to claim to be an active and decisive part of the processes shaping their daily routines.
- **From space:** protesters, by way of both their collective disruptive actions and everyday lived and felt passions inscribe and interweave their interests, identities and experiences in their immediate physical surroundings.
- **On space:** space, during protest, is appropriated as well as palpably and emblematically customized somewhat ephemerally (punctual and disruptive demonstrations; though newly symbolized meanings may well prevail over time amongst participants) or more perennially (when local community self-development, per se, becomes an unremitting protest action).

It is the concatenation of these three instants, which makes it possible for protesters to get rid of the idea that they're stuck in a never-ending struggle against an overriding and overwhelming foe. That their antithetical and contradictory outlooks and capacities do not necessarily comes from an 'antagonistic outside'. As a result, their political subjectivity, by

means of space, undergoes an **ontological, epistemological and methodological break**. Ontologically, they situate themselves, **in space**, as active political actors with a renovated identity (no longer constituted through a dominator-dominated dialectic) and with enough confidence to enact, rather than to demand, change. Epistemologically, a range of needs, wants, aspirations, interests that are collectively shared underlie, **from space**, decisions made and, more prominently, actions taken. Finally, and as the upshot of the two previous conditions, methodologically actions are, **on space**, framed in punctual and infrapolitical tactics instead of ambitious and structural reforms. The protesters' political subjectivities and identities, spatially constituted and practiced, are then redefined and protesters gain the emotional security to behave radically different as political subjects on the space they inhabit.

Protest actions, to summarize, while manifestly and joyfully unfolding, fight for and, for the most part momentarily, take over space. Notwithstanding, as long as protesting continues to be caught in the gridlock of waves of mobilizations, and the political subjectivity of participants, correspondingly, is not radically altered, the above mentioned threefold **spatial and political leap** is not likely to occur (see figure 5.1). It is via an oozy conquering and gradual forging of space, at the micro and specific level of the community (the par excellence domain for infrapolitical spatial tactics), that protesters can use their participatory abilities to change both the form and purpose of protesting and, in the long run, coalesce them. Protesters, little by little, become able to — *in, from and on space* — make the suitable conditions for a local community self-development to transpire, where everyday life activities (encountering, sharing, grabbing a bite, etc.) are intensified and a wide range of singularities coexist (including those of community members that are rather apathetic or skeptical about the whole collective undertaking). Consequently, a space of 'radical openness' is forged, giving way to 'new cartographies' where protesters, as the new cartographers, socio-spatially inscribe their ontologies and epistemologies and, ultimately, make visible distinct ways of world-making (see figure 5.1).

Space, by the same token, can become a major hurdle, given its **paradoxical inherent character** — it can liberate or subjugate, exclude or include, restrain or facilitate. Space is, in actuality, a double-edge sword, for it has the capacity to tip the balance either way: it may well be re-appropriated to further a local community self-development, or such potential downplayed, occluded and, thus, missed by the persistence and ubiquity of any one already ingrained and overriding spatial status quo. Moreover, space, regarded as always in the making, underscores how the relationship between the politics of urban (macro) and community (micro) development is actually neither inductive, nor deductive, but simply not analogous: community members can dictate their own fate without having to submit to or amend the totality of the city they live in. Ultimately, people are able to palpate the worth of their effort, of their meaning- and sense-making activities, of their joint attempt at, and the corresponding satisfaction of, having considerably induced, by themselves, the 'spatial coordinates' of their worldly existences.




Figure 5.1. 'Out of the wave of mobilizations': Local community self-development as steady and iterative protest action. Source: own elaboration.

As an analytical means, space makes it possible to grasp new ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies underpinning the politics of an autonomous community development derived from and, eventually, turned into a compound of surreptitious and infrapolitical collective protest actions. Spatial analysis, to that end, must refrain from not only absolute objectivity,

but also from subjectivism and relativism to operate somewhere in between. Especially when dealing with urban social movements and their protest actions, one must try not to become too sympathetic to or deeply critical of their usage of spatial tactics — both flaws and wise choices are to be acknowledged and dispassionately reflected upon. Likewise, an over optimistic account on urban social movements and community activism is to be avoided, given that human beings are, after all, at the core of action and “to err is human” — what truly matters and deserves, therefore, closer attention is their creative capacity to iteratively and subconsciously learn from it and improve (human action, either individual or collective, as pointed out by Hannah Arendt, is characterized by the possibility of creation and innovation).

5.3. Rather than making a theoretical planning assessment up, planning actions are what in actuality makes the difference

Integral to this research project is the question about what sort of planning thought and praxis could actually make operative and even enhance the participatory capacities that people acquire through, and employ to, doing protest and that are afterwards adapted and deployed to autonomously develop a community. I have hypothesized that, by way of a critical/radical theoretical and practical variation of planning, organized communities could be guided, their participatory skills (organization, leadership, deliberation) refined and, in due course, be rendered self-sufficient, resourceful and reliable enough to manage their development. That is to say, to dictate all by themselves **the collective production of their shared space**.

Theorywise, a tempting appraisal would be to state that radical planning, due to the epistemological and methodological disruption it calls for, validates the formulated hypothesis — as in it fits a ‘radical-planning-in-practice check list’. However, such confirmation, besides too simplistic (let alone tautological), would only be partial, given that radical planning, theoretically construed, does not entirely account for an ontological break and any spatial trait of an epistemological and methodological discontinuity is, if anything, barely tangentially addressed. Here a quite tempting and recurrent mistake is likely to be made: stating that there is a conceptual gap and, accordingly, a need to bridge it by means of a newfangled planning theoretical construction.

In order to *not* add yet another abstract formulation, among countless other ones (some even having mutated into a paradigm), that will most likely remain enclosed in the formalities of academia, a prospective uptick can be achieved by pointing out that what truly matters are planning actions in and of themselves. In other words, they need not be placed within a specific (and suspiciously fitting) theoretical framework, for them to provide valuable contribution to planning theory, practice and research. That being so, the particular genealogy of local community self-development that was analyzed in the case study can be, as previously elucidated, in effect deemed as a radical mode of planning praxis, because of the subversive alterations it makes to the very sediment of planning practice; namely the deconstruction of, and challenge to, its most basic constitutive elements (e.g., the non-necessity of ‘traditional’ planning expertise and the capacity to not only create new knowledge conjointly — and render it meaningful — out of both ‘singular’ and ‘common’ experiences, but also to turn it into continuous, creative and imaginative actions). Radical, in this sense, does not appeal to complete and thorough social, political, cultural, economic and spatial conversion (usually, though not exclusively, linked to the social and political practices of urban social movements). Far from it, ‘radical’ qualifies (though not as in smoothly suiting a description) the momentous capacity of grassroots actions, enabled by engaging in protest, which members of a community collectively perform to transform their living conditions. Such actions do not aim to change the entire world; nor to supplant a certain overpowering social, political, cultural, economic and spatial order. Rather they radically embody the innovative faculty of participants to endure commitment (despite hurdles found along the way), to recognize themselves in a quite different status as political subjects, and to spatialize their intents and purposes. They are radical planning practices inasmuch as they create situated heterotopological worlds that neither aspire to override, nor stand in opposition to, any other already existing ones.

Thus, radical planning actions ought to be the focus of attention — there is then no need whatsoever for an **'eye-catching' and trendy conceptual label**. The analytical kernel must be seeking the meaning of spatial and collective radical planning actions and the way they extensively modify the politics of community development and, by extension, of planning, through the shift provoked in the underlying logic of social and political action of citizen mobilizations. They bring thereby to the fore the fact that community development, locally and autonomously carried out, converts the desires and aspirations of people partaking into a **sensory certainty** and an object of a very specific and, in no way 'traditional' (i.e., as planners, urban designers, architects and others of a marked technocratic bent would probably define it), **aesthetical perception**. To put it differently, future research is to, thoroughly and counter-intuitively, delve into the not-so-conspicuous interrelations among **radical planning practices, politics and space**.

Furthermore, when digging into the meaning of radical planning actions, the political, social, cultural and economic peculiarity of their contexts must be, at all times, not only bore in mind, but also underscored. The less tendency towards any form of generalization (i.e., producing an umbrella concept such as 'oppositional' or 'insurgent' planning) or extrapolation (i.e., asserting, through a distorting 'extension category', that what has been discovered in a particular case 'magically' applies to the other realities that are confined within a homogenizing classification like, for example, 'global South'), the more chances there will be to make research much more substantially viable to planning practice. Additionally, a non-Cartesian and socially and culturally produced spatial perspective ought to be more widely incorporated to tackle not-so-akin-to-planning phenomena (such as protest action of urban social movements) and thus uncover how planning theory, research and practice can both nurture more prominently from other disciplines as well as evolve much more pragmatically. An overlapping conundrum is, too, how planning practice could make autonomously organized communities, in other manners, operative, more effective and how analysis is to discover paths towards that end — all along considering the possibility that organized communities may be better off on their own. Dealing with such fuzzy and complex questions means that **research must no longer be on, but rather with, organized communities**; if, at the end of the day, the theory, practice, research (which, at least ideally, impacts the education) of planning is to be significantly enriched (I explore this aspect further and outline a scheme of how to perchance go about with it in chapter 6).

5.4. Discussion: *Disentangling a Gordian knot*

In this chapter, I have conflated answers to both the main and the complementary research questions; while also addressing, and fairly disputing, the hypothesis of investigation. To that end, assumptions made were revisited to synthetically test them against the background of general theoretical and empirical findings and so pinpoint convergences as well as divergences. Though convergences are usually highlighted, and divergences are, at best, obliquely and hardly mentioned, I believe that planning research has to go the other way around. By accentuating what does not match, what seems extraneous, what has not been expected, what, in fact, has been discovered, it is feasible to give rise to a surge in planning theoretical and practical research. In doing so, research has to be both serendipitous and scintillating. Murky methods and, in particular, hoity-toity traditions of presenting results — which abound through academia — make planning research go astray. They offer little or even no input to improve the praxis of planning; they are therefore to be contested and surpassed. This, amid other things, means that planning researchers ought to accept, as inevitable, that investigations are always unfinished and are likely to raise more (new) questions than provide exhaustive answers.

Should one have feelings of unease and become even (a bit) anxious because of that, there is no reason to fret. There are always silver linings. What planning researchers, based on what I have discovered through this research (and my own previous — and certainly limited — research experience) have to do, is pay closer attention to the odds and ends of longstanding, Western-centric and still-in-vogue research mainstreams. Work within their interstices to, little by little, come up with a substantive change. That is why I did not provide definitive answers

to the research questions: there must be no unequivocal conclusions (everything is, after all, perfectible). Instead, it'd be best to carry out undying research struggles that, time and again, shall only partially discern what's going on; to, then, point out that there is always (much) more than meets the eye. In spite of this apparent inconsistency, making sense of such a puzzling situation, though it is indeed a hassle, turns out to be very pertinent if alternatives, through which redefining the interconnection between planning theory, research and practice, are to be explored. This, as aforesaid, must be a relentless task, even a sort of indulgence, which resembles the defiance of disentangling a Gordian knot to fathom out, a second later, that it is made out of an infinite number of other knots.

Finally, in regard to research on urban social movements as well as organized communities and, more particularly, if their collective subversive actions are to be seen as radical planning actions, it is essential to move beyond an epistemological (unsullied scientific knowledge)-technical (know-how) analytical lens that repeatedly occlude and downplay the potential that 'other' modes of planning hold. Moreover, implications for planning education, which could in turn foster alternative ways of understanding the practice of planning are to recognize that, all in all, we need to learn to look differently to be able to see better paths to improve the ever-changing field of planning research and action. In sum, in order to be cognizant we have to challenge traditional sequiturs to not keep on falling on stony ground.

CHAPTER 6

Outlook

How anagrammatic are planning theoretical and practical research?

6.1. Digging further into explanation: *Reconsidering planning research's language and discursivity*

Planning research is a task carried out by humans about actions done by humans. It is therefore, in my view, subject to **inexactitudes** (that one must not naïvely try to resolve) and **interpretations**, given that patterns of action and interaction, within social structures, are only partially unwavering. Based on the findings of the present work, together with my personal prior research and professional planning experience, planning research, in its quest to interrelate viewpoints from other disciplines to grasp the 'planning's worth' of phenomena that, at first sight, might not have any **planning practicability**, far from a "truth-producing machine", ought to be the outcome of "intuition, responsible and enlightened guesswork, well-nuanced verbal interpretation, and not least personal risk-taking" (Streeck, 2016). Furthermore, overtly praised and overrated methodological sophistication (particularly its intrinsic murkiness) could also be outfoxed by furnishing research with implicit skills, first-hand empirical experience and determined character.

On such account, researchers should bring their empirical understandings in (as unstructured and sketchy as they might be) and tacitly and gradually apply counter-intuitive analysis — which is, in the end, what I've attempted in this research. At stake, throughout the research, has been my willingness and ability to detach myself from my (allegedly indelible) professional and academic idiosyncrasies; so that I could be able to enter into a domain of guessing and speculation. Eventually, it became possible to, so to speak, outdistance superficial and merely descriptive account of facts that comprise (and, at times, enforce) social, political, economic, cultural and, particularly, spatial reality. When, for example, using case-study research, rather than simply describing or trying to explain the phenomenon I analyzed from a detached, 'completely objective', position (as if there could not be any type of *a priori* theoretical assumptions), the crucial further point, I eventually realized, was finding **applicable transformative alternatives** that could significantly inform not only the practice of planning, but also its theorization and education.

I, therefore, perceive a necessity for planning research to explore, yet more actively, phenomena through case-study research. More specifically, while reflecting on the case study I examined, rather than remaining distant to contextual circumstances and actors involved, I attempted to ask myself, as critically as possible, why people in Paso Ancho decided to *this* like *that* and interpreting what that may or may not mean, more proactively, in regard to the suitability of research tools. In so doing, I've traced different forms of **epistemic planning action** down, in an effort to, echoing and inverting John Friedmann's shrewd call, turn '**action into knowledge**'. This, it must be noted, does not suggest, at all, coming up with 'best practices', 'prescriptive measures', etc. Nor does it mean that practice (methodology) is to prevail over theory (epistemology). Between practice and theory, as I see it, there will always be an imbalance, which must be constantly addressed by dint of research, new knowledge production and its (potential) implementation. In this respect, it was quite important, to carry out this research's empirical section, to muddle through in spite of case-study research's alleged and obfuscating misinterpretations (see Flyvbjerg, 2004a).

In retrospective — and thinking prospectively — there seems to be a need for a reflective change in planning research's **language and discursivity**. Both the form (Lacan) and content (Foucault)¹⁴⁴ of research discourses is what determines the politics of academic knowledge production, which fundamentally shapes the interrelations among planning theory, research and practice (an influence that might also extend to the education of planning). Some theoretical discourses, for example, have a tendency to subdue research and practice by advancing a fairly monocular analytical vision — as though planning

¹⁴⁴ Foucauldian discourse analysis "works with the concrete material of the signifier, which puts the accent on the content of the discourse. Lacan, on the contrary, works beyond the content and places the accent on the formal relationships that each discourse draws" (Verhaeghe, 2001: 21) on to establish an (intrinsically imperfect) communication. Though these two core aspects of the communicative act appear to be at odds with each other, understanding their mutuality may well enhance planning research's methods and means of dissemination of outcomes.

phenomena and challenges responded solely to one particular dimension (e.g., the collaborative or communicative rhetoric). Furthermore, fruitful theoretical debates are sometimes unable to find ‘practical relays’, either because they grow into a duel between fierce theorists or due to their incapability to properly grasp unnamable practical instances — that is, avoiding the ‘naming’ of phenomena and embracing an **inherent lack of certainty**.

Trying to incorporate uncertainty into planning theory, practice, research and education, is, for sure, neither simplistic nor petty. However, as I was able to superficially grasp while drawing the overall appraisal of this investigation, ‘totalizing’ theories, which seek to assert ‘universal assurances’, turn out to be inadequate to envision planning practice as an undertaking that, though founded on applicable, critical, factual, and evaluative claims, ought to be, first and foremost, **exploratory** and **amendable**. Planning research endeavors on such type of planning praxis, rather than supplant, may well **supplement** one another and, in turn, give way to an **‘articulating’** (after Laclau and Mouffe) body of work that takes place, as it were, ‘outside the unassailable academic box’. Languages and discourses, moreover, maintain “some rational and cognitive purchase on both material reality and the moral and ethical values” (West, 2013: 206) of not only those being addressed, but also of those being analyzed. In time, it is my impression, planning theoretical and practical research would more effectively deal with uncertainty.

6.2. At issue is not how you call it, rather what you make of it: *Going beyond the label*

Among a myriad of hurdles with which planning research is awash, there is, as mentioned in the previous chapter (see section 5.3), the propensity to declare, drawing on a case study or a thorough theoretical review, a conceptual dearth and a concomitant need for a novel planning conceptualization to resolve it. Such deduction, while still acceptable and widespread, doesn’t offer much, at least in the light of my research’s findings, to improve planning theoretical and empirical research. But perhaps more noteworthy is the difficulty those ‘conceptual labels’ constitute to imagine substantive contributions to the exercise of planning — that is, to expand and improve the repertoires of those out there already trying or getting ready to come to grips with the real, messy and unpredictable world of planning practice.

Furthermore, these ‘eye-catching tags’, the spearheads of sophisticated and technical research jargon, are allegedly used to make understandable the complexity of a particular and ‘unheard-of’ phenomenon (or a specific aspect or dimension of it). Planning researchers frequently deploy what Lacan calls **“the discourse of the university”**¹⁴⁵ to label researched phenomena — hoping to elicit therewith the attention of the academic community — and, compellingly, put forward the primal necessity of newly coined terms. This type of research language and discursivity, adducing complete objectivity, brings to the fore that any one attempt to produce ‘absolutely’ neutral knowledge is, in the long run, a pursuit of domination over the other to whom knowledge is being conveyed (Evans, 2006 [1996]: 46). Such domination, furthermore, depends on the way knowledge is “presented as an accumulated, organised and transparent unity, coming straightforwardly to us from” (Verhaeghe, 2001: 30) the many planning research products (be it books, journal articles, dissertations, etc.). Such principle signals the contradiction that, despite the fact that absolute objectivity isn’t realistic, it is through absolute neutrality that planning research usually ‘stands on solid analytical ground’.

Hence, the insightful and careful analysis of specific, contextualized and cognitive practical instances, according to my empirical findings, rather than resorting to **universalization** or **syncretism**, emphasizes particularities found and suggests ways they may possibly inform theory, practice, and (future) research. In so doing, one could perfectly discover that

¹⁴⁵ The discourse of the university does not allude to the ‘university’ in its classical, most common sense. By contrast, “for Lacan, university discourse is not directly linked to the university as a social institution” (Žižek, 2006b).

practice outdoes theory, given that **critical assessment** is never tautological. By way of clarification, employing or crafting concepts is not entirely futile insofar as they're used as analytical vehicles: as flexible means whereby trying to comprehend what's going on and could possibly go on. To put it another way, they're not relevant in and of themselves. Thus, perceptive conceptualization has an '**enabling analytical character**' that helps understanding, though never utterly, and interpreting phenomena deemed relevant for planning theory and practice (and, by extension, education). In the frame of any given case study, it may well be that underlying theoretical assumptions are not met (see chapter 5), which highlights the importance of searching for the meaning of planning practices embedded in real-life circumstances; instead of bending them to comply with preconceived premises. In sum, it is about *seeing through theory to grasp something practical*.

Overall, it is advisable not to use 'beguiling' labels to render meaningful practical situations that supersede theoretical discourses. Planning research should never reach a final point: it is to remain open to all efforts envisaging the future and remembering the past more pragmatically and dynamically. Encouraging such type of planning research is quite necessary, given that, due to hasten and variegated processes of urbanization, planning theory, practice, research and education are confronted with unforeseeable challenges that escape traditional 'jigsaw' Euclidean planning paradigms. Additionally, practical approaches, oddly enough, still remain fairly prevalent and backed up by 'old-school', rational-comprehensive, positivist research methods.

6.3. Seeking the ever-changing meaning of action: *Towards a 'critical-hysterical' planning research*

By disentangling from the aforementioned research 'straitjacket', it may gradually become clear that practitioners, researchers, theorists and students/professors (in fact, everyone interested and involved in planning), "like good scientists, [...] [should] not set out to desperately explain everything with the knowledge they already have — that is the job of the systematizer or even the encyclopedist — nor do they take for granted that all solutions will be someday forthcoming" (Fink, 1997 [1995]: 134). Planning research, with that in mind, in order to be(come) yet more critical, it has to be(come) hysterical as well. In psychoanalytical theory, "hysteria emerges when a subject starts to question or to feel discomfort in his or her symbolic identity" (Žižek, 2006c: 35). That being so, a critical-hysterical planning research has its inception in pivotal questions like: "why am I a planner?", "What is it, exactly, that renders me a planner (theorist, practitioner, researcher and/or professor)?", "What forces are shaping and defining what counts as 'valid' modes of planning theory, practice, research and education? Such (self-)questioning touches transversally both a historical and an ideological context upon which the symbolic identity is built, for symbolic identities are determined by the 'interpellation' (any given ruling) ideology enforces through a socio-political institutional apparatus¹⁴⁶. Planning research could therewith be performed from a **critical and hysterical position** — "that of doubt, which is an extremely productive position: all new invention comes from hysterical questions" (Žižek, 2012b).

Anxiety, by the same token, may be as helpful: if we seek and believe to have found ultimate answers, we henceforth are not trying anymore to figure anything out. Critical-hysterical planning appraisals, for this reason, revise incessantly theory, practice and education, without ever providing a conclusive essential. They outdo systematization and dogmatism and make room for shambles and unorthodoxy. Such 'anxious desire' of unremitting discovery is therefore embodied and articulated by the Lacanian "**discourse of the hysteric**", which, not surprisingly, is the complete opposite of the discourse of the university. Whereas the "hysteric gets off on knowledge", knowledge in the university's discourse, instead of an end to be attained, functions as a means whereby justifying the "academic's very existence and activity" (Fink, 1997 [1995]: 133).

¹⁴⁶ As Louis Althusser (2001 [1971]: 117; italics in the original) explains, "*all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects*, by the functioning of the category of the subject".

Such distinctiveness, Michael Gunder (2004: 307) sustains, is characteristic of critical enquiring planning academics and students aiming to produce alternative new knowledge. Be that as it may, planning practitioners, especially 'non-traditional' and those having 'succumbed to hysteria', are perfectly capable of facing and challenging the internal and innate contradictions of their actions as well. Indeed, interpreting 'dissident' and rather warped planning practices (like those performed by organized communities or experimental practitioners), that explore and test other means whereby getting done, not only enlightens planning theory and education, but also refine the very practices performed and provide critical feedback for upcoming research.

A critical-hysterical planning research, by and large, delves into those occluded splitting spots between the epistemological and normative dimension of planning and, in that regard, moves from practical relays to theoretical points (and back), without assurances or full, definitive knowledge. Further, its critical-hysterical language and discursivity influences head-on the politics of academic knowledge and thereby makes an anagram out of planning theoretical and practical research, because it attempts neither to equate them, nor to resolve their inherent disparity — the one can be derived from the other without altering their both **intrinsic character** and **mutual dependency**. Planning research, all things considered, in a critical and hysterical fashion, contributes to render theory and practice more pragmatic, education less indoctrinating and eventual research counter-intuitive and as less positivist as feasible. Now, what could a critical-hysterical analytical take entail within the specificities of a concrete topic and/or case study?

6.3.1. Outlining a possibility: *A critical-hysterical view with organized communities and their protest actions*

When it comes to the analysis of urban social movements' and organized communities' politics of protesting and political repertoires, as it has been argued throughout the work, socio-spatial structures are not as static as, precisely, Neo-Marxist structuralist views assess them to be. They are not only created and altered by actors enmeshed in political discourse, but also socio-spatial structures exert a (sometimes counteracting) influence on them. Out of this interaction, both actors and structures change constantly: they do not remain caught up in a linear 'back-and-forth' interaction. Since between structure and agency there is no preexisting primacy, urban social movements as well as organized communities, through their collective and disrupting actions, may well be heading elsewhere out of the dialectical actor-structure tension. In other words, while still subject to and act on unending social, economic, cultural, political and spatial structures (Jenson, 1989; 1995: 115), the meaning- and sense-making capacities of protesting do not exclusively endure system reproduction or advance a definitive systemic change: they can also crystalize another possibility that escapes such bipolarity.

That is then the 'critical-hysterical' analytical focus: stating the aptitudes of urban social movements and organized communities for, and means whereby, furthering a different and located change; not of, **but within** the totality of social, economic, political, cultural and spatial relations. Through "participatory action research", collective protest actions can be examined departing from the premise that "there are many truths, based on identities formed out of social differences" and that the lived experience of those working together to autonomously develop their living conditions "provide the foundation for co-creating new knowledge as the basis of action change" (Ledwith, 2016: 144). These efforts have to be rearticulated (after Gramsci) into narratives that capture the nitty-gritty of collective protest actions, which lead the way to an heterotopological alternative future that mirrors, generally speaking, a cycle of permanent repetition of a somewhat unconscious 'trial and error' (see chapter 5). These stories, furthermore, have to be spatial(ized), which implies delving into the spatial underpinnings of social relations and examining how they alter the spatial formations wherefrom they spring (Lefebvre (1991 [1974]: 404) (see subsection 3.1.3 and figure 3.1).

Following Margaret Ledwith's (2016: 151ff.) "**emancipatory action research**" and based on the case study analyzed in chapter 4, I describe in Figure 6.1 six elements that help to

structure the transition from research *on* to *with* organized communities to, then, keep casting light on the enduring processes of collective disruptive actions (in particular those that make their way out of the ‘wave of mobilizations’) (see figure 5.1). Each factor, moreover, is associated with a specific ‘spatial moment’ (see section 5.2) to imprint analytical emphases on each one. Although the cycle might look neat and well-ordered, its application may well end up being quite volatile. As a matter of fact, that’s meant to be like that. According to reigning circumstances, that frame the phenomenon or phenomena being examined, the cycle is very likely to suffer adjustments. The cycle, to put it differently, has to be treated with certain ‘disrespect’. For instance, as seen in figure 6.1, research, though the aspects are numbered, does not have to begin by ‘Being there’; on the contrary, ‘Outreaching’ may well be the starting point (which also creates a direct link with ‘Conscientization’). Likewise, ‘Action’, the disruptive measures that organized communities implement, can bypass the ontological and epistemological ‘spatial moments’ of ‘Making-sense’, given that it can constitute a form of ‘Outreach’.




Figure 6.1. The analytical cycle *with* organized communities. Source: own elaboration based on and expanded from Ledwith (2016: 152).

Equally important is that the definition of the conceptual formulations may slightly or even widely vary, in consonance with contextual conditions and academic as well as socio-cultural idiosyncrasies of the researcher(s). Some of the theoretical constructions could even be disregarded or replaced. For instance, the notion of ‘conscientization’, in the frame of the case I studied, is largely permeated by the work of Paulo Freire (1970) and some of the principles of the *Liberation Theology*. Since both currents of thought have been highly influential in Latin America, they’re likely to be useful for other cases located there; whereas in other socio-geographical conditions they might not be as suitable (e.g., in the United States Saul Alinsky’s work may well be a much stronger conceptual and practical reference). Furthermore, conscientization was identified as a central part of the mindset of interviewed activists (especially those of an older age), provided that it is seen as a vital task. Interestingly enough, they did not refer to it as ‘conscientization’ (and only a handful of them actually mentioned Freire or the *Liberation Theology*), but all of them stressed as mandatory not to condescendingly raise awareness, because enthralling engagement, they believe, has to be propelled by maieutics and not directly provided by an external, ‘higher’ wisdom. So, the aim was never to pin down what conscientization is or not; but rather what ‘conscientization practices’, so to speak, lead to and what can originate from them planning-wise.

Again, it is not about validating a theoretical formulation or coming up with a new conceptual neologism, but about realizing the analytical possibilities that a concept offers or not (something that one may well state once having it applied to examine an empirical situation). Thus, future research ought to aim attention to all the suggested linkages

between the elements of the cycle as well as the elements themselves. In so doing, it is crucial for researchers to make the exercise of picturing the thinking, emotions, rationalities, behaviors of the members of urban social movements and/or organized communities orchestrating and performing protest that both demands and advances a local community self-development. (Incidentally, this also pretty much applies when approaching institutional counterparts, such as mayors, local officials, and the like). In short, to be in 'their shoes' to comprehend their ways to go about; instead of distantly observing and 'fixing', by naming, their practices. There are no resolute methodological rules or tools, only hints like the ones the analytical cycle provides. Every research has to adjust its analytical lens and thereby become, along the way, its own journey of discovery — in spite of how 'frustrating' or 'unsatisfying' it may turn out to be.

List of references

- Abbott, J. (1989). Community participation in water supply planning: The Ramagodi experience. First biennial of the water institute of Southern Africa, Cape Town, South Africa, March 29th-30th.
- Abbott, J. (1996). *Sharing the City: Community Participation in Urban Management*. London: Earthscan.
- Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S. (1984). *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Aberle, D. (1966). *The Peyote Religion among the Navaho*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Agnew, J. (1987). *Place and Politics: The Geographical Mediation of State and Society*. Boston and London: Allen and Unwin.
- Agnew, J. (1989). The devaluation of place in social science. In: J. Agnew and J. Duncan (eds.) *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Social Imaginations*. London: Unwin Hyman, pp.9-29.
- Agnew, J. (2005). Space: place. In: P. Cloke and R. Johnston (eds.) *Spaces of Geographical Thought: Deconstructing Human Geography's Binaries*. Sage: London, pp.81-96.
- Agnew, J. (2011). Space and place. In: J. Agnew and D. Livingstone (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Geographical Knowledge*. Los Angeles: Sage, pp.316-330.
- Agnew, J. and Duncan, J. (eds.) (1989). *The Power of Place: Bringing Together Geographical and Social Imaginations*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Alfaro, L.A. (1999). El Triángulo de Solidaridad en Acosta: Un vistazo desde abajo. *Aportes* 120: 24-27.
- Allmendinger, P. (2001). *Planning in Postmodern Times*. London: Routledge.
- Altshuler, A. (1965). The goals of comprehensive planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 31(3): 186-195.
- Alvarenga, P. (2005). *De Vecinos a Ciudadanos: Movimientos Comunes y Luchas Sociales en la Historia Contemporánea Costarricense*. San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica and Editorial de la Universidad Nacional.
- Alvarez, M. and Hintjens, H. (2009). The 2007 'No-CAFTA' movement in Costa Rica: Reflecting on social movements and political rights participation. *Working Paper No. 479*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
- Amin, A. (2002). Spatialities of globalization. *Environment and Planning A* 34(3): 385-399.
- Amin, A. (2004). Regions unbound: Towards a new politics of place. *Geografisker Annaler* 86(1): 33-44.
- Amin, A. (2006). The good city. *Urban Studies* 43(5-6): 1009-1023.
- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Arendt, H. (1998 [1958]). *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Arnstein, S. (1969). A ladder of citizen participation. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35(4): 216-224.
- Augé, M. (1995). *Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*. London: Verso.
- Badiou, A. (2006 [1988]). *Being and Event*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Barahona, M.A. (1999). El desarrollo económico. In: J.R. Quesada, D. Masís, M. Barahona, T. Meza, R. Cuevas and J. Rhenán (eds.) *Costa Rica Contemporánea: Raíces del Estado de la Nación*. San José: Proyecto Estado de la Nación, pp.97-152.
- Baudrillard, J. (1994 [1981]). *Simulacra and Simulation*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Baum, H. (1996). Practicing planning theory in a political world. In: S. Mandelbaum, L. Mazza and R. Burchell (eds.) *Explorations in Planning Theory*. New Brunswick: New Jersey Center for Urban Policy Research Press, pp.365-382.
- Bauman, Z. (1998). *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. New York: Columbia University Press.

- Bauman, Z. (1999). *Culture as Praxis*. London: Sage.
- Bauman, Z. (2001). *Seeking Safety in an Insecure World*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beard, V.A. (2002). Covert planning for social transformation in Indonesia. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 22(1): 15-25.
- Beard, V.A. (2003). Learning radical planning: The power of collective action. *Planning Theory* 2(13): 13-35.
- Beauregard, R.A. (1989). Between modernity and postmodernity: The ambiguous position of US planning. *Environment and Planning D* 7(4): 381-395.
- Beauregard, R. A. (1991). Without a net: Modernist planning and the postmodern abyss. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 10(3): 189-194.
- Bell, D. (1974). *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. New York: Basic Books.
- Benford, R.D. and Snow, D.A. (1988). Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization. *International Social Movement Research* 1: 197-217.
- Benford, R.D and Snow, D.A. (1992). Master frames and cycles of protest, in: A. Morris and C.M. Mueller (eds.) *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp.133-155.
- Benford, R.D and Snow, D.A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611-639.
- Benjamin, W. (1999) *The Arcades Project*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bernard, R.H. (2006). *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis*. Oxford: Altamira Press.
- Berndt, C. (2000). The rescaling of labour regulation in Germany: From national and regional corporatism to intrafirm welfare? *Environment and Planning A* 32(9): 1569-1592.
- Bertho, A. (1999). *Contre l'État, la Politique*. Paris: La Dispute.
- Biglaiser G. and DeRouen, K. (2004). The expansion of neoliberal economic reforms in Latin America. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(3): 561-578.
- Blanco, R.A. (2015). "Los del Sur de la Capital": Control social y estigmatización en los barrios del sur de San José, 1950-1980. *Diálogos* 16(2). Retrieved from: <<http://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/dialogos/article/view/17880/19531>> (accessed on 17 May 2016).
- Blumer, H. (1969). Collective behavior. In: A.M. Lee (ed.) *Principles of Sociology*. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, pp.165-221.
- Bollier, D. and Helfrich, S. (2012). The commons as a transformative vision. *Shareable: Sharing by Design Blog*. Retrieved from: <<http://www.shareable.net/blog/the-commons-as-a-transformative-vision>> (accessed on 15 April 2013).
- Bookchin, M. (1986 [1973]). *The Limits of the City*. Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books.
- Bookchin, M. (1992). *Urbanization without Cities: The Rise and Decline of Citizenship*. Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books.
- Boudreau, J-A. (2009). Taking the bus daily and demonstrating on Sunday: Reflections on the formation of political subjectivity in an urban world. *City* 13(2-3): 336-345.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*. London: Routledge.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990 [1980]). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1995 [1984]). *Sociology in Question*. London: Sage.
- Bracher, M. (1993). *Lacan, Discourse, and Social Change: A Psychoanalytic Cultural Criticism*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Brenner, N. (1998). Global cities, local states: Global city formation and state territorial restructuring in contemporary Europe. *Review of International Political Economy* 5(1): 1-37.
- Brenner, N. (1999). Globalization as reterritorialization: The re-scaling of urban governance in the European Union. *Urban Studies* 36(3): 431-451.

- Brenner, N. (2001). The limits to scale? Methodological reflections on scalar structuration. *Progress in Human Geography* 25(4): 591-614.
- Brenner, N. (2004). *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002). Cities and the geographies of "actually existing neoliberalism". *Antipode* 34(3): 349-379.
- Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2005). Neoliberalism and the urban condition. *City* 9(1): 101-107.
- Brenner, N. and Schmid, C. (2015). Towards a new epistemology of the urban? *City* 19(2-3): 151-182.
- Brodie, J. (2000). Imagining democratic urban citizenship. In: E.F. Isin (ed.) *Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City*. Routledge: London, pp.110-128.
- Brodie, J. (2007). Reforming social justice in neoliberal times. *Studies in Social Justice* 1(2): 93-107.
- Brugger, P. (2001). From haunted brain to haunted science: A cognitive neuroscience view of paranormal and pseudoscientific thought. In: J. Houran and R. Lange (eds.) *Hauntings and Poltergeists: Multidisciplinary Perspectives*. North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., pp.195-213.
- Buchanan, I. (2005). Space in the age of non-place. In: I. Buchanan, and G. Lambert (eds.) *Deleuze and Space*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p.16-35.
- Burns, D., Hambleton, R. and P. Hoggett (1994). *The Politics of Decentralisation: Revitalising Local Democracy*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Butler, J. (2011). Bodies in alliance and the politics of the Street. *EIPCP Multilingual Webjournal*. Retrieved from: <<http://www.eipcp.net/transversal/1011/butler/en>> (accessed on 9 January 2015).
- Calcagno, A. (2008). Alain Badiou: The event of becoming a political subject. *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 34(9): 1051-1070.
- Camacho, A.C. (1999). Pros y contras del Triángulo de Solidaridad. *Aportes* 120: 34-39.
- Camhis, M. (1979). *Planning Theory and Philosophy*. London: Tavistock.
- Campbell, H. (2006). Just planning: The art of situated ethical judgment. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 26(1): 92-106.
- Campfens, H. (ed.) (1997). *Community Development Around the World: Practice, Theory, Research, Training*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Canel, E. (1997). New social movement theory and resource mobilisation theory: The need for integration. In: M. Kaufman and H. Dilla Alfonso (eds.) *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, pp.189-221.
- Carley, M. (2001). Top-down and bottom-up: The challenge of cities in the new century. In: M. Carley, P. Jenkins and H. Smith (eds.) *Urban Development and Civil Society: The Role of Communities in Sustainable Cities*. London: Earthscan, pp.3-15.
- Carley, M. and Kirk, K. (1998). *Sustainable by 2020?: A Strategic Approach to Urban Regeneration for Britain's Cities*. Bristol: The Policy Press.
- Casey, E. (1996). How to go from space to place in a fairly short stretch of time: Phenomenological prolegomena. In: S. Feld and K.H. Basso (eds.) *Sense of Place*. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, pp.13-52.
- Casey, E. (1997). *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Casey, E. (2001). Between geography and philosophy: What does it mean to be in the place-world? *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 91(4): 683-693.
- Castells, M. (1978 [1972]). *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Castells, M. (1983). *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*. London and Victoria: Edward Arnold.

- Castells, M. (1996). *The Rise of the Network Society, Volume I: The Information Age*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1997). *The Power of Identity, Volume II: The Information Age*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (1998). *The End of Millennium, Volume III: The Information Age*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Castells, M. (2004). Space of flows, space of places: Materials for a theory of urbanism in the Information Age. In: S. Graham (ed.) *The Cybercities Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.82-93.
- Castells, M. (2005 [1999]). Grassrooting the space of flows. In: L. Amoore (ed.) *The Global Resistance Reader*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.294-302.
- Castillo, I. (2010). *Megaprojects—Megaparticipation?* Master thesis. Berlin: Berlin University of Technology.
- Castillo, I. (2013a). Unravelling spaces of representation through insurgent planning actions. *Planum The Journal of Urbanism* 26(1): 1-12.
- Castillo, I. (2013b). Unravelling spaces of representation through insurgent planning actions. In: F. Chiodelli, B. De Carli, M. Falletti and L. Scavuzzo (eds.) *Cities to be Tamed? Spatial Investigations Across the Global South*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp.262-283.
- Castillo, I. (2015). Acting in *reality* within the cranny of *the Real*. In: M. Dellenbaugh, M. Kip, M. Bieniok, A. Müller and M. Schwegmann (eds.) *Urban Commons: Moving Beyond State and Market*. Basel: Birkhäuser, pp.130-147.
- Castillo, I. (2016a). Public space as a catalyst for a disrupting 'redistribution of the sensible'. Paper prepared for the International Conference *TRIALOG—Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung* on Quartiersentwicklung im Globalen Süden/Neighbourhood Development in the Global South. University of Kassel: Kassel, June 16th-17th.
- Castillo, I. (2016b). From apophenia to epiphany: Making planning theory-research-practice co-constitutive. *plaNNext—next generation planning* 3: 16-35.
- Clark, M.A. (2001). *Gradual Economic Reform in Latin America: The Costa Rican Experience*. New York: Sunny.
- Cobarrubias, S. and Pickles, J. (2009). Spacing movements: The turn to cartographies and mapping in contemporary social movements. In: B. Warf and S. Arias (eds.) *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.36-58.
- Cohen, A.P. (1985). *The Symbolic Construction of Community*. London: Tavistock.
- Coleman, M. and Agnew, J. (2007). The problem with *Empire*. In: J.W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp. 317-340.
- Connolly, J. and Steil, J. (2009). Introduction: Finding justice in the city. In: P. Marcuse, J. Connolly, J. Novy, I. Olivo, C. Potter, and J. Steil (eds.) *Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge. pp.1-16.
- Consejo Nacional de Planificación Urbana (CNPU) (2013). *Plan GAM 2013 Resumen*. Retrieved from: <<http://www.mivah.go.cr/PlanGAM.shtml>> (accessed on 12 May 2014).
- Cooke, B. and Kothari, U. (2001). The case for participation as tyranny. In: B. Cooke and U. Kothari (eds.) *Participation: The New Tyranny?* London: Zed Books, pp.1-15.
- Cordero, A. (2005). Clases medias y movimientos sociales en Costa Rica. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 109-110 (3-4): 157-166.
- Crang, M. and Thrift, N. (2000). Introduction. In: M. Crang and N. Thrift (eds.) *Thinking Space*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.1-30.
- Creswell, T. (1996). *In Place-Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Creswell, T. (1997). Imagining the nomad: Mobility and the postmodern primitive. In: G. Benko and U. Strohmayr (eds.) *Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.360-382.
- Creswell, T. (2004). *Place: A Short Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Dabashi, H. (2012). *The Arab Spring: The End of Postcolonialism*. London: Zed Books.

- Dahl, R.A. (1961). *Who governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Dahl, R.A. (1989). *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dangschat, J. (2009). Space Matters—Marginalization and its Places. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 33(3): 835-840.
- Dasgupta, R. (2006). The sudden stardom of the Third World city. *The New Statesman*. Retrieved from: <http://www.ranadasgupta.com/texts.asp?text_id=36> (accessed on 22 January 2011).
- Davies, W.K.D. and Herbert, D.T. (1993). *Communities within Cities: An Urban Social Geography*. London: Bellhaven Press.
- Davoudi, S. (2006). Evidence-based planning: Rhetoric and reality. *DISP* 165(2): 14-25.
- Davoudi, S. (2009). Asymmetric development in spatial planning: Positivist content and post-modernist processes? In: S. Davoudi and I. Strange (eds.) *Conceptions of Space and Place in Strategic Spatial Planning*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.207-243.
- Davoudi, S. and Stead, D. (2002). Urban-rural relationships: An introduction and brief history. *Built Environment* 28(4): 269-277.
- Davoudi, S. and Strange, I. (2009). Space and place in twentieth-century planning: An analytical framework and an historical review. In: S. Davoudi and I. Strange (eds.) *Conceptions of Space and Place in Strategic Spatial Planning*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.7-42.
- Dear, M. (2002 [1986]). Postmodernism and planning. In: M. Dear and S. Flusty (eds.) *The Spaces of Postmodernity: Readings in Human Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.162-168.
- Dear, M. and Flusty, S. (2002a). Preface. In: M. Dear and S. Flusty (eds.) *The Spaces of Postmodernity: Readings in Human Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.ix-xiii.
- Dear, M. and Flusty, S. (2002b). Introduction: How to map a radical break. In: M. Dear and S. Flusty (eds.) *The Spaces of Postmodernity: Readings in Human Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.1-12.
- Debord, G. (2009 [1999]). *Correspondence: The Foundation of the Situationist International (June 1957-August 1960)*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).
- De Carli, B. and Falletti, M. (2013). Formal/informal interplays. In: F. Chiodelli, B. De Carli, M. Falletti and L. Scavuzzo (eds.) *Cities to be Tamed? Spatial Investigations Across the Global South*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp.2-25.
- de Certeau, M. (1997 [1984]). *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Dehaene, M. and De Cauter, L. (2008a). Introduction: Heterotopia in a postcivil society. In: M. Dehaene and L. De Cauter (eds.) *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in Postcivil Society*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.3-9.
- Dehaene, M. and De Cauter, L. (2008b). Translation of and comments on Foucault's 'Of other spaces'. In: M. Dehaene and L. De Cauter (eds.) *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in Postcivil Society*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.13-29.
- Deleuze, G. (1977 [1972]). Intellectuals and power: A conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. In: D.F. Bouchard (ed.) *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault*. New York: Cornell University Press, pp.205-217.
- Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987 [1980]). *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006 [1999]). *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell.
- D'Entreves, M. (1992). Hannah Arendt and the idea of citizenship. In: C. Mouffe (ed.) *Dimensions of Radical Democracy*. London: Verso.
- de Terán, F. (ed.) (1989). *La Ciudad Hispanoamericana*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Históricos de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo.
- Diani, M. (1992). The concept of social movement. *Sociological Review* 40(1): 1-25.
- Diani, M. and McAdam, D. (eds.) (2003). *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Dikeç, M. (2001). Justice and the spatial imagination. *Environment and Planning A* 33(10): 1785-1805.
- Dikeç, M. (2009). Space, politics and (in)justice. *Justice Spatiale / Spatial Justice* 1/September. Retrieved from: <www.jssp.org> (accessed on 24 August 2011).
- Dikeç, M. (2011). Crucial issues on space, law and politics [video online]. Retrieved from: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Bgr9-Bny8k> (accessed on 22 August 2012).
- Dikeç, M. (2012). Space as a mode of political thinking. *Geoforum* 43: 669-676.
- Dikeç, M. (2013). Beginners and equals: Political subjectivity in Arendt and Rancière. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38: 78-90.
- Domhoff, W. (1970). *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America*. New York: Random House.
- Domhoff, W. (2010 [1978]). *Who Really Rules? New Haven and Community Power Reexamined*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Douglas, A. (2005 [1980]). *The Restaurant at the End of the Universe*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Douglass, M. (1999). Geographies of resilience: Slums, squatters and community-state relations in Seoul and Bangkok. *Plurimondi* 1(2): 213-233.
- Dove, M.R. and Kammen, D.M. (2001). Vernacular models of development: An analysis of Indonesia under the "New Order". *World Development* 29(4): 619-639.
- Doxiadis, C. (1968). *Ekistics: An Introduction to the Science of Human Settlements*. London: Hutchinson.
- Dubet, F. and Martucelli, D. (1998). *Dans Quelle Société Vivons-Nous?* Paris: Editions du Seuil.
- Eckstein, H. (1992 [1975]). Case studies and theory in political science. Excerpt from: *Regarding Politics: Essays in Political Theory, Stability and Change*. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp.117-176.
- Eco, U. (1986 [1967]). *Travels in Hyperreality: Essays*. San Diego and New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.
- Elden, S. (2001). *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of Spatial History*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Elden, S. (2004). *Understanding Henri Lefebvre: Theory and the Possible*. London: Continuum.
- Elden, S. (2007). There is a politics of space because space is political: Henri Lefebvre and the production of space. *Radical Philosophy Review* 10(2): 101-116.
- Elden, S. and Crampton, J.W. (2007). Introduction. In: J.W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp.1-16.
- Elliot, R. and Timulak, L. (2005). Descriptive and interpretative approaches to qualitative research. In: J. Miles and P. Gilbert (eds.) *A handbook of Research Methods for Clinical and Health Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147-160.
- Estado de la Nación (2015). *Vigésimo Primer Informe Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible*. San José: PEN.
- Evans, D. (2006 [1996]). *An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Evers, T. (1984). *Identidad: El Lado Oculto de los Nuevos Movimientos Sociales*. Montevideo: CLAEH.
- Eyerman, R. and Jamison, A. (1991). *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fainstein, N.I. and Fainstein, S.S. (1979). New debates in urban planning: The impact of Marxist theory within the United States. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 3(3): 147-173.
- Fainstein, S. (2005). Planning theory and the city. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 25(2): 121-130.
- Faludi, A. (1973). What is planning theory? In: A. Faludi (ed.) *A Reader in Planning Theory*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp.1-10.

- Featherstone, D. (2003). Spatialities of transnational resistance to globalization: The maps of grievance of the inter-continental caravan. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographies* 28(4): 404-421.
- Feld, S. and Basso, K.H. (1996). Introduction. In: S. Feld and K. Basso (eds.) *Sense of Place*. Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, pp.3-12.
- Ferraro, G. (1996). Planning as creative interpretation. In: S. Mandelbaum, L. Mazza and R. Burchell (eds.) *Explorations in Planning Theory*. New Brunswick: New Jersey Center for Urban Policy Research Press, pp.312-327.
- Fink, B. (1997 [1995]). *The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- FitzGerald, M. (1980). *Urban community development in South Africa*. Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (1998a). *Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (1998b). Empowering civil society: Habermas, Foucault and the question of conflict. In: J. Friedmann and M. Douglass (eds.) *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age*. Chichester and New York: Wiley, pp.185-211.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2000). Ideal theory, real rationality: Habermas versus Foucault and Nietzsche. *Political Studies Association's 50th annual conference: The challenges for democracy in the 21st century*. London School of Economics and Political Science, April 10th-13th.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2002). Bringing power to planning research: One researcher's praxis story. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 21(4): 353-366.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2003). Rationality and power. In: S. Campbell and S. Fainstein (eds.) *Readings in Planning Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, 318-329.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2004a). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. In: C. Seale, G. Gobo, J.F. Gubrium and D. Silverman (eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice*. London: Sage, pp.420-434.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2004b). Phronetic planning research: Theoretical and methodological reflections. *Planning Theory and Practice* 5(3): 283-306.
- Forester, J. (1993). *Critical Theory, Public Policy, and Planning Practice: Toward a Critical Pragmatism*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Forester, J. (1999). Dealing with deep value differences. In: L. Susskind, S. McKernan, and L. Thomas-Larmer (eds.) *The Consensus Building Handbook: A Comprehensive Guide to Reaching Agreement*. London: Sage, pp.463-493.
- Forester, J. (2001). *The Deliberative Practitioner: Encouraging Participatory Planning Processes*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Forester J. (2013). On the theory and practice of critical pragmatism: Deliberative practice and creative negotiations. *Planning Theory* 12(1): 5-22.
- Forester, J. (2015). What kind of research might help us become better planners? *Planning Theory & Practice* 16(2): 145-148.
- Foucault, M. (1979). *La Microfísica del Poder*. Madrid: La Piqueta.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Foucault, M. (1984). Space, knowledge and power: Interview with Paul Rabinow. In: P. Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin Books, pp.239-256.
- Foucault, M. (1986 [1984]). Of other spaces. *Diacritics* 16(1): 22-27.
- Foucault, M. (1990 [1976]) *The History of Sexuality, Volume I*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Foucault, M. (1991 [1979]). Governmentality. In: G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller (eds.) *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.87-104.
- Foucault, M. (1995 [1975]). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage.
- Foucault, M. (2003 [1997]). *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976*. New York: Picador.

- Foucault, M. (2007 [1981/1982]). The meshes of power. In: J.W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp.153-162.
- Foucault, M. (2008 [1984]). Of other spaces. In: M. Dehaene and L. De Cauter (eds.) *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in Postcivil Society*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.13-29.
- Fraser, N. (1993). Rethinking the public sphere: A contribution to the critique to actually existing democracy. In: B. Robbins (ed.) *The Phantom Public Sphere*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Frazer, E. (1999). *The Problem of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Freire, P. (1970). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Friedman, T.L. (2005). *The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Friedmann, J. (1987). *Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action*. New Jersey and West Sussex: Princeton University Press.
- Friedmann, J. (1989). The Latin American barrio movement as a social movement: Contribution to the debate. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 13(3): 501-510.
- Friedmann, J. (1992). *Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Friedmann, J. (1993). Toward a non-Euclidean mode of planning. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 59(4): 482-485.
- Friedmann, J. (1998). The new political economy of planning: The rise of civil society. In: J. Friedmann and M. Douglass (eds.) *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age*. Chichester and New York: Wiley. pp.19-35.
- Friedmann, J. (2010). Place and place-making in cities: A global perspective. *Planning Theory and Practice* 11(2): 149-162.
- Friedmann, J. and Douglass, M. (1998). Editor's introduction. In: J. Friedmann and M. Douglass (eds.) *Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age*. Chichester and New York: Wiley, pp.1-6.
- Fylan, F. (2005). Semi-structured interviewing. In: J. Miles and P. Gilbert (eds.) *A handbook of Research Methods for Clinical and Health Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.65-78.
- Garber, J.A. (2000). The city as a heroic public sphere. In: E.F. Isin (ed.) *Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.257-274.
- George, A.L. & Bennett, A. (2004). *Case Studies and Theory Development*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gerring, J. (2004). What is a case study and what is it good for? *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 341-354.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Giddens, A. (1990). *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, A. (1994). *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics*. Oxford: Polity Press.
- Gieseeking J.J. and Mangold W. (2014). Introduction. In: J.J. Gieseeking and W. Mangold (eds.) *The People, Space and Place Reader*. New York and London: Routledge, pp.xix-xxxiv.
- Gilbert, L. and Dikeç, M. (2008). Right to the city: Politics of citizenship. In: K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom and C. Schmid (eds.) *Space, Difference, Everyday: Reading Henri Lefebvre*. New York and London: Routledge, pp.250-263.
- Gilbert, P.K. (2009). Sex and the modern city: English studies and the spatial turn. In: B. Warf and S. Arias (eds.) *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.102-121.
- Gläser, J. and Laudel, G. (2006). *Experteninterviews und Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Als Instrumente Rekonstruierender Untersuchungen*. Berlin: VS Verlag Mercedes Druck.

- Goldfarb, J.C. (2006). *The Politics of Small Things: The Power of the Powerless in Dark Times*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Goodwin, J., Jasper, J.M. and Polleta, F. (2001). Introduction: Why emotions matter. In: J. Goodwin, J.M. Jasper and F. Polleta (eds.) *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, pp.1-26.
- Goodwin, J. and Jasper, J.M. (2004). Caught in a winding, snarling vine: The structural bias of political process theory. In: J. Goodwin and J.M. Jasper (eds.) *Rethinking Social Movements: Structure, Meaning, and Emotion*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Goonewardena (2009). Urban studies, critical theories, radical politics: Eight theses for Peter Marcuse. *City* 13(2-3): 208-218.
- Goonewardena, K., Kipfer, S., Milgrom, R. and Schmid, C. (eds.) (2008) *Space, Difference, Everyday: Reading Henri Lefebvre*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Gottdiener, M. (1994 [1985]). *The Social Production of Urban Space*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Gottdiener, M. (2000). Lefebvre and the bias of academic urbanism: What can we learn from the 'new' urban analysis? *City* 4(1): 93-100.
- Graham, S. and Healey, P. (1999) Relational concepts of space and place: Issues for planning theory and practice. *European Planning Studies* 7(5): 623-646.
- Gran, G. (1986). Beyond African famines: Whose knowledge matters? *Alternative* 11(2): 275-296.
- Grange, K. (2013). Shaping acting space: In search of a new political awareness among local authority planners. *Planning Theory* 12(3): 225-243.
- Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
- Greiner, C. and Sakdapolrak, P. (2013). Translocality: Concepts, applications and emerging research perspectives. *Geography Compass* 7(5): 373-384.
- Grossberg, L. (1992). *We Gotta Get Out of this Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Guido, R. and Fernández, O. (1989). El juicio al sujeto: Un análisis de los movimientos sociales en América Latina. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 51(4): 45-76.
- Gunder, M. (2003). Passionate planning for the other's desire: An agonistic response to the dark side of planning. *Progress in Planning* 60(3): 235-319.
- Gunder, M. (2004). Shaping the planner's ego-ideal: A Lacanian interpretation of planning education. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 23(3): 299-311.
- Gunder, M. (2005). The production the desirous space: Mere fantasies of the utopian city? *Planning Theory* 4(2): 173-199.
- Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. (1992). Beyond "culture": Space, identity, and the politics of difference. *Cultural Anthropology* 7(1): 6-23.
- Gyford, J. (1991). *Citizens, Consumers and Councils: Local Government and the Public*. London: Macmillan.
- Hall, E.T. (1968). Proxemics. *Current Anthropology* 9(2): 83-95.
- Hall, P. (2002 [1988]). *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Hall, P., Thomas, R., Gracey, H. and Drewett, R. (1973). *The Containment of Urban England: Urban and Metropolitan Growth Processes and Megalopolis Denied*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Hamel, P., Lustiger-Thaler, H. and Mayer, M. (2000). Introduction: Urban social movements—local thematics, global spaces. In: P. Hamel, H. Lustiger-Thaler, and M. Mayer (eds.) *Urban Movements in a Globalising World*. New York and London: Routledge. pp.1-22.
- Harvey, D. (1982). *The Limits to Capital*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Harvey, D. (1985). *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Harvey, D. (1989). From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: The transformation of urban governance in late Capitalism. *Geografiska Annaler* 71(1): 3-17.

- Harvey, D. (1996). *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Harvey, D. (2009 [1973]). *Social Justice and the City*. Athens and London: The University of Georgia Press.
- Harvey, D. (2010). *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Harvey, D. (2012). *Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Healey, P. (1997). *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Healey, P. (2003). Collaborative planning in perspective. *Planning Theory* 2(2): 101-124.
- Healey, P. (2007). *Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies: Towards a Relational Planning for our Times*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Healey, P., Cameron, S., Davoudi, S., Graham, S. and Madanipour, A. (eds.) (1995). *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*. London: Wiley.
- Heidegger, M. (1971). *Poetry, Language, Thought*. New York: Harper Row.
- Henderson, G. and Sheppard, E. (2006). Marx and the spirit of Marx. In: S. Aiken and G. Valentine (eds.) *Approaches to Human Geography*. London: Sage, pp.57-74.
- Hindess, B. (1988). *Choice, Rationality, and Social Theory*. London and Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Hirsch, E.D., Jr. (1984). Meaning and significance reinterpreted. *Critical Inquiry* 11(2): 202-225.
- Hirt, S. (2002). Postmodernism and planning models. *Critical Planning* 9: 116-127.
- Hirt, S. (2005). Toward post-modern urbanism: Evolution of planning in Cleveland, Ohio. *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 25(1): 27-42.
- Hollis, M. (2003 [1994]). *The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holloway, J. (2005). Zapatismo urbano. *Humboldt Journal of Social Relations* 29(1): 168-178.
- Holmes, B. (2003). Maps for the Outside: Bureau d'Etudes, or the Revenge of the Concept. Retrieved from: <<http://dev.autonomeia.org/node/2398>> (accessed on 15 March 2015).
- Holston, J. (1999). Spaces of insurgent citizenship. In: J. Holston (ed.) *Cities and Citizenship*. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, pp.155-173.
- Holston, J. (2009). Insurgent citizenship in an era of global urban peripheries. *City and Society* 21(2): 245-267.
- Hubbard, P., Kitchin, R. and Valentine, G. (2004). Editors introduction. In: P. Hubbard, R. Kitchin and G. Valentine (eds.) *Key Thinkers on Space and Place*. London: Sage, pp.1-15.
- Hubbard, P. (2006). Space/place. In: D. Atkinson, P. Jackson, D. Sibley and N. Washbourne (eds.) *Cultural Geography: A Critical Dictionary of Key Concepts*. London and New York: I.B.Tauris, pp.41-48.
- Huxley, M (2007). Geographies of governmentality. In: J.W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp. 185-204.
- Isin, E.F. (1999). Introduction: Cities and citizenship in a global age. *Citizenship Studies* 3(2): 165-172.
- Instituto Nacional de Vivienda y Urbanismo (INVU) (2006). *Manual de procedimientos para la redacción y elaboración de planes reguladores*. San José: Dirección de Urbanismo.
- Jacobs, J. (1992 [1961]). *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Jameson, F. (1991), *Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Jameson, F. (2000 [1985]). Architecture and the critique of ideology. In: M.K. Hays (ed.) *Architecture Theory since 1968*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp.442-461.
- Jasper, J. (2006). Imagined victims, imagined villains: Anxious narratives of modernization. Paper prepared for the International Workshop on Fear, the City, and the Political

- Mobilization. The Canada Research Chair on the City and Issues of Insecurity: Montreal, April 16th-17th.
- Jasper, J.M. (2014). *Protest: A Cultural Introduction to Social Movements*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Jenkins, P. (2001). Relationships between the state and civil society and their importance for sustainable development. In: M. Carley, P. Jenkins and H. Smith (eds.) *Urban Development and Civil Society: The role of Communities in Sustainable Cities*. London: Earthscan, pp.175-191.
- Jenkins, P. and Smith, H. (2001). The state, the market and community: An analytical framework for community. In: M. Carley, P. Jenkins and H. Smith (eds.) *Urban Development and Civil Society: The role of Communities in Sustainable Cities*. London: Earthscan, pp.3-15.
- Jenson, J. (1989). 'Different' but not 'exceptional': Canada's permeable Fordism. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 30(3): 337-58.
- Jenson, J. (1995). What's in a name? Nationalist movements and public discourse. In: H. Johnston and B. Klandermans (eds.) *Social Movements and Culture*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.107-26.
- Jessop, B. (1994). Post-Fordism and the state. In: A. Amin (ed.) *Post-Fordism: A Reader*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, pp.251-274.
- Johnson, P. (2006). Unravelling Foucault's 'different spaces'. *History of the Human Sciences* 19(4): 75-90.
- Johnston, H. (2014). *What is a Social Movement?* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Kaufman, M. (1997a). Community power, grassroots democracy, and the transformation of social life. In: M. Kaufman and H. Dilla Alfonso (eds.) *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, pp.1-26.
- Kaufman, M. (1997b). Differential participation: Men, women and popular power. In: M. Kaufman and H. Dilla Alfonso (eds.) *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, pp.151-169.
- Kay, S. (2003). *Žižek: A Critical Introduction*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Kelley, R.D.G. (1996). *Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and Black Working Class*. New York: The Free Press.
- Klausen, J.E. and Sweeting, D. (2005). Legitimacy and community involvement in local governance. In: M. Haus, H. Heinelt, and M. Stewart (eds.) *Urban Governance and Democracy: Leadership and Community Involvement*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.214-232.
- Köhler, B. and Wissen, M. (2003). Glocalizing protest: Urban conflicts and global social movements. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(4): 942-951.
- Krauss, L.M. (2016). Chomsky & Krauss: An Origins Project Dialogue [video online]. Retrieved from: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M1IG919Bts0>> (accessed on 8 August 2016).
- Kuhn, T.S. (1970 [1962]). *The structure of scientific revolution*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Laclau, E. (1989). Preface. In: S. Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso, pp.ix-xv.
- Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. (2001 [1985]). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. London and New York: Verso.
- Lara, S. and Molina, E. (1997). Participation and popular democracy in the committees for the struggle for housing in Costa Rica. In: M. Kaufman and H. Dilla Alfonso (eds.) *Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: The Transformation of Social Life*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, pp.27-54.
- Lash, S. and Urry, J (1987). *The End of Organized Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Law, J. and Urry, J. (2004). Enacting the social. *Economy and Society* 33(3): 390-410.
- Leandro, M. (1995, June 30). Magisterio tomó camino de la huelga. *Diario Extra*, pp.4.
- Leavitt, J. (1994). Planning in the age of rebellion: Guidelines to activist research and applied planning. *Planning Theory* 10(11): 111-129.

- Leavitt, J. and Saegert, S. (1990). *From Abandonment to Hope: Community Households in Harlem*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lechner, N. (1997). Three forms of social coordination. *CEPAL Review* 61: 7-17.
- Le Corbusier (1971 [1924]). *The City of To-morrow and its Planning*. London: Architectural Press.
- Ledwith, M. (2016). *Community Development in Action: Putting Freire into Practice*. Bristol and Chicago: Policy Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1968). *Le Droit à la Ville*. Paris: Anthropos.
- Lefebvre, H. (1970). *Le Manifeste Différentialiste*. Paris: Gallimard.
- Lefebvre, H. (1976 [1970]). Reflection in the politics of space. *Antipode* 8: 30-37.
- Lefebvre, H. (1982 [1966]). *The Sociology of Marx*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991 [1974]). *The Production of Space*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (1993 [1968]). The right to the city. In: J. Ockman (ed.) *Architecture Culture 1943-1968: A Documentary Anthology*. New York: Rizzoli, pp.428-436.
- Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writing on Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lefebvre, H. (2002 [1961]). *Critique of Everyday Life, Volume II: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday*. London and New York: Verso.
- Lefebvre, H. (2003 [1970]). *The Urban Revolution*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (2003 [1970]). *The Urban Revolution*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (2007 [1992]). *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Lefebvre, H. (2009). *State, Space, World: Selected Essays*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Leibniz, G. (1991). *G.W. Leibniz's Monadology*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Lentin, A. (1999). Structure, strategy, sustainability: What future for new social movement theory? *Sociological Research Online* 4(3) (accessed on 12 May 2013).
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966 [1962]). *The Savage Mind*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Ley, D. (1974). The black inner city as frontier outpost: Images and behavior of a Philadelphia neighborhood. Washington, DC: Association of American Geographers.
- Liggett, H. and Perry, D.C (1995). Spatial practices: An introduction. In: H. Liggett and D.C. Perry (eds.) *Spatial Practices: Critical Explorations in Social/Spatial Theory*. London: Sage, pp.1-12.
- Lindblom, C. E. (1959). The science of muddling through. *Public Administration Review* 19(2): 79-99.
- Lindblom, C. E. (1979). Still muddling, not yet through. *Public Administration Review* 39(6): 517-526.
- Logan, J.R. and Molotch, H. (1996 [1987]). The city as a growth machine. In: S. Fainstein and S. Campbell (eds.) *Readings in Urban Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.199-238.
- Low, S.M. and Lawrence-Zúñiga, D. (2003). Locating culture. In: S.M. Low and D. Lawrence-Zúñiga (eds.) *The Anthropology of Space and Place: Locating Culture*. Malden and Oxford. Blackwell, pp.1-48.
- Low, S. M. and Smith, N. (2006). Introduction: The imperative of public space. In: S.M. Low and N. Smith (eds.) *The Politics of Public Space*. New York and London: Routledge, pp.1-16.
- Lynch, K. (1960). *The Image of the City*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Maclver, R.M. (1924). *Community: A Sociological Study*. New York: Macmillan.
- Madanipour, A. (1995). Reading the city. In: P. Healey, S. Cameron, S. Davoudi, S. Graham and A. Madanipour (eds.) *Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*. London: John Wiley, pp.21-26.
- Madanipour, A., Healey, P. and Hull, A. (2001). Introduction. In: A. Madanipour, A. Hull and P. Healey (eds.) *The Governance of Place, Space and Planning Processes*. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp.1-18.

- Magnusson, W. (1996). *The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Political Experience*. Toronto: The University of Toronto Press.
- Malpas, J. (1999). *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mäntysalo, R. (2005). Approaches to participation in urban planning theories. In: I. Zetti and S. Brand (eds.) *Rehabilitation of Urban Areas: Brozzi and Le Piagge Neighbourhoods*. Florence: University of Florence, pp.23-38.
- Marcuse, P. (2009). Postscript: Beyond the just city to the right to the city. In: P. Marcuse, J. Conolly, J. Novy, I. Olivo, C. Potter, and J. Steil (eds.) *Searching for the Just City: Debates in Urban Theory and Practice*. New York: Routledge. pp.240-254.
- Marcuse, P. (2013). The five paradoxes of public space, with proposals. *Peter Marcuse's Blog*. Retrieved from: <http://pmarcuse.wordpress.com/2013/05/12/blog-33-the-five-paradoxes-of-public-space-with-proposals/-_ftn2> (accessed on 1 August 2013).
- Marston, S. (2003). Mobilizing geography: Locating space in social movement theory. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 8(2): 227-231.
- Martin, D.G. and Miller, B. (2003). Space and contentious politics. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 8(2): 143-156.
- Marx, K. (1904 [1859]). *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company.
- Marx, K. (1992 [1867]). *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I*. London: Pelican Books.
- Massey, D. (1984). Introduction: Geography matters. In: D. Massey and J. Allen (eds.) *Geography Matters*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.1-11.
- Massey, D. (1991). A global sense of place. *Marxism Today* 38: 24-29.
- Massey, D. (1992). Politics and space/time. *New Left Review* 1/196: 65-84.
- Massey, D. (1994). *Space, Place, Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Massey, D. (1996). Politicising space and place. *Scottish Geographical Magazine* 112(2): 117-123.
- Massey, D. (1999). *Power-Geometries and the Politics of Space-Time*. Hettner Lecture, Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg, Department of Geography.
- Massey, D. (2005). *For Space*. London: Sage.
- Massey, D. (2009). Concepts of space and power in theory and in political practice. *Documents d'Anàlisi Geogràfica* 55: 15-26.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1890-1970*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- McAdam, D. and Snow, D. A. (1997). Social movements: Conceptual and theoretical issues. In: D. McAdam and D. A. Snow (eds.) *Social Movements: Readings on their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamic*. Los Angeles: Roxbury, pp.xviii-xxvi.
- McCarney, P.L. (1996). Considerations on the notion of "governance"—New directions for cities in the developing world. in: P.L. McCarney (ed.) *Cities and Governance: New Directions in Latin America, Asia and Africa*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp.3-20.
- McCarthy, J and Zald, M. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology* 82(6): 1212-1241.
- McLeod, M. (1996). Everyday and "other" spaces. In: D. Coleman, E. Danze, and C. Henderson (eds.) *Architecture and Feminism*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, pp.1-37.
- Merrifield, A. (1993). Place and space: A Lefebvrian reconciliation. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 18(4): 516-531.
- Merrifield, A. (2000). Henri Lefebvre: A socialist in space. In: M. Crang and N. Thrift (eds.) *Thinking Space*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.167-182.
- Merrifield, A. (2002). *Dialectical Urbanism: Social Struggles in the Capitalist City*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Merrifield, A. (2006). *Henri Lefebvre: A Critical Introduction*. New York and London: Routledge.

- Merrifield, A. (2008). Lefebvre and Debord: A Faustian fusion. In: K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom and C. Schmid (eds.) *Space, Difference, Everyday: Reading Henri Lefebvre*. New York and London: Routledge, pp.176-189.
- Merrifield, A. (2015). Amateur urbanism. *City* 19(5): 753-62.
- Merrifield, A. and Swyngedouw, E. (1997). Social justice and the urban experience: An introduction. In: A. Merrifield and E. Swyngedouw (eds.) *The Urbanization of Injustice*. New York: New York University Press, pp.1-17.
- Midgley, J., Hall, A., Hardiman, M. and Narine, D. (1986). *Community Participation, Social Development and the State*. London: Methuen.
- Miller, B. (2000). *Geography and Social Movements*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Miraftab, F. (2009). Insurgent planning: Situation radical planning in the Global South. *Planning Theory* 8(1): 32-50.
- Mitlin, D. and Thompson, J. (1995). Participatory approaches in urban areas: Strengthening civil society or reinforcing the status quo? *Environment and Urbanization* 7(1): 231-250.
- Mora, J.C. (1991). *Juntas Progresistas: Organización Autónoma Costarricense 1921-1980*. San José: Fundación Friedrich Ebert.
- Mora, S. (2009). Desunión y distanciamiento: Conflicto e interpretaciones de la Huelga del Magisterio Nacional. *Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos* 35-36: 149-170.
- Morales, R. (2012). De los movimientos a la acción política: Mujeres organizadas en los comités patrióticos de Costa Rica en la lucha contra el Tratado de Libre Comercio. *Rupturas* 1(2): 190-215.
- Morton, T. (2013). *Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Moser, CON (1983). The problem of evaluating community participation in urban development. In: CON Moser (ed.) *Evaluating Community Participation in Urban Development Projects*. London: Development Project Unit, working paper 14, pp.3-11.
- Mouffe, C. (1995). Post-Marxism: Democracy and identity. *Environment and Planning D* 13: 259-265.
- Municipalidad de San José (MSJ) (2006). *Proceso de Participación Ciudadana para el Mejoramiento de Barrios*. San José: Publicaciones MSJ.
- Municipalidad de San José (MSJ) (2008). *Propuesta Instituto de Formación y Desarrollo Municipal*. San José: Publicaciones MSJ.
- Municipalidad de San José (MSJ) (2010). *Información Básica del Cantón de San José*. San José: Publicaciones MSJ.
- Municipalidad de San José (MSJ) (2011). *Plan de Desarrollo Municipal 2012-2016*. San José: Publicaciones MSJ.
- Murdoch, J. (2006). *Post-structuralist Geography: An Guide to Relational Space*. London: Sage.
- Newman, S. (2011) Postanarchism and space: Revolutionary fantasies and autonomous zones. *Planning Theory* 10(4): 344-365.
- Nicolas-Le Strat, P. (2008). Multiplicité interstitielle. *Multitudes* 31: 115-121.
- O'Brien, R. (1992). *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography*. London: Pinter.
- Offe, C. (1985). New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional politics. *Social Research* 52(4): 817-868.
- Offe, C. (1987). *Contradictions of the Welfare State*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Ohmae, K. (1995). *The End of the Nation State*. New York: The Free Press.
- Pakulski, J. (1991). *Social Movements: The Politics of Moral Protest*. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.
- Parker, S. (2004). *Urban Theory and the Urban Experience: Encountering the City*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Pateman, C. (1970). *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Peattie, L.R. (1968a). *The View from the Barrio*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Peattie, L.R. (1968b). Reflections on advocacy planning. *Journal of the American Institute of Planning* 31(4): 331-338.
- Peet, R. (1998). *Modern Geographical Thought*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Pérez-Gómez, A. (2000 [1983]). Introduction to architecture and the crisis of modern science. In: K.M. Hays (ed.) *Architecture Theory since 1968*. Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, pp.466-475.
- Philo, C. (2007). 'Belicose history' and 'local discursivities': An archaeological reading of Michel Foucault's *Society Must be Defended*. In: J.W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp.341-368.
- Pickvance, C. (1985). The rise and fall of urban movements and the role of comparative analysis. *Environment and Planning D* 3(1): 31-53.
- Pickvance, C., 2003. From urban social movements to urban movements: A review and introduction to a symposium on urban movements. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(1): 102-109.
- Pile, S. (1997). Introduction: Opposition, political identities and spaces of resistance. In: S. Pile and M. Keith (eds.) *Geographies of Resistance*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.1-32.
- Pile, S. and Keith, M. (eds.) (1997) *Geographies of Resistance*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Piven, F.F. and Cloward, R.A. (1979 [1977]). *Poor People's Movements: Why they Succeed, how they Fail*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Poster, M. (2001 [1988]). Introduction. In: Poster, M. (ed). *Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings*. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Poulsen, B. (2012). Being amused by apophenia: Can we find pleasure and amusement in faulty reasoning? *Psychology Today*. Retrieved from <<https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/reality-play/201207/being-amused-apophenia>> (accessed on 12 December 2015).
- Purcell, M. (2003). Citizenship and the right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 27(3): 564-590.
- Raco, M. and Imrie, R. (2000), Governmentality and rights and responsibilities in urban policies. *Environment and Planning A* 32(12): 2187-2204.
- Rancière, J. (1999). *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rancière, J. (2004 [2000]). *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible*. London and New York: Continuum.
- Rapley, T.M. (2001). The art(fulness) of open-ended interviewing: Some consideration on analyzing interviews. *Qualitative Research* 1(3): 303-323.
- Ratti, C. and Helbing, D. (2016). The hidden danger of big data. *Project Syndicate: Innovation & Technology*. Retrieved from: <<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/data-optimization-danger-by-carlo-ratti-and-dirk-helbing-2016-08>> (Accessed on 18 August 2016).
- Raventós, C. (2008a). Costa Rica: El referéndum, el poder político y la participación ciudadana. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 121(3): 9-12.
- Raventós, C. (2008b). Balance del referendo sobre el TLC en Costa Rica a la luz de la teoría de la democracia. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 121(3): 13-29.
- Raventós, C. (unpublished). Cultura política y participación en Costa Rica. Article elaborated in the frame of the investigation "Participación política y electoral 2006". San José: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, Universidad de Costa Rica.
- Ravetz, A. (1980). *Remaking Cities: Contradictions of the Recent Urban Environment*. London: Croom Helm.
- Rayner, J. (2008). Vecinos, ciudadanos y patriotas: Los Comités Patrióticos y el espacio-temporalidad de oposición al neoliberalismo en Costa Rica. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 121(3): 71-87.

- Rayner, J. (2014). "A new way of doing politics": The movement against CAFTA in Costa Rica. *CUNY Academic Works*. New York: City University of New York.
- Reed, A. (2000). *Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene*. New York: The New Press.
- Relph, E. (1976). *Place and Placelessness*. London: Pion.
- Rescher, N. (1979). *Leibniz: An Introduction to his Philosophy*. New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Retana, J.C. (2000). ¿Hacia dónde va la planificación urbana en Costa Rica? (Una interpretación sociológica). *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 88: 97-108.
- Retana, J.C. & Sura, A. (1998). *Un Aporte Sociológico en torno a la Planificación Urbana de Costa Rica, a partir de la Segregación Urbana: Ruptura del Anillo de Contención del Crecimiento Urbano, del Plan Regional, GAM 1986-1990*. Tesis de licenciatura. Heredia: Universidad Nacional.
- Rivera, R. (1998). *La Descentralización Real en Costa Rica*. San José: Flacso.
- Robinson, I. (ed.) (1972). *Decision-Making in Urban Planning*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Rojas, M. (ed.) (1989). *Costa Rica: La Democracia Inconclusa*. San José: Departamento Ecueménico de Investigaciones.
- Rose, N. (1999). *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Routledge, P. (1993). *Terrains of Resistance: Nonviolent Social Movements and the Contestation of Place in India*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Routledge, P. (2003). Convergence space: Process geographies of grassroots globalization networks. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographies* 28(3): 333-349.
- Rubin, I.I. (1990 [1928]). *Essays on Marx's Theory of Value*. Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books.
- Ruggie, J.G. (1993). Territoriality and beyond: Problematising modernity in international relations. *International Organization* 47(1): 139-174.
- Sack, R.D. (1997). *Homo Geographicus: A Framework for Action, Awareness, and Moral Concern*. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press.
- Said, E. (2000). *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Salas, M. (2010). *Movimiento Social contra el TLC en Costa Rica: Una Mirada desde los Actores Sociales*. San José: Perro Azul.
- Sandercock, L. (1998a). *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities*. Chichester: Wiley.
- Sandercock, L. (ed.) (1998b). *Making the Invisible Visible: A Multicultural Planning History*. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.
- Sandercock, L. and Forsyth, A. (1992). Feminist theory and planning theory: The new epistemological links. *Planning Theory Newsletter* 7(8): 45-49.
- Sanders, I.T. (1970). The concept of community development. in: L.J. Cary (ed.) *Community Development as a Process*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, pp.9-31.
- Sassen, S. (1990). Economic restructuring and the American city. *Annual Review of Sociology* 16: 465-490.
- Schmid, C. (2005). *Stadt, Raum und Gesellschaft: Henri Lefebvre und die Theorie der Produktion des Raumes*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH.
- Schmid, C. (2008). Henri Lefebvre's theory of production of space: Towards a three-dimensional dialectic. In: K. Goonewardena, S. Kipfer, R. Milgrom and C. Schmid (eds.) *Space, Difference, Everyday: Reading Henri Lefebvre*. New York and London: Routledge, pp.27-45.
- Scholte, J.A. (1996). The geography of collective identities in a globalizing world. *Review of International Political Economy* 3(4): 565-607.
- Schön, D. (1983). *The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action*. New York: Basic Books.

- Schumpeter, J. (1974 [1942]). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.
- Schuurman, F.J. (1989). Urban social movements: Between regressive utopia and socialist panacea. In: F.J. Schuurman and T. van Naerssen (eds.) *Urban Social Movements in the Third World*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.1-26.
- Scott, J.C. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, J.C. (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Scott, A.J. and Roweis S.T. (1977). Urban planning in theory and practice: A reappraisal. *Environment and Planning A* 9(10): 1097-1119.
- Scruton, R. (1996 [1994]). *Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Scruton, R. (2002 [1984]). *A Short History of Modern Philosophy: From Descartes to Wittgenstein*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sennett, R. (2012). The occupy movements have dramatised the questions about public space: Who owns it? And who can use it? *LSE British Politics and Policy Blog*. Retrieved from: <<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/27607>> (accessed on 5 May 2013).
- Sennett, R. (2013 [2006]). The open city. In: W. Wang (ed.) *Culture: City*. Berlin: Akademie der Künste, pp.50-54.
- Shields, R. (1996). *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle: Spatial Dialectics*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Shor, I. (1992). *Empowering Education: Critical Teaching for Social Change*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Shukaitis, S. (2009). *Imaginal Machines: Autonomy & Self-organization in the Revolutions of Everyday Life*. New York: Autonomedia.
- Smith, H. (2004). Costa Rica's Triangle of Solidarity: Can government-led spaces for negotiation enhance the involvement of civil society in governance? *Environment and Urbanization* 16(1): 63-78.
- Smith, H. and Valverde, J.M. (2001). When community development becomes a political bargaining tool: The case for structural change in low income housing provision in Costa Rica. In: M. Carley, P. Jenkins and H. Smith (eds.) *Urban Development and Civil Society: The Role of Communities in Sustainable Cities*. London: Earthscan, pp.121-138.
- Smith, M.K. (2001). Community in the encyclopedia of informal education. Retrieved from: <<http://www.infed.org/community/community.htm>> (accessed on 21 June 2016).
- Smith, N. (1984). *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*. Oxford and New York: Blackwell.
- Smith, N. (1992). Geography, difference and the politics of scale. In: J. Doherty, E. Graham and M. Malek (eds.) *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*. New York and London: Macmillan, pp.57-79.
- Smith, N. (2004). Scale bending and the fate of the national. In: E. Sheppard and R.B. McMaster (eds.) *Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society and Method*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, pp.192-212.
- Smith, P. (2001). *Cultural theory: An Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Sohn, H. (2008). Heterotopia: Anamesis of a medical term. In: M. Dehaene and L. De Caeter (eds.) *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in Postcivil Society*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.41-50.
- Soja, E. (1980). The socio-spatial dialectic. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 70(2): 207-225.
- Soja, E. (1987). Economic restructuring and the internationalization of the Los Angeles region. In: M.P. Smith and J. Feagin (eds.) *The Capitalist City*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, pp.178-198.
- Soja, E. (1989). *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*. London and New York: Verso.

- Soja, E. (1993). Postmodern geographies and the critique of historicism. In: J.P. Jones III, W. Natter, and T.R. Schatzki (eds.) *Postmodern Contentions: Epochs, Politics, Space*. New York: Guilford, pp.113-136.
- Soja, E. (1996). *Thirdspace: Journey to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Soja, E. (1997). Planning in/for postmodernity. In: G. Benko and U. Strohmayr (eds.) *Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity*. Oxford and Malden: Blackwell, pp.236-249.
- Soja, E. (2000). *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions*. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell.
- Soja, E. (2003). Writing the city spatially. *City* 7(3): 269-280.
- Soja, E. (2009). Taking space personally. In: B. Warf and S. Arias (eds.) *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.11-35.
- Soja, E. (2010a). *Seeking Spatial Justice*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Soja, E. (2010b). Spatializing the urban—part I. *City* 14(6): 629-635.
- Soja, E., 2010c. Excerpt from 'Ed Soja: Putting space first...and demanding more'. *City analysis* [e-journal]. Retrieved from: <<http://www.city-analysis.net/2011/01/30/spatializing-the-urban>> (accessed 18 January 2011).
- Soja, E. and Hooper, B. (2002 [1993]). The spaces that difference makes. In: M. Dear and S. Flusty (eds.) *The Spaces of Postmodernity: Readings in Human Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.378-389.
- Sojo, C. (2004). Líneas de tensión: Gestión política de la reforma económica—El Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE) y la privatización de empresas públicas. *Políticas Sociales*: 33-48.
- Solís, M. (2002). Entre el cambio y la tradición: El fracaso de la privatización de la energía y las telecomunicaciones en Costa Rica. *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 95(1): 33-48.
- Souza, M.L. (2000). Urban development on the basis of autonomy: A politico-philosophical and ethical framework for urban planning and management. *Ethics, Policy & Environment* 3(2): 187-201.
- Souza, M.L. (2006). Together *with* the state, *despite* the state, *against* the state: Social movements as 'critical urban planning' agents. *City* 10(3): 327-342.
- Souza, M.L. (2010). *Which* right to *which* city? In defense of political-strategic clarity. *Interface* 2(1): 315-333.
- Stanek, Ł. (2011). *Henri Lefebvre on Space: Architecture, Urban Research and the Production of Theory*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press.
- Stavrakakis, Y. (1999). *Lacan and the Political: Thinking the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Streeck, W. (2016). "Order is an exception, not the rule": An interview with Wolfgang Streeck. In: Verso blog. Retrieved from: <http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2807-order-is-an-exception-not-the-rule-an-interview-with-wolfgang-streeck> (accessed on 29 August 2016).
- Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos (interviewed by Julio Scherer García) (2001). La entrevista insólita. *Proceso* 1271: 11-16.
- Susser, I. (2002). *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Swyngedouw, E. (1996). Reconstructing citizenship, the re-scaling of the state and the new authoritarianism: Closing the Belgian mines. *Urban Studies* 33(8): 1499-1521.
- Swyngedouw, E. (1997). Neither global nor local: 'Glocalization' and the politics of scale. In: K.R. Cox (ed.) *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*. New York and London: The Guilford Press, pp.137-166.
- Swyngedouw, E. (2000). Authoritarian governance, power and the politics of rescaling. *Environment and Planning D* 18(1): 63-76.
- Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodríguez, A. (2002). Neoliberal urbanization in Europe: Large-scale urban development projects and the new urban policy. *Antipode* 34(3): 542-577.

- Swyngedouw, E., Moulaert, F. and Rodríguez, A. (2003). The world in a grain of sand: Large-scale urban development projects and the dynamics of 'glocal' transformations. In: F. Moulaert, A. Rodríguez, and E. Swyngedouw (eds.) *The Globalized City: Restructuring and Social Polarization in European Cities*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.9-28.
- Tarrow, S. (1988). National politics and collective action: Recent theory and research in Western Europe and the United States. *Annual Review of Sociology* 14: 421-440.
- Tarrow, S. (1998). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, N. (1998). *Urban Planning Theory since 1945*. London: Sage.
- Tenhunen, S. (2011). Culture, conflict, and translocal communication: Mobile technology and politics in Rural West Bengal, India. *Ethnos* 76(3): 398-420.
- Thomas, M. (1982 [1979]). The procedural planning theory of A. Faludi. In: C. Paris (ed.) *Critical Readings in Planning Theory*. Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, pp.13-25.
- Thrift, N. (1996). *Spatial Formations*. London: Sage.
- Thrift, N. (1999). Steps to an ecology of place. In: D. Massey, J. Allen and P. Sarre (eds.) *Human Geography Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Thrift, N. (2004). Summoning life. In: P. Cloke, P. Crang and M. Goodwin (eds.) *Envisioning Human Geographies*. London: Arnold, pp.81-103.
- Thrift, N. (2006). Space. *Theory, Culture & Society* 23(2-3): 139-155.
- Thrift, N. (2007). Overcome by space: Reworking Foucault. In: J.W. Crampton and S. Elden (eds.) *Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp.53-58.
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Tilly, C. (2008). *Contentious Performances*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Touraine, A. (1971). *The Post Industrial Society*. New York: Random House.
- Touraine, A. (1981). *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Trejos, M.E. (2008). Institucionalización del movimiento social: La oposición al TLC en Costa Rica. In: bilaterals.org, BIOTHAI and GRAIN (eds.) *Combatiendo los TLC: La Creciente Resistencia a los Tratados Bilaterales de Comercio e Inversión*. Retrieved from: <<http://www.bilaterals.org/fightingFTA-es-Hi.pdf>> (accessed on 23 May 2013).
- Tuan, Y-F. (2001 [1977]). *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience*. Minneapolis and London: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Vallès, J.M. (2001). La acción colectiva: Los grupos de interés y los movimientos sociales. In: J.M. Vallès (ed.) *Curso de Ciencia Política*. Barcelona: Ariel, pp.229-344.
- Valverde, J.M. (1998). Descentralización y política social. In: Unicef (ed.) *Política Social y Descentralización en Costa Rica*. San José: Unicef.
- Valverde, J.M. and Trejos, M.A. (1993). Diez años de luchas urbanas en Costa Rica (1982-1992). *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 61: 7-16.
- van Kempen, R. and Marcuse, P. (1997). A new spatial order in cities? *American Behavioral Scientist* 41(3): 285-298.
- Vega, J.L. (1987). *Aspectos Organizativos y Estratégicos del Desarrollo Comunal en Costa Rica*. San José: Mimeo.
- Verhaeghe, P. (2001). *Beyond Gender: From Subject to Drive*. New York: Other Press.
- Veyne, P. (2014 [2008]). *Foucault: Pensamiento y Vida*. Barcelona: Paidós.
- Vickers, G. (1995). *The Art of Judgement: A Study of Policy Making*. London: Sage.
- Voth, D. and Brewster M. (1989). An overview of international community development. In: J.A. Christenson and J.W. Robinson, Jr. (eds.) *Community Development in Perspective*. Ames: Iowa State University Press, pp.280-305.
- Wainwright, J. and Barnes, J.B. (2009). Nature, economy, and the space-place distinction. *Environment and Planning D* 27(6): 966-986.

- Waldman, K. (2014). It's all connected: What links creativity, conspiracy theories, and delusions? A phenomenon called apophenia. Slate. Retrieved from: <http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2014/09/apophenia_makes_unrelated_things_seem_connected_metaphors_paranormal_beliefs.html> (accessed on 13 November 2015).
- Ward, S. (2004). *Planning and Urban Change*. London: Sage.
- Warf, B. (2009). From surfaces to networks. In: B. Warf and S. Arias (eds.) *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.59-76.
- Warf, B. and Arias, S. (2009). Introduction: The reinsertion of space in the humanities and social sciences. In: B. Warf and S. Arias (eds.) *The Spatial Turn: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*. London and New York: Routledge, pp.1-10.
- Watson, V., 2003. Conflicting rationalities: Implications for planning theory and ethics. *Planning Theory and Practice*, 4(4), pp.395-407.
- Weiler, H.N. (2009). Whose knowledge matters? Development and the politics of knowledge. In: T. Hanf, H.N. Weiler and H. Dickow (eds.) *Entwicklung als Beruf*. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp.485-496.
- West, C. (2011). Cornel West: How intellectuals betrayed the poor [video online]. Retrieved from: <<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-rcQZxawdWk>> (accessed on 12 May 2015).
- West, D. (2013). *Social Movements in Global Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Wieviorka, M. (2003). After new social movements. *Social Movement Studies* 4(1): 1-19.
- Wildavsky, A. (2007 [1979]). *Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
- Wildavsky, A. (1973). If planning is everything, maybe it's nothing. *Policy Sciences* 4(2): 127-153.
- Wilson, A. (2000). *Complex Spatial Systems: The Modelling Foundations of Urban and Regional Analysis*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
- Wolf, K.D. (2002). Contextualizing normative standards for legitimate governance beyond the state. In: J.R. Grote and B. Gbikpi (eds.) *Participatory Governance: Political and Societal Implications*. Opladen: Leske+Budrich, pp.35-50.
- Wolford, W. (2003). Family, fields, and fighting for land: The spatial dynamics of contention in rural Brazil. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 8(2): 201-215.
- Woodbridge, R. (2003). *Historia de la Arquitectura en Costa Rica*. Cartago: Editorial Tecnológica de Costa Rica.
- Yap, K.S. (1990). Community participation in low-income housing projects: Problems and prospects. *Community Development Journal* 25(1): 56-65.
- Yin, R.K. (2003). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. London: Sage.
- Yitfachel, O. (1998). Planning and social control: Exploring the "dark side". *Journal of Planning Literature* 12(4): 395-406.
- Yitfachel, O. (2007). Introduction: Outlining the power of planning. In: O. Yitfachel, J. Little, D. Hedgcock and I. Alexander (eds.) *The Power of Planning: Spaces of Control and Transformation*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.1-20.
- Yitfachel, O. (2009). Critical theory and 'gray space': Mobilization of the colonized. *City* 13(2-3): 246-263.
- Young, I.M. (1990). *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zibechi, R. (2000 [1999]). *La Mirada Horizontal: Movimientos Sociales y Emancipación*. Quito: Editorial Abya-Yala.
- Zibechi, R. (2003). *La Genealogía de la Revuelta. Argentina: La Sociedad en Movimiento*. La Plata: Letra Libre.
- Zibechi, R. (2007). *Autonomías y Emancipaciones: América Latina en Movimiento*. Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos.
- Žižek, S. (2006a). Philosophy, the "unknown knowns", and the public use of reason. *Topoi* (25): 137-142.

- Žižek, S. (2006b). Jacques Lacan's four discourses. In: Lacan.com. Retrieved from: <http://www.lacan.com/zizfour.htm> (accessed on 1 October 2015).
- Žižek, S. (2006c). *How to Read Lacan*. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
- Žižek, S. (2008 [1989]). *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. (2008 [1991]). *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor*. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. (2008). The ambiguous legacy of '68: Forty years ago, what was revolutionized—the world or capitalism? In *These Times*. Retrieved from: http://inthesetimes.com/%20article/3751/the_ambiguous_legacy_of_68/ (accessed on 12 January 2011).
- Žižek, S. (2012a). *The Year of Dreaming Dangerously*. London: Verso.
- Žižek, S. (2012b). *The Pervert's Guide to Ideology*. Documentary film directed by Sophie Fiennes. United Kingdom: P Guide Productions and Zeitgeist Films.
- Žižek, S. (2015). The freedom of force choice [video online]. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hukgmURSSGQ> (accessed on 22 September 2015).

Appendixes

<i>Topics addressed</i>	<i>Interviewees</i>								
	Paso Ancho activist 1	Paso Ancho activist 2	Academic/activist	Activist	Local official (high tier)	Local official (middle tier)	Local official (middle tier)	Local official (low tier)	Academics/researchers
Genealogy of citizen mobilization	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>						
Stages of citizen mobilization (actions, tactics, constrains, challenges, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>						
Historical background (e.g., urban citizen mobilization, community organizing, institutional development)	<input type="radio"/>								
Community organizing (theoretical/practical appraisal, future perspectives, challenges, hurdles, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>			<input type="radio"/>					<input type="radio"/>
Local development (theoretical/practical appraisal, future perspectives, challenges, hurdles, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>			<input type="radio"/>					<input type="radio"/>
Citizen (political) participation (theoretical/practical appraisal, decision-making mechanisms, hurdles, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>								
Planning (theoretical and practical approach, scale of actions, role of communities, etc.)									
Local government/governance (local officials-communities relationship, tokenism vs. community empowerment, etc.)	<input type="radio"/>			<input type="radio"/>					<input type="radio"/>

○ MICRO SCALE ('Locale', barrio)

<i>Topics addressed</i>	<i>Interviewees</i>								
	Paso Ancho activist 1	Paso Ancho activist 2	Academic/activist	Activist	Local official (high tier)	Local official (middle tier)	Local official (middle tier)	Local official (low tier)	Academics/researchers
Genealogy of citizen mobilization			<input checked="" type="radio"/>						
Stages of citizen mobilization (actions, tactics, constrains, challenges, etc.)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>		<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>					
Historical background (e.g., urban citizen mobilization, community organizing, institutional development)	<input checked="" type="radio"/>		<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>					<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Community organizing (theoretical/practical appraisal, future perspectives, challenges, hurdles, etc.)				<input checked="" type="radio"/>					<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Local development (theoretical/practical appraisal, future perspectives, challenges, hurdles, etc.)				<input checked="" type="radio"/>		<input checked="" type="radio"/>		<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Citizen (political) participation (theoretical/practical appraisal, decision-making mechanisms, hurdles, etc.)							<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>
Planning (theoretical and practical approach, scale of actions, role of communities, etc.)					<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			
Local government/governance (local officials-communities relationship, tokenism vs. community empowerment, etc.)			<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>			<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>	<input checked="" type="radio"/>

● MESO SCALE (Costa Rica, canton, district)

Appendix 1. Thematic 'mapping' of the interviews: Situating opinions and accounts. Source: own elaboration

Interviewee	Profession/Position	Institutional affiliation	Date	Place
Mathew Griffin	Architect/urban activist	Deadline—Office for architectural services	06/12/2012	Berlin, Germany
Edison Valverde	Activist	Paso Ancho's patriotic committee	03/01/2013	Paso Ancho, San José, Costa Rica
Manuel Solís	Researcher and university professor/activist	Institute of Social Research, University of Costa Rica (IIS-UCR)/Curridabat's patriotic committee	08/01/2013	San Pedro de Montes de Oca, San José, Costa Rica
Héctor Ferlini	University professor/activist	School of Collective Communications Sciences, University of Costa Rica (UCR)/SURCOS Newsletter	24/01/2013	Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, San José, Costa Rica
Patricia Zúñiga	Head of the Department of Urbanism	Municipality of San José (MSJ)	25/01/2013	San José, Costa Rica
Johnny Viquez	Head of the Department of Citizen Participation	Municipality of San José (MSJ)	25/01/2013	San José, Costa Rica
Jeannette Rosales	Head of the Department of Community Organization Strengthening and Neighborhood Upgrading	Municipality of San José (MSJ)	25/01/2013	San José, Costa Rica
Xinia Campos	Head of the Cantonal Development Plans and Operative Annual Plans Unit	Municipality of San José (MSJ)	30/01/2013	San José, Costa Rica
Javier Ureña	Head of the Institute of Municipal Training and Local Development, The Distance State University (IFCMDL-UNED)	The Distance State University of Costa Rica (UNED)	30/01/2013	Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, San José, Costa Rica
Italo Fera	Local Management Program of the Institute of Municipal Training and Local Development, The Distance State University (IFCMDL-UNED)	The Distance State University of Costa Rica (UNED)	07/02/2013	Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, San José, Costa Rica
Carolina Somarribas	Local Management Program of the Institute of Municipal Training and Local Development, The Distance State University (IFCMDL-UNED)	The Distance State University of Costa Rica (UNED)	07/02/2013	Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, San José, Costa Rica
Eugenia Molina	University Professor/researcher	School of Sociology, University of Costa Rica (UCR)	07/02/2013	Sabanilla de Montes de Oca, San José, Costa Rica
Juan Carlos Bermúdez	Business owner	Paso Ancho's patriotic committee	08/02/2013	Paso Ancho, San José, Costa Rica

Appendix 2. List of interviewees (in chronological order).

Figure	Page	Image	Source
4.1	101	1	http://mapregions.com/index.php/tag/mapquest-europe/
		2	https://commons.wikimedia.org
		3	Consejo Nacional de Planificación Urbana (2013: 8)
		4	Google Maps
		5	http://tecdigital.tec.ac.cr/servicios/gam/
4.6	105	1	http://www.condominioscostarica.com
		2	http://www.diarioextra.com
		3	http://catcomm.org/latin-america-map/#prettyPhoto
		4	http://www.amprensa.com
		5	nacion.com
4.7	109	1	www.elpais.cr
		2	Trejos (2008: 92)
		3	http://www.skyscrapercity.com
		4	http://derechoshumanoscr.wordpress.com
		5	http://comitedelasbarras.blogspot.de
4.8	114	1	Google Maps
		2	https://www.msj.go.cr/informacion_ciudadana/SiteAssets/RDU2014/PDU2014_14_Barrios.jpg
		3	Google Maps
		4	Google Maps
		5	The author
		6	The author
		7	The author
4.9	115	1	www.nacion.com
		2	The author
		3	The author
		4	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		5	Picasaweb
		6	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
4.10	119	1	Google Maps
		2	The author
		3	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		4	The author
		5	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		6	The author
		7	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		8	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
4.11	120	1	The author
		2	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		3	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		4	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		5	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho
		6	The author
		7	Facebook Page of Paso Ancho

Appendix 3. Sources of images used in (indicated) figures.