Housing and Governance:
Perspectives, Policy and Practice in Global South Cities
The Case of Nairobi

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Dedication: To those fervently searching for answers to the urban South crisis
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Abstract

Ongoing deepening globalisation and rapid urbanisation trends, coupled with political and socio-economic insufficiencies are resulting in severe societal problems globally. However, the situation is exacerbated in the Global South where most of this rapid urbanisation is concentrated, and which also suffers more from those insufficiencies. These have generated the so called ‘urban South’s crisis’ that is mainly exemplified by the prominence and persistence of informal settlements. The past six decades have seen the failure of several prescribed solutions attempting to deal with the urban South’s crisis, leading to not only paradigm shifts but also to competing approaches. Furthermore, the urban South housing arena has become very complex and fragmented, involving an ever increasing number of highly heterogeneous actors, with huge disparities in their not only in their roles, resources, power, and scales, but also in their interests and perspectives. Accordingly, the failure of housing policy and initiatives and persistence of housing problems in the urban South have often been attributed to unhealthy actors’ relations, arising from their conflicting interests and competition over power and resources. Furthermore, with the shift from ‘government to governance’ and the rise of ‘good governance’ prescriptions, ‘improved’ actors’ relations have increasingly been seen a prerequisite for dealing with the complex urban challenges in the Global South. Nevertheless, this study postulates that apart from conflicting interests and competition over power and resources, paradigmatic dimensions also play a crucial role in failure of initiatives and the perpetuation of the urban South housing crisis. Consequently, this study explores three urban South’s critical defining themes of ‘development, housing, and governance’; coupled with their ‘static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions’ which are integrated through Structuration theory as an analytical and interpretational framework. This framework guides this study’s theoretical discourses on the urban South crisis, and an empirical case study in the slums and housing arena in Nairobi, Kenya; and ultimately informs the resultant deduced implications to both theory and practice.

Key Words: Informal housing, multilevel stakeholders, paradigm shifts, Structuration, interests and perspectives.
Abstrakt


Schlüsselwörter: Informelles Wohnen, multilevel stakeholders, Paradigmenwechsel, Structuration, Interessen und Perspektiven
1. Introduction

The world is currently in the ‘urban millennium’, whose advent was marked by the attainment of the ‘irreversible tipping point’ in the year 2007, when the global urban population surpassed rural population (Konvitz, 1985, Crane and Kinzig, 2005, UNFPA, 2007, UN-Habitat, 2013b). Since the turning of the twentieth century the world has been experiencing unprecedented rapid urban growth. The proportion of the global population residing in urban areas has risen exponentially from 13% in the year 1900 to 52% in 2013, representing rise in urban population from 220 million to 3.5 billion people respectively. Accordingly, it is projected that by 2030, in all regions of the World, both the Global North and South, more people would be residing in the urban areas than in the rural areas, and approximately 60% of the global population would be urban. In this way “the wise man” Homo sapiens, whether wisely or not, will become Homo sapiens urbanus in virtually all countries in the world (UN-Habitat, 2012b, UNDESA, 2012, UN-Habitat, 2013b). Certainly, the significance of urbanisation and urban areas cannot be understated; while urban areas occupy only 2% of global surface area, they are currently accommodating more than half of the world population Furthermore, they generate more than 80% of global Gross domestic product (GDP) and account for 85% consumption of world resources and energy (World Bank, 2013e).

Figure 1: The Urban Millennium: Global urban population surpasses rural

Source: (World Bank, 2013f)

Historically, urbanisation has often represented human progress and prosperity. Hence, urban areas are usually portrayed as ‘incubators of civilisation’ and ‘engines of growth’, serving as centres for economic, technological, political and socio-cultural development. Currently, urbanisation is one of the major driving forces of globalisation by providing a global network of ‘competitive’ centres that set the physical reference points for the ongoing globalisation (UN-Habitat, 1996, Van der Merwe, 2004, Hesse, 2010). Conversely, globalisation is also a major driving force for the current rapid urbanisation, leading to a self-reinforcing loop of globalisation and urbanisation (Lewandowski and Streich, 2012). Those twin processes of globalisation and urbanisation ostensibly promise immense benefits and prosperity to humankind (Kirdar, 2003, Robertson, 2004, Thacker, 2008, Calitoiu, 2011). Urbanisation promises economic prosperity, enhanced social and cultural experience, more political freedoms, and a better living experience, by offering opportunities and amenities lacking in the rural areas (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2010a, Dima et al., 2011). Likewise, globalisation
promises increased economic and political freedom, cultural enrichment, technological advancement and quick solutions to global and local problems, through removing barriers and allowing wealth, culture and ideas to flow freely across borders (Gereffi et al., 2001, UN-Habitat, 2004, Sachs, 2005, Werhane, 2010). However, these urbanisation and globalisation processes also have severe negative implications. Moreover, these benefits and costs are not evenly distributed. While these processes have stimulated overall economic growth, the benefits have accrued only to a few. For the majority of the people globally, their real incomes have dwindled, poverty levels increased and facing serious political, socio-cultural and environmental degradation (Jones, 2010, Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2010a) For instance, half of the world’s population controlled only 1 per cent of the global wealth, and lived on less than two dollars a day (Hennig and Dorling, 2013, Kroll and Dolan, 2013, World Bank, 2013b).

Additionally, the twin processes have seemingly sparked the ‘race to the bottom’ involving countries and cities lowering taxes, standards and regulations for business, labour and environment, to attract international businesses relocating in pursuit of lower costs. This has led to low incomes, environmental degradation, negative health impacts, social exclusion, marginalisation, ‘informalisation’ and generally the urbanisation of poverty (Brecher and Costello, 1994, Mehta, 2000, UN-Habitat, 2004). Accordingly, many Global South countries have seen their socio-economic situation deteriorate rapidly since the 1980s’ (UNDP, 1999a). Consequently, there is increasing socio-economic disparities between global regions, countries, cities, neighbourhoods, and individuals, with worsening inequalities and polarisation. As exemplified in the Global South’s situation in the urban areas which have wide contrasts such as informal settlements in the shadows of luxurious apartments and/or skyscrapers hosting multi-billion dollar worth corporations. These Global South cities display stark dualities such that, spatially, these cities could be misconstrued as uncoordinated patchworks of informal settlements and gated communities, industrial zones and luxurious resorts, refugee camps and golf courses and many other fragments. Notwithstanding this, there are many existing informal-formal links and networks between these dualities (Coy, 2006, Anyamba, 2008, Charton-Bigot and Rodriguez-Torres, 2010).

In sum, ongoing globalisation and rapid urbanisation trends, coupled with political and socio-economic insufficiencies, are resulting in severe urban problems globally. However, the situation is exacerbated in the Global South which apart from bearing most of the current and future global urbanisation also suffers more from the said political and socio-economic insufficiencies, resulting in severe urban problems. These include: increasing poverty, inequities, injustices, and marginalisation for the majority of the urban population; accompanied by environmental degradation, collapse of political or economic systems, social fragmentation, escalating informalisation of various politico-economic aspects, and proliferation of slums. This conundrum of problems has often been referred to as the urbanisation or urban crisis of the Global south, or simply the ‘urban South crisis’ (Stren and White, 1989, Tostensen et al., 2001, Tibaijuka, 2004).

Accordingly, this study explores the Global south urban arena in view of the ongoing urbanisation and globalisation processes, focusing on the involved actors who are playing various roles in the urban
arena, either mitigating or exacerbating the ‘urban South crisis’. Hence, these actors, their actions and interactions are examined in their contextuality of time and space. Among others, this contextuality comprises of a milieu of ever-evolving policy directions amidst the impacts of rapid urbanisation and globalisation processes in the Global south. Indeed, the term ‘urban South’ has been applied to collectively describe the urban areas of the Global South. These comprise of highly varied urban environments scattered across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, sharing to varying degrees similar characteristics. These include tension amongst various paths to ‘development’ and ‘advancement’ including exogenous and endogenous paths, and also continuous and aggravated socio-political and economic conflicts pertaining to the use and control of their urban space (Al Sayyad, 2004, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). However, the prominence and persistence of informal settlements, in which a significant proportion of the urban South’s population live, lay supreme as a peculiar and common unifying factor defining the ‘urban south’ (Roy, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2010a, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Moreover, the ‘urban South crisis’ is for the most part exemplified by this prominence and persistence of informal settlements.

1.1. The urban South crisis

The notion of ‘urban South crisis’ has been applied upon the myriad complexities and problems facing Global South’s urban areas, arising from challenges of deepening globalisation and rapid urbanisation, amidst serious global and domestic policy, and politico-economic inadequacies. Since the 1950s, the world has undergone very rapid urbanisation. In 1950, the urban population was 732 million representing 29% of the global population. These figures have risen dramatically to 3.5 billion and 52% respectively, and 4.9 billion and 60% by 2030. Nonetheless, over 90% of this rapid urban growth since 1950 and almost all of the future urbanisation growth will be concentrated in the Global South. For instance, the by the year 2003 the urban land cover in Africa could be 590% above the 2000 level (UN-Habitat, 2009b, UNDESA, 2012). However, this recent rapid growth of the urban South is happening mainly through informal settlements, with many urban areas growing at the same rate as informal settlements, as illustrated by the urban growth rate of 4.58 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to their informal settlement growth rate of 4.53 per cent (UN-Habitat, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2010a). Subsequently, a third of the global urban population – or one billion people – resides in informal settlements. This number is projected to double to two billion by 2030 unless drastic measures are taken. Accordingly, the UN-Habitat (2013b) statistics show that collectively the Global South had 32.7% of its urban population in slums. However, a cursory glance at those statistics reveal that on average, most of the countries of Africa, and many in Asia and Latin America had more than half of their urban populations living in slums (see UN-Habitat, 2012b, UN-Habitat, 2013b). Additionally, according to United Nations’ definition and statistics, in some countries such as Sudan, Central African Republic and Chad, the informal settlements accommodated around 90% of their urban population (UN-Habitat, 2003, UN-Habitat, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2010a).
Figure 2: Percentage of urban population and agglomerations by size class, 1960, 2011, 2025

Source: (UNDESA, 2012)
Figure 3: Increase in urban population by major regions, 1950-2011 and 2011-2050

Notes: Per cent of total urban increase: 95% of future urban growth will be in the South
Source (adapted from UNDESA, 2012)

Figure 4: Proportion of urban population living in slum (per cent) in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% slum pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global South</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-eastern Asia</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Asia</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Africa</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Author's construct with data from UN-Habitat, 2012b)
Figure 5: Gross mismatches: Magnitude of slum problem vis-à-vis targets

For example, MDGs target 7d aims at a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020 while the projected number of slum dwellers in 2020 is 2 billion.

Source: (adapted from UN-Habitat, 2005)

Consequently, this proliferation and persistence of informal settlements has often been seen as being the main representation of the ‘urban South crisis’, and a physical and spatial manifestation of many societal ills, failures and injustices, including other situations gone bad both globally and locally (UN-Habitat, 2003, Rao, 2006). As stated by UN-Habitat (2003 pp.xxxii), informal settlements can be seen as the ‘products of failed policies, legal, regulatory and financial systems, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, dysfunctional land markets, unresponsive financial systems and a fundamental lack of political will’. As such, if there is no significant change in addressing and understanding the challenge, the current urban South crisis could be just but a tiny ‘glimpse of the future’ problem (World Bank, 2011e). In this way, informal settlements are seen as symptoms of many overt and benign problems. In sum, informal settlements are also seen as representing societal failure or unwillingness to deal with problems besetting the poor members of society. Moreover, depending on the prism through which the problem is viewed, according to different actors, and at different times in history, the urban South crisis and the problem of slums have been described differently, or have been described as different forms of societal failure. Depending on those perspectives, they have been labelled as economic or market failure, failure of policy and planning, or failure to modernise, benefit from or tame globalisation. Currently the urban South crisis is increasingly being viewed as failure in governance (UN-Habitat, 2003, Tosa, 2009, UN-Habitat, 2009b).

Certainly, since the urban South crisis emerged or became significant in many Global South countries in 1950, many global and local solutions, policies and actions have been prescribed and initiated. However, many of those prescribed solutions have generally failed to adequately deal with the crisis. Moreover, according to several studies, some of these solutions have in fact worsened the situation,
and in other cases the solutions themselves actually have become the problem (Syagga et al., 2001c, Ravallion, 2002). As such, there has been very great disparities between the intended and the actual outcomes from those prescribed solutions (Werlin, 1999). Hence, the solutions which were once proclaimed as being the panacea, have subsequently been deemed as being ineffective, inadequate, inappropriate or even harmful by various actors. This has in turn led to newer approaches at different times becoming dominant or to be perceived as the ‘most appropriate’ to deal with the urban South crisis. These dominant approaches and their shifts are encapsulated in this study through the concept of ‘paradigms’.

A ‘paradigm’ can be described as a set of basic assumptions, values, conceptualisations and practices that for a time, constitutes a way of viewing reality, and provides model problems and solutions for a community of theorists or practitioners (Kuhn, 1962b, Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Handa, 1987). Hence a ‘dominant paradigm’ would refer to the system of thought and values that are widely held and deemed most standard at a given historical moment. As follows a ‘paradigm shift’ would denote a radical change in ‘the prevailing view of things’ including the underlying beliefs, theories and practices. As such, a paradigm can also be seen as a commonality of perspective that would bind together a group of actors in space and time contextualities. As follows, an examination of the urban South arena, for instance through document analysis and other methods, reveals that each decade since the 1950s, has seen this shift in the dominant approach. These shifts have been so fundamental, including radical shifts in the framing and definition of the problem and its prescribed actors and solutions, among many others beyond mere policy changes. Consequently these decadian shifts, with their constituent elements such as the legal framework, actors, problem definition and solutions, could be described as being paradigmatic and involving paradigm shifts.

In each of the last six decades those prescribed solutions for the urban South crisis have been subjected to paradigm shifts and new conceptualisations of the solutions evolving mostly under the influence of the prevailing geo-political forces. Starting with modernisation in the 1950s, these decadian paradigmatic shifts have progressed sequentially to the current ‘good governance’ paradigm, heralded by a global shift on emphasis from ‘government’ to ‘governance. As a consequence, ‘good governance’ is currently being espoused by many actors as a panacea for various global and local problems, including the complex multifaceted urban challenges facing the Global South (UN-Habitat, 2003, Tosa, 2009, UN-Habitat, 2009b).

1.2. Research Rationale

The preceding discussions present the observations that since the 1950s, globalisation and urbanisation processes have contributed significantly to the urban South crisis whose main manifestation has been the growth of informal settlements. The crisis seems to have defied most of the prescribed countermeasures and the urban problems have not only persisted, they are also growing in magnitude. Accordingly, the past six decades have seen the failure of several prescribed solutions attempting to deal with the urban South’s crisis, leading to not only paradigm shifts but also to competing approaches. However more importantly, the situation is complicated further by the fact
that the urban South’s crisis and arena has over the years attracted more and more actors. The urban arena in the Global South has become very complex and fragmented, involving heterogeneous actors at various scales, actors who are greatly varied in their attitudes and attributes. These actors could be either global or local actors, formal or informal, legal or illegal, state or non-state, weak or powerful actors. Additionally, they not only have disparities in their resources, scales, power, roles and approaches, they have also competing interests, and different perspectives; all of which could be contributing to the failure of initiatives and thereby propagating the crisis.

1.2.1. Beyond interests

Indeed according to numerous scholarly and practice studies, much of the urban South housing arena is characterised with ‘unhealthy’ actors’ relations involving antagonism, conflicts, violence, unhealthy competition, misunderstandings and lack of political will; which have been blamed for the failure of many initiatives and the perpetuation of the urban South crisis. These unhealthy actors’ relations have mainly been blamed on conflicting interests and competition over power and resources (Sanyal and Mukhija, 2001, Syagga et al., 2001a, Imparato and Ruster, 2003, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Kedogo, 2009). Indeed, the current ‘good governance’ paradigm stresses that mediating those conflicting interests would lead to cooperation and resolution of the urban South crisis (Harpham and Boateng, 1997, Habitat, 2001, Habitat, 2002, Cities Alliance, 2006). However, this study postulates that those unhealthy actors’ relations cannot be blamed on conflicting interests alone, but that ‘paradigms’ could also be playing a significant role.

In view of the fact that deepening globalisation and rapid urbanisation in the Global South, with their accompanying positive and negative implications will continue for many more years, with the majority of the people in the urban South mainly receiving the negative impacts; it is easily predictable that unless drastic measures are taken, informal settlements will continue to be prominent features in the urban South. Furthermore, informal settlements will continue providing shelter to majority of the urban population which will also continue suffering from abject poverty. Consequently, since unhealthy actors’ relations have been blamed for contributing to the urban South crisis, an appreciation of the actors’ relations and the major factors influencing those relations is a condition sine qua non for both understanding and resolution of the urban South crisis. This includes uncovering both the underlying and overt issues that prevent the attainment of a common ground and affective cooperation, which lead to a fundamental lack of mutual understanding among the actors, evident in many urban South arenas. Furthermore these issues surrounding actors’ relations become even more significant in view of the prevailing ‘good governance’ paradigm; which is premised on productive negations, attainment of common ground, and multi-level urban governance systems that integrate well both vertically and horizontally. Thus any factor that may hinder mutual understanding becomes very critical. Thus, this appreciation could be a critical contribution towards a better multi-level governance system, effective housing initiatives, better resolution of the urban South crisis, meaningful improvements in the lives and housing conditions of the urban poor and slum dwellers, and ultimately more sustainable and inclusive urbanisation.
1.2.2. Need for more nuanced understanding: Issues, objectives, and methods

The myriad issues encompassing the urban South crisis are often subtle, hidden, ‘unknowable’ not easy to uncover, and may appear insignificant, yet they have extremely significant connotations; therefore necessitating a more nuanced understanding. Consequently, the overall goal of this study is to contribute to broadening the understanding of the so called urban South crisis especially on the issues surrounding the problem of informal settlements. The study aims to achieve this goal by interrogating the themes of Global South development, housing, and governance issues in the background of evolving approaches. The study uses the derived expositions to examine a Global South urban setting of Nairobi, Kenya, and its informal settlements’ arena, narratives, descriptions, and observations, and aims to generate relevant interpretations and arguments. This is with the aim of contributing further towards a better understanding of the urban South’s housing and governance issues. The hope is that the study will in some way contribute towards improvement of the urban South’s situation as pertaining to its discourse, theory and practice.

This entails an exploration into the question of why despite many global and local initiatives, principal commitments, good intentions and even rhetoric, the Urban South crisis and problem of informal settlements remains persistent. Indeed, the prescribed policies and initiatives have largely been ineffective or failed to meet the expected goals. Furthermore, there have been great variances between the expected results and the actual outcomes, while the urban South crisis has continued to grow unabated. Consequently, the main objective of this study is to contribute to a theoretical perspective on the urban South housing crisis firstly through a discursive politico-historical examination of urban South ‘development’, housing, and governance together with its geopolitico-economic milieu. Secondly, through an empirical investigation of the above emerging discourses in
Nairobi’s informal housing arena; and thirdly by obtaining their implications to theory and practice for Nairobi and the urban South crisis as well as its solutions. Undoubtedly, Nairobi exemplifies the situation in a typical Global South city; it typifies the character of the urban South with its postcolonial legacy, primacy, immense inequalities and injustices, soaring poverty levels for a segment of its population, elevated levels of informality and dualities, unbridled crime and conflicts, rampant corruption and arbitrary application of the law, multiple conflicting modes of transformation, and more importantly the prominence and persistence of slums. Certainly, slums are one of the most significant defining characteristics of the urban South and its many challenges. Therefore, a nuanced engagement of slums as a substantive issue, alongside the issue of involved actors' attitudes and attributes, changing approaches, including other surrounding matters and contexts could be helpful in shedding light on the issue of failure of initiatives and persistence of slums.

In pursuance of these objectives, the study is comprised of a discursive component and an investigative component involving a continuous dialectical back-and-forth switching between theory and empirical data, especially concerning the involved actors' attributes, attitudes and contextuality. On the one hand, the discursive component seeks to deliberate on the phenomenon and condition of the urban South crisis in light of existing constituent discourses, with the aim of not only contributing to broadening the general perspectives and understanding, but also to furnish a theoretical lens and conceptual framework that orients the consequent study. On the other hand, the investigative component aims at further clarifying and contextualising the ensuing argument by attempting to obtain evidence or suggestions that situate the above discussions, in actors' day to day activities, in a given historical, socio-economic and geopolitical context of Nairobi, Kenya, as a Global South city. Accordingly, the research techniques, methods and approaches employed in this study are mainly qualitative, encompassing archival research, semi-structured in-depth interviews with key-actors or privileged witnesses, and also direct observation in the fieldwork carried out during different periods in Nairobi, between the years 2009 and 2012. The analysis and interpretation of the data also follows qualitative approaches and methods including coding, memoing, discourse analysis, and qualitative data analysis software such as MAXQDA. These involve a reflexive movement between fieldwork and theory, through which data production is based not only on the theoretical assumptions alone, but on new insights from empirical findings which are fed back to the discursive theoretical component and vice versa; such that the study follows a cyclical research strategy. Accordingly, all these are pursued with the envision objective of contributing useful methodologies, perspectives, and alternatives ways of looking at the urban South crisis and its solutions.

1.2.3. Problematique and triple hermeneutics

A study pertaining to the issues surrounding the urban South crisis and especially the problem of informal settlements is confronted with the challenge that most of the concepts and terms used in the material and discursive practices, both in theory and practice, are highly contentious with contested and competing definitions and formulations; and even sometimes pejorative considerations. These include terms like governance, urban housing, slums, informal settlements, formality and informality, poverty, Global South, developed, development and underdevelopment among others (see Gilbert,
Hence, it should be noted that this study proceeds with caution when using those terms, being cognisant of the fact that some those terms might be deemed as pejorative and offensive in certain conceptualisation circumstances, or by particular actors, scholars, and practitioners. Hence, this study endeavours to use those terms with all the necessary care and prudence. Moreover, as there is no agreement amongst various actors as to what those terms mean, and as shall be discussed in this study, these terms produce different meanings to different actors. Some of these actors therefore may play a significant role in defining the terms to their own understanding and often times to suit their own interests. Indeed, it is probable that certain actors may choose the meaning and justifications strategically so as to gain some advantages at the bargaining tables. These may resonate with some actors but not others, potentially leading to either coalitions or schisms (Goddard, 2006). Hence, making inferences based on the actors’ opinions potentially becomes highly complex and complicated.

As a consequence, each of those terms can be considered as being a problematique, i.e. a complex cluster of interrelated and intertwined problems with many aspects to be considered which are difficult to solve and are not easily reducible to simple cause and effect relationships. As such, those terms encapsulate the complex arrays of problems, challenges, and opportunities facing humanity since the 1950s, which are enmeshed in rich experiences of failure with very limited success (Roberts, 1994). Thus, they prompt concerns about our collective doing, learning and knowing processes; leading to different involved actors to see them in different angles based on their perspectives, rationalities, and frames of references or paradigmatic stands, which are the focus of this study.

Therefore, the working of this study would involve what could be described as a form of triple hermeneutics, which follows a build up of three successive levels. Firstly, simple hermeneutics pertains to individuals’ interpretations of themselves and their own subjective or inter-subjective cultural reality. Secondly, the double hermeneutics entails the interpretive research of interpretive beings. Finally, triple hermeneutics encompasses not only the simple and double hermeneutics, but also critical interpretations of the unconscious processes conditioning the involved actors’ actions, interactions, and relations; their pertinent meanings, power relations, norms, ideologies, justifications, and other expressions of dominance, communication, and sanctions (see Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b, Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). Indeed one of the main foci of this study is to uncover and examine some of the hidden or unacknowledged motives for actions that have a profound effect on the effectiveness of housing initiatives and the urban South housing situation. These could also relate to the underlying factors responsible for the persistence of the urban South crisis.

1.2.4. Time-space context and scoping: Limitations and Delimitations

As the preceding discussions indicate, this study is concerned with the urban South crisis and especially as they are manifested through informal settlements and the issues that surround them, especially the search for solutions and the relatively low effectiveness of those solutions leading to persistence of the problem. However, this study focuses on the informal settlement arena of Nairobi, with special emphasis on the actors’ perspectives, frames of references and paradigmatic stands. Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, is the regional hub of Eastern Africa. As such Nairobi relates to a number of the issues of Sub-Saharan Africa, situated in the Global South. However, in as much as Nairobi is a
unique scenario and care should be taken not to quickly generalise, Nairobi shares many actors and structuring forces with many other Sub-Saharan African cities, and to a lesser degree with the entire Global South.

The study is conducted in a time-space context when and where the ‘good governance’ is the globally prevailing paradigm. Currently, the urban South crisis and informal settlements are seen as a failure or problem of ‘governance’. Indeed ‘good governance’ is increasingly being seen as the key to solving the problem of informal settlements and for that matter the challenges brought about by rapid urbanisation and deepening globalisation (Jessop, 2002b, UN-Habitat, 2002b, World Bank, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2013b). As such the empirical inquiry is conducted against the backdrop of governance. Consequently, for the purposes of this study, governance is considered from three major positions. Firstly, historical, representing the prevailing shift from ‘government to governance’ and new emerging government arrangements and state-society relations; thus it forms one of the paradigmatic views in the urban development debate. Secondly, governance is considered from a constructivist position referring to the diverse ways different actors define and apply the concept according to their own perspectives and normative interests e.g. in the concept of ‘good governance’ indeed certain actors may implicitly or explicitly define (normative) governance concepts to serve their ends (Jordan, 2008). Here, common patterns of regulation and negotiation can be traced. However, due to asymmetric distribution of power, certain actors are included or excluded, consciously or unconsciously (Mertins, 2009). Thirdly, governance is considered from an analytical position. It is perceived as timeless and value free decision-making interactions, observable in any community in time and space. In this way governance can be used as an analytical conceptual framework for the understanding of complex structures in societal action in the urban South arena (Benz, 2004, Hufty, 2011a). Nonetheless, with the ongoing emphasis on the shift from ‘government to governance’, the urban South arena is awash with many new planning prescriptions such as collaborative, participatory, and community action planning. However, a closer look at the global urban arena reveals great disparities between theory and practice, normative and positive, as well as the desired and reality, in terms of inclusiveness, effectiveness and responsiveness to societal needs. Certainly, current policy and academic discourse continue to view Global South’s urbanisation through a prism of “abnormality” or “exceptionalism”, terming it “pathological” or “dysfunctional”(Fay and Opal, 2000, Spence et al., 2009). Furthermore, urban South cities are subjected to multiple modes of transformation. On the one hand, there are visions and programmes mainly relying on stereotypical notions of development, that are in most cases envisioned exogenously at the supranational level, often detached from the milieus they are aimed at. These are more often than not driven by ‘powerful’ exogenous actors. On the other hand, there are the endogenous politico-historical forces, mostly driven by ‘powerful’ endogenous actors, which significantly determine how the initiatives will eventually be implemented. However, there are also spontaneous transformative actions by the inhabitants and other ordinary citizens, who are often regarded as weak or least powerful actors or even termed as the ‘subaltern’ (Yeboah, 2006, Gramsci, 2010).
What follows is an inquiry into the foregoing concerns, including the diverse actors and the decadian policy shifts since the 1950s, with persistent failure of approaches and initiatives, and persistence of the urban South crisis despite numerous efforts. Without doubt this state of affairs raises a multitude of questions for instance: Why have these approaches consistently been plagued with less effectiveness/efficiency? Therefore, why have these seemingly inappropriate initiatives been prescribed from decade to decade? Why, how, where, for whom, and by whom were the dominant approaches and conceptualisations of the housing problems and solutions envisioned, conceived, made, maintained, modified or replaced? Whose vision were they, and who stood to gain or lose in their implementation and what was at stake, and the motivation behind them? How do global agendas relate to actions at the local levels? How do the different modes of transformation on the ground influence certain actions and interactions? What reasons led the ‘relabeling’ of initiatives to comply with the latest approach? How can the apparent time-lag between prescription and adoption of new approaches and national and local levels be explained? Certainly, these questions concerning the mechanisms of framing and setting such globally dominant discourses, and subsequent formulation and implementation of initiatives at a local level clearly suggest unequal power relations and dissimilar vested interest; however a more nuanced look at these processes suggest that the involved dynamic cannot be attributed to power struggles, competition over resource, or vested interest alone.

Consequently this study pursues the question of the possibility of ‘paradigmatic dynamics’ which are both conditioning and being conditioned by the concerns raised in the questions above, and the involved actors’ interactions and interrelations, with the possible profound effect end explanatory value for the urban South housing crisis. Accordingly, this study explores those questions through Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1971, Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b), following its concept of “duality of structure” denoting continual interaction and mutual re-constitution of structure and agency. Indeed, the theory provides a framework for identifying, integrating, analysing, and interpreting those ‘paradigmatic dynamics’ and constituent meanings, asymmetric power relations, justification, communication, and others; involved in the urban South crisis development, ideological, housing and governance processes; in their politico-historical and geopolitico-economic contexts. The theory provides for linkages through which structures can be generated, reproduced, maintained or modified in the flow of actors’ interaction and practices, and how meanings and norms are set with their systems of reward, sanctions, resources, and communication among others (Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992). If, according to Giddens (1984b pp 377), “structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action”, then those ‘paradigmatic dynamics’ may frame not only the motivations and interactions of the actors, but also the arena itself; with the possibility of the many interested actors in the urban South having a multiplicity of social worlds, conflicting rationalities, competing approaches and perspectives, co-existing in the arena with complex relations; and all with highly significant connotations for the urban South crisis. Thus this application of the theory could carry the potential of contributing to an enhanced and more nuanced understanding of the urban South crisis.
1.3. Organisation of the study

Therefore, based on the above mentioned theoretical and conceptual formulations, postulations and objectives, the study is organised into three parts; comprising of theoretical-discursive, empirical-analytical, and interpretive parts.

Chapter one: Introduction: This chapter sets the background and space-time context for the study by laying out the geopolitico-historical facts pertinent to the subject of the urban South crisis, and especially the problems wrought by the ongoing twin process of globalisation and urbanisation. This is followed by the research rationale that briefly illuminates the focus, justification, significance, and envisioned contributions of the study. This chapter therefore situates the study theme on the ongoing discourses concerning the Global South and its urban housing problems, and sets the ground for engaging with the pertinent issues.

PART I: Theoretical conceptualisation:
This part outlines the overall frame of interrogation, both discursively and empirically.

Chapter Two: The Global South and its crises: Explores the Global South, the politico-historical trajectory and geopolitical-economic context, focusing on the themes of ‘development and underdevelopment’, with the constituent ideologies, influences, and practices, policy prescriptions and the outcome of those prescriptions, as they help to explain the current and probably future condition of the urban South. These serve as the background for the urban South housing crisis.

Chapter Three: Examines the urban South and the trajectory of its housing crisis and responses, focusing on last six decades of approaches and their impacts and failures, as well as the persistence of the crisis. This forms the substantive basis study, and the subject matter around which the study revolves.

Chapter Four: Delves into the concept of governance from a historical, constructivist, and analytical perspective; elucidating the various modes and forms of governance and how they relate to the urban South housing crises and solutions as well as development across time. This forms the basis for inferring into the actors relationships, their power relation, participation and communication forms.

Chapter Five: Highlights various aspects of static and dynamic dimensions, including individual and dominant paradigms, epistemic communities, and paradigm shifts; besides how all these relate to urban South housing problem-solution nexus

Chapter Six: Elucidates various aspects of Structuration Theory and highlights the various elements of the theory that relevant for the study. Subsequently, the themes of development, housing, and governance together with their paradigmatic dimensions, are integrated through the theory to produce an analytical and interpretive framework for the study. The theory provides a thread that binds the entire study together.

Chapter Seven: Encapsulates the theoretical aspects of study, followed by the development of the conceptual and analytical framework, which are also transmuted in to practical empirical utility.

Chapter Eight: Explicates on the methodological framework and formulations derived from the conceptual and analytical framework; highlighting the research approach, strategy, and setting; data
collection procedures and frame of analysis and interpretation; as well as the political and ethical implications of the study and the role of the researcher.

PART II: Case study

Empirical investigation, data collection and analysis

Chapter Nine: Discusses the trajectory of Nairobi’s housing crisis and slums vis a vis the responses and initiatives as well as their outcomes; besides the closely related issues of ‘development’ and governance. This is done against its background of the Kenya politico-historical context, and the global geopolitico-economic milieu.

Chapter Ten: Focuses on overt attitudes and attributes of the indentified stakeholders relating to there interests, influence, and networks; and how this relates to the potential for conflict and misunderstandings, as well as opportunities for cooperation, mutual understating, and common ground. This is done on the basis of the classical ‘stakeholder analysis’, by which those with an interest (stake) in an issue under consideration are identified and related to their capacity to influence the issue. All these are then related to the success or failure of initiatives, and the possible resolution or persistence of the problem.

PART III: Interpretation and implications

Chapter Eleven: Linkages and interpretations of all the above issues, perceived through the theoretical framework: the urban South crisis in a Structurationist perspective; focusing on static and dynamic paradigmatic dimension and their role in actors interactions, interrelations, consciousness, and other issues of structure and agency; as they explain and impact the urban South housing crisis. The focus here is on hidden, unacknowledged, and unconscious issues that condition the actors and context; issues that are beyond overt interests, influence, and networks.

Chapter Twelve: Conclusion: Implications and recommendations to theory and practice presents the implications of the research findings to theory and practice, including discourse, policy and practice concerning the urban South, its crisis and informal housing problems. It concludes the study, reiterating the key lessons, insights, contributions, desiderata, and recommendations for future research.
Table 1: Organisation of the Study

Chapter 1: Introduction: Rationale, significance and justification

Part I: Discourses and Theoretical Framework

Chapter 2: Global South: development discourses, the politico-historical and geopolitico-economic context of the urban South housing crisis

Chapter 3: Housing: Problem-solution nexus, urban South, slums, six decades of approaches, failures, and persistence

Chapter 4: Governance: the concept, styles, and modes. Historical, constructivist, and analytical. Actor relations, power, participation, communication

Chapter 5: Paradigms: static and dynamic dimensions

Part II: Empirical Case Study

Chapter 6: Structuration Theory

Chapter 7: Conceptual, analytic, and interpretational framework

Chapter 8: Methodological framework


Chapter 10. Actors' attitudes and attributes: Analysis of the key actors: trajectories, involvement, interactions, and interrelations. Significance to Nairobi’s housing situation and urban South crisis

Part III Interpretations and implications

Chapter 11: Linkages and interpretations of the above issues through theoretical framework: static and dynamic structural and agency issues, actor interactions, and interrelations, and other involved aspects and process, as they explain and impact the urban South housing crisis.

Chapter 12: Implications and recommendations to theory and practice
PART I: THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALISATION
2. The Global South and its crises: A time-space context

The urban South situation, its conceptualisations, framing, responses and indeed most of the issues surrounding the Global South have been shaped by the global politico-economic forces and changes especially with the increasing global connectivity since the 15th Century. According to Giddens (1984a) "the contextuality of time-space, and especially the connections between time-space location and physical milieux of action, are not just uninteresting boundaries of social life but are inherently involved in its constitution or reproduction." Hence, in the Global South the prevailing global politico-economic forces seem to inform the dominant narratives of any given epochs thereby, shaping most of the societal material and discursive practices at the particular time space, with significant influence not only in the day to day lives but also long term aspects and prospects of the people in these regions. Consequently, this section traces the course of the Global South across time, as it mainly relates to its ever increasing ‘crises’ as well as prescribed solutions, especially as viewed through the lenses of ‘development’, how it frames other issues, and other ensuing consequences.

2.1. Pre-1950s: Foundations of the Global South and decades of (under)development

In terms of geopolitical-economics, the world is often depicted through the prism of Global North–South dichotomy, distinguishing the highly industrialised wealthier countries mainly located in the northern hemisphere from the poorer, ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘developing’ countries in the southern hemisphere (Solarz, 2012). The Global South (GS) is comprised of 133 countries in Africa, Asia, South and Central America with 75% of the global population, but less than 20% share of the global income, mainly exporting raw materials to the Global North (GN) (Williams et al., 2009, Mimiko, 2012). The GS is comprised mainly of formerly colonised countries, having extreme poverty levels and lacking political stability, economic growth properly functioning systems and many are overly ‘dependent’ on international assistance and ‘development programmes’ for their very survival (Brandt, 1980, Mimiko, 2012). According to Webster (2006), the GN and GS had metropole-periphery relations of control and exploitation, in which the GN progressed to the detriment of other regions by exploiting their value. Thus two regions progressed in a divergent path, with the richer regions growing even richer, and the poorer ones poorer, confining the latter to a state of ‘underdevelopment’ (Sunkel, 1973, McNulty, 1976, Friedmann and Weaver, 1979).

The ‘great global convergence’ between the 15th and 17th centuries brought together Africa, Europe, Asia, and Americas in one politico-economic system, with imperialism, mercantilism, and Trans-Atlantic slave trade permanently linking these regions; however, with unequal relations that produced immense benefits for some with highly devastating consequences for others (Feuer, 1989, Burke et al., 2009, Marks, 2012). The ‘modern revolution’ from the mid 18th to the early 20th century produced further autocatalytic changes technologically, politico-economically, and socio-culturally. The industrial revolution altered the systems of production, consumption, warfare, and political control; aggravating the competition for raw materials, labour, markets, and colonial empires; with unjust and unfair
markets and governance systems greatly deepening the global wealth and poverty extremes (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002). However, intense rivalry and vicious competition amongst the world powers for colonies, global market share, and resources, contributed to the outbreak of the first and second World Wars (Bentley et al., 2000).

These wars devastated European great powers, and their influence declined while the United States and Soviet Union emerged as rival superpowers that culminated into a Cold War. The colonised peoples become more confident in their anti-colonial struggles and the decolonisation process began. However the Cold War rivalry resulted in serious devastation in several GS countries through vicious civil wars and dictators, as the two hegemonic powers competed to influence the emerging countries; each power striving to make their ideology and politico-economic system globally dominant. The ensuing proxy wars and the imposition of despotic kleptomaniac regimes by the superpowers, became very instrumental in the deterioration of socio-economic conditions in many Global South countries, including the proliferation of slums (Fay and Opal, 2000, Gaddis, 2005, Westad, 2005). By the end of the wars, several competing political-economic doctrines such liberalism, communism, fascism, Keynesianism, liberal democracy, idealism, and realism emerged that would dominate the global geopolitical-economical, material and discursive practices of the subsequent decades.

In the post World War II period, the GN through the Marshall Plan and other strategies quickly recovered and went on to enjoy unprecedented growth and prosperity in the subsequent decades. On the contrary, many GS countries were released into independence in very dire politico-socio-economic circumstances and went on a downward spiral from crisis to crisis, with severe deprivations of basic needs, numerous wars and conflicts, ‘bad governance’, dysfunctional systems, and extreme weather events among others. Externally most of these countries faced unfavourable terms of trade and other exploitative relations with other countries in the world system. Internally, many countries had extreme autocratic and kleptomaniac regimes with unprecedented levels of corruption, economic mismanagement, ethnicism and nepotism, brutality and apathy; where the elite looted and misruled their countries subjecting the ordinary citizens into intense suffering, hopelessness and despair. This was in addition to vicious conflicts and wars. All these would be eventually related to the condition of ‘underdevelopment’; against which certain ‘development’ strategies would be prescribed, with expectations of rapid improvements, as the Marshall Plan did for the GN. However these strategies produced mainly disappointing results leading to decades of diverse strategies. Subsequently, many problem issues in the GS came to be viewed through the lens of (under)development crises, and solutions framed based on the prevailing ‘decade of development’ orthodoxy (Jolly, 2004b, Yusuf et al., 2009, Moreira and Crespo, 2012).

Development henceforth became a general normative concept to refer to a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the socio-economic conditions in the mass of the population. It mainly encompassed economic growth, but subsequently other perspectives emerged that also included improvements in freedoms, choices, health, and other structural transformation, through sustained
policy interventions and actions either by the states alone, or through concerted efforts including non-state actors both local and international (Schumpeter, 1934, Seers, 1969, Bell, 1989, Rodney, 2012, Todaro and Smith, 2013). In the post World War II period, with the Global South countries having deplorable conditions, the main concern became the search for ways these countries could rise from that misery into prosperity. This search has over the decades engendered a body of diverse doctrines, strong controversies and criticisms that persist to date. Indeed after six decades of ‘development’ effort and international aid, the socio-economic conditions for many in the Global South remain highly appalling, with great proportions of their populations not being able to satisfy even their simplest needs and enduring severe deprivations. Consequently, this great variance between intentions and outcomes has brought into question the whole concept of development, with some critics even categorising the whole concept of development and aid as being more detrimental than beneficial (Collier, 1999, Lensink and Morrissey, 2000, Bulir and Hamann, 2003).

2.2. The 1950s: Post war idealism and late colonial exclusivism

In the wake of World War II devastation, humanity was seized by a desire for peace and harmony, to improve the world so that all could live happily and peacefully; and humanity increasingly thought on a global scale. Thus ‘idealism’ began to dominate global politico-economic debates, emphasising the ‘universality of man’, a unified world, and doing good; prioritising ideals over the prevailing realities (Kant, 2002, Kant et al., 2005, Alighieri, 2009). It focused on minimising conflict through international cooperation, multilateral organisations, global consensus on normative goals and the pursuit of universal human rights dignity and justice; with a belief in a ‘plannable’ global future (Markwell, 2006). This contributed to the creation of international organisations such as the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, the decolonisation process, and ‘development’ for the newly independent countries. Development assistance from idealism was based on altruistic humanitarian concerns. However, increasing Cold War hostilities led to the supplanting of idealism by realism, with the ‘struggle for power’, ‘realpolitik’ and competition among hegemonic countries aiming only to achieve national interest with little regard for ethical considerations or the needs of others. Development support from Western countries became a tool for preventing GS countries from joining the Communist Bloc, with the Soviet Union also deploying similar tactics. Furthermore, aid became a sanctioning tool to coerce the Global South governments to behave in a certain manner (Barya, 1993, Bearce and Tirone, 2010), greatly contradicting the idealistic vision.

The decolonisation process in some countries was smooth and peaceful. However, in others, the anti-colonial struggle was bitter and violent and was suppressed by using intense brutality. In fact in the 1950s, many countries remained under the yoke of the unjust, oppressive, exploitative, and segregative colonial rule. The colonial system was based on ‘exclusivism’ whereby ‘the chosen’ or a select few by virtue of their race, ethnicity, or socio-political class, lived in highly ideal situations. In this ‘privileging’ and ‘othering’ discriminative processes; the minority elite enjoyed those idealised and exclusive conditions at the expense and detriment of the majority of the populace, who were marginalised and languished in extremely dire conditions (Lewis, 1962, Williams and Chrisman, 1994,
According to this view, societies existed solely to serve the needs of the select few, while the purpose of ‘others’ was just to facilitate this. Consequently, while idealism dominated this international scene, for most of the Global South, what prevailed was exclusivism maintained by the use of brutal force.

2.3. The 1960s: Liberation, modernisation, and disillusionment

The 1960s was a liberation decade, characterised by the increasing demand for greater freedoms, rights and justice for the minorities and oppressed. Many countries in Africa and Asia gained independence while several dictatorships in Latin America were overthrown. Western countries turned to the ‘left’ pursuing social equality and attending to the needs of the relatively disadvantaged. In the United States of America, John F. Kennedy was elected espousing Keynesianism and social reforms globally. The liberation theme dominated the geopolitico-economic scene espousing the breaking of the political yoke of colonial bondage through independence, but also the breaking of the shackles of poverty that bound many through development.

Nevertheless, efforts towards ‘developing’ the ‘underdeveloped countries’ were spurred by both humanitarian concerns and vested interests. Apart from the ‘sense of guilt’ arising from the deplorable conditions the Global South countries were released into independence and Cold-War strategic objectives. Weaver (1981) asserts that ‘development’ was a new mechanism for integrating the Global South into the international economy through the United Nations establishing a Pax Americana, especially following the colonial systems of finance capital and royal navies (Griffin, 1991, Berthélemy, 2006, Nielsen, 2010). Furthermore, the promise of rapid prosperity through modernisation appealed to the elites of the emerging Global South countries. These countries joined the United Nations’ development objective, gained prominence, and in the subsequent decades, the UN and the World Bank would play a very significant role in setting out the Global South normative and development agenda. Therefore, at the 1961 UN General Assembly, Kennedy proclaimed the 1960s a ‘Decade of Development’, a ‘growth plus change’ action plan for Global South countries to achieve a minimum annual growth rate of 5% in aggregate national income by1970 (Jolly, 2004b). The Global North was required to give 1% of their GNP to the Global South as both capital investment and developmental assistance; as well as make trade concessions to the Global South countries to allow stable prices. Nonetheless the countries declined to make the concessions and flows to the Global South remained less than 0.3 % of their GNP as investment and developmental assistance, and trade deteriorated (Cohen and Sisler, 1971, Jolly, 2004b). Thus, ultimately this action plan failed, paving way for five more ‘decades of development’ all of which fell short of their stated objectives.

In the 1960s, ‘Modernisation’ became the globally dominant notion of development with the belief that ‘underdevelopment’ arose from ‘backwardness’ and lack of necessary factors of production. Therefore, it was postulated that, with industrialisation through massive injection of capital and public sector intervention; and with the right quantity and combination of capital aid, transfer of know-how, as well as the modernisation of the production apparatus; Global South countries would ‘take off’ and quickly

In Modernisation theories, ‘Development’ was synonymous with rapid aggregate economic growth; while underdevelopment arose from the traditional attitude of the population, agrarian structure, lack of infrastructure and other endogenous factors in these countries, but not their politico-historical and international dependencies. According to Rostow’s (1960) linear stages of growth model, the transition from underdevelopment to development consisted of a series of stages, through which ‘all’ countries must proceed, from traditional society to the age of high mass consumption. This theory gained prominence in the Cold War climate as it was a counter-position to Marxist approaches. While Marxists argued that all sectors should develop equally, Rostow contended that economic development should be led by certain strong sectors (Rostow, 1960, Kuhnen, 1987); and concentrate on a few individuals and regions (‘growth poles’); after which the accrued benefits by the few would trickle-down to the mass of the population (Perroux, 1952, Hirschman, 1958, Rostow, 1960, Perroux, 1970). However, these trickle-down effects hardly ever happened; contributing to the stark socio-spatial polarisation and inequalities prevalent in the Global South. Theories had high degrees of ethnocentrism, neglecting the role of socio-political and institutional casual factors and alternative development processes and goals, which were very significant (Todaro and Smith, 2013). Development was measured solely by means of GDP per capita increase, disregarding other indicators of wellbeing for the mass population, or the distribution of that growth. The poor were mostly neglected (Parayil, 1998, Frey et al., 1999). Consequently, several of the promised advantages, modernisation and growth-oriented orthodoxies induced violent and radical change from outside that destroyed the remaining traditional system, ultimately exacerbating a modern form of poverty in many countries (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1978, Rader, 1990, Higgott, 2005, Ziai, 2011). Based on capital intensive, industrial, high technology and large-scale project approaches, modernisation concentrated productive wealth and capital in the hands of a small powerful elite, and the urban areas; precipitating massive rural to urban migration in many Global South countries, which led to the formation of primate cities, with crowded slums, high poverty and unemployment rates (Stohr and Taylor, 1981, Arndt, 1983). Thus, while the First Development Decade and its Modernisation basis produced massive socio-spatial and economic transformation in the Global South, there was very little improvement in the lives of the really poor.

In the 1960s, the hope for improved socio-politico-economic conditions for all citizens, was quickly turned to disillusionment as many countries descended into dictatorships, kleptocracy, politico-
ethnicity, anarchy, with numerous coups d'état and vicious civil wars; many as a result of the Cold war. Many Global South leaders instead of pursuing improvements in the lives of their citizens, concentrated on strengthening their political bases through patronage and corruption that benefited only a few individuals, while the welfare of the majority deteriorated rapidly (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995). Additionally, many societal ills and dysfunctions systems that were hidden under the cloak of colonialism became apparent; for instance removal of restrictive laws spawned explosive urbanisation and slum growth that brightly illuminated the hitherto hidden massive poverty and inequalities. Moreover, decolonisation ushered in neo-colonialism and exploitative global relations persisted, that benefited only the elite (Chomsky and Herman, 1979, Galbraith, 1994, Sartre, 2001). In the eyes of many, independence was a bitter betrayal, as merciless politicians interested only in pursuing power and wealth replaced the colonisers. The ordinary citizens' welfare became a subject of discussion only at election time (Boukaka, 1970). Consequently, many in the Global South were left out by the liberation and modernisation strides of the 1960s, and were worse off by the end of the decade compared to its beginning. Nevertheless, despite its success and failures, modernisation remains as one of the most preferred modes of ‘development’ by many actors and organisations in the Global South; even with the emergence of other orthodoxies.

Figure 7: Rostownian five stages of economic development

Source (Rostow, 1960, Elliott, 2012)

2.4. The 1970s: Global crises and basic needs

The 1970s was characterised by increased worldwide crises and global interdependence. The post-war economic boom was brought to an abrupt halt by the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, 1973 oil crisis, and the resultant stagflation in the GN; followed by plummeting commodity exports demand and prices, rising costs of imports and domestic production due to increased oil prices, heavy external borrowing and high indebtedness in the GS (Hammes and Wills, 2005). Furthermore, gross economic mismanagement, corrupting coups d'état, and brutal ‘buffoon’ and kleptomanic dictatorships continued to destroy many GS countries internally, supported by Cold war rivalries. Global South plunged deeper into socio-politico-economic crises, which were now increasingly becoming seemingly insurmountable. In the 1970s, the entire Global South seemed to be plagued with crisis after crisis,
including absolute poverty, famines, slums, and other various rapidly deteriorating situations; such
that these became a global concern calling for urgent concerted action. These led to several global
initiatives, declarations, and the internationalisation of urban South problems, with creation of several
UN bodies to tackle these crises. Additionally, the World Bank focused its attention to the Global
South.

The Global South when taken as a whole had experienced remarkable economic growth with per
capita GNP growing at 3.4 per cent a year between 1950 and 1970; however, this growth had not
yielded the expected improvements in the lives of the mass population. In fact for many, the socio-
economic conditions were deteriorating drastically. Despite impressive economic growth, the number
of people suffering from malnutrition, debilitating disease, inadequate housing, and lack of clean
drinking water, sanitation, health care, and education was increasing tremendously. These average
country GNP figures were concealing the fact that inequality and the incidence of absolute poverty
had increased tremendously, and that the incomes and living standards for most of the Global South
populations were actually falling (ILO, 1976, McNamara, 1976, Morawetz, 1977, Streeten and Burki,
1978). Consequently, there was increased disenchantment with modernisation approaches and the
prevailing notions of development, raising the need to re-evaluate and reformulate the whole concept
development itself, its meaning, objective, and measurement. In the 1970s, there was a growing
consensus amongst the theorist and policy makers about the need to identify the fundamental root
causes of poverty and inequality, in addition to dethronement of economic growth as the measure for
development. Such that the main goal of development would be to meet the basic human needs for
all, while focusing on improving the ‘quality of life’ of the majority rather than only satisfying
the conspicuous consumption of the minority elites (Seers, 1969, Seers, 1972, ILO, 1976). Accordingly,
the mounting disenchantment with modernisation, as well as the need for people-oriented
development approaches led to ‘Dependencia theories’, ‘Basic Needs’, and ‘Redistribution with
Growth’ strategies.

The Dependencia theories asserted that mass poverty was not caused by ‘backwardness’, but by the
GS’ integration into the world socio-politico-economic system. Resources flowed from the GS
(periphery) to the GN (core) countries, leading to wealth accumulation at the core at the expense of
the periphery (Dos Santos, 1970, Amin, 1976). Underdevelopment was historically determined as the
periphery provided cheap natural resources and labour, but was a receptacle ready market for
expensive manufactured goods, services, and obsolete technology, produced at the core (Prebisch,
Thus the theorists rejected the notion of ‘stages of development’ since the root cause of
underdevelopment was dependency rooted in the heritage of colonialism and perpetuated through
unequal international division of labour; resulting in impoverished peripheral countries with severe
stratification, having an extremely wealthy externally-oriented minority elite besides a majority
marginalised, exploited and pauperised masses (Baran, 1962, Ishikawa, 1967, So, 1990, Wallerstein,
2004). Hence, the situation in the GS countries would continue to deteriorate, and the dependency
would never be broken though Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) or even through revolutions. This was because the elites defended the status quo and constantly resisted reforms towards improving the welfare of the poor (Hirschman, 1968, Baer, 1972, Katz and Kosacoff, 2000). Nonetheless, these strategies foundered due to the small size of domestic markets, the role of transnational corporations and the high indebtedness in these Global South countries. In sum, while there was general consensus that the dependency theorists’ assertions were legitimate, their policy prescriptions did not find similar acceptance, nor when implemented produced satisfactory results (Friedmann and Wayne, 1977).

From the growing recognition that modernisation and its mammoth projects were not benefiting the world’s disadvantaged people, there was a growing consensus that emphasis should be towards abolishment of absolute poverty within a short period of time, with policies directly aimed at the poor as the ‘target group’; such that the main goal of development should be meeting the basic human needs for all (ILO, 1970a, ILO, 1970b, ILO, 1972, Jolly, 1976, Streeten and Burki, 1978). Consequently, in the 1970s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) conducted policy analyses in several Global South countries including Kenya, Sudan, Iran, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia; and presented its findings at the World Employment Conference in 1976 published as ‘Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem’ (ILO, 1976). This became the basis of the Basic Needs approach, focusing development policies directly on the poorest in society, emphasising not only the physical needs for survival, but also access to services, employment and decision making. This included national strategies with the explicit objective of meeting the country’s entire population’s basic needs; entailing firstly, the private household needs of food, housing, and clothing; and secondly, the community services of education, health, public transport, water, and sanitation; in addition to human rights, public participation in decision making, and productive employment. Furthermore, it called for a shift in bias from ‘modern’ capital intensive projects with highest rates of return, to labour-intensive and appropriate technology projects which generated the highest number of productive jobs and reduced income inequalities; in addition to small scale and informal sector production, as well as ‘sweat equity’ (ILO, 1970b, ILO, 1976). This approach gained a wide consensus at the international level, and McNamara, the World Bank President, further proposed the ‘Redistribution with Growth’ strategy (Chenery et al., 1974) which would concentrate outcomes of the economic growth’s increase in parts of the economy having more numbers of poor people, so as to enable the incomes of the poor to increase faster; and also increase their access to productive assets (Chenery et al., 1974, Jolly, 1975, Leys, 1975). These were reiterated by the ‘International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade’ (UN, 1970), whose focus was improving the standard of living in the GS, reducing inequalities globally. Accordingly, the Global South development arena’s discursive and material practices of the 1970s became dominated by a two-pronged macroeconomic strategy involving meeting the basic needs of all households, and redistribution of growth.
Despite the initial controversy, the Basic Needs strategy received widespread support from scholars and practitioners, multilateral and bilateral agencies, Global North and South countries, such that it almost became the universal 'development consensus'. However, the oil, economic and debt crises of the 1970s, the ‘crisis of Fordism’, the election of Reagan and Thatcher and shift to Neoliberal policies dealt a deathblow to the basic needs policies; such that it became the official policy of only a few countries such as Tanzania, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, Mexico, Cuba, and China (Streeten and Burki, 1978, O’connor, 1979). Nevertheless, despite its largely insignificant adoption as the official policy of countries and organisations, the ‘Basic Needs’ concept had a very big influence upon the other policies and programmes that were subsequently implemented by numerous countries, NGOs, multilateral and bilateral organisations starting from the 1970s to date; including the Human Development Index (HDI) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It also forms the raison d’être for many organisations and programmes.

2.5. The 1980s: The ‘lost decade’, neoliberalism, and reversals

In the wake of the numerous crises from the previous decade, the 1980s witnessed massive global geopolitico-economical transformation that included the rise of neoliberalism, deepening globalisation, and drastic deterioration of socio-economic conditions of majority of the people in the world. In the Global North, the 1970’s crises precipitated a shift from Leftist welfarism towards Rightist conservatism; bringing to power Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (1979–90) and Ronald Reagan in the United States with their politico-economic ideologies. These included eradicating the prevailing Keynesian-style ‘big government’, reducing state ‘interference’ in the market, and diminishing the power of labour unions; as well as propagating market fundamentalism and other neoliberalist policies globally (O’connor, 1979, Himmelstein, 1990). Neoliberalism proclaimed the superiority of self-regulating market mechanisms over state interventions in generating sustained economic growth, and contending that maintaining low levels of inflation was more important than achieving full employment; with the mantra of ‘stabilise, privatisate, and liberalise’ (Kolodko, 1999, Rodrik, 2006, Friedman, 2007, Friedman, 2009). These policies would be spread globally through ‘shock therapy’, coercion and co-option of the target countries’ elites such as the ‘the Chicago Boys’, ‘perestroika’ programme in the Eastern Bloc, and mainly through international financial institutions. The neoliberalists captured the upper echelons of power in IMF and the World Bank and radically transmuted them from their previous Keynesian frameworks into some of the most effective vehicles for spreading neoliberalism to the rest of the world through the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Sachs, 1994, Stiglitz, 1998, Harvey, 2005, Klein, 2007, Steger and Roy, 2010, Kolodko and Brand, 2013). Thus Neoliberalism quickly became the globally dominant politico-economic orthodoxy.

In the Global South, due to exogenous and endogenous factors, there were innumerable crises most of which could have been easily averted. Poverty, inequalities, famines, conflicts, and other socio-economic deficiencies increased exponentially; compounded with the advent of the AIDS disease and SAPs. As such, there was increased dependence on foreign aid and worldwide efforts to deal with even mundane and preventable local problems. All these were aggravated by malevolent national and
corrupt governments in much of the Global South, which grossly mismanaged and looted their countries, oppressed their citizens, and engaged in numerous conflicts, many attributable to the Cold War. Accordingly, the Global South underwent unprecedented drastic socio-economic deterioration exacerbated by a debilitating debt crisis.

These countries had incurred heavy debts to fund modernisation mega projects; as well as borrowed heavily to deal with emergencies, famines; and to cover the rising cost of imports and oil amidst falling export prices and revenues amidst extreme budgetary deficits and negative balance of trade. However, in many countries much of these funds had gone to wasteful projects, corruption, patronage, weapons, civil wars, and to ‘Swiss accounts’; coupled with gross economic mismanagement and kleptomaniac regimes. The oil crisis had yielded enormous profits for petrochemical corporations, which international commercial banks ‘reinvested’ by recklessly lending to these GS regimes. However the rapidly declining commodity prices and the sharp increase of interest rates in USA due to neoliberalist stabilisation policies, drastically reduced GS cash flows necessary for debt payments; increasing the probability of defaulting. This threatened to cause the failure of those lending banks and a major global financial crisis. To pre-empt this, the G7 countries directed the IMF and World Bank to bail out those GS countries; however with the conditionalities of SAPs. Since many GS governments were faced with high indebtedness and imminent economic collapse, they had to accept the conditionalities (Cohen, 2000b, Harvey, 2005, Steger and Roy, 2010). Accordingly, even though SAPs were touted as ‘development packages’ their main goal was ensuring that large portions of new loans and GS revenues would be freed up for servicing the debts. The policies strongly opposed ‘developmentalism’ and prescribed severe spending cuts for social programmes and public services; making the poor incur the burdens of debt enjoyed mainly by the powerful (Chomsky, 2007).

The typical SAPs followed the ‘DLP Formula’, i.e. deregulation of the economy, liberalisation of trade and industry, and privatisation of state enterprises; in addition to the downsizing and withdrawal of the state from the provision of services such as housing, health, education, water and sanitation; among other severe austerity measures. Instead, the government was now only required to concentrate on providing an enabling environment for the private sector to do so; through market mechanisms. The exiting largely dysfunctional governments in most GS countries, with huge public sector wage bills, and inefficient loss making and corrupt laded state enterprises seemed to justify the call for less governments and privatisation, and structural reforms to ‘make markets work’. Certainly, liberalisation and transforming the public sector into vibrant private companies would make institutions effective, efficient, transparent, and accountable; increase employment, incomes, technological progress, and more so foreign investment flows (World Bank, 1990a, Rodrik, 2006, Steger and Roy, 2010). The policies transferred the ideal of ‘responsibility’ from the government to individuals ‘caring for themselves’, shifting the role of governors from being bureaucratic public servants and guardians of a qualitatively defined ‘public good’, into entrepreneurial identities responsible only to the ‘market’ (Steger and Roy, 2010). Furthermore, emphasis was also laid on removing controls on global

The proponents of SAPs asserted that after the initial ‘bitter pill’, these market-oriented reforms would spur sustained economic growth, and lift millions of the GS populations out of poverty, and bring unprecedented prosperity with more individual freedoms. However, the SAPs mainly produced disastrous results (Sachs, 1994, Stiglitz, 1998, Klein, 2007, Arrighi, 2010). Massive layoffs and reductions in government budgets significantly increased unemployment levels and the number of people living in poverty while at the same time these severe cuts to public spending and privatisation reforms greatly diminished welfare, social security programmes and other ‘safety nets’ that could have aided in alleviating the problems faced by those falling into poverty. Indeed many inept, corrupt, and dysfunctional governments needed reform; however most poor citizens overly depended on these governments for most of the basic services, needs and also employment. What they needed therefore, was not ‘less government’, but ‘better government’. Thus the downsizing and withdrawal of the government resulted in drastic deterioration in the lives of many (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999, Mkandawire, 2007). Liberalisation and competition for foreign investment contributed to ‘race to the bottom’ (Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013). Reduction in labour and environmental regulations encouraged FDI but contributed to poor working conditions and environmental destruction, ‘urbanisation of poverty’ and other forms of ‘bloody Taylorism’. Export Processing Zones (EPZ), sweat shops, call centres, and dirty industries; accompanied with slums, smog, and other forms of human and environmental degradation became an enduring feature of the GS cities. Emphasis on export-oriented production of monoculture crops at the expense of domestic food production and environmental destruction increased vulnerabilities to famines, epidemics, and political instability (Lipietz, 1982, Mehta, 2000, Ravallion, 2002, Milberg and Amengual, 2008). Moreover, whereas privatisation and the withdrawal of the state greatly impoverished the ordinary citizens and reduced their access to essential services, these presented the elites immense opportunities for enrichment both legally and corruptly, thereby exacerbating the socio-economic inequalities within many GS countries (Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999, Lando and Bujra, 2009). The policies facilitated the exploitation of the ordinary citizens by powerful transnational corporations in collusion with the domestic power elites (Chomsky, 1999, Harvey, 2005, Neilson and Stubbs, 2011). The debt crises, budgetary and trade deficits worsened in many GS countries (World Bank, 1996, Mohan et al., 2000); and the 1980s saw the lowest rates of economic growth ever recorded in most of the GS, along with rapidly increasing disparities in wealth and wellbeing; including plummeting per capita income and worsening socio-economic, human and environmental situations in many countries (Stiglitz, 2002, Yusuf et al., 2009).

In sum, the 1980s decade saw unparalleled deterioration of the GS as a whole in almost all aspects, including severe reversals of numerous gains attained in the preceding decades. The politico-economic contexts and prescribed policies carried a heavy price in terms of human sacrifice, as well as societal and environmental destruction. The SAPs had failed to stimulate growth, but instead had

Accordingly, the SAPs came under severe criticism from the civil society, scholars, policy makers and practitioners. They called either for their abolishment, or at least “adjustment with a human face’ and social concerns (Cohen, 1990, Jolly, 1991, Stiglitz, 1998, Meier and Stiglitz, 2001). SAPs fell out of favour and were replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the ‘Augmented Washington Consensus’ as a precursor to the ‘Good Governance’ (UNCTAD, 2002, Jolly, 2004b).

However, despite various modifications and relabeling, many policy prescriptions remained neoliberalist at heart (UN, 1980, UN, 1990, Rodrik, 2006, Marangos, 2009).

Table 2: “Augmented” Washington Consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Washington Consensus</th>
<th>“Augmented” Washington Consensus (Plus original)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fiscal discipline to curb budget deficit</td>
<td>11. Corporate governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reduction of public expenditure</td>
<td>12. Anti-corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Tax reform towards broadening the base, effective enforcement, and no progressive tax.</td>
<td>13. Flexible labour markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Financial liberalisation with market determined interest rates</td>
<td>14. Adherence to WTO agreements and discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Competitive exchange rates to facilitate export-led growth</td>
<td>15. Adherence to international financial codes and standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Trade liberalization, with reduction of tariffs and import licensing</td>
<td>16. “Prudent” capital-account opening</td>
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<td>7. Promotion of and openness to foreign direct investment (FDI)</td>
<td>17. Non-intermediate exchange rate regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Privatization of state enterprises, for efficient management and improved performance</td>
<td>18. Independent central banks/inflation targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Economy deregulation by removing regulations that impede market entry or restrict competition</td>
<td>19. Social safety nets</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Secure property rights</td>
<td>20. Targeted poverty reduction</td>
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2.6. The 1990s: Globalisation and sustainability

The 1990s were characterised by growing human and environmental concerns amidst a rapidly globalising world. Advancements in telecommunications and international media coverage enhanced the international integration, interconnectedness, and interchange of peoples, products, cultures, ideas and world views. Humanity increasingly thought and acted at the global scale and localities were being shaped by happenings far away (Giddens, 1990, Sassen, 1998, IMF, 2000, Mann, 2013).

The end of the Cold War increased democratisation in the Global South and ushered in the ‘second liberation decade’. Russia and USA no longer needed to support their erstwhile Cold War allies, mainly comprising of authoritarian regimes. Hence, these regimes lost their grip on power and capacity to resist democratic change; emboldening citizens in their agitation for freedom, precipitating multipartyism and the ouster of authoritarian regimes all over the Global South (Baynham, 1991,
Osaghae, 2005). These agitations were greatly aided by civil society organisations, whose number and presence had increased exponentially since the 1980s. These organisations were actively opposing policies and actions by governments, multilateral organisations, and private sector that were deemed unfair and detrimental to the welfare of the ordinary citizens and the environment. The general populace became more bold, vocal, and organised in demanding for their rights. There was an increase in alternative voices advocating for communities’ interests, representing marginalised groups, and challenging the existing powers’ orthodoxy and ‘mainstream’ worldviews. These alternative voices formed global coalitions, alliances, and epistemic communities to champion those causes (Haas, 1992b, Bläser, 2005, Herrle et al., 2015).

By the 1990s, the conditions and processes of globalisation and neoliberalism had produced not only severe human, societal and environmental degradation, but also profound global injustice and inequality. In pursuit of profits and economic growth, lives and societies were being destroyed, tropical rainforests including other natural resources faced depletion. Pollution was rising to crisis level, and a drastic climate change threatened (Aglietta, 1979, Low, 1999, Steger, 2010, Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013). Increasing manmade catastrophes and natural disasters gave credence to the voices calling for a rethinking of the prevailing ‘business-as-usual’ attitude (Stern, 2007, Giddens, 2009, Zalasiewicz et al., 2011). There was a growing consensus that humanity was on a self-destruction path that threatened the common future and survival of the human race. Numerous epistemic communities, scholars, politicians, and a whole array of individuals, organisations especially the civil society, became very vocal in raising these concerns. There was need for more appropriate development strategies that enhanced the welfare of all people across regions and generations. Since economic growth alone would not guarantee sustained prosperity, equality, or social justice for all; there was need to integrate social, economic and environmental dimensions when dealing with multifaceted problems that were besetting the world (WCED, 1987, UN, 1992, UNCED, 1992, Ul Haq, 1996, Sen, 1999b, Jolly, 2004a). Consequently, the concepts of ‘Sustainability’ attained prominence in the global politico-economic and development policy space of the 1990s.

The notion of ‘sustainability’ is not recent and can be traced back to time immemorial. Many societies had explicit rules and norms regarding respecting nature and proper use of natural resources; including the saying “we do not inherit the earth from our ancestors; we borrow it from our children”. However, it was the report of the World Conference on Environment and Development (WCED), entitled, ‘Our Common Future’/’Brundtland Report’ (WCED, 1987), and its definition; “Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987 p43); that brought the concept to global prominence. This was followed by the 1992, United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or the ‘Earth Summit’; that drew 109 heads of state, thousands of NGO representatives, and other actors; to address the challenges in an increasingly globalising world with mounting environmental destruction, poverty and inequity. The Summit produced ‘The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’
and the Agenda 21 (UN, 1992, UNCED, 1992) that established ‘sustainable development’ firmly into the international politico-economic arena.

Figure 8: Three pillars of sustainability and objectives of sustainable development


Sustainable development comprised three pillars: economic, environmental, and social; which were interdependent and mutually reinforcing elements of the same integrated process (UN, 2002, UNGA, 2005, Magee et al., 2013). The numerous crises facing various people and parts of the world were not separate; they were part of ‘one interlocking crisis’ affecting the whole world and everyone, since the whole humanity was intrinsically linked. These crises were multidimensional in nature, interdependent, mutually reinforcing, and inextricably intertwined. Therefore they required holistic and integrated approaches. Worldwide collective responsibility and active concerted actions and participation of all members of society was of necessity, with the needs of the poorest and the most vulnerable people being given overriding priority; with emphasis to interregional and intergenerational equity, solidarity and social justice (WCED, 1987, Raskin et al., 2002, Esty et al., 2005, UNDESA, 2007). Since, economic growth and human progress were not the same, there was need for ‘development’ that benefited people, enlarged their choices, and enabled them to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives; with access to education, political freedom, and a decent standard of living; with more attention being given to human rights, personal self-respect, environmental justice, and equitable income distribution (UNDP, 1990, Ul Haq, 1996, Jolly, 2004b). This involved ensuring all the people of the world had adequate access to food, clothing, shelter, water and sanitation; opportunities for education, employment, participation, and civil society; as well as safety, health, quality of life, and equity, peace, security, resilience, dignity, and culture. Emphasis was to be placed on developing the capacity of institutions, and conditions for all members of society to be able to not only determine and meet their needs, but also have a larger range of choices to achieve their potential (Raskin et al., 2002, Esty et al., 2005, UNDESA, 2007). Accordingly, non-economic gains such as life expectancy, education, equity; social justice, community ties, social capital, equal opportunity; protection against threats of conflicts, crime, economic or environmental decline; and improved community organisation and social ties that lead to better social norms, trust, enhanced well-being, capability, life satisfaction and happiness; were even more important (WCED, 1987, Ul Haq, 1996, Sen, 1999b, UNDP, 1999b).
In the 1990s ‘Sustainabilism’ became dominant from the grassroots to the global level, in governmental, private, and civil society sectors; resulting in the creation of innumerable organisations, declarations, treaties, laws, policies, programmes, and projects; including several United Nations, specialized agencies and divisions. In fact, an immense industry emerged. Furthermore Sustainabilism became a colossal social movement that brought together many individuals, organisations, and groupings. It entered organization charts of private enterprises and the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) became entrenched. The global solidarity movement emerged that went beyond the traditional altruistic and charity activities; and moved towards fair trade, anti-globalisation and debt cancellation campaigns. They demanded appropriate policies and actions from government and private sector entities (Brecher et al., 2000, Raynolds, 2000). Ultimately, Sustainabilism, which encompassed ideas from Idealism and Basic Needs approaches culminated in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), that were based on solidarity, poverty eradication, and respect for nature and the needs of the vulnerable (UNGA, 2000). However, as Sustainabilism attracted an extraordinarily large number of actors, there were extremely many and diverse notions, definitions, approaches, aspirations, values, goals, interests, and perspectives. This contributed to great ambiguity such that sometimes it merely became a ‘buzzword’ as exemplified by ‘green washing’ and ‘labelling’ of practices (Estes, 1993, Herrle and Walther, 2005b, Walker and Wan, 2012, Borel-Saladin and Turok, 2013). Accordingly, whereas Sustainabilism had a colossal presence in the global politico-economic arena, media, academic circles, policy and practice discourses; it had very minimal impact in the Global South’s economic and development prescription policies which remained neoliberalist (Jolly, 2004b). Nonetheless, outside the realms of government policy and private sector actions, Sustainabilism seemed to reign supreme and resonate well with the aspirations and hopes of the majority of the people globally, in a rapidly globalising and probably deteriorating world.

2.7. Since the year 2000: The new millennium and good governance

Socio-politico-economical and technological transformations that had began in the 1980s and 1990s greatly intensified such that a radically transformed world with new aspirations emerged in the year 2000, the ‘New Millennium’. Globalisation deepened and became one of the most influencing forces in the day to day lives of the people all over the world (Sassen, 1998, Mimiko, 2012). Increased internet and mobile phone-use globally, fundamentally changed the way people interacted, exchanged ideas, conducted business, and carried out their daily lives. Almost all the people and regions of the world became interwoven into a single global network socio-culturally and politico-economically, with capital cities being intricately linked at various levels into a single global system (Sassen, 1998, Sassen, 2002, Steger, 2010, Carver, 2013, James and Steger, 2014). By the year 2000, the forces of globalisation and neoliberalism had grossly eroded the authority, focus, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the ‘government’. Transnational corporations exceeded most governments both in size and power. There was a tremendous rise in the number of civil society and private sector actors who were not only increasingly taking over functions previously done by the government, but were also challenging the government and demanding for its accountability. Many societal problems were no longer falling
under the jurisdictions of any one specific agency or nation state; and there was an increase in regional integration and supranational entities. Accordingly, with the ‘weakening of the state’ and the proliferation of non-state actors, policy actions were taking place in an ‘institutional void’ without generally accepted or clear rules and norms. There was a need for new forms of authority and control, involving numerous interdependent actors (Korten, 2001, Hajer, 2003, Piattoni, 2009).

Furthermore, there was an increased awareness and boldness among ordinary citizens all over the world, who were finding a ‘voice’ to demand for their freedoms, socio-economic rights, and involvement in democratised decision-making processes. They had changed from being ‘target groups’ and ‘beneficiaries’ into ‘negotiators’ and ‘partners’, often holding the government and the private sector to account (Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013, Ley et al., 2014b, Herrle et al., 2015); exemplified by rising incidents of ‘whistle-blowing’ and organisations such as ‘WikiLeaks’. Furthermore the citizens became more organised and coordinated, forming global alliances and networks to fight against societal ills, oppression, and socio-economic economic challenges; as well as find solutions to their common problems (Skinner, 2011, Costanza-Chock, 2012, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2012b, Ley et al., 2014a, Herrle et al., 2015). All these significantly challenged the existing relationship between the state and society precipitating a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ (Mayntz, 2003, Bonnafous-Boucher, 2005, Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, Bellamy and Palumbo, 2010, Osborne, 2010). By the year 2000, ‘governance’ had become a dominant ‘catchword’ permeating almost all socio-politico-economic contexts including politics, business, and academia; resulting in a proliferation of terms such as global governance, corporate governance, and urban governance, with ‘governance’ being attached to a plethora of socio-politico-economic agendas, studies, policies, and practices. It soon entered the Global South’s aid and development arena, and attained a ‘mantra’ status; with most of GS problems being attributed to ‘bad governance’, and ‘good governance’ being prescribed as a panacea.

In 1986, in a bid to explain the disastrous performance of the SAPs, in response to intense criticism from various quarters, and in an attempt at consensus building among the staff who were highly divided with some having intense discontent with SAPs; the World Bank commissioned a Long-term Perspective Study (LTPS) that involved surveys in 15 African counties (World Bank, 1989b, Agarwala and Schwartz, 1994, Mkandawire, 2007). These culminated in the report: “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study” (World Bank, 1989b). The World Bank consulted scholars in Africa to prepare the background papers; in which they were very critical of the SAPs, but also stressed that state–society relations were the main problem. What was required was “not less government but better government” (World Bank, 1989b p 5). Therefore they asserted that; “Underlying the litany of Africa’s development problems is a crisis of governance”(World Bank, 1989b). Consequently, according to Mkandawire (2007) the scholars put forward a triad by which good governance should be judged; the establishment of state–society relations that were:
Developmental, in the sense that they allow the management of the economy in a manner that maximises economic growth, induces structural change, and uses all available resources in a responsible and sustainable manner in highly competitive global conditions;

- Democratic and respectful of citizens’ rights; and

- Socially inclusive, providing all citizens with a decent living and full participation in national affairs, paying special attention to issues of equity and inclusion.

The scholars stressed on the urgency of democratisation and strongly opposed authoritarianism and misgovernment as well as the imposition of development policies. They therefore insisted “on the importance of local initiatives, political accountability to the citizens, and the need to reconcile African traditions and institutions with ‘modern’ ones” (Mkandawire, 2007). Accordingly, the first draft of the report was highly critical of adjustment and recommended ‘better governance’.

Hence, the draft was not well received by the top officials in the World Bank which in that period was dominated by the neoliberal agenda. Furthermore, the Bank preferred not to engage in political issues, but concentrate on economic issues. Therefore the top officials demanded that the report be toned down, depoliticised and narrowed to focus on economic management, resulting in the 1989 final report (Agarwala and Schwartz, 1994, Kapur et al., 1997a, Stein, 2008). Consequently, the approach to ‘good governance’ that emerged in the final report differed radically from the scholars’ conceptualisation. Thus, the initial World Bank’s conceptualisations of ‘good governance’ did not differ significantly from the SAPs; as their main focus remained macroeconomic stabilisation; and to the Global South governments’ simply ‘one more item on the list of aid conditionalities’ and ‘an instrument for ensuring the implementation of adjustment programmes’ (Stiglitz, 1998, Stiglitz, 2000, Mkandawire, 2007).

Nevertheless, with the 1989 report, the ‘good governance’ terminology gained prominence in the politico-economic and development arena. Other organisations and actors followed suit, by simply relabelling their programmes and divisions from their previous names to ‘governance’. Subsequently, any failure of policies and initiatives came to be blamed upon ‘institutional weakness’ and ‘bad governance’. Thus, the ‘new’ governance agenda that emerged simply involved ‘old wine in a new bottle’ in which existing programs strategies and projects were creatively reclassified and relabelled as governance, by multilateral and bilateral organisations, governments, politicians, and other actors (Agarwala and Schwartz, 1994, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, Stein, 2008, Yusuf et al., 2009).

Nonetheless, with the ending of the Cold War, it was no longer economically viable or politically prudent to continue dealing with authoritarian regimes steeped in corruption and public malfeasance (Kelly, 1993, Girling and Girling, 1997, Weiss, 2000). Hence, donor countries demanded democratisation as well as an end to corruption and human rights abuses which were added to development aid conditionalities. In subsequent years the World Bank and other development organisations revised their definitions to include more and more socio-political concerns and normative agendas. As ‘good governance’ gained prominence, more actors and organisations
adopted the terminology but with their own conceptualisations and meanings; with an ever expanding lexicon of normative objectives. Thus good governance came to be associated with poverty reduction, sustainable development, market efficiency, accountability, and many other sometimes conflicting objectives.

**Box 1: Definitions of Good Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good governance rests on the twin values of inclusiveness and accountability which are established in three key areas: First, the selection, accountability and replacement of authorities (Voice and accountability, stability and lack of violence); Second, the efficiency of institutions, regulations, resource management (regulatory framework; government effectiveness) and; Third the respect for institutions, laws and interactions among players in civil society, business, and politics (control of corruption; rule of law) (World Bank, n.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good governance implies inclusion and representation of all groups in the urban society – and accountability, integrity, and transparency of local government actions – in defining and pursuing shared goals (World Bank, 2011d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources (UNDP, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance processes refer to the quality of participation necessary to ensure that political, social and economic priorities are based on a broad consensus in society and that the voices of the excluded, poorest and most vulnerable are heard in decision-making. Mechanisms of good governance include transparent, democratic institutions as well as efficient and effective public services. The outcomes of good governance could be peaceful, stable and resilient societies, where services are delivered and reflect the needs of communities, including the voices of the most vulnerable and marginalised (UNDP, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance includes ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption (IMF, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance relates to the transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory environment for private sector activity (IMF, 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society (UNESCOP, 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance encompasses seven key capabilities the states need to develop, in partnership with the private sector and civil society: to operate political systems which provide opportunities for all the people, including the poor and disadvantaged, to influence government policy and practice; provide macroeconomic stability and to facilitate private sector investment and trade so as to promote the growth necessary to reduce poverty; implement pro-poor policy and to raise, allocate and account for public resources accordingly; guarantee the equitable and universal provision of effective basic services; ensure personal safety and security with access to justice for all; manage national security arrangements accountably and to resolve differences between communities before they develop into violent conflicts; develop honest and accountable government that can combat corruption (DFID, 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance mainly entails the ability of citizens to make their voices heard and hold their governments to account (DFID, 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance entails transparency, pluralism, citizen involvement in decision-making, representation, and accountability; focusing particularly on five areas: legislative strengthening, decentralisation and democratic local governance, anti-corruption, civil-military relations, and improving policy implementation (USAID, 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance entails establishment and consolidation of inclusive and accountable democracies to advance freedom, dignity, and development (USAID, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance comprises five dimensions: participation, fairness, decency, efficiency, accountability, and transparency in state-society relations and how the state and non-state actors operate in each of six arenas: civil society, political society, government, bureaucracy, economic society, and judiciary (Hydén et al., 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance comprises six dimensions: voice and external accountability; political stability and lack of violence, crime, and terrorism; government effectiveness; lack of regulatory burden; rule of law; control of corruption (Kaufmann et al., 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance is about the performance of agents in carrying out the wishes of principals, and not about the goals that principals set. The quality of governance is different from the ends that governance is meant to fulfil (Fukuyama, 2013).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Accordingly, among the myriad of involved actors and organisations, what constituted ‘governance’ or ‘good governance’ remained a highly contentious matter (Kirby, 1997, Doornbos, 2001, Nanda, 2006, Mkandawire, 2007, UNESCAP, 2007, Grindle, 2011); with highly varied definitions, understandings, conceptualisations, and prescribed actions that motivated extremely diverse practices, power relations, norms, and state-society relations; as well as the forms of interaction between ‘those governing and the governed’. All these could have had critical consequences to problems, solutions, interrelations, and the effectiveness of initiatives in the Global South’s situations and arena. Consequently, it is this contextuality of ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’, with a multitude of highly differentiated actors and organisations, and probably having extremely diverse conceptualisations and perspectives that frames this study and also provides its background.

2.8. Decades of (under)development: orthodoxy, zeitgeist, and critiques

Zeitgeist is the spirit of the time denoting the dominant school of thought that typifies and influences the society at a particular period in time. A historical interrogation of the situations surrounding a particular phenomenon over time necessitates an appreciation of the zeitgeists it has gone through, with the involved challenges and opportunities. This chapter has identified six international development orthodoxies that dominated the Global South in each of the last six decades: Exclusivism, Modernisationism, Redistributionism (Basic Needs), Neoliberalism, Sustainabilism and finally Good Governism; as they were shaped by the prevailing geopolitico-economic and socio-cultural context, hegemonic interests, major events, as well as the array of critical perspectives and counterrevolutionary resurgences. The successive orthodoxies and policies were promoted vigorously and widely publicised as the ‘truth’, ‘the only alternative’, the ‘best practice’, and were considered the ‘silver bullet’ or panacea; such that they became globally dominant in a particular decade. However, in the successive decades, these grand ideas were discredited as being flawed, based on faulty assumptions, or out of touch with the prevailing geopolitico-economic climate. Furthermore, these orthodoxies were then deemed incomplete, ineffective, and pernicious; fell from the dominant position, only to be replaced by the next ‘great idea’. Whereas it is inaccurate to suggest that development thinking and practice during any given epoch was monolithic, for each decade a dominant model can be identified and characterised that dominated not only the development theory, but also constituted the basis for the policies of both development agencies and most of the Global South countries. This included how the problems were constructed and solutions designated.

In the 1950s, Exclusivism was premised upon maintaining a social order based on privilegisation, ‘othering’ discrimination, exploitation, and oppression. However, with independence overt explicit exclusivism became untenable, so it took a more latent and implicit form. Independence aspiration in the Global South coupled with USA hegemonic interests, brought to the fore Modernisationism which was eventually brought into question by increasing poverty and inequalities despite economic growth. This ushered in the Basic Needs (Redistributionism) in the 1970s with deliberate redistribution of growth geared towards eradicating absolute poverty. However, the economic crises and the coming to power of conservatives in Western countries dealt a death blow to Redistributionism, leading to a
Neoliberalist neoclassical counterrevolution in the 1980s with an emphasis on free market fundamentalism. Nonetheless, the disastrous consequence of Neoliberalist policies with severe human, societal and environmental degradation, contributed to the rise of Sustainabilism in the 1990s. Sustainabilism stressed on holistical solutions and was an outcome of numerous critical perspectives from previous decades that highlighted the ethical and cultural ramification of development and illuminated the absurdities in some approaches. This was mainly a people-oriented orthodoxy from below that challenged the hegemony. In the wake of Sustainabilism in the 2000s, there arose Good Governism that redefined state-society relations, amidst a weakened state and rapidly globalising world. Nevertheless, a deeper look at the different orthodoxies on the one hand, reveals a probable link between Exclusivism, Modernisationism, Neoliberalism, and some forms of Good Governism; and on the other hand, a link can also be established between Idealism, Dependencianism, Redistributionism (Basic Needs), Sustainabilism and some forms of Good Governism. Nonetheless, the current dominant ‒ism, the Good Governism, has been conceptualised in numerous ways by different actors, such that it has become an extremely polyvalent and vague concept that seems to have carried in all the contentions from all the previous orthodoxies, with possible critical ramification on actor relations, effectiveness of initiatives, and the resolution of societal problems.

Over the decades, the development arena became highly contentious, concerning why, what, and how it should be pursued, who should do it and for whom; what was the problem and solution, which path should be taken; whose interests should be advanced, and finally what was the ultimate goal. Some actors have seen it as a genuine attempt to improve the lives of the many who continue to languish in abject poverty, while others see it merely as an advancement of hegemonic interests. Indeed over the decades discussions on development have been influenced not only by the prevailing politico-economic contexts and crises, but also by the prevailing dominant ideologies. Over those decades, these different development orthodoxies and approaches have arisen from several sources. These have included academia working either in tandem, in reaction, or in opposition to the existing underlying political and economical ideologies and situations; in addition to the actions of ordinary citizens, civil society, private sector interests, epistemic communities, among others. Hence the development process is socially constructed. Development over the decades involved the process of articulating knowledge and power through which particular concepts, theories, and practices for social change were created, reproduced, or transformed (Escobar, 1992, Crush, 1995, Escobar, 1995). It entailed how problems are constructed and solutions designated. The ‘dominant models of development became a highly contested domain in which dominant groups attempted to assert control over marginalised groups of people’ and marginalised groups sometimes resisted or offered alternatives. Nonetheless, the reasons why certain ideologies became dominant at a particular epoch are numerous (and beyond the scope of this thesis). For instance the oil crises in the 1970s which precipitated the crisis of Fordism with the accompanying stagflation put Keynesianism into question. This played a role in the election of right wing conservatives in Western countries leading to the resurgence of neoclassical economics and ultimately led to the almost three decade dominance of Neoliberalism in the politico-economic and development arena. In the same way Sustainability
concepts existed for many years, however, the increasing global recognition and probably acceptance that the prevailing politico-economic and development practices are threatening the environment, the planet, and the future existence of humanity, coupled with other activists’ efforts, pushed the Sustainability concepts to the fore in the 1990s.

Nevertheless from the onset due to both conflicting vested interests and highly diverse perspectives, the development arena has been plagued with an ever increasing lack and decline of consensus among the ever growing number of interested actors. This has been worsened by the disappointing results decade after decade, and the bitterness over the still prevailing deplorable conditions in many countries. Whereas development was supposed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the Global South’s ordinary citizens, and also bridge the gap between the poor and rich nations, the conditions for many in the Global South have continued to deteriorate drastically, and the gap between poor and rich nations, and between the poor and rich people within and across countries has continued to grow tremendously since 1960s (see Table) (UNDP, 1990, World Bank, 1996, UNDP, 1999b, UN-Habitat, 2003, UNDP, 2013, World Bank, 2013b). These have highlighted recurring themes in the development arena; however, profits seemed to have taken precedence over humanity, and the primacy of the human person has been denied (UNDP, 1990, UJ Haq, 1996, Chomsky, 1999, Harvey, 2005, Stiglitz, 2009). The elites’ interests seemed to have always taken precedence and were pursued regardless of their detrimental effects to the welfare of the ordinary citizens.

As a consequence of these, and other dilemmas and contentions surrounding the development arena several ‘circles’ have emerged among the interested actors. These circles include: Firstly, those calling for alternative development strategies such as ‘development from below’ and people oriented development. Second, circles demanding fundamental structural changes in international relations including issues of trade, indebtedness, and other imbalances, without which the creditability and effectiveness of development efforts and assistance will ever remain in doubt. Thirdly, circles of those who optimistically trudge on undeterred by persistent failures, criticisms, and doubts, in search of more appropriate or effective solutions; and many more circles represented in the scholarly world, policy, politics, and practice spheres; with some striving for change, while others to maintain the status quo. All these have seemingly played a significant role in the lack of consensus that plagues the development arena.

The whole idea of development itself has come under severe criticism. According to Post-developmentalist critique the “idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work” (Sachs, 1992 p 1). The Post-developmentalists posit that development as prescribed to the Global South has always been unjust, imperialistic, and ethnocentric, always failed, and never worked, but it has just been an euphemism for post-war American/Western hegemony; with Western interests guiding its direction, goals, and outcomes (Sachs, 1992, Escobar, 1995, Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997, Ziai, 2007). Given that ‘development’
since the 1950 was defined in terms of escaping from ‘underdevelopment’, it meant that over two-thirds of the world’s populations saw themselves as having fallen into this undignified condition and the need to look outside for salvation to escape this condition (Sachs, 1992). By reducing development to a simple measurement of the economic growth led to morally ambiguous justification for imperialist behaviour espoused by some of the mainstream development theories (Sachs, 1992, Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). Escobar (1995) argues that the “coherence of effects that the development discourse achieved is the key to its success as a hegemonic form of representation: the construction of the poor and underdeveloped as universal, pre-constituted subjects, based on the privilege of the representers”. Nonetheless, post-development theory has been criticised for failing to take cognisance of the fact that not all development was imposed upon the Global South by the West, but in fact, a significant proportion of development theory and practice has originated from the Global South (Crush, 1995, Edelman, 1999). By categorising all development as being Western hegemony, Postdevelopmentalists failed to recognise heterogeneity within development discourse and its varied meanings and applications. Indeed, according to Crush (1995 p 8) “Development, for all its power to speak and to control the terms of speaking, has never been impervious to challenge and resistance, nor, in response, to reformulation and change”. Moreover their rejection of all development would imply rejecting possibility for material advancement and transformation in welfare and life opportunities for the poor in the Global South, in the past, present, and future.

Over the decades there have been persistent and often unheeded calls to redefine the whole concept of development, especially towards a more optimistic path for the Global South’s poor. This includes placing more emphasis on the objectives of development, especially reducing absolute poverty and inequalities, towards the improvement of the lives of the majority and the achievement of a dignified life for all humanity. Hence there is need to devise development alternative strategies toward not only achieving those objectives, but also devise means for overcoming obstacles to arising from the nature of the world geopolitico-economic systems. Accordingly, the first priority is to genuinely establish the underlying root causes of underdevelopment, obstacles to development, failure of initiatives, and the persistence of Global South problems. Probably owing to the fact that many development initiatives over the decades have failed to properly understand or deliberately ignored the targeted peoples’ needs, interests, perspectives, and other socio-cultural and economic values; coupled with the many vested interests and diverse perspectives involved in those initiatives; since the 1950s many development initiatives have not only failed to yield the desired result, they have also had a myriad of unexpected negative consequences. In many cases due to the complex socio-cultural structures that those initiatives operate through, from the Global to Grassroots level, the outcomes of those initiatives are often an unrecognisable transformation of the original intention (Ferguson, 1990, Escobar, 1992, Syagga et al., 2001a). Development can therefore be seen as comprising sets of knowledge, worldviews, discourses, norms, justifications, significations, and power relations. Thus by implication it carries the power to intervene, transform and rule by a given set of actors upon the issue in question and upon other actors. Questions of agency in the defining and carrying out of the development practices became crucial. These include questions of who voices the concerns, the power relations,
which voices are included or excluded as a result, and finally whose concerns, interests, and priorities are pursued. In the Global South where the government, private sector, academia, and civil society, bilateral, and multilateral organisations play a key role in development, these questions extend to the role of ‘experts’ and how their perspectives and interests play in the development arena; for example, how they determine and rule the development priorities, and whom to include or exclude in the process. Ultimately, to overcome pessimism and move towards optimism, what development constitutes and its process may need to be redefined through innovative practices and processes; so as to include the perspectives and concerns of the poor in the Global South, to whom development is aimed, but currently have little or no say at all in these development matters that profoundly affect their lives.

2.9. Development and the Global South

This chapter looked at the Global South through the lens of development. Apparently the theme of development and issues that surround them seem to be so pervasive and encompass almost all aspects of long term and day to day issues in the Global South. Development seems to frame all other problem-solution aspects of the Global South and especially on how the region relates to the world system at any time and space. Many situations in the Global South including those related to housing and governance seem to reverberate around the development themes that have emerged in the last six decades. Whereas most actors more or less agree that something has to be done concerning the deplorable socio-economic conditions, a significant proportion of people in the Global South have to endure in their day to day lives. Furthermore, there is no agreement as to what the problem ‘is’ or ‘how’ the problem should be dealt with. This has contributed to the emergence of different development orthodoxies, some of which became dominant in some decades and were part of the zeitgeist. Nonetheless, despite their loss of prominence, the orthodoxies did not simply disappear. They remained co-present, and continued competing not only with the new orthodoxies, but also the previous ones they had unseated, resulting in a quagmire of ideologies, normative ideals, policy directions, doctrines, prescriptions, and other –ims; with severe consequences in numerous Global South situations. Indeed, even when the orthodoxy was dominant, it was not readily accepted by all neither was there a full agreement or consensus concerning what should be. Each orthodoxy faced intense criticism and opposition. Accordingly, this perplexing situation one encounters in many Global South problem-solution situations necessitates deeper and more nuanced appreciation. It thus provides an entry point and a basis for this inquiry; especially into the persistence of numerous Global South crises and the observed difficulty in solving even seemingly straightforward problems. Consequently, the identified six decadian dominant politico-economic and development orthodoxies assist in formulating a framework, perspective, and operational structure through which this study is pursued.
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### 1990s: Limits to Growth: Effects of Globalisation and Neoliberalism
- Need for ensuring current sustainability and future survival in a rapidly deteriorating, globalising and neoliberalising world.
- Multinational corporations become exceedingly powerful, IMF, World Bank, and WTO enhanced
- Growing human and environmental concerns, global injustice and inequality
- Civil societies, and epistemic communities ascendancy: activism, lobby, protests
- International exchange 'World Wide Web', mobile phone, CNN
- Increased post Cold War democratisation, second liberation decade
- Brundtland Report (WCED) 1987
- Fourth UN Development Decade (21 Dec. 1990)

### 2000s: The New Millennium: Deeping Globalisation
- Interconnection: single global network, socio-culturally, politico-economically. E-mail, text messaging, and social networking; Offshoring, call centres, EPZs increase, millennium bug.
- Dot-com bubble burst and Global financial and economic crisis: Keynesian resurgence
- Local and international conflicts e.g. War on Terror and international terrorism; Refugees and IDP increase
- Ordinary citizens increased awareness, and boldness, and demand for rights-Democratisation deepens, Arab Spring (social media & 24 hour TV); Whistleblowing, Wikileaks, Snowden
- New institutionalism and new governance discourses
- Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank, 1999b)
- Declarations on Good Governance (March 30, 2006)

### Good Governance
- Role: Enabling environment
- Tools: Macroeconomic stabilisation, structural adjustment, private property rights, SAPs, DLP, Foreign direct investment (FDI) relaxed labour and environmental standards, anti-unionisation, free markets, laissez-faire, shock doctrine
- Rationale: Free market is king and freedom, governments are inherently evil and rarely good, their interventions disruptive, regulation is the enemy
- Focus: Clients, the private sector
- Measurement of 'development': getting the market right, low inflation, dept repayment

### Sustainability
- Meet present needs without compromising the future generations ability to meet their own needs; social, environmental, economical, and cultural justice and equity across time and space.
- Key actor: Regulating, responsive and inclusive governments, civil society
- Role: Regulation, inclusion, protection
- Tools: regulations, multi-sectoral strategies capacity building, participation and ownership, inclusion and empowerment mechanisms, shift from 'business as usual', special focus on the vulnerable, good and best practices
- Rationale: Our common future, inalienable rights, shared responsibility, justice, freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature, and shared responsibility,
- Focus: Stakeholders, marginalised groups
- Measurement of 'development': Sustainable Human Development Index (HDI, S-HDI, ESI, SL etc), MDGs, Economic development, social development and environmental protection
3. The urban South: Housing conundrum

The ‘urban South’ refers to a nuanced variety of extremely diverse urban environments scattered across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. However, despite this extreme diversity, there are distinct features that seem to categorise most of the urban environments in the Global South, such as colonial legacies, inequality, informality, conflict, multiperspectivity and slums, as highlighted hereunder. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the urban South is its housing conundrum that is seemingly becoming ‘unsolvable’, and comprises the ‘urban South crisis’ notwithstanding almost six decades of resolution efforts (UN-Habitat, 2003, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2013b, Orbit, n.d.). Accordingly, since the 1950s, this conundrum has elicited various responses most of which have not been successful. Moreover, they have attracted myriads of highly varied actors, all of whom have significantly compounded the problem; making the problem of housing, slums and their proposed solutions a critical theme in the urban South. Accordingly, these comprise the substantive issue in this study; which aims to put forward some possible explanations for this conundrum. Hence this chapter discuses some of the key themes, significant shifts, and tensions that have dominated the urban South’s housing arena for the past six decades and probably, whose unintended consequence has been the perpetuation of the urban South crisis.

3.1. The ‘urban South’ and its peculiarity

Postcoloniality: Many urban areas of the Global South originated as colonial administrative or resource collection centres and are characterised by an enduring legacy of colonialism. Numerous colonial structures, institutions, policies, and relationships persist still intact, with their discriminative and exploitative processes; and have been blamed for the emergence and persistence of many of the urban South’s crises (Basu, 1985, King, 1985, Hardoy, 1992, Myers, 2003b, Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, UN-Habitat, 2009a, Myers, 2010). In response, several subaltern, postcolonial, ‘dependencia’, and sustainability approaches have emerged in attempt to break away from these path dependencies.

Inequality: Much of the urban South is characterised by an intense concentration of wealth amidst widespread abject poverty, accompanied with gross politico-economic and historical injustices; often illuminated by their stark dualities and spatial unfairness. A minority elite occupies most of the urban land and lives in extreme opulence; while a significant proportion of the urban population – the ‘unseen majority’, suffers severe deprivations confined in tiny left over and hazardous locations without basic services. While much of this is attributed to the colonial legacy, these inequalities and injustices have been exacerbated after ‘independence’ in pursuit of elite biased ‘world class’ policy objectives (Mehta, 2000, Ravallion, 2001, Ravallion, 2002, Basu, 2006, Coy, 2006, Watson, 2009, Watson, 2012, Garrido, 2013, Myers, 2014). Thus much of the urban South is comprised of exclusive, luxurious gated communities, behind/besides which are tucked tiny pockets of extremely dense settlements; with the total area covered by golf courses in several cities greatly exceeding the collective land coverage of those settlements in which over half of its populations reside. This has formed the basis of approaches such as the Basic Needs and sustainability.
Informality: Much of the urban South is defined by a very high degree of ‘informality’ in which a majority of its populations and activities often fall outside of the confines of the ‘established’ society, ‘modern’ sector, and existing legal and regulatory frameworks. This extremely ‘fuzzy’ concept is laden with structural ambiguities and vagueness of connotations as it is increasingly being used euphemistically to describe the escalating poverty, inequalities and exclusion in the urban South as well as the exploitative practices arising from linkages with its own subsystems and interactions with other systems (Hart, 1973, Drakakis-Smith, 2000, Roy, 2005, Hart, 2006, Lindell, 2010, Anyamba, 2011, Herrle and Fokdal, 2011). This has led to the emergence of approaches that espouse the elimination of ‘informality’ and ‘dead capital’ through ‘formalisation’ and ‘regularisation’ and other means, as the panacea for the urban South’s problems (Kombe and Kreibich, 2000, Gilbert, 2002, Manji, 2006, De Soto, 2009).

Figure 9: Urban South’s Inequalities: A single housing unit vis-à-vis millions of slum dwellings

Casualty: Very few cities in the Global South can escape the label of ‘wounded city’; many are suffering from the repercussions of past and ongoing conflicts; in addition to numerous natural and manmade disasters. There are exacerbated conflicts and tensions over the use of urban space and many simmering politico-ethnic, religious, and class-based tensions waiting to erupt at the slightest provocation. The weak and the poor endure horrendous living and working conditions, human rights abuses, exploitation, oppression, and marginalisation. Rampant corruption, inequalities, unfair distribution of resources, arbitrary application of law, discrimination and exclusion of other groups have increased vengeance-seeking group grievance. Furthermore, these urban areas are receptacles to people experiencing conflicts, economic injustices and hardships (Susser and Schneider, 2003, Myers, 2010, Crisp and Reftsie, 2011, Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2012, Till, 2012, Satterthwaite and Dodman, 2013). These have provoked approaches addressing vulnerability, resilience, adaptive capacity, and better governance.
**Multiperspectivity:** Much of the urban South is subjected to multiple modes of transformation, including numerous and discrepant mindsets, rationalities, ideologies, and other perspectives in addition to diverse vested interests. These include firstly, exogenous perspectives fixed at the supranational level and driven by global politico-economic and hegemonic forces, usually through multilateral and bilateral organisations, transnational corporations and civil society; secondly, perspectives from the powerful endogenous elites who often dictate what should happen at the local level; and thirdly, those of the general citizenry arising from their survival strategies often termed as ‘informal’ (Harrison, 2006, Holston, 2009, Herrle and Fokdal, 2011, Watson, 2012). Furthermore, these three broad categories involve myriads of highly diverse actors with highly divergent perspectives. Thus issues of the urban South are the subject of vicious scholarly debates and policy contentions; often producing a conflicting understanding of the problems, solutions, and prescriptions. What some see as the panacea, others see as being fatally flawed and in fact the cause of the problems; probably generating the ‘governance’ debate (Kombe and Kreibich, 2000, Watson, 2007, Harrison *et al.*, 2008, Kedogo *et al.*, 2010a, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Accordingly, this multiperspectivity and their intended and unintended consequences are the main focus of this study.

**Slums:** These seem to be the most peculiar, significant, and common defining characteristic for many urban South areas and their ‘crises’; especially due to their persistence and prominence (in population but not spatially). Certainly, in much of the urban South, slums occupy an infinitesimal area of land and in many cases are ‘nonexistent’ in maps or plans. They are tucked away in wastelands and precarious ‘in between’ spaces such as river valleys, cliff heads, dumpsites and ‘cities of the dead’; even though housing a considerable proportion of the urban population; 30% in the entire urban South and almost 60% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, these figures are highly disputed and often go up and down at the whims of powerful exogenous and endogenous actors; applying the diverse perspectives (Satterthwaite, 2005, Watson, 2009, Khalifa, 2011, Simone and Rao, 2012, UN-Habitat, 2013b, Myers, 2014, UN, 2015). Indeed many slums ‘disappear’ overnight not only theatrically in new maps, censuses, statistics, and reclassification, but also in reality through demolitions and evictions. Nevertheless, in the past six decades, the problem of slums has grown drastically in many countries, and gained prominence in the global politico-economic and development agendas. In fact, slums seem to significantly encapsulate the other defining characteristics of the urban South: postcoloniality, inequality, informality, casualty and multiperspectivity. Thus the slum problem and its persistence against a background of numerous prescribed and failed solutions, conflict vested interests and divergent perspectives, is sometimes used as a proxy for inferring the myriad societal problems and failures exhibited in the urban South. Indeed, slums are prominent amongst the multifaceted complex situations facing the urban South, in a conundrum of problems broadly referred to as the ‘urban South crisis’ (Stren and White, 1989, Tostensen *et al.*, 2001, Ravallion, 2002, UN-Habitat, 2003, Tibajjuka, 2004, Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2012).

### 3.2. Discourses and notions of ‘slums’ and their connotations

The term ‘slum’ is increasingly being used as an ‘umbrella concept’ and a ‘catch-all phrase’ to describe a wide range of settlements with inadequate, poor or hazardous human living conditions in the urban
The term encompasses diverse categories of settlement with different features, forms, connotations and other attributes and attitudes towards them (UN-Habitat, 2003, Gilbert, 2007, Gilbert, 2009). However, the term is equally applied to describe the highly heterogeneous mixture of housing conditions, legal status and local ascriptions. Indeed, the different local names for ‘slums’ in various locations such as favela (Brazil), chalis (Mumbai), ghetto (Nairobi), aashwa’i (Cairo), umjondolo (Durban), and gecekondu (Ankara) carry very different connotations and ascriptions. The local names reflect different histories, legality and official sufferance levels, use of land, economic activity, quality of ‘houses’ and environment, physical consolidation, social organisation, and hazardousness levels (Stokes, 1962, Neuwirth, 2005, Gilbert, 2007, UN-Habitat, 2010c, Khalifa, 2011). Hence, what could be considered a slum in one location or perspective may be considered adequate shelter in another.

Nonetheless, despite these differences and diverse connotations these settlements share varying degrees of deprivations, illegality, and hazardousness that make a distinct part of a given urban area. Accordingly, in an attempt to provide a universal definition, the UN-Habitat described a slum as one that is “lacking one or more of the following: improved water, improved sanitation, sufficient living area, durable housing and secure tenure” (UN-Habitat, 2010c). As follows, recent decades have seen the increased use of the term to describe the problem, solutions, programmes, and organisations; for instance, ‘the challenge of slums’, ‘slum-upgrading’, ‘Slum Dwellers International’, and ‘Cities Without Slums’. Nonetheless this usage has been denounced as being pejorative and condescending; followed by the counter-denunciation that avoidance of the term and usage of other ‘equivalent’ terms was merely euphemistic and avoided directly confronting the magnitude the urban South’s housing problem (UN-Habitat, 2003, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Gilbert, 2007). Disputes over the terms also relate to different ideologies concerning the problem and solutions; some actors see slums as problems which must be eradicated, while others see them as solutions only needing to be improved upon. Consequently, the term ‘slum’ encompasses diverse schools of thought and normative conceptualisations, with numerous contentions and contradictory stands.

Accordingly, the usage of the term ‘slum’ in this study is not in any way aimed at condoning any pejoratives. In fact, those controversies over meanings amongst the different actors form the core of this study; since apparently, the ‘putting of old wine in new bottles’ and those other ‘language games’ that sidestep core underlying issues seem to be part and parcel of the urban South's problems. This necessitates seeking ways to better understand, confront, and engage with those issues (Watson, 2003, Herrle and Walther, 2005b, Gilbert, 2007, Gilbert, 2009). Therefore, since ‘slum’ issues are imbued with immense contentions and contradictions that contribute to conflicts and misunderstandings, this study is undertaken with the belief that discussing openly those controversies could contribute to uncovering of some of the underlying issues and impediments to finding meaningful and effective solutions.

What can be considered as ‘slums’ in the current sense have existed in one form or another throughout history in many urban landscapes including the Roman Empire through to the Victorian period, where the urban poor or marginalised lived (Hartwell et al., 1974, Scobie, 1986, Uperti, 2004, Masterman, 2012). Accordingly, to explain the slum phenomenon, several theories emerged including
the neo-classical and postmodern schools of thought. On the one hand, the neo-classical models that included Chicago School ‘theories of residential differentiation’, ‘rent-gradient’, ‘factorial ecology’ and their successor, the neo-liberal theories, regarded slums as the natural response of the market providing the urban poor the housing that they could afford; thus the poor outbid the rich for those locations and made a ‘choice’ of where to live mainly on the basis of the cost of land and housing, transport costs, and the amount of living space (Alonso, 1964, Muth, 1969, Mills, 1972, Flood, 2000, UN-Habitat, 2003). These theories seem to be behind the conceptualisation of ‘freedom to build’ and ‘housing as a verb’ (Turner and Fichter, 1972), as well as ‘enabling policies’, land titling and regularisation, modernisation approaches and laissez faire. On the other hand, postmodern theories that included reproduction of social classes, ‘space and social reproduction’, ‘cultural landscapes’, post-structuralism, and post-colonialism; regarded slums as being essentially social constructs of what was ‘real’. These social constructs assign the ‘good’ and ‘successful’ to the best locations, while the ‘bad’ and ‘unsuccessful’ to left over, ‘non-existent’, hazardous and un-serviced locations (Marx, 1975, Harvey, 2000, Harvey, 2009c, Myers, 2011). These theories seem to be the basis of the ‘Basic Needs’, sustainable and integrated urban development, empowerment, capacity building, and certain forms of ‘good governisms’. However, the peculiarities of the urban South such as postcoloniality, the ‘urbanisation of poverty’, inequality, and rapid urbanisation with explosive growth of slums since the 1950s have led to South-specific discourses concerning the proliferation and persistence of slums. These include the structural, policy, and agency schools of thought.

Firstly, the problem of slums has been attributed to structural and systemic factors such as colonialism, path dependencies, globalisation, geopolitico-economic forces; that disrupted and supplanted hitherto relatively well-functioning systems, and replaced them with exploitative and dependency systems; resulting in legal pluralism and dualities such as ‘formal and informal’ of which the persistence of slums is a part of (Tabb, 1971, Christopher, 1984, Chandler, 1994, Debusmann and Arnold, 1996, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, UN-Habitat, 2009a). These exploitative systems are sustained by exogenous actors in cohorts with the indigenous elite and their ‘bad’ governance, undemocratic, segregative and corrupt systems, conflicts and wars, coupled with the ‘new’ espoused economic systems and ways of conducting business, as well as supra-nationally prescribed policies for the Global South. These forces ‘ratchet up’ inequalities with every global economic cycle, making the poor even poorer, and sending more to ‘sweat shops’, ‘slave wages’, and slums (Barán, 1957, Rao, 1971, Furtado, 1973, Sassen, 1998, UNDP, 1999b, Ravallion, 2001, Ravallion, 2002, Wallerstein, 2004). These are exacerbated as the Global South pursue ‘world class’ status and the ‘race to the bottom’ while competing for foreign investment. Accordingly, unless these structural issues are radically addressed, slums will remain an enduring feature of the urban South (Harvey, 2000, Satterthwaite, 2005, Harvey, 2009b, UN-Habitat, 2010c, Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2013).

Secondly, the proliferation and persistence of slums have been attributed to policy failure at all levels: global, national and local; and not just a manifestation of impersonal structural forces. Global policies produce the structural force that reinforce poverty and inequality; national policies address only the vested interest of the elites but worsen conditions for the poor; for which there is usually no political will to meaningfully tackle; and at the local level there is lack of capacities and poor implementation
(UN-Habitat, 2003, Satterthwaite, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2009a). However, it is not only the lack and failure of ‘good’ policies as some policies are ‘bad’ in the first place. In fact slums are direct outcomes of certain deliberate colonial policies and practices, exogenous prescriptions and endogenous policy machinations. For instance, the persisting ‘modernist’ policies prevalent in the urban South as well as planning and zoning approaches tend to be elitist and exclusionary, forcing many people towards informality, illegality, and slums (Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Gilbert, 2007, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, Gilbert, 2009, Alexander, 2012). Even policies with ‘good intentions’ and other normative aspirations have eventually been castigated as being inappropriate, ineffective, misguided, mismatched, misdirected, unrealistic, outdated, piecemeal, lacking scale, impractical or outright unimplementable among many others. Certainly, when some of those polices were implemented they failed to yield the intended outcomes; in fact several have had disastrous unintended consequences (Mitullah and Kibwana, 1998, Syagga et al., 2001a, Watson, 2009, Watson, 2012).

Thirdly, the proliferation and persistence of slums have been attributed to the practices, interactions, and interrelationships of the actors in the urban South housing arena, across time and space. Hence, structural factors, policy failure, and ‘bad’ policies do not just occur, rather they are intended or unintended outcomes of the involved actors’ interactions; and so are slums. Certainly, issues such as failure in governance, lack of political will, lack of adequate participation, exclusion, among others, all point to some action or non-action by particular actors. Indeed, unequal power relations, competition over resources and power, contradictory rationalities, conflicting vested interests, incompatible perspectives, lack of mutual understanding and actual conflicts among involved actors have played a key role in the perpetuation of the slum problem (Syagga et al., 2001a, Watson, 2003, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Kedogo, 2009, Alexander, 2012).

In summation, despite their tremendous contestations, a cursory look at all the above theories and schools of thought, points to some sort of relation amongst them. As a consequence, this study seeks to explore some of the positions above through a combined structure-agency perspective. Nonetheless, between these schools of thought and within themselves, no agreement exists amongst the scholars, practitioners, and other involved actors concerning the slum problem or its appropriate solution. In fact, each decade since the 1950s saw particular theories and practices becoming dominant as the most valid explanation for the urban South crisis, and the ‘best’ solution; until they were replaced by the next dominant narrative and practices; as will be explicated in the following section.

3.3. Conceptualisations of housing problems and solutions since 1950s

Soon after World War II, the seriousness of the urban South housing problem became vividly apparent and elicited various responses. Whereas the nature of the problems as well as the attitudes and responses they elicited were highly varied between regions, a common trend could be established across the entire urban South. This is because, to a certain extent, the entire urban South has been subjected to similar global geopolitico-economic forces and path dependencies; a trend which was escalated in the 1970s by the internationalisation of urban South housing polices through global
conferences, declarations, and initiatives as well as the increasing role of multilateral and bilateral aid agencies (Moser, 1995, Pugh, 1995, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006). Consequently, a dominant overarching theme for each decade can be identified. These are containment, modern-housing, site-services, enablement, integrated, and city-wide approaches; all of which were influenced by the prevailing development orthodoxies. However, these decadian policy shifts did not occur revolutionarily with marked breaks, rather the dominant themes replaced one another in an apparently seamless manner, with one decade’s theme evolving into the next. Furthermore, a particular decade’s policies and approaches did not begin or end with that decade, even though they lost the dominance, they continued to be practiced to a lesser extent.

3.3.1. Housing as a privilege: Containment

In the 1950s, most of the Global South including Africa, Asia and Latin America, were under oppressive, exploitative, segregative governance systems under colonial rule or dictatorial regimes. During this period many countries were embroiled in bitter struggles for independence, decolonisation had begun; and a few countries had already attained independence. In these governance systems, urban living and housing were seen as a privilege for ‘a chosen few’; and the ‘others’ were kept out through segregation laws, urban planning and zoning practices; maintained through military or police force. Nevertheless due to the lack of housing provision for the others, slums (unauthorised settlements) often emerged either in the periphery or in derelict spaces of the urban areas. However, these were treated as generators of disease and crime, in addition to political dissent. As a result, they would ruthlessly be demolished and residents would be ‘expelled’ to other locations including the rural areas at the whims of the authorities; especially, whenever the authorities felt ‘threatened’ or the privileged citizens felt ‘disgusted’ (Myers, 2003b, Myers, 2003a, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007). The policy was to keep urban areas pure and ideal for the ‘right people’. Thus emphasis was placed on achieving or maintaining racial purity, class hierarchy, spatial order, an idealised aesthetics, and often an ‘utopian’ way of living for the privileged to the detriment of the ‘others’. Accordingly, the role of the regimes was to control and to protect the privileges of the ‘chosen ones’ by maintaining the ideals, standards, purity, law and order; mainly through containment of the ‘others’ through segregative norms. Thus the policies were aimed at the ordinary citizens, not to improve their welfare, but to control and exploit them; hence the policies were mostly detrimental to their welfare (Karst et al., 1973, Lai, 1995, Solinger, 1999, Gooptu, 2001, Crawford, 2002, Myers, 2003a, Myers, 2003b, Young and Turner, 2013). Not only did the authorities control the only ‘quality’ of the urban areas, they also highly monitored, controlled, and restricted the movements, livelihoods, and most aspects of the lives of the ordinary citizens.

Certainly, these regimes provided minimal housing for labourers such as the ‘dormitories’, ‘bachelor quarters’, and ‘servant quarters’. Indeed the ‘others’ existed only to serve the privileged, and for only this reason were they to be allowed entry into the urban areas and access to the minimal housing (Lewis, 1962, Williams and Chrisman, 1994, Rodgers, 2004, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, Veracini, 2010). In fact, the British and French colonialists have been described as ‘the greatest slums-builders in all history’ as many of the urban South cites that were founded in the colonial era began as massive
slums; with no planning or housing provision for the ‘imported’ labourers and displaced natives who were forced to live in deplorable self-built ‘labour camps’ in unauthorised villages which were mostly situated in crowded segregated zones, or on the fringes of restricted towns without adequate water, sanitation, and other essential services (Suret-Canale, 1971, Gooptu, 2001, Crawford, 2002, Young and Turner, 2013). Whenever the situation got out of hand, especially with the outbreak of diseases that could threaten the privileged, these settlements were simply razed down; establishing the culture of slum demolitions and reconstruction cycles (Hake, 1977, Clayton and Savage, 2012, Otte and Neilson, 2012).

These exclusivist, privileging, othering, and containment polices where carried on in the newly independent countries as they built ‘new towns’ and ‘planned cities’ such as Brasilia (Brazil), Chandigarh (India) and many others that sprung up in the Global South. These towns were purposefully planned to certain aesthetic standards, but without catering for the poor. Most of the workers were therefore, forced to live in slums that emerged around these cities. Furthermore, in most of the urban South, these exclusivist policies persisted with zoning and planning practices, ‘world class’ aspirations, ‘beautification’, and ‘mega event’ preparations. In a bid to attract foreign investment and tourism, standards were geared towards a very specific transnational aesthetic serving the interest of the elites, while alienating majority of the citizens. Accordingly, much of the urban South is composed of gated communities, ‘leafy suburbs’ and luxurious apartments for a tiny minority, occupying sometimes over 90% of the residential land. Moreover, these gated communities are highly serviced although exclusive; while the majority of the citizens are cramped in the left over spaces without adequate infrastructure and services. In fact, majority are restricted from entering the exclusive zones (most of the urban land) unless they are going there to provide some services or labour, and they have an ‘appointment’ or special permission to enter these zones (O’Hare et al., 1998, Sassen, 1998, Appadurai, 2001, Konadu-Agyemang, 2001, Ruggeri, 2007, Watson, 2009, Watson, 2012).

3.3.2. Housing as progress: Modern public housing

In the 1960s, most of the Global South attained independence. In Latin America, the dictatorships were overthrown; necessitating the removal of segregative and confinement policies that had restricted the entry of many into the urban area and kept the urban population artificially low. Additionally, following the ‘modernisation’ prescriptions, the new government embarked on large urban infrastructure and industrialisation projects which were urban biased. Modernisation coupled with the removal of confinement policies, induced a massive rural-urban migration alongside with the ‘urbanisation of poverty’ and explosive growth of slums. As a result, much of the urban South shared a common trajectory of constrained slow growth before the 1960s, followed by an abrupt accelerated rapid growth during this period (Aldrich and Sandhu, 1995, Ravallion, 2002, Satterthwaite, 2005). Following the modernisation approaches, the rapidly growing housing and slum problems would be solved through modern-standard public housing and blueprint planning. Slums and other informal practices represented ‘backwardness’ which was attributed to ‘underdevelopment’. These were therefore to be tolerated as they would totally be eradicated and replaced with ‘well’ planned cities having modern housing, infrastructure, services and amenities; representing modernity and progress.
These were also done on the premises that modern cities and housing would accelerate economic growth and development by attracting international business, tourism and investments. Furthermore, it was believed that modernisation would produce accelerated economic growth and ‘trickle down’ that would enable Global South countries to attain the socio-economic standards of the Global North within a decade; therefore there would be no need to target housing for the poor, since poverty would soon be eradicated. Thus the focus was planning for economic growth and building houses according to the middle class’ standards, urban renewal, slum clearance and relocation of residents to new public housing estates; following the early 20th century practices in Global North cities (Gaskell, 1990, Gilbert, 2002, Njoh, 2003, De Soto, 2009). Consequently, to achieve these objectives, the role of the newly independent governments became that of a planner, using expertise and funds (mostly from development aid and loans), in an authoritatively top down manner without the input of other societal actors.

Ultimately, modernisation policies failed to yield the expected results of rapid economic growth. In fact poverty, inequalities and slums increased at an explosive rate. At the same time, the number of public houses produced was extremely insignificant, catering for less than 5% of the housing demand; and which were also highly unaffordable for majority of the urban South populations. Furthermore, much more slums were being demolished compared to the number of the new houses being produced; such that, many of those who were displaced after demolitions were never re-housed in the new housing estates. Moreover with increasing despotism, corruption, and clientelism in much of the urban South, the main beneficiaries of these public housing schemes were the more affluent or politically connected persons. All these led to circles of demolition and rebuilding that produced more slums of even more deplorable conditions and worse locations (Malpezzi and Sa‐Aadu, 1996, Hope, 1999, Fekade, 2000, Smart, 2001, Weru and Bodewes, 2001a, Smart, 2002, UN-Habitat, 2009a). In due course, the above practices threatened a severe political backlash and in response, the governments began to turn a ‘blind eye’ to the slum and not fully enforce the official policy of slum clearance. This gave rise to the semi-illegal status of slums in many countries and contributed to the increase of the informal-formal dualities pervading the urban South’s housing practices (Farvacque and McAuslan, 1992, Rakodi, 2001). Arguably, this ‘blind eye’ approach was consistent with the modernist assumption that the problems of poverty and slums were only a transient phenomena that would disappear on their own with economic growth and modernisation (Obudho and Aduwo, 1989b, Weru and Bodewes, 2001b). In the end, the modernist approaches played a signification role in creating, maintaining, and aggravating the problem of slums in the urban South. Nonetheless, despite its failures, modernisation remains one of the most preferred approaches by the urban South’s governors and elites; especially in pursuit of ‘progress’, western standards, and ‘world class’ status (Devas, 1993, Fernandes, 2003, GoK, 2008, UN-Habitat, 2009a, Watson, 2009, Watson, 2012, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013, Myers, 2014).

3.3.3. Housing as a basic need: Sites and services

By the year 1970, the rapidly deteriorating situation in the entire urban South, with increasing urban poverty and proliferation of slums amidst explosive’ urbanisation rates, had became a global concern. The 1969 UN General Assembly had declared this a priority; precipitating the internationalisation of
urban South housing polices (Pugh, 1995, UN-Habitat, 2006a, Un-Habitat, 2008). Following this, a series of international meetings and resolutions culminated in the first United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT I), held in Vancouver Canada from 31 May to 11 June 1976 that produced the ‘Vancouver Declaration on Human Settlements’. It declared that adequate shelter and services were a basic human right and need, of which the national governments were obligated to ensure, while prioritising the need of the poor as well as eliminating any impediments to this goal (UN, 1976). Additionally, the declaration asserted that the worsening problems of human settlements in the Global South arose from the existing unjust international economic relations. It therefore, called for concerted, intensified, and sustained actions, from global to grassroots levels to address the problem of achieving a just and equitable world and an international community based on the principles of equity, justice and solidarity. As a consequence, the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (which became UN-Habitat) was created in 1977, with the mandate of promoting the Vancouver action plan and monitoring national policies all over the world (UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2014d). Furthermore, the World Bank launched its shelter assistance programs considering that the frustrations which festered among the urban poor were readily exploited by political extremists. Therefore, if cities did not begin to deal more constructively with poverty, poverty would begin to deal more destructively with cities (McNamara, 1975 p 20). Henceforth, the UN-Habitat and World Bank became key agenda setting organisations in the urban South arena, with great influence upon the actions of the governments and other actors (Pugh, 1995, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, Stren, 2012). Additionally, other multilateral, bilateral, and charity organisations became deeply involved in finding solutions for the Urban South housing problems; mainly with the objective of ‘helping’ these ‘target-groups’ meet their ‘basic need’ such as shelter (Jolly, 1976, Streeten and Burki, 1978, Jolly, 2004a).

With colossal funding and intense championing by the World Bank, the ‘sites-and-services’ schemes, under a very wide range of types and variations, emerged as the dominant urban South housing approach in the 1970s. The World Bank commissioned over a hundred of these schemes in 55 countries through its First, Second, and Third Urban Projects; in conjunction with target countries and other donor organisations (Pugh, 1995, Pugh, 2001b, Alexander, 2012). Depending upon the different perspectives, the Sites-and-Services were espoused either in accordance with the Basic Needs approach, or as a counter-revolutionary response against this Basic Needs approach which obligated the nation states and the international community to ensure that the basic needs of all the citizens were met (Harris, 1999, Pugh, 2001b, Harris, 2003, Alexander, 2012).

In line with the Basic Needs ideology, through the sites-and-services, housing was seen as a basic need which the poor lacked. Therefore the government, with support of the international community, would ‘provide’ the basics i.e. plots of land (sites), basic infrastructure, water, and sanitation (services), and in some cases ‘core’ or ‘embryo’ units; while on the beneficiaries’ side, the target groups would build their own houses on those serviced plots or complete building the core units ‘incrementally’. All these represented a radical shift in the prescribed housing approaches, including the introduction of incremental building or progressive development, community participation, ‘sweat equity’, ‘appropriate technology’ and the acceptance of ‘substandard’ housing or occupation of ‘unfinished’ buildings. Even
so, these ran contrary to official building codes and land use regulations of those countries, as well as
the aspirations of the politicians and governors; thus these projects were often implemented following
lengthy discussions, disputes, and compromises that often delayed the projects and escalated the
Alexander, 2012). Certainly, these approaches were greatly influenced by the left-leaning critiques and
works of Charles Abrams (1964), the anthropologist-sociologist works of William Mangin (1967), and
of demolishing slums in a country having a severe housing deficit, calling for more tolerance towards
slum, and supporting of the efforts of the urban poor, incremental housing, and the legalisation of
slums. Turner (1972) decried the imposition of housing ‘standards’ that did not relate to the needs of
the urban poor, asserting that housing was a ‘verb’ i.e. a process, and therefore should not be treated
as a standard product. Indeed, compared to the 1960 public housing project, the sites-and-services
schemes’ costs per unit to the governments were much lower permitting a significantly higher number
of beneficiaries to be targeted.

Whereas site and services approaches were initiated under the label of ‘Basic Needs’, they came
under severe criticism of being merely an amalgamation of anarchist and neoliberalist ideology; that
were aimed at reneging governments’ obligations to relieve poverty, reduce entitlements for the poor
citizens, and set the stage for the ‘rolling back of the state’; by highly glorifying the praxis, ability, and
capacity of the urban poor and slum dwellers including the ‘impractical’ ‘sweat equity’ and ‘self-
construction’ (Cohen, 1983b, Pugh, 1992, Pugh, 1995, Werlin, 1999, Jones and Datta, 2000, Pugh,
2001a, Alexander, 2012). Indeed, the insistence on ‘full cost recovery’ and removal of subsidies,
reduced the governments input per unit into the projects. However, these transferred the costs from
the state to the ‘target group’, making it practically unaffordable to the urban poor, such that these
schemes mainly benefited higher income groups and the poor were left out. Additionally, in many
countries, the schemes were also permeated with corruption and clientelism that benefited the more
affluent and politically connected individuals. Furthermore, contrary to the envisioned approach, these
schemes involved slum demolitions and evictions, to relocate the residents to the new schemes
located in the cities’ peripheries where land was available and cheaper. However, the new sites were
so insignificant compared not only to the number of slum houses demolished, but also to the
magnitude of the prevailing housing problem. In addition, the bureaucratic process involved locked out
the poor and illiterate. Moreover, more slums were demolished compared to the new sites provided.
Needless to say, these schemes did very little to improve the urban South housing situation, neither
did it achieve their stated objectives of ‘affordability, cost recovery, and replicability’; in fact it worsened
the conditions of many who were evicted or displaced (Bank, 1974, Syagga and Kiamba, 1988a,
countries, these schemes became subject to ‘down-raiding’, ‘trickle up’, gentrification, and total
redesign; such that they became middle class estates, and the initial ‘target groups’ hardly ever
benefited from the schemes (Gilbert, 1992, Malpezzi and Sa - Adu, 1996, Hope, 1999, Werlin, 1999,
Huchzermeyer, 2007a, Huchzermeyer, 2009). Following the neoliberalist turn in the 1980s, the support
to the site and services schemes drastically declined as focus shifted away from supporting housing
projects towards policy and institution-building loans. Ultimately, even though the sites-and-services schemes largely failed to meet their objectives; they precipitated a policy shift of tolerance towards slums and laid the ground for the ‘in-situ slum upgrading’ that would dominate the urban South for many decades to come.

3.3.4. Housing as a commodity: Enablement

The 1980s saw the drastic decline and reversals in socio-economic conditions in much of the Global South; as neoliberalism became the dominant ideology, proclaiming the superiority of ‘self-regulating’ market mechanisms over government interventions and therefore prescribing government withdrawal from direct involvement in issues such as housing. Instead, the government was to concentrate on creating an ‘enabling environment’ for the private sector and the urban poor to produce housing; shifting the role of the government from being a housing ‘provider’ to ‘enabler’ and making the private sector the main actant in the housing arena (Mayo and Angel, 1993, World Bank, 1993a, UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2012a).

Following the neoliberalist ideology, housing became mainly a commodity that could be traded and invested in the market. Furthermore, its price, quantity, quality, demand, and supply were determined by market forces and therefore it was a part of the macro-economic environment. Correspondingly, slums represented the kind of housing which the urban poor could afford and were ‘willing to pay’ as a result of dysfunctional’ markets, unresponsive financial systems, under investment, and the ‘sitting on of dead capital’ in the form of unregularised land (Renaud, 1982, World Bank, 1993a, Gilbert, 2002, De Soto, 2009). The focus therefore was on creating an appropriate legal, institutional and regulatory environment. Moreover, the focus moved from projects to managing the housing sector as a whole in a manner that would ensure markets provided adequate and affordable housing; urban management for economic ‘productivity’ and ‘efficiency’; and broad institutional reforms to achieve the above especially, reorienting government institutions to appropriately deal with the ‘supply and demand issues’ in the housing market and providing incentives for the private sector (Mayo and Gross, 1987, Cohen, 1990, UMP, 1991, Mayo and Angel, 1993, Stren, 1993, Jones and Ward, 1994a, Hamdi, 1995, Jones and Datta, 2000, UMP, 2001, Myers, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2006a). These were encapsulated in the ‘enabling housing policy’ whose basis was Neoclassical economic analysis that posited housing supply and demand issues were a function of property rights, tenure security, finance availability; and that state interference was detrimental to market efficiency. Consequently, emphasis was to be placed on ‘enabling housing markets to work’ by focusing on the ‘supply and demand issues’ (Mayo and Angel, 1993, World Bank, 1993a, UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2012a). The demand side strategies entailed developing property rights and regularisation of tenure (titling), liberalising housing finance, and rationalising subsidies (focusing on tenure and infrastructure). The supply side strategies included providing infrastructure, removing regulations that hinder housing supply, and liberalising building industry and trade (imported and local) as well as lowering of building and planning standards (World Bank, 1993a). These were crystallised in the dogmatic ‘Dos and Don’ts’, that soon dominated the urban South’s housing policy prescriptions; and were also reiterated in the ‘Global Strategy for Shelter to the Year 2000’, which had a very significant impact worldwide (UN, 1988). Following this, many
Global South countries reformulated their national housing policies. Nonetheless, with the shift to enablement, many governments totally withdrew from housing issues, and housing concerns lost prominence in the international development agenda. Most bilateral and multilateral organisations shifted their focus away from housing issues and disbanded their housing departments. Accordingly, these factors played a significant role in the neglect and rapid deterioration of the urban South’s housing situation experienced in the 1980s and subsequent decades (UN-Habitat, 1990, UN-Habitat, 1991b, UN-Habitat, 1991a, UN, 2003, UN-Habitat, 2003, Alexander, 2012, Stren, 2012).

In the 1980s, the combined onslaught of worsening economies, rapid urbanisation, corruption and state mismanagement as well as neoliberalist prescriptions, saw the drastic deterioration of the housing situation for many citizens and the explosive growth of slums across the entire Global South (Pugh, 1995, Ravallion, 2002, UN-Habitat, 2003, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006). State withdrawal from housing and service provision greatly reduced their supply quantity and quality, while severe austerity measures such as retrenchment and layoffs severely curtailed the abilities of many to afford or invest in descent housing. Although these policies were premised upon the entry of the private sector, despite many incentives and enabling efforts, the private sector failed to step in meaningfully and perform the roles the government had withdrawn from (Pugh, 2001b). Seemingly, without state and civil society intervention, slums were the best solution the market could offer; they were highly profitable for investors who could take the risk, while the urban poor were ‘willing to pay’ a very high price for them (Amis, 1984, Pugh, 2001b, Satterthwaite, 2005, Huchzermeyer, 2007a, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008). Furthermore, the emergent in-situ slum upgrading focused on regularisation of tenure, titling, housing finance, and the provision of infrastructure and services on the premises that these would enable and provide incentive for the slum dwellers to improve their own housing situation. However, these mainly benefited the slumlords, land ‘grabbers’ and land speculators, rather than the slum dwellers. As a result, the land became commoditised and the locations gained real estate value resulting in displacement of the original residents by higher income groups. Moreover, the retreat of the state increased the voice and participation of the urban poor in housing initiatives but led to a massive proliferation of civil society and other non-state actors, with many diverse interests and perspectives, that tremendously increased unhealthy actor relations, conflicts, misunderstandings and wasteful competition. This led to piecemeal uncoordinated projects, with duplication and mismatches; sometimes with major conflicts and violence regarding the control of those initiatives; all this to the detriment of the initiatives’ effectiveness and objectives, as well as the housing situation as a whole. In fact, the end result of many initiatives became displacement and evictions, destruction of property and livelihoods, disruptions of socio-economic networks, and even loss of life (Werlin, 1999, Kigochie, 2001, Pugh, 2001b, Sanyal and Mukhija, 2001, Kusienya, 2004, Payne, 2004, Field and Kremer, 2006). Indeed the worsening housing conditions in the urban South contributed to the calls for ‘adjustment with a human face’ and for more holistic policies that meaningfully addressed the social concerns of the urban poor. Nevertheless, emergent approaches such as the focus on broad sectoral reforms and managing the whole housing sector instead of just projects, in-situ upgrading with security of tenure focus, and housing without
houses, remained prominent even when the neoliberalist policies came under heavy criticism, fell out of favour and lost dominance.

Table 4: The Dos and Don’ts of enabling housing markets to work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Do</th>
<th>Don’t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Developing property rights</td>
<td>Regularize land tenure</td>
<td>Engage in mass evictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expand land registration</td>
<td>Institute costly titling systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privatize public housing stock</td>
<td>Nationalize land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establish property taxation</td>
<td>Discourage land transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing mortgage finance</td>
<td>Allow private sector to lend</td>
<td>Allow interest-rate subsidies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lend at positive/market rates</td>
<td>Discriminate against rental housing investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enforce foreclosure laws</td>
<td>Neglect resource mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensure prudential regulation</td>
<td>Allow high default rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduce better loan instruments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationalizing subsidies</td>
<td>Make subsidies transparent</td>
<td>Build subsidized public housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target subsidies to the poor</td>
<td>Allow for hidden subsidies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidize people, not houses</td>
<td>Let subsidies distort prices</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subject subsidies to review</td>
<td>Use rent control as subsidy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Providing infrastructure for</td>
<td>Co-ordinate land development</td>
<td>Allow bias against infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>residential land development</td>
<td>Emphasize cost recovery</td>
<td>improvements</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Base provision on demand</td>
<td>Use environmental concerns as reasons for slum clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve slum infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulating land and housing</td>
<td>Reduce regulatory complexity</td>
<td>Impose unaffordable standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>development</td>
<td>Assess costs of regulation</td>
<td>Maintain unenforceable rules</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remove price distortions</td>
<td>Design projects without link to regulatory/institutional reform</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remove artificial shortages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizing the building industry</td>
<td>Eliminate monopoly practices</td>
<td>Allow long permit delays</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage small firm entry</td>
<td>Institute regulations inhibiting</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduce import controls</td>
<td>competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support building research</td>
<td>Continue public monopolies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a policy and institutional framework</td>
<td>Balance public/private sector roles</td>
<td>Engage in direct housing delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Create a forum for managing the housing sector</td>
<td>Neglect local government role</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>as a whole</td>
<td>Retain financially unsustainable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop enabling strategies</td>
<td>institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitor sector performance</td>
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</table>

Source (World Bank, 1993b pp 46-47)

3.3.5. Housing as sustainability: Integrated approaches

In 1990s it became widely recognised that the forces of globalisation and neoliberalism were resulting in severe deteriorations in the urban South; as many people were down spiralling into abject poverty and horrendous living conditions. Slums were not only growing exponentially in numbers, sizes, and density; the quality of life and the living environment in them were drastically declining. Seemingly, not only were the past and existing policy approaches failing in their stated objectives, they were actually aggravating the situation. In fact these approaches were exclusionary, marginalising and very myopic as well as selectively benefit-sharing, often driven by selfish short gains for a few people but with humongous detriment effects on majority of the people and the natural environment coupled with profound global injustice and inequalities that drastically increased the vulnerabilities of the poor in the urban South (Cohen, 1990, Jolly, 1991, UN, 1992, UN, 1996, Stiglitz, 1998, Meier and Stiglitz, 2001, UN-Habitat, 2003, Harvey, 2005, Harvey, 2009b, Harvey, 2009a, UN-Habitat, 2010b). Accordingly, these concerns rose to global prominence with the rise of the Sustainabilism orthodoxy in the 1990s; with calls for more appropriate and people centred approaches that were long term, holistic, just, and
fair; and gave priority to the needs of the poor, weak, and the vulnerable; with more considerations for social and environmental concerns, beyond merely economic considerations.

In Sustainabilism, dignified housing with healthy liveable environments in a just, equitable, and fair society were crucial components; while slums amidst global, national, or the city’s prosperity represented injustice, unfairness, marginalisation, and exclusion; therefore ‘unsustainable’ development. The existence of slums and poverty was not only detrimental to the wellbeing of the urban poor and the natural environment, but also to the wellbeing of all other human beings. Since all humanity was connected in one world system, it would be naive to imagine the destruction of one societal segment would not affect the other segments. Policies and practices which increased inequalities would not only hurt the poor and the weak; in the long run, even the wealthy and powerful were bound to pay a heavy price. Therefore addressing poverty, inequalities, environmental and housing concerns of the poor and marginalised were part and parcel of ensuring ‘our common future’ (WCED, 1987, Harvey, 2009c, UN-Habitat, 2010b). Since all the crises facing the world, including the urban South housing crisis, were interlocked with other societal problems, systems and forces; they required the concerted effort and participation of all humanity. Indeed, urban South’s housing problems were multidimensional and ‘cross cutting’ in nature and could not be isolated from the broader socio-politico-economic issues. These necessitated ‘Integrated Approaches’ that went beyond sectoral and multi-sectoral approaches which were single-goal oriented even though they included actors from different sectors and disciplines striving to solve the same problem; towards integrated approaches in which these actors pursued multiple goals and several mutually related problems in a holistic manner. Hence housing initiatives were to be conceptualised beyond solely shelter considerations, to involve an assorted ‘package’ of issues, elements and actions, based on the participation and priorities of the target population; focusing on root causes of the problem rather than just the symptoms. Thus housing initiatives included income generation opportunities, educational and health facilities, civic education, socio-cultural issues, among others. These were encapsulated in the ‘Sustainable livelihoods (SL) approaches’ that addressed the natural, social, human, physical, and financial assets which the residents lacked the resultant vulnerabilities because of that lacking (Chambers, 1991, Chambers and Conway, 1992). An integrated approach not only meant several actors and sectors working in tandem on different issues to produce synergies; but also integrating the hitherto marginalised and excluded urban poor and their issues into the wider general societal matters (politico-economic and socio-cultural) as well as with the rest of the urban area and its infrastructure, services and natural environment.

In Sustainabilism and its corresponding integrated and rights-based approaches, all human beings in the present and future generations, regardless of race, ethnicity, gender or socio-economic status possessed the ‘right’ to adequate and dignified housing, including the ‘right to the city’. Thus initiatives were to address and reconcile economic, environmental, social, political, and cultural equality and the inclusion of all residents as well as their capabilities; towards holistic and participatory initiatives that produced liveable, inclusive, and harmonious urban areas; and long-term maintenance of positive change and improvement in the well being of ‘all’ (Sen, 1999a, Harvey, 2009b, UN-Habitat, 2010b).
Accordingly, the focus became ‘adequate housing for all’, this was a right for all, for which the state was the duty bearer for its realisation with the participation of other actors with a ‘stake’. As opposed to the ‘withdrawal of the state’, here the role of the state was enhanced not only in the realisation of that right, but also in regulating the interactions of all the mutual actors towards achieving sustainability by ensuring that the rights of all (especially the poor, weak, and vulnerable) were realised and protected. This entailed the protection of the ecological and socio-cultural from harm that could arise from societal actors’ interests and practices, for instance through collectively produced rights-based regulations. These arose from the realisation that prevailing economic practices were myopic, driven by selfish short gains but enormous long term detrimental effects; and left on their own they often resulted in exploitation and marginalisation of the poor, societal and environmental destruction, and increasing poverty, inequalities, and slums. Thus it was the duty of the state not only to regulate societal actors, but also to protect the weakest and vulnerable by ensuring their fundamental rights. Furthermore, the role of civil societies was also enhanced with emphasis on community ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ and ‘bottom up’ approaches (Craig and Mayo, 1995, Fraser et al., 2006, Majale, 2008). Hence, in housing initiatives, slum dwellers moved from being ‘beneficiaries’ or ‘target groups’, and became ‘primary stakeholders’; whose views, interests, concerns, and meaningful participation were to be paramount. Therefore, actions by the state, civil, and private sectors were to be guided by a strong social contract and rights-based objectives; and aimed at equity, solidarity, cohesion, integration and improved quality of life for all. These included promoting the inclusion of the community in the decision making process, empowerment of the vulnerable actors in the process, and also stimulating the learning and knowledge sharing of ‘best practices’. Furthermore, it included creating institutions that ensured inclusiveness, accountability, and efficiency; building frameworks that incorporated dreams, aspirations, dignity, freedoms and rights of all the residents; and addressing issues of marginalisation, exclusion, oppression, exploitation, and socio-politico-economic practices such as rentseeking, clientelism, patronage, and other multiple violations that majority of the urban South residents had often been subjected to (Harvey, 2000, Rakodi, 2004, Satterthwaite, 2005, Milbert, 2006, Harvey, 2009c, UN-Habitat, 2010b).

**Box 2: Programme areas of Agenda 21 Chapter 7**

- Providing adequate shelter for all;
- Improving human settlement management;
- Promoting sustainable land-use planning and management;
- Promoting the integrated provision of environmental infrastructure: water, sanitation, drainage and solid-waste management;
- Promoting sustainable energy and transport systems in human settlements;
- Promoting human settlement planning and management in disaster-prone areas;
- Promoting sustainable construction industry activities;
- Promoting human resource development and capacity-building for human settlement development.

Source (UN, 1992)

These Sustainabilism concerns were the focus of the 1992 Rio ‘Earth Summit’ and the resultant ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ and ‘Agenda 21’, followed by the 1996 ‘Second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II)’ that produced the ‘Istanbul Declaration’ and the ‘Habitat Agenda’. The Declarations stressed on the right to adequate shelter for all, partnerships, community participation and empowerment; as well as a comprehensive global plan of action and
strategies for implementation of which most governments of the world committed themselves to (WCED, 1987, UN, 1992, UNCED, 1992, UN, 1996, UN-Habitat, 1996). Following these declarations, numerous ‘Local Agenda 21’ programmes were launched in the urban South with the notion of the ‘right to adequate housing’ entering the housing policy and practices of many Global South countries. However, what ‘right to adequate housing’ meant, how it would be realised, and by whom became a highly contested issue with extremely diverse interpretations. Thus even though housing rights entered national constitutions, and several countries explicitly adopted a rights-based approach, these became subject to varying interpretations and explanations; such that the realisation of this ‘right’ in many countries seems unattainable in any foreseeable future (UN-HABITAT and OHCHR, 2002, Herrle and Walther, 2005b, UN-Habitat, 2010b, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2012a, OHCHR, nd). In the end Sustainabilism approaches produced many ‘good intentions’ which were never realised and the practices of many actors remained unchanged despite much rhetoric and ‘paper policies’ that were well written but would never be implemented. Nonetheless, Sustainabilism and its corresponding integrated and right based approaches gained prominence in the urban South’s housing arena with entry of numerous rights-based civil society organisations; and even those that were hitherto only concerned with charity and philanthropy changing their approaches accordingly. Integrated and Sustainable livelihoods approaches were infused into in-situ slum upgrading programs and on other housing initiatives and policies. Participation, inclusion, and empowerment became the main stated normative objective of most initiatives and policies. ‘Environmental Impact assessment’, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ as well as the importance of stakeholders and ethical considerations gained a significant and enduring importance. Ultimately, Sustainabilism formed the basis of the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ and especially their focus on slums and issues surrounding them. Hence, with Sustainabilism, normative concerns and perspectives became even more important than vested interests. The main contentions between actors became the definition of what was ‘right’, ‘what was the right thing to do’, how and by whom, for whom. Accordingly, Sustainabilism brought in myriads of different ‘stakeholders’ (actors and organisations), with extremely different opinions, perspectives, interests, resources, power, among the other highly diverse attitudes and attributes; creating the problem of how to address them. These probably contributed to the rise of Governism in the urban South arena in the subsequent decade.

3.3.6. Housing as a pact: Wide partnerships

The 2000s began with increasing calls for urgent, serious and concerted action by all the involved actors, from all sectors and levels, to address the immense ‘challenge of slums’. Since, after almost two decades of global apathy, globalisation, and neoliberalism, the ‘challenge’ was growing to ‘catastrophic levels’ that potentially threatened national and global peace and security. Indeed in some countries, 90% of the urban residents lived in slums and with the explosive population growth accompanied with plummeting economies in the Global South, amidst growing global inequalities, the urban South had become the dumping ground for a ‘surplus’ of humanity and a potential ‘time-bomb’ (Harvey, 2000, UN-Habitat, 2003, Neuwirth, 2005, Davis, 2006, Harvey, 2009c, Davis, 2010). Hence a prompt worldwide joint response was required. Certainly, the preceding two decades had seen the proliferation of global to local non-state actors in the urban South’s housing arena. However they had
highly diverse interests and perspectives which had resulted in numerous uncoordinated initiatives, duplication, and wasteful competition; with conflicts and misunderstands among the myriad of involved and interested actors that contributed to the ineffectiveness and failure of those initiatives, and thus perpetuated the crisis (Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Indeed, despite much efforts, rhetoric and ‘good intentions, the urban South problems were continuing to grow unabated. Nonetheless, these numerous, diverse and interdependent actors purporting to pursue ‘common' state goals; contributed to practices such as Public Social Private Partnership (PSPP) and ‘City Alliances', that produced state-society relationships that redefined the roles of actors and led to ‘pluricentric’ governance systems (Payne, 1999, World Bank, 2000a, Otiso, 2003, Cities Alliance, 2006). Furthermore, participatory and empowerment practices had increased the awareness and boldness of some of the slum dwellers; in their demands for their rights, the addressing of their concerns, as well as genuine inclusion and democratised decision-making processes; such that they had changed from being ‘beneficiaries’ into ‘negotiators'; with some forming ‘global alliances’ to champion their courses (Herrle, 1979, Appadurai, 2001, Patel et al., 2001, Satterthwaite, 2001, Weru, 2004, Kedogo, 2009, Ley, 2010, Herrle and Fokdal, 2011, Ley et al., 2014b, Herrle et al., 2015). Accordingly, Governism narratives and prescriptions entered the urban South housing arena; with the objective of addressing the myriads of actors and their diverse interests; through negotiations, to achieve the agreed and mediated ‘common goals' through partnerships, in a coordinated and cooperative manner that could yield beneficial ‘win-win’ outcomes for all involved parties. Since the urban South housing crisis was now considered to represent a ‘failure of governance' at various societal levels; and that competing interests, conflicts as well as misunderstandings were perpetuating the crisis; ‘good governance’s’ normative prescriptions gained supremacy in the urban South arena from the year 2000.

In Governism, housing was a pact following negotiations between several actors with different interests. Thus what was needed was for the different actors to find a common ground and shared interests by indentifying common problems, negotiating and arriving at collective decisions that accommodated their diverse interests and produced cooperative action to solve these problems. Considering it was optimistically envisioned that a commonality of interest would guarantee cooperation negotiations were deemed to yield mutually beneficial ‘win-win’ partnerships and outcomes. For instance, pursuits of profit interests, environment concerns, and votes could converge in producing affordable housing for the urban poor through a Public-Social-Private Partnership. As opposed to Sustainabilism where housing was a right for all, in Governism actors had to negotiate for it. Accordingly, since Governism approaches were dependent upon negotiations and making an actor’s concerns count at the negotiating table, ‘voice’ became the most valuable resource. In this view, slums represented voicelessness or lack of influence at negotiation tables; therefore if the slum dwellers gained a ‘voice’ with influence, they would be able to negotiate for ‘better’ policies, initiatives, and other societal actions that could improve their housing situation (Fivush, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2010b, Adams, 2014, UN-Habitat, 2014b, World Bank, 2014e). Furthermore, since initiatives involved competing interests that had been mediated and agreed upon through bargaining processes, accountability and transparency was required of all actors, who were now partners. Even the
government was conceived as also having vested interests, and therefore was just one of the partners. Furthermore, societal problems would be addressed through ‘civic engagement’ such that the voices of the citizens (even the weak) would be heard and included as societal decisions and partnerships.

By the year 2000, Governism had become the most prominent theme in international narratives and actions concerning the urban South’s housing problem. The ‘Global Campaign on Urban Governance’ espoused “transparent, responsible, accountable, just, effective and efficient governance of cities and other human settlements” (UN, 2001). The ‘Istanbul +5’ conference and its ‘Declaration on Cities and other Human Settlements in the New Millennium’ identified governance as one of the priorities. This was because many countries had well-formulated and comprehensive housing policies and strategies that could not be implemented because of weak or the lack of institutional arrangements, legal frameworks as well as mechanisms to engage the relevant actors with financial resources and political will (UN, 2001, UN-Habitat, 2002a). In the 2000s, the Urban Management Programme (UMP) initiated by the World Bank, UN-HABITAT, and UNDP in 1986, changed its objectives to pro-poor governance (UMP, 1991, Dahiya and Pugh, 2000, UMP, 2001, Mitullah, 2008a). Even though the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were mainly a product of Sustainabilism, they were also considerably influenced by Governism, especially the goal of developing global partnerships. Indeed the MDGs Target 11 was derived from the ‘Cities without Slums action plan’ by Cities Alliance. This was an alliance of the urban poor, local authorities, national governments, and aid agencies; under the auspices of the World Bank and UN-HABITAT; with the aim of strengthening global partnerships towards addressing the urban South housing problems (Cities Alliance, 1999, UN, 2001, UN-Habitat, 2002a). All the above international declarations and activities had a colossal impact at national and local levels. Many national housing policies in the urban South were reformulated and numerous housing initiatives launched with ‘good governance’ objectives. These included the pursuits of ‘good urban governance’, nationwide and citywide slum upgrading programmes, ‘Cities without Slums’ action plans, ‘Street-led’ slum upgrading among many others, all focusing on the plurality of actors, mediation of their diverse interests and formation of partnerships (World Bank, 2000a, Cities Alliance, 2006, Bocquier, 2008, UN-Habitat, 2008b, Huchzermeyer, 2011, UN-Habitat, 2012e).

Box 3: Urban governance according to UN-Habitat

Urban governance is the software that enables the urban hardware to function. Urban governance can be defined as the many ways that institutions and individuals organize the day-to-day management of a city, and the processes used for effectively realizing the short term and long-term agenda of a city’s development. Governance is the enabling environment that requires adequate legal frameworks, efficient political, managerial and administrative processes, as well as mechanisms, guidelines and tools to enable the local government’s response to the needs of citizens. It is in fact a process of decision-making that engages various actors with different priorities to ensure that rules are made and enforced, development is realized and services delivered. It is therefore a continuous process that informs the success of a city system. Urban governance is inextricably linked to the welfare of the citizenry: it must enable women and men to access the benefits of urban citizenship. Good urban governance, based on the principle of urban citizenship, affirms that no man, woman or child can be denied access to the necessities of urban life, including adequate shelter, security of tenure, safe water, sanitation, a clean environment, health, education and nutrition, employment and public safety and mobility.

Source: (UN-Habitat, 2014b)

Nevertheless, the Governism approach is beset by many challenges and has come under intense criticism. To start with the concept of governance in housing and the approaches that should be followed have been subjects of tremendous contentions among the involved actors. These have been aggravated by the differences between the normative aspects of ‘good urban governance’ and
housing practices which have been subject to diverse conceptualisation, interpretations, explanations, and applications among the actors that have grossly complicated the arena and compounded the misunderstandings as well as conflicts (Field and Kremer, 2006, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Kedogo et al., 2010b, Huchzermeyer, 2011). Accordingly, the urban South housing arena has become even more extremely complicated and fragmented, with numerous highly differentiated actors, with dissimilar interests, approaches and conceptions despite the introduction of Governism approaches.

In fact, the Governism approaches of the 2000s seem to have added to the complexities and contradictions in the urban South housing arena, with more contradictory labels, meanings, and efforts which have not been translated into tangible effective or meaningful outcomes for the slum dwellers. Many initiatives are characterised with a very wide variance between their intended objectives and actual outcomes (Neuwirth, 2005, Field and Kremer, 2006, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Bocquier, 2008, Kedogo et al., 2010b, Huchzermeyer, 2011). Critics point out that redefining the role of the government as a ‘partner’ removes the regulatory and protection role as well as absolving the powerful societal actors from fulfilling their ‘social contracts’, since everything becomes negotiable; while the probably over-glorified ‘partnership’ is highly depended upon presumed actors whose presence, interests, or commitment is unpredictable, unassured, undependable, or even totally absent. Indeed, the involvement of the private sector has remained a public relations exercise, corporate social responsibility advertisement, or charity ventures which in total are not meaningful in comparison to the magnitude of the problem.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade &amp; ideology</th>
<th>Housing vs. Slum</th>
<th>Approach: objectives, methods and tools</th>
<th>Key actors &amp; roles (govt vs. resident)</th>
<th>Documents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1950s Exclusivism</strong></td>
<td>Privilege vs. Otherness, crime, disease, dissent</td>
<td>Containment&lt;br&gt;• Create an ideal place for a select group while keeping out ‘others’.&lt;br&gt;• Forceful restrictions, brutal evictions, and demolitions, land annexation&lt;br&gt;• Segregation laws and practices, military force and police action, walls and gates</td>
<td>Colonial and repressive governments:&lt;br&gt;• Govt: Controller (Quality) Keeper of ideals&lt;br&gt;• Resident: ‘Othered’, unauthorised, dissident, criminal, dirty</td>
<td>Garden cities of tomorrow (Howard 1898)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1960s Modernisationism</strong></td>
<td>Modernity vs. Backwardness traditional</td>
<td>Standard housing&lt;br&gt;• Eliminating ‘backwardness’ and impediments to progress, economic development&lt;br&gt;• Slum demolitions and ‘standard’ public housing Physical ‘Blueprint’ planning</td>
<td>Newly independent, representative and authoritative governments&lt;br&gt;• Govt: Planner for progress&lt;br&gt;• Resident: Citizen, middle class</td>
<td>The city of tomorrow and its planning (Corbusier 1929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1970s Redistributionism</strong></td>
<td>Basic need vs. Lack, deprivation, denial</td>
<td>Site and Services&lt;br&gt;• State and donors to help poor meet the basic needs of Shelter&lt;br&gt;• Sites, services, incremental housing, appropriate technology</td>
<td>Benevolent governments, donors, charities:&lt;br&gt;• Govt: provider of Basic needs&lt;br&gt;• Resident: Target group lacking basic needs</td>
<td>Habitat I: Vancouver Declaration and Plan of Action (UN, 1976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980s Neoliberalism</strong></td>
<td>Commodity vs. Dead capital, investment opportunity, market outcomes</td>
<td>Enablement&lt;br&gt;• Create an enabling environment for the private sector and slum dwellers to supply housing&lt;br&gt;• Enable housing markets to work&lt;br&gt;• Focus on ‘supply and demand issues’ e.g. incentives, lowering standards, deregulation, titling, infrastructure</td>
<td>Private sector, self, civil society,&lt;br&gt;• Govt: Enabler for enabling environment&lt;br&gt;• Resident: client, investors, consumer</td>
<td>Enabling housing markets to work (World Bank, 1993a) Urban management program (UMP, 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990s Sustainabilism</strong></td>
<td>Sustainability vs. Exclusion, marginalisation unsustainable development</td>
<td>Integrated&lt;br&gt;• Holistic addressing socio-politico-economic cultural and natural environment issues.&lt;br&gt;• Solidarity, equity, justice.&lt;br&gt;• Package issues: housing and livelihoods&lt;br&gt;• Participation, inclusion, empowerment, capacity building, resilience, collaboration.</td>
<td>Responsive government, civil society, community.&lt;br&gt;• Govt: Regulator: protection, inclusion, empowerment&lt;br&gt;• Resident: Stakeholders, marginalised groups</td>
<td>Agenda 21(UN, 1992) Istanbul Declaration (UN, 1996) Habitat Agenda (UN-Habitat, 1996) Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UNGA, 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2000s Governism</strong></td>
<td>Pact vs. Voicelessness</td>
<td>Wide partnerships&lt;br&gt;• Collective decisions to accommodate diverse actors interests towards cooperative action partnerships&lt;br&gt;• Nation and citywide public social private partnerships (PSPP), mixed approaches, ‘City Alliances’ ‘Cities Without Slums’, ‘Street-led upgrading’</td>
<td>Partners (state and many non-state actors)&lt;br&gt;• Govt: partner, negotiating and steering&lt;br&gt;• Resident: Negotiators, alliances, partners</td>
<td>‘Cities without Slums (Cities Alliance, 1999) Declaration on Cities (UN, 2001) Global Campaign on Urban Governance (Habitat, 2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In fact most of the targets and initiatives that have ensued from Governism have been extremely modest in quality and quantity compared to the ‘challenge of slums’, as exemplified by the minuscule MDGs target of improving living conditions for 100 slum dwellers compared to the one billion slum dwellers in the year 2000 or almost 2 billion by the end of the target in 2020 (Cities Alliance, 2006, Gilbert, 2007, Gilbert, 2009, UN-Habitat, 2010b, UN-Habitat, 2013b, World Bank, 2013f).

However, more importantly, as it is the contention of this study, is the excessive preoccupation with interests and negotiations by the Governism approach which could be its fundamental or even fatal flaw. Vested interest alone does not seem to fully explain the interrelation of problems amongst the actors in the urban South’s arena; neither can negotiations alone nor even a commonality of interests guarantee win-win and effective solutions for all. In fact most of the urban poor and slum dwellers are greatly disadvantaged by negotiations. They lack ‘voice’ and ‘influence’ at the negotiation tables on most issues that affect their lives. Furthermore, as highlighted by the conflicts over normative concerns and objectives even in Governism approaches, vested interests and competition over power and resources may not be the only contributory factors to the prevalent conflicts, misunderstandings, and lack of common ground that have been blamed for unhealthy actor relations, ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives as well as the persistence and perpetuation of the urban South’s housing crisis.

3.4. Six decades six approaches: A space time continuum

From the discussion in this chapter, for each decade since the 1950s a dominant housing approach for the urban South’s housing crisis and slums can be identified; summing up to six dominant approaches in the last six decades. The dominant approaches represented a problem-solution nexus, where the perspectives surround the problem and the proposed approaches coalesced, such that the problem was defined in a particular way with a given approach as its solution. These perspectives were signified by the prevailing development orthodoxies, geopolitico-economic issues, major events, key global personalities, hegemonic interests, among other issues reigning in that epoch. Whereas these approaches were apparently mainly influenced by exogenous perspectives fixed at the supranational level, the perspectives of the powerful endogenous actors, as well as those of ordinary citizens could have also played a central role. Whereas it would be inaccurate to suggest that the perspectives and conceptualisation of the urban South’s housing problem-solution nexus in any given decade were monolithic, it is vividly apparent that for each decade a particular dominant approach can be identified and characterised. This is apparent especially, through the meanings, rationales and the envisioned roles of the key actors that gained prominence in each decade in the prescribed housing policies and practices, political and scholarly discourses, international conferences and declarations, scholarly works, and other influential politico-economic and development documents.

- **The meaning of housing**: How housing, lack of housing, slums, the slum dwellers, or to whom the housing initiatives were focused on were described (e.g. as ‘beneficiaries’ of government resources or aid; ‘consumers’ with preferences and capacity to buy; ‘stakeholders’ with rights, or ‘negotiators’ with voice); said much about what the housing
The problem was deemed to represent and therefore determined the prescribed solutions, approaches, and their rationale.

- **The rationale for the approach**: included the reason and justification for pursuing the proposed actions as well as providing the *raison d'être* for the presence and roles of certain actors in the arena, in addition to determining the rules, resources, and criteria to be used. For instance, in Neoliberalism, market mechanisms were best suited to solve the problem and government interference was detrimental. This justified the withdrawal of the government but enhanced the role of the private sector, with the civil society coming in to fill the gap left by the retreating state.

- **The role the government**: Each of the six dominant approaches involved a different mix and number of actors, with varying roles and power; with the role of the government in relation to the other actors being a crucial component.

- **The resources**: deemed most crucial for the approach to succeed or which the actors have or should have. These include varied immaterial and material forms such as money, knowledge, as well as means of violence, rights, and voice among others.

- **The rules and regulations**: which determine the course of the approach and which guide the conduct and interactions of the involved actors.

- **The criteria for monitoring the approach**: including measuring performance and success of the initiatives, as well as determining who can participate or not. For instance, in Redistributionism the initiative is targeted at the poor, who 'merit' the prescribed 'help'; and the initiative would be deemed successful once the target population have been helped, attained the basic needs, and gone above the prescribed threshold, such that they no longer merit the help.

### Table 6: Urban South housing problem-solution nexus: Orthodoxies, meanings, and rationales

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orthodoxy</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Govt. role</th>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Rules</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusivism</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Force/plunder</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisationism</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Expertise/funds</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redistributionism</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Site-Services</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Enablement</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainabilism</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
<td>Common Future</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governism</td>
<td>Pact</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas each decade was characterised by a particular dominant approach; these dominant approaches did not revolutionarily replace each other, rather they seemed to have seamlessly evolved or morphed into the next one. Over the decades, it can be readily observed that the attitudes towards slum and slum dwellers in the prescriptions have shifted radically from intolerance and restrictive policies towards tolerant and supportive; from piecemeal projects to nation-wide programmes; from top-down to bottom-up approaches; and the number of interested actors has increased tremendously with each passing decade radically shifting the prescribed power relations and actors’ roles in the initiatives. Nonetheless, in practice, intolerance and restrictive practices, piecemeal projects, top-down, and former power relations and actors’ roles still persist. Indeed, in every decade the successive dominant approaches were promoted vigorously as the best alternatives but soon came under heavy criticism (due to their failures, flaws, and negative outcomes but also simply due to the change in the
dominant orthodoxy and hegemonic interest), and were replaced by the next best approach which was vigorously touted as the ‘better’ or the ‘only’ alternative. However, the fact that the erstwhile dominant approaches lost dominance does not mean they necessarily simply disappeared. Accordingly, it is the contention of this study that these approaches persisted in the arena, raising the possibility of continued co-existence and competition between approaches in any given Global South urban arena at any time. Thus at any given time and space in the urban South arena, there was the ‘dominant’ perspective/approach as well as ‘other’ competing ones; approaches that had been ‘replaced’ in theory but still ‘present’ in practice; and old practices that had remained unchanged but relabelled to comply with the new approach. In this view, over the decades several theoretical models and approaches emerged and evolved alongside with different actors, interactions, relations, perspectives, and perceptions. Some of those models and approaches were viewed differently and deemed more relevant than others in the different epochs and by the different actors; thus suggesting both contradictory and shifting perspectives in the urban South’s housing problem-solution nexus at any given time. Certainly, these shifts and contradictions in dominant approaches have played a central role in the design, formulation and implementation processes of initiatives, and also determined how success was to be measured. Consequently, it is highly probable that these shifts and contradictions have played a significant role in the success and failure of initiatives; and there could be significant to the resolution or persistence of the urban South crisis.

Even though each decade saw a significant shift in national policies, programme documents and prescribed initiatives following the dominant approach in that period, it was commonly observed that there were wide variances between what was written and what was actually practiced, between the intended actions and actual ones, and between the expected outcomes and actual ones. The initiatives were often never implemented as they were initially described. In several cases there could be an apparent ‘time lag’ between various actors, organisations, scales, sections of government, and other entities; while others appeared to be ahead of their ‘time’. Furthermore initiatives initiated in one decade could span over several decades. This was exemplified in some of the slum upgrading and site and services schemes that were initially implemented starting in the 1970s, of which constructions spanned over two decades, into the 1990s. However it is worth noting that as the constructions continued, new themes from the prevailing late approaches such as sustainability or empowerment themes were often infused into them. Accordingly, most of these approaches did not start and end with any decade, most of those approaches can be traced back to various decades, and they were still practiced by some actors several decades later (Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, Huchzermeier and Karam, 2006, UN-Habitat, 2006a, Gilbert, 2007, Gilbert, 2009, World Bank, 2011e, Alexander, 2012, UN-Habitat, 2013b). As a result, the urban South housing arena became highly complex and fragmented, with numerous conflicting approaches, and an ever increasing number of highly diverse actors. However, in much of the urban South, despite the decades of these myriads of concerted and unconcerted, complementary and contradictory approaches as well as efforts, the problems have continued to grow unabated; as the efforts have been often been characterised with failure, and even sometimes exacerbation of the problem. The efforts have usually been misdirected, inefficient, inaccessible, inadequate, and fragmented (UN-Habitat, 1991b, Buckley
and Kalarickal, 2006, UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2012e). All these seemed to have played a role in perpetuating the peculiarities of the urban South such as the increasing ‘urbanisation of poverty’, inequality, casualty, multiperspectivity; and more so the proliferation, prominence and persistence of slums that define the ‘urban South crisis; in fact this crisis seemed to have entered into the list of ‘unsolvable problems’ (UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2013b, Orbit, n.d.). These have led to a call for better understanding of the problem towards more proactive solutions that would not only deal meaningfully with the prevailing problem, but stem the formation of new problems. Accordingly, it is the endeavour of this study to seek possible explanations for this housing conundrum.

In sum, whereas six dominant approaches have been identified during the last six decades, the explanation for the urban South housing problems are not simple and direct. Arguably, the shifting and often contradictory approaches alongside their core themes and perspectives have had serious implications and consequences for this problem-solution nexus. Nevertheless, this study posits that the six approaches should be treated as ‘ideal types’ that can only be distinguished analytically; as in any decade, initiative, organisation, or actor, it might be difficult to identify a ‘pure’ form; as in any time and space these were constantly changing due to the evolutionary nature of the approaches; as well as the possibility of co-existence of multiple approaches. Accordingly, on the one hand, there is a shifting of dominant approaches as they gain prominence or are replaced by others. On the other hand, each approach can be analytically conceptualised as a static, timeless, and changeless phenomena; that does not change in time or space, but simply exists in all decades and places. Therefore in this view, it would be possible to examine and characterise any given actors, origination, or time-space with a particular approach or at least certain aspects of given approaches. As a consequence, since over the decades, there have been significant policy shifts and failures accompanied by heightened tensions among the myriad of diverse actors, all of which could have ensued in critical unintended consequences; in this study the postulation is that a nuanced in-depth appreciation of these tensions; the unacknowledged conditions for actions, the unintended consequences of the actors’ actions and the approaches, as well as the often hidden perspectives and motivation for actions is of necessity, if the urban South housing conundrum is to be effectively and meaningfully resolved.
4. Governance and housing

From the discussions in the foregoing chapters concerning the urban South’s development, housing issue and approaches, the critical role of the societal actors’ interrelations became vividly apparent. The different, pertinent ideologies and ensuing approaches in the development and housing problem-solution nexus were all contingent upon particular state-society relations as well as a given actor-mix and their interrelation modes. The tremendous growth of interested actors in the urban South’s housing arena has accentuated the importance of these inter-actor relations. As a consequence, a meaningful appreciation of the urban South’s housing situation may not be possible without examining those interrelations. Therefore, this study engages with those actor interrelations’ issues through the analytical concept of ‘governance’. Indeed this study takes place when Governism is the prevailing politico-economic and development orthodoxy, and thus forms part of the time-space contextuality that frames the various themes pursued in the study. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the various governance modes, power relations and communication forms that were related to the various urban South development and housing approaches over the decades and their implications to the urban South crisis.

4.1. The concept of governance

The ‘governance’ concept has a long recorded history. In the 4th century BC, Plato used the term ‘kubernân’ to metaphorically refer to the steering of societies like ships (Cooper and Hutchinson, 1997, Allen, 2006). Over the years the concept was used in various ways such as, a synonym of ‘government’ as well as the act or quality of ruling, and more recently an analytical framework for coordination systems and a normative prescriptive measure. In recent decades, the concept became a ‘buzzword’ globally. However, it had evolved into an extremely broad, complex, fuzzy and confusing concept. It had become extremely value-laden and ideologically charged with conceptual inconsistency. Hence there was no commonly agreed or stable definition and conceptualisation (Jessop, 2005, Hufty, 2011b). Towards the end of the 1980s, the term entered into the urban South’s housing context as a conditionality for development aid. By the year 2000, the urban South crisis was predominately being viewed as a failure in ‘governance’. Thus, ‘improving’ the quality of governance was not only a conditio sine qua non for the resolution of the problem; it was ‘the’ solution in itself (UN-Habitat, 2003, Mkandawire, 2007, Tosa, 2009, UN-Habitat, 2009b). In sum, governance gained prominence in politico-economic scholarly and policy debates, political rhetoric, ideological stances, and in actual practices with myriads of different conceptualisations and applications; thus it can be considered from numerous positions. Nonetheless, this study considers governance from three major positions: historical, constructivist, and analytical.

Governance as a historical form arises from the ‘hollowing-out of the state’ debates, neoliberalist polices, weakening of the state and increased involvement of non-state actors in societal ‘governing’ processes. Globally, by end of the 1990s, there was a vividly visible shift from hierarchical regulation mechanisms by state authorities to more horizontal and network mechanisms by a plurality of actors, changing relations between politics and institutions, and even questioning the relevance of the state.
Furthermore, there was the rise of the ‘Governism’ orthodoxy that permeated most societal discourses and practices globally as well as in the urban South arena with ‘good governance’ prescriptions. Accordingly, the concept of governance as a specific historical form relates to this emerging trend in intellectual, politico-economic, and other societal issues that intensified after the year 2000 (Rhodes, 1994, Rhodes, 1996, Marinetto, 2003, Jessop, 2005, Mkandawire, 2007, Hufty, 2011a, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013).

Governance in a constructivist form refers to the way the involved actors implicitly or explicitly define governance concepts depending on their perspectives, understandings, vested interests, or to serve certain ends. Thus in this form, governance is normative, value laden, and prescriptive. It consciously or unconsciously carries ideologies and principles concerning particular ideas of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, as well as certain patterns of regulations and negotiations, norms and legitimisation, distribution of power, as well as the inclusion and exclusion of certain actors (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2006, Jordan, 2008, Mertins, 2009). This is exemplified by the numerous diverse ‘versions’ of ‘good governance’ prescriptions to the urban South that involve different ‘recipes’, idealism, norms and values; as well as the differing descriptions of what the ‘problem of governance’ is (Hydén et al., 2004, Mkandawire, 2007, Kedogo et al., 2010a, Grindle, 2011, Hufty, 2011a). Accordingly, in this form, governance’ is seen as a tool for addressing societal problems, socio-economic and political transformation. It has also become the subject of power games as some actors use the asymmetries of power and resources to make their perspectives and conceptions dominant in society as well as be accepted by other actors, organisations or countries.

Finally, governance as an analytical concept refers to the interaction processes between actors involved in collective issues that produce certain decisions and norms. Hence this can be observable in any given society in time and space, since each society involves decision making systems, conflict resolution mechanisms, and other norms and institutions for its members to co-exist and cooperate in any way. Therefore, in this form, ‘governance’ is not prescriptive, value laden, good or bad; nor is it specific to any time or space. Thus it is neither a historical form restricted to a particular time, nor a normative model that is desirable to have; rather it is a ‘social fact’ that can be analysed, interpreted, and generalised in any society; at any time in history, and any level of society from the grassroots to global scales. These may involve the decision-making processes in collective stakes that produce competition, conflict, or misunderstandings, as well as mutual understanding, common ground and cooperation (Hufty, 2009, Kedogo et al., 2010a, Ley, 2010, Hufty, 2011a, Hufty, 2011b, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2012b).

Accordingly, in these three forms, governance becomes both the subject as well as an analytical framework for examining the interaction and inter-relational processes, perceptions, and outcomes involved in the urban South’s housing crises and solutions over the decades. Hence the various usages of the governance concept in this study will often carry varying nuances of the three meanings and forms: historical, constructivist, and analytical.
Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a science of effective coordination in the steering of an organization, where knowledge and power are distributed (Paquet, 2000). The use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society or the economy (Bell, 2002). The government's ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not (Fukuyama, 2013). Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest (Carlsson et al., 1995). The processes of interactions and decision-making among the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement or reproduction of social norms and institutions. Governance processes are found in any society; governance is neither normative nor prescriptive: it refers to an observable phenomenon that can be analyzed from a non-normative perspective based on five analytical tools: problems, actors, social norms, processes and nodal points. GAF (Hufty, 2011b).

Even though there are myriads of conceptualisations, inferences and prescribed applications of ‘governance’ from diverse scholarly and practice perspectives, influences and vested interests; analytically the concept is simple. In all those conceptualisations, governance is about a particular set of actors, making specific binding decisions for enabling or constraining specified actions, their modes of co-ordination and the rules (formal and informal) that guide those specified actions, interactions, and interrelations. Governance may also include processes, by which those rules are produced, sustained, and regulated (Hufty, 2009, Kedogo et al., 2010a, Ley, 2010, Hufty, 2011a, Hufty, 2011b,
Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2012b). Nonetheless, in its historical and constructivist form, governance has become an extremely fuzzy, indiscriminate and polyvalent concept “that can be applied to almost everything and therefore, describes and explains nothing” (Jessop, 2002a p 36); especially with its increase as a ‘buzzword’ globally and its ‘mantra’ status in the urban South’s development arena. Governance conceptualisations and prescriptions have varied greatly in terms of scope, normative content, objectives, outcomes, hidden assumptions, involved processes and actors, among others. This has resulted in numerous vicious debates concerning the application of governance and its measurement, its indicators, and the ‘best’ actor mix, to mention a few (Stoker, 1998, Kjaer, 2004, Jordan et al., 2005, Pierre and Peters, 2005, Chhotray and Stoker, 2009, Grindle, 2011). Apart from the numerous conceptualisations, various key actors and organisations have kept on changing and revising their conceptualisation over the years, adding to the fuzziness. See (UNDP, 1997, UNDP, 2005, UNDP, 2009, UNDP, 2014); (World Bank, 1989a, World Bank, 1992, World Bank, 2013g, World Bank, 2014e, World Bank, n.d. ); (Hydén, 1999, Hydén et al., 2004, Hydén, 2013) and many more.

In light of the presumed declining effectiveness and legitimacy of prevailing government systems and development approaches, ‘governance’ was prescribed as a means of improving that effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as enhancing coordination capacities among the ever increasing interested actors and diverse functional systems. Thus as a normative concept, ‘governance’ was espoused with diverse positive connotations such as subsidiarity, cooperation, transparency, accountability and partnership that contrasted the prevailing government’s ‘iron fist’, inefficiency and corruption (Jessop, 2003, Bevir, 2010, Hydén, 2013). These normative conceptions were goal-oriented with a priori assumptions of good and bad, including the involved process and outcomes. In this way, the urban South crisis resulted from ‘bad governance’ while the solutions lay in ‘good governance’ (UN-Habitat, 2003, Tibaijuka, 2009, World Bank, 2013a, Fox, 2014b, World Bank, 2014e). Consequently, in the urban South, governance in various conceptualisations has been prescribed not only as a necessary element to facilitate the solutions, but also as the solution in itself as well as a societal desideratum; both as the means to an end, as well as the end in itself. Nevertheless, these normative notions encapsulated a wide range of concerns with enormous and diverse analytical, theoretical, descriptive, and practical weight; and were applied to a very wide range of social issues at all scales. Furthermore, these were inserted into many diverse problematic, resulting in multiplicity of meanings for the involved actors and issues (Jessop, 2005, Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, Mkandawire, 2007, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2012c). Hence, by the year 2000, most urban South development and housing prescriptions involved the ‘judicious mixing’ of hierarchy (state), market (private sector), and networks (civil society) to manage the plurality of actors and vested interests so as to solve the problems more effectively and achieve better outcomes. This was based on the idealised conception of society as being composed of state, private sector, and civil society with three ‘ideal-types’ of governance styles: hierarchical, market, and network governance; with each segment of society having a specific designated role (Thompson et al., 1990, Jessop, 2003, Kooiman, 2003, Thompson, 2003, Kersbergen and Waarden, 2004, Jordan et al., 2005, UNESCAP, 2007, UN-Habitat, 2009a, World Bank, 2013g).
Table 7: Prescriptions of governance styles to the Global South through the decades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>1990s</th>
<th>2000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical govern.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market govern.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network govern.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from (Mkandawire, 2007, Meuleman, 2008, Carothers and Gramont, 2011, Mossberger et al., 2012)

Table 8: Attributes of the three ideal types of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Market</th>
<th>Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture-Way of life</td>
<td>Hierarchism</td>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Egalitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic principle</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination principle</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stylized Mode of Calculation</td>
<td>Homo hierarchicus</td>
<td>Homo economicus</td>
<td>Homo politicus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key concepts &amp; value</td>
<td>Public good</td>
<td>Public choice</td>
<td>Public value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key concerns</td>
<td>Laws</td>
<td>Self-determination</td>
<td>Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary virtues</td>
<td>Goal driven &amp; Reliable</td>
<td>Cost-driven</td>
<td>Great discretion, flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common motive</td>
<td>Minimising risk</td>
<td>Maximising advantage</td>
<td>Satisfying identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focused on</td>
<td>Rule-making</td>
<td>Bargaining</td>
<td>Results via dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy and methods</td>
<td>Planning, control, procedures</td>
<td>Negotiate, incentives, compete</td>
<td>Persuasion, deliberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical solutions &amp; outcome</td>
<td>Laws, regulations, output</td>
<td>Contracts, services, products</td>
<td>Consensus, agreement, content</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motive of subordinate actors</td>
<td>Fear of punishment</td>
<td>Material benefit</td>
<td>Belonging to group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles of government</td>
<td>Ruler</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative basis</td>
<td>Employment relationships</td>
<td>Contract and property rights</td>
<td>Complementary strengths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors</td>
<td>Supervisor and subordinates</td>
<td>Buyers and sellers</td>
<td>Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery focus</td>
<td>Target groups, Subjects</td>
<td>Customers, clients,</td>
<td>Universal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key purpose</td>
<td>Power, authority</td>
<td>Trade, investment</td>
<td>Social equity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key effect</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key product</td>
<td>Public goods</td>
<td>Private goods</td>
<td>Collective goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>Higher authority</td>
<td>Self-interest</td>
<td>Group empowerment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>State, army, corporation</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time orientation</td>
<td>Past traditions</td>
<td>Present demand</td>
<td>Future needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial orientation</td>
<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Atomised</td>
<td>Flat horizontal web-like</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation of organisations</td>
<td>Top-down, formal, internal</td>
<td>Bottom-up, suspicious, external</td>
<td>Reciprocity, informal, empathy,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control and choice of actors</td>
<td>Authority, Written rules</td>
<td>Price and negotiation</td>
<td>Trust and reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action orientation</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Trade and exchange</td>
<td>Dialogue and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means of communication</td>
<td>Routines</td>
<td>Prices</td>
<td>Relational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of conflict resolution</td>
<td>Administrative fiat- supervision</td>
<td>Haggling and law courts</td>
<td>Reciprocity Reputation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tone or climate</td>
<td>Formal, bureaucratic</td>
<td>Precision and suspicion</td>
<td>Open-ended mutual benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor preferences of choices</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Transaction</td>
<td>Trust Collaborative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations</td>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
<td>Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Command and control</td>
<td>Delegating, enabling</td>
<td>Coaching and supporting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of exchange</td>
<td>Routine</td>
<td>Non-repetitive</td>
<td>Repetitive Intermittent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Management</td>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Contracts</td>
<td>Conventions and agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit of decision making</td>
<td>Public authority</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of rationality</td>
<td>Law and Management</td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of control</td>
<td>Rules and Plans</td>
<td>Contracts</td>
<td>Coproduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Imperatives; ex ante</td>
<td>Competition; ex post</td>
<td>Diplomacy; self-organised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transactions</td>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Bi- and multilateral</td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles of knowledge</td>
<td>For ruling effectiveness</td>
<td>For competitive advantage</td>
<td>As a shared good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness</td>
<td>Economic transactions</td>
<td>Overlooks social equity</td>
<td>Information overload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dark side</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>Deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakness</td>
<td>Economic transactions</td>
<td>Social equity</td>
<td>Information overload</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criterion of Failure</td>
<td>Ineffectiveness, Bureaucratism,</td>
<td>Economic Inefficiency, Market</td>
<td>'Noise', 'Talking Shop', Never-ending talks, no decisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 10: Urban South housing arena: Idealised versus existing societal relationships
Nevertheless, these ideal-types of governance styles and sectors rarely exist distinctly in society; many actors and organisations cannot be neatly allocated in any particular sector and most practices, situations, problems and solutions straddle across the three styles and sectors. In fact, relations and practices in the arena are highly complex and heterogeneous with the styles and sectors being in various combinations or hybrids; compounded by issues of vertical and horizontal steering. Consequently from a governance perspective, in the urban South development and housing arena, the involved actors are often faced with numerous paradoxical situations, complexities, ambiguities, and dilemmas that contribute to high conflict potential and misunderstandings that could be detrimental to the effectiveness and success of the pertinent initiatives; with profound consequences for the housing situation as a whole (Kalders et al., 2004, Jessop, 2005, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Accordingly, this study focuses on issues of governance implicated in the urban South development and housing arena, as influenced by the prevailing dominant orthodoxies over the decades. In this view, governance is implicated firstly, at the operation level of how the actors act and interact to solve the problem; secondly, the institutional arrangements, state-society relations and actors’ interrelations that allow the actions and interactions; and thirdly, the constitutional (meta) level of decisions on the norms, values, and principles for the interactions and interrelations, i.e. rules that that ‘govern the governance’ (Kooiman, 2003).

In the final analysis, governance is all about actors’ interrelations and especially between the governors and the governed. While the governors include authorities, politicians, officials, bureaucrats,
funders, implementers and other power-holders; the governed represent the citizens to whom the initiatives are aimed at. Thus governance is mainly about the rights and obligations of the governors and the governed, the degree of power and control, and the communication forms between them. These may include those who have control and influence over the decisions, actions, interactions, issues, and situations, as exemplified by various state-society relations or interrelations between equally powerful or unequal actors. Since the governed are affected by the decisions and actions of the governors, the varying degrees of accountability between the governors and the governed distinguish various governance modes and relations. As a consequence, this chapter focuses on the various governance modes, power relations, and communication forms that have been implicated in the urban South’s housing crisis and the resultant responses over the decades since the 1950s.

4.2. Modes of governance

Apart from the three ‘ideal-types’ of governance - hierarchical, market, network, and their hybrids- other modes of governance have been characterised based on the principles of representation and legitimacy which seem to have more of explanatory value and relevance to the urban South housing situation (Healey, 1997, DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1999, Pierre, 1999, DiGaetano and Strom, 2003, Thompson, 2003, Hydén et al., 2004, Rakodi, 2004, Jessop, 2005, Meuleman, 2008, Hydén, 2014). For instance, DiGaetano and Strom (2003) as well as Pierre (1999), combined structural, cultural, rational actor and neoinstitutionalist approaches to analytically distinguish particular modes of governance based on the involved governing relations and logic, objectives, key decision makers, state-society relations, instruments and evaluative criteria. Accordingly, this section presents various modes of governance that have been implicated in the urban South’s housing arena and prescribed approaches.

4.2.1. Realpolitik: Authoritarianist, clientelist, corporatist, and populist

Authoritarianist mode of governance involves concentration of power upon one or a few actors, the governors; while from the rest of the actors, the governed, complete or blind obedience and submission to the authority of the governors is required. The governors exercise almost complete control and influence over the decisions and actions affecting the lives of the governed, and are opposed to individual freedom of thought and action among the governed. Indeed the governors are not accountable to the majority of the governed. Thus, the governors exercise authority and rule arbitrarily without regard to the concerns of the majority, and with severe deprivation of civil liberties, selective application of the law as well as very little tolerance for opposition and criticism. In fact any disobedience or dissent is severely punished (Vestal, 1999, Linz, 2000). For legitimacy, the governors often appeal to emotions, ideology, ethnicity/race, or tradition; as well as justifying their actions to combat certain ‘problems’ such as disorder, insurgency, insecurity, ‘enemy’ threats, primitivity and underdevelopment; so as to achieve ‘order’, ‘security’, ‘civilisation’, ‘purity’, ‘development’ and ‘world class’ status. This mode is maintained by force and threat of violence, military and police action, stifling of the civil society and potential challengers, corruption and patronage, manipulation of the populace, as well as through other social controls and suppressive regulations and practices. Concessions are mainly obtained as personal favours and through personal loyalties, such that
clientelism is intricately linked with this mode (Vestal, 1999, Jessop, 2005, Gasiorowski, 2006, Hydén, 2014). In the Global South, this was exemplified in the colonialist regime as well as in the kleptomaniac dictatorships in many independent countries, especially with coup d’états, one-party rule, military juntas, suppression of the opposition and citizens, and rule through use of fear. Many countries for many decades had personalistic regimes which depended on coercion and patronage networks rather than formal rules and institutions or populist regimes run by strong, charismatic, manipulative governors (Arnstein, 1969, Vestal, 1999, Linz, 2000, Hydén et al., 2004, Rakodi, 2004, Hydén, 2008, Hydén, 2014). Consequently, one or few governors monopolised political power and regulated almost all aspects of the public and private behaviour of the ordinary citizens through imposition, conquest, usurpation, and other forceful, unjust, undemocratic, unlawful, and manipulative means. Hence, related to the authoritarianist mode of governance are the clientelist, corporatist, and populist modes.

The clientelist mode involves particularistic, personalised, and pragmatic exchange relationships between the governors (patrons) and a select group of individuals (clients). The patrons confer favours upon the clients in return for political support. These patron-client relations guarantee decisions and actions that affect the wider society by mainly advancing the interests of the patrons and their clients; in most cases to the detriment of other citizens who are not in the networks. Thus, it entails ‘selective democracy’ by which the key elites and their supporters redefine the borders of the polity in an exclusionary way that denies the majority of the citizens legitimate representation and access to initiatives and political space (Bourdieu, 1979, Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1984, DiGaetano and Strom, 2003, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Thus clientelist practices engender kleptocratism and cronyism as the governors embezzle collective resources and appoint their clients to positions of authority to sustain the patronage relations. It may also breed resentment as the governors unfairly and selectively allocate collective benefits based on their biased systems of reciprocal relations of obligations. In the Global South clientelist practices are prevalent in ‘neopatrimonialism’ that runs from the highest levels of governance to the grassroots and supplants the official political and bureaucratic structure (Eisenstadt, 1973, Clapham, 1985, Mkandawire, 2001, Hydén, 2014).

In the corporatist mode, the negotiated common interests of the powerful actors and groups (corporate entities) form the basis of decisions affecting the whole society and define the wider societal agendas (Harding, 1995, Pierre, 1999, DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). These may include a few powerful politicians, private sector entities, interest groups and even civil society actors, sometimes purporting to advance societal good. However, in fact, this is ‘restrictive participation’ that promotes only the selective and narrowly defined interests of the few involved entities and societal elites; very little attention being given to the broader societal good or needs of the ordinary citizens. Certainly, this is akin to oligarchism in which a few elites control political power and make decisions affecting the wider community; a form in which many authoritarianist governance arrangements are carried out. In the urban South, prescriptions which involved ‘consultations’ and ‘negotiations’ in actuality ended up being corporatist as these arrangements were captured by the elites, powerful interests, and gate keepers. In fact public private partnership and several ‘good governance’ arrangements have only ended up

In the populist mode, the governors appeal to the emotions, hopes, and fears of the ordinary citizens using rhetoric, unrealistic proposals, and token goals and actions that appear to address the priorities of the majority, but whose sole aim is for the governors to attain more influence or maintain themselves in power. Usually, the resource and efforts dedicated to goals and actions are often so insignificant compared to the problem, while any little success, if any, is highly publicised and greatly exaggerated (Canovan, 1981, DiGaetano and Strom, 2003, Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). Consequently, in all these three modes of governance as well as the authoritarianist, power is monopolised by an elite minority, while the governed are suppressed and manipulated. The arrangements benefit the governors, their clients, and fellow powerful actors, to the detriment of the ordinary citizens’ welfare. A few benefit at the expense and sometimes also in the name of the majority and the common societal good.

4.2.2. Criteria-driven: Managerialist, pro-growthist, and welfarist

The managerialist, pro-growthist, and welfarist modes of governance are purposive and criteria-driven approaches mainly concerned with delivering the stated objectives. The managerialist mode aims to deliver these objectives as efficiently as possible. Thus, the focus is on effectiveness and efficiency of policies, programs, service delivery, and practical goals, rather than consensus-building, democratic-participatory or political conflict resolution (Pierre, 1999, DiGaetano and Strom, 2003, Healey, 2003, Rakodi, 2003). This mode gained prominence globally with the 1980s neoliberalist turn that demanded a shift away from collective political involvement and welfare responsibilities towards the pursuit of individual interests and cost-effective delivery of services. These included contractual arrangements between the government and private sector actors. The ‘new public management’ (NPM) and other market-based concepts emphasised market-like approaches to service delivery in accordance with private management standards that focused on costs, efficiency, public choice, demand, and willingness to pay; rather than those being determined by political, collective, or social concerns. Hence, professional managers were to play the main role, while elected officials a very minimal role as well as a diminished role for the state vis-à-vis an enhanced role for the private sector (Pollitt, 1990, Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, Pierre, 1999, Osborne, 2010). Hence, this mode separates decision-making and policy development from political argumentation which risks the alienation of the governance processes from the ongoing flow of social life; thus making the ensuing initiatives to be out of tune with the concerns of the ordinary citizens. On the basis of public choice theories, this mode emphasises performance and output targets, management-by-objectives, competitive behaviour, and a contract culture following a ‘fragmented, market-like, agency structure’ which is aimed at efficient achievement of the involved objectives, based on performance indicators and monetary values.
(Dunleavy and O’leary, 1987, Healey, 1997, Healey, 2003). The assumption was that the citizens were mainly driven by instrumental rationality and individual preferences and would therefore be very responsive to market signals, prices, and incentives. Nevertheless, according to Healey (2003), monetary values can never capture ‘what is at stake’ for the majority of the citizens and also reduce ‘public interest’ to only cater for the interests of a few while marginalising the majority.

The pro-growthist mode is mainly concerned with economic development and the role of the private sector in achieving this end. It is therefore, mainly composed of arrangements between the wielders of state power and those of market power; usually emphasising government restructuring, close public-private cooperation, and incentives to powerful private sector entities (Stone, 1987, Parkinson, 1990, Pierre, 1999). Thus in many cases this mode is intertwined with the managerialist. Nevertheless, this mode is highly elitist and exclusive; and tends towards oversimplification by presenting the interests of the powerful private sector entities as being the public good (Peterson, 1981, Swanstrom, 1985, Pierre, 1999).

In welfarist mode, the governors are charged with the protection and promotion of the socio-economic well-being of the citizens, especially the weak, vulnerable and poor. This is based upon various principles that include equitable distribution of wealth, redistribution, charity, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice. Usually these social rights and benefits are awarded selectively on the basis of need, class, or other laid out criteria, to provide for certain identified basic needs; amelioration of poverty or other deprivations (Marshall, 1950, Pierson, 1996, Pierre, 1999, Pierson and Castles, 2006, Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). Nevertheless, welfarist modes have been criticised for a number of reasons including being anti-growthist, distorting the market, discouraging the private sector, and increasing government spending and size; and therefore, impending economic growth, and confining the poor citizens to a state of high dependency (Parkinson and Judd, 1988, Parkinson, 1990, Friedman, 2009, Hayek, 2012, Ryan, 2012). On the contrary, welfarist modes have also been said to stimulate economic growth (Atkinson, 1995, Lindert, 2004, Ball et al., 2011, Eiermann, 2012, IMF, 2012, Rømer and Mlcousek, 2012, Nuti, 2013). However, claims of welfarist pursuits can actually be merely populist and in the urban South, welfarism has tended to be merely clientelism as the welfare mainly benefits the client and is used to buy and reward loyalty. In sum, these three modes are based on different perspectives over the best way to deal with the societal politico-socio-economic problem.

4.2.3. Idealised conceptions: Representativist, inclusivist, and pluralist

The representativist, inclusivist, and pluralist mode of governance are based on idealised conceptions of society and democracy with the aim of attaining the common good of all the citizens. The representativist mode is an indirect democracy where the citizens elect a body of governors to exercise power and to govern for the benefit and best interests of all the involved citizens; (Guinier, 1994, Urbinati, 2006), i.e. “of the people, by the people, for the people” (Wycliffe, 1384 as quoted by, Lincoln, 1863). The assumption is that the citizens vote fairly for the representatives (politicians), who oversee the officials (experts, administrators, or bureaucrats) in articulating and implementing the ‘public interest’ and also ‘common good’. Additionally, the representatives not only execute the wishes
of the electorate, but also use their own judgement to achieve this (Burke, 1949). Thus the officials are accountable upwards, to the representatives and the politicians outwards, to the people. The power to make decisions lies with the representatives who ‘know’ what is ‘good’ and the power of implementation lies with the officials who ‘know what to do’; with the politico-bureaucracy focused around technical and administrative expertise. Nevertheless, in the urban South this mode has often been dysfunctional, leading to quasi-democratic situations. Elections are not always fair nor regular, the representatives often pursue their vested interests instead of the common good, and they often do not ‘know enough’ nor act appropriately. Thus the mode has degenerated into authoritarianism, corporatism, clientelism, with very low accountability and effectiveness (Michels, 1915, Hydén et al., 2004, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013, Hydén, 2014).

The pluralist mode acknowledges the multiplicity and diversity of actors and their interests, and thus the focus is negotiating and mediating between competing interests to arrive at decisions that all the parties can ‘agree’ upon towards pursuit of common goals and cooperative action (Dahl, 1961, Judge et al., 1995, Healey, 2003, Brindley et al., 2005, Flathman, 2005, Held, 2006). This encompasses confrontational ‘advocacy’ practices, ‘politics of voice’, adversarial and contentious negotiations as well as various conceptualisations of ‘good governance’ that are conceived as continuous bargaining processes between the different competing groups. Furthermore, the governors are not considered neutral umpires, but rather, like all the other actors they have their own vested interests. By acknowledging the plurality of actors and interest, the mode promises more ‘realistic’ relations between the conflicting interests, the amelioration of factionalism and extremisms, as well as a diversification of policy and multiple ideological schema. Nevertheless, in reality pluralism is often ‘imperfect’ (Brindley et al., 2005), favours those with more resources, voice, and power, such that the weak (voiceless) are systematically excluded; with this mode degenerating into forms of corporatism. In fact, some actors have ‘veto power’ (Schattschneider, 1975, Connolly, 1995, Habib, 1997, Held, 2013). Often, the pluralist mode results in the struggle for power and shifting alliances with unpredictable decisions and solutions, as it degenerates into ‘zero-sum’ and ‘win-lose’ games, and some actors ‘dig-in’ and establish defensive positions to safeguard their position such that new possibilities cannot be explored. This is especially when they come to the negotiating table with preconceived (probably faulty) perceptions of mutual actors (Schattschneider, 1975, Forester, 1992, Wolsink, 1994, Stoker, 1995, Healey, 2003). Ultimately, the pluralist mode is a process of ‘mutual adjustment’ towards the most ‘agreeable’ positions, producing ‘least common denominator’ solutions that may be agreeable but not optimum nor appropriate. Due to its adversarial positioning, this mode often lacks ‘wide-angle strategic lenses’, producing short term agreeable outcomes that may be very harmful in the long run.

The inclusivist mode of governance is rights-based and is built on the principles of equity, justice, and solidarity, by which all actors with a ‘stake’ in any given issue, play a meaningful role in its decisions and implementation (Brown, 2002, Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, Healey, 2003). It is governance by both the governors and the governed, with the governors acting on the basis of a strong social contract and being highly accountable to the governed. Unlike the pluralist mode which involves
adversarial, contentious negotiations and marginalisation of the weak and the voiceless; this modes involves collaborative consensus-building, relation-building, and deliberate measures to ensure the voice of the weak are heard and have influence, as well as prioritising the concerns of the poor, weak, and marginalised. All the actors have the right to be heard but also the responsibility to listen, respecting other actors and mutually learning about their concerns; making decisions towards best inclusionary alternatives that benefit all members of the society (Giddens, 1984b, Habermas, 1984, Elster, 1991, Healey, 2003). The aim is equitable distribution of political power despite one’s wealth or position in society. This mode therefore stresses the accommodation of diverse perspectives, not on the basis of negotiations, but based on good reasons towards the pursuit of concerted actions and the cooperation of all involved actors, in the making of fair, transparent, well-founded, and effective decisions. The focus is not only rights and obligations, but also on relation-building and fostering respectful mutual learning of other actors’ concerns and perspectives. Accordingly, this mode represents the most idealistic endeavour towards attainment of the ultimate governance ‘of the people, for the people and by the people’ (Brown, 2002, Healey, 2003). As a consequence, due to the highly idealistic notions, this mode has been criticised for being unrealistic, impractical, time wasting, and even impossible to create and implement. Indeed its application in the urban South has so far remained tokenistic or degenerated into corporatist, representativist, pluralist and even clientelist modes (Latour, 1987, Swyngedouw, 2005, Kedogo, 2009, UN-Habitat, 2009a, Hydén, 2013, Gardesse, 2014, Hydén, 2014, Mitchell et al., 2014).

Consequently, even though these three modes are based on idealised conceptions towards articulating ‘public interest’ and attaining the common good for all, in many cases they have not been meaningfully implemented and have remained tokenistic or have morphed into other purposive, coercive and marginalising modes that only serve the interests of a small segment of the society while disadvantaging the majority.

4.2.4. Modes of governance in the urban South arena

In summation, these modes of governance can be clearly identified analytically in the urban South housing arena; and have also been used as labels to prescribed polices, programmes, and practices. However empirically and in actuality, it is rare to find any of those modes in their pure forms; in most cases, these modes appear in combinations such as authoritarianist/clientelist, managerialist/pro-growthist, representativist/welfarist, among many other hybrids. Additionally, even though these modes condition practices of the actors, the modes themselves are dynamic as they are constantly being transformed by those very practices of the involved actors. Thus, for instance pluralist modes quickly transform into forms of corporatism, as the actors negotiate and form exclusive partnerships. Accordingly, the implications of these modes and their dynamics undoubtedly play a significant role in the difficulty and complexity of the urban South’s housing crises’ explanatory and resolution endeavours.

Table 9: Modes of governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianist</td>
<td>Highly undemocratic repressive system. Power is centred on the governors who make all decisions and act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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4.3. Governing power relations and communication forms

From the elucidation of the various modes of governance, it can be clearly observed that governance is fundamentally about the share of influence, decision-making and accountability between the governors and the governed which can be expressed by their communication and power relations. Furthermore power relations and communication forms are intrinsically interlinked; how the actors are related in terms of power (and perceptions) will significantly influence how they communicate with each other. Accordingly, on the basis of various conceptualisations of power, communication, and citizen participation (Arnstein, 1969, Giddens, 1984b, Habermas, 1984, Elster, 1991, Pretty, 1995, White, 1996, Healey, 1997, Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001, Goetz and Gaventa, 2001, Brown, 2002, Hajer, 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, Cornwall, 2004, Cleaver, 2005, Gaventa, 2007, Cornwall, 2008), various forms of power relations and their pertinent communication forms are implied in the urban South housing arena under situations that are highlighted here below.

4.3.1. Authoritarian decree

Authoritarian power relations are highly asymmetrical between the governors and the governed. In these master–slave relationships, the governors have absolute authority without responsibility or accountability to the governed, while the governed have very little rights, authority, or voice options but from them much responsibility is demanded. Thus the actions of the governors are not limited by the rights and wishes of the governed, or other norms, laws, conditions; while the options and actions of the governed are highly controlled, limited, and suppressed (Vestal, 1999, Linz, 2000). These relations are often established and maintained by conquest, subjugation, violence, threats, manipulation, and also by the establishment of unjust laws and norms. The communication between the governors and the governed is mostly unidirectional, top down, from the governors to the governed by means of decrees, edicts, commands or orders; while the concerns, views, opinions, and perspectives of the governed are usually not considered. These decrees which must be adhered to without question are issued in a forceful way, or in the least, implicitly appeal to force; carrying with them the threat of serious negative consequence if disobeyed. In fact any noncompliance is often dealt with promptly and severely (Arnstein, 1969, Vestal, 1999, Linz, 2000, Hydén et al., 2004, Rakodi, 2004, Hydén,
2008, Hydén, 2014). Even though not all authoritarian power relations and decrees are malevolent, in most cases these relations favour the interests of the governors to the detriment of the governed. Mostly, these relations and decrees are aimed securing some advantages or legitimacy for the governors, as well as manipulate, ‘educate’, ‘cure’, or ‘placate’ the governed. These may include communicative interactions, ‘therapy’, and actions aimed at changing the attitudes and perspectives of the governed so that they can learn to accept their unfavourable conditions, and to comply ‘willingly’ and ‘happily’ to the wishes of the governors (Arnstein, 1969, Pretty, 1995, White, 1996, Cornwall, 2008).

4.3.2. Authoritative information

Authoritative power relations and the resultant communication forms are also highly asymmetrical and with a one-way information flow from the governors to the governed. However, as opposed to authoritarian relationships which the governors use their power to bind the citizens through the domination of their will and contravention of their rights; in authoritative relationships the governors have claim to legitimacy through authority vested upon them for instance, through voting, legality, expertise, and social competence, among others. Thus authoritative relations are based on the assumptions that the governors ‘know’ what is in the best interests of the citizens; ‘know’ what is to be done; are the ones who are best equipped and mandated to safeguard the ‘public interest’ and attain the ‘common good (Guinier, 1994, Urbinati, 2006). On the premises that these governors are future-oriented and knowledge-rich, and that their decisions and actions are accurate, correct and conclusive and therefore cannot be challenged or improved upon, it is presumed that the governors can undertake responsible decision and actions on behalf of the good and best interest of the citizens. Therefore the input of the governed is not needed. As follows, the communication form from the governors to the governed is ‘information’, by which the citizens are made aware of what the governors are doing, but cannot provide any feedback or participate in any decision-making, negotiations, or implementations. They have little opportunity to influence the actions of the governors therefore the governors make all the decisions and implement them without any input from the governed. The governed are often informed only when some action is required of them, or to endorse the laid out proposals usually at a very late stage in planning, where they have little or no opportunity to influence the initiative (Arnstein, 1969, Pretty, 1995, White, 1996, Cornwall, 2008).

4.3.3. Benevolent intercession

In benevolent power relations the governors and the governed have paternalistic giver-receiver or donor-beggar relationships, with asymmetries of power between them. In fact the powerlessness and deprivations of the governed are presumed to have formed the raison d'etre for these relations. The governors come in to provide what the citizens need or have lost, and in some cases to give goods, services, certain values, or knowledge which the governors believe the governed should have (Otnes et al., 1993). Since the governed have very little voice options, the governors intercede and speak for them, advocating for their concerns in society and amongst other powerful actors. Thus the governors assume the responsibility of speaking on behalf of their constituencies, pleading and beseeching other actors for charity and donations to help the constituencies. Nonetheless these relations and the
corresponding communication form may create conditions of helplessness and continued dependence and subservience; a ‘dependency syndrome’ by which the recipients develop a belief that they can never solve their problems without help (Harvey and Lind, 2005).

4.3.4. Autonomous consultation

In autonomous power relations, all the actors, including the governors and the governed, act independently and take part in the initiatives of decision-making and implementation in a non-collective manner. Furthermore, they decide whether or not to participate, coordinate, cooperate, compete, or share information depending on their interests and ‘rational’ choices. This was exemplified in the neoliberalist ‘New Public Management’s’ prescriptions that entailed a business-client relationship between the governors and the governed; in a fragmented market-like agency structure; guided by principles such as ‘willingness to pay’, ‘rational choice’, and ‘public choice’ (Dunleavy and O’leary, 1987, Healey, 1997, Horowitz and McConnell, 2003, Ostrom, 2010). Hence the communication form is mainly consultation which involves a two-way flow of information, deliberation and opinion exchange between the governors and the governed as well as with other actors who might be interested in the relations such as the private sector and civil society entities. However, even though the governors invite the opinions of the governed and the other actors, the governors may decide whether or not to take those opinions into account. For instance, the governed might be subjected to questionnaires and ‘market surveys’ without being fully informed about what they are all about, the purposes as well as the final outcomes and resultant decisions and actions. In many cases, the purpose of these consultations is mainly instrumental for the governors as their means of achieving certain goals such as, assembling useful information to avoid losing control of the initiatives, enhancing community ownership of the initiatives, obtaining evidence to prove that citizens were involved, cost-effectiveness and efficiency, obtaining time and resource contributions from the governed and other actors (Arnstein, 1969, Pretty, 1995, White, 1996, Cornwall, 2008).

4.3.5. Partnership negotiation

In partnership power relations, the involved actors, including the governors and the governed, agree to cooperate to advance their mutual or negotiated interests. This involves a degree of power-sharing or redistribution of power, in the same way as through negotiations; the involved actors agree to share various aspects of decision-making and implementation through agreed joint structures (Arnstein, 1969, Judge et al., 1995, Healey, 2003). Negotiations as a communication form involve mutual discussions and agreements between the involved parties. The intentions are often not only, to resolve points of difference and reach an understanding that produces a settlement or agreement; but also for the actors to gain some advantage by crafting out outcomes that satisfy various vested interests. In fact, negotiations are all about obtaining the most advantageous outcomes from the relationships, and often involve actors inducing or forcing other actors to the ‘agreement’ using promises and threats based on their negotiating power. This is exemplified in the pluralist modes of governance whereby the involved actors articulate their diverse concerns and competing interests through adversarial and contentious negotiations, to arrive at decisions that all the parties can ‘agree’ to (Dahl, 1961, Elster, 1991, Judge et al., 1995, Healey, 2003, Brindley et al., 2005, Flathman, 2005,
Held, 2006). Nonetheless, the partnership power relations and negotiations give the governed and other involved actors the leverage to influence decisions and their implementation, and demand accountability from the governors. These relations permit the expression of voice that could lead to improved responsiveness as well as organizing and aggregating different views towards the creation of more appropriate initiatives. However these arrangements favour only those with voice, influence, and negotiating power; while marginalising the weak (Pretty, 1995, White, 1996, Brindley et al., 2005, Cornwall, 2008).

4.3.6. Collaborative argumentation
Collaborative power relations go beyond the mediation of interests, intersection of common goals, and working together to achieve shared goals; towards consensus building, mutual learning, and deliberate inclusionary and empowering practices to ensure the concerns of all involved actors are dealt with, despite their powerlessness and voicelessness; as an inherent human right (Brown, 2002, Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003, Healey, 2003). Communication takes the form of ‘argumentations’ which involve providing ‘good reasons’ toward decisions that benefit all the members of society on the basis of equity, justice, and solidarity, with all actors having equal rights to be heard and to listen to others (Giddens, 1984b, Habermas, 1984, Elster, 1991, Healey, 2003). These contrast the adversarial negotiations and partnerships which are based on power, threats, and promises; with the assumption of equal distribution of power amongst the actors. Instead collaborative relations and argumentations take cognisance of the existing asymmetries in power, resources, and voice options prevalent in society and therefore, these relations and communication entail purposefully and consciously overcoming the disadvantages. Hence the relations and communication forms are transformative, in that they are aimed at empowering the governed so that they can meaningfully participate in decisions and collaborative actions with the governors and other actors; delegating more power to the weak and poor citizens for the purpose of more citizen control (Arnstein, 1969, Pretty, 1995, White, 1996, Cornwall, 2008). Hence, the expectation is that these relations and communication would lead to optimal decisions and actions that are arrived at in a fair and transparent manner, accommodating different perspectives which benefit the society as a whole much more, beyond just the intersection of common interest and the agreed solutions of a few powerful actors.

4.3.7. Power relations and communication forms in the urban South arena
Similar to the modes of governance, the various power relations and communication forms can only be clearly identified analytically in the urban South housing arena. In actuality the situation is more complex and dynamic. The associations between the modes, power, and communication forms are not always necessarily direct or as expected; for instance, typically authoritarianist governors can in some moments have benevolent relations with their subjects and intercede on their behalf, while welfarist governors can have authoritative relations with the governed and communicate with them through information or even decrees. Furthermore, the relations and communication forms are subject to change depending on the context, situation, or the actor mix involved. A governor could be benevolent to some actors, partner with a few, but be authoritarian with others. All in all, these
relations compound the difficulty in understanding and resolving the urban South housing crises; necessitating approaches that can meaningfully deal with these quandaries.

Table 10: Governing power relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Governors have ‘unlimited powers’ and the governed very few voice options. Governors have controlling use of power to bind the citizens through the subjugation of their will and contravention of their basic rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Governors have the authority vested upon them and ‘know’ what to do (experts), their decisions and actions therefore cannot be challenged or improved upon, hence citizens input is not needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Governors are helpers of the citizens, and providers of what they need. Citizens need help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Actors act individually, and may decide whether or not to participate, coordinate or share information depending on their interests and ‘rational’ choices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Actors agree to cooperate to advance their mutual or negotiated interests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Actors work together to achieve shared goals, beyond just the intersection of common goals, but also consensus building and mutual learning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Communication forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attributes</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Governors issue forceful orders which must be complied with without question, or risk negative consequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>The citizens are made aware of what the governors are doing, but cannot provide any feedback or participate in any decision-making, the governors make all the decisions and implement them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Governors plead on behalf of and speak for the poor citizens, safeguard their interests and ensure their basic needs and protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Two-way information between the governors and the governed, as well as with other actors, but the governors have the discretion to take or not to take into account those opinions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Mutual discussions between the actors with competing interests, using power, threats, and promises; towards an agreement, a settlement, or an advantage (Governors also have vested interests).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Actors argue using ‘good reasons’ based on equal rights, equity, justice, and solidarity; towards decisions that benefit the whole society (Governors are mediators of the actors and provide empowerment for the weak).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.4. Governance in urban South’s housing crises and solutions

As an analytical concept, governance refers to the interaction processes between actors involved in collective issues that lead to decisions and the formulation of social norms. This entails the systems of regulation and co-ordination governing interactions, and the processes by which the actors steer themselves as they define and pursue their objectives, as well as how they conceptualise the problems at hand and their solutions (Rosell, 1999, Moulaert, 2000, Hufty, 2009). Accordingly, the different development orthodoxies and housing problem-solution approaches in the urban South over the decades evoked particular modes of governance, power relations and communication forms.

The exclusivist orthodoxy and containment housing approaches of the 1950s involved authoritarianist modes of governance with authoritarian power relations and decree communication forms between the colonial authorities and the colonised people. These involved gross violation of basic rights, extensive use of extreme violence, unjust and segregatory law backed by military or police force and threat of severe negative consequences in case of non compliance. The colonised people were denied any voice options and other rights. In fact much of the governance relations involved enforcing obedience and compliance as well as maintaining the highly exploitative relations and status quo. Hence the citizens were continuously subjected to ‘therapy’ aimed at changing their attitudes and perspectives, to accept their unfavourable conditions as an inevitable consequence of existence, to lose their will to fight for change, and concede to the demands of their governors. The citizens had to accept their dehumanisation, loss of land and livelihoods, segregative and restrictive laws, eviction and demolitions,
denial of basic rights, exclusion, violence, and other atrocities meted against them, as a fact of life. Nevertheless, some citizens were privileged and engaged in patron-client relationships with the governors; they were richly rewarded so as to help subjugate and exploit their fellow colonised people.

The 1960s ushered in independence with ‘democratic’ representativist modes of governances, modernisation orthodoxy and standard housing approaches which were contingent upon authoritative power relations and information communication forms. The new governments came with the promise of accelerated development that would in a short time eradicate the oppression and poverty associated with colonialisms and would guarantee the citizens a better life. The governing process involved experts and a massive injection of funds (local and from abroad) to solve the problem of ‘underdevelopment’. The governors ‘knew’ what was to be done, and what was best for the citizens, thus the input of the presumed ignorant citizens was not needed. The citizens gained some voice options as they had the chance to elect governors who would pursue the best interest of the citizens. Nevertheless, in a few years many Global South countries fell to election fraud, coup d’états, violations or repealing of their constitutions, and became authoritarian and clientelist. In some cases these were even worse than in the colonial period; in fact, the urban South’s crisis worsened tremendously during this decade.

The 1970s’ redistributionism and basic needs development orthodoxy with the sites-and-services housing approaches involved welfarist modes of governance with the governors having the role of ensuring basic needs of the poor and weak citizens. This implied benevolent giver-receiver power relations with intercession communication forms, as the governed looked up to the governors as their protectors, benefactors, and voice; while to the governors, the governed were helpless and voiceless citizens, who needed help and ‘advocacy by governors’. Nonetheless, while these sentiments dominated political rhetoric in the Global South as well as the international scholarly and policy debates, in reality they were hardly implemented in most Global South countries. The resources’ allocations were very minimal, while many Global South governors seemed more concerned with maintaining themselves in power. Hence this welfarist approaches in practice became mainly populist and clientelist, such as the site-services schemes which were usually used as political capital for campaigns or material exchanges in patron-client relationships (Malpezzi and Sa-Aadu, 1996, Hope, 1999, Syagga et al., 2001a, Davis, 2006, Hydén, 2014)

The 1980s show the rise of the neoliberalist development orthodoxy and enablement housing approaches. These involved prescriptions of managerialist and pro-growthist modes of governance, with the governors introducing private sector management methods, incentive structures, market competition, delegating some roles to private sectors, and developing a ‘business-client’ relationship with the citizens (Jones and Ward, 1994b). The retreat of the state, increasing role of the private sector and civil society, proliferation of actors, and the ‘enabler’ state role meant autonomous power relations and consultation communication form. This is because, it was presumed that all the actors, including the governors, the governed, and other interest actors could ‘rationally’ chose how to act, as well as when and with whom to interact with (Dunleavy and O’leary, 1987, Healey, 1997, Horowitz and
McConnell, 2003, Ostrom, 2010). The commodification of housing, public services, rights and other previous ‘entitlements’ meant that the governors would make decisions based on the citizens ‘willingness to pay’, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and cost-sharing. Hence the citizens’ voice options were their willingness and ability to pay; and their participation in initiatives which became mainly instrumental as a means to achieve cost-effectiveness by limiting the funders’ input, and drawing in resources from the community and the private sector (Hamdi, 1995, Gilbert, 2002, Cornwall, 2008, De Soto, 2009, Alexander, 2012). Indeed the 1980s saw the beginning of ‘governance’ prescriptions, heralding the rise of its historical and constructivist conceptualisations with the ‘hollowing-out of the state’ debates, and its normative descriptions and prescriptions (Hydén, 1999, Mkandawire, 2007, Kedogo et al., 2010a, Grindle, 2011). Nevertheless, in actuality, the neoliberalist prescriptions such as deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation, and state withdrawal, seemed to legitimise the abandoning of the welfare of the weak and poor citizens; as well as increased authoritarianism, plutocratism, kleptocratism, and clientelism (Stiglitz, 2000, Syagga et al., 2001a, UN-Habitat, 2003, Davis and Monk, 2011, Hydén, 2013, Littler, 2013). Diminishing of public services meant access to them would be mainly through clientelist networks, and the increased role of the private sector and the civil society increased elitist corporatism and entrepreneurial consensus to the detriment of the urban poor and other ordinary citizens. Accordingly, it is highly probable that all these contributed to the rapid deterioration of the urban South’s condition, and the massive failure as well as ineffectiveness of the initiatives witnessed in the 1908s.

The Sustainabilism development orthodoxy and integrated housing approaches that rose to prominence in the 1990s entailed the Inclusivist ‘rights based’ mode of governance by which all actors with a stake had to be meaningfully included in decision-making and implementation. Additionally, this entailed collaborative power relations that involved consensus building, mutual learning, and empowering the weak as well as prioritising their concerns; and argumentation communication form based on ‘good reasons’ toward decisions and optimal solutions that benefit all regardless of their power or position in society. These approaches were ‘transformative’ and were aimed at changing the attitudes of both the weak and powerful as well as the governors and the governed in the direction of accepting the norms of equity, justice, and solidarity; across people, regions, and generations. The approaches were geared towards empowering the governed to take a more active role in defining their destinies, and participate more meaningful in societal activities. The approaches gave the governors the custodial role as duty bearer for the protection and assurance of the rights and wellbeing of the citizens as well as their socio-economic and environmental concerns. Accordingly, the approaches required many concessions from the powerful and the governors. Its success overtly depended upon their political good will. Ultimately these approaches became reduced to contestations regarding normative objectives and best approaches. As the citizens and the civil society actively engaged in activism and advocacy to demand for change, the governors engaged in rhetoric and populist nominal agendas; paying lip service to their concerns while relabeling their practices and programmes. The private sector also engaged in ‘green washing’ and nominal corporate responsibility programmes. In the end much of the good intentions were never realised, and the urban South crisis continued unabated.
Table 12: Governance modes in urban South’s prescriptive orthodoxies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade &amp; orthodoxy</th>
<th>Mode of governance</th>
<th>Power relations</th>
<th>Communication &amp; Participation</th>
<th>Voice options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s Exclusivism</td>
<td>Authoritarianist</td>
<td>Authoritarian: Master-Slave</td>
<td>Decree: Therapy, manipulation</td>
<td>None: Fight for it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s Modernisation</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Authoritative: Representative-Voter</td>
<td>Information: Vote</td>
<td>Represented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s Redistribution</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Benevolent: Giver-Receiver</td>
<td>Intercession: Condescending</td>
<td>Helped: Spoken for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Autonomous: Business-Client</td>
<td>Consultation: Instrumental</td>
<td>Price: Willingness to pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s Sustainabilism</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Collaborative: Empowered equals</td>
<td>Argumentation: Transformative</td>
<td>Inherent right: Advocacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s Governism</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Partnership: Competing partners</td>
<td>Negotiation: Representative</td>
<td>Bargain: Make voice count</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the year 2000, Governism’s development ideologies and wider-partnership housing approaches dominated the prescriptions to the urban South arena; their focus dealing appropriately with the myriads and still increasing actors with conflicting interests and approaches. These prescriptions entailed Pluralist modes of governance that acknowledged the multiplicity of actors and their varied interests; partnership power relations in which the actors cooperated to advance their mutually agreed interests; negotiations as the communication form, in which the actors strived to resolve their points of difference and reach an agreement, as well as gain the most advantageous position in the arrangements. Nonetheless, these approaches tended to favour those with more negotiation power and control over resources; and marginalised the weak, the poor, and the voiceless. In the end, the resultant arrangements were mainly elitist corporatism. However, more importantly, the 2000s also saw a tremendous increase in the number of ways Governism approaches were conceptualised, prescribed, and implemented; with many conflicting normative objectives; especially concerning what was ‘good governance’ (Mkandawire, 2007, Kedogo et al., 2010a, Grindle, 2011). Many of the governance prescriptions were presented as being normative and ‘good’. However the actual outcome radically differed from the initially stated objectives, and the outcomes were rarely ‘good’ for many urban South citizens; resulting in more contentions. Thus the historical, constructivist, and analytical governance contentions entered the fray; exacerbating the quandary in which the urban South crisis is, from which extrication now seems much more difficult or even ‘unsolvable’ (UN-Habitat, 2006a, UN-Habitat, 2014a, Orbit, n.d.). Consequently, a better understanding and resolution of the crisis demands the uncovering and unravelling of some of these underlying and entangled issues that comprise the crisis and make it seemingly impossible to meaningfully resolve.
5. Paradigms in the urban South crises and solutions

From the discussion on the foregoing, concerning the various conceptualisations of the urban South crises and its prescribed development, housing and governance approaches, a certain trend is clearly discernable. Since the 1950s, each decade saw a particular triad of development, housing and governance approaches rise to prominence as the ‘best alternative’. That triad was promoted vigorously and dominated scholarly, policy and practice debates concerning how the urban South problems were defined and the solutions constructed. Most of the policy prescriptions and programmes carried the label of that triad for that particular debate. However, this triad of ‘best alternative’ usually came under heavy criticism and disenchantment, to be replaced by a new triad in the following decade. These changes were related to the prevailing geopolitico-economic issues, events and hegemonic influences; nevertheless, whether the connection was causal or correlational is hard to discern. Whereas the changes were not revolutionary but gradual, by the end of any particular epoch, the differences between the succeeding triads were so radical. Nonetheless, while a certain triad dominated each decade, those approaches did not start and end with that decade; each of those approaches could be traced back to various decades and continued to be practiced several decades after their zenith decade. Seemingly, certain societal factors made that triad rise to prominence remain dominant for a decade, then fall out of favour. However, the approaches seemed to have remained in the arena competing with the prevailing dominant triad, other previous ones and even future ones. Furthermore, from a more nuanced observation of these situations, it can be inferred that the fact that a particular triad was dominant for a particular decade, does not mean that all actors, organisations, or regions accepted and subscribed to them. There are visible ‘time lags’, coercions, manipulations and transformations concerning the application of the triad prescriptions, such that the outcome in most cases was very different from the initial objectives or intended outcomes. Therefore, these triads comprise on the one hand, timeless and changeless characteristics that remain the same across time and space, over the decades and regions; on the other hand, they involve dynamic dimensions which change over the decades, actors, organisations, regions, zeitgeist, schools of thought, theories and other entities. Thus static and dynamic dimensions seem to create complex and paradoxical situations that could be playing a major role in aggravating the urban South crisis. Accordingly, in an attempt to examine these apparent paradoxes, complexities, and contradictions in the urban South arena this study applies the concept of ‘paradigm’.

5.1. The concept of paradigm

Etymologically, ‘paradigm’ originates from the classical Greek word ‘paradeigma’ meaning ‘pattern or ‘example’ (Liddell and Scott, 2005). Over the centuries, the term has undergone several transformations to denote ‘the prevailing view of things’ (Clarke and Clegg, 2000, Dogan, 2001). Kuhn (1962b) defined a paradigm as “universally recognized scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of researchers”. These comprised ‘what’ was to be observed, scrutinised and questions to be asked; as well as, how these questions were to be structured, investigations conducted and the results interpreted (Kuhn, 2012 pp. xlii).
Hermeneutically, the concept of paradigm relates to the notion of ‘Gestalt of a Weltanschauung’ i.e. ‘the organised whole of a worldview’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Lehmann, 2009). According to Kuhn (1962b) a paradigm is not only the ‘entire constellation’ of beliefs, values and techniques shared by the members of a given community, it is also ‘one sort of element in that constellation’ which employed as a model, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the given problem. Hence a paradigm consists of: firstly, the metaphysical assumptions that predisposes actors to act in particular ways and their perceptions at the macro level; secondly, epistemological theories on how to deal with the problems and their solutions at the meso level; and thirdly, the ethical praxis where the basic assumptions and theories are translated into action at the micro level. Thus a paradigm is a view of reality that is a ‘Gestalt’ forming a hermeneutical understanding; a unified whole resulting from a metaphysical assumption of what could be known, forming the basis for a conception of epistemological knowledge acquisition, and the essentialistic line of praxis in an ethic for living (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, Yontef and Jacobs, 1989, Yolles, 1998, Cohen, 2000a, Lehmann, 2009, Ruse, 2009, Kuhn, 2012). As a consequence, manifestations of paradigms include worldviews, epistemological stances and model examples. As a worldview, a paradigm is an all-encompassing way actors experience and think about a given issue on the basis of their beliefs about morals, values, and all other pertinent issues. As an epistemological stance, a paradigm is a distinctive belief system influencing how a given group of actors question and seek answers to a given problem (based on their worldviews). As a model example, a paradigm is an ‘exemplar’ such as an approach, representing a set of theories and practices (based on a given epistemological stance). All these could be held individually, or be a shared belief within a community of actors, having a consensus about which questions are most meaningful and which procedures are most appropriate for answering those questions (Patton, 1982, Patton, 1988, Schwandt, 1989, Morgan, 2007, Kuhn, 2012).

In view of the above, paradigms are related to and encompass notions of ‘frame of reference’. These include the concepts of ‘Gestalt’ by which the mind imposes a frame on sense-perception to make it ‘make sense’, so as to see objects in their entirety before perceiving their individual parts. When the mind is confronted by optical illusions such the ‘Rubin's vase’, the mind insists on ‘seeing’ two faces, due to the mind's insistence on structuring perceived reality (Gregory, 1997, Hochberg, 1998). Similarly, according to Piaget (2007) model of ‘assimilation and accommodation’, there exists schemata in the mind by which incoming sense-data from the outside world is modified and internalised into the internal world; hence actors may either force incoming information to fit into their world-views producing prejudices, stereotypes or be forced to change their world-views (Festinger, 1957, Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991). However, as opposed to stereotypes which are maintained by wilful ignorance, ‘typifications’ are social constructions which are based on standard assumptions. These assumptions are derived from familiarity which lead to profiling, -isms, religion and socialisation in professional groups (Becker, 1961, Berger, 1961, Schutz, 1967). Furthermore, by ‘framing’ the actors create mental constructions (frames) that allow the actors to locate, perceive, identify, label, and present a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences. Thus the actors interpret situations through their primary framework, leading to certain perceptions, action and agenda-setting.
Consequently, actors can predefine public debate leading to the prominence of certain paradigms (Goffman, 1974, Gitlin, 1980, Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996, Scheufele, 2000).

Ultimately, each paradigm is constituted of elements of certain methodologies, approaches, ideologies, and frames of reference; and can be applied to various societal entities. Firstly, methodologies are systematic and theoretical analyses, of the bodies of methods and principles applied to a given field of theory or practice. These analyses proffer the theoretical underpinning for understanding which set of methods may be applied to a given scenario. However, methodologies in themselves do not set out to give the preferred solutions, set questions, or unite actors. These are set out by the approaches, ideologies, and ultimately the paradigms as a whole. Hence the same methodology can be applied in diverse approaches, ideologies, and paradigms (Berg, 2004, Kuhn, 2012, Steger and James, 2013). Secondly, approaches are groups of attitudes, processes, and techniques that actors apply in defining and solving problems to achieve their objectives. These encompass not only the actors’ methodologies, but also the actors’ mental and emotional relationship to the methodologies and ideologies (Davies, 1965, Dane, 2010). Thirdly, ideologies are a system of interlinked and patterned clusters of normatively imbued ideas, concepts, symbols and beliefs by which actors seeks to justify and perpetuate themselves, carry claims to social ‘truth’, and form conceptual maps to help them navigate the complexity of their societal experiences. However, ideologies not only encompass problem-creating and problem-solving aspects of the actors, these belong to the paradigm (Bercovitch, 1986, Steger and James, 2013). Finally, frames of reference are “the context, viewpoint, or set of presuppositions of evaluative criteria within which a person’s perception and thinking seem always to occur, and which constrains selectively the course and outcome of these activities” (Bullock et al., 1988 pp.). By these frames of reference, the actors force the problems and solutions into their world views (or are forced to alter their world views) as well as the actors’ already set societal agendas that predefine or predetermine public debate and discourses. This leads to the prominence of certain methodologies, approaches, ideologies, and therefore, paradigms (Schutz, 1967, Goffman, 1974, Gitlin, 1980, Fairhurst and Sarr, 1996, Scheufele, 2000, Piaget, 2007). Accordingly, paradigms encompass specific methodologies for inquiring into a problem and solving it. They also include specific approaches that encompass particular attitudes, processes, and techniques; specific ideologies involving the patterning and contingent claims to truth; as well as specific frames of reference that influence not only the course which the methodologies, approaches, and ideologies take, but also their outcomes. In this way, paradigms can be applied to individuals, groups, epochs, regions, models, theories, schools of thought, practices, and many other societal entities.

5.2. Individual and dominant paradigms

From Kuhn’s definition of paradigms as ‘universally recognized scientific achievements’ for a time, ‘dominant paradigms’ can be seen as systems of thought and values that are considered ‘most standard’ and ‘most widely held’ at given historical moments. It is the paradigm that defines the zeitgeist such that, its terminologies become ‘buzz words’ and attain mantra status in that epoch. Most of the situations and actors become in one way or another, even if to only a small degree, affected by the dominant paradigm of the subject field. Hence whether consciously or unconsciously some adopt it,
others re-label their practice, and still others engage in active or passive resistance of the paradigm (Kuhn, 1962a, Cotgrove, 1982, Handa, 1987, Milbrath, 1989, Herrle and Walther, 2005a, Kedogo, 2009, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Indeed, from the triad of development, housing, and governance problem-solution issues, distinct paradigms that framed the material and discursive practices in each decade are clearly discernible. Furthermore, document analyses over the decades reveals that there was a marked increase in the use of terms associated with the dominant paradigm in each epoch; as shown by the Google n-gram digital-based analysis for cultural patterns in language-use over the last six decades. This is based on ‘culturomics’, a quantitative analysis of digitized texts through computational lexicology to study human behaviour and cultural trends over time, by which words that imparted the ‘tone’ or ‘mood’ of each epoch can be established (Michel et al., 2011).

Figure 11: Dominant paradigms through culturomics document analysis - Google n-gram

Several reasons have been proffered to explain why paradigms become dominant in an epoch; chief among these being the prevailing global hegemonic interests, major events, as well politico-scientific theoretical breakthroughs and consensus. However, a more nuanced observation of the constellations of events, practices, attitudes meanings of action, beliefs, and their milieux in any epoch reveals that the factors and conditions that facilitate a system of thought to become a dominant paradigm are far more complex than that. Several other reasons have also been observed to play a key role. These include powerful organisations outlining and legitimising certain paradigms or normative directions; the role of dynamic political leadership; media coverage and publishing directions; funding for certain research programmes; the role of educators and students, lay persons and groups agitating for certain societal concerns; processes of ‘creative destruction’; as well as simply the result of outbreaks of ‘mob psychology’ without any rational grounds or intellectual breakthroughs (Harvey, 1972, Harman, 1988, Haas, 1992b, Haas, 1992a, Pfeffer, 1993, Harvey, 2000, Schumpeter, 2013).

Correspondingly, according to Marx and Engels (1845-6); since the ruling classes control the means of material and mental production as well as regulate the production and distribution of ideas, “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” (Marx and Engels, 1970 p 64). Therefore, the dominant paradigms are merely expressions of the dominant material relationships, of which those lacking the means of production become subject to. However, even from a cursory examination of the urban South development, governance, and housing arena, evidence suggests that this may not be
the case all of the time. For instance, some dominant paradigms such as Redistributionism and Sustainabilism were driven by counter-hegemonic, ‘underdog’, or subaltern perspectives and interests that were contradictory to those of the ruling classes. The paradigms reigned supreme in their decades despite fierce opposition from the ruling classes. Consequently, it may be inaccurate to equate dominant paradigms with the ruling class ideas, power, or vested interests alone. Several underlying and unconscious factors could be at play; the inquiry into which comprises the subject matter of this study.

**Figure 12: Diffusion of innovations**

![Diffusion of innovations](image)

Source (Rogers, 1962)

Even though in each decade and issue, the pertinent dominant paradigms influenced most of the involved material and discursive practices in the urban South arena; it could also be readily observed that the different actors, regions, or situations did not accept, adopt, or uptake the dominant paradigm at the same rate, degree, or depth. These were also observed by Rogers (1962) in the rates of acceptance and uptake of new ideas and innovations among individuals and organisations. However, the situation in the urban South crises arena could be far more complex. Whereas some actors were ahead of the paradigm such as the proponents and avant-garde, there are also vividly visible ‘time lags’ and ‘laggards’ with some actors actively resisting the dominant paradigm. These raise a number of probable situations. First, the dominant paradigms were not subscribed to equally by all the individual actors, organisations, or other entities. Second, this produces the possibility of the actors, organisations, and other entities having their own individual paradigm subscriptions that are distinct from the dominant one. Third, if the actors and other entities have individual paradigm subscriptions, and also different rates of paradigmatic acceptance and uptake, this raises a high likelihood of different and probably conflicting paradigmatic subscriptions among those entities. These three possibilities carry the risk of creating highly perplexing situations in the urban South arena, with probable profound and critical importance to the understanding, persistence, and resolution of the urban South crises. Besides, these three possibilities seem to entail static, timeless and changeless paradigmatic dimensions observable in individuals, organisations, regions, theories, and other societal entities in any time and space; as well as dynamic dimensions as the paradigms rise and fall, are accepted and rejected. Furthermore, not all these possibilities, dimensions and involved conditions of actions and their consequences are intended, conscious or acknowledged. Accordingly, an exploration into these three possibilities and their implication to theory and practice in the urban South crises form the main thrust and basis of this study.
5.3. Epistemic communities

Still from Kuhn’s (1962b) description of a paradigms as “universally recognised scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners”; and that “attract an enduring group of adherents away from [other] competing modes of scientific activities” (Kuhn, 2012); it can be inferred that paradigms unite groups of like-thinking individuals; expressing the groups’ consensus on particular issues, as well as giving these groups, identity and group solidarity. Since paradigms influence how actors look at problems and the search for solutions, for these groups, their paradigms are ‘not simply a way of looking at reality’, they are the ‘reality’ in themselves (Wise, 1980, Kedogo et al., 2010a). According to Foucault (2012) the term ‘episteme’ denotes the historical a priori grounding knowledge and its discourses, and hence represents the ‘conditions of their possibility’ in a given epoch for a particular set of actors. Hence, episteme is the strategic apparatus that permits the separation of what is acceptable or not, within a particular theory of a given group of actors. Thus an episteme is the ‘epistemological unconscious’ that configures knowledge for a group of actors at a given time, based on particular sets of fundamental assumptions; while an ‘epistemic community’ is a group of actors sharing these fundamental assumptions, accepting one version of a story or its validation. These fundamental assumptions enables the cohesion of a discourse, and therefore unites the community of its holders; “an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by members of a given community” that governs “not a subject matter but a group of practitioners” (Kuhn, 1970 pp. 180). Consequently, an epistemic community is a network of actors subscribing to the same paradigm on a given issue and in a given arena.

Box 5: Attributes of an epistemic community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>An epistemic community shares:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• A set of normative and principled beliefs which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Causal beliefs derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Notions of validity: that are intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A common policy enterprise: a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Haas, 1992a p 3)

This could encompass actors from extremely different academic and professional backgrounds, histories, countries, levels, organisations, economic classes, and political affiliations among many other differences; whose unifying factor is not a commonality of interests or collective gain, but the commonality of ideas, ‘normative component’, and promotion of collective amelioration (Holzner and Marx, 1979, Fleck, 1981, Haas, 1992b, Haas, 1992a, Sebenius, 1992, Polanyi, 2000). This is exemplified by Hass’ (1992a) description of an epistemic community sharing normative and causal beliefs, notions of validity as well as the same policy enterprise. In sum, the possibility of there being several paradigms, co-existing and interacting at the same time, space, and situation; with the actors subscribing to different paradigms, greatly raises the probable existence of epistemic communities. This underscores the importance of examining the existence, role, and implications of these epistemic communities on the urban South crisis and the arena as a whole.
5.4. Paradigm shifts

Broadly speaking, a ‘paradigm shift’ represents a major change in a certain thought-pattern, personal beliefs, fundamental assumptions and other ‘truths’ by which former ways of thinking and organising are replaced by radically new ones (Harvey, 1972, Handa, 1987, Breton and Largent, 1996, Kuhn, 2012). According to Kuhn (2012) a paradigm makes those who subscribe to it blind to any other alternative ‘reality’ and obscures their view to any disqualifying evidence that might undermine their prevailing paradigm; while any anomaly that arises is ignored or brushed away as acceptable levels of error are not dealt with. This leads to a build-up of unreconcilable anomalies that culminate into a ‘crisis’, during which new ideas and previously discarded alternatives are tried, precipitating a ‘battle’ between the old and forthcoming paradigm (and its followers); which if the new paradigm wins a revolution occurs - a paradigm shift. Hence a radical shift occurs, not only in the theory, but also in the entire worldview and the implications that surround and arise from them; a revolutionary overthrow of the incumbent paradigm and its replacement by a new one. Thus Kuhn (2012) posits that theoretical advancement is not evolutionary, but rather a “series of peaceful interludes punctuated by intellectually violent revolutions”, by which "one conceptual worldview is replaced by another".

In the urban South housing arena, radical shifts in the development, housing and governance triad are observable in each of the dominant and individual paradigms; nonetheless, the rates of shifts are difficult to discern. However, as opposed to Kuhnian descriptions, these shifts were not revolutionary but evolutionary; and also the shifts occurred without any observed anomalies with novelties playing only a secondary role in the paradigm shifts. Furthermore, the Kuhnian description does not offer sufficient explanation on how anomalies arise, generate crises and the new paradigms, as well as how these paradigms come to be accepted. Based on the premises that paradigm shifts do not just happen, but rather that they are driven by agents of change, Kuhn’s analysis does not explicitly examine the ‘guiding force’ that leads to the shifts (Handa, 1987, Breton and Largent, 1996, Dogan, 2001, Harvey, 2009b). Moreover, even though several scholars argue that paradigm shifts are simply interest-driven, and the jostling of ruling classes’ ideas (Marx and Engels, 1970, Marx, 1975, Harvey, 2009c), evidence suggests that these may not be the case, such that paradigms and paradigm shifts might to a great extent stand independent of interests, but be driven by normative concerns such as the pursuit of the common good and collective improvement (Haas, 1992b, Haas, 1992a, Sebenius, 1992, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013). Hence paradigm shifts may involve ‘battles’ between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary or reactionary paradigms such that, newer paradigms are not necessarily better than the previous ones, neither do they produce methods and solutions nor mean progress or improvement in societal conditions. Thus a paradigm can rise to prominence even if it is ineffective and inappropriate to the problem at hand. Furthermore, there being a possibility of distinct dominant paradigms as well as numerous individual ones, they can also raise the possibility of paradigm shifts at all those levels and probably at different rates, triggering a very complex dynamic in any problem-solution arena. Apparently, the only distinctly visible shifts are those of the dominant paradigms, but at other levels the paradigm shifts and subscriptions seem to be shrouded with many unknowns, unacknowledged, and unintended issues. Simply put, paradigm shifts denote radical transformation or metamorphosis in attitude and world view at various societal scales, of which its causes and the
courses which they follow are not easily discernable. Nonetheless, paradigm shifts and the involved dynamics could be very critical in the urban South crisis, necessitating due attention.

5.5. Paradigms and the urban South housing problem-solution nexus

From the foregoing discussions in this chapter, it can be inferred that paradigms comprise worldviews that are based on simplifying assumptions. These paradigms embody given sets of ideologies, frames of reference, approaches and methodologies; based on certain values, visions of reality as well as basic assumptions concerning what a ‘good’ society is and the ‘best’ way to achieve it. Accordingly, from the urban South crisis and its prescribed solutions through the triad of development, housing, and governance, six dominant paradigms (with paradigm shifts) can clearly be established in each decade since the 1950s, each with distinct ideologies, frames of reference, approaches and methodologies. These are Exclusivism, Modernisationism, Redistributionism (Basic Needs), Neoliberalism, Sustainabilism, and Governism. However, apart from the dominant paradigms, there were also possible individual paradigms which could be shared (separately or in epistemic communities) with other actors or not, as well as be or not be compliant with the dominant paradigms of their epochs. While the dominant paradigms and their shifts were readily discernable, individual paradigms were not. Furthermore, the fact that the dominant paradigms were prominent in particular decades does not mean that they began or ended with that decade; they only rose to prominence and defined the zeitgeist, and then faded into the background. Hence apart from their clearly visible dynamic components, these paradigms could also have timeless, changeless and static components that may be identified in any time and space in the urban South’s housing issues since the 1950s.

On the basis of these premises, in this study, the six identified dominant paradigms are used to create a heuristic devise and analytical framework for uncovering the individual paradigms, the issues that surround them and finally their implications to the urban South crisis, both in theory and practice. Nonetheless, whereas this study identifies six dominant paradigms in the urban South’s housing arena, they should be treated with caution. Even though clear distinctions are possible analytically, in practice and empirically, there could be hundreds of paradigms with less sharp and ‘pure’ peculiarities among them. Probably arising from the evolutionary nature of the paradigm shifts in the urban South’s housing arena, dissimilar rates of uptake and differences between individual paradigms, an actor might subscribe to elements of more than one paradigm, or some characteristics of one paradigm might be applicable to parts of other paradigms in practice. Certainly, paradigmatic features in actors and society may not be readily apparent or explicitly displayed, and thus hard to observe. This necessitates the creation of an analytical tool that can facilitate uncovering the features and implications of the paradigms; especially the deep-seated unconscious ones.

Paradigms are based on simplifying assumptions, as actors attempt to understand and control their environments by fitting what they observe into a pattern that can help them develop their thoughts. This involves abstracting from the details to develop frameworks that can enable them to understand the complexities of the real world and reflect them in their day to day understanding, practices, and processes. Hence paradigms comprise the frameworks that structure actors’ thinking and serve as
‘cognitive maps’ that help the actors to organise reality and to make sense out of a multitude of phenomena the actors are confronted with. Paradigms mainly consist of a set of basic assumptions that are made as well as required by a given set of theories; thus theories, experiments, laws, and generalisations are made in support of the paradigms, but also new ones are formulated due to the paradigms; in a self reinforcing loop, that probably contributes to the persistence of paradigms despite their anomalies. Hence, paradigm shifts may occur when those basic assumptions get challenged and rejected, necessitating new assumptions and theories to be created for the purpose of understanding the same phenomena. Since paradigm shifts indicate radical transformation in attitude at various societal scales, the involved dynamics could be highly crucial in the urban South crisis; and need to be adequately appreciated and engaged with. In the urban South’s housing arena, radical shifts in the development, housing and governance triad are observable in both the dominant and individual paradigms, nonetheless the rates of shifts as well as how and why they take place are difficult to discern. Apparently, the only distinctly visible shifts are those of the dominant paradigms, but at other levels the paradigm shifts and subscriptions seem to be shrouded with many unknowns, unacknowledged, and unintended issues.

Furthermore, paradigms could bring together a community of actors by addressing problems and solutions with a joint attitude, yet at the same time, separate those actors with differing attitudes. When a paradigm becomes widely accepted or acknowledged, it might rise to prominence in society and become the dominant paradigm that defines the zeitgeist and other general ideas, movements, and ideologies of that epoch. However, as observed in this study, these dominant paradigms are not usually uniformly or equally accepted and taken up by all the actors, contributing to different paradigms among the actors. Different paradigms encompass different views on ‘social reality’; ‘what is a good society’, and ‘what is good for society’. Therefore, they apply different criteria for determining how society should function, state-society relations and actor relations; thereby resulting in policies and initiatives that are based on different assumptions, goals, institutions, and methods of analysis. There being a plurality of value judgements and causal stories in society, raises the possibility of the existence of various competing paradigms, all of which have different implications for what should be or can be done, prioritised, and achieved. Accordingly, the urban South’s housing arena could be the ‘battleground of ideas’ over which the paradigm concept was most realistic, feasible, and desirable for its effective resolution. Hence, answers to questions associated with development, housing, and governance in the urban South crises are most likely not derived solely from value-free scientific analysis; but could also be dependent on the various involved actors’ perceptions of social reality, assumptions, institutions, and ethical issues; in the formulation, elaboration, and implementation of theories, policies, and initiatives.

The discussions on the urban South’s development-housing-governance issues over the decades clearly indicate that the collective societal knowledge pertaining to the urban South crisis has seemingly been fallible and fickle. However, at the same time the different involved actors seem to have been building their knowledge as well as formulating their theories and solutions mainly on the basis of and within their own paradigms. Indeed Dobb (1975 p 27) observed that “one’s view of the
nature of historical change – its structure, sequence and causal mechanism – will colour one’s view of the permitted limits and permissible forms of generalisations”. Thus the actors are predisposed to navigate towards certain paradigms and not others. Since paradigms embody certain sets of values, visions of reality, and methodologies; actors tend to build up their knowledge mainly within their paradigms, which in turn influence the actors’ actions, interactions, and relations with other actors (Dow, 2002). These raise the possibility of there being multiple competing paradigms in any time and space, built upon totally different assumptions, visions of reality, and values, and based on different methodologies. Furthermore, attention is focused towards certain phenomena and away from others; in addition to paradigms being personal and drawing actors either together or asunder with similar or diverse world views and different models of reality.

As observed in this study, each paradigm involves different theories and criteria for determining how society should function, the role of the state, the responsibilities of the citizens, ‘target groups’, and all other involved actors; among other issues. These paradigms embody given sets of ideologies, frames of reference, approaches, and methodologies; based on certain values, visions of reality as well as basic assumptions concerning what a ‘good’ society is and the ‘best’ way to achieve it. Nonetheless, the issues surrounding the urban South crisis are ever changing, and theorising often requires abstraction. Hence building knowledge in the triad of development, housing, and governance involves substantial value judgments, and is not simply a straightforward matter of applying an agreed logic to an agreed set of facts; but, that ideology and therefore, paradigmatic subscriptions of the actors, takes on great importance. Paradigms consist of a synthesis of both scientific and non-scientific analysis providing problems and solutions to a group of actors who share and subscribe to the beliefs, values and techniques of that very paradigm, creating a self reinforcing loop. Dobb (1975) illustrated that in actual development of theory, the ‘positive’ and the ‘normative’ elements tended to fuse and had proved hard to separate. Similarly, from the same set of situations and circumstance, different paradigms told different stories, with different implications of the meaning of the situations and the appropriate actions to be taken or not. Accordingly, the urban South crisis and solutions involved a ‘battle of ideas’ in theory and practice focusing on which paradigm was most appropriate; with different paradigms competing for supremacy at any given time and space in the arena. All these are of critical consequence for understanding and resolving the urban South crisis. Indeed, awareness of these paradigmatic issues could facilitate the better interpretation and understanding of the often less clear sources of disagreements, misunderstandings, and lack of common ground prevalent in the urban South’s housing arena, amongst other numerous complexities involved which have inevitably contributed to the ineffectiveness and failure of solutions as well as the perpetuation of the urban South housing crisis.
Table 13: Paradigm shifts in Urban South development-housing-governance triad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusivism</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Privilege-Order</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation</td>
<td>Representativ</td>
<td>Modernity-Progress</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Standard housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Needs</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Equity-Basic need</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Site-Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Free market-Commodity</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Enablement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainabilism</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Common Future-Sustainability</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Integrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governism</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Democracy-Pact</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Wide partnerships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: Paradigm shifts in Urban South development-housing-governance triad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm &amp; decade of dominance</th>
<th>Development orthodoxy</th>
<th>Housing Approaches</th>
<th>Governance in Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Govt Role</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusivism 1950s</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisationism 1960s</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Needs 1970s</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Donations</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism 1980s</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainabilism 1990s</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governism 2000s</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Civic engage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Structuration in the urban South housing arena

From the discussions concerning the urban South housing crisis and its prescribed solutions through various triads of development, housing and governance approaches along with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions; the role of the involved actors’ interactions alongside the contextualities of those interactions, emerge as very critical features. In view of the multitude of interested actors and decades of several unsuccessful approaches coupled with shifts in dominant paradigms as well as the possible presence of multiple paradigms, the urban South arena involves extreme paradoxes, complexities and contradictions that could be playing a significant role in the urban South crisis. There are seemingly numerous hidden, underlying, unacknowledged conditions that influence the interactions, as well as many unintended consequences from those interactions. Accordingly, this study applies elements of ‘Structuration theory’ (Giddens, 1971, Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1993a) to examine these issues, in addition to providing a theoretical thread that binds the three critical themes of the urban South’s development, housing, and governance, besides their encompassing paradigmatic dimensions. The critical themes involve issues of structure and agency in the arena. Thus the theory is applied to explore various structure-agency questions including the surrounding material and discursive issues in the arena; in addition to their implications to both theory and practice in the understanding and resolution of the urban South crisis; as well as the effectiveness of initiatives and actors’ interrelations. The theory’s concept of ‘the duality of structure’ offers perspectives on human behaviour based on a synthesis of structure and agency effects. This enables the exploration of not only the social order and the patterning of human behaviour across space and time, but also the ways structures are created, maintained, and modified through interactions. Consequently, Structuration theory becomes the basis of this study’s conceptual, analytical, and interpretational framework.

Figure 13: Structuration model: the mutual constitution of structure and agency

6.1. Structuration theory: Duality of structure and agency

Structuration theory posits that human behaviour and social structures are intertwined. Social structures are both the medium and the outcome of human actions. Human actions (re)produce social structures which simultaneously enable and constrain those actions; restricting certain elements of those actions, but also creating possibilities for other elements. Hence structures exist both externally as the manifestation of social actions, and internally within agents as memory traces (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b, Stones, 2005). In contrast to the theories which on the one hand posit the pre-eminence of structure such as structuralism, functionalism, and objectivism stressing on holism and macro-level phenomena, (Marx, 1975, Kant, 1998, Parsons et al., 2001, Koffka, 2013, Durkheim, 2014); and on the other hand theories positing the pre-eminence of agency such as methodological
individualism, social phenomenology, interactionism, and ethnomethodology stressing voluntarist and micro-level phenomena (Schutz, 1967, Garfinkel, 1984, Heidegger, 1988, Mises, 1989, Mead, 2009). Structuration theory is based on the concept of ‘the duality of structure’ which does not give pre-eminence to either structure or agency (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, McAnulla, 1998).

According to the concept of ‘the duality of structure’, structure and agency were not a ‘dualism’ of two distinct competitive or mutually exclusive entities, but a ‘duality’ of consisting divergent aspects of the same reality. Structure and agency did not represent different phenomena, rather structure and agency were mutually constitutive, dependent, intertwined and internally related phenomena representing two sides of the same coin; and having equal ontological status. Structure and agency were a duality that could not be conceived separately. Without structures to shape motives into practices there cannot be agency, and without the routine practices to create them there cannot be structures (Giddens, 1971, Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1993a). Even though the actors encounter the structures as restrictions and facilitation, these actors through their actions create, recreate, maintain, and modify those structures; “the structural properties of social systems exist only insofar as forms of social conduct are reproduced chronically across time and space” (Giddens, 1984b p xxi). Thus structure was not just some external form or a given; whereas structure gave shape and form to social life, it was not itself the shape and form; rather structure existed only in and through human interactions. Correspondingly, agency was not just a phenomenon ‘contained’ within the individuals, neither was it their intentions in doing things; rather agency was the flow or pattern of human interactions, conditioned by the existing structures, but also creating and recreating those structures through the enactment process (Giddens, 1984b, Walsham and Han, 1991, Giddens and Pierson, 1998). Thus even though actors were not fully knowledgeable nor entirely free to choose their own actions, it was their actions that recreated and modified structure. Even though structure existed only through agency, it was structure that enabled or constrained that agency. Hence the actors were situated, although not clueless, as they had a degree of self-awareness and reflexivity that allowed them both to influence and be influenced by the structures, as well as to varying degrees be conscious of their emplacement (Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1993a). Although actors were conditioned by structures, these structures were reinforced when actors acted in a compliant manner, or were modified when they acted outside the structures’ constraints through the exercise of reflexivity. Thus structures, being that they were socially constructed, lacked inherent stability outside of human action. As a consequence, the capacity of human action was not solely a function of societal constraining stable structures, nor solely an individual’s expression of will, but a dynamic relationship between the two. Hence theories focusing either on structure or agency alone cannot fully explain social action. Consequently, Giddens (1984) contends that since structure and agency are recursive, the most crucial societal element to be examined “is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time” (Giddens, 1984b pp 2); especially as encapsulated by the concept of ‘the duality of structure’. Accordingly, with the actors’ autonomy being influenced by structures, and structures being maintained by actors exercising agency; Giddens (1984b) terms the interface at which actors meet structures ‘Structuration’.
Structuration theory therefore, is an attempt to transcend the dualism of structure and agency towards the ‘duality of structure’; elucidating the close interrelationship between them by positing the concept of ‘mutual constitution of structure and agency’. The theory was conceived as "an exercise in clarification of logical issues" (Giddens, 1993a p viii) critically engaging and combining the best of agency and structure approaches towards an all-encompassing approach. Hence, this critical and grand theory drew simultaneously on functionalism and phenomenology tenets, endeavouring to bridge the gap between the static-objective-deterministic notions of structure and the dynamic-subjective-voluntaristic notions of agency, by focusing attention on the points of intersection between those two divergent notions. Consequently, the theory attempts to bridge the dualism between macro/micro, holism/atomism, socialisation/autonomy and objectivism/subjectivism, among others; towards providing an understanding of human social behaviour by resolving the competing views of structure-agency. Indeed, according to Giddens (1984b), Structuration theory is an ‘extended reflection’ upon Karl Marx’s phrase that “Men [human beings] create history, but not in circumstances of their own” (Marx, 2008). On this basis, Giddens (1984) defines ‘Structuration’ as being the ways in which social systems are produced and reproduced in social interaction; “the structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure” (Giddens, 1984b p 376); and the “conditions governing the continuity or transmutation of structures, and therefore, the reproduction of social systems” (Giddens, 1984b p 25). Hence the structures that actors use to accomplish their intentions are not static, but reflect the work of situated actors who constantly monitor and adapt their behaviour. Consequently, Structuration theory can serve as a heuristic and logical conceptual model of human behaviour and action. The theory, offers a model of viewing societal structures and all other involved societal issues, as being constantly reshaped by the involved actors’ interactions, with the meanings, values, and resources they use; as much as the structures conditioning those interactions.

As follows, being that human practices are recursive, individual actors through their actions and interactions, create their consciousness and the structural conditions that make those actions and interactions possible. This is because human actors are knowledgeable and reflectively monitor their actions and structural conditions. They develop routines which would enable them to deal efficiently with societal issues and provide them with a sense of security; with their motives providing the overall plan of action and their routine practices determining the shape those actions will take. Inasmuch as actors can shape their own actions, some of the consequences of their actions are often unintended; especially the reconstitution of structure. Moreover, the structures which are both constraining and enabling, give the social practices a systemic form; given that a social system is a set of “reproduced relations between actors or collectivises, organized as regular social practices” (Giddens, 1984b p 25). Correspondingly, “human actors are not only able to monitor their activities and those of others in the regularity of day-to-day conduct; they are also able to ‘monitor that monitoring’ in discursive consciousness” (Giddens, 1984b p 29). Hence, examining societal features involves the ‘double hermeneutic’, since human actors can make choices and revise their understandings, worldviews, and practices, using new information they receives which “very often enter constitutively into the world they describe” (Giddens, 1987 p 20).
Accordingly, in Structuration theory, three dimensions of ‘structure’ are identified, firstly, *signification*, where meaning is coded in the practice of language and discourse; secondly, *domination* which is concerned with how power is applied, particularly in the control of resources; and thirdly, *legitimation* consisting of the normative perspectives embedded as societal norms and values. However, owing to the ‘duality of structure’, these three dimensions of structure are only realised through human ‘interaction’ as *communication, power, and sanction* respectively. To link the realms of structure and interaction are the modalities of *interpretative scheme, facility, and norm*; through which structures enable and constrain interactions, and through which the interactions and the structures are recreated, maintained or modified (Giddens, 1984b). Nevertheless, the separation of these dimensions is purely analytical and not ontological or substantive, since in practice they are intrinsically and inextricably linked and interdependent; since, in the course of interactions, “meaning, normative elements and power” are interlaced (Giddens, 1984b pp 28-29).

6.2. Structures

In Structuration theory, structures are the rules and resources that constrain and enable action. They are "sets of chronically reproduced, deeply sedimented rules and resources that constrain and facilitate social actions". Furthermore, they also "bind social actions in time and space so that more or less systematic action patterns come to be generated and reproduced", serving as mental maps in the heads of social actors (Giddens, 1984b, Jessop, 2001). Consequently, social structures are not the patterns of action, but are the principles that generate action (Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992); they are "sets of transformation relations, organised as properties of social systems" (Giddens, 1984b p 25). Structures are therefore, the rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of those social systems; with structures existing only as ‘memory traces’ and ‘as instantiated in action’. Hence structures exist only in what the individual actors know and how they put them into practice; with the structures being 'virtual', existing not in the practice but outside the practice; guiding rules for interactions (Giddens, 1984b p 377). The rules i.e. "generalisable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practice" (Giddens, 1984b p 20), guide the actors’ behaviour consciously and unconsciously, allowing the actors to deal with new situations and incorporate them into the existing situations, practices and other rules. On the one hand, rules are more than just implicit formulas, recipes, and guides for action and interactions ‘on how to play the game’ or ‘get on’ in and with life; they “are 'methodical procedures' of social interaction” that relate to “the constitution of meaning” and “the sanctioning of modes of social conduct” (Giddens, 1984b pp 17-18). On the other hand, structures as resources involve which and how resources are deployed to generate forces of domination and submission (Marx, 1975, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992). Nevertheless the rules and resources are inextricably linked as ‘rules and resource sets’, since particular types of resources require specific rules to activate them and those rules become only observable in practice through the use of those particular resources (Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1991a, Sewell, 1992, Giddens and Pierson, 1998). Thus, structures as rules comprise normative elements and codes of signification, while structures as resources comprise authoritative and allocative aspects.
Accordingly, in structuration theory, three dimensions of structure are identified namely: *signification, domination, and legitimation.*

Signification entails a system of semantic rules and codes by which meaning is produced through organised webs of language, interpretative rules, symbolic orders, and modes of discourse. Hence signification constrains/enables actors to make certain sense (meaning) of the context of their interactions and to communicate that sense to other mutual actors (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b, Sydow and Windeler, 1998). These meanings provide regulative and interpretative rules on social conduct and resources of authority, generating particular interpretations of reality that allow the actors to understand/misunderstand the conduct of other actors. Thus, even though signification enables and constrains communication, signification is continuously produced, reproduced or modified through communication. However, these meanings may not be necessarily understood or shared by all actors raising the possibility of the existence of multiple dissimilar structures in any given context among the involved actors (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992, Bryant and Jary, 1997).

Domination entails the application and production of power, both ‘for’ and ‘from’ the control of resources. It is also related to resource authorisation and allocation as well as political and economic institutional orders. "Structures of domination involve asymmetries of resources employed in sustaining power relations in and between systems of interactions" (Giddens, 1979). Thus domination arises from (and causes) unequally distributed resources that shape the nature and conduct of agents through inducement and coercion, producing (resulting from) relations of autonomy and dependence. Domination enables/constrains the generation of the transformative capacity of resources such as power, by which certain actors can secure outcomes whose realisation depends on the agency of other actors; making the other actors comply with their wants, and act in a certain way. These actors ‘would have acted otherwise’ had that particular domination structure and its constituent power not been exercised (Giddens, 1979). Thus domination conveys messages about the degree of power an actor may wield during a given interaction moment and with which resources. However, domination is not about ‘will’ or ‘intentions’; all actors exercise power even without intending or wanting to do so. Hence, Giddens (1984) asserts that all interactions in society entail domination; the most autonomous agent has some degree of dependence, and the most dependent retains some autonomy. Thus domination entails several aspects such as the mobilisation of resources, its methods of mobilisation, tolerance of how much power may be wielded, and others which may differ amongst the actors leading to the existence of multiple structures in any given context (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992, Bryant and Jary, 1997).

Legitimation comprises methodological procedures for governing human behaviour. These entail normative perspectives embedded as societal norms and values, as well as normative regulation and legal institutional orders. Hence, legitimation involves “the actualisation of rights and the enactment of obligations” (Giddens, 1979 p 86), besides the involved ‘rewards and punishments’. These include value consensus, legal institutions, justifications and the rationale for undertaking certain actions as well as other normative constitutions that actors draw on to endorse, authorise, sanction, justify or
condemn their actions and those of others (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b). Legitimation stipulates and enables/constrains which norms, rewards and punishments should be applied by a particular actor in a given interaction setting and situation; and how these should be applied i.e. sanctioned in the interactions. However, it is through this sanctioning that actors monitor their actions and those of other mutual actors on the basis of certain norms, whether or not an action is considered legitimate; thereby maintaining or transforming the legitimation structure. Thus, legitimation produces moral order via norms in the course of sanctioning interactions, and sanctions via those norms produce legitimation (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997). Each legitimation structure has its own designations of what is ‘proper’ or appropriate conduct, procedure and other normative expectations, with the accompanying sanctions for any given actor and setting. Thus legitimation, is both moral guidance and justification concerning what should count as important or should be trivialised, what ought/ought not to happen, and which actors can/cannot hold which actors accountable for their actions (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997). Accordingly, legitimation is the ‘normative constitution of interaction’ involving expectations and evaluations of what an actor can/cannot do, should/should not do, and with/without whom; and their being differences in this among actors, raises the possibility of the existence of a multiplicity of legitimation structures in any given setting; just as the structures of signification and domination (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992, Bryant and Jary, 1997).

Nevertheless, all these three structures in society and interactions are intrinsically and intricately linked. Any given form of legitimation would require a certain domination to empower it, and particular forms of signification for it to be understood and conveyed in society and among the involved actors; and the same goes for any given form of signification and domination (Giddens, 1976, Archer, 1982, Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997).

6.3. Modalities

Modalities mediate between the realm structure (virtual) and interaction (situated). Structuration theory focuses on the area of intersection between structure and agency and their mutual constitution through their enactments (Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997). With ‘the duality of structure’ being the central argument of the theory, modalities are of critical importance since the ‘process of Structuration’ is the linkage between the realms of social structure and human action; the process by which the duality of structure evolves and is reproduced over time and space. This process is realised through modalities (Giddens, 1984b, McLennan, 1997). Hence, modalities “serve to clarify the main dimensions of the duality of structure in interaction; relating the knowledgeable capacities of agents to structural features” (Giddens, 1984b p 28). It is through modalities that structures enable and constrain the interactions of actors and also through modalities that those interactions produce, reproduce or modify those structures; since “actors draw upon the modalities of Structuration in the reproduction of systems of interaction, by the same token reconstituting their structural properties” (Giddens, 1984b p 28). Modalities are therefore, the media for the (re)production of both structure and interaction which enable either the repetition of patterns of practice that maintain structures, or variations in practice that modify the structures through the three modalities: interpretive schemes, resources and norms. These
Interpretive schemes are standardised shared stocks of knowledge that actors draw on reflexively to interpret actions, behaviour, situations, and events, so as to achieve meaningful interaction and sustain communications. Interpretative schemes are “the modes of typification incorporated within actors' stocks of knowledge” (Giddens, 1984b p 29); “the core of mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe is sustained” (Giddens, 1979 pp. 83); and mutual "stocks of knowledge" that mediate communication. These include semantic codes, discursive practices, knowledge, assumptions, or expectations concerning situations in question. Hence, by means of interpretative schemes, “actors sustain the meaning of what they say and do, through routinely incorporating 'what went before' and anticipations of 'what will come next' into the present of an encounter” (Giddens, 1979 p 84).

Consequently, interpretative schemes not only enable (and constrain) communication, but in drawing on interpretive schemes, actors reproduce or modify the structures of signification (Giddens, 1984b, Elliott, 2013).

Facilities or resources are the means through which intentions are realised, goals are accomplished, and power is exercised; the “media whereby transformative capacity is employed as power in the routine course of social interaction” (Giddens, 1979 p 92). Facilities are the capabilities that actors bring into interactions to alter their course and attain certain outcomes, making themselves and other actors ‘act otherwise’. Giddens (1984) asserts that in all interaction situations, some actors have more facilities than others hence, domination and power relations are sustained by these asymmetries in the distribution of resources in society. These asymmetries also grant actors the ability to sanction the others. Facilities are distinguished conceptually as either ‘authoritative’ or ‘allocative’ resources. Authoritative resources are non-material capabilities or transformative capacities that generate command over human agents and harness the activities of human beings. These entail firstly, the ability to organise social time-space, the socio-spatial interactions, or the temporal-spatial constitution of paths and regions; secondly, the control over the production/reproduction of the body as well as the organisation and relations of actors in mutual associations; and thirdly, the control over life chances and the potential for self-development and self-expression (Giddens, 1984b p 258). These resources arise from (and reinforces) domination of some actors over others. Allocative resources are capabilities or forms of transformative capacity generating command over objects, goods, physical artefacts, or material phenomena. These entail firstly, material features of the environment such as raw material and energy sources; secondly, means of material (re)production through technology, instruments and machines; and thirdly, the produced goods created by the first two (Giddens, 1984b p 258). Nonetheless, even though these phenomena might seem to have a ‘real existence’ due to their ‘materiality’, they only become resources when incorporated within Structuration processes. Their transformational character is bound to meaning and normative sanctions, while facilities are thus focused via signification and legitimation (Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997). Facilities when used in interactions generate power “involving the reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence
in social interaction” (Giddens, 1979 p 93). Hence, actors draw upon facilities to wield power during interaction, but in doing so, structures of power and control (domination) are reproduced or modified. Consequently, facilities enable (and constrain) the exercise of power, as well as the reproduction and modification of structures of domination (Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1991, Orlikowski and Robey, 1991, Bryant and Jary, 1997, Orlikowski, 2008).

Norms are “rules of conduct which specify appropriate behaviour in a given range of social contexts” (Giddens, 1997a p 583). They prescribe acceptable/unacceptable, appropriate/inappropriate, or normal/abnormal behaviour, backed by varying degrees of sanctions. Thus they are the rules governing sanctioned or appropriate conduct and define the legitimacy of interaction within a setting’s moral order. Norms are adapted according to particular settings and for different actors, since they typically involve reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of conduct (Giddens, 1984b). Norms entail “the actualization of rights and enactment of obligations” (Giddens, 1976 p 86); depicting the “ought to do” to actors by prescribing how they ought to behave in particular situations, as well as providing the actors normative grounds to justify their actions and be accountable for them. These include customs, traditions and values embedded in interaction contexts that impose restrictions (or permissions) upon human agency so as to accomplish societal goals. Nevertheless strongly sanctioned societal norms may result in actors who do not really ‘believe’ in them, leading to ‘playing roles’. This can lead to a situation where ‘official’ formal norms are laid out publicly but not followed; instead the actors in practice only adhere to informal norms that reflect the actors beliefs which may vary radically from the formal ones. These inconsistencies may operate unconsciously ‘behind the backs/below the surface’ of purposive human agents. Thus, whereas norms provide ‘factual’ boundaries to interactions, what the actors do may vary radically from the norms and other reasons they offer discursively (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Cassel, 1993). Hence, the enactment of norms is dependent on the communication of meaning and power relations as well as all the other elements of Structuration (Giddens, 1984b, Orlikowski, 2008). The actors draw upon norms to sanction their actions and those of other actors during interactions, but in doing so, the structures of morality, rationale and ‘moral rules’ (legitimation) are reproduced or modified. Consequently, facilities’ norms enable (and constrain) action through their invocation in interaction through sanctions, as well as the reproduction and modification of structures of legitimation.

In sum, all these three modalities which are intrinsically interconnected, on the one hand, determine how the institutional properties of social systems (structures) influence human action by affecting how the actors communicate, enact power and determine what behaviours to sanction and reward. On the other hand, the modalities also determine how human action constitutes social structure when structured social practices are institutionalised; as they become deeply embedded in time and expand in space and therefore become acknowledged widely by actors. Through modalities actors produce, maintain, and modify the structures of signification, domination, and legitimation. Hence the modalities are the fulcrum all societal Structuration processes (Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997, Stones, 2005, Elliott, 2013, Roberts, 2014). Actors draw upon the modalities in the production of interaction, but at the same time the modalities are the media of the reproduction of structures. Through modalities
the institutionalisation of socially constructed order is achieved in which a frame of mutual meanings can be communicated, a system of authority, control and power established, and a moral code of conduct and rationale recognised. These encompass enactment processes by which actors constitute their environments, ‘see things’ and define situations; make sense of those situations by constructing certain meaning, understanding, and frames; and select structures which make sense in the particular setting. However the use of various modalities, with different meanings, power and values raised the possibility of multiple interpretations of the same event (equivocality) and therefore, multiplicity of structures (Giddens, 1984b, Weick, 1995, Bryant and Jary, 1997, Stones, 2005, Elliott, 2013, Roberts, 2014). As a consequence, since structure and agency are a mutually interacting duality, the three modalities are the locus of interaction between the knowledgeable capacities of actors and the structural features of social systems.

6.4. Interactions

Interactions are the human agents’ activities within the social system, “the fitful yet routinized occurrence of encounters, fading away in time and space, yet constantly reconstituted within different areas of time-space” (Giddens, 1984b p 86). Hence, all interactions are situated, occurring in a specific *contextuality*, i.e. “the situated character of interaction in time-space, involving the setting of interaction, co-present actors and the communication between them” (Giddens, 1984b p 373). Thus interactions entail not only the mix of actors present and their communication, but also the time, situation, and physical character of activity setting. Hence time-space relations are not just ‘boundaries’ to the actors’ social activities, rather they are fundamental to the way these social activities are structured and regionalised in time (historically) and space (geographically). Hence interactions can be face to face, or faceless over vast distances and time (Giddens, 1979, Bryant and Jary, 1991, Giddens, 1991a). Whereas interactions are the means by which social structures of meaning, power, and values are constituted and modified; the interactions are enabled or constrained by those social structures; which define, empower and justify them. Thus three dimensions of human interaction are identified namely: *communication*, *power*, and *sanction*; which characterise all actualised human actions (Giddens, 1971, Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989).

Communication entails “a basis for understanding and bridging experiences, a way of creating social reality” (Giddens, 1976 p 57). Communication involves conditioned (enabled or constrained) structures of signification. Actors draw upon rules of signification and reflexively apply stocks of knowledge (interpretative schemes) to make sense of their own and others’ actions, and to convey this meaning to others; thereby producing, reproducing or modifying the structures of meaning (signification) (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b). This involves verbal and nonverbal transmission of information in face to face encounters as well as over vast distances across space; by which actors make accounts of and offer reasons for their actions, and at the same time acquire and transform information they require interact. These may include facts, skills, ideas, opinions, justifications, emotions, intentions, expectations, commands, threats, and encouragements, just to mention a few. Hence power relations and sanctions are conveyed to other actors through communication, but they also determine the content and form of the communication. Thus the meaningful, relational and normative contents are
conveyed between actors, “through routinely incorporating both ‘what went before’ and anticipations of ‘what will come next’ into the present of an encounter” which involves knowledgeability and reflexivity (Giddens, 1979 p 84). Through ‘double hermeneutics’ actors reflexively incorporate new information to revise their understandings, meanings and communication, thereby producing changes in codification from their own and others perspectives. In this way, they deal with distinctions between meaningful information and uncertainty (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992). Nonetheless, communication is more than just explicit intentional transmission of messages, it involves all those processes by which actors influence one another, involving understanding and misunderstanding with numerous intended and unintended consequences (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b). Hence, communication still takes place even in the absence of intent and also when the intended messages are not conveyed, received, or understood and are therefore, misconstrued. Furthermore, communication is greatly conditioned by contextual factors, such that the same information sets produce very different meanings in different contexts and actor mixes. Communication does not merely happen in time-space, the actors “routinely incorporate temporal and spatial features of encounters in processes of meaning-constitution” (Giddens, 1984b p 29) using that awareness to reflexively control the flow of information and the interaction as a whole. Communication involves signs, myths, and metaphors which presuppose a great deal of common or mutual knowledge between the actors for them to understand each other (Giddens, 1984b). However, at the same time communication transforms those contexts. Consequently, through communication, intended and unintended messages are conveyed involving knowledgeability, contextuality, reflexivity and reciprocity; with many unexpected consequences that define the relationship between actors, their actions, behaviour and interaction forms.

Power both transformative and relational, is firstly, the “capability of the actor to intervene in a series of events so as to alter their course”; the ‘can’ between intentions and realisation of those intentions (Giddens, 1976 pp 117-118); and secondly, the “capability to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others” i.e. some actors exercise power ‘over’ others, resulting in ‘domination’ (Giddens, 1976 p 118). Thus it is the capacity of an actor to effectively decide and alter the courses of events despite the contestation or resistance of others; making the perspectives, interests, or concerns of some actors count more than those of other mutual actors (Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1997b). Being conditioned by the structures of domination, actors draw upon allocative and authoritative resources to wield power, but in exercising that power they maintain or modify those structures of domination. By the duality of structure, power involves individuals not only acting voluntarily to achieve their intentions, but also being structured by systems of domination, meaning, and legitimation. Hence power is not solely the will of individuals, neither are actors passive helpless dupes or ‘docile bodies' who behave like the automata (Giddens, 1984b, Hajer, 1989). Power is dependent on signification and legitimation, as different meanings and values will radically alter the power relations (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989). Furthermore, the magnitude of power accruing from a given set of resources will vary significantly depending upon the contextuality (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b). Conversely, power “manifests the capabilities of actors to make certain ‘accounts count’ [i.e. signification] and to enact or resist sanctioning processes [i.e. legitimation]” with these
capabilities being drawn upon the modes of domination (Giddens, 1979 p 83). Moreover, exercise of power can also radically transform the contextualities. Hence power is a process in which actors routinely construct, maintain or transform their relations. As a consequence, power is not a possession or a resource, it is a dynamic, processual, relational force that can only be affirmed and executed in interactions. It is not about ‘who’ has the power, but ‘how’ the involved actors employ the resources they have access to during interactions to cause themselves and others to ‘act otherwise’ (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989, Hillier, 2002). Power is not about some actors having predetermined control or intent over others, but all actors at any given time can exercise a range of causal powers and be able to ‘make a difference’. Even when their actions are severely restricted, they always have a sense of ‘they could have done otherwise’. No matter how oppressive sanctions can be, they always “demand some kind of acquiescence from those subject to them” (Giddens, 1984b p 175). Hence compliance (or outward signs of compliance) in oppressive situations often results from a rational assessment of the situation, possible alternatives and consequences. Thus the exercise of power involves a two-way relationship that expresses autonomy and dependence in both directions; a ‘dialectic of control’, “the two-way character of the distributive aspect of power; how the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established power relationships” (Giddens, 1984b p 374).

All interactions across time and space, from the micro- and macro-levels, from mundane levels of everyday interactions to the global level of cultures and ideologies involve power. Power is an inseparable part of every social interaction and integral to all action. Agency implies power, since agency is not the ‘intentions’ of actors to do things but “their capability of doing those things” such that “whatever happened would not have happened” if these actors had not intervened (Giddens, 1984b p 9). Agency means to be able to ‘act otherwise’ by intervening in the world (or refraining to do so); to influence the state of affairs and processes of other actors. Hence, all actors exercise power, since agents cease to be such when they lose that capability to ‘make a difference’ (Giddens, 1984b p 14). Nonetheless, all actors are not equally powerful during interactions due to the asymmetries in access to resources, as well as the different meanings and values attached to the resources that enable or constrain some actors more than others. Hence, power entails a continuum of autonomy and dependence, with both the ‘powerful’ and ‘weak’ being both autonomous and dependent on each other; which involves dialectics of constraint and enablement (Giddens, 1984b, Davis, 1988). Thus, “one person's constraint is another's enabling”(Giddens, 1984b p 176), and power can be both an obstacle to freedom, but also the medium for emancipation. Nevertheless, power should not be thought of only in terms of asymmetries of distribution but should be recognised as being inherent in all human action. “Power is not intrinsically connected to the achievement of sectional interests”, but is present in interactions (Giddens, 1984b pp 15-16).

Sanctions are reactions by actors towards the behaviour of others and themselves; thus are aimed at ensuring that the involved norms are complied with during interactions (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Cassel, 1993). All social interactions involve sanctions for encouraging conformity and guarding against deviance and non-conformity to societal norms (moral/normative sanctions), as well
as checking against the failure of achieving desired outcomes (utilitarian sanctions). ‘Statistical’ sanctions guard against uncommon behaviour; ‘relative’ sanctions are dependent on the context, while ‘absolutist’ are negatively sanctioned across all societies and ‘reactivist’ involve labelling through power by which particular actors label others’ actions and actors as being deviant, while their own remain legitimate (Giddens and Dallmayr, 1982, Giddens and Held, 1982, Giddens, 1990, Bryant and Jary, 1991, Giddens, 1993b). Hence, sanctions are “mode[s] of reward or punishment that reinforce socially expected forms of behaviour” (Giddens, 1997 ap 761) by which actors being conditioned by structures of legitimation, draw upon norms to reflectively monitor and justify their own conduct and that of others ‘encouraging’ appropriate behaviour in the contexts they interact in; but in doing so, reproduce or modify the structures of legitimation (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1997a, Cohen, 2000a). Thus sanctions are felt as coercion or encouragement. Positive sanctions entail rewards and incentive for conformity to encourage certain behaviour, while negative sanctions involve punishment for nonconformity, discouragement for certain behaviour or coercion towards conformity. Depending on the resources mobilised, sanctions can be ‘internal’, involving elements of the actor’s personality such as peace, fulfilment, fear and guilt; or ‘external’, drawing upon features of the interaction context such as appreciative smiles, inducements, ridicule and violence (Giddens and Dallmayr, 1982, Giddens and Held, 1982, Cassel, 1993). Sanctions entail pursuit of ontological security that involves an actor sustaining a certain ‘positive/negative’ view of one’s self, others and the context, and guarding against chaos, anxiety, and anything that threatens the ‘normal’ including protecting the actors’ identities, social roles, and positions. Thus sanction as a basic anxiety-controlling mechanism helps to sustain routines, the ‘normal’ and normative actions. Through sanctioning “a sense of trust or ontological security is sustained in the daily activities of social life” (Giddens, 1984b p xxiii). By the duality of structures, the deployment of sanctions is contingent upon the structures of signification (interpretive and communication) for definition, codification, and transmission; and upon domination (power and resource) for rewarding, punishing, coercing or encouraging. Concurrently, asymmetries in power and resources are expressed through sanctions and domination is mainly about who can sanction who in a particular way; while norms constitute the stocks of knowledge (interpretative schemes) drawn upon for communication and signification. Sanctions comprise enablement as well as constraint. Any given sanction can constrain some actors but enable others. It can also constrain actors in one context, but enable the same actors in another; “placing limits upon the range of options open to an actor” depending on the contextuality (Giddens, 1984b p 176). In this way, sanctions form a ‘barrier’ that separates those to be engaged from those to be excluded, as well as defining actors’ identities as each actor is subjected to a particular range or ‘category of relevant’ sanctions (Giddens, 1984b, Cassel, 1993). Consequently, through sanctions, knowledgeable’ actors draw upon rules of legitimation and reflexively apply norms created, maintained, or modified by a certain normative constitution in their interaction settings and society at large.

Nonetheless, even though there are three interaction forms that are identified analytically, in the real world it is not possible to separate them, and any interaction form simultaneously involves the others; for instance, any communication entails power and sanctions. Moreover, any interaction form in actuality carries with it particular types of all the nine Structuration elements. Indeed, structures and
Modalities are virtual and are only actualised and given real existence through interactions (Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992, Cohen, 2000a). Thus interactions become very critical elements in any examination and attempts towards understanding the constitution of society, its problems, and relevant solutions.

Table 15: Structuration elements

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements</th>
<th>Structurationist descriptions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Signification: Semantic rules, codes through which meaning is produced</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domination: Asymmetries in power relations/resources related to inducement and coercion; politico-economic institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legitimation: Value consensus, legal institutions, justification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Interpretive scheme: The modes of typification incorporated within actors' stocks of knowledge for sustaining communication</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Facility: The command over people (authoritative) and material resources (allocative)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Norms: Customary rules a group uses to regulate appropriate and inappropriate behaviour</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Communication: Way of decision-making and conveying information amidst asymmetries</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Power relations: Exercising capacity to make others to 'act otherwise' based on asymmetries of the resources</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanction: Expressing structural asymmetries of domination, normatively constraining or enabling action</td>
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6.5. Continuum of consciousness

During interactions in any given context, the actors confront the question ‘what is going on here?’; to which they respond either without conscious acknowledgement, on the level of practice, or discursively. Accordingly in Structuration theory interactions entail a continuum consciousness comprising unconscious, practical consciousness and discursive consciousness (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b).

At the unconscious level, the actors are unaware of the reasons for their actions. According to Giddens (1979) the ‘motivation of action’ for the most part dwells in ‘the unconscious’. “The stocks of knowledge applied in the production and reproduction of social life as a skilled activity are largely ‘unconscious’ in so far as social actors can normally only offer a fragmentary account of what they ‘know’ if called upon to do so” (Giddens, 1979 p 40). The unconscious motivations involve cognition and impulsion forms that express the ‘depth’ of the life history of the actor. They also express the actors’ buried desires and needs which predispose them to behave in a particular manner but which are mostly repressed from consciousness and the actors cannot readily give an account of (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989). These motivations arise from the actors’ constant quest for ‘ontological security’ i.e. “confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity” (Giddens, 1984b p 375). Thus the actors can feel secure in the reality they have created and in the fact that everyday actions have some degree of predictability, order and continuity which gives the actors a stable state of mind and meaning in their individual experiences and lives. Furthermore, the actors obtain a ‘sense of trust’ without which they would suffer acute anxiety in their interactions (Giddens, 1984b, Giddens, 1991b, Bryant and Jary, 1997). The quest for ontological security leads to routinisation and regionalisation of interactions such that interactions are predictable and stable over time and ordered in space. Hence, routine becomes “integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, and to the institutions of society, which are as such only through their continued reproduction” (Giddens, 1984b p 60). As a consequence, unconscious motivations lead to routines and recursive interactions that reproduce and maintain structures.
At the practical consciousness level, the actors have the ‘know-how’; they know what to do but they cannot put it in words. This “consists of all the things which actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social life without being able to give them direct discursive expression” (Giddens 1984 p xxiii). The practical consciousness involves tacit knowledge, the actors ‘know more than they can tell’ which if called upon to give an account, they could not express discursively, but would give ‘rationalization’ of their conduct. Through rationalization, actors supply reasons for their activities as the ‘means’ to securing particular outcomes; providing theoretical understanding of their action through teleological reasons aimed at achieving particular ends but not why they discursively undertake the actions (Giddens, 1979, Bryant and Jary, 1997). Through rationalization, the actors “maintain a tacit understanding of what their actions accomplish in social life” (Cohen, 1989 p 50) and become purposive actors. However these actors are not fully aware of the conditions and motivations of their actions. Hence their purposive actions result in both intended and unintended consequences. Nonetheless, mutual knowledge is largely tacit and carried at the practical consciousness level where actors are involved in continuous reflexive monitoring of interactions and engage with societal structures. Thus practical consciousness comprises “the stock of knowledge that one implicitly uses to act in situations and to interpret the actions of others. It is this knowledgability that is constantly used, but rarely articulated, to interpret events – one’s own and those of others” (Turner, 1991 p 531) and to orient themselves to situations. Reflexive monitoring occurs at the level of practical consciousness. Practical consciousness involves knowledgability that actors bring into their day to day interactions which is so integrated that it is hardly noticed. As such tacit knowledge is what is used for the majority of day to day social action with rationalization being used by the actors to 'keep in touch' with the grounds of what they do to achieve their goals (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b). Consequently, it is primarily through their practical consciousness and the rationalization of actions that makes structures as ‘sets of rules, count in the actors’ day-to-day interactions; as actors draw upon structure using modalities to constitute their social practices, and, in so doing reconstitute structure (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989).

At the discursive consciousness level, actors can verbalise their intentions and give reason for what they and other mutual actors do; it encompasses “what actors are able to say or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action; awareness which has a discursive form” (Giddens, 1984b p 374). At this level, when asked to account for their actions, the actors can “elaborate discursively upon those reasons (including lying about them)” (Giddens, 1984b p 3). Thus at the discursive consciousness level, actors can imply reasoning to explain their actions, give justifications and produce discourse that may either sustain or modify the structures and modalities, and lay down conditions for further actions. Discursive consciousness involves the ‘reflexive monitoring of action’ i.e. the faculty which actors’ have of situating their action in relation to themselves and to others, including the actors’ capacity to control the physical and social aspects of their interaction contexts (Giddens, 1984b, Giddens and Pierson, 1998); i.e. monitoring both the behaviours of actors and the settings of interactions, materially and temporally; leading to sense-making and ‘intentionalization’ (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b, Cassel, 1993). Reflexive monitoring of action is therefore, “the purposive or intentional character of human behaviour,
considered within the flow of activity of the agent; action is not a string of discrete acts involving an aggregate of intentions, but a continuous process” (Giddens, 1984b p 376). Furthermore, discursive consciousness involves the ‘reflexive self-regulation’ i.e. “causal loops which have a feedback effect in system reproduction, where that feedback is substantially influenced by knowledge which agents have of the mechanisms of system reproduction; the knowledge which the agents employ to control the system reproduction” (Giddens, 1984b p 376). Hence actors can incorporate their contextuality in their discourses, and be reflexive in making sense of their interactions since according to Giddens (1984 p 18) every actor “is ipso facto a social theorist on the level of discursive consciousness and a ‘methodological specialist’”. Thus the actors not only monitor their actions and those of others, they also ‘monitor that monitoring’ (Giddens, 1984b p 29). Consequently, through discursive consciousness and reflexive monitoring of action, the actors can sustain communication, power relations and deploy sanctions to modify or sustain structures. Furthermore, they can relate their actions to ongoing events and give a coherent account of their actions and the reasons for them; nonetheless, with many unintended consequences.

**Figure 14: Stratification model of consciousness and action**

Unacknowledged conditions of action  
\[ \rightarrow \]  
Reflexive monitoring of action  
Discursive consciousness  
\[ \rightarrow \]  
Rationalization of action  
Practical consciousness  
\[ \rightarrow \]  
Motivation of action  
Unconscious cognitions  
\[ \rightarrow \]  
Unintended consequences of action

Source: Adapted from (Giddens, 1979 p 56, Giddens, 1984b pp 5,7)

In sum, according to Giddens (1976, 1979, 1984b), both the knowledgeability of actors as well as the inherent routine character of most day-to-day activities are established through ongoing and interdependent processes of motivation, rationalization, and reflexive monitoring. First, unconscious motivation of action, i.e. pursuit of ontological security leads to routines and regionalisation of interactions. Second, practical consciousness shapes actors according to societal structures, enabling/constraining them to behave in particular ways, and be able to act in a knowledgeable way in rationalising their actions and applying tacit knowledge towards the realisation of their motives. Third, by discursive consciousness actors reflexively make sense of their interactions and context, and are able to explicitly and discursively express their motivations and actions. Considering that actors are knowledgeable, they can choose to act routinely, knowledgeable, or give an explanation for their actions. They can also choose whether or not to follow established norms of behaviour and thus either reproduce or transform social practices and structures. The level of anxiety the actors experience at the practical and discursive consciousness levels positively relates to the degree to which their day-to-day routines can be disrupted. Critical situations i.e. radical or unpredictable situations that threaten the certitudes of institutionalised routines may lead to the breakdown of those routines. Consequently, actors’ interactions in these three modes of consciousness, under both acknowledged and
unacknowledged conditions of actions, lead to both intended and unintended consequences of actions which include the reproduction or modification of structures; and those consequences may systematically feedback to become conditions for further actions. These represent the actors’ deep seated desires and emotions that provide the guidelines for their actions and interactions, impacting the way they engage in social activities, even as they constantly switch between the different levels of consciousness (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b).

Figure 15: Agency in Structuration

Source (Bryant and Jary, 1997)

6.6. An actor: Interaction as praxis

According to Cohen (1989), Structuration theory follows the praxis approach, whereby social action is composed of enacted conduct and the reproduction of practices and structures. Although the enacted conduct of human actors are influenced by structures as habits and patterns during interactions; the enacted conduct is also the product of reflection and conscious decision-making (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989, Giddens, 1991a). Praxis approaches emphasise the enactment, performance, or production of social action (Goffman, 1974, Garfinkel, 1984). Structuration theory examines the time-space material conditions and environments of interactions that both enable and constrain social action. According to Giddens (1984 p 2) human social activities are recursive and self-reproducing; “they are not brought into being by social actors, but are continually recreated by them via the very means through which they express themselves as actors. In and through their activities, agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible”. In this way, the theory integrates human interactions with the larger societal structures and systems. The theory asserts the reflexivity, flexibility, creativity, and change in interactions by individual actors that presents the possibility of social change (Cohen, 1989). When actors encounter ‘fateful moments’ they make reflections on how to handle the situation not only guided by the actors reflectivity, knowledgeability, abilities, and consciousness, but also by history, the set of experiences, contextual features, and societal structures. Consequently, in Structuration theory the approach to social action, human interaction entails praxis (Cohen, 1989); i.e.
“regular patterns of enacted conduct by active actors who interact with each other in situations in habitual, reflexive, reflective, and more conscious ways” (Gingrich, 2000).

In view of the above, an actor is a situated but not clueless human agent. Actors are knowledgeable, reflective, reflexive, and relational; interacting with other actors at varying levels of consciousness (discursive, practical, unconsciousness); as they reflexively monitor, rationalise and motivate their actions and interactions in varying contextualities. “Human agents or actors - I use these terms interchangeably - have, as an inherent aspect of what they do, the capacity to understand what they do while they do it” (Giddens, 1984b p xxii). The actors draw upon those rules and resources to produce and reproduce social activity, thereby reconstituting or modifying social structures, both intentionally and unintentionally. As such all actors in society have the inherent capacity to communicate, wield power, and sanction their conduct and that of others; such that an actor “ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to ‘make a difference’” (Giddens, 1984b p 14). Thus, according to Giddens (1984), all actors always have a ‘choice’ to act in a given way, no matter how constrained they are; they make choices based on the evaluation of alternatives and their consequences. The actors are competent knowledgeable agents, who know what they are doing when they follow rules; they may choose to follow a rule or not depending on their assessment of the ramifications of either choice; based on their different levels of consciousness (Giddens, 1984b, Onuf, 2012). The actors employ those rules and resources acquired from socialization, experience etc; not in a deterministic manner, but reflexively and knowledgeable, such that the outcomes of their actions are never totally predictable. Thus, actors are never ‘cultural dopes’, or docile bodies' who behave like the automata, but rather they are active participants shaping the rules and resources, by them being knowledgeable, capable and reflexively monitoring their actions. Actors are not just faceless bearers or supports of social structures such as culture or class interests. Rather, they are knowledgeable agents invoking rules and resources in specific contexts, implicating structure in their actions. While actors are entirely free to choose their own actions, and their knowledge is limited, they nonetheless are the agency that reproduces the social structure and leads either to social change or the maintenance of the status quo (Giddens, 1976, Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b). Actors are enabled and constrained by firstly their knowledgeability, i.e. all they know/believe about their action, circumstances and that of mutual actors; and secondly by the unacknowledged conditions and consequences of their activities which they do not know about, that nevertheless influence their actions (Giddens, 1984b). Agents are purposive human actors, with various levels of consciousness of what they do and why they do it, embedded in social contexts (structures) which condition their actions and explanations. Consequently, in contrast to other theories which postulate on the active involvement of non-human ‘actants’ such as artefacts, institutions or organisations as agents, in Structuration theory an ‘agent’ or ‘actor’ refers to an individual human being.

6.7. Critiques, rebuttals and usefulness of Structuration theory

Even though from its inception, Structuration theory has had overwhelming success and acceptance in its numerous applications and adaptations in myriads of studies and various fields, it has also come under intense criticisms (Held and Thompson, 1989, Bryant and Jary, 1997, Stones, 2005). These

First of all, based on it concepts of the ‘duality of structure’, critics have charged that the theory ‘conflates’ structure with agency; i.e. reduces structure to agency and vice versa (Archer, 1982, Layder, 1987, Archer, 1990, Rose, 1998). Structuration theory stresses that structure and agency are mutually dependent and that there is no precedence of one over the other; resolving the dualism between them. However, according to Archer (1990), instead of resolving that dualism between structure and agency, the theory in fact either conflates the two, or retains the very dualism it seeks to transcend: the theory “oscillates between the two divergent images it bestrides-between (a) the hyperactivity of agency, whose corollary is the innate volatility of society, and (b) the rigid coherence of structural properties associated, on the contrary, with the essential recursiveness of social life” (Archer, 1982). Thus, “it is difficult to analyze the way in which structural features may predominate in certain areas at certain times, while the creative and transformative activities of people may come to the fore” (Layder, 2006 p 185). The theory’s emphasis on ‘rational action’ that leaves no conceptual space for passion and desire and the idea of ‘choice’, circumvents the enduring problem of coercion and constraint, giving precedence to agency (subjectivism) at the cost of structure; while routinisation and recursion give precedence to structure, where agents are passive accepters of structural elements (Layder, 1987, Clegg, 1989, Thrift, 1996, Stones, 2005). Consequently, the theory has been charged as either being too voluntaristic or being too deterministic; as well as suffering explanatory weakness in tackling the production of space, historical change, cultural, temporal, and spatial dimensions (Stinchcombe, 1986, Gregory, 1989, Thompson, 1989, Archer, 1990, Taylor, 1993, Thrift, 1996, Layder, 2006). Nonetheless, whereas Structuration theory is mainly concerned with ontology, the critique of conflation actually lies in the epistemological rather than the ontological issues that the theory raises (Barley and Tolbert, 1997, Holt-Jensen, 1999). Socially constructed phenomena are explained in Structuration theory as being constituted through rules and resources which are not simply given, but repeatedly reconstituted. People’s everyday actions reinforce and reproduce a set of expectations which make up the ‘social forces’ and ‘social structures’ (Gauntlett, 2002). “Society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do” (Giddens and Pierson, 1998 p 77). Accordingly, the distinctiveness, intrinsic power, and value of Structuration theory lies in the particular way the theory conceptualises structure and agency without giving a priori primacy to either. The theory emphasises interrelationships and interdependencies between structure and agency and places phenomenology, hermeneutics, and practices as a hinge between these structure and agency (Giddens, 1984b, Bryant and Jary, 1997, Stones, 2005). Consequently, Structuration theory attempts to provide a point of intersection between the two divergent notions of structure and agency, providing a bridge between the macro and micro levels (McAnulla, 1998).
Secondly, Structuration theory has been criticised for eclecticism, extreme expansiveness, abstractness, complexity and contradictions. It has therefore, been perceived as an incoherent mixture of realist, positivist, and idealist arguments that are lacking in epistemology in general as well as comprising a plethora of terminology and concepts with problems in definitional quality. The critics have insisted on the impossibility of bringing together such radically discrepant theoretical traditions in a coherent synthesis, making Structuration theory a ‘syncretic project’ that elevates ambivalence into virtue, with profound political and ethical dangers (Cohen, 1989, Held and Thompson, 1989, Turner, 1991, McLennan, 1997, Mestrovic, 1998, Pozzebon and Pinsonneault, 2005, Nizet, 2010). Nevertheless, the charge of eclecticism has lost its force with time, since currently very few theorists can accurately situate their work under any given single ‘-ism’ or ‘-ology; and in fact inter-disciplinarism and multi-conceptualism are now considered desirable practice (Gregson, 1989, Turner, 1991). Hence, apart from the theory being considered as a serious engagement with Karl Marx’s writings, it has also received positive critiques as being a worthwhile endeavour at transcending the dualism of structure and agency, by combining some of the best agency and structure perspectives into an all-encompassing theory and approach for sociological problems without being overly abstract and obscure (Gane, 1983, Wright, 1989, Sayer, 1990, Bryant and Jary, 1991, Cassel, 1993, Taylor, 1993). Consequently, the theory has been deemed by numerous positive critiques as being relatively successful in the analytical mediations of important but conflicting notions and for providing potentially plausible resolution to several dilemmas besetting the social sciences arena; for instance, by providing a model that allows autonomy to social consciousness within a determined context (Bryant and Jary, 1991, Peet, 1998).

Thirdly, Structuration theory has been criticised for the lack of assumptions and lack of a methodology or methodological guidelines to go about research (Morrow and Brown, 1994, Rose, 1998, Joseph, 2006). Thus the theory has been derided as being just a ‘compilation of concepts’ that are difficult to test empirically and lacking any clear propositions; with an abstract nature and eclectic form making it analytically insufficient to provide empirical utility (Gregson, 1989, Held and Thompson, 1989, Archer, 1990, Turner, 1991, Morrow and Brown, 1994, Rose, 1998, Joseph, 2006). Furthermore, with the foundation of the theory being based on the specifically western, dichotomous constructs of reified individual and society, the application of the theory in non-western contexts has sometimes been considered doubtful (Rapport, 1996, Jordan, 2003). Nonetheless, Structuration theory being a highly abstract ‘grand theory’ and with a meta-perspective on society can be applied in almost any setting, linking the micro to the macro perspectives and from the abstract individuals to the global milieux (Pozzebon and Pinsonneault, 2005, Gregory et al., 2009). Since the theory synthesises several theories into reasonably coherent meta-theory frame, it can serve as a source of an overarching theoretical perspective for integrating multiple or multifaceted issues in diverse time-space contexts at various scales into a coherent framework (Ritzer, 2001, Uto, 2005). As consequence the theory (as a whole, parts of it, or adaptations) has been applied to an exceedingly wide range of studies (Layder, 1994, Hardcastle et al., 2005, Pozzebon and Pinsonneault, 2005, den Hond et al., 2012, van Veenstra et al., 2014). Accordingly, the theory and its concepts can either be used ‘en bloc’ or parts of it selectively, ‘in a spare and critical fashion’; as well as be used as a ‘sensitising device’ for research or
to provide an ‘explication of the logic of research’; providing a means to view the world in a certain way (Giddens, 1989, Giddens, 1990, Bryant and Jary, 1991, Giddens, 1995, Costello, 2013). Hence, the theory can be very useful in examining how embedded structures influence empirical outcomes or events and vice versa. Consequently, Structuration theory can provide a very useful framework for examining and understanding the urban South housing arena; its problems and solutions, especially in aspects involving the reproduction of interactions and social relations as well as the unacknowledged conditions for these interactions and interrelations, and their often unintended consequences which may play a role in the persistence of the urban South crisis.

6.8. Structurationist perspective and the urban South crisis

In view of the foregoing discussions, elements of Structuration theory have been used in this study as a conceptual, analytical, and interpretative framework for examining the urban South housing arena, its crises and prescribed solutions. The aim of this is to obtain a broader appreciation of the involved issues which could probably contribute to the efforts towards a better understanding and a more meaningful and effective resolution of the problems. On the one hand, the theory provides a frame for linking seemingly discrete but related issues in the triad of development, housing, and governance approaches along with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions; as well as the involved actors, interactions, inter-relations and contextualities. On the other hand, the theory provides a frame for analytically separating inherently linked societal and interaction features, for better analysis and interpretation of phenomena. This integration and differentiation of phenomena is very useful especially for uncovering hidden and unacknowledged conditions for actions as well as observing of the unintended consequences of the interactions and linking them back to the actors’ actions, practices and behaviour. All these are aided by the fact that the theory provides a system for categorising and organising data that encompasses the social context of structure and agency from both micro and macro levels, and facilitates the making sense of social practices and meanings, especially those that are hidden and unacknowledged. Furthermore, the theory enables the “methodological ‘insertion’ of the researcher into the material that is the object of study, in several levels - “the hermeneutic elucidation of frames of meaning; investigation of context and form of practical consciousness and (unconsciousness); identification of bounds of knowledgeability; and specification of institutional orders” (Giddens, 1984b p 327) - all with significant conceptual, analytical, and interpretative utility in the South’s crisis.

These aspects firstly, facilitate the uncovering of the nature of the actors’ knowledgeability, their reasons for interacting in a particular manner, how they link theory and practice, therefore, how they manifest structures in their interactions. Secondly, these aspects facilitate comparing what the actors do tacitly, with their rationalisation, and discourses as well as how the actors relate with the time-space and co-present actors. Thirdly, these aspects facilitate identifying the unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences of actions. Fourthly, these aspects facilitate analysis of the conditions and implications of social integration from the micro-level integration of social relations to the macro-level patterning of social systems and vice versa. Moreover, the notion of double hermeneutics is of critical importance to empirical research, interpretation of findings and its applications. Actors who are
subjects of a research, continuously and reflexively incorporate new information in their meanings and communication (Giddens, 1984b). Thus research may involve numerous hermeneutics that encompass the actors’ interpretations of themselves and inter-subjective realities (simple hermeneutics), the interpretative research of those interpretative beings (double hermeneutics), and also the critical interpretation of unconscious processes involved in the process above (triple hermeneutics) among others (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009 p 44). The theory acknowledges and makes provision for the critical nature of the relationship of the ‘issues-actors-researchers’ when conducting research. The ‘issues-actors-researchers’ involve hermeneutic loops. Hence, research findings involve researchers’ interpretations of the actors’ interpretations of the issues which may involve the actors reflecting upon the researcher’s interactions and changing their behaviour in unpredictable ways. Hence interviews, observations, and interpretations of the issues may not be static, predictable, or coherent. Consequently, the theory permits the researcher to interact with their ‘objects of study’ at a subjective level in order to conduct the research. Giddens (1984) describes structures as being both paradigmatic and syntagmatic. This facilitates the examination of change and stability in social systems in time-space; the link between the subjective and objective notion, the static and dynamic notions of structure and agency as well as examination of the existence of a multiplicity of structures in a time-space context, with different interpretations of events and interaction forms with significant unintended outcomes. These have considerable implications for theory and practice (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989, Bryant and Jary, 1991, Sewell, 1992). In addition, the theory addresses both ‘what is’ and ‘what might be’; sensitising the researcher to uncover consensus and contradictions in the actors’ practices, actions, interactions, and interrelationships against the meanings that actors ascribe to them. Hence uncovering these consistencies and inconsistencies may be useful, for instance, in illuminating how and why the urban South housing situation ‘is what it is’ rather than what it ‘ought to be’ (or should be according to actors’ discourses), and the differences between the envisioned and actual outcomes (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989, Giddens, 1990, Cohen, 1998, Stones, 2005).

Table 16: Structuration and development-housing-governance (DHG) triad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strucurationist descriptions</th>
<th>DHG paradigmatic descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Ideology and frame of reference (in theory)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sets of transformation relations organized as properties of social systems that enable or constrain interactions</td>
<td>How is DHG defined, by whom and why</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signification: Semantic rules</td>
<td>• What does DHG mean (Housing-meaning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Domination: Power/resource rules</td>
<td>• With whom and how (Governance-mode)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Legitimation: Value consensus/justification</td>
<td>• Why (Housing-rationale)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Methodology (with what)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Means by which structures are translated into interactions and vice versa</td>
<td>How should it be pursued, with what, to which extend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interpretive scheme: Modes of typification</td>
<td>• Envisioned roles (Development-government role)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Facility: Authoritative and allocative resources</td>
<td>• Material and non-material required (Development-resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Norms: Values</td>
<td>• Rules and standards (Development-rules/Housing-type)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Approach (in practice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent's activity within the social system, space and time</td>
<td>How it is told/done, to whom, and ensured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication: Information transformation</td>
<td>• Participation, how it is told (Governance-communication)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Power: Transformative capacity</td>
<td>• Who tells who asymmetries (Governance-power)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sanction: Rewards and punishments</td>
<td>• Ensuring compliance to practice (Housing-criteria)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17: Structuration theory model: Dimensions of the duality of structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Domination</th>
<th>Legitimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Interpretative scheme</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Norm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Sanction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Giddens, 1984b p 29)

Table 18: Questions of Structuration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>What is it</th>
<th>How it is (who&amp;who)</th>
<th>Because</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>why is it</td>
<td>with what</td>
<td>It (ought) to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>how it is told</td>
<td>how who tells/do who</td>
<td>How who should</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Structuration of DHG paradigms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Housing means</th>
<th>Governance mode</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Envisioned role</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Participation form</td>
<td>Governing interaction</td>
<td>Criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As follows, concepts of Structuration theory have been applied to examine the issues of structures and agency in the urban South housing arena; especially as manifested through the triad of development, housing, and governance with the involved static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions. These include: how these issues of structures and agency manifest themselves within different time-space contexts and co-present actors (contextualities). Furthermore, this includes how actors are related to the structural features of society as they interact with other actors, being conditioned by the structures although reconstituting them with their interaction. Additionally, this includes how the social structures enable or constrain the involved actors vis-à-vis how the meaning, power relations and justification is maintained or modified by those actors. And how all these relate to the persistence and resolution of the urban South housing from the micro to macro levels of society; besides the many blurred and hidden issues that are involved and the other numerous complexities and contradictions. These are encapsulated into four main queries, pursued through a Structurationist perspective to deduce firstly, the actors’ static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions as well as perceptions; secondly, the consequences of these on the quality of the actors’ interrelations and their impact on the housing arena; thirdly, the surrounding structure-agency and material-discursive issues; and finally the implications and explanatory value of the paradigmatic dimensions to the persistence and possible resolution of the urban South crisis, in both theory and practice.
### Table 20: Exclusivism Structuration model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Privilege</th>
<th>Authoritarianist</th>
<th>Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Force</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Authoritarianan</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 21: Modernisationism Structuration model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Modernity</th>
<th>Representativist</th>
<th>Progress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Expertise &amp; Funds</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Authorative</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 22: Basic Needs Structuration model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Basic need</th>
<th>Welfarist</th>
<th>Equity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Merit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23: Neoliberalism Structuration model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Managerialist</th>
<th>Free market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 24: Sustainabilism Structuration model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Inclusivist</th>
<th>Common Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 25: Good Governism Structuration model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Pact</th>
<th>Pluralist</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modality</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 26: DHG matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusivist</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>Common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Force/plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As a consequence, three critical themes of the urban South arena namely: development, housing, and governance (with their paradigmatic dimensions) have been analytically differentiated into their constituent parts, and integrated through elements of Structuration theory into the ‘DHG Matrix’ that is used as a heuristic device to prod the four main queries presented hereinabove. In sum, in view of the sentiments observed in this section, the study proceeds with the assertion that a Structurationist and paradigmatic perspective of the urban South crisis could prove very valuable in providing an additional understanding of the crisis; and probably help shed light into some of the pertinent issues that make the urban South housing problems seemingly unsolvable; as well as possibly be a useful step in the search for meaningful and effective solutions.
7. Theoretical and analytical framework

The critical defining themes identified in the urban South crisis alongside the surrounding issues are to be integrated through elements of Structuration theory to produce a conceptual, analytical, and interpretational framework. This framework guides the study’s further theoretical discourses on the urban South’s crisis as a whole, as well as frames the empirical case study on Nairobi Kenya, and provides the basis for the ensuing implications to both theory and practice.

7.1. Critical Themes: Development, Housing and Governance

Attempts to resolve the urban South crisis have revolved around the three critical defining themes which were identified, namely: development, housing and governance. Since the 1950s, each decade has had radical shifts in the dominant approaches and a tremendous increase in the number of involved actors with unequal power relations and differentiated interests. Largely, these approaches have failed to meet their stated objectives and the crisis has continued to grow unabated; in fact some of the approaches have been blamed of aggravating the crisis. The failures probably contributed to the shifts in dominant approaches. However, major global events and prevailing hegemonic interests seemed to have also played an even more significant role exogenously, at the supranational level and endogenously, at the local level in the interests, perspectives, and practices of both the powerful and weak actors in the urban South. This probably resulted in both the static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions that could have contributed to the myriad of complexities and contradiction in the urban South housing arena.

All in all, by 2000, the urban South housing crisis was increasingly seen as becoming too hard to meaningfully resolve, with other actors deeming it ‘unsolvable’. In fact the dismal performance of many prescribed initiatives as well as their increasingly minimal targets with every decade, has led to a very pessimistic prognosis with some scholars and practitioners terming the prescriptions as being merely palliative, aimed at soothing the pain but not meaningfully solving the crisis. From a politico-economic perspective, many of the Global South practices, including the peoples’ everyday lives as well as material and discursive practices have been framed around the theme of underdevelopment and development. Despite several decades of development, the situations of many remain very dire. However, there is generally no agreement as to what the problem ‘is’ or ‘how’ the problem should be dealt with. Not only have all the approaches, including the dominant ones in any given epoch been strongly criticised and opposed, but also the whole idea of development itself has come under intense criticism. Despite numerous housing initiatives and concerted efforts, the most defining characteristic in most of the urban South remains the housing problem and slums; with the highly fragmented problem-solution arenas characterised by numerous competing approaches, attitudes, interests and possibly, perspectives. Despite the struggles by ordinary citizens, efforts of the civil society and popular political movements for improved ‘governance’, the state-society relations and interactions among involved actors remain highly unconducive for the improvement of the welfare of the ordinary citizens and the resolution of the housing crisis. Much of the urban South is characterised by extremely unseemly governance situations which instead of facilitating the solution of the problems the
urban poor face, they actually aggravate them. These governance situations also greatly compromise the effectiveness of initiatives and diminish their possibilities for success. All in all, the urban South housing arena seems to comprise many hidden, underlying, unacknowledged conditions as well as many unintended consequences which have strong self reinforcing loops that seem to contribute to making the housing crisis seem ‘unsolvable. Consequently, there is the need to engage appropriately with these critical themes given that their better appreciation and handling is crucial for a more meaningful understanding and resolution of the urban South crisis.

Figure 16: Critical themes in the urban South crisis

The trajectory of the development, governance and housing policy history revealed a profound shift in the dominant approaches; in spite of their perpetual failure to adequately deal with the crisis. Hence, despite the numerous initiatives’ inability of the poor, and increasingly even of those further up the ladder to afford a descent place to live in, the crisis has continued to increase unabated over the decades. However, over the decades, it became widely acknowledged that the problem was not being driven by poverty and the lack of income or lack of economic growth alone, there were apparently more underlying issues that were perpetuating the crisis. Thus, over the decades, in the dominant approaches’ debates over the urban South’s housing crisis, the emphasis shifted from looking at shelter as being merely a house (building). Housing was perceived as more than shelter provision, and shelter was perceived as more than a building. In fact by the 1980s, the dominant policy became ‘housing without houses’. The approaches increasingly looked beyond traditional agencies (mainly governmental) policies, and emphasised the need to engage more ‘partners’ in creating more ‘appropriate’ solutions. These contributed not only to several competing approaches, but also to myriads of actors with different interests and probably divergent perspectives. By the 2000s, the focus shifted to the plurality of actors and their diverse interests; and how to achieve improved relations, cooperation, forge new partnerships and coalitions as encapsulated by the Governism ideologies and ‘good governance’ prescriptions. These prescriptions emphasised the actors’ relations rather than discrete characteristics of the projects, houses or the ‘target groups’. Hence the approaches became more and more imbued with different interests and normative objectives. However, apart from shifts in the dominant approaches, other paradigmatic dimensions seemed to have played also a very significant role in the crisis.

The three critical themes are not only interwoven amongst themselves; they are also intertwined with relations of meaning, power, norms as well as other numerous societal structure and agency issues.
There were conflicting motivations amongst actors concerning the various approaches in the triad of development, housing, and governance. Despite some approaches dominating the arena in particular epochs, vicious debate has and continues to rage, not only over the merits and demerits of the approaches, but also over their role in either resolving or precipitating the crisis. However, approaches and the ensuing debates have seemingly not been value-free and objectively derived. They increasingly seem to be value laden, based on the various involved actors’ perception of social reality, assumptions, ethical issues, and normative concerns beside the more often than not cited interests and competition for power and resources. Various values and ideological positions as well as a priori assumptions of good and bad seem to underlay the debates of the problems and prescribed solutions. Hence various conceptualisations of the urban South crisis and prescribed issues involve exceedingly pervasive and highly charged backgrounds based on various conceptualisations of ‘ought-to-be-ness’; with extreme tensions among the various goals of the ought-to-be-ness.

Whereas some conceptualisations became dominant, there were always controversies regarding how best to understand the housing problem, its resolution as well as the focus of the policies; which approaches were or should have been right; the rationale and assumptions underlying the policies’ focus and the various strategies that were to be undertaken and more so the ideological underpinnings. Indeed the examination of the development, housing, and governance approaches geographically and historically linked them to the various ideological and political debates surrounding their decades of dominance. Nonetheless the approaches, options and debates around them were not limited to the globally dominant ‘shared’ understanding but also, seemingly, other numerous perspectives were involved. Even though with each decade, the previously held assumptions concerning the main approaches seemed to have been questioned and replaced, a more nuanced view reveals that the previous assumptions continued to be strongly defended by some actors, while the new assumption was simultaneously greatly opposed. Furthermore, even though this study concentrates on the present time, the vicious contentions in various forms, seemed to have played a significant role in the perpetuation of the crisis over the decades. Moreover, the approaches also involved political coercion and compromises. These were not only limited to competing goals and interests, but they were seemingly reinforced by the prevailing dominant perspectives and normative concerns. Additionally, as the approaches moved from the supranational level (where most were conceived) to the lower grassroots levels for implementation, these tensions seemed to intensify; as the initiatives became more and more imbued with different interests and probably perspectives. Tensions were observable between the targeted communities and implementers, between the implementers and formulators, as well as among various implementation agencies and other actors. Moreover, there were observable tensions even within the same organisation for example, between the field and office staff. In the end, there seemed to be a colossal variance between not only the initially envisioned initiative and the one that was implemented, but also between the stated intents and actual outcomes. Consequently, many initiatives were plagued with high levels of ineffectiveness and also failure, notwithstanding the colossal efforts, highly normative aspirations and ‘good’ intentions.
Accordingly, it is the assertion of this study that the urban South crisis cannot be understood in the absence of an awareness of the surrounding meanings and values of the various actors which shape the formulation and implementation of initiatives at various points in time and space. The focus of this study then, becomes the sum of those underlying fundamental causes (and self-reinforcing consequences) of the crisis that have served to establish and reinforce the crisis over the decades, and made it difficult to resolve. This study posits that the contentions involved in these themes and their various paradigmatic dimensions, are central to grasping the dynamics surrounding the ineffectiveness of initiatives and persistence of the urban South crisis. This study is based on the assumption that appropriately engaging with these themes and their surrounding issues is the key to gaining better understanding, as well as meaningfully confronting the fundamental challenge of ensuring that the low income residents in the urban South have access to what can be reasonably considered adequate shelter.

7.2. General objectives and generative questions

From the preceding observations, several recurrent themes and points stand out in discourses concerning the urban South housing crisis. First of all, is the persistence of the crisis despite many global and local initiatives, concerted and disjointed efforts, principal commitments, good intentions and also rhetoric. The prescribed policies and initiatives have largely been ineffective or failed to meet the expected goals, exhibiting great variances not only between the expected goal and eventual outcome, but also between the envisioned and the actually implemented initiatives (if at all implemented). Hence, most of these numerous efforts have failed to yield any meaningful improvements in the living conditions of many in the urban South. Secondly, there have been fundamental shifts in the dominant approaches over the decades, partly owing to the failures of previous initiatives, global hegemonic interests, the zeitgeist and prevailing dominant perspectives, among others. However these shifts, besides generating changes in the conceptualisation of the problem and approaches, have further induced competition among various conceptualisations, approaches as well as transformations in the attitudes and attributes of involved actors. Thirdly, the first two factors have contributed to the proliferation of actors in the arena, with huge disparities not only in their form, scales, resources, roles, and approaches; but also highly differentiated, interests and probably perspectives; that contribute to conflicts, misunderstandings, wasteful competition, and duplication of efforts. All these have led to a highly fragmented arena with many underlying and paradoxical issues having far-reaching repercussions for the ordinary urban South citizens. Certainly, there is need to better understand and address the urban South housing problems in a more proactive and effective way, beyond wasteful efforts, token gestures, empty rhetoric and approaches that often yield unwanted results and fall far from their envisioned outcomes.

Accordingly, over the decades the persistence of the crisis has been attributed to structural factors, policy failures, and more recently to dysfunctional actor relations, especially characterised by competing interests. This focus has led to the rise of ‘good governance’ approaches to harness the plurality of actors and interests into cooperative action and partnerships. However, these approaches seem to have added to the complexities and contradictions in the urban South arena, especially with
their ‘fuzziness’ and diverse prescriptions. Hence, there is need to uncover and understand some of
the underlying reasons for these dysfunctional actors’ relations, and the impediments to achieving
more appropriate governance situations that could lead to improvements in the housing situations as
well as the lives of the urban poor and slum dwellers. Nonetheless, due to the enigmatic, obscure and
underlying nature of many issues surrounding the urban South arena and its housing crisis, various
scholars and practitioners have categorised the arena as being dysfunctional, pathological,
despondent and immitigate; in addition to its crisis being deemed as incomprehensible, unfathomable,
Harvey, 2009b, Spence et al., 2009, Parsons, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2010a). Despite over six decades of
various efforts, much of the urban South arena and its crisis remain characterised with many
unknowns. Consequently, the overarching goal of this study is to contribute towards broadening the
understanding of the arena. This involves a theoretical discursive component, partly aided by the
empirical investigation of an urban South setting in Nairobi’s urban poor housing arena. This is
premised on the belief that effective tackling of these complex urban South challenges requires their
better appreciation both in theory and in practice.

By the 2000s, the role of actors and their relations had risen to prominence as an explanation and
solution to the urban South crisis. The failure of numerous initiatives and persistence of the crisis was
greatly blamed on ‘unhealthy relations’ among actors especially due to their competing interests as
well as bad or poor governance. Indeed numerous scholarly studies, programmes and project surveys
have adduced evidence concerning the role of these actor relations and their influence in either
propagating or resolving the crisis (Syagga et al., 2001c, UN-Habitat, 2009a, Myers, 2011, de Wit,
2012). In much of the urban South, the actors’ relations were categorised as ‘unhealthy’ because they
were not only conflict laden as well as being characterised with antagonism, unhealthy competition,
resistance and violence; their relations were also plagued with a lack of mutual understanding and
common ground with the many of the involved actors pulling in different directions. The arena was
typified by numerous disjointed initiatives and a duplication of efforts, besides an acute lack of
coordination, clear policy and leadership. Apart from the apparently profound lack of ‘political will’ by
the governors to meaningfully deal with the crisis, and apart from the tokenistic initiatives and empty
rhetoric; even as some actors strived towards resolution of the crisis, other actors were motivated to
perpetuate the crisis. Indeed the perpetuation of the crisis was beneficial to some actors. However,
even conflicts and misunderstandings were also observable between actors who were expected to
cooperate by virtue of their shared interests and mutual goals. Hence, these unhealthy actors’
relations have been cited not only as the reason for the ineffectiveness and failure of many initiatives,
but also as one of the main reasons why the urban South crisis persists despite so much effort,
rhetoric, and ‘good intentions’ (Sanyal and Mukhija, 2001, Imparato and Ruster, 2003, Leckie, 2003,
Fernandez and Calas, 2011, UN-Habitat, 2012e). In most studies and programmes the ‘unhealthy
relations’ among actors have mainly and traditionally been blamed on conflicting interests, involving
competition for power and resources among the actors. In fact the focus of the prevailing Governism
approach is the plurality of actors and their conflicting interests. In fact good governance approaches
have been prescribed on the premises that successful mediation of the constituent diverse interests will lead to cooperation in pursuit of common goals and therefore, facilitate the problem’s resolution. However, as already observed by discussions in this study these unhealthy relations as well as the persistence of the urban South crisis cannot be attributed to interests alone. There seem to be many other overt and covert issues with critical significance to the crisis. These include the role of the shift in approaches over the decades which is encapsulated in previous discussions as static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions; structure, agency, and contextuality issues; as well as numerous other hidden and unacknowledged conditions surrounding the arena and the actors’ interactions, besides the unintended consequences of the actors actions and interactions.

Figure 17: Urban South crisis: Unacknowledged conditions and consequences

These observations raise a number of questions including:

- What are the underlying causes for unhealthy relations among the actors, ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives as well as the persistence of the urban South housing crisis; despite a seemingly deeply-felt universal concern as well as myriads of efforts and activities by many actors from the global scale to the grassroots?

- What is the role of the postulated paradigmatic dimensions in the quality of the actors’ relations as well as in the effectiveness of initiatives and the urban South housing crisis as whole.

These generative questions point to the key objectives of this study:

- To uncover some of the underlying causes for the apparent unhealthy relations among the actors, initiative failures, and the persistence of the urban South housing crisis; with a view to generating a broader general understanding.

- To explore the possible existence and role of the various, postulated paradigmatic dimensions in the urban South crisis arena and problem-solution nexus; and their implications to both theory and practice, for a more nuanced understanding and meaningful resolution of the crisis.

In pursuit of these objectives, the urban South’s three key defining themes of development, housing, and governance; coupled with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions have been integrated through elements of Structuration theory to generate a conceptual, analytical, and interpretational framework. This includes the ‘DHG Matrix’ constituted in the foregoing chapter which serves as a heuristic device to prod the above questions and generate further explanations, interpretations, and understating on the basis of empirical work in Nairobi’s housing arena, besides a discursive engagement with the general issues surrounding the urban South crisis.
7.3. Research questions, hypothesis and assumptions

Framing the emergent generative questions and broad objectives through a Structurationist perspective, this study is organised around two research questions:

1. What features of static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions as well as their constituent aspects of structure, agency and contextuality can be uncovered in a given urban South housing space-time setting; and in what ways and extent do those shape the urban South housing arena?

2. What are the implications of those uncovered features (if any) on the actors’ relations, initiatives’ effectiveness, and persistence/resolution of the urban South crisis, both in theory and practice?

The endeavour to answer these questions involves a continuous exchange between the urban South’s relevant theoretical discourses and empirical data from the case study of Nairobi’s informal housing arena as an urban South crisis setting; using a Structurationist framing. As observed earlier, in the recent decades, failure of the initiatives and persistence of the urban South housing crisis have increasingly been attributed to unhealthy actors’ relations arising from their conflicting interests and competition over power and resources. Indeed these have been observed by numerous studies across several settings in the urban South including Nairobi. However, while focusing on the case of Nairobi, this study postulates the hypothesis that:
Apart from conflicting interests and competition over power and resources, there exist ‘diverse paradigmatic positions’ amongst the many interested actors in Nairobi’s informal housing arena which greatly contribute to the actors’ apparent lack of common ground and mutual understanding thereby compromising the effectiveness of involved initiatives and playing a significant role in perpetuating the ‘urban South crisis’.

**Figure 19: Hypothesis: There exists a multiplicity of paradigmatic positions**

![Diagram showing structural and agency properties with hypotheses]

Based on (Giddens, 1984b, Orlikowski, 2008)

**Table 27: Assumptions: The influence of paradigms and interests on actors’ relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similar Paradigm</th>
<th>Contradictory Paradigm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common Interests</td>
<td>Cooperation possibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing Interests</td>
<td>Negotiation ease</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Idealised: cooperation with common ground and mutual understanding
2. Maximum Governism achievement: after achieving common interests misunderstandings persist
3. Governism assumptions: only the problem of interests
4. Postulated reality in most of the arena: different interests and perspectives

This postulation is premised on several assumptions concerning interests and paradigmatic positions. Firstly, if actors have similar interests (win-win) and common paradigmatic stands, there is a high likelihood of mutual understanding and cooperation in pursuit of their goals. Secondly, similar interests but contradictory paradigmatic positions may increase the likelihood of misunderstanding. Thirdly, actors having competing interests but common paradigmatic stands, can negotiate (or fight) much more easily, since there is reduced misunderstanding, leading to clearer and faster negotiated settlements, solutions or other outcomes. Finally, however, when the actors have competing interests and contradictory paradigmatic positions as the study postulates is the case in most of the urban South situations, the likelihood of misunderstanding and conflict potential amongst these actors is increased tremendously. Consequently, even though neither cooperation nor negotiations per se can
solve the urban South problems in themselves; they may go a great way in facilitating not only the finding of effective solutions, but also in reducing wasteful conflicts and misunderstanding, thus greatly contributing to the actual resolution of the crisis.

Figure 20: Conceptual Model

7.4. Conceptual and analytical framework

The study’s overall theme revolves around the issue of persistent housing problems in the Global South arena especially with the prescribed policies and initiatives largely failing to produce the expected results, leaving in their wake several competing approaches and myriads of actors with conflicting interests and probably divergent perspectives; all of these with possible severe repercussions for the condition of the urban South and the urban poor. While this study touches generally on the entire urban South, the empirical case study focuses on Nairobi, Kenya. Nonetheless, Nairobi’s arena is embedded in a global geopolitical-economic milieu of the urban South. Hence while the study’s focus is on Nairobi, it relates more closely to Sub-Saharan African issues, followed by those of the Global South as a whole. The urban areas in the Global South (and in fact different parts of the same urban area) are extremely unique, therefore sweeping generalisations must be avoided. Nevertheless, these all these urban areas share some common distinct features and cross cutting issues that define them as distinctively as the ‘urban South’. This is exemplified by the dominant paradigmatic approaches that swept across the entire urban South, especially with the internationalisation of policies and the commonality between multilateral and bilateral organisations as
well as key actors in various arenas, among other larger pervasive issues. Nevertheless, this study is mainly about the situation observed in Nairobi, with the replication of the study in other urban areas in the Global South as one of the study’s desideratum.

Following the Structurationist conceptual, analytical, and interpretative framework, various paradigmatic dimensions, structure and agency issues, as well as many underlying, unacknowledged, and unintended factors can be uncovered, observed, analysed, and interpreted alongside the questions of what, how, why, and for whom. Even though these questions can be separated analytically, in actual interactions in society, the ‘what’ is simultaneously the ‘how’, the ‘why’ and ‘for whom’ and are inextricably linked. They are subtly yet tightly interwoven as in empirical observations the meaning, normative elements and power are interlaced (Giddens, 1984: 28). Hence, after the identification of the key actors and organisations, their paradigmatic positions (and perceptions) are mapped; besides their involved static and dynamic dimensions and other features of structure, agency, and contextuality. This is followed by comparisons of those positions and perceptions between actors and organisations, to uncover their ramifications to the actors’ interrelations, mutual influence, and interactions; as well as the implication in the constitution, persistence, and resolutions of the urban South crisis.

Accordingly, among other issues, the study endeavours to deduce the following:

- The pertinent static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions that condition the actors’ interactions and opportunities for action.
- Their unconscious and conscious motivations for their actions, the hidden and overt motives, the rationalisation for their actions, their ‘routinized’ and tacit actions, as well as their knowledgeability; and how all these relate to their discursive descriptions of their actions, for instance the labelling of their initiatives and other practices,
- How the above, condition the actors’ options for interactions and interrelations such as cooperation, competition, conflict, misunderstanding, common ground, schisms, and factions, among others; and how these could affect the effectiveness of involved initiatives and the housing situation as a whole.
- The acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions for the actors’ actions in the urban housing arena, as well as the ensuing intended and unintended consequences of their actions; and how these feed back to the process, resulting in either the maintenance or transformation of those conditions for action (elements of ‘the duality of structure’). These encompass the dynamic elements of paradigm shifts and also paradigm acceptance, rejection, subscriptions, and disenchantment at individual, organisational, or societal levels, with both spatial and temporal aspects.
- The implications of all these to the actors’ relations, the initiatives, and the urban South crisis and arena as a whole, in theory and practice.
7.5. From discursive theoretical perspectives to practical empirical utility

The transmutation of the discursive theoretical concepts to the empirical level of situational application in Nairobi’s urban informal housing arena, as well as the exchange between the two levels raises a number of questions. These include:

- What can observations, analyses, and interpretations of the actions as well as oral and written statements of the involved actors reveal about their various paradigmatic dimensions based on a Structurationist perspective and in view of the DHG matrix?
- What do comparisons of the various paradigmatic dimensions of mutual actors, organisations, the dominant paradigm, the ‘stated’ and ‘actual’ positions, personal and official positions, perceptions, and the underlying and overt arguments, among others reveal?
- Are there any congruities and incongruence in those paradigmatic dimensions; as well as conjunctions (and, but, although, nevertheless); disjunctions (or, either, unless); and negations (not, impossible); and how do these relate to the actors options for interactions and interrelations: especially between conflict and cooperation, as well as between misunderstanding and finding common ground?
- How are those options for interactions and interrelations related to the urban South housing crisis: the associated problem-solution nexus, the involved initiatives, the lives of the urban poor and slum dwellers, and the persistence or resolution of the crisis; in the past, present, and future; both at a theoretical and practice levels?

As follows, these questions among others are pursued from a Structurationist perspective, through the empirical case study of Nairobi’s arena, framed by the theoretical underpinnings derived for the discourse of development, housing, and governance; with their pertinent paradigmatic dimensions. Accordingly, the express objective of the study is:

To contribute a theoretical perspective on the urban South housing crisis and its proposed solutions; firstly, by cultivating an understanding based on drawing inferences derived from discursively engaging the urban South housing problem-solution issues in time and space, against the background of their politico-historical and geopolitico-economic context, and other surrounding matters. And, secondly, endeavouring to uncover, if any, the paradigmatic dynamics structuring or being structured by Nairobi’s informal housing arena, and their implications to theory and practice for the urban South crisis and its solutions.

Consequently, the study has been operationalised around the following research sub-questions which form the basis of organising the study:

1. What is the space time context of the urban South housing crisis, from politico-historical and geopolitico-economic perspectives, and in view of the ongoing deepening globalisation and rapid urbanisation situation?
2. How have the emergent critical themes of the urban South dynamics namely; development, housing, and governance, alongside their paradigmatic dimensions evolved over the decades;
how have those themes shaped and been shaped by the urban South situation; and what is
their significance to the present and future urban South housing situation?

3. How can the apparent connections between those themes be identified and linked through a
theoretical conceptualisation that can permit the examination of the said significance to the
urban South housing situation? (Including identifying and synthesising their constituent
features of structure, agency, and contextuality; static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions,
issues of asymmetric power relations, and finally the mutual re-constitution of structure and
agency by which those themes shape and are shaped by the urban South situation and are
generated and maintained in the flow of the actors’ practices and interactions).

4. Which methodological frameworks, guidelines, research strategies, assumptions, and
propositions can be derived based on the above theoretical conceptualisation, for examining
and understanding an urban South’s housing issues and context; identifying the involved
causal relationships, and providing empirical analytical and interpretational utility?

5. How can these methodological frameworks be applied in an urban South context (such as
Nairobi) to examine issues that surround the informal housing arena; in view of its politico-
historical context, evolution of housing problems and responses, and the past, current, and
future implications?

6. What are the attitudes and attributes of the identified key actors in such an urban South
housing arena: their trajectories, involvement, interactions, and interrelations with other actors;
and the impact and implications of these to the housing situation in any given arena, and
probably the entire urban South?

7. How all of the above questions can be linked and interpreted through the generated theoretical,
methodological, interpretational framework for the urban South problem, as situated in any
unique arena or the Global South in general, especially relating to the static and dynamic
paradigmatic dimension, structural and agency issues, as well as the actor interactions and
interrelations, among other involved aspects and processes that may explain and impact the
urban South housing crisis. And ultimately, what are the implications of all these to the
pertinent theory and practice issues; in view of the problem-solution approaches, stakeholder/
actor analyses, interpretations of surveys; among other myriad possible theoretical,
methodological, and practical connotations that could arise from the study and its desiderata.

Accordingly, with these questions and objectives in mind, this study involves a continuous
interrogation and dialectic exchange between the constituent theoretical discourses and practical
empirical aspects. This is in pursuit of broadening an understanding of the urban South housing
situation and the issues that surround them; as well as developing an understanding which could yield
to a useful contribution in the search for effective and meaningful solutions, in addition to providing a
step forward in the resolution of the crisis, with meaningful improvements in the housing situations and
lives of the urban poor and slum dwellers in the urban South.
8. Methodological framework

In view of the postulated conceptual, theoretical and analytical frame work, this study proceeds from a discursive engagement with urban South’s critical themes, followed by an empirical investigation of the single case study of Nairobi’s informal housing arena with it various dimensions and embedded units. Whereas the discursive component dwelt on the themes of development, housing, and governance with various paradigmatic dimensions, the empirical investigation, framed by the various discursive outcomes, focuses on three major issues. Firstly, it focuses on identifying the key actors in the arena, their practices and behaviours, actions and interactions as well as the prevailing nature of their interrelations, among other attitudes and attributes. Secondly, it focuses on uncovering the key actors’ conditions for these actions, interactions, and interrelations, alongside both the acknowledged and unacknowledged, the conscious and unconscious motivations; and the consequences from those actions, interactions, and interrelations including both the intended and unintended; and their self-reinforcing loops. And thirdly, the contextual issues which frame and provide for all of the above issues. Hence, these include issues of agency and structure, and are contextually based on the various paradigmatic dimensions in space and time; including how all these issues influence each other and their implication on the housing issues and involved initiatives’ actors. Consequently, this study employs a qualitative research approach from the data collection, its analysis, interpretation, and the derivation of insights, implications and recommendations; bounded by various identified limitations, and guided by the spelt out ethical considerations.

8.1. Qualitative research approach

Owing to the fact that the objectives of the study involve the investigation of questions that go beyond what, where and when; towards those of why, how, and who; the study adopts a ‘qualitative’ research approach, with the aim of gaining an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons governing such behaviour. This approach is chosen because the study focuses on words, meanings, realities, processes, and the points of view of respondents in their natural setting; rather than on numbers, or points of view of the researcher in artificial settings. Qualitative research is valuable for looking at, describing, and understanding meanings, experiences, ideas, beliefs, and values, among other similar intangibles. Indeed Bryman (2012) defines qualitative research as a research strategy that emphasises words rather than quantification in its collection and analysis of data; and is therefore, mostly inductivist, constructionist, and interpretivist. Hence, the qualitative research approach ontologically treats the social world as being a construct of both the researcher and the respondents, and is therefore, epistemologically interpretivist which is in line with the study’s theoretical and conceptual framework.

8.1.1. Integrated inductivist logic

Following an inductivist logic, this study moves from the specific to the general, with the aim of generating an understanding on the basis of collected data; nonetheless, incorporating a certain degree of deductive reasoning. The generated Structurationist framework (with its urban South critical themes) provides a theoretical lens that guides the investigations, analyses and interpretations. In the field, the data arising from observations and interactions with the respondents through observations
(participant and non), in-depth interviews, and focus groups was collected in textual form; leading to the production of descriptive texts that emphasised the contextual understanding of observed social behaviour (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, Bryman, 2012, Creswell, 2013). Hence, the data collection processes were flexible and adaptable to address any emerging issues and incorporate additional insights learnt during the process; with some respondents, questions, and answers being added or dropped on the basis of the emerging insights, their appropriateness and relevance. Thus the number and type of respondents eventually incorporated in the research could not be predetermined, but varied during the course of the study (McCracken, 1988a, Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). Indeed, the aim of the study was not to convert the data into numerical form or statistical analysis; rather the focus was on unveiling individual meanings and the complexity of the situations in the arena. This included exploring the meanings which the actors (and organisations) ascribed to the crisis and its solutions; based on an attitudinal and behavioural focus that sought to distinguish between what actors ‘believed’, ‘said’ and ‘did’ in their time-space contextuality and in the co-presence of other actors (Giddens, 1984b, McCracken, 1988a). As follows, the data was mainly collected in the respondents’ settings, followed by the analyses and interpretations being inductively built into the general framework from the emerging themes, and the pre-formulated Structurationist frame. Consequently, this study followed an integrated approach as opposed to either a purist deductive or inductive approach.

8.1.2. Pragmatic constructivist ontology

Ontologically, qualitative research is mainly constructivist, emphasising the socially constructed nature of reality i.e. human actors construct subjective meanings of their experiences as they engage with the world they are seeking to interpret and understand the world in which they interact in. Hence, these meanings are not simply imprinted on the actors, but are a product of interactions with other actors, as well as historical and cultural norms that produce historically and socially negotiated meanings that are numerous and highly varied (Giddens, 1984b, Lincoln and Guba, 1985, McCracken, 1988a, Crotty, 1998, Lincoln et al., 2011). Following this view, instead of narrowing meanings into a few categories, this study endeavoured to uncover the complexity of views presumably present in the arena, based on the respondents’ constructed views (and the researchers’ constructed perspectives of the respondents’ views). These entailed using broad and general open-ended questions aimed at ensuring the respondents could adequately construct their meanings and share their views during the interviews, with the researchers listening and paying close attention to what the respondents said, meant, and did in their contexts (e.g. politico-historical setting). Nonetheless, firstly, this constructivist view necessitated the researchers to be cognisant with their own backgrounds as well as personal, cultural, and historical experiences which could have shaped not only how they conducted the surveys and interviews, but also the analyses and interpretations of the findings; hence the need for the researchers to position themselves appropriately in the research, bearing this in mind. Secondly, by virtue of this study touching societal issues of social injustice, inequalities, poverty and slums; with the objective partly being to contribute to the resolution of those problems, the study involved aspects of the ‘transformative’ approach that attempts to confront societal evils and help bring about ‘desirable’ change by giving voice to issues usually silenced or misrepresented by other powerful societal interests (Mertens, 2009). Ultimately, pursuit of the above objectives required a ‘pragmatic’ approach
(Cherryholmes, 1992, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010), that was not overtly concerned with –isms, but with applying the most appropriate mix of methods and approaches which the situation demanded and which could yield the clearest understanding of the problems under investigations.

8.1.3. Interpretivist epistemology

Related to its generally constructivist ontology, qualitative research is epistemologically mainly interpretivist. This is based on the premises that ‘reality’ is socially constructed and fluid, and that what is taken to be true or valid is often negotiated, relative, and dependent on multiple systems for meanings; resulting in multiple valid claims to reality, truth, and knowledge (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Crotty, 1998). Hence, in this view the reality of both the researchers and the respondents are constructed inter-subjectively; their values permeate the research process, since it may not be possible to separate their values from their knowledge; and their interpretations are based on a particular time-space context and therefore, open to negotiation and re-interpretation (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Crotty, 1998, Neuman, 2006, Lincoln et al., 2011). Hence this study endeavoured to foster a dialogue between researchers and respondents, using personal and flexible methods that could capture the various meanings and make sense of what was being perceived as ‘reality’ by different respondents, with the aim of producing a more informed understanding of their created social world. Since in this view, multiple interpretations of reality can only be fully understood through the subjective interpretation (Lincoln and Guba, 1986); the study remained open to new knowledge throughout the research process; incorporating emergent insights and allowing its development with the help of respondents; while acknowledging that researchers could not avoid affecting (and being affected) by the phenomena they sought to study. Thus, whereas the interpretivist approach generally generates primary data with a low level of reliability, this data is typically empathetic in nature with a high level of credibility (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Accordingly, because the objective of this study was not to generalise and predict causes and effects; but rather to understand and interpret the meanings in human behaviour, reasons, motives, and other subjective experiences as they are bound in their space-time context attempting to ‘see beyond mere appearances’; the interpretivist approach was very appropriate.

8.1.4. Trustworthiness: Qualitative validity criteria and verification strategies

In conducting qualitative research, Guba and Lincoln (1981, 1985, 1986, 2011) postulated the substitution of the pursuit ‘rigor’ and its goals of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity; with the parallel concept of ‘trustworthiness’ and its goals of credibility, transferability, dependability and conformability respectively. In line with this view, this study strives for:

- **Credibility** such that the findings are considered to have truth value, make sense, and are believable by the participants, the research community, the practitioners, and others in the arena and subject area; with the findings being highly congruent with the reasonable ‘reality’ and presenting a ‘true’ picture of the situation and underlying issues.

- **Transferability** by ensuring ample contextual detail of this study, such that other researchers and practitioners can make informed decisions about whether or not to apply (or modify) this study’s findings and conclusions to their context of interests. This also includes highlighting
Elements of the findings that can be generalised, have any larger import, and are transferable to other contexts (time, space, situations, programmes, people, etc); with the inherent limitations pointed out.

- **Dependability** such that the processes of the study are consistent and reasonably stable across time, space, methods, researchers, and practitioners; allowing the repetition of this study (and similar ones) in future, as well as accounting for the ever-changing context, ‘moving targets’ and other dynamics surrounding the study, the crisis, and its arenas.

- **Conformability** such that the study findings can be corroborated and confirmed by others, with replications and multiple results pointing towards similar interpretation and conclusions; as well as striving for relative neutrality; however, being cognisant of the researchers’ acknowledged and unacknowledged biases.

### Table 28: Quantitative and qualitative research validity criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Quantitative</th>
<th>Qualitative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truth value</td>
<td>Internal validity</td>
<td>Credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicability</td>
<td>External validity</td>
<td>Transferability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistency</td>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td>Dependability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality</td>
<td>Objectivity</td>
<td>Confirmability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Indeed without trustworthiness (or rigor) research is worthless and without utility. Over the years, several strategies have been put forward to ensure this in qualitative research, especially with its interpretivist, constructivist, and inductivist logic. These included audit trails, member checks when coding, peer debriefings, referential material adequacy, structural corroborations, negative case analyses, and confirming of results with participants and other researchers; among many other authenticity criteria to evaluate research quality beyond merely its methodological dimensions (Guba, 1981, Guba and Lincoln, 1981, Guba and Lincoln, 1982, Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Guba and Lincoln, 1989, Yin, 1994b, Yin, 2002, Morse *et al.*, 2008, Lincoln *et al.*, 2011). Hence apart from the concerns about obtaining tangible outcomes as stated in the objectives, emphasis was placed on ensuring trustworthiness during the course and process of the study as well as its post hoc evaluation potential. These included self-correcting mechanisms in the study, and measures towards plausible and credible explanations through the researchers’ responsiveness and active analytical stances as well as methodological coherence, besides appropriate sampling categorisation and saturation or adequacy. These were aimed at ensuring the correction of the direction of the research and its development, analyses, and interpretations based on the emerging insights. Accordingly, in a bid to achieve these, various verification strategies which are highlighted below were applied to shape and direct the research in the endeavour for relevance, significance, impact, and utility.

Verification refers to the processes of checking and confirming; of being certain to establish the correctness of the issue. Hence, in qualitative research, verification strategies are the mechanisms used in the research process to incrementally contribute to ensuring trustworthiness, by identifying and correcting errors before they are built into inquiry and affect the analyses, interpretations and outcomes (Guba, 1981, Lincoln and Guba, 1986, McCracken, 1988a, Yin, 1994b, Morse *et al.*, 2008). As follows, verification strategies used in this study involved ensuring methodological coherence,
using overlapping methods and triangulation; sampling appropriateness and saturation; establishing the context and background information, debriefing sessions and peer scrutiny; reflexivity, self reflection, acknowledgment of researcher’s beliefs and assumptions as well as the shortcomings of the study’s methods and their potential effects. All these necessitated a dynamic iteration and recursion between data collection, analysis, interpretation and theory development.

Table 29: Strategies to establish trustworthiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quality criterion</th>
<th>Strategies to achieve quality and trustworthiness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credibility</strong></td>
<td>Adoption of appropriate, well recognised research methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of early familiarity with culture of participating organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Triangulation via use of different methods, different types of informants and different sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tactics to help ensure honesty in informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iterative questioning in data collection dialogues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De-briefing sessions between the researcher and supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peer scrutiny of project/ conferences and peer reviewed publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of reflective commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Description of background, qualifications and experience of the researcher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member checks of data collected and interpretations/theories formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thick description of phenomenon under scrutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Examination of previous research to frame findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Varied field experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflexivity (field journal) – self reflection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transferability</strong></td>
<td>Provision of background data to establish the context of study and detailed description of phenomenon in question to allow comparisons to be made</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependability</strong></td>
<td>Employment of “overlapping methods”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-depth methodological description to allow study to be repeated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peer examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confirmability</strong></td>
<td>Triangulation to reduce effect of investigator bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admission of researcher’s beliefs and assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reflexivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition of shortcomings in study’s methods and their potential effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-depth methodological description to allow integrity of research results to be scrutinised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of diagrams to demonstrate “audit trail”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Shenton, 2004)

For instance, by methodological coherence, the study involved the pursuit of congruence between the research questions, data sampling/collection, analytical, and interpretative procedures; with each of those procedures being revised and modified in the course of the research so as to march each other. Hence the research process was not linear but cyclic and iterative, with the different procedures of the research being interdependent and influencing each other. Therefore, the procedures were enacted concurrently whenever possible, integrating the ‘known’ and what ‘needed to be known’; with the theoretical insights emerging from the data and the previous procedures that had influenced the way the new circle of procedures were undertaken and types of data collected; with constant rechecking and reintegrating of macro-micro perspectives into the study as well as the data and procedures with the theoretical processes, outcomes, and understanding (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Yin, 2002, Shenton, 2004, Morse et al., 2008).

By sampling appropriateness and saturation, the study aimed at ensuring that it had captured an ample range of respondents who best represented the situation in the arena; and was as representative as possible. Snowballing and reference were employed judiciously with acknowledgment of the fact that there could have been numerous networks in the arena, but that snowballing could only capture a single network. Furthermore, this included looking out for saturation.
and replication to ensure sampling adequacy, completeness, and comprehensiveness. In addition, triangulation which entails the use of a combination of several research methods was deployed not only to overcome the weakness and intrinsic biases inherent in any single method, but also in pursuit of completeness, cross-checking of data, and capturing of the richness and complexity of the arena, the actors, their interactions and situations, from multiple standpoints (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Yin, 2002, Shenton, 2004, Denzin, 2006, Morse et al., 2008, Rothbauer, 2008).

In sum, the study endeavoured to interweave the above verification strategies in all the stages of the inquiry, such that the inquiry was self-correcting; in a bid to ensure errors were not built into the study thus jeopardising the ‘trustworthiness’ of the study’s outcomes. Hence, by back and forth movements between various research procedures, the relative congruence between theoretical analysis, research questions, data collection and analysis/interpretation strategies, and theory development was maintained; data and interpretations continuously monitored, and the research process adjusted accordingly in the pursuit of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability.

8.1.5. Critiques, rebuttals, and usefulness of qualitative research

Qualitative research has been criticised for being ‘less scientific’, with lack of precision, falsifiability, generalisability, and parsimony; besides having a profound deficiency in rigor (validity, reliability, objectivity). Hence, by lack of reliability it is hard to repeat the research and obtain the same results, which is even aggravated by the lack of precision, since qualitative studies typically involve the exploration of broad research areas without narrowed operational definitions and hypotheses, making it difficult for researchers to replicate the research. By lack of falsifiability, it is difficult to reject, falsify or prove the research outcomes as wrong so as to ensure there is no confirmation bias. Indeed many qualitative studies are not formulated to ‘prove’ anything, any hypothesis or theory, but to describe and explore issues. By lack of parsimony, qualitative research has been criticised for not facilitating the giving of the simplest explanation for any given set of observations, thus permitting numerous and frivolous ‘anything goes’ theories to emerge (Stake, 1980, Yin, 1994b, Ritzer, 2001, Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010, Lincoln et al., 2011, Creswell, 2013). In addition, considering that qualitative research is mostly context based, the specific conditions and interactions are impossible to replicate in another time-space, making the replications and generalizations to other time-space contexts less confident. This also involves the interference of the study by the researcher’s presence and ‘immersion’ in the research; as well as the viewpoints and biases of both the researcher and participants; and other issues of anonymity and confidentiality. Furthermore, qualitative research typically involves a smaller number of participants, due to its time and labour intensive methods, such as in-depth interviews or participatory action, and so its results do not usually lead to generalisations. Thus qualitative research may be plagued with problems of ‘anecdotalism’, by which the conclusions are drawn based on a few telling ‘examples’ while ignoring the less clear or contradictory data; this is in addition to the research lacking ‘structure’ and ‘consistency’; as well as being open to misinterpretation and observer bias (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Yin, 2002, Lincoln et al., 2011, Silverman, 2013)
However, the above concerns, such as the smaller number of participants and the methods employed do not make the qualitative approach in any way less scientific than the quantitative approach with more subjects and rigid methods; rather the underpinning philosophical assumptions and objectives of the two approaches are just simply different (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Yin, 2002, Lincoln et al., 2011, Silverman, 2013). In fact, Feyerabend (2010) observed that most of the greatest discoveries in the world would not have been discovered if they had followed the ‘scientific method’. Nonetheless, the application of the ‘trustworthiness’ principles and verification strategies spelt out above seem to adequately tackle most of the criticism raised. Moreover, this study endeavoured to use methods that gave the participants a degree of freedom and allowed spontaneity to ensure an atmosphere that could enable the participants to express themselves more freely. This entailed employing the less formal and rigid approaches that qualitative research affords. The study avoided forcing the participants to select from sets of pre-determined responses which in any case, would have been inappropriate or inaccurate, to describe the participant’s meanings, thoughts, opinions, feelings, attitudes or behaviour; and thus jeopardised the study’s objectives. Since the assumption was that the actors were continuously trying to attribute meaning to their experiences, limiting the study solely to the researcher’s view and understandings of the situation, would certainly have hampered the learning and acquiring of new perspectives from the views, experiences, and understandings of the participants. Accordingly, this study employed more open-ended, less narrow and more exploratory methods; that permitted going beyond the initial responses and asking questions of ‘what’ and ‘how many’; towards not only ‘why’, ‘how’, and ‘what if’, but also other dimensions of ‘what if’, ‘can’, ‘could/should have’ as well as why ‘not’. Accordingly, the qualitative research approach was useful in enabling the researcher’s involvement and insider’s view of the field, to uncover subtleties, complexities, and other underlying issues; besides a nuanced observation and capturing of the interactions, causes-effects relations, and other dynamic processes. Hence the approach facilitated in-depth explorations and explanations that could facilitate understanding of the various idiosyncrasies within the urban South crisis, thus moving towards gaining new insights and forms of knowledge that might otherwise have been difficult to achieve.

8.2. Research strategy: Case study and its setting

In pursuance of the research questions and objectives, this study examined the housing arena in Nairobi using case study as the principal method, augmented by elements of historical and archival analysis. This was because the main questions were ‘how’ and ‘why’, and were focusing on contemporary situations as well as on those without control of behavioural events; albeit also with some questions of ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘how many/much’, and ‘when’. This followed Yin’s (2009p 18) definition of a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when, the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Furthermore, a case study copes with “more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, it copes with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (Yin, 2009 p 18). Hence, case study is typically a triangulated research strategy (Denzin, 1984, Feagin et al., 1991, Denzin, 2006). As opposed to experimental studies where data collection and analysis methods were known to hide some details; case studies
facilitate the bringing out of those details from the viewpoints of the participants and by means of multiple sources of data (Stake, 1980, Feagin et al., 1991, Yin, 1993, Yin, 1994b, Stake, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2009). Accordingly, case study was an ideal methodology for this study whose main objective was to endeavour an in-depth and holistic uncovering and understanding of real-life phenomena in the urban South crisis; phenomena which are intricately entangled with the context, and sometimes hidden and unacknowledged; involving both contemporary and non-contemporary events; of which the researcher has very little control over, if any.

The use of the case study in this research was derived from an ‘instrumental’ motive: to understand ‘more than what was obvious’; and why what was ‘obvious’ and readily observable was not fully explaining the situation in the urban South arena, as stated in the research question (Stake, 1995). Hence, the study involved the procedure circles of exploratory-explanatory-descriptive. The circles began with descriptive and exploratory elements, with questions of ‘what has happened and is currently happening’. This was followed by explanatory elements with causal investigations and questions of ‘how and why it happened or is happening that way’. With each circle ending with descriptive elements, with pattern-matching and theory creation, hence beginning a new circle. Thus the study involved both exploratory and confirmatory elements aiming not only at deriving new prepositions, hypotheses and theories, but also testing the existing and the newly derived ones (Stake, 1980, Feagin et al., 1991, Yin, 1993, Yin, 1994b, Stake, 1995, Yin, 2009). This involved multi-perspective analyses, considering not just the voices, actions, and perspectives of the actors, but also the interaction between them; as well as the conditions for those interactions and outcomes; thereby facilitating the giving of a voice to the voiceless, and voicing the unvoiced (Feagin et al., 1991). Accordingly, the study endeavoured to integrate theoretical prepositions with the empirical part of the case study, going beyond overt simplifications, toward a more holistic understanding of the urban South situation and its context. As recommended by Yin (2009 pp 19-20); the case study approach was applied in the research to: firstly, explain the presumed causal links in the urban South interventions that were too complex to be readily observed or uncovered by ordinary surveys and analyses; secondly, describe those interventions and the real-life context in which they occurred; thirdly, illustrate nuances and emerging critical issues within those interventions and evaluations; and fourthly, enlighten those situations in which those interventions and evaluations did not have any clear set of outcomes or consequences. Thus case study method was used with the expectations that the study’s outcomes would resonate experientially with a broad cross section of actors, theorists, and practitioners; producing a ‘naturalistic’ generalisation (Stake, 1995) that could facilitate a better understanding of the urban South situation.

Nevertheless, even though case studies can reveal deep insights, their major weakness is that the data collection, analysis, and interpretation is highly exposed to the researcher’s biases that may jeopardise the validity of the results. This calls for an appropriate and explicit framework of sample selection, data collection, analysis, and interpretation; besides the trustworthiness verification strategies to be diligently applied at any stage of the research.
Table 30: Strengths and weaknesses of the case study method

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High Internal Credibility</td>
<td>Low External Validity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• More complete understanding</td>
<td>• Low generality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct observation of situation</td>
<td>• Little control over phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multiple sources of data</td>
<td>• Comparative analysis difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Triangulation of data</td>
<td>• Representativeness of case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Meaningful to subjects</td>
<td>• Difficult to replicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holistic</td>
<td>Researcher bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Realistic</td>
<td>• Observation bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Depth of analysis</td>
<td>• Interpretation bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Attention to context</td>
<td>• Cannot see everything that is going on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Extensive range of variables</td>
<td>• Presence changes case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive</td>
<td>• Acceptance by subjects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The question</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Methods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Data sources etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can be changed as the case develops</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longitudinal</td>
<td>Costly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop history of case</td>
<td>• Research time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Details of process</td>
<td>• Volume of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Causation and interactions</td>
<td>• Analysis of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Situation as it happens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


8.2.1. Research design: Single-case (embedded)

In view of the above, this study applies a single-case design with embedded multiple units of analysis i.e. the type 2 as defined by Yin (2009), by which the main unit of analysis was the single case of the Nairobi housing arena (as part of the greater urban South). However, focusing on the embedded multiple units of analysis that included individual actors and organisations with their various attitudes and attributes, programmes and initiatives, as well as other numerous components, features, and dynamics.

Figure 21: Research design: Embedded single-case (type 2)

Source: (Yin, 2009)

Nonetheless, there was a constant switching between the holistic and embedded levels, as the study continuously returned to the main unit of analysis, the Nairobi’s arena as a whole, besides being referenced to the context of the urban South in its entirety and global nature, as the original and ultimate phenomenon of interest. Yin (2009 p 52) further puts forward several conditions under which single-case design is justifiable: “(a) a critical test of existing theory, (b) a rare or unique circumstance, (c) a representative or typical case, or where the case serves a (d) revelatory or (e) longitudinal purpose”. It is on the basis of these rationales in pursuit of the study objectives and questions that this research design as well as the Nairobi arena and its embedded units were chosen.
8.2.2. The setting of the inquiry

The focus of this study is the actions, interactions, and interrelations of actors involved in Nairobi's informal housing arena. Hence, the actors might not necessarily be situated in Nairobi, but what is important is that they act, are involved or interested in the arena. As a location in time-space, the study focuses on contemporary happenings with reference to their past and future, as it is concerned with Nairobi as a whole, and not a particular slum location. This is based on the premises that slum issues in general are not unique for any location, and that slums are not islands of deprived neighbourhoods but are actually integral parts of the overall city networks and systems. Nevertheless, this is not to negate the colossal diversity and uniqueness among the slums of Nairobi, as even within most slums huge differences can be identified between its various sub-parts. Whereas the focus is on actors interested in Nairobi, these actors have extreme diversities in scale, roles, level of involvement among other diverse attitudes and attributes. To some, Nairobi is just one of the many locations they deal with, while other actors deal with only a small part of a slum location. The lives of other actors are wholly engulfed in slum issues and it is hard to escape them, while for others, it forms a tiny bit of their existence, and can get in and out of it voluntarily. Nevertheless, the larger slums and more active settlements of Kibera, Mathare, Mukuru kwa Njenga, and Korogocho, with more involved actors, organisations, and initiatives, seemed to have received more attention than others; especially following the referencing and snowballing techniques employed in the study as an entry point to the slum location and issues.

8.2.3. The choice of Nairobi's arena and embedded case study design

The choice of Nairobi as the setting of this inquiry was mainly due to fact that Nairobi is both an extremely unique but also a highly representative typical case in the urban South crisis and solutions; in addition to the requisite role of the researcher as per the research questions. Nairobi typifies an urban South arena; with postcoloniality, inequality, informality, casualty, slums, and multiperspectivity characteristics (see Chapter 3.1). Nairobi is the capital city of Kenya and often serves as the regional capital of Eastern and Central Africa in many issues including political, business, and cultural. Indeed what makes Nairobi special when it comes to urban South issues is the fact that Nairobi hosts the world headquarters of the international United Nations agency that is mandated and dedicated to deal with the issues of slums and other housing and urban issues, the UN-Habitat. In addition, Nairobi has an exceedingly large number of NGOs, international and local, big and small, involved in various aspects of slums. This extremely diverse assemblage of actors, efforts, approaches, interests, and perspectives makes Nairobi the ideal case study choice for this study's research objectives. This highly cosmopolitan, relatively 'advanced' metropolis and 'global city' is the home of some of the wealthiest as well as the poorest individuals in the East African region. On the one hand, it comprises 'world class' infrastructure and services, luxurious apartments and gated communities, 'state of the art' amenities, malls, office parks, hotels, and prestigious towers. On the other hand, Nairobi hosts supposedly some of the largest slums in the world in terms of population, but with extremely high densities, such that they occupy infinitesimal land area that is hardly visible in most aerial photographs and city maps. Nonetheless, the issues of slums in Nairobi are beset with monstrous contestations and disputes in almost all spheres including theory, policy, practice, politico-economic, and socio-
cultural dimensions. For instance, it is impossible to ascertain the number of slum dwellers in Nairobi, there being highly contrasting figures for the same time and place. These among other issues render Nairobi a quintessential exemplar for interrogating the issues of the urban South crisis and its prescribed solutions. Nevertheless, the researcher’s familiarity with Nairobi and its underlying nuances also played a significant role in the choice of the location. This presented immense opportunities and advantages in answering the research questions and examining the involved specific phenomena in operational detail; notwithstanding some disadvantages that comes with being overly familiar with the context and some of the respondents.

As an embedded case study, Nairobi represented a critical case, meeting most of the conditions required to pursue the study's objectives and questions, and could be used to ascertain whether the study’s propositions were plausible or if corrections as well as alternative and more explanations were required. But at the same time, Nairobi was a typical case capturing the circumstances and conditions of commonplace situations in the urban South crisis. Hence, insights generated from the case could be informative for some elements prevalent in the entire urban South, and in any given time and locations; after necessary adaptations and modifications. Indeed, this case study can be deemed revelatory in intention, due to its objectives of observing, uncovering and analysing phenomenon ordinarily not openly visible or accessible, using most of the prevailing actor/stakeholder methods. Nonetheless, in the totality of the urban South crisis, a case study of Nairobi cannot be regarded as a complete study on its own, necessitating more similar studies in other urban South time-space locations. In this view this study can be seen as a ‘pilot case’, if it will be followed by others. This could also include longitudinal studies to examine the housing arenas and their changes over time. Ultimately, all of the above are pursued with the assumptions that these endeavours could provide a significant contribution to knowledge, and play a role in refocusing future theory and practice towards a better understanding and resolution of the urban South crisis.

Table 31: Structurationist empirical conceptualisation and operationalisation of the DHG matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Purpose in interaction and structure</th>
<th>Question pointer in Nairobi informal housing arena</th>
<th>Phrases to check in answers:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpretative schemes</td>
<td>To communicate and produce signification (meaning).</td>
<td>What do housing/governance/problems mean to you?</td>
<td>if we do this-it will mean, it means, it signifies, it represents,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilities</td>
<td>To exercise power and produce domination</td>
<td>What resources do you have (or should have) to achieve your goal?</td>
<td>Who, with what, with whom, for whom, because of so, who tells who, has what</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>To sanction and produce legitimation</td>
<td>What should be done, Why should it be done?</td>
<td>“should” or “because” or “in order to”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.4. Types of questions

Yin (1994) recommended case studies firstly, on the basis of the questions posed; secondly, on the extent of control the researcher has over the behavioural events; and thirdly, the degree of focus on contemporary events. Apart from the main focus on ongoing issues and limited control the researcher
has on the research context, this study posed a number of what, who, how, and why questions. Hence in addition to the main study questions; the interview questions were derived from the DHG matrix as highlighted by Table 31 as empirical conceptualisation and operationalisation.

8.3. Data collection procedures

This study employs a number of primary sources of evidence for case study research as identified by Yin (1994), each necessitating different skills from the researcher. This is premised on the importance of multiple sources of data for the reliability and trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Stake, 1995). These sources are:

- Document and archival reviews (programme documents, reports, newspapers, policies, archives)
- Key informant interviews (experts, gatekeepers, privileged witnesses, officials, dwellers) and focus group discussions (dwellers, stakeholder forums)
- Participatory observation and general non-participant direct observation.
- Artefacts (material and non-material resources and outputs)

Since each of the sources had strengths and weaknesses, the sources were used complementarily in tandem, not only to mitigate the weakness of other sources, but also for purposes of triangulation, to increase the study's trustworthiness. Accordingly, prior to the field work a case study protocol was developed that entailed the project objectives, field procedures, case study questions, among other rules and guides to be followed during the study to enhance its trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Yin, 1994a).

Table 32: Evidence collection procedures: Strengths and weaknesses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Evidence</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Documentation and archival Records</td>
<td>• stable - repeated review&lt;br&gt;• unobtrusive - exist prior to case study&lt;br&gt;• exact - names etc.&lt;br&gt;• broad coverage - extended time span&lt;br&gt;• precise and quantitative&lt;br&gt;• targeted - focuses on case study topic&lt;br&gt;• insightful - provides perceived causal inferences</td>
<td>• retrievability - difficult&lt;br&gt;• biased selectivity&lt;br&gt;• reporting bias - reflects author bias&lt;br&gt;• access - may be blocked&lt;br&gt;• privacy might inhibit access&lt;br&gt;• bias due to poor questions&lt;br&gt;• response bias&lt;br&gt;• incomplete recollection&lt;br&gt;• reflexivity - interviewee expresses what interviewer wants to hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>• reality - covers events in real time&lt;br&gt;• contextual - covers event context&lt;br&gt;• insightful into interpersonal behaviour</td>
<td>• time-consuming&lt;br&gt;• selectivity - might miss facts&lt;br&gt;• reflexivity - observer's presence might cause change&lt;br&gt;• cost - observers need time&lt;br&gt;• bias due to investigator's actions&lt;br&gt;• selectivity&lt;br&gt;• availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant and direct observation</td>
<td>• insightful into cultural features&lt;br&gt;• insightful into technical operations</td>
<td>&lt;br&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Artefacts</td>
<td>&lt;br&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources Adapted (Yin, 1994a p 80)

8.3.1. Document and archival reviews

Document and archival reviews were done before, during, and after the field work, from the preparation of the study, collection of data, and in its analysis and interpretation. Prior to interviewing an actor, documents and information related to them were studied, or examined. These included
actors’ key documents, mandates, service chatters, annual reports, project reports, websites, and others. News and information about a given actor was also gleaned from newspapers, journals, archives, and online sources. During and after the interviews, most of the formal actors interviewed provided literature about their organisations, reports, minutes of meetings of interest to the study, including information of other actors they had worked closely with (non-confidential material). Some actors shared their own confidential materials which the study could infer from, but was not allowed to quote from. Some actors generously continued to furnish the researcher with emerging new data, long after the interviews were conducted. Hence this remained a continuous process throughout the study.

Table 33: Nairobi informal housing actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor type, group, organisations</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Meetings &amp; activities type</th>
<th>Categories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slum Dwellers</td>
<td>Residents from Kibera, Mathare, Mukuru, Korogocho, Huruma, Kosovo, Mtumba, Kyangombe, Kawangware</td>
<td>One-to-one individual interviews Small focus groups (2-5 pax) Large groups (6-20 pax)</td>
<td>Affiliated vs. Non-affiliated Structure owners vs. tenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral organisations</td>
<td>UN-Habitat, Word Bank, UNDP, City Alliance</td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews</td>
<td>Seniors, mid-level, junior Office vs. Field staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral organisations</td>
<td>GIZ, SIDA, USAID, IDC</td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews</td>
<td>Seniors, mid-level, junior Office vs. Field staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmentals</td>
<td>Central and local government ministries &amp; parastatals Housing, Local government, Metropolitan, Lands, KENSUP, KISIP, NHC, City Council of Nairobi</td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews</td>
<td>Seniors, mid-level, junior Office vs. Field staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews Political/ project functions</td>
<td>Supporting vs. opposing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experts and scholars</td>
<td>Universities, consultants, architects, planners,</td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews</td>
<td>Seniors, mid-level, junior Office vs. Field staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>NGOs, FBOs, CBOs, trust and foundations e.g. MuST, Akiba, Muungano, Pamoja, Rockefeller, Ford Foundation, KEPSA, Shelter forum, Map, youth groups,</td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews Meetings &amp; project activities (6-20 pax)</td>
<td>Seniors, mid-level, junior Office vs. Field staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
<td>Investors, employers, traders, CSR Business, employers, contractors, developers, Banks and financial institutions e.g. Eco-bank, slumlords, agents,</td>
<td>Expert/actor interviews</td>
<td>Formal vs. Informal Powerful vs. Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extralegals</td>
<td>Slumlords, Service providers Criminal gangs Some Politicians, Mafia, ‘Youths’, Vigilante</td>
<td>Expert/actor or proxy interviews</td>
<td>Powerful vs. Weak Patrons vs. Clients</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. In some organisations, several interviews were conducted, for example after an interview, the researcher would be introduced to another officer in the same department who was also conversant with information required.
2. Some meetings were formal and held in offices, while others were informal; held in restaurants, outside meeting halls, or homes.
3. The interviews lasted from 15 minutes to 3 hours, (while some officers were very pressed for time, other interviewees volunteered more time and information). On average high ranking officials gave 30 minutes while residents, middle level officers and NGOs gave one to two hours.

8.3.2. Semi-structured interviews

Interview guides were prepared and semi-structured interviews were administered to the actors. This allowed for flexibility, such that new questions could be added in response to what the interviewees said, and questions tailored appropriately to the diverse actors and contexts. Following a pre-study involving an actor/stakeholder analysis, various categories of actors were identified, and actors in each category, involving scales and sectors, were selected for the interviews. Most experts, officials, and
other formal actors were interviewed, mostly on a one-to-one basis, by means of expert interviews in English; while the residents and other informal actors were either interviewed on a one-to-one basis, in groups of two and five, or in focus groups ranging from six to twenty, in Kiswahili or Sheng’ (a Nairobi slang); often with the help of an NGO, government, or multilateral organisation personnel. On several occasions, after a stakeholder meeting, the researcher was introduced to the meeting and asked those willing to be interviewed to remain and give their opinions, sometimes heated discussions ensued. The one-on-one interviews generated deep insights including those on sensitive issues as well as individuals’ personal experiences and perspectives; while group interviews were effective in generating broad overviews of issues of concern for the group and eliciting data on the cultural norms, meanings, and power-relational dynamics. Nonetheless, most actors requested anonymity and confidentiality, not wanting their voices recorded or names mentioned in subsequent writings; especially when sensitive topics were being explored.

8.3.3. Participant, direct observations and artefacts

Participant observation was appropriate for collecting data on naturally occurring behaviours in their usual contexts. By participating for some time with some of the actors in their daily work and interactions with informal settlements, the researcher was able, for a limited time, to take on a role in the situation under observation. The researcher was able to understand the actors better and the actors’ motives, modus operandi, perceptions, understanding and interpretation, etc. It also built trust with the actors who were thereafter, able to share more and help in arranging for meetings, security briefings, contacts, documents etc. Participant observation was done in a couple of NGOs, government agencies, a multilateral organisation, and with some experts. Moreover, by participating in meetings or projects quietly without asking any questions, a lot of information was gathered (with permission), concerning not only about the observed actors, but also other actors from other groups and organisations that were interacting with the observed actor. Nevertheless, apart from participant observation, much of the study comprised direct observation of what the actors did and how they interacted with others in the arena. This includes identifying their actors’ artefacts which comprised material and non-material resources and outputs, such as the housing types, materials used, non material objects, such as voice and planning charts, among others, that indentified actors with particular approaches.

8.3.4. Selection of participants and sampling

In view of the study’s research objectives, and the size, diversity and other characteristics of the study population; it was neither possible nor necessary to collect data from all the involved actors and organisations in order to get valid findings. As a consequence, the study employed various sampling strategies. Firstly, elements of purposive sampling were employed, by which the actors were grouped according to the pre-selected criteria set out in the research questions and objectives. This involved a prestudy actor/stakeholder analysis by which individual actors and organisations were identified, characterised, and grouped based on their interests, resources, influence, patterns of action, relations with other actors, and relevance to the study’s objective pertaining to issues of slums, housing and governance.
Table 34: Prestudy: Mapping key stakeholder categories and profiles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifying key stakeholders</td>
<td>• Based on interests, resources, power, influence, legitimacy, connections, and the magnitude, scale, and form of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• How they are affected positively or negatively, directly or indirectly, winners and losers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder mapping</td>
<td>• Based on their relevance to study objective issues (housing), and locate the issue with the actors’ objectives and scope of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identity and characterise the relationships between the actors and the respective networks, power relations, who works with who, trusts, fights, conflicting, distrusts, cooperates, dictates, powerful, marginalised, disadvantaged, advantaged etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder profiles and grouping</td>
<td>• Generate informative profiles of stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Actor-specific patterns of behaviour in relation to the objective issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To identify differences and similarities among actors: clustering and networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Based on the classical stakeholder analysis, this Prestudy serves firstly to identify, characterise, and group actors to interview; and secondly to indentify the key actors with their interests, influence, and networks; as well as the quality of their relations; especially the potential of conflict or cooperation, misunderstanding of common ground.

Secondly, once the key actors, groupings and organisations were identified, an element of quota sampling was applied in the planning stages, to ensure each of the identified groups was represented in the study in an equitable and reasonable manner, as well as to obtain adequately representative insights concerning the situation in Nairobi’s housing arena. Nevertheless, during the study, despite all efforts, it was almost impossible to obtain a perfectly balanced representation, as some actor groups were more willing and eager to participate than others who were even outrightly hostile. Furthermore, the principle of theoretical saturation was pursued, whereby data collection continued to the point it was deemed that new data was no longer bringing additional insights to the research’s objective questions from the actor group or network being pursued.

Table 35: Objectives and methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>DATA REQUIREMENTS &amp; SOURCES</th>
<th>METHODS &amp; TOOLS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical framework</td>
<td>Framework explaining Global South urban informal housing arena focusing on multi-actor &amp; multi-paradigmatic structure and agency situation</td>
<td>Literature review, Archival research and secondary data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deduce what Nairobi informal housing arena is</td>
<td>Nairobi informal housing arena’s socio-political geography and history e.g. housing systems, policies, programmes- desired versus the realities, normative vs positive Planning, historical and geographical data of Nairobi, Who said or did what, to whom, why, to what, with what, with whom, to what extent and effect</td>
<td>Literature review, Archival research and secondary data analysis Expert interviews, field observations, participatory Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obtain actors’: attitudes and attributes.</td>
<td>Roles, interests, actions, resources, power, scope, scale, positions, views, perceptions, relations, motives, driving forces etc. Data from 1 and 2 above Paradigmatic positions (e.g. by looking at interpretive schemes, facilities and norms constraining or enabling given actors)</td>
<td>Multi-level actor analysis Case study methodology Interviews: expert, semi structured closed and open ended informal Archival research and secondary data analysis Participatory Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyse Paradigmatic positions</td>
<td>Analysis of data following analytical and theoretical frame work above Paradigmatic positions vis-à-vis relations, actions, inputs and outputs in housing system. Data from 1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>DNGH Matrix, Memoing, Coding, MAXQDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications to theory and practice</td>
<td>Results from data analysis and conclusions pointing towards alternatives for improvement, opportunities and social innovations, i.e. the way forward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Thirdly, snowballing or a non-probability chain referral sampling became one of the most useful and available methods for use, as already interviewed participants referred the researcher to other potential participants, often in the participants’ own social networks. This proved very valuable in gaining trust and access to many extremely significant insights, and also many ‘unknown’ issues and especially the ‘hidden populations’ and the voiceless. Indeed it was many times impossible to be granted an interview without being referred to by a ‘trusted friend’, bearing in mind that the issue of slums and land in Kenya tend to be highly emotive and politically-charged topics, teeming with suspicions and antagonism. Nevertheless this method is beset with several risks concerning the validity of the research, due to the problem of ‘gatekeepers’ and the issue of ‘epistemic communities’ as shall be discussed in the subsequent sections. All in all, the study employed a judicious mixing and application of these three sampling methods depending on the objectives and situations at hand at any given time and location during the investigation.

Ultimately, this study is mainly about the endeavour to uncover the deeper meanings and significance of actors’ behaviours and experiences in the arena, and especially their contradictory perspectives, perceptions, beliefs, and behaviours. These include what the actors do, what problems or issues condition their actions, and how they deal with them. Whereas the study is aimed at gaining a rich and complex understanding of the entire urban South crisis and the related actors’ perspectives, relations, and experience, the empirical focus is on Nairobi; and the study is not aimed at obtaining generalisable information, but an in-depth understanding of issues in that arena with probable transferability to other space-time contexts after necessary contextual adjustments.

8.4. Frame of analysis and interpretation

According to (McCracken, 1988b) qualitative data is “normally relatively messy, unorganised data” necessitating techniques of observation to sort data, search out patterns of associations and assumptions, organising ideas, and reflexively managing the research process towards achieving credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba, 1986). In this study this involved a reflexive movement between fieldwork and theory, with a continuous movement between empirical and theory building. This entailed using several strategies that included ‘memoing’, ‘coding’, and integrative diagrams. Memoing involved writing up of thoughts, musings, ideas and reflections that emerged throughout the study, from prior as well as during data collection, and while going through the data and recording reflective notes about what was being learnt from the data; starting with being very open and later on increasingly focusing on the core concepts. Coding entailed conceptualisation and organisation of data to introduce interpretations of it into based codes derived from the DHG matrix for analysis and interpretation. This included both categorising data and describing the details and implications of these categories, by which the data was systematically coded with respect to a core concept of the study, based on a structurationist paradigmatic perspective. The data derived from interviews, documents, observations, desktop surveys, and other fieldwork notes, was systematically categorised for each actor, actor groups, and organisations of interests; and checked for words and phrases that directly or indirectly captured the essence and
particular attributes of the given DHG matrix elements, which served as codes. Whereas this process began in the field, it was refined as the study progressed, and theoretical issues elaborated and crystallised. Additionally, a form of document and discourse analysis was employed to examine the constructions and interpretations of meaning, and how words from speech, text and gestures, and also actions framed and represented power, interests, relations, interactions, cognitions, norms, sanctions, spaces, and time among other elements, on the basis of the DHG matrix, structure, agency, contextuality and other elements from the study's theoretical perspectives. Finally, the integrative diagram was based on DHG matrices and Structuration concepts were utilised as summarising devices to bring the various details together, to help make sense of the data with respect to the emerging analysis, interpretations, theories, and their implications.

8.5. Political and ethical implications: Limitations, reflexivity, and researcher’s role

In conducting this study, several issues emerged that made it difficult to conduct the research and risked jeopardising the study’s quality as well as raised ethical matters. These included mainly the difficulty of accessing the arena, asymmetries in respondents and cases, and the researcher’s close relation with the case issues and location.

In Nairobi, and in fact most of the urban South, issues of slums are exceedingly sensitive, controversial, highly charged with politico-ethno-class tensions; usually involving illegality, corruption, injustices, and political manipulation. In the conduct of this study, these factors were aggravated even further by the fact that the study period coincided with the tremulous aftermath of 2008’s politically instigated, extremely violent politico-ethnic clashes, and just before the even more polarising and tense elections of 2013. This made the study exceedingly difficult in numerous dimensions, including access to the actors, issues of trust, and problems of biases which could impact the quality of data obtained. In a bid to overcome issues of politico-ethnic biases and mistrust, the researcher was often accompanied by a diverse team, who also stated their neutrality and that their intentions were solely academic without any political motives, and with assurances that none of them had been ‘sent’ by any of the politicians highly interested in slum issues and politics. Indeed it was very difficult for many potential respondents to accept to participate in the study or be interviewed; and most of those who accepted to be interviewed requested anonymity, and did not allow the interview to be voice-recorded, or permit the quotation and mention of their names or organisations in the subsequent thesis or publications. Therefore this study respected this, following the principles of beneficence, justice; and respect for persons, office, and communities (Lincoln and Guba, 1986, McCracken, 1988a, Feagin et al., 1991, Yin, 1993, Stake, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2009).

Nonetheless, apart from the sensitivity and controversy surrounding slum issues, there is a need to investigate the reason why many of the actors in the arena were very apprehensive; not wanting to grant any interviews or giving their own honest opinions unless they trusted the interviewer fully, or the interviewer had been referred to the actor by a trusted contact. Hence, before trust was gained, the actors usually presented only the ‘official’ perspective, which in many cases differed radically from
their own ‘real and honest’ opinions, given only after trust had been built. In fact, more often than not, most useful information seemed to be given mostly after ‘finishing’ the interviews, during the farewells as ‘by the way’ or ‘I forgot to mention something more important’; which again most actors did not allow to be voice recorded or quoted in the subsequent thesis and publications. For this reason, the initial aim of having all the interviews voice-recorded for later analysis became wholly untenable.

Generally, it was extremely difficult and sometimes dangerous to gain access to many slums actors and locations unless one was referred by a friend, a field staff, or a high ranking official; or went through either an organisation, ‘gatekeepers’, ‘spokesmen’ or other representatives. However, being referred by someone familiar or being affiliated to an organisation came with its disadvantages. This compromised the perceived neutrality of the researcher to the respondents, with possible significant influences on the responses the respondents gave to questions. For instance, being referred to officials by their superiors carried the risk of those officials giving only the official positions, or not saying anything that might contradict or paint the superior in a bad light; hence largely missing their personal opinions, and the essence of the study. This necessitated finding means to approach the staff directly, or through horizontal relations but not superiors whenever possible. However, more importantly, the ‘references’ and snowballing have a tendency to bias the type of participants since it might be possible to interview a cross-section of only one of the many networks in the arena, and miss out on many other networks present in the arena, thereby leading to serious misinterpretation of the aggregate system.

Furthermore, in a bid to gain a deeper understanding of the working of Nairobi’s housing arena, as well as gain easier access to slum actors, the researcher was embedded in the work of a multilateral organisation, a government agency, and an NGO at various times of the study. These proved extremely useful in providing invaluable insights and access to slum issues, actors, and locations. However, when the respondents perceived the researcher to be affiliated with a certain organisation, these tended to either increase or diminish their trust, but more importantly influence how the respondents answered questions. Indeed, it was uncommon for the respondents to give answers that criticised the ‘organisation of the researcher’. Moreover, the time the researcher spent with those actors and organisations carried the risk of influencing and biasing the researcher’s interpretations towards certain directions, as the researcher gained more insights from these organisations more than from others (Giddens, 1984b, Lincoln and Guba, 1986, McCracken, 1988a, Feagin et al., 1991, Yin, 1993, Stake, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2009).

Moreover, dealing with the difficulty of accessing slum locations, actors, and the arena as a whole; including the issues of security, politics, suspicion and mistrust, necessitated going through ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘spokesmen’ and other representatives at the grassroots. Whereas this facilitated access to wider groups of respondents who were probably more knowledgeable and credible, there is also a high likelihood that the gatekeepers could manipulate access to ensure only the ‘right’ respondents were contacted, while inhibiting access to sensitive, opposing or incriminating information. This risk was also borne by the snowballing technique utilised in this study. Consequently, in a bid to
circumvent this risk, the researcher attempted to access the slum issues and actors through multiple channels including different gatekeepers and organisations, as well as actively seeking to uncover other different networks and groupings that were involved in the arena, and explored them too. Indeed Nairobi’s housing arena was beset with competition and rivalry amongst several organisations and networks. Consequently, this necessitated that neutrality had to be expressly stated at all times, otherwise being identified with a particular grouping or actor could not only to lead to denial of access and honest opinions, but also carried the risk of extremely serious repercussions.

Further to the above, it was remarkably difficult to secure appointments with senior officials in the government and other key organisations. For instance, among several government officials, it was common for the researcher to arrive for a scheduled appointment, only for it to be rescheduled; such that many interviews happened after being rescheduled four or five times. Nevertheless, the rescheduling tended to build familiarity and trust with the officials’ subordinates who on several occasions provided very useful information. Additionally, even though most NGOs, multilateral, and bilateral organisations were very open and welcome to interviews, most of the time, the key officers had travelled out of the country or were not available for various reasons. Conversely, it was much easier to secure appointments with midlevel and junior officials, and especially with the field staff at any level. Nonetheless, as already mentioned, access to slums and slum dwellers in their habitations, as well as some ongoing initiatives was difficult, and sometimes carried high security risks due to criminal or political activities, such that research in settlements was not possible on some days and some locations were totally ‘no go zones’.

All the above issues were sometimes mitigated, but at other times aggravated by fact that the researcher was a Kenyan who had lived in Nairobi and had previously worked or interacted in various ways with some of the actors dealing with slum issues; therefore, was already personally known to several persons living in slums as well as government officials and other non-state actors. This familiarity with local matters, and other questions surrounding the issues of slums in Kenya, had tremendous advantages for the study. These included background knowledge of the issues, their backgrounds, nuances, hidden issues, connotations, politics, contradictions, complications, and other various ‘insider’ dimensions that could not easily be grappled with by an ‘outsider’. The knowledge of local languages and slangs that made it easier to communicate and grasp meanings; while the familiarity with issues and their backgrounds, enabled access and building of trust, facilitated by ease of interpreting nuances, gestures, and hints; as well as ‘knowing what to do, say, or not’ in given situations (Giddens, 1984b, Feagin et al., 1991, Yin, 1993, Stake, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2009). These allowed ease of access to some actors, issues and locations but also impeded access to others.

Nevertheless these advantages also carried severe risks to the research. In a highly politically polarised environment the respondents involuntarily assigned the researcher certain politico-ethnic ascriptions, as well as ascribed the researcher to particular networks, approaches, and probably political affiliations. These could have probably contributed to the ease or difficulty of accepting to be interviewed, as well as carried the risk of influencing the answers respondents gave; with the
information being withheld or given in a particular way that may neither be entirely truthful nor open. Certainly, being Kenyan raised the likelihood of this unintentional entanglement into the already complex political complexities surrounding the slum issues, with the risk of serious consequence, both to the researcher and the study itself. Hence, with the respondents labelling and viewing the researcher in a certain light, they could have produced various degrees of trust and mistrust, with some respondents endeavouring to give ‘right’, ‘safe’, or ‘inoffensive’ answers; thereby seriously impacting the quality and nature of information delivered (Giddens, 1984b, Lincoln and Guba, 1986, McCracken, 1988a, Feagin et al., 1991, Yin, 1993, Stake, 1995, Flyvbjerg, 2006, Yin, 2009).

Furthermore, whereas the researcher endeavoured to maintain the truth value (credibility), neutrality (confirmability) and general trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1986); the researcher also had his own perspectives, political positions, reflections, and biases that may have unknowingly and unintentionally served as a lens that influenced the perceptions and interpretations of situations and the actors’ statements and actions (Giddens, 1984b, Feagin et al., 1991). Indeed, often in studies involving injustices, there is often the tendency of the researcher to be biased towards the oppressed and underprivileged and unintentionally aggravated towards normative perspectives. Thus what is stated as respondents’ views and perspectives could simply be the researcher’s perspectives of other people’s perspectives (sometimes also of others), in a chain of reinterpretations, perceptions, and multiple hermeneutics. The researcher both influences and is influenced by the context of the research, such that the outcomes of the research are to a certain extent merely a reflection of this reflexive self reinforcing loop (Giddens, 1984b, Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). Consequently, the role of the researcher’s reflexivity or reflectiveness cannot be overstated, especially the implications to his mere presence in the very situations he is investigating; alongside with the researcher’s vis-à-vis the respondents’ values, biases, and decisions, as well as the knowledge generated by the research methods in the course of the study.

Additionally, all the above issues also risked making the study highly asymmetrical. Issues of trust, access, security and politics, allowed massive access and availability of information from a segment of the actors, slums and initiatives, while some segments were highly restrictive. There were extremely varied responses to requests for interviews. While some actors were overly eager to be interviewed, were friendly, divulging exceedingly meaningful and colossal amounts of information, as well as being very helpful in various aspects including facilitating access to other actors and organisations; others were exceptionally hostile, secretive and unhelpful, and did not grant interviews, or when they granted them, they would only divulge common knowledge. Similarly, whereas, the formal actors and organisations had a colossal amount of their own documents, project reports, websites, news reports and scholarly studies, many of the key actors, especially the informal ones, did not have any of their own documents to scrutinise, or much written information about them. In addition, there were also the illegal or invisible, but very important actors who whilst their information was important, it was very difficult and even dangerous to contact, such as the mafias, illegal providers etc. In mixed groups, some participants had language limitations, and the researcher had to keep on switching languages to accommodate all. However, some actors with oratory or education advantages, tended to dominate
group interviews, shutting out critical or important voices from other actors, hence, the researcher had to actively seek out the views of the silent actors. Moreover, to obtain the personal individual actors’ positions that in many cases were contrary to their employer organisation’s required personal communications and building of trust; or else only the formal text book positions would be given. Hence, there was a wide asymmetry concerning the available information about different actors; with the danger of significantly skewing interpretations. Thus, there was a risk of painting a picture of only those who responded, and not adequately factoring in the views of those who did not respond, thereby risking to make wrong inferences concerning the situation in Nairobi. Nevertheless, the objectives of this study did not require a representative sample since the objective is to observe the paradigmatic dynamics which can also be examined in a non-representative sample (Guba, 1981, Lincoln and Guba, 1986, Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009, Lincoln et al., 2011).

Ultimately, the issues raised above carried a high risk of jeopardising the quality of the research. However, most were mitigated by the verification strategies so as to establish the trustworthiness state beforehand, as well as recognition, acknowledgement, and factoring in of all those factors in the subsequent analysis, and interpretation of the study’s findings. In sum, issues related to development, housing, slums, and governance are tremendously diverse, complex, and contradictory; with myriads of perspectives, dimensions, actors, and interests among many others in Nairobi, let alone the entire urban South. However, this study focuses mainly on the paradigmatic dimensions in the involved actors’ perspectives in relation to the informal housing issues, and how they relate to the actors’ interactions, and potentially to the effectiveness of initiatives as well as the resolution of the urban South housing crisis.
PART II: CASE STUDY
9. The case of Nairobi Kenya

The situation in the city of Nairobi Kenya exemplifies the condition of most of capitals and major urban areas in Global South, and more so in Sub-Saharan Africa; especially with its features of postcoloniality, inequality, informality, casualty, multiperspectivity, and slums. Whereas its housing problems and slums occupy an infinitesimal proportion of space in both policy matters and physical land area; they concern probably more than half of Nairobi’s populations. Slums are estimated to house approximately 60% of Nairobi’s population; however, in about 1% of its total land area (5% of total residential land area). In a profound display of massive inequalities, slums housing the majority of the city’s population appear as tiny specks in the aerial maps and urban plans, whose collative areas could be less than that occupied by the golf courses in Nairobi (UN-Habitat, 2006b, UN-Habitat, 2008b, UN-Habitat, 2013b, GOK, 2014). Nevertheless, issues of slums are highly politically charged, and usually occupy a prominent place in the country’s political space around the times elections, referendums, plebiscites, demonstrations, and issue in which ‘numbers’ are needed by the country’s political elite. Indeed since the founding of Nairobi towards the end the 19th Century, housing issues and related inequalities have been part and parcel of the City’s history, and closely related to the country’s politico-economic and socio-cultural issues and their trajectories. Housing problems, for the majority in Nairobi’s populations at any given time, emerged with the founding of the city, and have continued to grow and persist despite numerous countermeasures and efforts. Certainly, over the decades, Nairobi’s housing arena has seen a massive increase in the number and type of involved actors with extremely diverse interests, perspectives, and approaches. Accordingly, this chapter discusses the trajectory of Nairobi’s housing crisis and slums vis a vis the responses and initiatives as well as their outcomes; besides the closely related issues of ‘development’ and governance. This is done against its background of the Kenya politico-historical context, and the global geopolitico-economic milieu.

Figure 22: Nairobi the Global South, Africa, Kenya, and the ‘Uganda-Railway’

Sources: (CIA, 2013)
Table 36: Kenya’s country fact sheet (2012 estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Relevance to slums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location &amp; size</strong></td>
<td>Eastern Africa, Geographic coordinates: 1 00 N, 38 00 E</td>
<td>Location in Sub Saharan Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Border countries: Ethiopia 861 km, Somalia 682 km, South Sudan 232 km, Tanzania 769 km, Uganda 933 km</td>
<td>Instabilities, wars and refugees from neighbouring country contributes to the informal settlements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area: Total: 582,650 sq km (no 55) land: 569,250 sq km; water: 13,400 sq km</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy:</strong></td>
<td>GDP(PPP): 76.07 billion No. 84</td>
<td>Poverty levels, unemployment, and other economic factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP (official) $41.84 billion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP): $1,800. No 198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Real GDP growth 5.1%. No 57</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP composition: agriculture: 24.2%; industry: 14.8%; services: 61%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployment Rate: 40% No 187</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inflation: 9.4%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget revenues: $7.375 billion, expenditures: $9.3 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Budget deficit (-):-4.6% of GDP. No 149</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public debt: 50% of GDP . No. 64</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inflation rate (consumer prices): 10.1% No 198</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exchange rates: Kenyan shillings (KES) per US dollar - 85, Euro - 100</td>
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<td><strong>Poverty levels &amp; Inequalities</strong></td>
<td>Population below poverty line: 50%</td>
<td>Inequalities manifested in slums and as an outcome of globalisation and neo-liberal policies in a divisive politico-ethnic environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gini index 42.5 No 49</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Household income lowest 10%: 1.8%, highest 10%: 37.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Development indices</strong></td>
<td>HDI (2013) 0.519 (low) (145th)</td>
<td>Low literacy, education, health and others together with poverty and slums become a self reinforcing vicious cycle</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and older) 87.4%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio(%)60.6 (129)</td>
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<td>Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) Kenya 24.43 (60th)</td>
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<td>Total fertility rate 4.57</td>
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<td>Under-5 mortality Male/Female115/99</td>
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<td>Infant mortality total/1,000 64</td>
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<td>Life expectancy at birth 50.5/48.7</td>
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<td>Population: 44,037,656</td>
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<td>Maternal mortality ratio1,000</td>
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<td><strong>Urbanization:</strong></td>
<td>Urban population: 31% of total population</td>
<td>Low urbanisation level, but very rapid urbanisation. Urban growth equivalent to slum growth</td>
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<td>Rate of urbanization: 4.2% annual rate of change</td>
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<td>Major cities – population NAIROBI 3.375 million; Mombasa 966,000</td>
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<td>Sanitation facility access: unimproved total: 68% of population</td>
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9.1. Kenya the country: National politico-historical context

The Republic of Kenya is located on the east coast of Africa, and on the equator; bordering South- Sudan and Ethiopia to the North, Somalia and the Indian Ocean to the East, Tanzania to the South, and Uganda to the West. Since the founding of the country, as a colony of Britain, towards the end of the 19th century; it population steadily rose from 1.7 million to 6.1 million in 1950, which rapidly grew to 8.9 million at independence in 1963 to the current 45 million people (UNFPA, 2007, KNSB, 2010, KNSB, 2012, UNDESA, 2013, UNDESA, 2014). The land total area of the country is 582,650 km$^2$ of which 85% of this area is arid and semi-arid and sparsely populated, mainly utilised for nomadic pastoralism and wildlife conservation. Hence most of the Kenya’s population are concentrated on the 15% of the land; located in the southern part of the country, along the Kisumu-Mombasa railway line (formerly Uganda-Railway). Nonetheless, much of this productive area is owned by a few individuals and companies, as expansive ranches and plantations (formerly the White Highlands); leaving the majority of the population to live in dense villages and small subsistence farms in the rural areas (formerly Native reserves), or in the urban areas, most of which are also located on the railway line (UN-Habitat, 2006b, Kameri-Mbote, 2009, Clayton and Savage, 2012, KNSB, 2012, GOK, 2013b, KIPPRA, 2013, GOK, 2014). Whereas only 32% of Kenya’s population resides in the urban areas,
Kenya continued to experience a rapid urban population growth rate, which has ranged from over 20% in the 1930s, to 8.2% in the 1960s and is currently growing at 3.9% per year (UNFPA, 2007, KNSB, 2010, KNSB, 2012, UNDESA, 2013, UNDESA, 2014). However, the highly inequitable distribution land in both the rural areas and urban has been a key driver of poverty in Kenya; as it has influenced (as well as been influenced by) the patterns of development, politico-economic stability, peace and conflict; besides the matters of governance, corruption, class segregation, and politico-ethnic dynamics. These have been linked to the problem of inadequate shelter for the majority of its urban citizens since the formation of the country; besides failed or inadequate policies, proliferation of slums, and worsening socio-economic situation; with an ever widening gap between the ‘haves and have-nots’ as well as numerous problems related to ‘governance’. Indeed, socio-economic inequalities and politico-ethnic divisions (in regions, communities, and individuals) play a considerable role in the citizens lives. The country is divided into eight administratively provinces. Prior to 2013 these provinces were divided into a total of 256 districts, which in 2013 were converted into 47 counties; with the demarcations of the provinces, districts, and counties closely following the country’s ethnic groupings.

Whereas politico-ethnic affiliations and divisions seem dominate the politico-economic discourse, the media, and even scholarly debates; it is the country’s massive socio-economic inequalities that actually define the lives, interests, and perspectives of its citizens. According to the 2009 census, Kenya roughly 42 major ethnic groups comprising, the Kikuyu 17%, Luhy 14%, Kalenjin 13%, Luo 11%, Kamba 10%, Somali 6%, Kisii 6%, Mijikenda 5%, Meru 4%, other African 13 percent, non-African (Asian, European and Arab) 1% percent (KNSB, 2012). These ethnic and kinship ties often times play a significant role in the socio-politico-economic structure of Kenyan society, either enabling and constrain ones access to material and non-material resources, thereby influencing many aspects the citizens life and the entire country’s governance, and politico-economic processes and outcomes. Nonetheless, most of these ethnic groups are mainly a colonial creation, in pursuance of the ‘divide and rule’ policy and client-patron systems, of which current politicians have continued to perpetuate to manipulate the populace and maintain themselves in power (Wa Wamwere, 2003, Lynch, 2006, Lonsdale, 2008, Murunga, 2011, Hornsby, 2012, Lonsdale, 2014). Hence, in the day to day lives of many citizens politico-ethnicity plays a very minimal role, with most affiliations, networks, business and work partnerships, marriages, and other associations usually transcending ethnicity. In fact, most divisions in Kenya society and day to day lives are based on economic class. However, in political situations ethnic affiliations suddenly gain extreme significance, and even become matters of life and death. Nevertheless despite intense politico-ethnic manipulation of the citizenry by the country’s elite, socio-economic inequalities and its consequences remain the most enduring defining issue in the lives of many citizens, since the founding of the country. Accordingly, in the year 2014, following rebasing and recalculation that showed the size its economy being 25% larger than previously thought, Kenya was reclassified as a middle-income country and the 5th largest economy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus with this announcement many starving Kenyans woke to the news that they were much richer than they were the day before (World Bank, 2014c). However, at the same time over 40% of Kenyans were living below the poverty line; and Kenya was also ranked the sixth poorest country in Africa based on
‘extreme poverty index’ (World Bank, 2014c, Turner et al., 2015). Hence, Kenya was at simultaneously considered one of the richest and the poorest countries in Africa; indicating extreme inequalities.

Apart from the paradox of being concurrently considered one the richest and poorest country in the region, Kenya seem to be mainly characterised by numerous complexities and contradictions; which pervade various dimensions of what Kenya is. Depending on the perspective, the country is hailed as one of the most peaceful countries in the Global South, but at the same time ranked as one of the most volatile. It is often presents as a one highly united country, but also one with extremely bitter divisions between economic classes and politico-ethnic groupings that it make a very unpredictable country with intense antagonisms. On the one hand it has the semblance of a highly democratic country with a ‘mature democracy’, having since its independence conducted ‘democratic’ elections other democratic procedures regularly without fail. On the other hand, its history has been characterised by state repression, injustices, and political fraud, corruption, and other malpractices, such that it has been considered a classic case of extremely constrained ‘virtual democracy’(Throup and Hornsby, 1998, Orvis, 2001, Murunga, 2007, Murunga and Nasong'o, 2007, Hornsby, 2012). As a consequence, depending on the perspective, angle, or the various categories of the population; the country has either made tremendously large gains in various politico-economic, development, and governance issues; or suffered drastic deteriorations and a downward spiral of the same. These complexities and contradictions have been part of almost all of the country’s aspects since its foundation as a modern country as part of the British Empire in 1885.


In the twilight years of the 19th century, Kenya was established as a modern nation state, following the activities of numerous state, civil society, and private sector actors; that included politicians, capitalists, entrepreneurs, explorers, adventurers, and missionaries.

The state

Prior to the 20th century, the area that became Kenya, was a stateless region with various decentralised communities living in under-populated conditions; mainly concerned with pursuing livelihoods and internal debates of maintaining honour; without the presence of any central power to sustain ‘tribal rivalry’ and hierarchical relations amongst the communities. However, following the 1885 Berlin Conference, these extremely diverse communities living in the territory between the Lake ‘Victoria’ and Indian Ocean had become part of one country. Without their knowledge or consolation, the communities had become part of the British Empire, subjects of its Monarch, and lost the right to their lands, which now belonged to the ‘crown’. Henceforth these communities were ‘squatters’, and only the ‘crown’ could decide who could live where, or do what with that land. Additionally, they had lost their religion, culture, economic and honour systems, and virtual all aspects of their lives had been radically altered (Staley, 1935, Hake, 1977, Kanogo, 1987, Lonsdale, 1994). This ‘fact’ was subsequently made ‘known’ to the ‘Natives’, a fact they predictably refused and bitterly resisted. As follows, colonialism was introduced upon these communities, through extremely brute force, deceit, and manipulation. Pax Britannica was established in the territory through a series of pacification and
punitive expeditions that comprised numerous acts of genocide, forced migrations, land alienation, confiscation of livestock, and the destruction of cultures, livelihoods, and even entire societies; among other atrocious practices, grave humiliation, degradation, systematic odious attacks on human dignity of the Natives. Thus several communities that resisted were utterly ‘wiped out’ or ‘scattered’ (McDermott, 1895, Staley, 1935, Matson, 1974, Waller, 1976, Lonsdale, 1977, Mungeam, 1978, Maxon and Javersak, 1981, UN, 1998, Elkins, 2005a). Hence, out of the scattered remnants, the communities of collaborators, and of those who saw the futility of resistance submitted peacefully to the crown; a modern Leviathan state was created assembled by force; borne out of European rivalry for colonies, as well as the self-interest, pride, and imperial perspectives of some British elites. From the onset the colony was designed a highly unequal society with layers of oppression and exploitation, that would benefit a few, to the detriment of many, for the glory of the empire; as a layered society in a pyramid of profit and power, with a small powerful centre and marginalised peripheries for the majority. Consequently, what was previously a territory of multi-polar mosaic of scattered communities was brought together under one colony with defined new borders.

After creating the new country, the colonial authorities fostered divisions, rivalries, and antagonisms between the various communities; in pursuance of the ‘divide and rule’ policy to gain and maintain power and control. Divisions were fostered through there main perspectives: ethnicisation, racialisation, and social class differentiation. Firstly, Natives were cleared out of productive lands to create ‘white highland’ for sole European settlement, and forcefully relocated to various ‘Native reserves’ that were created in the marginal lands; from which most of the current Kenyan ‘tribes’ emerged. Subsequently, ethnic consciousness, antagonisms, and rivalries would be accentuated by the colonial and independent governments to manipulate and divide the masses, to maintain power over them (Staley, 1935, Hake, 1977, Kanogo, 1987, Lonsdale, 1994, Klopp, 2002, Wa Wamwere, 2003, Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006, Berman et al., 2009, Kanyinga, 2009).

Secondly, by racial tripartition, Europeans were designated the superior race, with freedom to live and work anywhere, and accorded many privileges. Africans were considered primitive, backward, animalistic, and prone to rebellion and were to be confined mainly in the Native reserves to provide labour. Even thought Asians had been instrumental in laying the foundations of the new colony, they were barely tolerated, and considered as vermin and harbingers of plague; and they would be confined in the urban areas people. Hence tensions were deliberately fostered between the races and prevented common action, even when a commonality of grievances existed across the races (Huxley, 1968, Hake, 1977, Clayton and Savage, 2012).

Thirdly, however, social class differentiation became the main defining characteristic of the colony, divided into upper, middle, and lower class. The colony was billed as a home for wealthy aristocrats and settlers were initially required to have more than £1000 in assets to be allowed entry in the country (Duder, 1993). Hence, the upper class comprised aristocratic settler-farmers. This highly exclusive class that even excluded even the colony’s governor, was comprised of highly hedonistic and villainous characters with extreme decadence and excesses that epitomised the evils of
colonialism; such that the British officials looked down on them with intense embarrassment. However, they were above the law, often acting with impunity, and dictating the policies of the colony; a trend that persist to date (Hake, 1977, Best, 1979, Kennedy, 1987, Duder, 1991, Carberry et al., 1999, Campbell, 2007). Additionally some Africans and Asians were admitted to this class, to help in the subjugation and exploitation of their fellow kinsmen; in exchange for extreme wealth and power. The upper class Asians controlled labour, trade, and some land speculation. The African nouveau elites were a colonial creation, who owe their allegiance to the crown. In establishing Pax Britannica, most traditional leadership systems were destroyed; and most of the respected, wise, charismatic, and just leaders and prophets assassinated or exiled. These were replaced by mainly ruthless, greedy, and conniving individuals; chosen mainly because they lacked traditional legitimacy, morals, and leadership skills, beside being shunned by their own communities. They aligned themselves with the colonialist against their communities to extract labour, resource, crush rebellion, and provide armies for conquering other communities. The middle class comprised colonial administrators, civil servants, soldiers, professionals and traders; mainly British, with Indians dominating trade, skilled labour, and artisan work. This class of Europeans and Asians was barely tolerated in the colony, and after the Second World War these ranks were more and more filled by relatively privileged Africans. The lower class comprised labourers, farmhands, low skilled workers, small retail traders, and artisans. Even thought a good number of Europeans belonged to this class, they were totally unwelcomed in the colony as they diminished the glory of the empire. While, most of the Asians belonged to this class; almost all the Africans belonged to this class, apart from a few privileged ones admitted to the higher classes, and they were confided in the Native reserves (Hake, 1977, Best, 1979, Kennedy, 1987, Duder, 1991, Carberry et al., 1999, Campbell, 2007). Consequently, the new colony was controlled and administered through various divisions and antagonisms, with the exploitation of various conflicting perspectives among the citizens. At independence in 1963, most middle and lower class Europeans and Asians left the county, leaving mostly the upper class; and while the elite and ‘educated’ Africans rapidly populated the upper class and middles classes. However, racist segregation and its pejorative labelling of the ‘others’ was replaced by an even more vicious class segregation and labelling that would condition the interactions, interrelations, perfectives, and perceptions in almost all aspects of life in Kenya.

The private sector
The colony began as a ‘private’ sector venture. After the Berlin conference, the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.C.) was incorporated by royal charter on 3rd September 1888, and charged with penetrating the interior and establishing British imperial and commercial interests; with the authority to carry out commerce and govern the territory, including establishing forts and army/police systems and levying taxes on the Natives; to assert British ‘rights’ in Africa (Staley, 1935, McGregor, 2012). This chartered company comprised mainly of individuals with personal unions as both company directors and state officials, pursuing mainly commercial interests using state authority; by harnessing the interests of private enterprise investment with the prevailing dominant perspective of colonial conquest in British national policy. The company system was chosen to escape scrutiny and checks by anti-colonialists in the government and parliament; so as to engage in bold unscrupulous
enterprises including committing atrocities to advance the goals of the company, without fear of reproach or restraints of bureaucracy and public opinion; promising to acquire magnificent empire for their country, increase its imports, exports, and glory, at no cost to the taxpayers (McDermott, 1895, Staley, 1935, McGregor, 2012). Nevertheless, as soon as it was established, the company started asking for subsidies from the government, religious bodies, colonial and geographical societies among others on the basis of imperialist sentiment, humanitarian, religious, and patriotic grounds. Indeed the Church Missionary Society advanced to the company several thousand pounds, in private sector-civil society partnership. However, the Missionary society’s treasurer also happened to be one of the company’s directors, personal unions that persist in various arenas in Kenya today.

In pursuance of its objectives of controlling and exploiting the territory, the company laid out plans to build the Uganda Railway, from the Indian Ocean to Lake Victoria; and requisitioned funds from the government. Due to differences in perspectives, fierce debate ensured that lasted for five years before the funds were availed. On the one hand, the Liberals argued that Britain had no the right to drive a railway through other peoples lands and to assert mastery over their lives; besides the railway was colossal waste of taxpayers' money, ‘gigantic folly’, and a ‘lunatic express’(Miller, 1971, Otte and Neilson, 2012). On the other hand, the conservatives argued that the railway would be of immense politico-economic benefit to the empire. It would ensure the protection of the source of the Nile, facilitate the extraction of resources and ensure a huge market for British goods, and combat slave trade. The conservatives clothed the railway with all manner of humanitarian, religious, and patriotic adornments; asserting that not doing it would make Britain appear ‘too weak, poor, and cowardly’(Brantley, 1981, Otte and Neilson, 2012). Eventually the conservatives won the debate, and the railway construction commenced in 1896 in Mombasa, reaching the Kisumu terminus at Lake Victoria on 20 December 1901. Along the railway sprung up most of the major urban areas of Kenya, and from the railway labourers who remained sizable community of Indian East Africans emerged.

The funds for building the railway was a loan from the British government to the colony; hence the colony began with a colossal foreign debt that needed to be paid back quickly. This became the main objective of the new colony. After failing to find minerals attention was shifted to developing export agriculture, with settler farmers. This began with plans to make the colony a Jewish settlement with the Zionists; however this was changed to make the colony a ‘White Man's Country’ of wealthy aristocratic European farmers; a country not only with a pleasant climate, but also an abundant supply of cheap labour of Natives (serfs); a feudal paradise (Huxley, 1953, Duder, 1993, Fox, 2014a). Firstly, in a series of excisions, millions of hectares of the most fertile lands in Kenya were cleared off Natives to create the ‘White Highlands’ for exclusive European settler agriculture. Secondly, for abundant labour, the Natives were deprived of their means of livelihoods, through land alienation and confiscation of livestock, so that they had to work for the settlers to meet their basic needs. Since many had been rendered landless, a ‘squatter’ system was devised where the Natives had to work for settlers to ‘earn the right’ use tiny plots of settlers’ land for substance farming; or also pay the settler farmer in cash or with farm produce. Furthermore, a series of taxes were imposed upon the Natives to force them to seek wages and enter labour market; among other measures towards deliberate impoverishment and
destitution of the Natives to ensure their malleability and availability for labour (Dilley, 1966, Sorrenson, 1969, Van Zwanenberg, 1975, Kanogo, 1987, Anderson, 2011, Clayton and Savage, 2012). Finally, to control labour movement, curb desertion, and maintain a constant supply of labour; other legislation such as the 1906 ‘Masters and Servant Ordinance’, and the 1918 ‘Kipande’ identification pass were imposed upon the Natives. These confined the Natives in their reserves and settler farms, and forbade their movement to other reserves or urban areas without express permission of their masters (Dilley, 1966, Sorrenson, 1969, Somjee, 1980, Kanogo, 1987, Zeleza, 1992, Clayton and Savage, 2012). Thus the original socio-politico-economic systems were destroyed, and new one established based on exploitation and mass impoverishment of the Natives, that probably explain the pervasive poverty and inequalities in Kenya today.

Religion and civil society
The third force, religion and civil society played a very significant role in the foundation of the new country. Pioneering explores and missionaries such as Johann Ludwig Krapf, Johannes Rebmann, and David Livingstone contributed greatly in opening up the territory for colonisation, driven by the perspective that ‘Christianity, commerce and civilization’ would improve the lives of Natives, besides ending slave trade. After the Berlin Conference and establishment of the Imperial British East Africa Company, missionary activities were intensified with various motives. One the one hand, some missionaries were driven by altruistic motives. They defended the interests of the Natives, and helped check the excess of the settlers; including thwarting the plans to make Kenya a ‘white colony’ such as Australia that would have had serious negative repercussion to the indigenous people; leading to the Devonshire white paper in 1923 that upheld some rights for the Natives (Maxon, 1993). On the other hand, there those whose main purpose was to advance conquest, colonial expansion and policies’, by making the Natives less warlike, more governable, and submissive to the colonial authorities. All in all the missionaries were charged with giving the brutal colonial system a ‘human face’, by providing social services such as educational and health facilities, as well as caring for widows and orphans produced by ‘pacification’ activities; a role currently taken over by the NGOs.

Most communities readily embraced Christianity because firstly, its basic tenets were very similar to their traditional cultural beliefs and practices; secondly, Christianity offered hope and a refuge in these traumatising times; and thirdly, it was the only recourse since most traditional practices, shrines and priesthoods had been destroyed and criminalised by colonial authorities. However other motives were to escape reprisal or access some benefits by feigning conversion. All in all, whether genuine or not, despite the conversion to Christianity most communities deeply resented some of the new practises; and were also not ready to drop some of the traditional practices they deemed important. These led to relabeling of practices, syncretism, and many ‘informal’ practices and institutions. By the 1930s several Natives had undertaken theological studies and came up with interpretation of Christianity (paradigm shift) that greatly differed from the missionaries advocacy for blind acceptance to colonial subjugation, segregation, forced labour, and assault on people’s dignity and culture. According to these new scholars Christianity was actually about fighting for justice. Furthermore, these scholars asserted that Christianity was initially and African religion that had been ‘spoilt’ by Westernisation
(from Roman to the British Empire); hence, all that was needed was to strip off Christianity of its Westernisation and infuse it back with its traditional African religious world views. Predictably, the missionaries could not condone such teachings in their missions, and these scholars went out to form their own ‘independent churches’ and schools all over the country (Welbourn, 1961, Barrett, 1968, Gertzel et al., 1969, Were, 1972, Murray, 1976, Kamuyu-Wa-Kangethe, 1988, Githieya, 1997). The independent churches produced a cultural nationalism and politico-religious movement that formed the back bone of resistance to colonial rule in the ensuing decades. Hence, divisions in perspectives emerged between these supporting or resisting the colonial rule, as well as between independent and mainstream missionaries churches.

In society, a split emerged. Most of the relatively wealthy and western educated Natives who admired a western way of life followed the missionaries and were loyal to colonial authorities; while many underprivileged poor and ‘illiterate’ Natives coalesced around the indigenous churches, which were resistant to colonialism. Overtime, the indigenous churches offered solidarity and social capital to poor, especially in the emerging slums in the urban areas, providing a home while away from their families and communities, and became the basis of many current grassroots Community Based Organisations. They espoused self-help and right based approaches, demanding justice and speaking against the excess of the state (Hake, 1977, Kamuyu-Wa-Kangethe, 1988, Imunde and Padwick, 2008). Conversely, from the missionary church emerged Faith Based Organisations (FBOs) and several NGOs advocating the giving of charity to the needy, usually working in conjunction with the government and the private sector; however from time to time engaging the authorities and demanding justice for the citizens. Hence from the onset the civil society was driven by diverse interests and perspectives.

**Uncreative destruction: The constitution of a colonial nation-state**

The foundation of the country that would become Kenya involved the destruction of numerous existing decentralised systems and codes, that were arguably more egalitarian, just, dynamic, and viable; tempered with solidarity and morality. These were replaced or superimposed by new centralised systems and codes; by means of force, deceit, and conniving under the ‘Pax Britannica’ with the whole world as its matrix; systems and codes that characterised by extreme avarice, injustice, exploitation, apathy, individualism, and self seeking; that would be the hallmark of the colony as well as the subsequent independent country. Consequently, by 1950s the region had been totally and irreversibly transformed, with new laws, cultures, ‘tribes’, clans, politics, religion, economy, and thinking among many others. Modes of lives of the people as well as their interests and perspectives had been irrevocably altered.

In socio-economic terms, the emergent colonial nation-state comprised enclaves of privilege amidst mass extreme poverty, exploitation, and oppression. Whereas the settlers lived in great opulence with excessive abandon and impunity; the Natives had been deliberately destituted through land alienation, confiscation of livestock, destruction their livelihoods, and forced migration to unproductive lands. These would contributed to the extremely high levels poverty and inequality in Kenya; as well as rural-
urban migration and proliferation of slums in the subsequent decades (Furedi, 1973b, Bennett, 1996, Okoth, 2006, Hornsby, 2012). These would later be enforced by oppressive laws and practices in the name of maintain law and order and crushing dissent. While the laws, regulations, and allocation of public resource favoured the elite; the ordinary citizens would be deprived of public services and resource, exploited, and oppressed; and their activities, as well as the people themselves, often labelled illegal or unauthorised. Thus many citizens were forced to live and work outside the law i.e. illegally or euphemistically, ‘informally’.

In socio-political terms, the nation was consisted of the colonisers and the colonised, each comprised of three major divisions in perspectives and interests. The European community of settlers, colonial administrators, missionaires, and others comprised of, firstly, those who were unsympathetic to the plight of the colonised, and were in fact the ones perpetuating the oppression and exploitation. Secondly, those who felt sympathetic to the oppressed, and strived to amelioration of these situations; however there was no agreement between them concerning what the nature of the evil, an what was to be done to solve it. Thirdly, there were also many who were apathetic, neutral, or unconcerned politically. Correspondingly, the colonised (Africans and Asian) comprised firstly, the patriots, who had gained a voice, awareness, and boldness to demand justice, freedom, and fairness. They wanted total reform, complete removal of the colonial state, and full independence. They represented the voices, suffering, bitterness, concerns and the aspiration of the masses; and therefore constituted ‘popular nationalism’. However, the colonial administration referred to them as the ‘nyeta’ i.e. pigheaded and insolent individuals, who need ‘straightening’ through ruthless means (Furedi, 1973a, Tamarkin, 1978, Mamdani, 1990a). Secondly, the majority of ordinary citizens, the ‘lumpens’ or ‘hoi polloi’, had been marginalised, dispossessed, and uprooted; but were too scared of the possible consequences if they raised their voices or concerns. They had been broken and beaten into submission and thus ‘nyoroshwa’ i.e. straightened, and their main concern was day to day survival, fearing to do anything that may evoke the wrath of their colonial masters, and Native elites. Hence, they were extremely manipulatable, even against their fellow citizens, and the patriots (Furedi, 1973a, Tamarkin, 1978, Mamdani, 1990a, Davidson, 1992, Füredi, 1994, Murunga, 2004a). Thirdly, the loyalists included the powerful and wealthy Native elites, lumpenbourgeoisie’, ‘wabemzi’ (of Mercedes-Benz), ‘wasomi’ (western educated) and others who aligned themselves the colonialists and against the masses; in return for wealth, social standing, and power. Acting as intermediaries and tools of exploitation and oppression for personal gain, the loyalist became extremely dependent and supportive of the Empire. They saw themselves as British (colonial) citizens whose duty and allegiance was to the crown. Certainly, colonialism served them well, and so they were hostile to calls for independence; and when they ‘joined’ the ‘struggle for independence’ as ‘state nationalism’, it was not to fight for the freedom and justice of the oppressed masses, but to compete to join the higher ranks of the oppressors. The loyalist main interest was sharing power with the local European administrators, under the British empire; but not full independence(Furedi, 1973a, Tamarkin, 1978, Mamdani, 1990a, Davidson, 1992, Füredi, 1994, Murunga, 2004a). This was fulfilled at independence, with the creation of a neo-colonial state, based on British colonial codes and systems, that maintained
the status quo, politico-economic systems, and relations between the core and periphery (Mamdani, 1990a, Mamdani, 1996).

Indeed, to facilitate the conquest and control of the colony, the colonial authorities created a Native elite group; which was accorded many privileges, and in return they helped to subjugate their fellow indigenous people; in patron-client systems. This group mainly comprised of highly ruthless, greedy, and amoral individuals, who sold their communities for personal gain, aligning themselves with the oppressors against their own communities. Nonetheless, it is this group of ‘loyalists’ that became the rulers of the independent country, probably explaining the rampant corruption, bad governance, apathy, and a profound lack political will to deal with problems affecting the ordinary citizens; in addition to the groups’ seemingly predisposition towards authoritarianism and clientelism (Furedi, 1973b, Berry, 1992, Ogot and Ochieng, 1996, Mamdani, 1999, Wrong, 2010, McGregor, 2012). Furthermore, conquest and control was facilitated through ‘divide and rule’ policies, such as ethnicisation, its politicisation, and fostering rivalries and antagonisms between the created ‘tribes’; dynamics which continue today and have permeated almost all aspects of the nation, including issues of slums and housing initiatives. The ‘divide and rule’ policies thwarted efforts of the oppressed communities to unite and confront their oppressors, and thus greatly advanced the interests of the ruling elites; practices which persist today to the detriment of the ordinary citizens’ welfare. In sum, the constitution the new colonial nation-state was based on segregative-exploitative-oppressive systems; most of which persist to date.

The Colonial government of Kenya began as the Imperial British East Africa Company (I.B.E.A.C.) in 1888 with Sir William Mackinnon as its chairman, under Queen Victoria. The company was very effective in conquest, but failed miserably as a colony administrator (McDermott, 1895, Staley, 1935, McGregor, 2012). Hence, the company was bought out by the British government in 1895, which established direct rule through the East African Protectorate, administered by the British Foreign Office. In 1920 country was declared the ‘Colony of Kenya and Protectorate of Kenya’ until 1963, when the county gained independence, and became a republic in 1964, with Jomo Kenyatta as the President. This was followed by the presidencies of Moi from 1978, Mwai Kibaki from 2002, and finally Uhuru Kenyatta from 2013. Hence, the period of interest in this study from 1950 to 2013, in terms of national governance can be divided into four eras: Elizabeth II (1950s), Kenyatta I (1960s and 70s), Moi (1980s and 90s), and finally Kibaki (2000s). These four political eras had distinct as well as similar characteristics, and had a massive influence in the lives of the citizens as well as profound impacts on the country’s development, housing, and governance situations. Hence the political eras were not only the social product of history, they were also the container and reproducer of history; forming the contextuality for the various societal actors, and conditioning their perspectives and interests in various societal issues.

9.1.2. 1950s Elizabeth II Regina: Pax Britannica and ‘decolonisation’

On 6 February 1952, while in Kenya, Princesses Elizabeth Alexandra Mary was proclaimed the Queen Regnant of the British Empire and the Head of the Commonwealth realms; an Empire which was
rapidly disintegrating due to widespread independence struggles and ‘decolonisation’ processes. In Kenya, this struggle was becoming exceedingly bitter and was being repressed with extreme brutality and conniving. From the establishment of colonial rule, it had always been oppressive, exploitative, and unjust; and the colonised people had in one form or another resisted colonialism throughout its entire history. However, in the post World War II period not only did the conditions for the colonised deteriorate to crisis levels; but also the colonised become bolder in their demand for freedom, justice, and independence. This was done through political parties, trade unions, churches, and other external pressure groups. Moreover, soldiers returning from World War II fomented armed resistance, as was exemplified by the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA); the was disparagingly referred to as the Mau Mau rebel or terrorist group by the colonial authorities to deny it international legitimacy. In response the colonial authorities declared a ‘state of emergency’ from October 1952 to December 1959, suppressing those independence struggles by means of extremely brutal, inhuman, and unjust means that included indiscriminate communal punishments and intense suffering to many. Between 1952 and 1956, as high as 300,000 Native civilians could have lost their lives, while many more were subjected to concentration camps, forced labour, compulsory mass migrations, and punitive ‘villagisation’. Urban areas were cleared off communities which were considered not loyal enough (Corfield, 1960, Elkins, 2005a, Anderson, 2011, Chappell, 2011). Hence in this period colonial oppression, conniving, and atrocities intensified. Furthermore, divide and rule policies were accentuated, including fanning inter and intra tribal animosity and politicisation of ethnicity; making the formation of a united national front for independence struggle impossible. Land in the Native reserves was taken away from the patriots and given to the loyalists; among other things, the patriot were severely sanctioned, while loyalists richly rewarded. By 1956, through ‘coercion through exemplary force’, ‘special treatment’ and ‘pseudo gangs’ the insurgency as well as all manner of ‘popular nationalism’ by the patriots had been defeated, and replaced by ‘state nationalism’ led the loyalists Native elites, collaborators, and other reactionary ‘nationalists’(Mamdani, 1990b, Thompson, 1991, Davidson, 1992, Füredi, 1994, French, 2011).

While the settlers wanted to maintain the exploitative status quo they enjoyed, it was no longer viable to continue ruling the colony in the same manner. As General Lathbury noted, the insurgency “has not been cured: it has been suppressed” (quoted in Chappell, 2011); uprisings would merely flare up at a later dates and places, and it would ultimately become impossible to suppress popular voices, and ensure the submission of all citizens. Hence, the colonial state embraced the stark reality the force alone would not be able to deal with the increasing political struggles, bitterness, awareness, and demands for justice. Thus a strategy was mooted, to meet the struggles not with force but with guile, not to fight it but to guide it; staying ahead of any rebellion by usurping the genuine processes by the people arising from their need and concerns; and supplanting these with counter-revolutionary processes of the Native loyalists to maintain the interests of the colonialists. Hence, a decision was made to hand over power to the loyalist Native elite, who would maintain the status quo; but at the same time placate the ordinary citizens, and through this ‘state nationalism’, counter-revolutionarily pre-empt the patriots demand for independence (Mamdani, 1990a, Mamdani, 1996, Chappell, 2011, French, 2011). Whereas ‘popular nationalism’ arose from struggles for justice, democracy, and
freedom by ordinary citizens, ‘state nationalism’ was colonial reactionary counter-attack ideology aimed at neutralising the popular nationalism by co-opting collaborators and loyalists in the leadership structures of a new neo-colonialist state. This arrangement would yield the same benefit to the settlers and the Empire, but at a much lower cost to the metropole, and much higher legitimacy (false) and acceptance by the Natives. Consequently, in the run up to independence, it was the co-opted loyalist elite that negotiated the terms of independence with the colonial government; their main interest and perspective was jostling for their better positioning, power, and wealth in the new neo-colonial state, but not the interests and concerns of the masses, apart from token or populist activities aimed at generating ‘votes’ (Furedi, 1973b, Ogot, 1995, Wrong, 2010).

9.1.3. 1960s-70s Kenyatta I: Exclusive independence, disillusionment, and fear
In 1963, independence and Kenyatta’s presidency were ushered in with many promises and great expectations for emancipation and prosperity for the majority of the citizens. However, through ‘state nationalism’ and other political machinations, most of the segregative-exploitative-oppressive and manipulative colonial had been inherited intact, and the status quo maintained. These facilitated the elites’ pursuit for unlimited power and wealth, to the detriment of the welfare of the general citizenry. In fact, there was a rapid reversal in some of gains the ordinary citizens had obtained with decolonisation, such as increased ‘voice’ and space for popular expression, and the chance for genuine elections and representative democracy (Furedi, 1973b, Mamdani, 1990a, Davidson, 1992, Mamdani, 1996, Hornsby, 2012). Most of the leaders in the new regime were loyalists-state nationalists, who through colonial machinations, well crafted narratives, and other devious actions had mythical hero status (even globally) as freedom fighters and fathers of the nation to claim to legitimacy; while the patriots-popular nationalist and real freedom fighters had been demonised, criminalised, pauperised, or eliminated (Mamdani, 1990a, Murunga, 2007). The new leaders were mainly interested in power and wealth, but not the concerns of the masses. Nevertheless, the hoi polloi, who were relatively clueless, welcomed the new leaders and independence with very high expectations and hope. Through modernisation development approaches, with large infrastructure projects, industrialisation, and massive capital and aid flows, there were visible socio-economic transformations and prosperity. However it soon became apparent to the ordinary citizens, that this prosperity was only being enjoyed by a few; while the situations for many were taking a downward spiral. Furthermore, most of the colonial oppressive practices had not ended, but had only been relabelled and modified. Consequently, with this realisation, there was widespread disillusionment, resentment, and dissent; with the state rapidly losing its legitimacy among the masses. To counter this and maintain its grip on power and control, the regime and the ruling deployed the institutionalisation of despotism, politicisation of ethnicity, patronage and clientelism, besides the detention and assassination of critics (Furedi, 1973b, Mamdani, 1990a, Davidson, 1992, Mamdani, 1996, Hornsby, 2012).

With independence, racial segregation was more or less abolished. However, this was replaced by an even more severe stratification based on wealth (and sometimes ethnicity, kinship ties, and political connections). Most the middle class Europeans left the county at independence, and their ranks in civil
service and private sector were rapidly filled by the Natives (and Asians), as the emerging middle class. The Native elites consolidated and greatly enhanced their position in the upper class strata, and in fact became ‘super elite’, emulating colonial aristocratic ways, with large-scale farming or huge commercial or industrial interests, dominating politics, the civil service, and private business, thus controlling both the private and public sectors, with some sitting in the boards of both the multinationals and public parastatal. The settlers, took a back seat in political, but retained colossal influence of the country’s governance and remained above the law, often acting with impunity. However, the majority their socio-economic situation continued to deteriorate, as the county seemingly prospered; however the hoi polloi lacked the voice, were fearful, and were easily manipulated through politico-ethnic machinations of the elite (Furedi, 1973b, Mamdani, 1990a, Davidson, 1992, Mamdani, 1996, Hornsby, 2012).

Indeed, the constitution of Kenya’s political society comprised a continuum between the extremes of the conservatives and radicals with moderates between them, however with most of the ordinary citizens being highly clueless and easily manipulatable. The government was dominated by the conservatives, who were formally the colonial loyalists and now the ‘super elite’, mainly driven with the perspective of maintaining the status quo, and main self seeking interests of wealth and power through exploitative, oppressive, corrupt, and manipulative ways. Conversely, the radicals were remnants of the patriots, and were viscously criticising the government and demanding genuine political reforms and change to the social order that would benefit that the ordinary citizens, with freedom, justice, and equitable distribution of resources and opportunity. Soon the regime and its political mafia became highly intolerant to criticism, and shortly most the radicals were in either ‘detained without trial’, assassinated, ‘disappeared’, exiled, or crippled economically and politically. These ‘enemies of development’ had been ‘crushed like locusts’ (Tamarkin, 1978, wa Thiong’o, 1981, Anyang’Nyong’o, 1989, Wamwere, 1993, Obama, 2004, Nowrojee, 2007).

Amidst rising resentment and criticism the regime became increasingly authoritarian to maintain its grip on power, privileges, and enrichment opportunities. In addition the inherited colonial oppressive structures, was tremendous concentration of power in the presidency; such that the presidency became overwhelmingly powerful; not only through Kenyatta’s charisma and other personal traits, but also through the institutionalisation of those powers. The executive, legislature, and judiciary came under the control of the presidency; they lost their independence and became compromised; the president could hire and fire the officers at will; and only persons acceptable to the presidency and the ruling elites could vie for elections. Thus to some extent voters become irrelevant. Soon, most public officers and elected owed their positions and allegiance more to the presidency than to the electorate (Barkan, 1992, Throup and Hornsby, 1998, Murunga, 2007). By this ‘institutional despotism’, civil servants were require ‘not to be impartial’ but to be loyal to the presidency and ruling elites; with state security agents being attached to them to ensure this. Any ‘disloyalty’ risked severe consequences; while proved ‘loyalty’ would be heavily illegal allocation of state land, state appointments, and other political or economic rewards (Ajulu, 2000, Hornsby, 2012).
The regime became increasingly intolerant to criticism; any questions concerning increasing inequality, unfair land distribution, or activities of the political mafia could lead to the critics being labelled as ‘dangerous, anti-development, and ungrateful’ in need of exemplary ‘cure’ to prevent them infecting others; besides ‘detentions without trial’ or assassination (Barkan, 1992, Throup and Hornsby, 1998, Murunga, 2007). While remained Kenya a de jure multi-party democracy, by 1969 all opposition political parties had been banned and Kenya had become a de facto one-party state. Only the ruling party Kenya African National Union (KANU) was allowed, and forming or joining any other political party was tantamount to treason. Furthermore, to gain support, the regime became an adherent Western Bloc supporter in the Cold War, with Kenya becoming the regional bulwark against the spread of communism as an army and intelligence base; besides the regime pursuing ‘McCarthyism’. Many critics of the regime would be labelled communist and severely sanctioned (wa Thiong’o, 1981, Hornsby, 2012). All these authoritarianist practices were facilitated by the countries governance systems, which remained colonial in design, content, and purpose; for subjugation, exploitation, manipulation, discrimination, oppression, and control. For instance, the devolved colonial provincial administration system for enforcing the states interests at all levels, was retained as a parallel governance structure, from the grassroots to the presidency; with its officers being accountable only to the presidency, but not any other person, citizen, or arm of the government. The system being oppressive, coercive, extractive and exploitative design, became very useful for devolving authoritarianism to all levels; as well as a channel for patronage and clientelism. This formed the basis of slumlordism and quasi-legal land allocation in Kenya., thus played a major role in perpetuating the housing crisis and failure of initiatives (Syagga et al., 2001b, Weru and Bodewes, 2001a, COHRE, 2006, Syagga, 2011a, Hornsby, 2012). Ultimately, in the face of rapidly dwindling legitimacy, the presidency assumed the label of ‘Mzee’ (old man), exploiting Kenya’s cultural gerontocratism. Mzee had all encompassing wisdom, knew what was good for all, and could not be questioned or criticised. Kenya was one happy family under the wise and loving care of Mzee; and any opposition, challenge, or criticism would be construed as an affront to the person of Mzee, the ‘father and founder of the nation who had sacrificed so much for the country’ (Ogot and Ochieng, 1996, Ajulu, 2000, Hornsby, 2012).

Despite all these autocratic efforts criticism and opposition to the regime mounted and some citizens and radicals became even bolder. The regime had squandered its legitimacy, and the independence euphoria and optimism had been rapidly exhausted and replaced by cynicism, despondency, and resentment. To counter the raising national opposition and criticism, the regime revived the ‘divide and rule’ system using the politicisation of ethnicity, ethnicisation of government, and clientelism to ensure a solid political ethnic backing and base; to maintain power and thwart the efforts of the opposition clamouring for meaningful change and justice for the ordinary citizens, as well as fair distribution of national resources and opportunities. Soon most of the strategic positions in the civil service, army, judiciary, and the provincial administration were held individuals belonging to the to the president’s ethnic group, Kikuyu; with this bias permeating the issuance of government contracts and permits, as well as the regional allocation of public funds, initiatives, services and infrastructure; selective demolitions of slums, and allocation of houses and land (formal and informal). Thus through ethnic
based patronage and clientelism most slumlords were Kikuyu. Furthermore, these biases also affected the regional distribution of assistance and selection of beneficiaries during the Basic Need strategy of the 1970s (Tamarkin, 1978, Amis, 1984, Shihembetsa, 1989, GOK, 2002, Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau, 2004, GOK, 2004b, Rakodi, 2004, Bodewes, 2005, Omenya and Huchzermeyer, 2006, Murunga, 2007, Dafe, 2009, Hornsby, 2012). Additionally, to bulwark it hold on power, the regime coalesced around itself the so called ‘Kiambu Mafia’, a coterie of wealthy and powerful trusted tribesmen, the super elite who had been loyalists in the colonial era (Kenyatta’s home district was Kiambu). They formed powerful a cartel and oligarchy that controlled the country's governance, appointments, politics, investments, trade, and economics (This benefited only Kenyatta’s sub-tribe, while excluding and deriding other Kikuyu sub-tribes).

Presently, public service became construed as favours based on ones ethnicity and patronage networks; with holders of government positions being seen as ethnic representatives. Public resources was the national cake, prepared collectively by all, but be eaten selectively, with the president’s ethnicity expected to receive a bigger share. It was their ‘turn to eat’, others had to wait for their turn, when their own would ascend to presidency, if ever. Predictably, these practice eroded the sense of belonging to Kenya as well as a deep resentment for the Kikuyu by other ethnicities, that would culminate in the post-2007 election violence (KNCHR, 2008, Murunga, 2011, Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). However these generalising rhetoric and narratives that portrayed the whole ‘tribe’ as benfitting were in the main false. In reality, only a select group of individuals and their clients benefited in those ethnic arrangements, while others suffered with the rest of the citizens almost equally. Nonetheless, the narratives succeeded in generating an emotional sway among the hoi polloi, some who felt attachment to their ethnic-controlled state and leader, and thought themselves as having a privileged position in the country regardless of their miserable lives in the slum; while others who felt left out harboured deep resentment for their ‘privileged’ neighbours. These narratives would be played again and again by the elites and politicians, to manipulate the poor citizens, thwart efforts towards better governance, and even scuttle initiatives that would improve the lives of the citizens and reduce their dependence (Murunga, 2007, Klopp, 2009, Hydén, 2014).

In Kenyatta’s reign the contradictions that characterise Kenya emerged and became accentuated. Firstly, during these reign Kenya became very prosperous nation with all the sectors of the economy showing excellent performance; buoyed by post-war economic boom, good commodity prices, massive development aid and foreign investment flows. The world was awash with ‘petrodollars’ which were being recklessly ‘invested’ and lent to Global South countries such as Kenya. However this was accompanied by increasing poverty and downward spiralling socio-economic conditions for the majority of the ordinary citizens. By the end of the 1970s, Kenya’s elites had joined the ranks of the world’s wealthiest individual and had investments all over the world, and ‘offshore secret accounts’ worth millions of dollars. At the same time the level of abject poverty, and the number of the destitute and slum dwellers had increase exponentially, and many could not meet their basic needs. Secondly, a relatively high level of professionalism in civil service and judiciary was maintained, and process meticulously followed; however conditioned by ethnicism, clientelism, and ‘kick-back' corruption; with
several officers being known as “Mr. Ten Percent” (Ogot and Ochieng, 1995, Ajulu, 2002, Hornsby, 2012). Thirdly, in theory Kenya was a highly democratic government, with a functional representativist-welfarist democracy and competitive politics with regular elections; as long as these did not challenge the interests and dominance of the president and his elites. In reality the governance degenerated into authoritarianism and oligarchism (based on prebendalism, plutocratism, and kleptocracism) sustained by patronage and clientelism. Hence Pax Kenyatta, was upon based on institutionalised despotism, manipulation of ethnicity, and the neutralisation of any potential opposition foci. Thus the peace and stability of the country during this period lay not in the respect people accorded to the regime, but from the coercive regime that was constructed and massive fear it generated (Ogot and Ochieng, 1995, Ajulu, 2002). The citizens had little or no voice options unless they were part of patronage-clientelistic networks, and initiatives were typically bottom down with very little participation of the citizens; but benefiting mainly the middle class especially those in the clientelist networks; with the elites massively benefiting directly or indirectly. Poverty became highly stigmatised and criminalised, and the poor were labelled lazy, filthy, and anti-development; beside being subjected to clean ups that involve evictions, demolitions arrests and imprisonment. Consequently, by the end this regime in 1978, there was profound hopelessness and resentment, extreme fearfulness and voicelessness among the majority of the poor citizens. Kenya had become an extremely unequal society, with very little democratic space, divided and characterised with gross deep-seated resentment.

9.1.4. 1980s-90s Moi: ‘Nyayo era’ of regression and second ‘liberation’ struggle

Moi’s presidency also known as the Nyayo era began in 1978, inheriting a much divided and unequal country; with majority of its citizens being extremely fearful and voiceless as well as full of intense despair, cynicism, and resentment. However, Moi ascended to power from a very weak and disadvantaged position. Indeed he had become and remained Kenyatta’s deputy mainly because he was assumed to lack ambition and was considered unlikely president. In fact, he had endured untold humiliation in the hands of Kenyatta’s politico-ethnic elites (Kiambu mafia) during Kenyatta’s reign; and had only been allowed to ascend to power upon Kenyatta’s death, temporarily, as those elites completed their power sharing arrangements and agreed on a ‘suitable’ president of their ‘own’. Due to deep set prebendalism, those elites believed Kenya’s presidency was their ‘inherent right’, and thus pejoratively referred to Moi as ‘the passing cloud’ (Morton, 1998, Steeves, 2006, Murunga, 2007, Hornsby, 2012, Munene, 2014). Accordingly, the immediate priority of Moi’s regime became fighting for survival and consolidating its hold on power; through populism and politico-ethnic calculations, which eventually morphed into ‘Machiavellianist’ clientelism and authoritarianism.

The new regime reached out to all communities, and especially to those who had been marginalised and disadvantaged during the colonial and Kenyatta’s regimes. Numerous initiatives were launched aimed at improving the welfare of the ordinary, poor, and marginalised citizens; including redistributive and affirmative policies. Measure were taken to curb rampant corruption, abuse of power, and the biases in public services provision and distribution of national resources. All Kenyatta era political prisoners were released; and a more inclusive, caring, free and ‘down to earth’ governance instituted, that appeared concerned with the struggles of the common citizens; greatly contrasting the elitist,
exclusivist, and fearful governance it had just replaced. Thus by lifting the harsh and criminal rule of the previous regime, Moi became exceedingly popular throughout the country amongst the masses; as ‘Brother President’. These were greatly aided by Moi’s humble mien and portrayal as an honest deeply religious Christian man; who could be trusted and cut a much less fearful image than his predecessor (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980, Ajulu, 2002, Murunga, 2004b, Hornsby, 2012). Presently, the regime formulated the ‘Nyayo philosophy’ with three pillars of peace, love, and unity; as a rallying call articulating the regimes’ vision for the county; based on Christian values and African Socialism that emphasised human dignity and equality for all, with equitable sharing of resources produced by all people working hard (Moi, 1986). However, ‘Nyayo’ which means ‘footsteps’ was also calculated at placating and win the support of Kenyatta’s politico ethnic elites and constituencies; that Moi would follow the Kenyatta’s footsteps of conservativeness; thus assuring continuity and quietening the concerns of those who feared revolutionary or radical changes. This regime would bring changes but within the path laid down by Kenyatta, and maintain country on a ‘prosperous’ path but for all (Moi, 1986, Murunga, 2007, Hornsby, 2012). Accordingly, the regime became exceedingly popular, with support of most of the masses, and consolidated its hold in power. However, even with raising popularity, it soon proved impossible to please all parties, culminating in the attempted military coup of 1982, and other plots by Kenyatta’s politico-ethnic elites and conservatives (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980, Ajulu, 2002, Murunga, 2004b, Hornsby, 2012).

Hence, despite the massive support from the masses, Moi perceived himself to be isolated, weak, and vulnerable; unlike Kenyatta who had surrounded himself with a coterie of trusted tribesmen who were able, educated, experienced, extremely wealthy and powerful; the conservative politico-ethnic ‘super elites’ and the ‘Kiambu mafia’. Accordingly, Moi’s next priority became curtailing the influence of existing elite groups by constructing his own elite group, consisting mainly of his ethnic community, the Kalenjin, but also more importantly co-opted ‘kingpins’ from all other ethnic groups including the Kikuyu. However, whenever convenient, the regime exploited the national resentment against the Kikuyu for political advantage. Hence, following the established practices of politicisation of ethnicity and corruption, the Kalenjin mafia emerged, coalesced around the presidency, and replaced the Kiambu mafia (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980, Ogot and Ochieng, 1995, Ajulu, 2002, Murunga, 2004b, Murunga and Godwin, 2004, Murunga and Nasong'o, 2007, Hornsby, 2012). Nonetheless, this group was constructed on the basis of patronage and clientelism fuelled by massive corruption and plunder of state resource. Providing quality governance and public service took a backstage as gaining political support became the regime’s first priority.

This attitude soon permeated government policies and initiatives. Appointment to public service and service delivery became based on ‘loyalty’ and patronage rather than competence. Soon the government was staffed by having highly inept, ignorant, and even illiterate officers; whose priority was primitive accumulation and corruption to support the patron client systems, rather than service delivery; demanding bribes from citizens for ordinary government services. Kenyatta had ruled in times of great prosperity awash with ‘petro dollars’, development aid, investment, and high commodity prices; with modernisation and basic needs which favoured a large government and public spending. These
economy readily absorbed the corruption and patronage practices. However, Moi ruled in of the Global economic depression, dept crises; neoliberalism that called for austerity and a small government; and those practices put a great stain on the citizens, domestic economy, and international relations. Development funds were being misappropriated, and contracts became massively overpriced to allow for bribes. Initiatives became unaffordable to the target groups, unattractive to investors and donors, and collapsed altogether. Some projects were initiated primarily for the rent-seeking opportunities they provided, rather than to meet the needs of the populace. Hence, many the Nyayo projects, both the populist and the well intentioned, were poorly planned, riddled with corruption and negative political interference, thus they collapsed; and Nyayo era become indentified with numerous unfinished ‘white elephant projects’. Public land was irregularly allocated, housing approaches altered, and beneficiaries selected to reward clients and compromise opponents. State sanctioned land grabbing led to massive evictions of the poor, and collapse of initiatives whose land had been grabbed. In sum, grand corruption, mediocrity, and public malfeasance became the order of the day; internal constrains collapsed and corruption in Kenya became an ‘acceptable’ and ‘unavoidable’ fact of life. Indeed, according to Hornsby (2013) corruption became self-sustaining such that Moi could not have stop corruption even if he wanted to. His regime’s survival rested upon fragile corruption-based elite alliances, which if broken the regime would have collapsed within months. Accordingly, Moi’s regime became synonymous with very poor governance, and gross economic mismanagement; that was hutting the ordinary citizens, and the regime popularity among the citizens plummeted as it entrenched itself in power.

The combined internal corruption, malfeasance, and gross economic mismanagement on the one hand, and the externally induced neoliberalist development prescriptions and prevailing global politico-economic situation led to drastic deterioration in the socio-economic conditions of the citizens. The combine unsought of a collapsing economy, corruption, and severe austerity measures that included massive layoffs and withdrawal of the state from service provision drastically increased the magnitude of absolute poverty and deprivations. Many middle class families join the ranks of the absolutely poor, and the poor became poorer, contributing to the explosive increase in slum dwellers in the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank, 1990a, Syagga et al., 2001c, Murunga, 2004b, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, Baker, 2008, Lando and Bujra, 2009, Hornsby, 2012). However, as the conditions of the ordinary citizens worsened, the neoliberalist prescriptions presented immense opportunities for enrichment, legally or through corruption; and became a means for patronage. The elite some times in cohorts with ‘foreign investors’ acquired state assets very cheaply, and supplied ‘out sourced’ services to the government at highly inflated prices; besides grossly manipulating the currency and the entire economy as exemplified by the Goldenberg scandal (Warutere, 2005, Murunga, 2007, Hornsby, 2012).These massively exacerbating the inequities in Kenya. As some politically connected individuals became billionaires and multimillionaires and joined the ‘super elite’; the number of those living in absolute poverty increased exponentially, while the middle class was decimated. As luxurious gated communities emerged, slum slums increased ten-fold in the Nyayo era, accompanied by numerous demolitions and evictions to pave way for illegal allocation of public land to the elites and political clients for luxurious developments. In sum, the regime which had ascendant to power as the friend
and hope to the ordinary citizens had transformed into a extremely despotic and corrupt system; preoccupied with its own survival and hold in power, with addressing the ordinary citizens’ concerns being only incidental, manipulative, populist, and tokenist. ‘Nyayoism’ came to symbolise lack of voice, political manipulation, oppression, and hypocrisy; unfettered corruption and greed, cronyism, and neopatrimonialism; as well as mediocrity, malfeasance, and gross economic mismanagement; among many other negative epitaphs that would serve as exemplar for ‘bad governance’ (World Bank, 1989b, Eigen, 1996, Hydén et al., 2004). These socio-economic reversals and malfeasance generated great distress, dissatisfaction, and dissention among the citizens, leading intense criticism and opposition to Moi’s regime; with demand for reforms and even regime change.

To counter the increasing criticism and opposition, the regime became increasingly authoritarianist and corrupt; generating more criticism and opposition. Even though the regime had come to power from a very weak position, it had inherited an extremely powerful and despotic presidency that Kenyatta’s regime had crafted; which Moi’s regime now started exploiting. Critics and radical were either silenced with fear and threats of ‘detention without trial’ and torture; or bought off, compromised, and blackmailed using state resources, illegal public land allocation, and ‘unsecured loans’. Soon some of the fiercest critics turned into praise singers, proclaiming their love for Nyayo. Seemingly, the regime depended on a delicate balance between populist derived support of the masses and manipulating or cracking hard on the critics and opponents that may perpetuate perspectives that painted the regime in bad light before masses. Hence Kenyatta’s regime was based mainly on fear, for Moi’s regime it was better to be both loved and feared, judiciously mixing clemency and cruelty (Machiavelli, 1998). By the end of the 1980s, the humble and lovable ‘Brother’ presidency had been transformed in a strict and fearsome ‘Baba’ (father) that demanded absolute loyalty and obedience; ‘good’ children would be heavily rewarded, and the ‘bad’ ones severely and exemplarily punished so that they can turn from their evil ways and others with similar thoughts may take heed as well. Kenya was made into a de jure one-party state, and the ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU) to be most powerful organ in the county, over the parliament, judiciary, and all executive. None could be elected, employed, do business, or access an initiative unless they were certifiably ‘loyal’ to KANU and the presidency. Any disloyal persons was threatened with suspension from KANU, which meant being cut out from normal life. This fear of exclusion led to national self-censorship and extreme despondency. With combined state censorship and self-censorship, the citizens lost their ‘voice’ and freedom to ‘hear’ anything else, apart from what the regime wanted them to hear; and the governors become highly ‘unaccountable’ at all societal levels with extralegal extortionist powers. Even though initiatives now included ‘participation’; the only words and perspectives allowed were those that praised the ‘goodness’ of the regime its ‘colossal achievements’. Difference, ambiguity, and creativity were criminalised leading to a state of dull uniformity. Additionally, following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Kenya’s strategic importance the US had increased; and Moi’s regime received colossal political support against the opposition; in fact several unrelenting critics would be labelled communist and then persecuted accordingly (Wamwere, 1992, Ogot and Ochieng, 1995, Throup and Hornsby, 1998, Murunga and Godwin, 2004). Despite all these the criticism and opposition intensified.
However, the criticism and opposition to Moi’s regime was extremely divided, driven by different interests and perspectives. Firstly, the Kenyatta’s politico-ethnic elites and conservatives had not relented in their struggle for power, they seized every opportunity to criticise the regime and gain power, and in fact some them had rebranded themselves as reformers and agitators for human rights. Secondly, they were genuine fearless political voices of radicals agitating for change, reform, and an end to corruption and human right abuses; and the addressing of the concerns of the ordinary citizens. Thirdly, with other avenues for reproaching the state suppressed, the ‘church’ remained the only safe voice for the voiceless and defender of the weak; reproaching leaders who professed Christianity for their ‘unchristian’ actions such as corruption, oppressing the weak, and stealing from the poor. Thus church premises and religious gathering became the only safe locations to criticise the government and to demand for justice and reform; with the clergy in conjunction radical politicians and the civil society agitating for the removal of oppressive laws, structures, and practices. Fourthly, Neoliberalist and Sustainabilist development approaches had led to a proliferation of NGOs and CBOs, many of which were ‘right based’ and demanded transparency, justice, freedom, and equity. Fifthly, the citizens had become more literate, aware, and bold; and no longer timidly and passively tolerated authoritarianism public malfeasance and corruption; the citizens, especially those in the urban areas and slums, began to engage in bold mass action to demand for justice and reform; as well as organise into civil society and pressure groups. Sixthly, the donor and countries had been supportive of the regime during the Cold War, focusing only on Neoliberalist economic reforms and technocratic-managerial aspects of governance; practicing ‘political abstinence’. While the donor ostensibly responded to voices against corruption and oppression, they preferred order to freedom, and were not very welcome to political activities, democratisation, or regime change that would their investments and business interests in Kenya. In fact some donors reinforced Moi’s regimes’ authoritarianism and repeatedly undermined and frustrated domestic democratisation efforts, and calls for reduction in corruption (Eigen, 1996, Olukoshi, 2003, Mkandawire, 2007, Murunga, 2007). Indeed it is instructive to note that Transparency International was formed as a direct reaction to World Bank’s continual support of Moi’s regime despite its unprecedented levels of corruption, impunity, and ‘bad governance’ (Eigen, 1996). However the end of the Cold War generated a paradigm shift that no longer tolerated corrupt and autocratic regimes, but demanded anti-corruption, human rights, transparency, multipartism, participatory democracy. With Moi’s regime badly in need of donor funds, owing to Kenya’s debt and balance-of-payment deficit crisis and rapidly deteriorating economic situation, the threat of withdrawal donor funding reinforced all the above pressures; forcing the regime to respond. Nonetheless, the differences in interests and perspectives greatly compromised the pressure and impact of these demands; and perpetuated the regime for another decade.

The numerous actor groups criticising, challenging, and opposing Moi’s regime had diverse and often contradictory goals, objectives, voices and actions; driven by varying perspectives and interests; which the regime exploited. The radical politicians sought genuine change and rights for the citizen, while the conservatives sought power and ‘time to eat’ again. The civil society fought for basic rights and basic needs. The donors were mainly concerned with economic reforms, while the clergy morals and justice. The ordinary citizens wanted relief from their politico-economic oppressions, but were susceptible to
manipulation. These groups formed tenuous ‘reform coalition’, a feeble amalgam of actors and groupings united whenever there was a commonality of interests and perspectives, but most of the times opposing each other. Accordingly, the reform coalition lacked of a clear consensus on the reform agenda and strategies, such that even the very definition of what needed to be reformed was under contestation.

Under the threat of aid withdrawal, the regime would concede to reforms and draft policies, but these would be shelved when the threat was over. Numerous commissions of inquiry were established but findings never implemented. Soon Kenya came to have two sets of policies, the written donor and civil society driven paper policies which were never meant to be implemented; and unwritten policies and ‘road side’ populist declarations that the regime believed in and were actually implemented. Under pressure, the regime instituted the ‘dream team’ made of experts to implement neoliberalist reforms, but the regime preferred welfarist policies with populist initiatives for patronage. Nevertheless, many of the regime’s populist as well as ‘good intentions’ only ended up only benefiting the regime elites and had severe negative consequence for the general citizenry (Ogot and Ochieng, 1995, Throup and Hornsby, 1998, Ajulu, 2000, Murunga and Godwin, 2004, Hornsby, 2012).

Eventually this ‘reform coalition’ was united with common assumption that regime change would lead to a ‘better’ government and governance; removal of Moi would be ‘reform’ itself; producing a common declaration that ‘Moi Must Go’. Donors withdrew their funding to the government and instead diverted aid to the civil society, increasing the pressure to the government as well as the number of CSOs. The regime conceded to the restoration multipartyism and constitutional reforms to guarantee several citizen rights, besides limiting the presidency to two elective terms. However, the regime played the reform groups against each other, manipulating politico-ethnic schisms, bought opponents, and exploited the diverse perspective and interests among the challengers to aggravate the divisions in the opposition. Thus Moi won the 1992 and 1997 multiparty elections. However, as the 2000s dawned, the opposition was seemingly united. In response Moi named Uhuru Kenyatta (son of the former president) as his heir. This move forced the opposition to proclaim Mwai Kibaki (a conservative and Moi’s deputy for decade) as its presidential candidate, as a counter move based on politico-ethnic calculations. Moi and his conservative elites felt very vulnerable to prosecution for their regimes numerous acts human rights violation and rampant corruption; and greatly feared that a with united opposition, a radical politician would ascent to power, cause drastic changes in status quo; besides prosecuting them. However, the regime felt safe with a conservative who had been part of the system, regardless the political party (Wolf, 2006, Arriola, 2012, Hornsby, 2012). Accordingly, in 2002, Moi handed over power to Kibaki. Whereas the hoi polloi were celebrating that ‘Moi had gone’, and were filled with hope and euphoria, in reality this was just a change of guard, while the status quo remained the same. Despite considerable gains in democratisation and quality of government service and governance, most of the rules and structures from the colonial times, through Kenyatta’s and Moi’s regimes remained intact, and there would be no radical changes to improve the lives of the ordinary citizens or constructively engage with their concerns.
9.1.5. The 2000s Mwai Kibaki: Great expectations and grand disappointment

In 2002 Mwai Kibaki was brought to power by the ‘reform coalition’, under National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party; as a culmination of a protracted and concerted struggle for democracy and better governance. Hence, Kibaki’s presidency was ushered in with massive nationwide euphoria, with tremendous hope and expectation to end authoritarianism, politicisation of ethnicity, ‘tribalism’, public malfeasance, corruption, and impunity; and to radically improve the political and socio-economic situation of the ordinary citizens, national economic performance, democratic space, and governance (Barkan, 2004, Brown, 2004, Murunga and Nasong'o, 2006, Hornsby, 2012, Okombo et al., 2012). Indeed, NARC was composed of radical politicians, clergy, civil society luminaries, civil rights activists, exiles and former detainees; who had impeccable reform credentials and deep convictions; and had made much sacrifices in fighting for the rights of the poor and oppressed citizens. Furthermore, Kibaki was presented as a highly intelligent and competent technocrat who was averse to politics and publicity, in contrast to Moi’s informal, populist, strongman ‘big-man’ and buffoonish style. Accordingly, on the basis of the regime’s promises to focus on anti-corruption, economic reforms, good governance, there was resumption of development aid and foreign investments, which had been suspended in the last decade of Moi’s regime. Indeed, quality of public service, governance and civil rights improved tremendously; the largely inept public sector of Moi’s regime greatly transformed, and staffed with now comprised highly qualified, experienced, and competent individuals with the mind to serve the nation. Kenya's economy experienced a major turnaround. The government launched the ‘Kenya Vision 2030’ “to create a globally competitive and prosperous nation with a high quality of life by 2030” (GOK, 2007); revived state corporations, and initiated massive infrastructure projects; as well as numerous pro-poor initiatives such as he Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP). Politicisation of ethnicity and ‘tribalism’ seemed to have suddenly ended, and the citizens were largely united in one accord, thinking themselves as Kenyan; and ordinary citizens felt like they owned the government, and in fact made citizen arrests of corrupt policemen and government officials. Certainly, the second liberation had come.

However, the NARC government was also composed of conservatives, who had joined the ‘reform coalition’ solely as means to personal power, wealth, and prestige; but not democratisation, better governance, or the welfare of the citizens. Being driven by their predatory and kleptocratic perspectives, their main contention with Moi’s regime had been in the sharing of the ‘loot’, but not the bad governance, all they wanted was a chance to ‘eat’. Hence this group of politicians, that included elites from Kenyatta’s and Moi’s regime, was primarily interested in state power and the access to resources and privileges it guaranteed. Hence they had expediently used this fight for democracy only as guise to gain control of the existing Kenya’s dictatorial state structures, which they were in fact not willing to change (Ajulu, 2003, Brown, 2004, Ooreng, 2005, Murunga and Nasong'o, 2006, Steeves, 2006, Hornsby, 2012). Accordingly, those radical changes brought by the radicals, clergy, and civil society luminaries were not welcome; now that the conservatives were back in power, it was their ‘time to eat’, but the radicals were preventing this.
Predictably, the new government was immediately plagued with tremendous acrimony, factional fighting, and strife, with many conflicts over power, interests, and perspectives; which became hallmark of this regime. Certainly, this contributed greatly to the highly contradictory policies, programmes, projects, and other initiatives that emanated throughout Kibaki’s regime. Subsequently, a powerful elite conservative circle with networks forged since the Colonial times, the so called ‘Mount Kenya Mafia’, coalesced itself around the presidency, and isolated the presidency from the rest of the reform coalition and the general citizens concerns. They soon dominated the cabinet and other key positions in the government and parastatals, vetted and determined appointments to the executive and judiciary, and in effect became the main Kibaki’s advisers in policy and actions. The regime purged radical politicians, steadfast civil society activists, political reformers and other critical voices from the government, and brought in KANU politicians and other ‘friendly’ conservatives in a ‘government of national unity’ (Wrong, 2010, Hornsby, 2012). Influence of the ‘Mount Kenya Mafia’ even permeated the civil society; those criticising the regime had their critical personnel replaced by more ‘friendly’ ones; such that those organisations lost their voices; instead of checking the government’s excesses, their main function became giving the government legitimacy (Otieno, 2005, Murunga and Nasong'o, 2006, Wrong, 2010, Hornsby, 2012). Consequently, transparency, accountability and professionalism was rapidly being replaced by cronyism, patrimonialism, corruption, and nepotism; as the politics of ethnicity took centre stage.

Furthermore, despite massive economic gains the socio-economic situation of many citizens was not improving; the gains seemed to benefit mainly some individuals and regions. There were massive infrastructure investments in some regions, but none in others. It soon became apparent that there is no commitment by Kibaki’s regime to fighting corruption, Inquiries into past political abuses and corruption became merely tokenistic and farces. In fact, the level of corruption that far outweighed that of Moi’s regime; of corruption ending in this regime as promised, it had instead become more sophisticated, better hidden, and harder to trace and fight it; as exemplified by the Anglo-Leasing scandal (Wrong, 2010). With the exit of the radical, the regime seemed more committed to the politics of continuity rather than change. Instead of perusing state reform, broad-based consensus politics, and efficient economic management, the new regime now seemed bent on continuing the personal rule, impunity, and the kleptocratic-authoritarianist-oligarchic mode of governance of the preceding regimes (Ajulu, 2002, Ajulu, 2003, Muluka, 2005, Otieno, 2005, Murunga and Nasong'o, 2006, Wrong, 2010, Hornsby, 2012).

The regime now displayed a blatant elite biased development ideology; in a departure from the radicals’ pro-poor attitudes, the poor were now blatantly labelled as being lazy drunkards, who did nothing to ‘enrich’ themselves, but slothfully waited for government assistance in everything. For instance, the US$15 billion Silicon Savannah Konza Techno City, aimed at attracting the upper classes and formal businesses, was purposively planned with ten kilometres buffer zone to keep out the poor, their settlements and activities (GOK, 2011c, Watson, 2012). While billions of dollars were allocated for supper highways, commuter trains, and luxurious satellite cities to achieve world class’ status, pro-poor initiatives received only minimal tokenistic allocations. As the whole the country was more
prosperous and better managed, but the real incomes for the poor had drastically deteriorated; in fact, wealth was apparently ‘tricking up’ (KIPPPRA, 2013, World Bank, 2014c, Turner et al., 2015). The poor became frustrated, as while they were surrounded by ‘progress’, life was getting harder each day. Despite much rhetoric concerning commitment to good governance and inclusion, the regime remained averse to broadening democratic space, accountability, and also meaningfully engaging with the needs of the poor and marginalised. All these constituted major betrayal of the enthusiastic trust the ordinary citizens had bestowed upon this regime. In sum, this was not the government the citizens had overwhelmingly voted for. Their enthusiasm was replaced by bitter disappointment, disenchantment, despair, resentment, and the regime lost popularity, political goodwill, and support; both nationally and internationally.

The wide divergence in perspectives and interests in the NARC government, and the failure of the involved political actors to genuinely perceive and appreciate each other, their perspectives, and hidden attributes and attitudes had led to colossal misperceptions, misunderstandings, and lack of common ground amongst themselves. These contributed to massive disenchantment and bitterness that nearly brought the country to a catastrophic collapse. This did not only dash the hope of new mode of politics in Kenya, it also dashed the hope for trust and cohesion among the citizens in the country as whole. The NARC government broke apart; most of the purged radicals and some conservatives joined the Raila Odinga Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party; while most of the conservatives and a few radicals joined the Kibaki led Party of National Unity (PNU).

In the subsequent 2007 electoral campaigns ODM presented itself as the protector of the poor and defender of democracy and justice calling for fair distribution of national resources; while PNU presented itself a party for action, progress, and hard work and the protection of investments, which unlike ODM, did not ‘waste time bickering’ about politics and democracy, but concentrated only on ‘doing’. ODM presented itself as the party for the ‘the people’, and PNU as a party for the ‘the elite’ that had squandered the second liberation struggle. Hence the ODM focused its campaigns on the Mount Kenya Mafia, with PNU offering counter narratives against ODM elite. These degenerated into politics of ethnicity, as the politicians became ‘ethnic kingpins’ and used fear mongering and other scare tactics herded their communities into specific alliances and balkanised into politico-ethnic voting blocs (Kagwanja, 2009, Wrong, 2010, Murunga, 2011, Hornsby, 2012). Based on widespread disappointment amongst the majority of the citizens against Kibaki; the fact the ODM enjoyed national support, unlike PNU which had support mainly from the Central Province (Kikuyu region) hence the “41 against 1” ethnic narrative; and opinion polls; ODM was over-confident of winning (KNCHR, 2008, Kagwanja, 2009, Wrong, 2010, Murunga, 2011, Hornsby, 2012). Accordingly, following the declaration of Kibaki as the winner on the massively irregular 2007 elections and his hurried swearing in at night, cataclysmic violence erupted throughout the country. ODM supporters came out in mass protests but were violently dispersed and shot down by the police. This was followed by spontaneous, organised, and retaliatory politico-ethnic violence. However the slums of Nairobi bore the brunt of the violence.
Nevertheless, whereas this violence was depicted as ethnic clashes, in reality it was mainly a combination class war, state suppression, economic war, and pure crime; in which the poor were used and victimised. Most of the deaths resulted from police use of live ammunition against protesters; in the slums most violence was a continuation of gang wars over territory; and in the rural areas (apart from retaliatory attacks) these conflict over land had been going on since independence (KNCHR, 2008). Nonetheless politico-ethnic tensions, resentment, and a sense of betrayal reached a crescendo and permeated most aspects of Kenya’s political space; such that even a politico-ethnic clash between the various armed forces in county seemed eminent. Ultimately, this orgy of violence only ended after international efforts and mediations that led to the National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008; a power sharing agreement between PNU and ODM, in “Grand Coalition Government” with Kibaki as the President, and Raila taking up the newly re-created post of Prime Minister.

From the onset the Grand Coalition Government was marred with conflicts and misunderstandings, with the key actors being driven by highly conflicting interests and perspectives. To start with, this was not a willing and happy union; the parties had been brought together following bitter negotiations and forced to make certain concessions, compromises, and accommodations they were not willing to. Each sided claimed they had duly won the elections; and represented warring constituencies. The coalition had been borne out of conflict, bitter disputes, and deep sense of betrayal. The Grand Coalition Government was always encumbered with massive infighting and acrimony, and numerous contradictory policies, programmes, and projects. The new government was comprised of the same individuals who had acrimonious relationships in NARC, and now had to work again together again; the pro-poor vis a vis pro-elite individuals, and the radicals vis a vis the conservatives. They answered to constituencies with conflicting concerns, and were divided concerning loyalties to the President or the Prime Minister. The Coalition Government had several duplicate ministries and government departments, having similar mandates but operating based on different ideologies, one under a PNU and other under and ODM affiliated politicians. Thus the government was often working at cross-purposes with itself, in various initiatives and agencies. This problem permeated the urban, housing, and informal settlements arena, which saw a plethora of divergent programmes, approaches and responses; driven by conflicting interests, visions, philosophies and paradigmatic stands (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2006, KNCHR, 2008, Mueller, 2008, Shivji and Murunga, 2009, Murunga, 2011, Perscom, 2011). It is in this context that this study, takes place, a highly complex and multifarious policy environment; borne out of the rather completed, shrouded, and often deceptive Kenya’s politico-historical trajectory and context.

9.1.6. Contextuality: Role of governance-politico-historical situation

The fieldwork for this study was conducted in the second term of Kibaki’s presidency, with ‘Grand Coalition Government’ derived from a power sharing agreement; in the aftermath of election irregularities and violence. These had arisen because the regime had squandered second liberation and reversed several of the democratic and good governance gains that had been achieved it, leading Kenya to ‘the brink of the precipice’, almost to civil war, and total destruction; and a greatly divided nation, with profound mistrust, suspicion, resentment, and despair amongst the ordinary citizens as
well as the politicians and government officials. However, the post election violence and politics profoundly the slums and issues that surrounding it. Accordingly, at the time of the fieldwork, the country was deeply divided along politico-ethnic lines, and the impacts of the conflict were still fresh in the minds and the conversation of many slum dwellers, as well as of other involved actors, in urban housing issues. An air of suspicion and mistrust was visible between the residents, and many of them who were interviewed had profound distrust and resentment against the government and politicians, and were full of despair and disenchantment having resigned to future of without hope. At same time, the Government was also encumbered by massive infighting and acrimony, issuing contradictory solutions and directives; compounding the confusion and plight of the urban poor and slum dwellers.

From the perspective of the perspectives of the urban poor and marginalised citizens the troubled process political governance in Kenya has been of that continuity to maintain elite privilege but not change that could yield meaningful improvements in their lives. Throughout the Colonial, Kenyatta, Moi, and Kibaki regimes; cruel and unjust, segregative-exploitative-oppresive polices and systems have been elaborated and passed on from one regime to another, massively benefitting the elites and those favourably positioned, however always at the expense and of the poor and marginalised. There has always been an elitists bias in policy and practices, with pro-poor concerns being given only lip service. The state has been conceptualised as the cake where the poor see themselves doing most of the baking, but not the eating, unless one was politically connected; especially with expedient selective application of law to favour the strong against the weak. There are diverse perspectives among the citizens concerning what the legitimate exercise of power is. Politics and governance seem to be only about gaining or maintaining state power, and the access to resources and privileges that it guarantees; it is about sharing the cake among the elites, the ordinary citizens seem only to matter at election time; and when the can provide cheap labour and militia for the elites (Ajulu, 2003). Hence in this perspective concerns of the poor are not treated with the seriousness; but with populist, nominal, or tokenistic initiatives, accompanied by colossal amounts of rhetoric, mainly aimed at manipulating the citizens. The poor citizens have been manipulate through divide and rule’ principles, politico-ethnicism, and clientelism that has robbed them of their voices and power of unity; paying a heavy prices as they fight amongst themselves while the elite share the cake.

Kenya has a relatively effective judiciary and legislative systems, an operational executive and civil bureaucracy, a robust private sector, and a functional democratic system with regular elections; and is classified among the ‘emerging’ countries with highest ‘potential’ in economic prosperity, peace, and democratic freedom (Kearney, 2014, World Bank, 2014c). Indeed, since independence, the country has achieved great economic prosperity and democratic gains; but these have only been shared by the upper class and to an extent the middle class; and the poor have very little access to the judicial, legislative, and other public services. In fact, due to the way the political and governance system works, with its layers of exclusion, marginalisation, politico-ethnicism, patronage, suppression, and corruption; the poor on have a ‘virtual democracy’ (Orvis, 2001). Hence, since independence, for the poor the socio-economic situations have deteriorated continually; and concerning democracy the poor seem to be governed by a different set of very oppressive, segregative and exploitative rules and
regulations. Furthermore, according many poor citizens, the political system shuts out credible and popular leaders; and the country’s governance is only captured by elites and governors of questionable legitimacy and credibility. Thus many citizens feel left out by the ruling regime, resulting in mass bitterness, despondency, disenchantment, resentment, and seething anger that makes the country a potential ‘time bomb’ (KNCHR, 2008). Accordingly, notions such as independence, democracy, development, and prosperity in effect remain meaningless for many as they do not result in any meaningful improvements in their day to day lives. In fact they bound to remain that way in the foreseeable feature, unless the citizen acquire and cultivate a united and influential voice to challenge this status quo.

In summation, from the perspectives of the poor citizens, the politico-governance system in Kenya and its historical trajectory have continually undermined their socio-economic wellbeing. This included by firstly, ignoring popular concerns and voices. Secondly, by manipulating the mechanisms through which citizens could have channelled those concerns and voices and exercised their rights and freedoms. Thirdly, by corrupting the available avenues or chances for judicial redress for those violations. Fourthly, by outright repression and denial of freedom of choice, speech, movement and assembly when the citizens attempt to protest these issues and demand change. Fifthly, by dealing with the concerns of the citizens only when the ruling elites stand to benefit from such action, such as political support, patronage, or outright corruption and rent-seeking opportunities the initiatives could provide. Despite massive rhetoric the contrary, the state in all the four regimes have promoted an exclusivist rather than inclusivist logic leading to many citizens lacking a sense of belonging to the nation-state. All this are exemplified, and play a major role, in the formation and persistence of slums in Kenya, the continual failure of policies, and the profound lack of political will to meaningfully solve these problems. As a consequence, to the many ordinary citizens, all the high sounding epithets about Kenya and its prosperity have no meaning as long as they see their political and socio-economic situation continue to deteriorate without any hope of improvement in any foreseeable future.

All in all, the role of politico-historical trajectories and dynamics in the Global South issues such as urban housing cannot be understated; and any analysis or appreciations of the situation, crisis, policy, reform, or initiative that crises is ‘apolitical’ or ‘ahistorical’ may be imprudent and may not succeed in meeting its objectives. Accordingly, the role of political actors (both the governors and the governed), their interactions, interests, and perspectives have played a significant role in the emergence, evolution and persistence of housing problems in Nairobi; as will be explored in the subsequent section.

9.2. Nairobi: Housing crisis and responses before the 2000s

Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya and one of the largest in Africa, is the hub of trade and business in Eastern and parts of Central Africa. It has grown from a railway town of 13,500 inhabitants in 1906 census to a Metropolis of 6,547,547 by the 2009 census (White et al., 1948, KNSB, 2010). The A.T. Kearney (2014) ‘Global Cities Index’ ranks Nairobi at number 68, and the third most global city in Africa after Cairo and Johannesburg; and its ‘Emerging Cities Outlook’ considers Nairobi as one of the
10 cities in the world that are most favourably positioned to advance over the next 10 to 20 years, and also with the potential to become even more global (Kearney, 2014). Certainly, Nairobi is not only the political capital of Kenya and commerce; it hosts the headquarters of several multinational corporations and international organisations, and their regional offices; thus Nairobi wields considerable decision-making power at a global level. Indeed, Nairobi dominates entire Eastern Africa regions’ economy, culture and politics; serving as a centre for manufacturing, commerce, innovation, international financial services, media and communications, education and research, among others; and with dominant services and information sectors and extensive global networks (GaWC, 2010). Indeed, the service industry contributes about 60% of Nairobi’s GDP, with agriculture and manufacturing industry each contributing approximately 20%; with current development trends depicting a decay of industrial area with reduction in industrialisation and a more marked shift to information technology and service industry. Consequently, Nairobi is not only one of the largest urban agglomerations in the region; it is also highly interconnected, serving as a hub for global integration, ‘engine of growth’ and gateway to the region’s resources; playing a significant role in setting global and regional agendas, but also being subjected to great transnational dangers and risks.

Located 500 kilometres west of the Indian Ocean in the Kenya’s Central Highlands, and adjacent to the Rift Valley, Nairobi is strategically situated in the middle of Kenya, amidst of the most economically productive areas in the country and the region. Positioned 140 kilometres south of the equator, at latitude of 36°50’ east and longitude of 1°17’ south, and an altitude ranging from 1,600 to 1,850 metres above sea level (MSL); Nairobi has a cool subtropical highland climate, with average high day temperatures around 24 °C, and nights at average low of 10 °C throughout the year; and an average annual rainfall of 1000 mm (GoK, 2013). Topographically, western Nairobi (the hill) is rugged high ground around 1700–1850 MSL, while the eastern side (the swamp) is a generally flat at 1600 MSL. High income residential areas are located mainly on the higher locations, with other functions zoned and distributed on the lower altitudes. Middle and low income groups’ residential areas are located on the flatter plains on the lower altitudes, (the swamp). Finally, three rivers the Nairobi, Ngong, and Mathare, (and their tributaries), cut across Nairobi, and almost all of the slums of Nairobi are located in those river valleys (Lamba, 1994, Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau, 2004).

Like other cities in the Global South Nairobi is a primate city, with its urban agglomeration having a population that is seven times that of the Kenya’s second largest city, Mombasa (KNSB, 2010). Economically, Nairobi contributes over 60% of Kenya’s GDP, and a great proportion of countries formal and informal employment. The private sector contributes 80 percent of Nairobi’s GDP, of which the formal sector comprising mainly of large firms (40,000 in number) which subsidiaries of multinational corporations contribute 75 percent, and the small and micro firms (1.7 million in number) contribute 25% of the private sectors GDP share. Nevertheless more than half of Nairobi’s population depends upon the informal economy for their livelihoods. Furthermore, the estimates for Nairobi’s unemployment rate range from 26% to 40%, in conjunction with very high levels of under-employment.
Accordingly, Nairobi has an extremely skewed income, consumption, and spatial distribution, with the wealthier 10% of the population accruing 45.2% of income, while the poorest 10% only 1.6%, a GINI coefficient of 0.59 (UN-Habitat, 2013b).

**Figure 23: Primacy: Population of Nairobi in comparison to other major urban areas in Kenya**

These inequalities are reflected in the population densities and its geographical distribution. As whole, Nairobi has an average density of 4,515.6 inhabitants per square kilometre (inh./km²), however in high and middle income areas the density ranges from about 350 to 2,500 inh./km², while in low-income areas it ranges from about 16,000 to over 120,000 inh./km². Thus, whereas the wealthier 10% of the Nairobi’s population occupy over 80 % of Nairobi’s residential land, in ‘very low’ and ‘low dense habitations’; the poor, comprising almost 60% the city’s population live in informal settlements on less than 5% of Nairobi’s residential area, in ‘very high dense habitations’, which in fact is around 1% of total Nairobi’s area (Oparanya, 2009, KNSB, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2013b). The high income groups occupy well drained and serviced lands, with high quality and adequate infrastructure and services, while the poor mostly reside in slums with little or no infrastructure and services, in extremely hazardous locations and wastelands such as river valleys and flood plains, swamps, steep slopes, or adjacent to sewers or dump sites, on petroleum pipelines, and under high voltage power lines. While higher income groups have security of tenure, most poor people in Nairobi face an extremely high degree of tenure insecurity as most of their habitations are illegal or quasi-legal, and most are under constant threat of harassment and eviction, not only from the government and city authorities, but also from other private sectors actors, and more so from their own slumlords (DRSRS, 1994, Lamba, 1994, Syagga et al., 2001a, UN-Habitat, 2006b, GoK, 2008, UN-Habitat, 2008b).

In sum, the situation in Nairobi typifies the situations that characterise many cities of the Global South, such as postcoloniality, casualty, multiperspectivity, inequality, informality, and slums; by which a great proportion of its population resides slums (see Chapter 3.1). Since the 1950s, Nairobi has grown at an average rate of 4.8% per annum in population, saw increased economic activity and growth colossal
growth of its economy and wealth, but so have the slums been growing at around the same rate of 4.8% each year, while the magnitude and incidences of absolute poverty increased exponentially (UN-Habitat, 2006b, UN-Habitat, 2008b, UN-Habitat, 2013b).

Table 37: Nairobi land use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Area (sq. km)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Residential</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slums</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Commercial &amp; Industry</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed Residential &amp; Commercial</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No structures</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open space</td>
<td>332.0</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreational</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>598.2</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Park</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>695.1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GOK, 2014

Table 38: Population sizes and densities in a selected residential areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement/Estate</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No of households</th>
<th>Area in square km</th>
<th>Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>9,764</td>
<td>3,381</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthaiga</td>
<td>6,786</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lavington</td>
<td>18,966</td>
<td>5,815</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>1,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loresho</td>
<td>15,784</td>
<td>5,131</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>1,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langata</td>
<td>16,118</td>
<td>5,051</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highridge</td>
<td>46,642</td>
<td>13,019</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>1,103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parklands</td>
<td>11,456</td>
<td>3,369</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitisuru</td>
<td>27,459</td>
<td>8,603</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>1,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibera Slangs</td>
<td>16,518</td>
<td>6,281</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>82,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korogochi Gaharu</td>
<td>22,899</td>
<td>7,415</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>76,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukuru Ngyro</td>
<td>36,232</td>
<td>10,224</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>15,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathare</td>
<td>69,003</td>
<td>24,525</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>48,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Syagga et al., 2001a)

From the very beginning Nairobi has epitomised the pinnacle of splendour and squalor; showcasing the glory, majesty, and magnificence of its elite and powerful; while designating those deemed powerless to the status of ‘otherness’, ‘unwantedness’, or ‘non-existence’; and subjecting them to a life of misery, and deprivation. Hence, Nairobi is the home of some the wealthiest individuals in the Global South, as well as the poorest, with a massive gap between them; with the being categorised among the most unequal cities in the world (UN-Habitat, 2010b). These income and spatial polarities are exemplified Nairobi’s satellite imagery depiction of the comparison between golf courses to the slum areas, illustrating this urbanisation trend in the Global South. Consequently, whereas the city has shown marked growth in size and economic prosperity, and its luxurious and general formal housing stock has grown tremendously in those six decades, seemingly Nairobi’s growth in the main has been
through its slums; with ever increasing inequities in incomes, consumption, and spatial distribution (UN-Habitat, 2006b, UN-Habitat, 2008b, UN-Habitat, 2013b). Extreme opulence and luxury is often juxtaposed with extreme poverty, deprivation and squalor. From its founding as a Railway town in 1899 and subsequent development into a ‘Modern’ city, Nairobi has been subjected to various modes of transformation; whose net effect has been to marginalise a great proportion of its dwellers, and condemned them to extremely deplorable housing conditions. Indeed from its founding, whereas the city has been driven by grandiose visions, most of its population have lived in what can be described as slum like conditions, as unrecognised or authorised ‘surplus’ segment of society.

Figure 24: Spatial and Income polarities: Nairobi Satellite image of golf courses and slum areas

Nairobi, Kenya from the air: Interesting neighbours

Nairobi golf courses, for a few hours pleasure for a few wealthy individuals, occupy much more land areas than several slums, in which hundreds of thousands of poor people live and eke out their livelihoods. Source: UN-HABITAT, 2004

9.2.1. 1890s-1950s The genesis, a colonial legacy and a present continuum

From its very founding in the final years of the 19th century, Nairobi was beset with severe housing problems, attributable to conflicting interests and divergent perspectives, among the involved powerful actors. Several perspectives emerged in the pre 1950s period concerning housing problems and responses the persist to date, and define the current attitudes and practices.

In 1892 British surveyors indentified the area as suitable location for firstly, a railway depot, as at this halfway point between the Indian Ocean and Lake Victoria, lay the end of flat terrain and the beginning of the great natural obstacle, the Rift Valley with its 450 m drop at 50° gradient. Secondly, With its elevated altitude of 1,800 metres above sea level, cool climate, as well an ample supply of water, fertile land, and potential labour, the area would be suitable for European settlement. The hill was ideal for housing, and the massive flat area for the railway depot, workshops, and eventually the station, warehouses, and offices (White et al., 1948, Morgan, 1968, Hirst and Lamba, 1994, Nicholls, 2005). Nevertheless, the location was not unoccupied. This area known by the Maasai name of 'Enkare Nairobi' meaning ‘the place of cool waters’; served as location for grazing and watering cattle, as well as batter trade, for the communities that would be named Maasai, Kikuyu, Ogiek, and Kamba.
Moreover, a caravanserai like settlement named Pangani, had emerged on the trade route between
the coastal Arabs and interior communities, with a market and lodgings. As the railway proceeded, the
Native communities and settlements were cleared off; through pacification, punitive actions that
including biological warfare small pox for humans and rinderpest for cattle; and the remnants relocated
to respective ‘Native reserves’. While Pangani would grow rapidly as a settlement for the ‘surplus
population’ into one of the earliest slums of Nairobi, before being finally razed down in the 1920s
(Morgan, 1963, Hirst and Lamba, 1994, Nicholls, 2005). Hence from the onset, the perspective that
permitted injustice and violence against the marginalised was instituted; and slum demolition or razing
established as a practice.

Indeed, May 30 1899, when the railhead reached Enkare Nairobi, marks the official date when the
present day Nairobi was founded. Within a few weeks, Nairobi was rapidly populated by officials and
employees of the Railway, colonial administration, soldiers, shipping agents, contractors, big game
hunters, and established traders. However, also following the railway, was a huge population of
‘informal’ traders, low skilled persons, unattached labours, prostitutes, and others; whom the colonial
authorities referred to as ‘surplus population’; comprising mainly of Indians and Arabs, as well as few
population’ would be compounded by an additional huge influx from India, Mombasa, Britain, and also
the surrounding Native reserves, once the railway town was established. Accordingly, from the onset
the railway town was planed and housing provision made only for the upper and middle-class
Europeans and Asians who were formally employed by the Railway and Protectorate, or engaged in
formal business or profession; while none was provided for the ‘surplus population’ as well as the
lower-class Asian labourers ‘Coolies’ formally working for the Railway as well (Emig and Ismail, 1980,
Nevanlinna, 1996). Hence, from the very beginning, the lower classes and surplus population had to
provide for their own shelter ‘informally’ or illegally; in unhealthy locations, in the swamp, without
sanitary services or planning; thus a significant portion of modern Nairobi was founded as a massive
slum.

Firstly, the unplanned Indian Bazaar emerged in the swamp, comprised of haphazardly arranged
collection of tin huts that served as residential houses for mainly Asians, but also some Africans and
Europeans; as well as shops, butcheries, laundries, brothels, opium dens, and other informal, illegal,
and immoral activities. Its population continued to grow rapidly, but without planning, sewerage,
drainage, or potable water. Soon the settlement became ‘overcrowded, miserable, and filthy in
extreme, teeming with rats and vermin’; as a typical slum pejoratised as a place of ‘vice, depravity,
squalor, wretchedness, and disease’ (Ward, 1912, White et al., 1948, Hake, 1977). Secondly, with
the destruction of their livelihoods, and imposition of heavy taxes the Native were compelled find
employment in the new town. Initially they walked long distances from their Native reserves. In a short
while this proved untenable, and found accommodation in the servants’ quarters on the Hill or in the
Indian Bazaar. However the majority went to live in Pagani and other ‘unauthorised villages’ such as
‘Mombasa’ and Maskini (i.e. poor) the sprung up on the town’s periphery. These ‘African Villages’ did
not follow the traditional built form or planning; this was a new style that emerged due to urbanisation
and crude makeshift living; a style which became the exemplar of the current ‘slum’ house types (Hake, 1977, Stren, 1978, Nevanlinna, 1996, Makachia, 2011, Macharia, 2014). Like the Bazaar, the unauthorised villages’ were unplanned, unserviced, and became crowded. Nonetheless, the subsequent urban plans and policies would continue to ignore the needs and the presence of the lower classes and ‘surplus humanity’.

**Figure 25: Nairobi’s early spatial structure**

Towards the end of the 19th century, bubonic plague in India broke out in India. Owing to continuous migration, the same broke out at Indian Bazaar in 1902 casing several fatalities. In response the Principal Medical Officer ordered the burning down of most of Nairobi including the Bazaar, military lines, railway workshops, and surrounding ‘African villages’. However, they were rebuilt again in the same haphazard manner, in unsuitable locations, and unsanitary condition. Predictably, this was followed by another outbreak, followed by another burning, relocation, and rebuilding; numerous times. This became considered “the only method of town improvement known to Africa” (White *et al.*, 1948 p 7); and established the cycle of slum demolitions, forceful evictions, relocations, and rebuilding as a common practice in Nairobi; with each cycle resulting in even bigger and worse ‘self-help’ settlements (Hake, 1977, Emig and Ismail, 1980, Nevanlinna, 1996).

Initially Nairobi’s residential segregation and planning logic was derived British aristocratic perspectives based upon social class position, nobility, wealth, income, and profession; with different locations for the officers, subordinates, workers, and the surplus humanity; a basis of functionality and class differentiation. However, the Anglo-Boer war brought a massive influx of settlers from South Africa, who transposed into Nairobi the racists perspectives and relations they had with Indians, and Natives in South Africa (Morgan, 1967, Huxley, 1968, Hake, 1977, Nevanlinna, 1996, Murunga, 2005, Otiso, 2005). In this perspectives, the British settlers were the only people, the only true ‘Kenyans’ and ‘Nairobians’; the others were merely tools and objects for their needs and pleasure. Poor Europeans
would not be tolerated as they diminished the image of the super race. Africans were ‘rural animals’ and ‘primitive objects’ in need of ‘civilising’ to be turned into ‘beneficial use’, and ‘fruitful purposes’. However they had the tendency to fall sway to ‘dangerous ideas’ like ‘liberation’, ‘equality’, or ‘justice’; which had to stumped out with maximum brute force and contained with utmost cunning; to ensure their continued ‘obedience’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘conformity’ the ‘civilised way of life’. The Asians were vermin bringing diseases as well as a threat to the European way of life, ideas and standards; with some holding ‘dangerous dreams’ of ‘representation and equality’. They had outlived their usefulness in the colony and hence further immigration had to be stemmed (Huxley, 1968, Hake, 1977, Clayton and Savage, 2012, Aiyar, 2015). Accordingly, in this perspective the frequently plague outbreaks came to be blamed in the low class habits and customs of the ‘uncivilized dirty creatures’ and the ‘intermingling of races’; thus sanitation and control of plague became one more rationalisation for racial segregation; to protect the British settlers from disease (Morgan, 1967, Huxley, 1968, Hake, 1977, Emig and Ismail, 1980, Nevanlinna, 1996, Murunga, 2005, Otiso, 2005). Furthermore, this established the perspective that blamed the poor for the urban problems, and the subjecting them to severe sanctions; besides them pejorative labels such as dirt or vermin, to be ‘clean up’.

Figure 26: Plan for Railway town and early slums in 1910 and 1948 plan

Notes:
The highlighted circle shows the 1910 extent of Nairobi, with the higher altitude ‘hill’ area (green/darker) was reserved for Europeans; and the dotted line the 1948 boundary. In 1910, apart from ‘Mombasa’, unauthorised villages (red dots) were located outside the town’s boundaries. With the 1948 boundary extension most slums are incorporated inside Nairobi’s boundaries, all slums within the 1948 boundaries were demolished with the exception of Kibera.
Source:(White et al., 1948) Based on Survey of Kenya 1910 map and 1948 Nairobi Master Plan.

However, in reality the numerous plague outbreaks were directly caused by the crowded unsanitary conditions, in a hazardous poorly drained swampy location with sewerage, garbage collection, or potable water; which were in fact as a result of lack of proper concern and planning for the poor and
underclass. Nonetheless, these were largely just symptomatic of the fundamental interests and perspectives at stake; with viscous rivalry and disputes between the Railways and the Protectorate officials, not only over power and control, but also ‘best’ the way Nairobi should develop (Morgan, 1967, Huxley, 1968, Hake, 1977, Nevanlinna, 1996). Indeed, from the first census of Nairobi in 1906, in which the total population was 11,512; comprised of 7,371 Africans, 3,582 Asians, and 559 Europeans; this had grown to approximately 17,000 with about 10,200 Africans, 5,000 Asians, and 1,800 Europeans in 1914. However no adequate provision had been made for the African and Asian populations, and most had to live in the slum-like Indian Bazaar and African unauthorised villages (White et al., 1948, Aiyar, 2015). Thus Nairobi was razed down and rebuilt numerous time until the First World War as the officials bickered of the best location and planning of the railway town/ capital of the Colony; in conflict over vested interests, but more so perspectives.

The World Wars radically transformed Nairobi politically, economically, and spatially. Not only did the town’s global stature, imperial splendour, planning and architectural aesthetic, size, and role increase tremendously; but also the level of misery, deprivation, poverty, slums, and oppression for the colonised rose drastically. In both wars Nairobi acquired international role and status as a command, troop base, logistics and recruitment centre Africa, Middle East, and Asia theatres of war; that saw a massive influx of soldier and labourers; not only from all over the British Empire, but also from the Native reserves in Kenya. Several slums such as Kariokor (Carrier Corps) and Kibera emerged or grew as a direct consequence of the wars as settlements for demobilised soldiers. Indeed, the population of Nairobi doubled in each of the wars, and the city enjoyed massive post war economic booms (Hake, 1977, Nevanlinna, 1996). In July 1919, Nairobi was granted a Municipal Status, with a council to run the city.

However, the wars also increased the boldness, political awareness, and unity of the colonised who increased their demands for justice, representation, and fairness; to which the settlers and colonial government responded with even harsher measures. The British East Africa protectorate was transformed into the Kenya Crown Colony in 1920, with more powers to the Settlers who had very unsympathetic perspectives against the Natives and Asians. The 1920 Native Registration Ordinance required all Africans to carry mental identification (kipande) hanging around the neck, to control movement in to the urban areas, to prevent desertion from farms and labour in camps, and also to humiliate and crush the spirits of would be agitators for freedom, and contain any potential dissent as the result of the increasing awareness and boldness (Leys, 1973, Ogot, 1974, Kanogo, 1987). The Vagrancy Ordinance of 1920 restricted residence of Nairobi only to employed Africans (mainly male); defining vagrants as the unemployed and self-employed, as well as the families of the employed persons. The ordinances included pass-laws, curfews, repatriation of ‘vagrants’, demolition of native settlements, with stricter control on lives of the Natives and server punishments (Hake, 1977). In 1923, the oldest slums of Pangani, Masikini, Kaburini, and Mombasa were demolished. In sum, the Africans were confined in the rural areas, while the Asian were forbidden entry into rural areas through the 1922 ‘Command Paper’; with much oppression and restrictions, but which would in fact increase their demands for freedom (White et al., 1948, Huxley, 1968).
To ensure the above, the colonial authorities commissioned J.R. Feetham from South Africa to prepare a new town plan, the 1927 ‘Plan for Settler Capital’, that would establish zoning and regulate land use in Nairobi; as well as “give outward expression of the colonialist’s national ideal” and make Nairobi a monumental administrative centre (Emig and Ismail, 1980 p 22). This plan apportioned almost 90% of Nairobi’s residential land to the upper and middle class Europeans to the West of Nairobi; almost 10% to Wealthier Asians (who had acquired British perspectives and tests) to the North; with the most of the Asians and African sharing one percent to the East. This class/race residential differentiation and zoning was reinforced in the 1948 master plan, a persist to date as Nairobi’s spatial character, with the upper classes occupying 90% to the West, the Middle class the 10%, and the urban poor the 1% (White et al., 1948, Ogot, 1974, Hake, 1977, Emig and Ismail, 1980, Kahimbaara, 1986, Nevanlinna, 1996). Furthermore, to counter the increasing demands for equality by the Indians, the colonial authority would reserve minor government positions for Africans (who were certifiably loyal and had fully embraced British perspectives) to create a new middle class. For them, the government would build civil servants housing in Starehe (comfortable in Kiswahili) (Huxley, 1968). For lower class African labourers, the was Railway housing in Muthurwa, and 317 ‘site and services’ plots in Pumwani based on South African ‘Soweto’ models (Hake, 1977). The poor Asian would dwell near the city centre to work as shop assistants, or the Railway for the labours. Nevertheless, while these schemes provide several hundreds of housing; there were almost 28,000 Africans and 16,000 Asians dire need of shelter and were force to live in slum-like conditions. The rationalisation for the minuscule provision was that Africans as rural dwellers to be limitedly allowed in the city whenever need, while the Asians were transients who would go back ‘home’; but Nairobi belonged to the settlers (Hake, 1977, Nevanlinna, 1996). The plan was aimed at entrenching and safeguarding the social privileges of settlers, to the detriment of the others; an elitist biased perspective that persist to date. At independence the African elite, nouveau riche, and governors assumed these aristocratic status, privileges, and perspectives, perceiving all the city material resources and people were there only for the use and pleasure of the aristocrats; thus they perpetuated the elite biased planning and zoning practices and attitudes that appropriated massive privileges for a few, while condemning the majority to a life of misery in slums and ‘informal’ livelihoods. In sum, at independence, this residential tripartition would define the spatial character on Nairobi, high income groups occupying the west, upper middle income the north. The middle classes would take over the post-independence housing schemes that spread eastwards from the African locations, while the poor would be confined to the slums that would continue to be demolished and spring up in marginal locations (Obudho and Aduwo, 1989a, Syagga et al., 2001a, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007).

The Second World War and other prevailing geopolitico-economic forces radically altered Nairobi, despite the fervent efforts of the settlers to maintain the old order. During the War, Nairobi was totally transformed from a railway town into a ‘modern garden city’ and colonial capital; that served not only as a collection point for raw materials, but also a centre for industrial production and processing; and its population doubled from around 50,000 to over 110,000. Post war socio-economic challenges in Europe precipitated and in a influx of poor and middle-class British ‘food immigrants’, who greatly
contradicted the settlers’ aristocratic perspectives. They introduced to the colony, ‘low-class European way of life’ to the great chagrin of the earlier settlers who worked vehemently to preserve the aristocratic practices and privileges. This is akin to the contemporary governance perspective of Nairobi that is overly preoccupied with ‘world class status’ and elite privilege, often in total disregard and detriment of the common citizens (Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975, Hake, 1977, Obudho, 1983, Clayton and Savage, 2012). Moreover, Britain changed its policy that permitted only the exporting raw materials and forbade industrialisation in the colonies, to allowing particular industries in the colonies, which necessitated permanent stable skilled African labour and change in urban housing policy and attitude to consider them as permanent city dwellers and not transients. In addition it bought in industrialist who challenged the dominance of the settler farmer in the countries governance debates. For instance while the settlers pushed for the ‘Vagrancy (Amendment) Bill’ to repatriate any vagrants’ found walking in the city without proof of employment back to their native reserve; the industrialist favoured surplus labour for casual employment on the basis of their fluctuating labour needs; and pushed for the Voluntary Unemployed Persons Ordinance unemployed men could live in Nairobi for seven days; creating ambiguity that permitted ‘informal’ living and settlements (Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975, Hake, 1977). Furthermore, in 1945, Labour government came to power in Britain, espousing improvement of colonised people’s welfare, housing, socio-economic conditions, and decolonisation. From 1945 the Labour government officials comprised the executive arm of the state; while the Kenya Legislative council and Nairobi Municipal Council was dominated by European settlers (and a few African and Asian elites) who were extreme-right Conservatives and vehemently opposed most of the policies and perspectives of the administration; which according to them gave ‘too much concessions’ to the colonised. Accordingly, most of the administrations initiatives to improve the welfare of the natives would be thwarted, and the Labour government perspectives would never put in practice. In fact, even harsher condition would be imposed upon the colonised to stem their quest for independence.

In response to massive post World War II transformations, the Nairobi Town Council commissioned a team from South Africa led by L.W. T. White to develop the 1948 ‘Nairobi Master Plan for a Colonial Capital’, so that Nairobi could be befitting “for the mature role of a Colonial Capital” (Nairobi’s Mayor F.G. R. Woodley quoted in White et al., 1948, p iii). The goal was to achieve architectural control over the appearance of the city and ‘formal dignity’; as well as express a newness that would communicate the splendour of the Empire. Hence an aesthetic and rational plan based on the ‘garden city’ concept; that would preserve the existing urban structure and zoning; but also introducing boulevards, and landscaped highways, large open spaces, and industrial zones (White et al., 1948). The Plan realigned the railway line, which passed the though the town, to now circumvent the town and go thorough Kibera; and placed on its former path and landscaped highway. This realignment altered the established power structure in Nairobi, with the Railways losing the right of veto, and the Municipality acquiring the ‘authority of change’ (Tiwari, 1981). This plan maintained the 1927 residential housing zoning, in addition to providing a few thousand ‘official housing’ for African and Asians in formal employment in close proximity to the Railways and Industrial area; in the ‘Eastlands’. Until independence in 1963, the combined efforts of the Government and the Railway to build houses for
its employees, and the Nairobi Municipality for Industrial workers would produce slightly over 10,000 housing units (mostly bachelor quarters). Nonetheless, the Plan dismissed the housing need of over 200,000 people in informal employment and living in unauthorised villages and bazaars (White et al., 1948, Hake, 1977, Emig and Ismail, 1980, Kahimbaara, 1986, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, Hall, 2014); because “even though they were the most numerous they were the most transitory” (Hall 1988 p 190). Indeed, while the Labour Department stressed the need for African family housing so as to achieve the required stabilisation and efficiency of labour force; the Commissioner of Lands insisted that “the African is not a town dweller” and would be “socially and financially liabilities housing and welfare to the urban authorities” (Stren, 1972 p. 68 quoting Ernest Versay 1950 Report ). Hence the goal of the Plan was to ensure The post war boom and prosperity in Nairobi with was shared by a few; and entrenched the perspective that “Nairobi was an island of wealth, attempting to defend it shores against intruders” (Hake, 1977 p 59); an attitude that persists to date. In sum, the plan has been numerously described as a political and ideological strategy to carry out the interest of the settlers and emerging industrial bourgeoisies; to safeguard certain social privleges and divisions, using urban space, tools, and zoning to achieve total socio-economic, cultural, and political control. Accordingly, the plan has been characterised as being segregationist, elitist, imperialist, and extremely exclusivist; an attitude that has persisted to present Nairobi planning practices (White et al., 1948, Hake, 1977, Emig and Ismail, 1980, Obudho, 1983, Kahimbaara, 1986, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, Hall, 2014).

In March 1950, Nairobi Municipality became a City by the Royal Charter of Incorporation, with a Settler dominated ‘Nairobi City Council’; however, the independence struggle intensified as well as its repression in the 1950s. Following the outbreak of the Mau-Mau uprising, the government declared State of emergency in 1952. Slums were identified as centres of aggression and subversion; with some slums serving as hideouts, command, logistic and recruitment centres. In fact, according to Stren (1972), inadequate urban housing was one of the reasons for the Mau-Mau. Accordingly, the authority initiated the 1954 ‘Operation Anvil’ by which all Africans living were arrested; after intense screening and interrogations 77,000 were released after ‘rehabilitation’; 30,000 ‘repatriated’ to the Native reserves; 30, 000 sent to forced-labour camps; and the ‘hard core’ of Mau Mau subjected to severe punishment. The goal of the exercise was to ensure only certifiably loyal and working African were left in the city; also to get rid of ‘surplus population’ (Van Zwanenberg and King, 1975, Hake, 1977, Elkins, 2005b). Hence several slums were razed down. Furthermore, to stem further ‘detribalisation’ and ‘nationalism’ each ethnic groups was forcefully relocated to certain slums, resulting in ethnic homogeneity in various slums that persists to date. Consequently, controlling dissent and political agitation entered into the lexicon of rationalisation of demolishing slum; and housing issues became a means of divide and rule through its ethnicisation. Consequently, the urban and housing policy defined housing and urban living as an exclusive privilege for the ‘right people’; with exclusion being based on social class, race, ethnicity, employment status, political views, among other differentiation criteria. Emphasis was placed on achieving maintaining class/racial purity, spatial order, and the idealised aesthetics for the designated people; ensuring the most ‘ideal’ and exquisite place for this select population to live in; while removing and confining any undesirable elements from entering into the city. The ‘others’ could be allowed limited entry, or tolerated only if they were needed
to serve the needs of the ‘right people’. The rationalisation for this intolerance and containment attitude towards the urban poor was maintaining law and order, health, and quiet; as well as minimising disease, crime, and dissent. Improving housing situation of the urban poor was discouraged, as this could legitimise their settlements as well as encourage rural-urban migration. Indeed this ideological perspective persist to date, leading to profound neglect of the urban poor housing conditions.

In summation, between 1890s and 1950s, due to certain actions and interaction, driven by particular interests, perspectives, and perceptions of certain powerful actors, Nairobi with its severe housing problems for the majority of its population emerged. With perspectives being the point of views regarding how the actors thought about themselves, others, the situation, and the contexts; and the perceptions being what the interpreted those to be; evidence suggests that divergent perspectives and perceptions among the actors played a critical role in perpetuating the housing crisis; as well as compromising most of the efforts aimed at alleviating the situation in that period. Furthermore, certain perspectives and perceptions emerged that continue to conditions the housing arena and involved practices in Nairobi to date.

Firstly, with the introduction of colonialism in Kenya, most existing systems and codes were destroyed and replaced with new ones, that greatly degraded the socio-economic conditions of most Natives. These included a new socio-politico-economic system, land tenure, class differentiation and others based on subjugation, exploitation, injustice, and ‘othering’. The othering perspectives and perceptions culturally justified the domination and subordination of the others, to maintain unequal imperial relations and facilitate the exploitation the Natives, their lands, natural resources, and labour; as well as legitimise the colonialist ‘moral responsibility’ or ‘burden’ to pursue this ‘civilising mission’. The Natives were dehumanised and objectified, and were mainly viewed as ‘resources’ without human dignity or rights; justifying atrocities against them. Furthermore, the commodification of human beings as well as the hitherto commons such as land directly induced the urban housing crisis. The deliberate destitution of the Natives by land alienation, confiscation of livestock, destruction of livelihood, settler farming, forced labour, imposition of taxes, and others; produced a vast destitute and landless population that would fuelled rural-urban migration and proliferation of ‘unauthorised villages’ and slums for many decades to come. Furthermore, current economic policies and political activities continue to push many to the urban areas.

Secondly, while these perspectives and practices forced many to the urban areas, Nairobi and other urban areas were created primarily to cater for the needs of a selected few. The housing needs of the ‘others’ who were actually there to provide labour (and military service) for the ‘select few’ were largely neglected resulting in bazaars, and numerous slums such as Kibera and Kariokor; a trend that persists today, as slums provide shelter for most of the labour forces that run Kenya’s industrial production and commercial activities, as well as housing many junior civil servants and other workers. Their housing need (and habitations) are mainly unacknowledged, unauthorised, illegal/informal, and often non-existent in policy and maps.
Finally, these unauthorised habitation of the urban poor (as well as the poor themselves) were pejoratively labelled as centres for disease, crime, filth, ‘ugliness’, aggression, and subversion. Whereas the city its elites benefit immensely from the slums and its inhabitants, on the basis of the above labels, have been subjected to intense negative sanctions, and extreme difficult situations such as regular brutal evictions and demolitions, besides hostile policies and practices, to suit the whims of the elite. Accordingly, the urban poor have been subjected not only to intense suffering, oppression, injustice, unfairness, and violence; they have also been subjected to massive political manipulation and exploitation. While the bear the brunt of political unrest and violent political conflict, they also provide and an abundant supply of votes and of militants to advance of the elites’ politico-economic interests that perpetuate the deplorable conditions those very slum dwellers. Accordingly, even though these perspectives and perceptions emerged in the colonial area, they would persist in various forms and continue to condition Nairobi’s arena even after independence; spurring on the proliferation and persistence of slums, as well as the failure of housing policies in the subsequent decades.

9.2.2. 1960s Modern public housing and selective ‘city clean-ups’

With independence in 1963, several segregation based laws and regulations restring movement of Natives into the urban areas became untenable and were relaxed; precipitating a massive rural to urban migration. In addition to massive impoverishment and lack of access to productive lands and livelihoods, the Natives reserves had became overcrowded, many could not find employment in the settler farms due to policy shift to exportable cash crops that needed fewer labourers. These formed a colossal push factor, while policy shift towards industrialisation with a chance of employment as well as the possibility to engage in numerous informal economic activities; provided a massive pull factor; with rural-urban migration being held in check by restrictive laws (Elkan and Van Zwanenberg, 1973, Hake, 1977). Within five years of postcolonial Nairobi, its population doubled to half a million residents, however, with a third living in slums and either engaged in informal economic activity or jobless. The existing ‘unauthorised settlements’ grew and densified, while other new ones sprung up in opens spaces, wastelands, road reserves, and river valleys all over the city (Etherton, 1971, Weisner, 1976, Hake, 1977, Amis, 1984). The explosively growing urban housing problems and proliferation of slums became one of the major challenges and thus a priority the new government.

However, from the beginning the government was encumbered by divergent perspectives concerning the path Kenya and Nairobi should take, including the Nairobi’s worsening housing crisis. On the one hand, the radicals preferred a pro-poor approach that would confront the problems of the growing urban poor, more humanely and constructively, to improve their lives; focusing on the people, and not the City in itself. With this perspective, they invited Charles Abrams and Lawrence Bloomberg under the United Nations Program for Technical assistance in 1964, who recommend that government funds be directed towards producing houses the low income groups could afford on public. Because their incomes were too low for them to access privately constructed housing, and there was ample public land (Bloomberg and Abrams, 1965, Nevanlinna, 1996). On the other hand, the conservatives were more focused towards the economic and aesthetic aspects of Nairobi, that would attract more foreign
investments, trade, and tourism; the priority being making Nairobi the most beautiful and prosperous ‘Green City in the Sun’. Moreover, Nairobi would not only be the ‘gate’ of Africa, but also the primary modernising generator, distributor, and vehicle the whole region. What mattered most was the image of the city, the poor people and their ‘dirty habitations and accusations’ jeopardised that image, and therefore should removed and not allowed in the city (Soja, 1968, Etherton, 1971, Macharia, 1992, Alder, 1995, Opondo, 2008). In this view pro-poor housing (like social housing in the West) would be vice ridden, centres for dissent, and decadence; as “dens of thieves, pimps, prostitutes, illicit liquor-stills, and terrorists”; and tarnish the image of the city and the country (Cox, 1965 p 156). President Kenyatta explicitly asserted that Nairobi would not be allowed to become a ‘shanty town’ (Stren, 1972).

Accordingly, the views of the radicals as well as Abrams and Bloomberg which would have produced ‘low standard’ and ‘ugly’ housing were overridden in favour of the modernist perspectives of the conservative elites. Hence, the first comprehensive housing policy for independent Kenya “Sessional Paper Number 5 of 1966/67” (GOK, 1967) stipulated firstly, the provision of subsidised public of standard quality, and secondly slum clearance. This was supported by the 1966-1970 Five Year Development Plan with focus on modernisation and the growth of the aggregate economy, and the ‘quality’ of housing and settlements (GOK, 1966). Their objective was to prevent urban areas from developing into “slums and centres of ill-health and evil social conditions” (GOK, 1966 p 7).

Nevertheless, these houses were highly inadequate and unaffordable; and slums continue to increase faster than they were being demolished. The Government through the City Council of Nairobi and National Housing Corporation (NHC); and with the assistance from Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and other donors built middle class estates in the Eastlands such as Uhuru, Madaraka, Harambee, California, and Kimathi; as well as Jamhuri and Salama next to Kibera; for direct ownership or tenant-purchase contracts. In all in the 1960s, almost 10,000 housing units were produced, whereas 300,000 people were in dire need of adequate shelter. Furthermore, despite being highly subsidised, these houses could only be afforded by middle class individuals in formal employment or business; totally neglecting the needs of the urban poor whose numbers in the slums continued to rise (GOK, 1985, Syagga and Kiamba, 1988b, Macharia, 1992, Alder, 1995, GOK, 1997b, Syagga et al., 2001a, Opondo, 2008). In pursuit of a beautiful and prosperous ‘Green City in the Sun’ the colonial era ‘unauthorised villages’ would be demolished and replaced with modern’ flats. This began with the ‘shanties’ of Pumwani which were demolished and replaced with ‘California Estate’. However, the new flats could only accommodate a quarter of the displaced population, but more importantly none of the displaced persons could afford the new rents. Thus they moved to nearby slums, which were also subsequently demolished, establishing a cycle of continuous of demolitions, evictions, and resettlement; that were even more vicious, unjust, and biased than those in the colonial times (Soja, 1968, Macharia, 1992, Alder, 1995, Opondo, 2008).

However, slums were not only being demolished to pave way for new housing, the main purpose was ‘to clean up the city’. With increasing slums, unemployment, and informal economic activities; the Chief Medical Officer warned of the resurgence of plague in Nairobi if the unlimited influx or rural
population continued; business owners threatened to stop paying taxes and rates if informal businesses were not destroyed, while higher income residents cited the increased risk of ‘loitering’ and petty crime (Hake, 1977, Werlin, 1981, Nevanlinna, 1996). Hence, ‘Operation Clean-Up’ was initiated to ‘sweep away’ the ‘undesirable (human) elements’, ‘unauthorised employment’, and ‘sub-standard housing’ through overt bulldozing and burning. However, this evoked intense bitterness, resentment, and strong opposition from the urban poor as well as highly critical public opinion; and the method shifted to ‘accidental’ fires. Nonetheless the numerous ‘Clean-up’ operations in the 1960s were not effective, more settlements emerged or re-emerged even after being ‘cleaned-up’ again and again, as the residents had no other alternative shelter choose. More importantly, some of the new officials, who had just replaced the British Settlers in City Council, were reluctant to act and pursued a laissez-faire policy; with the rationalisation that it was inhumane and inappropriate to impose harsh conditions and policies on those already facing serious socio-economic difficulties (Hake, 1977, Werlin, 1981, Nevanlinna, 1996). The laissez-faire attitude was also pursued by those who believed that with modernisation, poverty and slums would simply disappear with economic growth. For others slums ‘did not exist’ and therefore they did not need solutions. Moreover, as politicisation of ethnicity and patronage and clientelism took root in Kenya, not only did this bias the allocation of standard public housing, but also in the selective demolition of slums. Hence, slum predominantly occupied or owned by individuals in the patronage and politico-ethnic networks of the regime were not ‘cleaned up’ (Etherton, 1971, Amis, 1984, Syagga and Kiamba, 1988b, Obudho and Aduwo, 1989b, Shihembetsa, 1989, Syagga et al., 2001b, Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau, 2004, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Dafe, 2009, Andvig and Barasa, 2014). Accordingly, with these perspectives and perceptions, Nairobi would continue on its polyglot path, by which splendour and squalor co-existed side by side; as a beautiful, prosperous, opulent, and luxurious city where poverty and slums ‘did not exist’ officially; guided by Modernist visions in achieving its past colonial aristocratic aspiration. In sum, whereas Nairobi witnessed unprecedented prosperity in the 1960s, by 1970 its housing and slum problems were heading towards crisis levels with probably 200,000 people living in poverty and slums, and the number growing rapidly (Halliman and Morgan, 1967, GOK, 1985, Matrix, 1993, Ngau, 1995).

9.2.3. 1970s Site-services schemes and slumlordism

In the 1960s Nairobi’s population had grown at an average annual rate of almost 10% through rural to urban migration of mostly poor and unemployed individuals. Whereas their labour and purchasing power was needed to fuel the prosperity of the city and county; as well as ‘subsidise’ the aristocratic lifestyles enjoyed by the upper classes at very minimal cost; the urban poor were usually declared ‘persona non grata’ or ‘non-existent’; ostracised and subjected to intense harassment. Hence no housing or services were planned for them. From independence in 1963 to 1970, the government with donor support produce about 1,500 units annually, and the private sector 300; however mainly to the middle and high income; and the low income groups found shelter mostly in the proliferating slums. These slums were constantly being demolished ‘to clean up the city’; with profound apathy not only to the emerging housing crisis, but also to the plight of the urban poor (Stren, 1982, Barnow et al., 1983, Kahimbaara, 1986, Malombe, 1992, Nevanlinna, 1996). However, with the coming to global prominence of the ‘Basic Needs’ development orthodoxy (whose roots can be trace to analyses in
Kenya); this emphasis on upper and middle income housing, and slum demolition, came under heavy criticism; with calls for the government to change its housing policy to deliberately target the low income groups through ‘site and services schemes’; as well as issue a moratorium on slum demolition (Streeten and Burki, 1978, Stren, 1982, Malombe, 1992, Huchzermeyer, 2008). Nevertheless, the elites and governors greatly detested and resisted this with the rationalisation that “if building and sanitation standards were allowed to fall in Nairobi, tourism would suffer and international firms would hesitate to locate in Kenya” (Stren 1982 p 93); furthermore “Which government wants to be seen building slums?”(Peattie, 1982 p 134). Turning a blind eye to slum was palatable but accepting lower standard was not. However, the World Bank loans came with conditions of acceptance to the new approach. Hence, through coercion the government begrudgingly conceded to the new orthodoxy; contributing to the common scenario by which the government accepted policy change in paper, but failed to them into practice (Chana et al., 1979, Tager and Patel, 1979, Peattie, 1982, Alexander, 2012).

In accordance with the Basic Needs’ development strategy as well as the perspectives and support of the World Bank, the Kenya government, and other donors; the ‘site and services schemes’ where initiated. Their stated objectives was firstly, directly targeting the urban poor and ensuring their basic needs of shelter and services, especially water and sanitation; and secondly, achieving affordability, replicability, and full cost-recovery. This included incremental housing and the reduction of building and urban planning standards. Hence, Grade II building bylaws were formulated that permitted the use of cheaper construction materials and standards than the conventional more stringent Grade 1 bylaws of Nairobi (Chana et al., 1979, Tager and Patel, 1979, Peattie, 1982, GOK, 1985, Alexander, 2012). Hence the Dandora Community Development Project was initiated in 1975 as part of the ‘First Urban Project’ or ‘Urban I’, involving the collaboration of the Government of Kenya, Nairobi City Council, and the World Bank. This entailed 6,000 serviced plots, with basic services and infrastructure, and built toilet and shower unit; besides building plans and loans to assist the beneficiaries to incrementally complete their houses. This was followed by the Mathare North and Kayole site and services scheme under the ‘Second Urban Project’ and the USAID funded Umoja I core housing project in Eastlands; besides the Olympic aided self-help, New Kibera (Fort Jesus) tenant purchase, and Ayany site and services schemes in Kibera (Cohen, 1983a, GOK, 1985, Syagga and Kiamba, 1988b, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006). These projects’ objectives went beyond merely providing houses to first, ensuring of other basic needs through the provision of workshops, market stalls, and shopping areas; nutrition and ‘family planning’ services, health and educational facilities, among other amenities; and secondly to strengthen institutional capabilities of the Government and local authorities in implementing and managing urban housing initiatives. However more importantly, they altered the governance arrangements. Apart from the involvement of civil society organisations and participation of the target groups in implementing the initiatives, new departments and units such as the Housing Development Department (HDD) and Project Monitoring Unit (PMU) were created (Chana et al., 1979, Syagga, 2001).
In the end, despite many good stated intentions, these initiatives largely failed to deliver their objectives. Even though the new governance arrangements promised to strengthen the existing capacities, improve co-ordination, and facilitate the ease of uptake and experimenting with new innovative ideas compared to the established bureaucracy in the ‘traditional’ departments; they were not readily accepted. For instance the HDD and PMU increased the conflicts over interests and perspectives, not only intensifying the existing institutional feuds and rivalries, but also creating new ones. These increased the problems of co-ordination and obtaining prompt decisions or approvals, leading to the delay of all the above initiatives for several years. For instance, disagreements over the building standards in for Dandora scheme delayed its commences for three years, and its second phase until 1982 (Chana et al., 1979, Cohen, 1983a, Syagga, 2001).

Even though the 1970-1974 and 1974-1979 Development Plans were formulated under the Basic Needs and Redistribution ideology; with focus on the needs of the poor, aided sites and services schemes, and the moratorium on slum demolitions (GOK, 1970, GOK, 1974); the government commitment to these was largely wanting (Cohen, 1983a, Shihembetsa, 1989, Malombe, 1992, Matrix, 1993, Syagga, 1999, Syagga et al., 2001a, Werlin, 2006b, Myers, 2014). To start with, the stated objectives 1973 Master Plan for Nairobi ‘Metropolitan Growth Strategy’ was to accentuate Nairobi’s possibilities for profitable investment, highlight this potential to international and local investors. This included the decentralisation of light labour intensive industries and commercial activities to satellite locations in the outskirts, along with its employee housing (NUSG, 1973). However, according to Emig and Ismail (1980), the main goal of this plan was to “secure the safety of the upper class” and its hold of the best residential areas from encroachment by ‘undesirable human element’, habitations, and activities. In fact, this plan reiterated the 1948 plan segregative planning and zoning; with an elitist and aspiration focusing on an outlook that was far detached from the surroundings and the struggles of the common citizens. The main focus was expanding tourism and furthering the freedoms and opportunities of multinational companies to attract them (Emig and Ismail, 1980, Barnow et al., 1983). Hence in pursuance of the “Green City in the Sun” objectives, the road realignments and residential zoning were aimed at ensuring no temporary visitor of Nairobi would meet any ‘underdevelopment’, poverty, or habitations for the poor. Thus site and services schemes would be tucked away from sight, as far as possible from the city, elites, and touristic routes (Emig and Ismail, 1980). This was exemplified by the location of the Dandora project 10 kilometres away from the city centre, and next to the Nairobi’s landfill dumping site. Furthermore, even thought the government had conceded to Grade I bylaws and standards and incremental construction, it reverted to Grade I standards and demanded the allottees to complete the construction within 18 months. This tremendously increased the cost of the units and effectively exclude the poor (Chana et al., 1979, Syagga and Kiamba, 1988b, Yahya, 1988). Furthermore, selective slum clearance continued unabated.

Ultimately, even though the stated objectives of the site and services schemes was targeting the urban poor, in the end they left out the poor, if not worsening their housing situation. Firstly, World Bank’s insistence on full cost recovery excluded those who fell below 35th percentile income, as they lacked the ability to pay back the development costs, locking our 70% of Nairobi’s population. In fact, the
projects were highly successful in cost recovery as well as expanding Nairobi's housing stock, sewerage and water systems; but not to the target group (Chana et al., 1979, Syagga and Olima, 1999, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006). Secondly, reverting to higher standards with increased the costs; the distance from the city centre, industrial area, and employment opportunities; as well as complicated processes requiring literacy, among other design and planning issues excluded many. Thirdly, the total amount of housing units and serviced plots produced was highly insignificant compared to the housing shortage. Fourthly, the increasing politico-ethnic and patronage perspectives and practices biased the allocations (Chana et al., 1979, Maclinces, 1987, Shihembeza, 1989, Syagga and Olima, 1999, Werlin, 2006a). In the end, the units belonged to the wealthy and connect individuals; and occupied by middle class tenants; as exemplified by Umoja, which in a few year transformed into a high-rise settlement such that traces of the original house are hard to find (Mwangi, 1997, Syagga et al., 2001b, Huchzermeyer, 2007b).

The global shift in perspective concerning the urban poor and slums demanded a transformation in the perceptions of the slums and other habitations of the poor, from being a problem into a solution; especially with introduction of site and services schemes and in-situ slum upgrading. Even though in the main slums continued to be view as ‘problems’ (eyesores, criminal dens, political dissent, disease), there was a begrudged acceptance to them as a ‘solution’; and the realisation that they could not be simply ‘swept away’ with ‘clean-ups’. Hence, the 1974-1978 Development Plan issued a moratorium on slum demolition. Nonetheless, this came to be perceived as a tacit approval for slum building. With explosive slum growth due in massive influx of rural population amidst an acute housing shortage; government authorities stepped in ostensibly with the rationalisation of regain order and control; and began the issuance of quasi-legal building permits for building in the slums through the provincial administration; and structures without permits would be demolished. However, these permits were issued based on politico-ethnic patronage and clientelism. Squatter housing in which residents had built their own structures on public land, was largely eradicated and replaced by large scale slumlordism, in which individuals in the patronage network constructed hundreds or thousands of units and became absentee slumlords, and majority of the residents tenants, paying high rents for low quality accommodations. Slums were transformed not only into a multi-million dollar ‘real estate’ development, but vehicles for political power and control (Adams, 1933, Etherton, 1971, Temple, 1974b, Hake, 1977, Amis, 1984, Ladu, 1989, Parsons, 1997, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011).

In sum, by the end of the 1970s, over 300,000 people, or 40% of Nairobi's population were tenants in slums, which rapidly increasing in numbers, growing in sizes, and densifying; with drastically worsening living conditions. The site and services schemes had contributed to change of perspectives the urban poor and increased the housing stock, but these had not benefited the urban poor, whose hosing conditions continued to deteriorate. Despite the moratorium slum demolitions and evictions continued at the whims not only of the government authorities, but also the new slumlords, and tenant-landlord conflicts become politico-ethnic. These among others coupled with the internationalisation of housing solution, entry of civil society actors, and participation of the beneficiaries, radically altered the
arena, which become more complex and fragmented, with many dissimilar interests, perspectives, and perceptions; as well as a higher degree of misunderstanding and conflict potential.

9.2.4. 1980s Enabling shelter strategies and abdication of the state

The prescribed housing initiatives and policies of the 1970 carried on into 1980s, especially due to delays in decision making and implementation arising mainly from differences in perspectives and disagreements over the ‘quality’, form, and directions the initiatives should take. Thus the site and services and in situ slum upgrading projects continued. However, they lost the ‘basic needs’ components such as employment creation, appropriate technology, family planning, health and education services and others, as the initiatives came under the influence of neoliberalist policies, a change in World Bank perspectives, and massive reduction of both donor and government spending on housing. The ongoing and new initiatives in the 1980s became ‘sites only’ with great emphasis on ‘full cost recovery’, ‘self-help’, ‘sweat equity’, increased private sector involvement, and reduction of state’s role. By self help, the slum dwellers were expected to use their own efforts and resources to overcome their problems and achieve individual betterment without relying on the government (GOK, 1985, Hoek-Smit and USAID, 1989, Syagga, 2001, Syagga et al., 2001b, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005). For instance the ‘Pumwani-Majengo Slum redevelopment’ which was based on full cost recovery with requirements of $ 150 monthly unsubsidised mortgage repayments; by which higher income groups effectively replaced the original slum dwellers (NHC, 2005, Huchzermeyer, 2008). The World Bank funded ‘Third Urban Project’ included joint ventures between private developers and local authorities towards slum upgrading (Fransen, 1999, Syagga, 2001, Syagga et al., 2001b). While the Umoja II condominium housing project, with USAID financial and technical assistance, also had the objectives of ‘full cost-recovery without negative cash flow on public finances’, security of land tenure, and strengthening the capacity of the local government in managing housing (Hoek-Smit, 1989). In the end, the quantity of housing produced by these initiatives was highly insignificant compared to the housing shortage, as well as being totally unaffordable for any slum dweller. However, more importantly, there was global policy shift and perspective that seemed to endorse the ‘abdication of the state’ from housing issues(UN-Habitat, 2003, UN-Habitat, 2006a); and thus in general, the 1980s saw unprecedented neglect and apathy concerning the housing problem and the needs of the urban poor; and Nairobi slums saw an explosive growth in this decade (GOK, 1997a, GOK, 2000, Syagga et al., 2001b, UN-Habitat, 2006b, UN-Habitat, 2006a).

Under the influence of the World Bank and other donors, there was a profound shift towards Neoliberalist policy prescriptions and ‘enabling shelter strategies’ in the Government’s written policy, however, the implementation was much slower. The 1979-1983,1984-1988, and 1989-1993 Development Plans increasingly emphasised the role of market forces and encouraging private sector participation in increasing the housing supply. This included relaxation of rent controls, lowering building standards, research on low-cost construction, and establishing a regulatory framework to safeguard the interests of landlords and tenants (GOK, 1979, GOK, 1982, GOK, 1984, GOK, 1989). The 1989-1993 Development Plan stressed on the withdrawal of the government and the enhancement of the role of the private sector; with Government’s objective being to eliminate
constraints standing in the way of urban housing development such as inappropriate building regulations and standards, and the high cost of construction and finance, besides the lack of land titles and infrastructure (GOK, 1989). Additionally, the ‘Urban Management Programme’ (UMP) was also initiated with the aim of building the institutional capacity of involved actors, towards an enabling environment, economical productivity, and efficiency in the urban arena. The UMP involved decentralisation of authority and responsibility in housing form the central government agencies to local authorities, private sector, and civil society; as well as stressing the official recognition and regularisation of slums, infrastructure provision, and relaxation of several planning and development controls to encourage housing supply (UMP, 1991, Majale, 2001, UMP, 2001). Furthermore, under the influence the World Bank and other donors the Government developed the ‘National Housing Strategy to the Year 2000’, by which the state was to ‘withdraw’ from being a ‘provider’ of housing and transform into an ‘enabler’, by creating an appropriate legal, institutional and regulatory environment to facilitate housing provision by the private sector and the poor themselves; beside removing ‘constraints’ that stood in the way of effective private sector mobilisation (GOK, 1987, UN, 1988, UN-Habitat, 2006a). However despite much involvement of several international and local actors and organisations in the formulation of the above policies and plans, apart from the ‘withdrawal’ and ‘abdication’ of the state, these policies in the main failed to attain any national political endorsement and were largely unimplemented (GOK, 1985, GOK, 1997a, GOK, 2000, Syagga et al., 2001b, GOK, 2004d, GOK, 2005).

In the 1980s, under the combined onslaught of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and gross economic mismanagement, there was a massive deterioration in their socio-economic situations of many ordinary citizens as well as an explosive growth of slums. The Neoliberalist economic programmes entailed reduction on government spending, and its involvement in service provision, housing provision and subsidies. In as much as the urban poor had not directly benefited from the housing initiatives; they were highly dependent of the government for basic utilities, services, and amenities such as water, sanitation, education, and health. Furthermore some of the previous housing initiatives indirectly benefited the urban poor, by housing the lower middle classes, and relieving some pressure from the poor. The shrinking of the public employment and massive retrenchment increased the number of unemployed people, many of whom ended up in the slums. Currency devaluation immensely increased housing construction costs; while ‘cost cutting’, ‘cost sharing’ and privatisation made many services inaccessible, unaffordable, or unavailable for the urban poor. Accordingly, the withdrawal of the state had profound negative effect in the lives and housing situation for many; at the same time, the private sector and the civil society did not step in adequately or even at all in the gap left by the state (GOK, 1996, GOK, 1997b, NISCC, 1997, Syagga, 1999, Syagga et al., 2001b, Syagga, 2011b). The Neoliberalist prescriptions not only resulted in immense impoverishment in Nairobi, but also in other towns and rural areas as agriculture and industrial sectors largely depended on government assistance, subsides, protection or other intervention collapsed when these were withdrawn, resulting in massive immigration of poor people into Nairobi, and the ‘increasing urbanisation of poverty’ (GOK, 1987, Mitullah and Kibwana, 1998, Ravallion, 2002, UN-Habitat, 2006b). All these were compounded massive economic mismanagement, misrule, and incompetence
by the government, as well as gross public malfeasance, widespread plunder of state resources, and corruption, driven by politico-ethnic calculations, clientelist and populist dictatoral practices, and other Machiavellian tactics, towards consolidation power and political survival. As SAPs and reduction of aid reduced the amount or resources available for patronage, the regime resorted to more illegal allocations of public land, contributing to widespread slum demolitions evictions in both the 1980s and 1990s (Klopp, 2000, COHRE, 2006). Finally, with the increased role of non-state actors in line with Neoliberalist prescriptions, but also because they were deemed less corrupt and unbureaucratic, led to a tremendous increase in civil society actors in the arena; however with much duplication, uncoordinated activity, wasteful competition, conflict, misunderstanding, and ultimately ineffectiveness (Syagga et al., 2001b, Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau, 2004, Mitullah, 2008b). Moreover, some of the Neoliberalist prescriptions and housing initiative were not in tandem with the situations in Nairobi, aggravating the situation further, based on various misperceptions.

For instance, the enabling shelter strategies failed to recognise the unique ownership and tenancy structures in Nairobi, thus the preoccupation with titling and regularisation of tenure was premised on the false belief that the slum dwellers were squatters and had ‘ownership’ the structures. Hence these initiatives would benefit mainly the wealthy absentee slumlords and a few resident structure owners, leaving out most of the slum dweller. Moreover, regularised slums had their value increased, leading to gentrification or made them prime targets for ‘land grabbing’ that led to evictions. The prescribed policies of the 1980s called for ‘the recognition of the legitimate role’ of the urban poor and slum dwellers (as well as the private sector, and civil society) in housing, besides accepting legalising the existing slum; but these seem to only legitimise the ‘abdication of the state’; while evictions and demolitions would continue at the whims of the state agents, slumlords, and private sector entities. In sum the dominant perspectives and practices in the 1980s led to a drastic deterioration in Nairobi’s housing situation, by which more that half of Nairobi’s population became slum dwellers, with increasing poverty, worsening living conditions, and constant threat of evictions (and fires used in eviction) (Weru and Bodewes, 2001a, COHRE, 2006, Huchzermeier and Karam, 2006, UN-Habitat, 2006b, Huchzermeier, 2008). However, the prescribed solutions seemed to be based on perspectives and solutions far removed from the realities in Nairobi. All these was accentuated by the massive increase of actors with diverse interests, approaches and perspectives; such that by the end of the 1980s, the arena was highly fragmented and complicated.

9.2.5. 1990s Sustainabilism and political machinations

In 1990s Nairobi’s housing arena and policy environment came under the influence of Sustainabilism ideology. The 1994-1996 and 1997-2001 Development Plans included the twin goals of achieving adequate shelter for all and sustainable human settlements; through a comprehensive long term plan for upgrading all urban slums, integrated housing development and planning, institutional and community capacity building, adequate inclusion of all relevant stakeholders and their concerns, enhancing community participation and civic engagement, addressing environmental issues, and formulating and appropriate regulatory and institutional framework (GOK, 1994, GOK, 1997c). The push towards Sustainabilism, as well as, the level of activity and attention to Nairobi’s housing issues
greatly intensified, with the major revitalisation the UN-Habitat, which is headquartered in Nairobi; following the 1996 Habitat II conference, the Habitat Agenda; with the priorities of promote sustainable development (UN-Habitat, 2006b). All these was accentuated by the a rapidly increasing number of interested actors in the Nairobi's arena increased; firstly from the withdrawal of the state in the 1980s; secondly, the nature of Sustainabilism as it involves participation, inclusion, and integrated approaches with many ‘stakeholders’; thirdly, the suspension of development aid to Moi’s government and channelling this aid through civil society organisations. Indeed, numerous and mostly uncoordinated slum improvement initiatives were initiated through NGOs using donor support; these included comprehensive in-situ slum upgrading as well as minimal service and sanitation. However, more importantly, the 1990s saw the increasing role of ‘right based’ civil society organisations whose main concern was equity, solidarity, and justice. Thus the ‘right based’ perspectives and approaches to housing, which emphasised inclusion, dignity, and socio-economic-environmental issues as inalienable rights of all citizens; as well as, ‘integrated approaches’ that necessitated the inclusion and participation of all relevant stakeholders, sectors, and disciplines to solve housing problems in a holistic manner; gained prominence in the arena (Syagga, 2001, Omenya and Huchzermeyer, 2006, UN-Habitat, 2006b). Finally, under pressure from donors, civil society, and citizens the government undertook various policy initiatives and actions. This included the commissioning of the Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordination Committee (NISCC) comprising actors from the civil society, public, and private sector; to look into the issue of lack of a clear urban housing policy and conflicting instruments, and to develop an overall strategy for dealing with the problem of slums in Nairobi, as well as attempting to achieve coordination (GOK, 1997a, Syagga et al., 2001b). Whereas most of the committee’s recommendation were never implemented, they influenced the subsequent policies of the 2000s (Kore, 1996, GOK, 1997b, GOK, 2000, GOK, 2004d)

Even thought the 1990s policies were greatly influenced by Sustainabilism, and greatly contrasted the Neoliberalist policies of the 1980s, most of the 1980s practices carried on in to the 1990s. ‘Enabling shelter strategies’ continued however with the inclusion of Sustainabilism terminology and some ideals. The apathy, neglect, and lack of political will from the Government to deal meaningfully with housing issues intensified. This was attributable firstly, the carryover of the 1980s Neoliberalist ‘abdication of the state’ and laissez faire attitude; and secondly, fact that after the first multi-party elections in 1992, the governance of Nairobi politically largely fell under the opposition; seemingly the ruling party was keen to show ineptitude of the opposition governors through the housing conditions (Weru and Bodewes, 2001a, COHRE, 2006, Omenya and Huchzermeyer, 2006). Indeed the housing situations for many poor citizens in Nairobi underwent tremendous deterioration owing to various political machinations; mostly arising from the ruling regime self preservation interests and survivalist perspectives.

Since colonial times, and throughout Kenyatta’s regime, land had been used for patronage, however the 1990s witnessed a tremendous intensification of these irregular allocations of public land for political objective, sparking a ‘land grabbing mania’ that produce some of the most ruthless evictions. (Olima, 1997, Klopp, 2000, COHRE, 2006, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Kameri-Mbote, 2009).
The ‘land grabbing mania’ arose from accelerated land accumulation by regimes’ political elite who feared the emerging political realities would soon end their privileged access to this public resource; as well as, the withdrawal of aid and increased scrutiny on corruption had diminished other resources for patronage (Olima, 1997, Klopp, 2000). However, probably owing to Sustainabilism the citizens had become bolder and more organised to protest these evictions; in response following a huge public outcry and condemnation, the government was sometimes forced to resettle the evicted residents; for example in the Dandora Phases Four and Five green-field sites. The citizens with the support of the civil society demanded justice, fairness, as well as the meaningful addressing of their concerns and participation in processes that touched on their lives. However, owing to the political machinations, there was also steady rise of criminal gangs, mafias, and politico-ethnic groupings militia that would play a very significant role in subsequent Nairobi’s housing initiatives, illegal service provision, tenant-slumlord disputes, ‘safety and security’, and violence in the slums. The gangs often at the behest of the slumlords, violently opposed several initiatives or sometimes infiltrated the ‘participatory forums’ and usurped all the ‘community’ positions, and excluded other slum dwellers; a trend that would carryon in to the 1990s (Otiso, 2003, GOK, 2004b, Kusienya, 2004, SUM Consult, 2004, UN-Habitat, 2008b, KSUP, 2009a, Andvig and Barasa, 2014).

Notable initiatives in the 1990s include the Mathare 4A and the Nyayo High Rise. The Mathare 4A in-situ slum upgrading project was initiated under the Sustainabilism in the 1990s and carried on to the 2000s, involving the participation of the civil society, the residents, private and public sectors; With the support of German Development Bank (KfW) and Technical Cooperation (GIZ). After remarkable initial success, the project was scuttled by divergent interests, perspectives, and perceptions; that involved intense political machinations and violent clashes (see Section 9...). In the same period, under the label of ‘slum upgrading’, the Government cleared slum housing in a section of Kibera for the construction of the Nyayo High Rise Estate. However the project was muddled up with intense political interference that radically altered it design, allocations construction contracts, and the determination of the allottees to suit patronage purposes. The unit designs were altered to middle-class standards, and the units allocated to politically connected individuals, who let them out to middle income tenants at rents up to fifty times as much as those in Kibera (Huchzermeyer, 2008, Cronin and Guthrie, 2011, Pers.Com1, 2011).

 Whereas the 1990s saw an increased citizen voice and calls from various directions for more meaningful action regarding the housing problem, the government continued to display apathy and a lack of political will; only bowing to pressures enacting policies but not implementing them. Whenever issues reached a crisis level, a ‘commissions of inquiry’ comprising often highly respected experts and members of society was usually established, to articulate the concerns of the citizens and recommend solutions. However, once the political pressure subsided, the recommendations were never implemented. In fact, many policies, programmes, and project were initiated out of citizen and donor pressure; however they only meant to placate the involved parties, divert attention, obtain funding, or to defuse political tensions; resulting in excellent ‘paper policies’ that were never meant to be
implemented. Seemingly, most of the government actions were mainly aimed to manipulating or constituency of the urban poor but not necessarily to improve their housing and living conditions.

In fact many housing actions were as a result of ‘roadside declarations’ or ‘roadside policies’; comprising populist and spontaneous political statements made by the President or other powerful governors to appease, manipulate, or win the support of the crowds being addressed, often an impromptu gathering on the roadside. While this often became the de facto policies, they were often in contravention of existing written policies and regulations, and without adequate analysis of the problem, solution, and potential repercussions. In many cases, no resources were allocated to them, hence recourse had to be diverted from other already planned uses; since the word of the President was law, in the prevailing populist-authoritarianist mode of governance; and ‘paperless governance’ system where existing written policies were not being followed. The resultant ad hoc policy environment with many and sometimes conflicting ‘paper policies’ and ‘unwritten’ de facto policies; highly complicated the arena as the lower level governors and citizens interpreted these based on their own perspectives.

For instance, in a bid to woo the slum dwellers, who were mostly supported the opposition, in to the ruling party, the President lamented the exorbitant rents in the slums and deplorable housing conditions and directed the Provincial administration to look into those issues. The hitherto powerless tenants felt empowered by the President's roadside declaration demanded the rent be halved and the houses be improved. The slumlords were adamant. The ensuing impasse turned into a violent conflict between the tenements and the slumlords using gang militia; in which several people lost their lives; and thousands displace by the violence or the burning of the houses to evict ‘dissent’ tenants (IRIN, 2001, De Smedt, 2009). The conflict quickly assumed politico-ethnic dimensions, and would carry on in to the slum upgrading efforts of the 2000s, including the KENSUP; and the 2007 post election violence. A similar problem ensued also following a Presidential directive that Korogocho slums which were on public land be regularised ownership be transferred to the residents. However the slumlords also claimed ownership base on the same directive. This culminated in to vicious violent conflicts that carried on into the 2000s (Pamoja Trust, 2001, Syagga, 2011a, Moser and Rodgers, 2012).

In sum, the 1990s urban arena was characterised by exogenous driven sustainability policies amidst massive endogenous political machinations which resulted into a highly complicated and fragmented housing arena, with a rapidly increasing number of actors, with diverse interests, approaches, perspectives, and perceptions. The housing areas saw a tremendous increase in activity and publicity, especially owing to the civil society organisations' modus operandi. Nairobi housing problems gained international attention, especially as Kibera grew to be the ‘largest slum in the world’ attracting many actors and initiatives. Nevertheless, the housing conditions continued to deteriorate rapidly. There were numerous and diverse initiatives, nonetheless, they remained inadequate and sometimes inappropriate to the scale, nature, and magnitude of Nairobi’s housing problems. Many stated ‘good intentions’ were not being realised.
9.2.6. Towards the 2000s: Complex and fragmented housing arena and policy environment

From its very founding in the final years of the 19th century, Nairobi began with severe housing problems for its lower classes, and the so-called ‘surplus population’; most probably due to perspectives and perception that allowed apathy and neglect for needs of the segment of population regarded as others. The main response to the problem was mainly hostile containment. Prior to the 1950s, the housing policies and practice were mainly derived from the Colonial Office in London, either in conjunction or contestation with the Settler dominated governance organs in the country. After the 1950s and independence, there was internationalisation of housing policies and practice; such that most policies were fixed exogenously at the supranational level, but greatly influenced by endogenous interests and perspectives of the elites. Indeed, in both the colonial and independence period, the housing responses were mainly based on the perspectives of the elites and meant to further their interest, but not to solve the problems of the urban poor.

Indeed, from the very beginning, housing responses were mainly top-down by mainly the state, and later on, also multilateral and bilateral organisations as well as civil society and private sector actors. Hence over the years, there has been a tremendous increase in the number of actors, as well as the different interests, perspectives, perceptions, and approaches co-present in the arena. Furthermore, from the 1970s there was a steady increase in the role of the targeted beneficiaries, as they were ‘included’ and also became more aware and bolder; demanding meaningful inclusion in the initiatives and ‘bottom up process’. The discussions in this section suggest that particular interests, perspectives, and perceptions or particular actor in the arena led to the emergence, growth, and persistence of housing problems in Nairobi; and also the differences in these among the actors led to ineffectiveness of the responses to the problems.

Despite colossal shift in dominant perspectives and perceptions, some perspectives and perceptions that were first observe in the end the 19th century, persist to date, defining the current attitudes and practices in housing problems and responses. Over the years, an evolution of approaches and a change in the dominant perspectives and perceptions of the problem, slums, slum dwellers, and responses can be observed, however some element of those approaches, perspectives, and perceptions have remained unchanged over the decades; leading to various contradictions. This is exemplified by the de facto and de jure policies of the 1990s. The government actions were based ‘unwritten’ de facto policies guided by populist political calculations, outside the existing ‘written’ legal, regulatory, and institutional framework; with state agents actions guided by interests and perspective for gaining or maintaining themselves in power and access to privileges. Donor projects often followed pragmatism and objectives, which most of the sometimes were not in tandem the existing policies and regulations of the Nairobi; but driven by the mother country foreign relations interests and ruling perspectives. The civil society strived for relevance and legitimacy in the arena, as well as competed for funding from the donors or government. The citizens also were guided by various interests and perspectives, and were at different levels of awareness, boldness, and self-organisation. All in all, by the end of the 1990s the housing arena had became encumbered with extreme complexities,
contradictions, and fragmentations; with numerous diverse actors, an ad hoc policy-action environment, conflicting policies and regulations, conflicts and misunderstanding, dissimilar stated objectives and approaches by different actors; and driven by diverse interests, perspectives and perception. It is this scenario that ushered in the policies and initiatives of the 2000s.

9.3. Housing problems as slums of Nairobi in the 2000s

As observed in the forgoing sections in this chapter, slums in Nairobi are the intended and unintended consequences, of various practices, actions, and interaction, of certain powerful actors from the colonial times to the present, driven by particular interests, perspectives, and perceptions. Inferences from those discussions suggest that those interests, perspectives, and perceptions some of which have persisted throughout the history of modern Nairobi, have caused the emergence, proliferation, and persistence of slums; as well as the failure of initiatives. However, the differences in these among the many involved actors have greatly compounded the situation. Hence, by the year 2000, the number of slums in Nairobi was estimated to be over 200, with a total population of over two million. However, these figures are highly disputed, and there is no agreement between various actors as to what the actual pollution is; different studies, surveys, and projects have depicted figures that are ten times those of other studies (Karanja, 2010, KNSB, 2010, Map Kibera, 2010, Warah, 2010, Desgroppes and Taupin, 2011). Arguably, it is difficult to ascertain these figures, as slums in Nairobi are highly dynamic, not only there great seasonal variations in population in any given year; sections of slums (or entire slums) are routinely destroyed and rebuilt, expand and shrink, with a sizable population being constantly on the move. Nonetheless, despite all that contention over statistics, what cannot be disputed is the fact that over the decades it has been observed that the slums have continued to grow in numbers, expand in sizes, and densify; such that a significant population in Nairobi resides in slums in deplorable conditions, and that slums remain a fixture of Nairobi despite numerous efforts, policies, initiative, and rhetoric concerning their eradication and the improvement of live of the slum dwellers (Matrix, 1993, GOK, 1997b, Syagga et al., 2001b, GOK, 2008b, Huchzermeyer, 2008, UN-Habitat, 2013a, GOK, 2014). As a result, in most slums there will be numerous uncoordinated and disjointed civil society, donor, or government led initiatives, as several ‘upgrading activities’; all with mixed outcomes. Indeed many slums are the hotbed of both political, civil society, and criminal activities. There are many organisations involved in one activity or another with the stated objective of improving the lives the slum dwellers; politicians promising change and ‘fighting for the people’; and criminal gang providing ‘protection’, ‘services’ and utilities; among other numerous actors with varied interest and perspectives that make the slum arena and the issues that surround them highly complex and contentious. Consequently, in reiteration of previous discussions, slums in Nairobi began with its very founding in 1899, as the housing needs of a significant proportion of the towns populations were neglected; with the growth of these slums being accelerated by the deliberate impoverishment of the Natives and alienation of their lands. These trends of neglect and impoverishment continued in the independence period, while most housing initiatives were mainly inadequate and benefited mostly the middle classes and politically connected individuals, and at the same time worsening the conditions of the urban poor.
9.3.1. Trajectories and situations

In 1899, Nairobi’s boundary was officially defined as a circle with a radius of 1.5 miles (2.4 Km) around the administrative headquarters, encircling an area of 1831 ha. Almost immediately, ‘unauthorised villages’ or slums emerged within the town boundaries. These were razed down in the name of fighting plague and moved to the town’s periphery. Subsequently the boundaries were extended in 1920 to 2537 ha, and then with the 1927 ‘Plan for Settler Capital’ to 78 km² to encompass built up areas. However, with each subsequent boundary extension, the slums areas became incorporated inside the city’s boundaries and were once more demolished and relocated to the new peripheries. At independence in 1963, the boundaries were extended to include Nairobi’s dormitory areas. With this extensions all Nairobi’s slums were encompassed within the city, and even with demolitions, they kept spring up elsewhere within the boundary (White et al., 1948, Halliman and Morgan, 1967, Kahimbaara, 1986, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007, GoK, 2008). By 2008, the Nairobi’s urban agglomeration and functional area had a radius of over 100 kilometres, these were incorporated in the new Nairobi Metropolitan Region (NMR) boundaries; that includes 14 urban areas all with their own housing problems.

Figure 27: Nairobi: Boundary changes, 1900-1963

Source: (Obudho and Aduwo, 1992 p 53)

Figure 28: Nairobi Metropolitan Region: Morphological boundary

Source (GoK, 2008, UN-Habitat, 2010d)
Most slums in Nairobi are situated on government lands and especially on the river valleys and flood plains of the Nairobi, Ngong, and Mathare rivers that cut across Nairobi. Hence, the locations comprise mainly riparian reserves, as well as reserves and wayleaves for currently being utilised or committed future public infrastructure and utility reserves for railway, roads, airfields, and power; among other public utility or uncommitted lands. Hence apart from the 5.6% ‘regularised’ slums, over 90% of slums are in lands designated for other uses, and owned by the government as well as a few private sector entities (Lamba, 1994, Gatabaki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau, 2004, UNEP/OCHA, 2011). Nonetheless, almost all slums are strategically located near sources of employment such as the industrial area, the CBD, informal and formal markets, and affluent residential neighbourhoods and high end shopping locations; tucked in some marginal space behind those affluent location, as serving as their ‘servant quarters’ and ‘staff housing’. However, many of these locations are extremely hazardous and not fit for human habitation, such as on garbage dump sites, oil pipelines, high voltage power lines, steep slopes and cliff faces, derelict quarries, swamps, sewers, and frequently flooding river valleys. Nonetheless, some slum are located in very prime locations with very high real estate value, and are highly susceptible to land grabbing end demolitions and evictions; however some of these land became available for slums as they were encumbered with legal disputes, their ownership was contestable, or the ‘owners’ had delayed to ‘develop’ them waiting for a conducive political time to commence the development. In sum, slums are usually located in hazardous, unusable, abandoned, or reserved sites which have either not been developed or cannot be used for other purposes; but in strategic locations in terms of livelihoods, and minimal daily commuting costs to income opportunities.

Figure 29: Nairobi: Informal settlements

Source: (Obudho, 1992)

According the 2009 Census Nairobi Metropolitan region had a population of 6,547,547, with the core city 3,138,369 (KNSB, 2012). Since independence in 1963, the city has grown at an annual rate of over 4.5%, from 342,764 to 3,138,369 in 2009, representing a tenfold growth in five decades.
However, more than half of this growth ended up in slums. With Nairobi having less than 10 percent of those aged over 50 years, and less than 20 percent of those over 35 years being born in the city; the city's population is principally composed of migrants, most who arrive with the ages between 17 and 23 years as jobseekers in need of cheap housing (Agwanda et al., 2004, KNSB, 2010). Currently, whereas around 200,000 housing units required annually in Nairobi, only 20,000 were produced, and mainly to the high and middle income groups; thus only 10% the total housing demand was being met by the market, but no decent housing was being supplied to the low-income earners apart from the slum housing of very deplorable quality; and most of the demand was met by slums, leading to massive growth and densification of slums (GOK, 2004d, UN-Habitat, 2006b, GoK, 2008, GOK, 2014).

Indeed the city's growth has been characterised by spontaneous growth and haphazard development, mainly taking place outside the formal urban planning intervention; with the urban and housing policy environment being beset by a complex institutional arrangement, producing glaring disconnect between national economic planning process and initiatives as at a local level, as well as the preceding and proceeding realities. Whereas most of the decision making and formulation of plans is it at the supra-national and national level by the Central government, the implementation is often supposed to be the responsibility of Local authorities at the grass roots levels. Nevertheless, many of these plans, policies and initiatives are seldom informed by the local needs and realities. Certainly this contributes to the apparent apathy usually witnessed in the implementation phase at the grassroots; ineffective solutions, and persistence of the problems. Consequently, with the growth of Nairobi projected to continue, and the housing demand is forecasted to be 1,303,125 in 2030; there is urgent need for a better appreciation of the problem, and more appropriated attitudes and practices, if the housing problems is to be tackled more meaningfully.

Table 39: Population of Nairobi and slums between 1906 and 2009 censuses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Increase p.a. (%)</th>
<th>No. of slums</th>
<th>Population in slums</th>
<th>% of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>11,512</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>29,864</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>47,919</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>49,800</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>108,900</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>118,976</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>342,764</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>508,286</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>167,000</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>827,755</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>330,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,324,570</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>730,000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2,143,254</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>1,290,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,138,369</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>1,880,000</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures are highly disputed and usually gross approximations


Nairobi slums are extremely heterogenous, with highly varied origins, historical trajectories, development, physical conditions and layouts, demographics, politics, economies, and ownership histories; however with certain commonalities and unique characteristics that distinguish the slums and slum dwellers of Nairobi from many others in the world. On the one hand, Nairobi slums vary greatly both in their general physical conditions, as well as the socio-economic situations of the slum
dwellers. There are great differences in physical layout; availability of infrastructure and services; and the sizes, densities, and quality of housing units among other; not only between different slums, but

**Figure 30: Four largest slums of Nairobi: Kibera, Mathare, Mukuru, and Korogocho**

within the slums themselves, as most the slums of the are divided into a number of ‘villages’. Between and within the different slums and ‘villages’, the slum dwellers have highly varied income and literacy levels, employment status, and politico-ethnic affiliations, among many other differences in attributes, attitudes, interests, and perspectives (Matrix, 1993, Ngau, 1995, UN-Habitat, 2006b, Pamoja Trust, 2009, Karanja and Makau, 2010, GOK, 2011a, GOK, 2014). On the other hand, By the 2000s probably 90% of slum dwellers in Nairobi were tenants; paying rent to absentee slumlords who ‘owned’ the structures, having acquired a quasi-legal permission from the provincial administration to build, own, and obtain rent from the slums on public land (Amis, 1984, Syagga et al., 2001a, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Dafe, 2009). The 1970 saw the accelerated commodification and commercialisation of slums, that transformed the thitherto self-build owner occupied and small-scale subsistence renting into a massive multi-million dollar large-scale and politico-commercial slumlordism, that was based on negotiated informal arrangements between privileged individuals and public authorities, following the politico-ethnic and patronage-clientelistic machinations in the 1970s decade. This restricted number of supplier amidst a very huge demand for housing by the urban poor led to ‘high price-low quality trap’ that contributed to the rapid the proliferation of slums. Thus most slum dwellers in Kenya are not the typical ‘squatters’ who ‘own’ their own structures, and thus for instance,
regulation of tenure may not benefit most of them at all. Nairobi has a unique ‘ownership’ and ‘occupancy’ situation that needs to be adequately appreciated in theory and practice (Amis, 1984, Dafe, 2009). Furthermore, the vested political and economic interests as well as the perspectives of the powerful absentee slumlords and other involved parties have contributed to the scuttling several housing initiatives to maintain the lucrative business as well as prevailing status quo and politico-economic perspectives, especially among the clients in the patronage systems (Amis, 1984, Huchzermeyer, 2007a, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Dafe, 2009). Accordingly, it is highly probable that any standardised analysis or solution that does not pay adequate attention to both this heterogeneity and uniqueness may have a high risk of failure. This necessitates they be given due attention in any theoretical study as well as in the practical design and implementation of initiatives. The issue highlighted above are exemplified by the trajectories and current situations of Kibera, Mathare valley, Mukuru KwaNjenga, and Korogocho; which are probably the biggest slums in Nairobi, and are thus further explored hereunder.

9.3.2. Kibera

Located five kilometres to the southwest of the city centre, and covering 2.38 km² Kibera has various times been described as one of the largest and densest slums in the world; with population figures raging from a high as 2 million people according to some NGOs, and a low of 170,070 according to the 2009 government census(Karanja, 2010, KNSB, 2010, Map Kibera, 2010, Warah, 2010, Desgroppes and Taupin, 2011). Arguably, there is great contention concerning the actual number or residents probably due to the highly varied interests, perspectives, and perceptions of the involved actors. Surely, a tenfold variance cannot be blamed upon inadequate data or different methods. Nevertheless, most scholars and practitioners cite a population of half a million residents, and densities ranging from 48,000 to 300,000 inhabitants per km², depending upon the various locations of the slum. Indeed Kibera is composed of 13 highly varied villages; in terms of physical character (density, housing quality, security, environmental, infrastructure and services deprivations) as well as the politico-socio-economic attributes and attitudes of the residents (politico-ethnic affiliations, family status, literacy, income and employment levels). Nevertheless, the entire slum suffers massive overcrowding and suffers severe deprivations in terms of clean water, sanitation, and security; with the residents under constant threat of eviction, violence, political upheaval, and harassment from, police, criminal gangs, slumlords, and their fellow neighbours. Thus the lives of many in Kibera can aptly be described as being poor, nasty, brutish, and sometimes short; amidst immense political manipulation and economic exploitation.

Even though a significant portion of the slum occupies hazardous and unusable lands such as Ngong River flood plains, Nairobi Dam, railway and road reserves; much of Kibera occupies very prime lands, abutting ambassadorial residences, the Royal Nairobi Golf Club, and other high income neighbourhoods, shopping, and recreational facilities. Thus Kibera is strategically located with easy access to employment opportunities in the affluent neighbourhoods; besides being a walkable distance to the industrial area, CBD, and other sites of employment for many lowly paid labourers and jobseekers who cannot afford the high commuting prices of Nairobi.
Kibera is the arena of intense international to grassroots political, economical, and development interactions; attracting numerous actors, interests, and perspectives; as well as becoming the focus of numerous scholarly endeavours and testing ground for initiatives; especially since its acquired the status of one of the ‘biggest slums’ in the world. Thus became the site of countless uncoordinated state and non-state initiatives; such that by the year 2000, according to some highly disputed estimates, Kibera had probably over 15,000 highly varied international to grassroots civil society organisations (NGOs, CBOs, FBOs), over 2,000 international and national governmental organisations, as well as innumerable private sectors actions; according to some actors (Hake, 1977, Parsons, 1997, UN-Habitat, 2003, Davis, 2006, Gilbert, 2007, Smedt, 2009a, Warah, 2010, Perscom, 2011). Indeed since its foundations at the beginning of the 20th century Kibera has been the arena for intense political machinations and patronages; besides highly conflicting interests and contradictory perspectives. In fact the slum owes its very existence and over a century survival to the lack of agreement between the involved powerful actors as what the settlement meant and what should be done about it, to raze it down or to improve it, leading to inaction and neglect; that permitted the slum to exist in such a prime location, but in a highly deplorable condition (Hake, 1977, Parsons, 1997, Smedt, 2009a).

For conquest, pacification and punitive expeditions, guarding the new railway, and establishing the colony; the colonial authorities formed the King's African Rifles (KAR). A considerable proportion of the initial army comprised of former Emin Pasha's Sudanese (Nubi) slave soldiers. In 1904, KAR barracks were moved five kilometres southwest of the city centre to abut the Ngong forest. However, problems soon arose concerning soldiers were too old or injured to be of further military use, their families, and the numerous widows and orphans they left behind. These were allowed to settle in the military exercise grounds next to the forest, establishing a settlement of small villages with ample space for agriculture and livestock, which they named ‘Kibra’, meaning forest in Nubi language (Elkan and Van Zwanenberg, 1973, Parsons, 1997). The First and Second World Wars greatly increased the numbers of inhabitants with more demobilised veterans and widows; as well as many non Nubi ‘detrimental Native veterans’ who by virtue their long military service could longer return to their ‘Native reserves’. Furthermore, while the authorities increased the number of military personal increased, they did not provide them with married quarters, thus many soldiers’ families came to live in Kibera. However, from the 1920s, there was steady influx of non-Nubi Natives who were also not related to the KAR. Kibera began serving as an informal ‘servants’ quarters’ for the surrounding settler homes and farms; housing not only the Natives legally allowed to enter and work Nairobi (but lacked accommodation); but also for many more Natives not allowed in Nairobi, either looking for employment or engaged in informal/illegal activities (Elkan and Van Zwanenberg, 1973, Temple, 1974b, Hake, 1977, Parsons, 1997). Furthermore, Nairobi’s post War industrialisation brought in many industrial labourers in search of cheap accommodation near the Industrial Area, who became tenants of the Nubi. Thus, by the end World War II, the permanency of Kibera and its trajectory as slum were more or else established; as a settlement of an increasingly ethnically heterogeneous class of the ‘undesirables’ and ‘unauthorised’ urban poor; most of the having a tenuous right to live in Kibera. Whereas only the Nubi were legally
allowed to live in Kibera, there were 3000 Nubi compared 6000 Non-Nubi Natives; in supposedly 'temporary' houses built without authorisation (Adams, 1933, Elkan and Van Zwanenberg, 1973, Temple, 1974b, Hake, 1977, Parsons, 1997). However, these permanency and trajectory were not established automatically, they were outcomes of protracted contentions among the powerful actors including the settlers, army officers, and government officials; driven by conflicting interests, perspectives, and perceptions.

The army had provided the land to the Nubi as an incentive for loyalty and to embrace firmly the tradition of military service; while the long military service of the Nubi placed the British officers in their debt; ensuring a military patronage that would contribute to the preservation Kibera for the Nubi, throughout the colonial regime. Hence in 1912 the KAR officially sanctioned the residency Kibera by issuing 'land passes' to some veterans as a form of unofficial pension (Parsons, 1997, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011). However, by the 1920s, as Nairobi grew, the land became 'too valuable to be left to the Natives' and the Settlers began citing the risk of crime, disease, disorder, and immorality; with the settlement so close to the city centre and European neighbourhoods. They argued that Kibera was quickly filling up with 'all the rag-tag and bob-tail of East Africa' and was no longer a useful military recruiting ground. Hence they were determined to have this 'native settlement' destroyed and the land put it into 'better use' (Adams, 1933, Temple, 1974b, Parsons, 1997, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011). However, when all other Native settlements in the Nairobi that were too near European settlements’ and too valuable were being demolished and residents evicted, the Nubi called in a host of powerful military patrons, and Kibera was spared. Nevertheless, the Commission for Nairobi declared that the Nubi were "tenants at the will of the Crown" who could be evicted at any time; their 'land passes' were withdrawn and they were forbidden were build more houses, and thus Kibera became more or less an 'unauthorised village' (Adams, 1933, Temple, 1974b, Parsons, 1997, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011).

The powerful Settlers grew increasingly impatient with the continued Nubi presence on one of the most valuable real estate in Nairobi, and the slow action of the state, but no agreed solution could be found, leading to relative inaction. A decision was arrived at to finally relocate the settlement, but there was a failure to reach an agreement as to how this was to be done due to highly divergent perspectives, arguments, and objectives between the Settlers, and sections of the government, and Nairobi Town/Municipal Council. Thus a section of the actors imposed a policy of ‘wilful malicious neglect’ to make Kibera ‘unliveable’ and thus less attractive to potential migrants and also force the Nubi to move other locations, such that Kibera will cease to exist in a few years. Thus water supply, schools, roads, health faculties, and other infrastructural survives and amenities were cut off or left to decay, in a few year transforming Kibera into a very deplorable settlement. However, the Nubi did not move out and more non-Nubi moved in (Adams, 1933, Temple, 1974b, Hake, 1977, Parsons, 1997, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011). Nevertheless, the Post-War period ushered in a Labour government, emphasising good government and social welfare, which mooted plans to reorganise Kibera into an orderly planned settlement with modern amenities, infrastructure, and services. However these plans were scuttled by the Settlers and the Municipal Council who disagreed with that
view, while Kibera continued to grow due to the acute the post-war African housing shortage in Nairobi. Accordingly, both the relocation and improvement plans floundered due to the actors difficulty to arrive at an agreed solution or develop a coordinated approach; preserving Kibera (but in a deplorable state) until independence (Adams, 1933, Parsons, 1997, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011).

Figure 31: Villages of Kibera and population distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>No. of Structures</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Area (Ha)</th>
<th>Density Pax/Km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gatwekera</td>
<td>2217</td>
<td>55,425</td>
<td>28.550</td>
<td>194,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kambi Muru</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>10,600</td>
<td>7.758</td>
<td>136,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kianda</td>
<td>1344</td>
<td>33,600</td>
<td>15.764</td>
<td>213,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kichinjo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisumu Ndogo</td>
<td>1105</td>
<td>27,625</td>
<td>16.987</td>
<td>162,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laini Saba</td>
<td>2130</td>
<td>53,250</td>
<td>23.682</td>
<td>224,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindi</td>
<td>1818</td>
<td>45,450</td>
<td>21.379</td>
<td>251,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makina</td>
<td>2769</td>
<td>69,225</td>
<td>42.666</td>
<td>162,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashimoni</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>22,625</td>
<td>12.159</td>
<td>186,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raila</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>22,850</td>
<td>7.797</td>
<td>293,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silanga</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>43,250</td>
<td>22.445</td>
<td>192,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soweto East</td>
<td>2149</td>
<td>53,725</td>
<td>21.379</td>
<td>251,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soweto West</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>15,550</td>
<td>7.088</td>
<td>219,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>18132</td>
<td>453,175</td>
<td>206.082</td>
<td>219,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: According to the disputed 2009 official census the population of Kibera was 170,070, a third of the values above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Density Pax/Km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3,085</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>13,175</td>
<td>5,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>7,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>62,197</td>
<td>26,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>42,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>286,560</td>
<td>128,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>420,671</td>
<td>188,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>448,945</td>
<td>200,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>491,224</td>
<td>219,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: (Temple, 1974a, GOK, 2004c, Map Kibera, 2010, GOK, 2011a, KNSB, 2012)

At independence Kibera saw an explosive growth, but also became the site of numerous housing initiatives as well as extreme political machinations whose net effect was the drastic worsening socio-economic conditions of exiting residents, and many who would join Kibera in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s, part of Kibera was cleared to pave way for the Salama public ‘standard housing’ scheme; followed in the 1970s by the Olympic aided self-help scheme, the New Kibera (Fort Jesus) tenant
purchase/mortgage scheme, and the Ayany site and services scheme. However, while these schemes benefited very few structure owners whose houses had been demolished, majority of the beneficiaries neither lived nor owned structures in Kibera (Elkan and Van Zwanenberg, 1973, Temple, 1974b, Ladu, 1989, Pers.Com1, 2011). Thus Kibera shrank in size, but grew in population, especially in the 1980s when the SAPs increased the poverty levels and number of people in need of cheap shelter; as well as Kibera undergoing extreme deterioration, as the state withdrew form basic service provision. The 1990s Nyayo High-rise Kibera slum-upgrading scheme was constructed as a middle income housing estate, whose main beneficiaries were politically connected individuals of Moi’s regime. However more importantly is the rise of slumlordism in Kibera in the 1970s.

By the end World War II Kibera had become highly heterogeneous ethnically, with a majority or the residents being tenants of the Nubi, who had added extra rooms to there houses and living mostly in the same compounds. However, state of emergency in the 1950s, the colonial authorities forcefully removed the Kikuyu from Kibera leaving the Luo as the majority tenants. The demand for cheap housing increased tremendous with independence, relaxation of on Natives’ movement restrictions, and massive immigration into Nairobi. In the 1970s, following a moratorium on slum demolitions and issuance of quasi-legal building permits for building in the slums; selective demolition and preservation of slum as well as issuance of building permits ensued; however based on politico-ethnic patronage and clientelism that gravelly privileged the Kenyatta’s regime’s clients. Moreover, in 1974, Mwangi Mathai (Kikuyu) replaced Yunis Ali (Nubi) as the Member of Parliament for the Kibera. Soon the hither to small scale subsistence renting by resident the Nubi was transformed into massive large-scale politico-commercial slumlordism of the absentee Kikuyu; and a multi-million dollar ‘real estate’ development (Adams, 1933, Temple, 1974b, Hake, 1977, Amis, 1984, Ladu, 1989, Parsons, 1997, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Smedt, 2009a, Pers.Com1, 2011). Hence powerful or connected Kikuyu individuals became major absentee ‘slumlords’ with hundreds or even thousands of units, the Nubi remained poor resident structure owners with only around ten to twenty rooms, and the Luo the majority of the urban poor tenants. These three groups would come to have different visions, aspirations, interests, and perspective concerning how Kibera should evolve (or be maintained) with a colossal impact on eventual initiatives and other efforts to improve Kibera. The slumlords were opposed to and scuttled many initiatives that posed a threat to the lucrative slum business, but welcomed initiatives that gave tenure to the ‘owners’. The residents mostly favoured in situ initiatives that either changed and bestowed ownership to them or rental schemes with lower rents and better housing quality. The Nubi claimed the whole Kibera as their forefathers as military pension, but the government refuted the claim. All these provided fodder for political manipulation the often degenerated into bloody politico-ethnic conflicts, and any initiatives, depending on how it was designed was treated with suspicion and seen to favour a particular ethnicity or political affiliation (Syagga and Olima, 1999, Gulyani and Bassett, 2007, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Huchzeremeyer, 2008, Dafe, 2009, Pers.Com1, 2011).

It is with this background the Kibera became subjected to much political machinations and populist schemes of the Moi’s regime in the 1990s. Raila Odinga (a Luo) became the area Member of
Parliament promising to transform Kibera if their political party gained power, and Kibera become a defined ‘opposition zone’. In response, the President Moi, in a bid to lure the Kibera’s Luo residents and Raila Odinga into the ruling party KANU, declared reduction of rents. Nonetheless this sparked a violent tenant-landlord conflict (IRIN, 2001, De Smedt, 2009). Furthermore, it has been argued that it is this thinking, perspective, and interest that informed the initiation a Memorandum of Understanding between Moi’s government and UN-HABITAT in 2001 the led to the creation of Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP); whose flagship project was in Kibera’s Soweto East village (UN-Habitat, 2008b). Nonetheless, soon the tenant-slumlords conflicts of interests and perspectives entered the projects, delaying it for years; with the major implementing actors also faced their disagreements with most actors and organisation withdrawing from the project. Furthermore, with the intense Kenya’s political machinations, Kibera found itself often an ‘opposition zone’ and bearing the brunt of the wrath of the state, political operatives, and politico-ethnic criminal gangs with residents being subjected to extreme violence, destruction of property, and evictions; as exemplified by the 2007 post-election clashes (De Smedt, 2009, Murunga, 2011). Ultimately, even thought the 2000s brought in KENSUP and other myriads of MDGs related initiatives and organisation in Kibera, the effectiveness of those initiatives was mostly thwarted by numerous conflicts, disagreements, and misunderstandings; such that many of those initiatives floundered; and the situation in Kibera continued to deteriorate for majority of the residents.

9.3.3. Mathare

With an estimated population ranging from 600 000 (past estimates and NGO figures) to 80,309 (2009 government census), covering probably 1.5 Km2, and stretching almost three kilometres along the Mathare River valley, Mathare is considered probably the second largest slum in Kenya after Kibera. Mathare is comprised of 13 heterogeneous villages, and is strategically located about 5 Km north east of the CBD; abutting the highly affluent Muthaiga neighbourhood and the Kariobangi Light Industrial area that provide employment opportunities (AHT, 2000, SUM Consult, 2004, KNSB, 2012, Andvig and Barasa, 2014).

Figure 32: Villages of Mathare and population distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th># N Census 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3A</td>
<td>4059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3B</td>
<td>7433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3C</td>
<td>5316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4A</td>
<td>18776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4B</td>
<td>5681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Githururu</td>
<td>3737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiamutisya</td>
<td>5825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>8085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwa Kariuki</td>
<td>5290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mabatini</td>
<td>1160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashimon 4</td>
<td>4478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 10</td>
<td>2594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village 2</td>
<td>7875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>80309</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Etymologically Mathare is the Dracena tree in Kikuyu language. By the World War I Mathare Valley was sparsely populated with ‘unauthorised Native agricultural villages’. The colonial authorities had granted a leasing rights to a number of Indians to operate quarries in the area, and the Indians had in
turn informally/illegally sub-leased some of the land to the Natives (Etherton, 1971, Hake, 1977). However with the post World War I increase in African nationalism and political awareness and segregation, Pangani, an ‘unauthorised Native location’ in the town was demolished, and most of the residents moved to Mathare; which was spared because it was largely invisible from the roads and on derelict land. In the World War II period the Mathare increasingly populated with a majority Kikuyu population for the Native reserves, and other Natives seeking employment or engaged in informal or illegal activities. Soon the settlement acquired the reputation for beer brewing and liquor distillation, crime, poverty, violence, and rebellion. Indeed, Mathare became a significant organisation and logistics centre for the Mau Mau uprising largely carried out by some of the World War II demobilised Natives who settled there. In response, the colonial authorities razed down the entire settlement in 1953, and detained much of its population in prison and labour camps (Furedi, 1973b, Hake, 1977, Anderson, 2005). At independence in 1963, the previous inhabitants returned and rebuilt their structures, and were joined by thousands others.

However, the new government made it clear the slum would be bulldozed, and the residents were ordered leave within a month (Hake, 1977 p 148). However, with the majority of the Mathare residents being Kikuyu and as politico-ethnicism and patronage took root in the 1960s, dilemma in the regime ensued and thus Mathare was spared (Chege, 1981). With ‘city cleanup’ and demolition of other slums in Nairobi amidst massive rural to urban migration, the population of Mathare rose rapidly. Despite the common misconception that Mathare was purely a Kikuyu slum, by the 1970s, there was also a significant proportion of Luo, as well as Kamba and Luhya; making a heterogenous mix of squatters. However, there was a dramatic shift in the 1970s when ‘land buying companies’ or ‘cooperatives’ were formed by some residents in conjunction with powerful politico-ethnic patrons, and ‘bought’ the land on which Mathare stood (public land), and built thousands of roomed structures. The companies with help of sections of the City Council and their patrons evicted the squatters or forcing them to become tenants and to start paying rent. Thus by 1971, 93% of the residents were tenants. Whereas Mathare had a heterogenous ethnic mix of squatters, the company owners were predominantly Kikuyu (Etherton, 1971, Hake, 1977, Chege, 1981, Gitec Consult, 1995, Andvig and Barasa, 2014). Within a few years Mathare had become a extremely lucrative piece of real estate ‘investment’ and a powerful and wealthy class of absentee slumlord had been established in Mathare Valley and squatters had vanished. The tenant were predominantly Kikuyu and Luo, even though other ethnicities were also significantly represented. Often time the resident have united across politico-ethnic affiliation to pursue common objectives, and form a united front when they have contentions with the slumlords; however many time the slumlords and politicians have used politico-ethnic perspectives to manipulate and ‘divide and rule’ the residents thereby thwarting the residents cooperative actions. Furthermore, over the decades, differences in national politico-ethnic perspectives and rivalries between the Kikuyu and Luo have played out in the slums, degenerating into vicious criminal gang warfare and politico-ethnic violence such as in 2007, as well as the negatively impacting or even thwarted numerous initiatives in Mathare, such as the Mathare 4A programme (Kusienya, 2004, SUM Consult, 2004). Indeed, Mathare is teeming with numerous civil society organisations engaged in one activity or another, and has seen many initiatives over the decades, however with minimal improvements (and even reversals) in the

9.3.4. Mukuru

With an estimated population of between 700,000 and 100,000, Mukuru is considered probably third largest slum in Nairobi after Kibera and Mathare. Located between four to ten Kilometres southwest of the city centre, Mukuru consists a series of slum clusters (each divided into a number of villages) straddling the southern borders of the industrial area, and stretching over six kilometres along the Ngong River. While the land public, private individuals also claim ownership, and the residents are in constant threat of eviction. Mukuru, which means valley in Kikuyu. After the World War II, several British veterans were awarded a huge tract of land in Kenya for their services. This included Jack Reuben who set up sisal plantation and a depot, with a labour camp for Native labourers. At independence in 1963, Reuben like many other Europeans of the middle and lower classes left the country, and the lands passed to the new state. However, the labourers were left without employment or housing and began squatting on the land. Like the trajectory of other Nairobi slums, the slumlords took over the ‘ownership’ of the lands and the majority of the residents became tenants. Nonetheless, Mukuru consist of sizable resident structure owners. In the 1980s and 1990s, as part of Moi’s regime patronage machinations, parts of Mukuru were awarded to private individuals who tried to evict the residents, resulting in numerous bloody conflicts between the police and the residents. Nevertheless, much of the land on which the slums lie are abandoned quarries, derelict, and dumping sites, as well as reserves for high voltage power lines, pipeline, riparian, roads, and railway (UNEP/OCHA, 2011, CURI, 2012, Ngau, 2014).

Figure 33: Mukuru complex

Like the other slums, Mukuru is teeming with civil society activity with duplication, wasteful completion, and conflicts. These involve not only completion over donor funding or control of slum sections and population, but also over the ‘best way’ or approach the initiatives should take. These conflicts and misunderstandings also drawn in state and private sector actors, as well as donors with many culminating in legal deputes, lengthy and wasteful court process, as well as violence. This is exemplified by the conflict and misunderstandings surrounding the Mukuru Sinai Cross Subsidised Housing Project that drew in Slum Dwellers International (SDI), several local NGOs and CBOs, such
that the allocated funds for the project were re-routed to other projects; as the project was encumbered by legal disputes (UPFI, 2013). Moreover, the question of who should own the initiatives between the slumlords, tenants, or resident structure owners plays a critical role in several initiatives, and are compounded by politico-ethnic complexities.

The names of Mukuru villages tell their troubled history. For instance, Vietnam took its name from a massive confrontation between the police and the resident that resulted in numerous deaths, as the government attempted to demolish the settlement in 1996. Moto Moto (fire! fire!) alludes to conflict as well as numerous fires (for eviction), beside being the name of the group the irregularly acquired the area. Zone 48 owes its name to condition laid down the Industrialist/philanthropist who own the land, that the resident would only be allowed to stay in that land if all the ‘48 Kenyan tribes’ were represented there (Matrix, 1993, Ngau, 1995, Wairutu, 2008, Pamoja Trust, 2009). In fact all the villages have emerged, grew, or disappeared based on particular perspectives of the certain politicians, private sector actors, or government officials.

9.3.5. Korogocho

With an estimated population of ranging from 200,000 to 41,000 and an area of 1.5 km², Korogocho could be fourth largest informal settlement in Nairobi, after Kibera, Mathare Valley, and Mukuru Kwa Njenga (MacAuslan and Schofield, 2011). Located 11 kilometres northeast of the CBD, and on the banks of Nairobi River, Korogocho abuts Dandora, the principal dumping site of Nairobi that daily receives over 2000 tonnes of solid waste (UNEP, 2007). In fact, Korogocho is the Kikuyu word for scrap or garbage; and apart from residents who work as casual labourers in the neighbouring industrial areas, construction sites, and other informal businesses; many residents glean the garbage for recyclable scraps to sell. However this dumping site poses serious health, environmental, and security hazard, besides generating gang conflicts (Mutunga, 1995, UNEP, 2007, KSUP, 2009b).

Founded by rural migrants to the city in the 1960s, Korogocho is composed mainly of people who have been evicted severally from other parts of the city that were either being upgraded or taken over by private investors, and moving from one slum to another, before ending up here as tenants. Thus, Korogocho is composed of ten villages each with a distinctive character, leadership structure, cultural practices, politico-ethnic composition, and histories. These, in chronological order of formation are: Grogan A and B, Ngunyumu, Gitathuru, Highridge, Kisumu Ndogo, Nyayo, Korogocho A and B, and Ngomongo (Perscom, 2011, Kochcommunity, 2014). Accordingly, Korogocho as a whole is extremely diverse, with a mixed ethnic composition, highly varied household types and of livelihoods both legal and illegal; with each of the eight villages being unique.
Being the base of several organised criminal groups and gangs, Korogocho experiences serious vicious crimes and has seen some of the worst politico-ethnic classes and gang related violence in Nairobi. These have included slumlords- tenants conflicts and others that have reflected the national politico-ethnic-historical disputes; which have permeated most of the housing initiatives and negatively impacted them. Like most slums in Kenya, there are often four interested groups with a stake in the tenure issues: tenants, resident structure owners, slumlords, and de jure land owner. The land is public, even though certain individuals claim to have been allocated land; the powerful absentee slumlords claim de facto ownership (and quasi-legal title) with power build and demolish structure as well as evicting the tenants at will; resident structure owners and the rent paying tenants claim ‘ownership’ by virtue of them living there on public land (Pamoja Trust, 2001, Weru, 2004, Syagga, 2011a). Accordingly, when President Moi issued a directive that the residents of Korogocho slums should be permanently settled there and issued tenure; the slumlords and resident structure owners formed Korogocho Owners Welfare Association (KOWA) as a counter move. This resulted in protracted conflict involving the use of militia, court processes, and political manipulations that dragged on for year, and contributed to the bloody 2007 post-election violence in Korogocho (Pamoja Trust, 2001, Weru, 2004, Moser and Rodgers, 2012).

Nevertheless, Korogocho has large presence of NGOs, CBOs, and FBOs with the church taking a prominent role not only in the endeavour to improve living conditions in the settlement but also to bring peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, some of Korogocho based civil society organisations have a had a colossal global influence, that included the successful lobbying for Global South’s debt cancellation. These contributed to the initiation of the ‘debt for development swap’ Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP) by which, instead of Kenya repaying its debts to Italy, the repayment funds would be used for slum upgrading (KSUP, 2009b, Buckley, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2014e). Nevertheless, the criminal gangs permeated these initiatives and other NGO led activities and took over most of the community positions in the stakeholder forums; thereby seriously jeopardising the

9.3.6. Slums in 2000s: Enduring perspectives, perceptions, and contradictions

From the descriptions of the four slums above, it can be seen that as its own unique origin, history, and trajectory; an not only that its various villages are also unique. However most of the slums of Nairobi share their deplorable living environments and conditions, conflict, and politico-ethnic manipulation. Indeed, Slums of Nairobi typify the urban South crisis especially with the aspects of postcoloniality, extreme poverty and inequality, informality casualty and conflict, multiperspectivity, and profound neglect by these governing the countries and the city. Nevertheless, it can also be said that the slums of Nairobi originated and have continued to grow due to particular interests and perspectives of certain actors, while efforts to improve the housing situation have been highly compromised by differences in the interests and perspectives among the actors seeking improvement.

By the end of the 1970s slums in Nairobi had became a multi-million dollar business, and deeply steeped in the miasma of Kenya's political machinations; however conflict over interests and completion over power and resources alone may not be of sufficient explanatory value. More wealth and power can also be derived even with better housing and living conditions of the ordinary citizens; while presence of slums may not be entirely beneficial to the parties contributing to their presences, and those displaying lack of political will to solve the problem or in fact striving to maintain the deplorable status quo. Probably all these boil down to attributes, attitudes, perspectives, and perceptions that partially predispose some actors to act in particular way; and perceive other actors in a particular light.

It is slightly over a century existence, unknown numbers of slums have sprung up, razed down, and rebuilt; with the net effect being and explosive growth of slum populations, increase in size and number of slums, their densification and persistence; despite numerous counter measures against them. The totality of housing initiatives in Nairobi over the decades is infinitesimal compared to the problem and tend to benefit higher income groups, while making the condition of the poor even more desperate. For instance, while it has become widely know that most slum dwellers in Nairobi are tenants, most initiatives as still based on perspectives and perceptions that slum dwellers are squatters and structure owners. Thus these projects even if fully successful will leave out over 90% of slum dwellers. Hence the question why the actors persist in pursuing out of touch initiatives and objectives.

The slum arena has become extremely complicated with numerous actors, interests, and perspectives. To some slums represent suffering, exploitation, oppression, and injustice, to other it represents wealth and power. Slums remain the only housing available for many the poor in Nairobi, housing a great proportion of the industrial and construction labours, informal craftsmen and traders, domestic workers, and even civil servants. The description of slums ‘subsidising’ the luxurious lives enjoyed by some in Nairobi, and in fact driving the ‘prosperity’ of Nairobi can be seen to be accurate in many occasions. Even thought slums house a significant proportion of Nairobi’s population, and define most
day to day and also long term aspects of the lives of many; to most societal actors, and in fact majority of upper and middle class of Nairobi, slums are highly insignificant and invisible, and occupy a very small portion of political/policy space (as well as physical space on land). Consequently, despite much rhetoric and populistic or tokenistic action, by large there is no political will at all to deal meaningfully with the problems of the urban poor. Thus, slum issues tend to become more important only important during election time when ‘numbers’ are needed for political competition/conflict among the elites, or when slum issues cross paths with the interests and perspectives of the elites. Hence, with this governance logic and perspective, in action, lack of improvement, and worsening of the problem will continue, unless there is a radical shift in this attitude; either with the exiting governors changing their perspectives, or new governors with different perspectives coming to power. However, even among those seeking improvement different interests, divergent perspectives, conflict, and misunderstandings seem to greatly thwart their ‘good intentions’. Accordingly, unless attitudes, perspective, and perceptions that create, sustain, and perpetuate slums and housing problems are adequately understood and appropriately dealt with, the problem slums and housing conditions of many in Nairobi will continue to deteriorate, even with many initiatives and concerted efforts, without hope of improvement in the foreseeable future. In summation, it this over a century persisting and growing slum problems, despite numerous efforts and approaches; with numerous actors, interests, and perspectives that the initiatives and policies of the 2000s were aimed at.

9.4. The 2000s: Policy environment and ongoing initiatives

The policy environment in the 2000s, ongoing initiatives are a culmination of various processes driven buy certain interests, perspectives, and perceptions by particular actors in Nairobi’s slightly over a century history. In the 2000s, Nairobi’s housing arena came under the influence of the Globally dominant Governism orthodoxy, which emphasised the need for agreement, corporative and concerted actions by the myriad actors with diverse interests in the arena, a means for solving the mounting urban and housing crisis. Indeed the practices emanating from Neoliberalism and Sustainabilism of the two foregoing decades had tremendously increased the number and types of actors in the arena, and changed not only the state-society relations, but also the relations between the actors. Furthermore, the participatory and empowerment endeavours from Sustainabilism had greatly had increased the awareness and boldness of some of the slum dwellers, who had become more organised and demanded justice, fairness, and meaningful addressing of their concerns. This was augmented by the entry of right based civil society organisations also brought in Sustainabilism. Moreover, the year 2002 usher in Kibaki’s government which was partly composed of radicals, human rights activists, and civil society actors; all of whom, had been agitating for the rights of the poor and marginalised. Hence, the government, driven by the perspectives of the pro-poor radical segment, set forth various policies and initiatives to more meaningfully deal with the housing crisis and the problems of the urban poor and slum dwellers. Nonetheless, the government was also partly composed of conservatives who vehemently opposed this, insisting the government should focus on structuring the economy and boosting image of the city, to attract more business and investment. This added more conflicts and misunderstandings to an already highly fragmented and conflict laden arena; with this conflict over perspectives highlighting the need for finding common ground beyond the negotiation of
interests. In sum, it could be observed that, while Governism prevailed as the dominant orthodoxy in Nairobi’s, other previous orthodoxies seemed to continue to frame the interests, perspectives, and perceptions of the actors, as well as their practices, interrelations, and interactions; besides having a great bearing in course of the crisis and the effectiveness of the initiated solutions.

Table 40: National Development Plans and Urban Housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Housing policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDP 1</td>
<td>1966 -1970</td>
<td>Modernisation and aggregate economy growth, rural-urban migration</td>
<td>Public housing and slum demolition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 2</td>
<td>1970 -1974</td>
<td>Basic needs, economic growth and redistribution</td>
<td>Site and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 3</td>
<td>1974 -1979</td>
<td>Basic needs, equitable distribution of resources and income, balance economic growth between regions, rural-urban migration reduction</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 4</td>
<td>1979 -1983</td>
<td>Alleviation of poverty, infrastructure and services provision</td>
<td>Self help slum upgrading and core housing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 5</td>
<td>1984 -1988</td>
<td>Neoliberalist reforms: decentralisation, economic management, private sector, privatisation</td>
<td>Slum upgrading through enablement strategy, urban management, infrastructure and services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 6</td>
<td>1989 -1993</td>
<td>Neoliberalist reforms: deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 7</td>
<td>1994 -1996</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP 8</td>
<td>1997 -2001</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERS</td>
<td>2003 -2007</td>
<td>Recovery: good governance, democracy and empowerment</td>
<td>Low cost housing and slum upgrading through PPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTP I</td>
<td>2008 -2012</td>
<td>Good governance: a globally competitive and prosperous Kenya</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTP II</td>
<td>2013 -2017</td>
<td>Rapidly industrialising middle-income country</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


9.4.1. Housing in national policies, plans, and strategies

As observed in the forgoing section, since independence Kenya has had several development plans and strategies, including the Five Year National Development Plans, whose main objective was economic growth of the country, but in which urban housing problems and slums featured prominently. These plans and strategies were often prepared with the support and influence of multilateral and bilateral donors, and usually reflected the prevailing dominant development ideologies. Nonetheless, despite their good stated intentions and expert crafting, their implementation and achievement of objectives has been very dismal (Omiti et al., 2002, Alila and Njeru, 2005, GOK, 2007, GOK, 2008a). Furthermore, it could be observed that these plans and strategies consistently grossly underestimated the magnitude of the urban housing problem, while overstating governments’ commitment and intention to deal with the problem. Hence the plans and strategies has mostly remained political statements of intent, rarely meaningfully implemented, and whose objectives are seldom realised. Furthermore the implementation of pro-poor objective seems to be often jeopardised by the prevailing elite biases and the persisting aristocrat vs commoner perspectives; that focuses actions to the interests, perceptions, and aspiration of a minority higher income groups; such as attaining splendour and ‘world class status’ infrastructure and services; while totally ignoring the concerns of the majority common citizens, who are a best provided with a few tokenistic initiatives. Accordingly, dealing with this problem of policy non-implementation or non-effectiveness when implemented became one of the driving forces and stated objectives of the emerging policies in the 2000s; which would again put in severe jeopardy by the prevailing pro-poor versus pro-business contentions.
The Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) for Employment and Wealth Creation 2003 – 2007 was launched in the year 2003 with the objective of reversing the country’s systematic slide “into the abyss of underdevelopment and hopelessness” that included deplorable socio-economic conditions, political oppression, and bad governance; and shift its course toward economy recovery based on a multi-sectoral approach. Hence the focus was improving standards of living and democratic space through ‘democracy and empowerment’, building a ‘modern and prosperous nation’, promoting good governance and the rule of law, and maintaining a sound macro-economic framework (GOK, 2003b).

The ERS stated that housing was a ‘basic need’ for human survival; a social good for dignity, and an economic good for capital and labour productivity. However, over half of the urban population lived in slums due to ‘high cost of decent housing, land, and construction materials. Hence, the ERS committed the government to facilitate the construction of 150,000 housing units annually, enact appropriate land and housing legislation to facilitate private sector development of affordable houses; and work with development partners to develop a framework for upgrading slums. It is in this framework that the Housing Policy was enacted in 2004, and the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) continued with the goal of improving the livelihood of 5.3 million slum dwellers (GOK, 2003a, GOK, 2003b, GOK, 2004d, Government of Kenya, 2005).

The ERS led to the ‘Kenya Vision 2030’, a long-term national planning strategy towards achieving “a globally competitive and prosperous Kenya”, to be be implemented in successive five-year Medium Term development plans (MTP) until the year 2030 (GOK, 2007, GOK, 2008a). The ‘First Medium Term Plan (MTP I) 2008-2012’ noted that there was an acute shortage of affordable and decent housing for low-income earners in the urban area; since the market supplied only 20% of housing demand, but none the low-income earners apart from the slums; warning that the continued rapid growth of slums in urban areas was a potential disaster in the making (GOK, 2008a). This housing shortage was attributed to ‘under-investment’ due to poor governance, uncoordinated policy implementation, outdated legal and regulatory framework, insufficient capacity, inadequate financing to buyers and developers, and lack of research on low cost building materials and construction techniques; which the government would focus on solving, as well as “plans are in place to build 200,000 housing units annually by 2012” by the government (GOK, 2008a p x). Additionally, apart from producing 200,000 ‘decent’ housing units annually, incentives would be given to the private sector and individuals to construct houses, including finances and serviced land, and provision of housing for the low income groups through public–private partnership (PPP) arrangements. Furthermore, the government would prepare a land-use plan to facilitate better urban planning as well as make slums ‘formal settlements’ by installing physical and social infrastructure, besides permitting the construction of permanent houses. Moreover, efforts will be put in place to attract private investment in those locations, as well as housing technology centres established in slums to promote location-specific building materials and low-cost housing construction.

The 2007-2008 post-election violence greatly affected the Nairobi’s housing situation, starting with vicious violence, displacement, loss of life, and wanton destruction of property of many slum dwellers. Over 10,000 urban housing units were destroyed, and country wide over there were 600,000 internally
displaced person (IDPs), some of whom ended up being slum dwellers in Nairobi (GOK, 2008a, KNCHR, 2008, Klopp, 2009, Smedt, 2009b, Omenya and Lubaale, 2012, Ruteere et al., 2013). The perspectives and perceptions emanating from the violence negatively affected the ongoing housing initiatives and even completely scuttled others; as well as framed the subsequent housing policies and initiatives; whose objectives now included dealing with the problems that lead to the conflict as well as those that arose due to the conflict; besides focusing on boosting peace, harmony, and cooperation (GOK, 2008a, GOK, 2011a, GOK, 2013b, GOK, 2014). Hence, MTP I had also the objective of dealing with the urgent problem of resettling and rehousing IDPs for 2007 violence; besides, address safety and security issues, and advocate for peaceful co-existence amongst the conflicting residents.

In general, through the MTP I, the government would create strategies and incentives to attract investments, review and harmonisation the existing legal and institutional framework, and enact a new housing bill to accelerate housing provision by both the state and non-state actors, and to establish and strengthen partnerships and coalitions to mobilise support for policy and programmes. Nonetheless, by the year 2012, despite much rhetoric and efforts very little progress had been made in achieving those objectives. For instance in the whole period only 900 units in had been produced under the slum upgrading program (GOK, 2011e, FES, 2013, GOK, 2013b).

MTP I was followed by The Second Medium-Term Plan (MTP II) 2013 to 2017 with the stated objective of accelerated and inclusive economic growth with higher living standards for all Kenyans, by making Kenya a rapidly industrialising middle-income country. The problem of slums would be dealt by facilitating the construction of 200,000 ‘modern’ housing units annually through PPP arrangements, and the formulation of a sound policy, planning, management, and legal framework toward the achievement of “adequate and decent housing in a sustainable environment”; besides housing finance initiatives, physical and social infrastructure, and the development of appropriate building materials and technologies (GOK, 2013b). Nonetheless, this seemed to be a major climb down from the commitments and objectives of MTPI, relegating the government only the role of facilitation and participation in PPPs. However, these plans seemed to make very little reference to the existing housing policy and other instruments.

9.4.2. Housing Policy for Kenya

Box 6: Kenya Housing Policy of 2004

This National Housing Policy is intended to arrest the deteriorating housing conditions countrywide and to bridge the shortfall in housing stock arising from demand that far surpasses supply, particularly in urban areas. This situation has been exacerbated by population explosion, rapid urbanization, widespread poverty, and escalating costs of providing housing. The shortage in housing is manifested in overcrowding, proliferation of slum and informal settlements especially in urban areas.

The policy aims at:

- Enabling the poor to access housing and basic services and infrastructure necessary for a healthy living environment especially in urban areas.
- Encouraging integrated, participatory approaches to slum upgrading, including income-generating activities that effectively combat poverty.
- Promoting and funding of research on the development of low cost building materials and construction techniques.
- Harmonising existing laws governing urban development and electric power to facilitate more cost effective housing development.
- Facilitating increased investment by the formal and informal private sector, in the production of housing for low and middle-income urban dwellers.
- Creating a Housing Development Fund to be financed through budgetary allocations and financial support from development partners and other sources.

To comprehensively addresses the shelter problem the National Housing Policy comprises four elements:

- Element one is on policy targets and highlights urban housing, rural housing, slum upgrading and vulnerable groups; and proposes solutions, which include poverty alleviation.
- Element two is on main housing inputs and addresses ways of managing the housing inputs namely land, infrastructure, building materials, building technology and finances.
- Element three covers estate management and maintenance necessary to ensure long lifespan for housing stock, disaster management, environmental impact assessment for major housing projects, human resource development and monitoring and evaluation.
- Element four deals with legislative and institutional framework and assigns specific roles to various stakeholders. Under this element the policy also proposes enactment of a Housing Act to strengthen the role of the Ministry in charge of housing in regulating housing development.

THE GOAL

The overall goal of this Housing Policy is to facilitate the provision of adequate shelter and a healthy living environment at an affordable cost to all socioeconomic groups in Kenya in order to foster sustainable human settlements. This will minimise the number of citizens living in shelters that are below the habitable living conditions. It will also curtail the mushrooming of slums and informal settlements especially in the major towns.

OBJECTIVES

a) To facilitate progressive realisation of the right to adequate housing by all;

b) To promote the development of housing that is functional, healthy, aesthetically pleasant and environmentally friendly;

c) To earmark and set aside land for public housing development in urban areas;

d) To facilitate access to land and security of tenure for all socio-economic groups;

e) To eliminate legal and customary barriers, where they exist, to women’s equal access and control of land and finance;

f) To increase the proportion of the exchequer allocation for housing delivery and human settlements facilitation;

g) To facilitate greater access to funds from the domestic markets by housing developers and to promote innovative ways of mobilising finances by the vulnerable groups;

h) To assist the low-income earners and economically vulnerable groups in housing improvement and production;

i) To improve the quality of existing stock of houses;

j) To encourage research and popularise the use of appropriate building materials that are locally available and low cost building technologies to reduce the cost of housing;

k) To contribute in the alleviation of poverty by creating employment among the poor through building material production and construction processes as well as promote income-generating activities within the built environment;

l) To provide and improve infrastructural facilities in both the rural and urban areas so as to improve human settlements and living environments;

m) To protect the environment of human settlements and of ecosystems from pollution, degradation, and destruction in order to attain sustainable development;

n) To mobilise resources and strengthen capacity building in order to facilitate increased investment in the housing sector;

o) To streamline the legal and institutional framework to promote housing development;

p) To promote inclusive participation of the private sector, public sector, community based organisations, Non-Governmental Organisations, cooperatives, communities and other development partners in planning, development and management of housing programmes.

Source: Adapted from (GOK, 2004d).
In recognition that Kenya lacked a clear urban housing development policy, and that numerous and conflicting instruments were being used by different sectors to address the housing problem, several commissions and task forces were commissioned in response. This included the Nairobi Informal Settlements Coordination Committee (NISCC) in 1997, composed of public, civil society, and private sector actors; with the objective of developing an overall strategy for dealing with the problem of slums in Nairobi, and the coordination of the various instruments and actors (GOK, 1997a, Syagga et al., 2001b). In 2000s, the advent of the MDGs and Good Governance campaigns, as well as the pressure from the citizens, politicians, donors, and the civil society forced compelled the government to pursue compressive slum upgrading initiative in Nairobi. Due to the general lack of information concerning slums, a number of technical reports were commissioned. This included the ‘Nairobi Slum Upgrading Initiatives: Nairobi Situation Analysis’ that examined the housing problems of Nairobi and initiatives (Syagga et al., 2001b). The report observed, *inter alia*, that the failure of policies and persistence of the housing problems in Nairobi was a consequence of unhealthy actor relations, lack co-ordination, unhealthy completion, lack of common ground, and misunderstanding amongst the actors; that resulted in duplication of efforts, wasteful competition, and poor utilisation of available resources; besides loss of valuable experiences, lessons, and synergy. Therefore the report recommended finding means for improving actors’ collaboration and co-ordination to more effective and efficient policies, initiatives, and their implementation. This included adequately and appropriately involving all key stakeholder and their efforts, removing the existing bottlenecks in the administrative practices, and reinforcing the institutional capacity of the stakeholders in their operations towards an efficient urban governance system that could react rapidly and flexibly to the growing housing problem (Syagga et al., 2001b, Kedogo, 2009). These sentiments and those of previous drafts, recommendation, and reports directly influenced the production of the 2004 Housing Policy. Accordingly, the formulation having gone through various epochs, this policy was an eclectic mix of elements from Neoliberalist-enablement of the 1980s, Sustainabilism participation of the 1990s, and Governism partnership principles of the 2000s. Indeed the policy followed “an enabling strategy, guided by the principles of partnership and participation by all” (GOK, 2004d p 3).

The 2004 Housing Policy objective was to arrest the deteriorating housing conditions in the country, acute shortage of decent housing, and an accelerating proliferation of slums the urban areas. The policy described adequate housing variously as being: a basic need, human right, sustainable living environment, profitable investment, and component of economic growth. Among the challenges the Policy recognised and aimed to deal with were the failure of past policies and initiatives, deliberating effects of SAPs, high and increasing urban poverty levels, as well as slums without habitable dwellings, infrastructure and services. Therefore the goal of the policy was “to facilitate the provision of adequate shelter and a healthy living environment at an affordable cost to all socioeconomic groups in Kenya in order to foster sustainable human settlements”; thus curtail the proliferation of slums and minimising the number of those living below ‘habitable living conditions’ (GOK, 2004d p 4). This would be achieved through public housing, poverty alleviation, enabling policies, tax incentives, integrated participatory slum-upgrading, and the promotion of rental housing, among others. Moreover, the government would increase budgetary allocations to housing and create a ‘housing development
promote and fund research into low cost building techniques and materials; create an enabling environment to encourage investments by the private sector; and harmonise existing laws and improve the housing legislative and institutional framework to enhance the roles of the various stakeholders. This in addition to improving security of tenure, and preventing unjustified evictions and demolitions of slums, providing land for public housing, mobilising finances, and promoting the use of appropriate building materials. Ultimately, this policy to promote inclusive participation, cooperation, and partnership of the citizens, slum dwellers, the civil society, private and the private sector to ensure the right to adequate housing by all people in Kenya.

As a consequence of this policy, a new Ministry of Housing established with an enhanced mandate to regulate housing development in Kenya; under which the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) was placed. The creation of a dedicated ministry for housing and slum problems depicted a shift in government's commitment to deal more meaningfully with the housing issues; mainly attributable to the radical pro-poor segment of the government. Some of the politicians had their key constituencies in the slums and had been elected with the promise of meaningfully talking the housing issue. Hence, the ‘Housing Act, 2009’ was put forward in which social housing and slum upgrading would be funded by public resources or grants and managed by a public agency or a civil society organisation (GOK, 2009). Nevertheless, many of the actors interviewed doubted the policy’s practicability, applicability and the government’s commitment. Thus, they categorised it as being one more ‘paper policy’, which may never be implemented, let alone achieving its objectives and yielding the envisioned outcomes (Pers.Com1, 2011).

9.4.3. Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)
In the early 2000s, Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) emerged as the main government initiative towards addressing the mounting urban housing crisis in Kenya. Envisioned as a collaborative initiative that would synergistically incorporate and coordinate the actions of several government agencies, slum dwellers, donors, civil society, private sector; KENSUP was borne out several factors and efforts numerous actors. These included the relentless agitation by the citizens, civil society, and some politicians for the government to address the housing problem meaningfully. Furthermore the dominant Sustainabilism orthodoxy of the 1990s and emerging Governism of the 2000s demanded government action, with the MDGs even setting targets for the improvement of the lives of the urban poor and slum dwellers. The United Nations warned the government of Kenya that the magnitude of the slum problem was approaching catastrophic levels and threatened the future stability of the country. Finally, towards the end the 1990s, Moi’s regime began engaging in various slum and housing in initiatives, in the endeavour to woo into the ruling party the slum dwellers and their politicians, who mainly supported the opposition. Accordingly, following a meeting between President Moi and the UN-HABITAT’s Executive Director, KENSUP was initiated on 22 November 2000, with the President is its patron. This was followed by several consultations, workshops, and studies aimed at understating the housing situation, failure of past initiatives, and way forward; producing reports such as the ‘The Nairobi Situation Analysis’, ‘Cities without Slums concept note’,

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and ‘Policy Framework for Slum Upgrading’ besides programme documents, actors and rents surveys. On 15 January 2003, under Kibaki’s regime, Raila Odinga as the Minister for Roads, Public works and Housing, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the “Slum Upgrading Programme for Kenya” on behalf of the government, with the UN-HABITAT’s Executive Director. This MOU obligated the Government of Kenya and UN-HABITAT to work in close partnership to attaining the principal goal of the KENSUP. Finally, on 4 October 2004, the Programme was formally launched by President Kibaki during the Global Observance of the World Habitat Day (GOK, 2004b, GOK, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2008b, Kedogo, 2009, GOK, 2011a, Muraguri, 2011).

KENSUP was formulated under the Governism paradigm however with much influence from Sustainabilism as well as other past orthodoxies. Indeed the programme was aimed at learning from the success and failures of past initiatives and consolidating those experiences into integrated and collaborative slum upgrading process involving a wide variety of partners and incorporating all relevant stakeholders. Hence, KENSUP’s strategies were set in accordance to the Habitat Agenda and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with the target of improving the livelihoods of at least 5.3 million slum dwellers by the year 2020 at cost of US$ 11.05 billion; through provision of social and physical infrastructure, security of tenure, as well as opportunities for housing improvement and income generation; besides promoting pro-poor governance and empowerment of the urban poor (GOK, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2008b, GOK, 2011a).

Accordingly the objectives of KENSUP were:

- To develop a nationwide slum upgrading and management framework;
- To operationalise the principles of good urban governance (This includes stakeholder participation, transparency and accountability, decentralization, sustainability and community empowerment);
- To provide a broad range of social and physical infrastructure services (This includes schools, health centres, police posts, access roads, water reticulation, drainage and refuse collection centres among others);
- To provide security of tenure and improved housing;
- To enhance opportunities for income generation and employment creation;
- To attract private sector finance and encourage investments in slum upgrading;
- To promote a culture for environmental conservation and management;
- To enhance the capacity for research, planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and replication of shelter and human settlements programmes;
- To address and mitigate the prevalence and impacts of HIV/AIDS.

Whereas the main partners in the Programme were the Government and UN-Habitat, due to KENSUP formulation as a collaborative and integrated initiative it drew in many actors and organisation from the very beginning. Firstly, the ‘Cities Alliance’, which is a joint UN-HABITAT and World Bank initiative with ten bilateral cooperation agencies from Germany, United Kingdom, United States of America, Netherlands, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, and Sweden; provided grant of US$250,000 as
seed fund to initiate the process (GOK, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2008b, GOK, 2011a). The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) augmented this grant with technical support. This is in addition to financial and technical support from numerous international civil society and private sector actors and organisations and other donors. Secondly, the programme was collaborative, integrated, and multidisciplinary involving several government ministries and local authoritative, private sector, and civil society actors. Thirdly, the programme would involve intensive community participation. Indeed, one of the innovative aspects was its institutional set-up the formation of Settlement Executive Committee (SEC) composed of community representatives that linked the slum dwellers and other actors in the programme. Accordingly, one of the serious challenges that face KENSUP from the very beginning was how to appropriately coordinated the many involved actors, with very different interests, perspectives, roles, recourse, approaches, and other highly varied attributed and attitudes.

From its inception, KENSUP progressed very with the enthusiastic support of most of the involved actors and enjoying immense political will from the Government, the private sector, civil society, and the nation as whole. Whereas there was some little resistance, dissension, and criticism these voices were drowned by the prevailing enthusiasm. The critical and opposing civil society organisation seemed to lack legitimacy; while the slumlords were silent as they could not defend their avarice pursuits in the face of prevailing political environment and perspectives. Thus, various mapping and analyses activities were conducted; and works commenced on the planning and construction of the Kibera Decanting Site with 600 units, to be followed by 812 units Kibera-Soweto East, both in five storey high flats; formation of cooperatives; besides several related initiatives in Nairobi and other the major towns of Kenya (GOK, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2008b, GOK, 2011a)

However, due to various conflicting interests, perspectives, and perceptions; KENSUP began experiencing many problems. Firstly, the wrangles within the government and eventual purging of the radical and pro-poor politicians seemed to drastically affect the progress of the Programme. The Programme been mainly given impetus by the radical politicians and civil society luminaries in the government; and while in government their wrangles and clashes of perspectives with the conservatives had often produced divergent directives concerning the Programme, and level of government's commitment. Accordingly, with their exist, there was a massive loss in government's political will. In fact, KENSUP came to be seen as benefiting mainly benefiting the opposition zones. Secondly, due to contradictory ideologies, approaches, political loyalties, turf wars, power struggles, completion for funding, lack of budgetary allocations among other myriad issue related to interests, perspectives, and perceptions; it became very difficult for the various government ministries and other agencies to work cooperatively and harmoniously. Thirdly, with these wrangles becoming public, opposing politicians, private sector, and civil society actors became embolden in their opposition and criticism of the programme. Slumlord went to court citing ‘property rights’ and managed to stall the programme for several years; allegedly, the also sponsored some civil society organisations as well as criminal gangs to further the opposition of the programme (GOK, 2011a, Pers.Com1, 2011). Fourthly, there appeared to many misunderstandings and conflicts between the various actors at all levels, across and within each grouping, of donors, government, civil society actors, private sector actors,
and the residents; with some of this disputes escalating into viscous bloody battles and politico-ethnic contests and violence (GOK, 2011a, Pers.Com1, 2011, Omenya and Lubale, 2012)

Eventually, due to these and other factors the progress and potential effectiveness of KENSUP was highly compromised. Finally, most of the donors and other actors withdrew their support and went some went on to initiate other programmes, with similar objectives, actors, and location; but with approaches and driven by different perspectives, ideologies, and rationales. Even though several government ministries and the local authorities were supposed to play a key role, most were not actively involved in the programme. As the donors withdrew and shifted their attentions to other programmes and projects KENSUP became dependent mainly on financial allocations from the National Budget (GOK, 2011a, Muraguri, 2011, Pers.Com1, 2011). As a consequence, whereas KENSUP remains the umbrella Government’s initiative to deal with problem of slums; others such as Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project (KISIP), Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP), among other donor funded government initiatives have emerged. Ideally, these initiatives are supposed to be under KENSUP and complementary to it, however in actuality this in possible as they are driven by totally different logic, rationality, perspectives, and perceptions. At the same time, there several civil society led initiative operating either in harmony or conflict with KENSUP, and sometimes totally independent and indifferent. Accordingly, various initiatives are currently running in parallel to KENSUP, sometimes involving the same actors, personnel, locations, and target groups (albeit different approaches); reverting back to the duplication, wastefulness, antagonism, and lack of coordination that was the reason for setting up KENSUP in the first place. Hence KENSUP goes on however, at seemingly reduced pace and importance in the arena. All in all, all the above initiatives make very little reference to the existing housing policy.

9.4.4. Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project (KISIP)

In June 2011, the World Bank funded Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement project (KISIP) was also launched with the stated objective of complementing KENSUP in 15 Municipalities throughout the country (Muraguri, 2011, World Bank, 2013c). Whereas KENSUP had the objective of both dealing with existing slums and prevention of proliferation of slums, KENSUP would now focus on improving the current slums and KISIP to stem the formation of new ones (Sikuku, 2011). KENSUP would focus on housing provision and improvement, amenities, social and physical infrastructure, as well as community mobilization, organization and participation; while KISIP focused on tenure security, infrastructure, strengthening institutions, besides urban planning and management. Furthermore, while KENSUP was mainly dependent of budgetary allocation from the Government, KISIP was mainly donor funded with the World Bank providing 60% (repayable grant), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and French Agency for Development (AFD) 30% and the Government 10% (World Bank, 2013c). As opposed to KENSUP which had projected long duration, KISIP had a limited life time of five years and a budgeted cost of US$ 165 million (Sikuku, 2011, World Bank, 2013c). Whereas the objective KENSUP was to address national aspirations as envisaged in the Kenya Vision 2030 and in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution by contributing to the fulfilment of the Millennium Development goals (MDGs) particularly on improving lives of slum dwellers by year
2020, KISIP was to focus on improving living conditions in existing informal settlements by investing in infrastructure; strengthening tenure security and other ‘enablement strategies’. In sum, KISIP would support the government and KENSUP in planning for future urban growth in a manner that would prevent the emergence of new slums (Pers.Com1, 2011, Sikuku, 2011, World Bank, 2011c, World Bank, 2013c).

The objective of KISIP was “to improve living conditions in informal settlements in selected municipalities in Kenya”, through “enhancing security of tenure and improving infrastructure based on plans developed in consultation with the community” (World Bank, 2013c). This was to be achieve through four components.

- Component 1 focuses on strengthening institutions and program management by supporting institutional strengthening and capacity building of the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Lands, and the selected municipalities.
- Component 2 enhances tenure security by supporting systematization and scale-up of ongoing efforts to strengthen settlement planning and tenure security in urban informal settlements.
- Component 3 will invest in infrastructure and service delivery.
- Component 4, planning for urban growth, will support planning and development of options that facilitate the delivery of infrastructure services, land, and housing for future population growth.

Thus KISIP projects were initiated in Nairobi and the municipalities that would included improvement of infrastructure such as water and sanitation, roads and foot paths, lighting, and waste management; besides tenure regularisation, capacity building, and the prevention of future growth of informal settlement through planning for growth. Even though KISIP was supposed to complement KENSUP, for instance with ‘KISIP focusing on physical infrastructure while KENSUP social infrastructure’ in actuality there was a considerable degree of duplication as both programme had objectives touching on both social and physical infrastructure, albeit with different approaches. While at the highest levels the initiatives were steered by different actors and organisations, and originated from extremely different set of circumstances, ideologies and perspectives; and the implementation level the two programmes are supposed to be conducted by more less the same set of actors, organisations, and target groups. However, while KENSUP was mainly run by the Ministry of Housing, KISIP has also the Ministry of Local Government and Ministry of Lands playing a key role. Even thought KISIP and KENSUP are on the ground run by mostly the same actors and targeting related issues, the programmes seem to be run in parallel and independent of one other; without feeding into each other or any clear link between them to enable the said complementing. Accordingly, this would probably contribute to the increase the misunderstanding and conflict potential especially with introduction of more interests, perspectives, perception, and approaches. All in all, compared; to magnitude of the problem both KENSUP and KISIP are so small in scale and scope; such that very little impact on the housing situation is expected. Furthermore, they seem to repeat the same course of actions and approaches that led to failure and ineffectiveness of the past initiatives.
9.4.5. Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP)

The Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP) was the outcome of intense lobbying by civil society organisations in their networks and alliances, from Korogocho to international levels, to obtain debt cancellation for poor countries by rich countries. As a consequence, full cancellation of the debt of 44 million Euros of Kenya to Italy was obtained, and converted into Debt for Development Programme; of which 2.1 Million Euros was allocated for to finance the upgrade of Korogocho; as a joint initiative of the Governments of Kenya and Italy (Comboni, 2006, KSUP, 2009b, Buckley, 2010, UN-Habitat, 2014e). Accordingly the project would be initiated with Ministry of Local Government as the lead executing agency following a participatory process in which various government agencies, civil society, bilateral and multilateral organisation, as well as the community would be involved; in a bid to achieve ownership, sustainability, transfer of knowledge and capacity building. Accordingly, a ‘Residents Committee’, composed by 48 elected representatives was formed a link between the community and other project actors. The Residents Committee’ together with the UN-HABITAT, KENSUP, and other ministries, programmes, organisations formed the ‘Steering Committee’ with the task of overseeing the overall upgrading process and harmonising all the activities undertaken within the Programme.

With the aim of achieving a holistic and sustainable integrated strategy, the Programme was to be pursued through five key thematic pillars:

- The physical pillar covering security of tenure and infrastructure rehabilitation;
- The social pillar including health promotion as well as education support;
- The economic pillar including employment creation and income generating activities;
- The institutional pillar including capacity building activities and setting up governance mechanism ;
- The environment pillar including solid waste management.

Accordingly, with the long-term goal of improving “the quality of the living environment of the people and enhance their socio-economic welfare through participatory planning and management of the upgrading process in line with the Millennium Development Goals” the state objectives were:

- To have a detailed appreciation of Korogocho.
- To prepare an Advisory Physical Plan for Korogocho.
- To build capacity of various actors/Institutions.
- To prepare a sustainable integrated plan for upgrading Korogocho.
- To provide collective security of tenure to the residents of Korogocho.
- To implement concrete improvement to assure visible impact

Ideally all slum upgrading initiatives with government involvement would have been coordinated under KENSUP, however this programme had a totally different approach. As opposed to the more comprehensive upgrading with redevelopment and construction of houses of KENSUP, KSUP pursued a minimum invention approach (MINA) focusing mainly on tenure and infrastructure. In fact 70% of the
budgeted funds went to road construction, with rest going to series of socio-economic survey geared at providing background data for the development of a sustainable integrated plan with input from the community (KSUP, 2009b). Hence, in KSUP, KENSUP was relegated to the role of policy guidance and sharing upgrading lessons from its programmes. At the time of the research, the programme was progressing satisfactorily, however with several conflicts and misunderstandings among the actors. For instance it was alleged that the Residents Committee had been infiltrated by gang members, and had refuse to step down when their elected term ended; in fact they had formed a Community Based Organisations that excluded some members of the community from the programme among other issues.

Table 41: State-led housing initiatives in the 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)</th>
<th>Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement project (KISIP)</th>
<th>Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead organisation</strong></td>
<td>UN-HABITAT</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Italian Development Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral/Bilateral</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Budget (US$ million)</strong></td>
<td>11,050 Plus</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>2.3 Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lead Agency (Ministry)</strong></td>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Housing/Lands/Local Government</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scale</strong></td>
<td>Nation-wide (all urban areas)</td>
<td>Nation-wide (15 Municipalities)</td>
<td>One Slum; but with vision to spread city and nation wide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach</strong></td>
<td>Comprehensive upgrading with construction of houses, social and physical infrastructure; e.g. health programmes, cooperatives, etc</td>
<td>Enablement: Tenure security, institution strengthening, and 'Minimum Infrastructure Package'</td>
<td>Minimum Invention Approach (MINA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (GOK, 2005, UN-Habitat, 2008b, KSUP, 2009a, World Bank, 2013c)

9.4.6. Mathare 4A Slum Upgrading Project

In the 1990s under the influence of the Sustainabilism, numerous small projects were initiated through community and civil society efforts, in most cases with funding and technical support from bilateral organisation and other donors. However the Mathare 4A Slum Upgrading Project stood out as one the notable initiatives arising in this period in terms of its scale, level of intervention, and adherence to Sustainabilism ideology.

Towards the 1990s a German priest at the Saint Benedict Church, appalled by the deplorable living conditions of his parishioners and non action by the authorities, appealed to various the German institutions for support towards an intervention. As a consequence, the Mathare 4A Project was initiated in 1992, following an agreement between the Catholic Archdiocese of Nairobi and the Government of Germany and Kenya; at a budgeted cost of 8.05 million Euro for the initial phases running till 1997, to be followed by other seven phases. Thus, the Kenya Government would provide land, approvals, technical and official support, and allow use of relaxed codes and standards; the German Government through its Development Bank (KfW) and Technical Cooperation (GTZ) would provide financial and technical assistance; with several private sector firms providing consultancy services. The residents would participate in decision making, provide low-cost labour, and logistical support; but more importantly ensure the projects maintenance and perpetuation through paying ‘rent’. Finally, the Church, being the project initiator and the advocate for the poor would the mobiliser, mediator, and the main executing agency. The Church set up the Amani Housing Trust (AHT); body comprising representatives from the community, the church, the government, local politicians, the
technical and finance teams; an independent NGO to be the implementing agency. Thus AHT would manage and carry out the day-to-day work of the project through a board of trustees and a community participative structure (Gitec Consult, 1995, Kigochie, 2001, Syagga, 2001, Kamau and Ngari, 2002, SUM Consult, 2004, KfW, 2009).

In accordance with Sustainabilism, this project aimed for meaningful participation of the target community (primary stakeholders) and the inclusion of all the relevant stakeholders and their concerns; in an ‘integrated’ and ‘holistic’ manner, emphasising justice, equity, fairness, and solidarity. The project went beyond shelter provision and included related problems such as poverty alleviation, employment creation, youth and genders issues, education, health, sports and recreation. Moreover, applied the use of environmentally-friendly technology and construction materials, especially the stabilized soil blocks for walling, and simple but good quality infrastructure and services. Furthermore, the project would be carried out with minimal displacement of the residents and little disruption of their prevailing socio-economic activities. An Temporary Area (T-Area) with new houses would be created to temporarily accommodate the residents sequentially as their houses were being improved. While the rents would remain at same level even after the improvement. This rent would be used for administrative costs, houses and infrastructure maintenance, and the surplus for upgrading subsequent phases of the project. Thus it was envisioned, the project would achieve a high degree of sustainability with resident generating capital and maintenance funds without overly depending on government or donors assistance; and the project could continue to grow infinitely with continuous improvement of the housing situation and the living environment mainly with funds generated internally (Gitec Consult, 1995, Syagga, 2001, SUM Consult, 2004, KfW, 2009).

The goal of the project was to achieve a sustainable improvement in living conditions for the impoverished population of the Mathare 4A slum, with the stated objectives being:

- Speedy infrastructure upgrading and improvement of the housing environment with self-supportive administration and maintenance of services and facilities
- Continuous improvement of the housing situation in a process of development from inside with substantial contribution to housing investment from internally generated financial resources
- Preservation and strengthening of the multi-functional residential, social, commercial and economic character of the area.

These objectives world be pursued to achieve long-term sustainability following the principles of:

- Comprehensive involvement and participation of the target group
- Development preference for the current area residents
- Financial affordability of development measures for the target group
- Relocation requirements to be met within project area
- Combined short-term infrastructure upgrading and long-term improvement housing approach
- Programme body to own the land and structure owners to be compensated
- Residents to contribute to the programme by reliable payment of affordable rent, which rent should be adjusted annually
Rent income to be utilised for maintenance and administration, and surplus invested in housing improvement. This objectives and principles were formulated following participatory discussions, field survey, and taking into consideration the concerns and fears of the primary stake holders; as well as with the aim of avoiding the pitfalls and failure of previous housing initiatives. Especially, down raiding, massive increased in rents, and high levels of displacement of the ‘target group’; by which the initiatives benefited other groups but left the original tenants worse off.

However, in the run up to the 1997 elections with intensified political activity, much of the underlying resentments and conflicts of interests, perspectives, and perceptions came to the fore. Whereas the project stood to benefit the residents with better houses and security of tenure without increased rent; it also portended a loss of a very lucrative ‘investment’, source of massive income and power to the slumlords and their affiliated politicians. Nevertheless, both the tenants and slumlords had supported the project with the belief the houses would eventually belong to them. The tenants perceived the project as a tenant purchase scheme (rent-to-own); while the slumlords believed the houses would eventually revert to them, and they would start receiving the rents ATH had received enough rents to recoup the cost of the improvement. However, the most of the collected rents went to maintenance of the houses, service, and infrastructure as well as administration of the project; with some of the rent being used to expand the project. Hence, with both the tenants and the slumlords claiming to be the bona fide beneficiaries; and striving to make the project approach changed to reflect this; a massive conflicts and misunderstandings emerged between the tenants and the slumlords, that eventual involved other actors inside and outside the project.

The political machination of the politicians opposing the project intensified, as the propagated misinformation and miscommunication, sowing seeds of discord, and accentuating prevailing misunderstands and differences in perspectives and perceptions. These politicians also stirred politico-ethnic tensions and infused national political dynamics into the project, and managed to dived the hitherto more or less united tenants. With the project receiving support from the government, the politicians charged that this project was a ploy by Moi’s regime transfer wealth from the Kikuyu to other ‘tribes’. Indeed most slumlord were Kikuyu, however so were the tenants in addition to other ethnicities; nevertheless these narratives and perspectives fuelled tensions in the project community forums. These tensions, especially between Kikuyu and Luo would escalate as each group attempted to seize control of the project degenerating into violent clashes involving gang wars and destruction of structures and even records; that would carry on into the 2007 clashes and beyond. The slumlords, gangs, and politicians fearing the loss of control in the slum attempted to influence the ‘election’ of a ‘steering committee’ with main goal of supplanting ‘community participation’ and making the project follow an approach that would benefit the slumlords, or if not scuttle the project. These politico-ethnic tensions led to collapse of hitherto harmonious cooperatives and other communal activities. The slumlords demanded more ‘compensation’ regarding not only the loss of rental income and structures, but also the land (public), which they believed or claimed to ‘own’. However the government, donors, experts, and consultants felt that the initial compensation to the slumlords had already been too
generous, considering the slumlords had already earned colossal rental income while occupying governments’ land illegally and without paying any rates; thus any talk of more compensation was preposterous. Hence the slumlords became more determined to scuttle the project using court action, political activism, and criminal gang warfare; while the residents for the from the Church, Kenya and Germany governments, senior government officials, and the civil society; with some using also using gangs. Nevertheless, numerous mediation and reconciliation efforts by the Church, the Government, the donors and other actors keep the project going.

Ultimately, the slumlords and politicians turned their efforts to scuttle the projects by means of manipulating the residents perspectives further through misinformation and manipulation. The politicians charged that the German donors had given so much money, wondered why AHT was charging the residents more money, while this project was a ‘donation’ to ‘help the poor’. Some residents began perceiving themselves as being ‘helped’, but not active participants of the project. Furthermore, the notion that this was a ‘tenant purchase scheme’ and tenants were meant to believe they had completed the purchase and no longer needed to pay any more rent to AHT. However ATH was highly dependent on the rents to administrate, maintain, and perpetuate the project; without rents the project faced an imminent collapse. The project had endured massive negative political interference, numerous violent protest and conflicts; houses had been burnt and destroyed but rebuilt again, with project staff being threatened and harassed; amidst incitements for rent boycotts, claims from contractors, demands for more ‘compensation’ from slumlords. Finally, in 2008, citing the above, the German donors pulled out of project. AHT had run this project without significant support from the government, relying mainly on the rents and support of German donors. Without funds, no maintenance work or new housing could be done; the project began to decay; increasing the incitement and feeling of abandonment among the tenants; violence erupted once more by which AHT were assaulted and threatened and the project finally collapsed. The government took over the project and placed it under KENSUP; raising the hopes among some residents that a project similar to one in Kibera would soon commence in Mathare 4A. Nonetheless, there seem to be no immediate plans to revive the project. Despite being an extremely well designed and executed project, with full community participation, and tireless efforts and commitment by various actors, the project had collapsed.

Despite the collapse of the project, by 2007 almost all the roads had been completed, half of the targeted housing upgrading complete, and many of the community and commercial activities functional. The project achieved almost ‘zero displacement’ of the residents unlike past initiatives. This is in addition to affordability, flexible rent-collection, and strict vetting process that ensured units were allocated only to bona fide Mathare 4A residents among others. For instance, the housing and infrastructure, though of a good quality, were of such simplicity that they were not attractive to the higher income groups, hence preventing displacement of the original residents, and thus actually improving the living condition of the poor. The simple housing and infrastructure development measures that included simple roads, paths, street lighting produced enormous positive socio-economic changes. In the end, incomes of many residents had increased; there more home-based enterprises, and the general living environment and socio-economic condition of the area had greatly
improved. Whereas AHT and other participatory structure collapsed, the ‘Wetcore’ and ‘neighbourhood groups’ created for the project have remained operational beyond the project collapse, and continue to ensure toilets and sanitary facilities are well maintained, and also deal with security issues at the neighbourhood levels. Furthermore, a number of NGOs and CBOs sprung up as the result of the project and continue to date, offering valuable services to the residents. In sum, despite its failures, Mathare 4A project remains one of the most successful housing initiatives in Kenya, eclipsing the achievements of previous ones, especially in ensuring the urban poor benefited from the project. Its participatory structures and other successful components (and even failures) could provide invaluable lessons and examples that can be emulated (and take care of) in future housing initiatives.

In the final analysis, this project put much effort to handle the conflicts of interests and completion over power and resources. Its participatory setup ensured a smooth and harmonious initial progress. The mediation efforts of the involved actors who were keen to ensure the project succeeds bore fruit most of the time, keeping the project going on for over twenty years amidst much political interference, misinformation, misunderstandings, conflict, and violence. However, the project failed to adequately appreciate and handle the divergent perspectives and perceptions among the various actors in the project. Thus it could be postulated that this divergence in perspectives and perceptions contributed greatly to the many struggles the project faced, and ultimately led such well thought out and executed project to its collapse.

9.4.7. Typical NGO led initiatives

At the time of the study, there were numerous, probably thousands highly varied ongoing NGO led initiatives in the arena. They were highly varied in scope, scale, approach, the category of residents and types of other actors involved. Some NGOs have an international reach, while some are involved in a single project in one section of a slum. Some are attempting compressive slum upgrading with complete houses, while others a minimum invention approach, or focusing only on community mobilisation and organisation. Others only focus on lobbying and agitating for the rights of the slum dwellers, as well as acting as watchdogs, scrutinising the actions of the government, donors, and other actors and ensure they respect the rights of the urban poor. For instance, Hakijamii (2013) focuses on advocacy and works with slum dwellers to claim their socio-economic rights and improve their livelihoods and realise their human rights. This includes fighting discrimination, exploitation and injustice; besides strengthening the slum dwellers’ awareness and capacity to effectively organise and directly participate in these endeavours. Hence the organisation has been involved in amplified the voices of slum dwellers and facilitated their participation in some national and local policy formulation, as well as pushed the slum dwellers’ concerns in international and national forums, and the media. Umande Trust (2013), though it describes itself as a rights-based agency, focuses on the provision of better sanitation is slums by means of ‘biocenters’; which combine sanitary faculties, waste water management, bio-gas and solar energy for cooking and lighting; besides providing spaces for local organization meetings, entertainment, and income generation (Umande, 2013). Maji na Ufanisi (2013) pursues sustainable solutions to challenges of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Urban Informal Settlements Upgrading Initiatives (UISUI) that involved empowering communities with skills;
policy and service provision monitoring and assessment in the water sector; and climate change adaptation mechanisms in urban informal settlements. Muungano Support Trust (MuST) (2013) was an affiliate of Slum Dwellers International (SDI) involving a federation of slum dwellers in Kenya that started as movement in the 1990s to resist unlawful evictions, land-grabbing and discrimination; and eventually transformed into mobilised slum dwellers to participate in saving schemes and community-led enumerations; towards slum upgrading, and security of tenure for resident structure owners squatting on public or private lands. These and many others. There also global networks and alliances involved in one activity or another, all with the stated objectives of improving the lives, living conditions, housing situations, or life chances of the slum dwellers. Nonetheless, there is a presence of NGOs and CBOs whose role and conduct is questionable, and they seem mainly bent on creating confusion, disruptions, misinformation, and unnecessary opposition with the aim of thwarting progress in housing improvement. It has been alleged that some of these civil society organisations were created and funded by some slum lords and politicians (COHRE, 2006, Amnesty Int., 2009, Muraguri, 2011, Pers.Com1, 2011, Pers.com.MHous, 2011, Syagga, 2011b).

In addition to the above, and to highlight the diversity of the NGO initiatives, some of the are highlighted here. For instance, sponsored by Urban Poor Fund International (UPFI) and run by Akiba Mashinani Trust (AMT), Mukuru Cross Subsidised Housing was a ‘Greenfields housing development’ targeting 2000 slum dwellers in Mukuru; using community organisations, savings and advocacy to leverage resources for slum upgrading from the market. Subsidised mortgage financing was advanced to the targeted resident for construction of houses in the slum, from the African Investment Bank (ADB) and Shelter Afrique; with the parts of the funds being invested in a high return low risk land investment to so that the repayment risk of mortgage financing is not borne by community savings (UPFI, 2013).

In a different case, in the 1990s Kambi Moto (Camp of Fire) residents came together to resist the numerous evictions attempts against them. A series of deadly fires in the settlement attracted the attention of the Pamoja Trust NGO; with initiated an in-situ Slum Upgrading project. This began with the mobilisation of daily savings by the descendents and securing loans to build four storey incremental units. The NGO negotiated land regularization, security of tenure, service provision, and permissions to use lower planning standards with Nairobi City Council; which were granted, with residents obtaining sectional titles over their respective land plots each measuring 20 m2. Furthermore the NGO was able to secure free technical services from a collaborations of several local and international actors and organisations including other NGOs, Nairobi City Planning Department, and Universities in Nairobi. The beneficiaries had pay 20% percent of the cost of the cost of the house, raised through their saving schemes, and the given a loan for the remaining 80% which they had to be repaid as soon as the owner started occupying the house. The Italian organization COOPI (Cooperazione Internazionale) supported the construction of the infrastructure and helped secure 1.5 million euro (US$2.1 million) funding from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs among other donors. The project was initially planned to take three years (2005-2007), however due to various conflicts, misunderstandings, divergent perspectives conserving the direction of the project as well as the 2007 post-election violence the project saw much delay and disruptions. Furthermore, the initiative focused on resident structure owners who could afford to raise the 20% deposit, and make regular loan
repayments; these comprise an infinitesimal proportion of Nairobi’s slum dwellers. Ultimately, despite much publicity, the initiative had a very limited scope in terms of units and number of beneficiaries; by the time of the field study around 100 units had been completed. However, the initiative may progress into other phases as more residents get enjoined and organised using the same approach (Weru, 2004, Bowler and Desrocher, 2005, Pers.Com1, 2011, SDI, 2012). In sum, there are myriads of highly NGO led initiatives in the arena; however they all share the challenges of scale and targeting, as well as conflicts and misunderstandings.

In general, NGO led programmes and projects are usually laden with conflicts and misunderstandings, not only with other actors and organisations, but within the given NGO and project; which could be attributable to divergent interests, perspectives, and perceptions. The NGO activities are sometimes characterised by wasteful duplication, competition, and antagonism either arising from vested interests of differences concerning the direction of the project, often leading to undue delays, withdrawal of funding, and even the total collapse of the initiative. This is highlighted by the ‘Mukuru Sinai Affordable Housing I & II’ involving at a supra national scale the Slum Dwellers International (SDI) and it subsidiary the Urban Poor Fund International (UPFI); and the local scale their affiliate Slum Dwellers Federation of Kenya - Muungano wa Wanavijiji (MWW) and its housing development and finance agency the Akiba Mashinani Trust (AMT). The aim of the project was to achieve ‘sustainable habitation’ and security of tenure for over 2 000 squatting resident structure owners. This involved mobilising savings from the targeted slum dwellers, securing concessions for private and state land, facilitating the construction housing units, water connections, and sanitary facilities; as well as obtaining commitments from government leaders to provide infrastructure. However, another organisation, the Mukuru Makao Bora Trust (MMBT) claimed to be the bona fide representatives of the slum dwellers concerns and contested AMT’s project, claims, and approach. It is alleged (and also disputed) that MMBT entered into an agreement and funds received from a Norwegian non profit towards the development of the initiative but following a different approach; since according to MMBT the AMT “dictate which houses must be built, who to draw and build houses, make unilateral decisions and basically do everything regardless on the land at the expense of the community” (MMBT, 2015). Subsequently, MMBT filed legal case to compel AMT to relinquish claim to the land and project. Accordingly, due to the dispute, UPFI suspended its funding for the project, and re-routed the funds to other projects (MuST, 2013, UPFI, 2013, UPFI, 2015). Whereas this dispute is being settled through legal channels, disputes and misunderstandings in many other NGO led projects usually escalate into vicious bloody conflicts and with destruction of property and loss of life; that sometimes lead to the termination of the projects.

9.4.8. Policy and initiatives in the 2000s: Great proclamations and unrealised intentions

This section has discussed the policy environment in the 2000s and some of the recent housing initiatives in Nairobi. Although they had great proclaimed intentions, their objectives were scarcely achieved. The initiatives were mostly to insignificant in scale compared to the magnitude of the housing problems. However more importantly the initiatives were plagued with conflicts of intersects
and perspectives among the involved actors, that eventually led to the scuttling of most of those projects. This is exemplified by KENSUP with began with much enthusiasm and support of many actors. It was supposed to be the ultimate housing programme and a culmination of decades of attempts to deal with Kenya's housing problems. However the differences in perspectives and interests among the many involved actors eventually greatly hampered the project. The partners could not agree on the form the project should take. In the end many of the bilateral and multilateral organisations withdrew, and KENSUP remained largely a government project under a department in the Ministry of Housing, focusing mainly on construction of houses. Consequently, the World Bank went on established KISIP focusing mainly on security of tenure and investing in infrastructure; UN-Habitat focused on Mavoko Sustainable. Furthermore many civil society led projects ended up in conflicts and misunderstanding, between members of the civil society, the target communities, or the funders, such that many projects collapsed and left the participating communities even more worse off. In sum, all these point the critical role of not only the policies, programmes, projects and the overall governance; but also, and more importantly, the critical role of the actors and their interests, perspectives, and perceptions. These could probably explain the apparent lack of political will to meaningfully dealing with housing issues; the inadequacy, ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives; and more so the persistence of housing problems in Nairobi. Accordingly most of the policy initiatives involve mainly great proclamations of ‘good intentions’ which may never be realised; unless the crucial interests, perspectives, and perceptions involved in and surrounding them are adequately appreciated and engaged with appropriately.

9.5. Contextuality of Nairobi’s housing crisis: Interests, perspectives, and perceptions

This chapter discussed the Nairobi’s housing problems and responses, against the background of the Kenya politico-historical trajectory and global geopolitico-economic milieu; that not only provided the contextuality for this study, but also linked it to the condition of the greater urban South housing crisis and global policy environment, themes and responses. Over the decades, the global and national politico-historical context had a profound impact on Nairobi’s housing crisis and responses; as well as generated enduring perspectives and perceptions that have condition the current housing problems and slums, as well as, the current housing policy environment and ongoing initiatives. Nevertheless, the triad interests, perspectives, and perceptions emerged as a recurring theme, in the entirety of Nairobi’s slightly over a century existence a modern town/city, as greatly contributing to the emergence, maintenance, and perpetuation of the housing crisis. This triad was also implicated in the ineffectiveness and failure of countermeasure initiatives, as well as conflicts and misunderstandings amongst involved actors.

At the genesis of Nairobi town, forces of colonialism ushered in modernism with new world views, politico-economic system, technology, and spatiality, among many other phenomena; that supplanted the existing systems with new ones; that brought in radically new actors, interests, perspectives, and perceptions; besides drastically altering the contextually. Some outcome of these alterations were mass urban poverty and emergence of ‘unauthorised villages’, illegal housing, squatter and informal
settlements, among other which came to be collectively referred to as slums. The new perspectives and perceptions that came with colonialism permitted the deliberate pauperisation, marginalisation, exploitation, and oppression of a segment of the population; including the use of segregation laws and unfair planning, zoning and regulations; most of which persist to date, albeit in modified and relabelled forms. Accordingly the constituted structural forces and contexts the perpetuated the housing crisis to date. The emerging interests, perspectives, and perceptions were couched in cultural alienations and class differentiation that allowed cruelty or apathy towards the concerns of the urban poor, who were perceived as being dissident, carriers of disease, delinquent, and debased; upon whom negative sanction of any magnitude could be justified. However, their ‘human resources’ was required for politico-economic needs of the societal elite from the colonial times to the present. Hence an enduring approach to the housing concerns of the urban poor has oscillated between a hostile and laissez-faire attitude; that involved vicious evictions and demolitions depending on the needs, perspectives, and perception of the elite at particular times; and turning a blind eye and allowing the slums to flourish as long as they do not threaten the aesthetic, political, and economic concerns of the elite. Hence Nairobi’s arena has been conditioned by an elite biased urban approach; that mainly propagates the interests, perspectives, and perceptions of the elite; with a profound lack of political will to deal decisively with the problems affecting the urban poor; apart from rhetoric, tokenistic, and populist endeavours; whose actual aim is not address to the concerns of the urban poor, but advance the elite’s interests. Despite much rhetoric and publicity most initiatives have been highly insignificant compared to the magnitude of the problem.

Nevertheless, after the Second World War new globally dominant perspectives and perceptions emerged, the required meaningful addressing of the concerns of the urban poor. These perspectives and perceptions; and their subsequent evolution over the decades entered Nairobi housing arena producing new actors and approaches. Segments of the elites and other section of society seemed genuinely concerned with the worsening housing conditions and pushed for pro-poor policies and actions; while other segments of elite and society propagated worsening conditions. Furthermore, which each passing decade, the poor citizens became bolder in their demand for justice, fairness, and meaningful address to their concerns. The citizens’ perspectives and perceptions were changing from that of passive helplessness to that of proactive agitators towards a more equitable, just, and fair society. All these resulted in various policies and initiatives, which in the main were often highly inadequate and inappropriate, riddled with conflicts and misunderstandings, and unsatisfactory results. There were colossal mismatches between what was said and actually happened, and between the intend and actual results. Hence, over the decades more actors and initiatives entered the arena promising better outcomes, as the housing situation of many continued to deteriorate.

However in each epoch, there were several global and local factors as well as politico-historical and governance issues; involving various interests, perspectives, and perceptions among the involved actors that rendered many initiatives ineffective; regardless of how well those initiatives were formulated and implemented. In fact several well intentioned initiatives turned detrimental. Nonetheless some initiatives from the very beginning were not well intentioned (consciously or
unconsciously); being based interests, perspectives, and perceptions that were either deliberately injurious to the welfare of the urban poor, or wrongly premised based on faulty perceptions of the situations. In sum, Nairobi housing crisis did not just occur; rather its formation, growth, and persistence are the outcomes intended and unintended actions of the many involved actors globally and locally. The often cited structural factors, policy failure, and ‘bad’ policies do not just happen, but are the result of certain actors’ actions, interactions, and interrelations conditioned by their different interests, perspectives, and perceptions; which emerged as prominent as a recurring theme. These become the focus of the subsequent chapters. To start with, conflicting interests amidst unequal resources and power relations, completion and cooperation, as well as autonomy and networks among the many highly varied actors and organisation in Nairobi’s arena are the focus chapter 10. This is followed on issues that are issues that are beyond interests and classical stakeholder analysis, with are often hidden and underlying, of perspectives and perceptions, as encapsulated by ‘paradigms’ in chapter 11. All of which, are aimed at furthering the appreciation of the urban South crisis and arena.
10. Nairobi's arena: Actors, groups, and organisations

The previous chapters highlighted the importance of actors and their interests, power, and how interrelated to the Nairobi's housing crisis and responses; especially the emergence, growth and persistence of crisis; as well as the ineffectiveness and failure of response. Indeed over the decades, Nairobi’s housing arena has seen entry of myriads of actors of highly heterogeneous actors with very varied interests. Accordingly, the observations, analyses, and discussions, of this chapter are based on the classical ‘stakeholder analysis’, by which those with an interest (stake) in an issue under consideration are identified and related to their capacity to influence the issue (Grimble and Wellard, 1997, Etzioni, 1999, Varvasovszky and Brugha, 2000, Kedogo, 2009). Thus, a stakeholder is any entity with an interest an issue and either affect or is affected by it. These include the ‘target group’ or beneficiaries. intermediaries, initiators, ‘winners and losers’, and ‘supporters and opposers’ among others. Hence, the actors, organisations, departments, groupings, and other entities involved in the Nairobi’s housing arena are referred to as ‘stakeholders’ in this chapter. In this arena, with myriads highly varied stakeholders, three broad categories are readily observable; firstly, the influential exogenous stakeholders; secondly, the powerful endogenous stakeholders; and thirdly subaltern stakeholders who may be weak or strong depending on their positioning. In terms of legality, some actors are considered legitimate, while others informal or illegal. As a consequence, the following key types stakeholders were indentified: the multilateral and bilateral organisations, national and local governmental related agencies, civil society, private sector, extralegals and most importantly the slum dwellers.

In this chapter, multilateral and bilateral development organisations have been treated in greater detail for illustration purposes while other stakeholders have been relatively treated briefly; since the objective of this chapter was to highlight the stakeholder relation amidst similar and differentiated interests; and one grouping with generally common interests was ideal. Indeed most of the multilateral and bilateral organisations had very similar stated interests in the arena. Furthermore, compared to other stakeholders, they have a longer, relatively stable, and well documented history and form. While, the Kenya Government’s positions and trajectory has already be discussed in length in the foregoing chapter, most government ministries and departments were highly fickle and are constantly being established and abolished. Other stakeholders such as the extralegals are very obscure and data concerning them very scanty. Moreover, it would be highly lengthy to discus all stakeholders in detail, while it may not be not necessary for the purpose of this study.

Several assumptions have commonly been made concerning ‘stakeholders’. Firstly, that those with similar interest would cooperate, while those with conflicting or competing interests would not have cordial and harmonious relations. Secondly, losers would opposed an initiative, while the winners would support it. Thirdly, those with control over resources, power, and influence would always determine the direction of the initiative. This chapter seeks to interrogate these assumptions further, in view of the contradictions already suggested by observations in the Nairobi's housing arena. As a consequence, the key stakeholders in the arena and their overt observable attitudes and attributes are highlighted. These include the actors stated and openly observable roles, goals, and positions on the...
subject issue; their interests and salience; the resources they control and levels of influence or power they wield; how they related to other stakeholders and the networks to which they belonged; and finally how they were affected by the issue and the stakeholders’ relevance in the housing crisis and responses. The stakeholders’ observable attitudes and attributes also include their historical trajectories and quality of their relations, such as trust, cooperation, competition, conflicts, misunderstandings. The definition, magnitude, flow directions of resources may determine which stakeholders have influence over other stakeholders as well as over the subject issues greatly influencing their course and outcomes. Also important is the direction, frequency, and intensity of interrelations between stakeholders and their historical interactions. For formal organisations their overt values, interests, and other attitudes and attributes are spelt out in their programme documents and mission statements and are observable in their actions and modus operandi; while for informal stakeholders or those without written descriptions of themselves; their answers to interview questions and observations of their interaction reveals this. In sum this chapter looks at the stakeholders’ attitudes and attributes that can be clearly and readily observed; without the need for uncovering underlying issues. These include what the stakeholders say, do, and claim to do; and what others say about them. Thus this chapter entails observations on the official positions, and clearly observable cooperation, conflicts, interests, and perspectives; and as they relate to the visible success or failure of initiatives; but not their underlying basis.

10.1. Multilateral and bilateral development organisations

The dominant perspectives that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War led to the creation of several multilateral organisations such as the United Nations and 'Bretton Woods' institutions, dedicated to dealing with global socio-economic problems and threats to peace. With decolonisation and emergence of the Global South countries, the organisations become more engaged in ‘development’ and dealing with myriad problems and deplorable conditions these new countries began with. Ideally, these multilateral arrangements should pursue commonly and equitably agreed priorities set by all the involved countries; nonetheless several Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries (OECD), and especially the United States, who are the key financiers of the multilateral organisations; have considerable control over these organisations, their agendas, and selection of its key personnel. Furthermore, with decolonisation bilateral cooperation between the Global North and South countries emerged, especially between countries which had colonial relations in perpetuation of the ‘metropole-periphery’ relations. Thus while multilateral cooperation involves more than two countries funding and coordinating national policies, pursuing in concert ‘commonly agreed’ initiatives in multiple countries; bilateral cooperation involves politico-economic and cultural relations between one donor country and one recipient country. These bilateral organisations receive funding from their mother governments with the main objective of furthering their foreign relations interests. In fact, both multilateral and bilateral cooperation were driven not only by humanitarian and altruistic concerns, but also by Realpolitik motives of maintaining influence over the Global South and guiding its path. Indeed most of the technical and financial support came with conditionalities. With the Global South countries being highly depended on donor funding, these organisations and donor countries wield considerable influence on the policies, practices, and even the populace of the
recipient countries; in highly symmetrical and controlling relations. Accordingly, several multilateral and bilateral cooperation interventions have focused mainly on the short term interests and objectives of the donors; and lost the perspective of the recipient needs; sometimes with disastrous effects to the welfare of the ordinary citizens (Chomsky and Herman, 1979, Keohane, 1990, Chomsky, 1999, Mkandawire and Soludo, 1999, Meier and Stiglitz, 2001, Mkandawire, 2001, Buchanan and Keohane, 2006, Mkandawire, 2007, Yusuf et al., 2009). Nonetheless, it is highly probable that without donor funding, many housing initiatives as well as several governmental agencies and most civil society organisations would cease to exist.

Table 42: Multilateral versus bilateral funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Bilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Resources are spread across a broad geographic scale. While distributions from country to country or continent to continent may vary somewhat, multilateral donors strive for a wider geographic spread than their bilateral counterparts.</td>
<td>• Donors focus their assistance on specific countries and regions, whether because of economic and political interests, perceived need, historical ties, or geographic proximity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Assistance generally flows in relatively large blocks. World Bank projects and loans can run into the tens of millions of dollars, though there are programs that manage to release funding in smaller increments.</td>
<td>• Developed country governments often have well-established relationships with particular developing countries that provide a solid basis for dialogue and co-operation. As donor country agencies build knowledge and experience about local conditions, the result can be more effective development assistance programs targeting specific sectors or projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multilateral funding priorities by definition reflect the consensus of multiple nations working together.</td>
<td>• Bilateral assistance tends to be somewhat less bureaucratic and more efficient than multilateral support. One reason is that bilateral strategies are based on the priorities of two nations working in co-operation rather than a whole host of countries trying to reconcile differing agendas. Bilateral assistance is generally subject to fewer restrictions than those imposed by larger funding institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multilateral funding can be inflexible and difficult to obtain. Also, in large part due to safeguards such as rigid auditing and reporting requirements, approved grant funds may flow in an inefficient manner, hampering project effectiveness.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (Lapham et.al 2003)

Due to their low economic positions and meagre resources most of the Global South many countries are highly depended on multilateral and bilateral organisations for both financial and technical support for their housing initiatives. Furthermore, the rapidly increasing urbanisation is often accompanied by declining national economic situation and depreciating capacities and financial resources to manage the urban areas, let alone engaging in housing initiatives. This low financial position of the urban South is exemplified by their low average municipal revenue per person per year of US$15 in Africa, compared to US$ 2,763 in the urban North; with Nairobi’s being US$20 (World Bank 2001). Accordingly, Nairobi and other cities in the Global South are overly depended on this organisations in dealing with their housing problems, and in turn these organisation wield tremendous influence on the course the housing policies and initiatives take; besides defining the normative directions. As such, the
organisations, especially the World Bank, UN-Habitat, and several bilateral organisations, have been involved in the formulation and implementation of most of the housing initiatives in Nairobi, in conjunction with the government and the civil society.

Table 44: Multilateral and bilateral donor activities Kenya’s national urban arena

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Programmes</th>
<th>Financial and technical support</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Budget US$ Million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)</td>
<td>UN-Habitat, World Bank, SIDA,</td>
<td>2005-2020</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP)</td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mathare 4A Slum Upgrading Project</td>
<td>GTZ, KfW</td>
<td>1992-1997</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Donor Coordination in the Land Sector in Kenya</td>
<td>UN-Habitat, Sida, USAID, IFAD, JICA, FAO, DFID, World Bank, GTZ, IDC</td>
<td>2004–2012</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya Municipal Programme</td>
<td>World Bank., UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2010–2015</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Plan for Nairobi Metropolitan</td>
<td>JICA, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2011–</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation Service Improvement</td>
<td>World Bank., UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2007–2012</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Urban Development Policy</td>
<td>SIDA, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2004–</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Sector Non State Actors</td>
<td>SIDA, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2009–2012</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Urban Development Programme</td>
<td>SIDA, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2010–2012</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Empowerment</td>
<td>World Bank, UN-Habitat</td>
<td>2010–2015</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Acronyms in the table: World Bank (WB), Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), French Development Agency (AFD), Germany Development Agency (GTZ), German Development Bank (KfW), Italian Development Cooperation (IDC), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Department for International Development (DFID), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

Sources (GOK, 2005, KSUP, 2009a, GOK, 2011a, UN-Habitat, 2013a, World Bank, 2013c)

10.1.1. The World Bank

The World Bank is an international financial institution (IFI), with its headquarters in Washington, D.C, which provides loans and technical assistance to Global South countries for development and capital programmes. It comprises two institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) that lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries; and the International Development Association (IDA) that provides interest-free loans — called credits — and grants to governments of the poorest countries. With the goals of, firstly to ‘end extreme poverty by decreasing the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to no more than 3%’, and secondly to ‘promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% for every country’ by the year 2030; the World Bank lends to Global south governments for education, health, public administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development, agriculture, and environmental and natural resource management (World Bank 2013).

Even though the World Bank is currently associated with lending to the Global South for ‘development’, this was not the original purpose when it was established at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference. The main aim was to stabilise the global capitalist system and prevent situations that followed World War I, which saw the 1920s stock market crashes and several European countries failing to repay their external debts to the United States. Thus public capital would be provided to mitigate the risk of private
international investments. From 1944 to 1968, the loans were earmarked for reconstruction of the war ravaged economies of Western Europe; as well as building new income-producing infrastructure such as highway systems, power plants, and seaports that would generate enough income such that the borrowing countries could pay back the loans. From the onset, these loans come with strict conditions, such producing balanced budgets, giving priority repaying the loan, and removing communist individuals and parties from the borrower countries’ governments (Bird, 1992, Toussaint, 2008, Buckley, 2010). However, the Marshall Plan in 1947 with less strict conditions brought competition; and the World Bank shifted its focus to non-European countries, especially the ‘underdeveloped’. Moreover, the 1949 Chinese revolution persuaded the World Bank to focus on these countries and their ‘economic development’ so as to combat the rising threat of communism (Kapur et al., 1997b, Toussaint, 2008). Consequently, the World Bank began issuing Global South countries with high interest loans for profitable infrastructure, and agricultural projects, but not social projects such as housing, education and health. The stated aim was to ensure the funds went back to the industrialised countries; with the World Bank’s reports showed that over 90% the financial aid flowed right back to the United States and Western Europe; until the 1960s, when it became politically inappropriate to make publicly such statements (Toussaint, 2008). Furthermore, president of the World Bank would always come from United States, and propagate the prevailing dominant perspectives of the government in power.

In 1968, the US president appointed Robert McNamara to head of the World Bank. This ushered in a radical shift in focus towards the meeting the basic needs poor in the Global South, with increase in the size and number of loans and expansion of loan targets from infrastructure into social services and other sectors (Cohen, 1983b, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006). However the focus remained on the rural poor until the 1975, when McNamara warned that the ‘urban poor’ were a destabilising force the could upset economic growth; stating that “Historically, violence and civil upheaval are more common in cities than in the countryside Frustrations that fester among the urban poor are readily exploited by political extremists. If cities do not begin to deal more constructively with poverty, poverty may well begin to deal more destructively with cities” (McNamara 1975, p. 316). As a consequence, ‘urban’ became the new dominant concept and catchphrase at the World Bank, leading to the initiation a total of 278 programmes projects in 90 countries, beginning with the site and services as well as slum upgrading with focus on affordability, cost recovery, and replicability (Cohen, 1983b, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006).

1980 ushered in Neoliberalism, McNamara was succeeded by Alden W. Clausen as the head of the World Bank; who instituted a new ideological focus, and replaced many members of McNamara’s staff with those with neoliberalist perspectives and disdain for development funding. World Back focus turned towards Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) aimed at ensuring the servicing for Global South debt. Accordingly, in this view, funding towards housing was reduced drastically, and the housing section would eventually be disbanded. This followed was a shift from funding projects towards supporting urban management and decentralisation (Pugh, 1995, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2006, Alexander, 2012, Stren, 2012). In response to harsh criticism from all directions and evidence
concerning the rapidly deteriorating socio-economic conditions in the Global South attributable to the SAPs, the World Bank began pursuing ‘adjustment with a human face’ as well as responding to some concerns raised by the civil society, to mitigate the effects of the SAPs, as well as comply with the emerging dominant perspective of Sustainabilism in the 1990s (Cornia et al., 1989, Jolly, 1991). Nevertheless, the emphasis remained on large-scale policy-related loans in housing finance, adjustment loans, and privatisation; with a much smaller share of the funding going to housing for the urban poor (Baker, 2008). In the 2000s the World Bank became involved in Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets and the pursuit of good urban governance, through funding various housing initiatives; besides being engaged in the ‘Cities Alliance’ and its ‘Cities Without Slums Action Plan’ (World Bank, 2000a).

In sum, since 1970s, the World Bank has remained a vital source of housing financial and technical assistance to much of the urban South; as well as highly influential their official housing policy direction. By means of policy advice, ‘training’ of key decision makers, sponsoring research, besides the use of conditionalities the World Bank has had a very significant influence in setting and spreading new development agendas and paradigms in the Global South. Even though it is difficult to establish whether the World Bank originated some of the dominant paradigms or was simply responding to the prevailing ‘Zeitgeist’, what cannot be disputed is the significant role the organisation played as a means of the propagation of those paradigms globally (Pugh, 1995, Buckley and Kalarickal, 2005, Kedogo and Hamhaber, 2013).

Nairobi was among the first places the 1970s World Bank’s the ‘flagship’ urban projects were initiated; beginning with the Dandora Community Development Project in 1975 as part of the ‘First Urban Project’ collaboration of the Government of Kenya; followed by the Second, and the Third urban projects. These mainly consisted of site and services schemes and in-situ slum upgrading projects. Since then, with Nairobi also serves as the regional headquarters for the organisation, the World Bank has been very influential in housing policy and initiatives. From the espousing the Urban Management Programme (UMP) and ‘enabling housing policy’ of the 1980s to the ‘good urban governance’, city alliances, and public-private sectors partnerships of the 2000s. Accordingly, in the recent years the World Bank has been involved in:

- Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)
- Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project (KISIP)
- Water Supply and Sanitation Improvement Project (WaSSIP)
- Railway Relocation Action Plan (RAP) to relocate slum dwellers on railway reserves.

The main focus being infrastructure and service delivery, security of tenure, the private sector, strengthening institutions, and good governance with emphasis of reducing corruption and mismanagement; all these guided by the stated values of economic performances, fiscal accountability and transparency, strengthening management systems, vibrant private sector.
10.1.2. United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN–Habitat)

With its headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN–Habitat) is the United Nations agency for human settlements and sustainable urban development, mandated to address the issues of urban growth and provide global policy direction on all urbanisation and housing issues. UN–Habitat was established in 1978 following the First United Nations Conference on Human Settlements and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat I) that was in Vancouver, Canada in 1976. In the 1980s UN–Habitat struggled to fulfill its mandate with meagre financial and political support until the 1996 second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) in Istanbul, Turkey; when the organisation underwent a major revitalisation, guided by the Habitat Agenda. Furthermore, following the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000, UN–Habitat was elevated to a fully-fledged programme in the UN system and its mandate strengthened through a UN General Assembly Resolution in 2002, by which UN-Habitat would manage the United Nations Habitat and Human Settlements Foundation (UNHHSF) that would receive and distribute financial assistance to urban development programmes. In the 2000s UN-Habitat was guided the MDG target of reducing slum populations and improving the lives of slum-dwellers 100 million slum-dwellers by the year 2020. Thus it became part of the ‘Cities Alliance’ and its ‘Cities Without Slums Action Plan’; besides espousing good urban governance, poverty reduction, and sustainable development; working in partnership with governments, local authorities, NGOs, the private sector, civil society and other multilateral and bilateral organisations (World Bank, 2000a, Habitat, 2002, UN-Habitat, 2002a, UN-Habitat, 2014b). Accordingly, UN-Habitat had the aim of “working towards a better urban future” with the mission to “promote socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all” (UN-Habitat, 2014d, UN-Habitat, 2014f, UN-Habitat, 2014a).

UN-Habitat envisions well-planned, well-governed, and efficient cities and other human settlements, with adequate housing, infrastructure, and universal access to employment and basic services such as water, energy, and sanitation; with a better response to emerging urban trends such as new demographic, environmental, economic, spatial, and social developments. Hence, the organisation main concern is the absence of effective urban planning and dramatic consequences of rapid urbanisation especially the lack of proper housing and growth of slums, with escalating poverty and unemployment, pollution and health issues, climate change effects, safety and crime problems, and natural or man-made disasters which are poorly managed. As a consequence UN-Habitat aims changing mindsets, policies, and approaches towards urbanisation; in addition to addressing the apparent lack a of framework for urban development assistance by donor countries, as well as facilitating advocacy for urban programs with those countries (Shea, 2008, UN-Habitat, 2014a).

With its global headquarters being in Nairobi, UN-Habitat has been very influential in housing policy direction and the generation and implementation of initiatives, since the founding of the organisation in 1978. In fact the organisation has had direct political influence in housing issues as exemplified by the initiation of KENSUP. At the same time, issues arising from Nairobi’s arena have fed back to the global

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policy and action arena through the organisation. Furthermore, Nairobi has served as a launch pad and testing ground of many global housing initiatives and ideas.

UN-Habitat’s medium-term plan and development assistance framework (2009–2013) concerning Kenya included achievement of the MDG target of significant improvement in the lives of at slum dwellers, improving governance and realising human rights, empowering the poor and reducing disparities and vulnerabilities, as well as promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth for poverty and hunger reduction, with a focus on vulnerable groups. With inductions that that Kenya will not achieve the MDG targets, the framework seeks to coordinate and harmonise the work across agencies for improved aid effectiveness, besides building national ownership of aid initiatives. Hence the priorities are (UN-Habitat, 2013a):

- Urban legislation, land, and governance
- Urban planning and design
- Urban economy
- Urban basic services
- Housing and slum upgrading
- Risk reduction and rehabilitation
- Research and capacity development

These would involve joint programmatic work with the Government of Kenya, civil society organisations, private sector, and other multilateral and bilateral organisations. The focus would be on participatory slum upgrading programmes and building capacities at local and national levels for slum-upgrading policy development and the implementation of pilot projects.

Accordingly, in the recent years the World Bank has been involved in:

- Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)
- Mavoko Sustainable Neighbourhood Programme (SNP)
- Water Supply and Sanitation Improvement Project (WaSSIP),
- Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP).
- Kenya Slum Upgrading Fund
- Sourcing Funding and technical support to numerous government, community and civil society activities

In sum the current UN-Habitat focus in Nairobi is slums, livelihoods and poverty, living environment, and inclusive policies; driven by the values of inclusiveness, equity, solidarity, sustainability, good governance with emphasis on democracy and human rights.

10.1.3. German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ)
Headquartered in Bonn and Eschborn, the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ) or Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH is a company owned by the German Federal Government; for the pursuit of the Government’s international cooperation and foreign relations objectives; under the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). GIZ was established on 1 January 2011 through a merger of the three German organisations German
Development Service (DED), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), and Capacity Building International, Germany (InWEnt). The DED was established in 1963 following the ethos of the United States Peace Corp; for the secondment of development workers to government and civil society organisations in the Global South. This also included providing expert advice, supporting local experts, and financing small programmes; while focusing on poverty alleviation, self-determined sustainable development, preservation of natural resources, as well as promoting democracy and civil conflict resolution (BMZ, 2015). GTZ was established in 1975 to support the German government in its development-policy work within the framework of Technical Cooperation. This included transfer of technical knowledge, organisational and economic expertise; funding initiatives; as well as acting as a facilitator between the state, private, and civil society actors; and mediating in conflicts of interest within societies; besides facilitating Public Private Partnership (PPP) programmes (BMZ, 2015). InWEnt was established in 2002 for human resource development, advanced training and dialogue; aimed at expert, decision-makers, and civil society engaged in development initiatives; with the topics covering the priority areas agreed with partner countries (BMZ, 2015).

With the vision of being “the world’s leading provider of international cooperation services for sustainable development” and stated mission of holistically managing change, providing know-how, acting as an intermediary, being value-driven, advising policymakers, securing results, and being a global player; GIZ is involved globally in a variety of fields. These include economic development, poverty reduction, good governance, democracy, education, health, environment, infrastructure, agriculture, food, and social security. Furthermore, GIZ asserts it that its “core competencies include balancing diverse interests in sensitive contexts and providing entry points for the private sector and civil society” (GIZ, 2014). Thus, GIZ actions and interaction are guided by corporate values based on the principles of sustainability, with the belief that “only by combining social responsibility, ecological balance, political participation and economic capability will current and future generations be able to lead secure and dignified live”; as well as “conflicting goals and interests have to be resolved fairly among all stakeholders. Negotiation processes of this kind must be professionally designed if development is to be sustainable” (GIZ, 2013a) Accordingly GIZ

- Advocates respect for human rights, equal opportunities and integrity;
- Supports the rule of law and civic participation and are committed to ensuring fair negotiation processes, both within and outside the company;
- Promotes a market-oriented, ecological and social economic order and observe the principles of corporate responsibility in our work.

Nevertheless, GIZ explicitly states that “as a federally owned enterprise, we are guided by the principles of our social order, act in the interests of Germany and, first and foremost, support the development policy of the German Government” (GIZ, 2013a)

Since the 1970s, the organisations that were joined to form GIZ in conjunction with the German Development Bank (KfW) have financial and technical support for numerous housing initiatives in the urban South, as well as advising their governments on policy related issues surrounding housing, funding local housing financial institutions, and disaster housing. The urban development programmes
have focused on capacity development in urban management toward poverty-oriented programmes; and financing urban infrastructure and services. In the 2000s the focus included the promotion of good urban governance the include the participation and co-operation with the civil society and the private sector, application of accountable procedures, integration of environmental issues, and assessment of programme impacts on target groups.

In its previous forms, GIZ has been working in Kenya on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) since 1975, focusing on the lack of access to basic services by many citizens in Kenya, a situation that persists to date. As such GIZ has been actively involved in the urban housing sector as exemplified by the Mathare 4A development programme in Nairobi, and the Tanzania-Bondeni Community Lands Trust, along the main Nairobi-Mombasa railway line in Voi in the 1990s. Additionally, GIZ has provided financial and technical support to various NGOs and government initiatives. However in the 2000s, GIZ toned down its activities in the housing sector, and is currently focusing on good governance, water and sanitation programmes. Nonetheless, Kenya remains a priority partner country for German development cooperation in East Africa; and in recent years, GIZ has been helping to develop policies designed to achieve more than participatory and pro-poor goals; besides instituting decentralised decision making and implementation by civil society and the private sector.

In the 2000s, priority areas for GIZ in Kenya included water and sanitation, health, social justice, good governance, pro-poor management of the public budget, support for public finances, and risk management strategies for climate change adaptation. GIZ supports capacity development for individuals, organisations and institutions, to enable the people to improve their lives through their own efforts. This includes developing guidelines for pro poor development and carrying out projects in close cooperation with civil society on the basis of intergovernmental negotiations. For instance, GIZ was partnering with Kenya’s Water Services Trust Fund and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to implement the MajiData Initiative, by which water and sanitation data from Kenya’s low-income urban areas would be collected, with the aim of improve the living conditions of the urban poor. The project consists of a “technical component” (advisory services, capacity building, up-scaling concept development, monitoring and reporting system, etc.) and a “financial and up-scaling component” providing subsidies for plot level sanitation facilities.

In summation, in the recent years GIZ (and its former institutions) in conjunction with KfW and other partners and government in Nairobi have been involved in:

- Mathare 4A
- Water Supply and Sanitation various slums
- Water Services Trust Fund in implementing the MajiData Initiative
- Technical and financial support to various government agencies and civil society organisations

In sum the main focus was water and sanitation as well as good governance, driven by the values of partnering, sustainability, social responsibility, collaboration, corporate responsibility, ‘market-oriented, ecological and social economic order’ (GIZ, 2013b, GIZ, 2013c, GIZ, 2013d, GIZ, 2014, BMZ, 2015)
10.1.4. The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), which is Styrelsen för Internationellt Utvecklingssamarbete in Swedish, is a government agency of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and is headquartered in Stockholm. “We work in order to implement the Swedish development policy that will enable poor people to improve their lives” by distributing humanitarian aid to people in need of assistance (SIDA, 2013b, SIDA, 2013a). The objective of Sida is to create opportunities for people living in poverty and under oppression to improve their living conditions, driven by the perspective that people themselves are agents of change who can influence their own development. Hence the focus was contribution towards economic and political development in poor countries; to reduce poverty and strengthens democracy in those countries so as to create conditions for people to lift themselves out of poverty. This is with the belief that when people get political rights, they can participate in and influence social development; and also this reduces the risk of conflicts. Furthermore, according to Sida poverty reduction includes not only assisting poor countries to get opportunities to build up their economy and develop their trade and industry, but also the removal of trade barriers that prevent poor countries from gaining access to the world market. Sida was constituted. In 1965 following the Swedish popular movement organisations intense campaign of ‘Sweden helps’ in the 1950s to create public opinion and promote the perspectives concerning state aid to the Global South. Indeed the movement was already involved in several humanitarian programmes. In the 1970s Sida focused on building schools, hospitals, power plants and factories. In the 1990s with the realisation Western European models for creating wealth were not always suitable for other cultures, Sida endeavoured to provide assistance and formulate its initiatives in cooperation and under the terms of the recipient countries; following the concepts of ‘development cooperation and partner countries’. Furthermore, Sida has supported myriads of housing initiatives globally. Nonetheless, in the year 2007 Sida was restructured and its urban group eliminated; even though Sida still supports some urban and housing initiatives (SIDA, 2012a, SIDA, 2013a, SIDA, 2013b)

Since Kenya gained independence in 1963, Sida has supported poverty reduction in the country, with vision of “a Kenya in which all poor people have the opportunity to improve their living conditions, and where their human rights are realised” (SIDA, 2014a). This is based on a strategic dialogue of “economic growth, just and equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, a rights perspective in policymaking and policy implementation, the fight against corruption, and implementation of vital reforms to address the historical obstacles to development that lay at the root of the 2008 post-election violence”(SIDA, 2009). Hence, the priority areas are: democratic governance and human rights, natural resources and the environment, and urban development. Support these programmes is to be channelled not only through the government agencies, but also through the civil society “in order to generate pressure for their implementation” (SIDA, 2014a). Moreover, SIDA emphasises on the coordination of development cooperation between the state, the civil society as well as with other bilateral and multilateral development partners. Hence, it endeavours to adhere to principles enshrined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of ownership, harmonisation, alignment, management for results, and mutual accountability (OECD, 2005a).
According to SIDA (2014b), some of the major challenges facing Kenya include lack of democratic governance and the inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities, and impunity. Indeed the main causes of poverty in Kenya are of structural nature, with political institutions being guided by the elite’s interests retarding democratic development and deterring investors. It is for this reason that SIDA focuses on democracy and human rights. This is reflected in it budgeted disbursements in 2012, where democratic governance and urban development were respectively allocated 39% and 13% (SIDA, 2012a). Moreover, SIDA involvement in housing and urban development is premised on the idea that, with the ongoing exponential growth of slums in Kenya, many slum dwellers are increasingly being alienated from the rest of the society. Hence, improving their living conditions and prospects is very crucial for the country’s future (SIDA, 2014a). Consequently, the organisation pursues a pro-poor and rights perspective, emphasising on increased popular participation in urban planning in dealing with housing improvement and land ownership issues. The human rights’ perspective espouses participation, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency throughout the program cycle, while the poor peoples’ perspective endeavours to include the points of view of the poor in decision making, planning, and implementation, through social mobilisation.

Citing the importance of urban areas in Kenya’s economic development SIDA is involved in the urban arena with the objective of helping to reduce urban poverty. Moreover, Kenyan cities are failing to keep up with the rapidly increasing demand for shelter, infrastructure and basic services; since they are financially and managerially weak (SIDA, 2012b). For this reason, SIDA’s goal is to achieve an “improved urban planning which allows for the participation of poor residents” (SIDA, 2013b). Additionally, according to SIDA (2012a), one of the biggest risk to the objective of tackling urban housing problems was weak institutional capacity of involved governmental and municipal agencies, posed serious challenges for implementation efficiency and increased the risk of corruption. Hence there is a dire need for improved service delivery and accountability to citizens at all levels. In this regard SIDA is targeting to assist in strengthening local urban governance and improving service delivery, though reforming institutions, increasing capacity, strengthening planning, finances and human capabilities, and investing in infrastructure through the Kenya Municipal Program (KMP). Correspondingly, SIDA has the Civil Society Urban Development Program (CSUDP) whose objective is to achieve a vibrant, dignified and secure urban living environments through improved pro-poor basic service delivery and integrating urban planning and human rights perspective in into key policies (SIDA, 2012a). It aims for strengthened and coordinated partnerships for policy advocacy, incorporating of citizen views into the national urban development policy, pro-poor and participatory initiatives, achieving land tenure, formation of local urban forums, access to water and sanitation, and improved collaboration with service providers. Furthermore, SIDA has provided significant technical and financial support to the KENSUP for improving the basic infrastructure and services, enabling community participation in planning, implementation and monitoring, and the construction and relocation of households to the decanting site in Kibera. The support has extended to the Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project (KISIP), a project to improve living conditions in informal, and the National Urban Development Policy (NUDP) to provide the framework for inclusive and sustainable urban development, and the implementation of urban initiatives. Finally, SIDA has focused
on creation of national guidelines to reduce evictions, on increasing awareness amongst slum dwellers of their rights, and on developing new innovative approaches for housing financing and provision (SIDA, 2012b).

In the recent years, in Nairobi, Sida has been involved in several projects and programmes including
- Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP)
- Kenya Informal Settlement Improvement Project (KISIP)
- Kenya Municipal Program (KMP)
- Civil Society Urban Development Program (CSUDP)
- Land Sector Non State Actors
- Support to Donor Coordination in the Land Sector in Kenya
- National Urban Development Policy
- Funding and technical support to numerous NGO activities

In sum the main focus was poverty and oppression guided by values of democracy and human rights, equitable distribution of resources and opportunities, gender equality and women’s role in development, as well as sustainability, environment protection, and climate change.

10.1.5. Italian Development Cooperation (IDC)

With its headquarters in Rome, Italian Development Cooperation (IDC) or Cooperazione Italiana allo Sviluppo pursues Italy’s international cooperation and foreign relations objectives under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; with the stated aim “to guarantee respect for human dignity and ensure the social and economic growth of all peoples”. IDC was formed in the 1950s to intervene in countries linked to Italy by previous historic ties. Subsequently IDC joined the international efforts to alleviate global poverty and helping Global South countries to strengthen their institutions, as well as dealing with various humanitarian crises with the aim of maintain peace and managing migration flows. In the 2000s IDC initiatives were guided by the MDGs and Paris Declaration of aid effectiveness; with priorities being:
- Human development: health and education
- Law and governance: Promotion of human rights, gender equality, protection of minors and the disabled, democratic participation, improvement of governance and support for civil society
- Rural development, sustainable agriculture, food security and access to water
- Environment and cultural heritage
- Support to the development of the private sector of partner countries.

Furthermore IDC endeavours to facilitate dialogue between the various stakeholders of governments, civil society, and the private sector; besides supports research and innovation for development purposes.

In carrying out its activities, Italian development cooperation follows an approach inspired by:
- The sharing of principles of good governance (respect for human rights, rule of law and administrative transparency);
• Coherence among the various politics related to development (business law, free markets, 
debt sustainability, flow of public aid, promotion of direct foreign investments);
• Coordination between the individual donor states and multilateral donors, to avoid 
contradictory choices in the allocation of resources;
• Coordination between the actions of health support, education and training of human 
resources, food assistance, rural development of small and medium enterprises (SME) and of 
infrastructures and safeguarding of cultural aspects;
• The collaboration between system countries by means of NGOs, local entities (decentralized 
cooperation), university institutions, and the private sector in order to transfer know-how to 
developing states and taking human resources into the field for local training programs.

IDC in Kenya commenced in the year 1985 with the ratification of Italian-Kenya bilateral agreement, 
followed by the establishment of a Local Technical Unit in 1997, in Nairobi. However, citing rampant 
corruption in the Moi’s presidency, cooperation was suspended in the year 1999 until the advent of 
Kibaki’s presidency 2003, which came with a promise to fight corruption, undertake structural reforms 
and strengthen institutions. The new cooperation arrangements were based on the principles of the 
Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness. Currently the IDC’s priority sectors of intervention are: water, 
rural development and urban development, with particular regard to Slum upgrading. These, IDC 
implemented either directly or through NGOs. Moreover, it was involved in multilateral support to the 
interventions promoted by UN Agencies including those related to governance issues (IDC, 2014). In 
October 2006, following intense lobbying by the civil society, the MDGs, and the Paris Club ‘Agreed 
Minute’, the governments of Kenya and Italy entered a dept swap agreement, whereby a portion of the 
Official Development Assistance bilateral debt owed Kenya to Italy, instead of being paid back, would 
used to implement jointly agreed initiatives. This agreement provided a total amount of 44 million 
Euros for swap operations over a period of ten years (Italy-Kenya, 2006, Buckley, 2011). This led to 
the formation of the Kenya-Italy Debt for Development Programme (KIDDP), under which the 
Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP), was established (KSUP, 2009a). This, within the 
framework of the poverty reduction strategies aimed at promoting socio-economic development and 
environmental protection, in context of verifiable social participation and with an environmentally 
sustainable resource use (Italy-Kenya, 2006). Thus on the recent years, IDC has been involved in 
several projects and programmes including
  • Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP)
  • Donor coordination in the land sector
  • Land reforms
In sum, the main focus was economic and human development, water, infrastructure, and democratic 
participation guided by the values of humanitarianism, private sector, collaboration, good governance 
that entails human rights and transparency.

10.1.6. United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is 
the United States Government agency for administering civilian foreign aid; with the mission to
“partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity”; with the objective of “furthering America’s interests while improving lives in the developing world” (USAID, 2015). USAID was established in 1961, following an executive order by President John. F. Kennedy and signing into law the Foreign Assistance Act; as well as the launching of the “decade of development (US Congress, 1961, USAID, 2013, USAID, 2015). The initial aims included expanding democracy and free markets while helping those striving to get out of poverty or recover from disasters. Indeed USAID was envisioned as a successor of the Marshall Plan for the Global South; with the goals of firstly, “creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and increasing production in developing countries”; and secondly, “diminishing the threat of communism by helping countries prosper under capitalism” (USAID, 2015).

USAID was probably among the organisations that were very instrumental in spearhead the various paradigms shift in dominant development orthodoxies over the decades. In the 1960s, USAID helped propagate Modernisation by providing technical and capital assistance programs for large scale infrastructure and industrialisation in the Global South, until the 1970 when shift its emphasis to “basic human needs” focusing on food and nutrition, population planning, health, education, and human resources development. In the 1980s the focus turned to free markets, and SAPs aiming to stabilise currencies and financial systems; with development initiatives increasingly being channelled through the private and civil society sectors, as opposed to government; as well as a shifting from individual projects to large programs. In 1990s the top priority became sustainable development and democracy, to help countries improve their own quality of life, with assistance programs being tailored to the target country’s conditions; with the goals establishing functioning democracies with open market-oriented economic systems and responsive social safety nets. In the 2000s, the focus became good governance, with USAID endeavouring to achieve the most out of its funding allocations by means of partnering with the private sector and civil society, to extend the reach of foreign assistance. Indeed, in the 2000s, with allocations of less than 1 percent of the total federal budget, USAID worked in over 100 countries towards promoting broadly shared economic prosperity, democracy and good governance, human rights, health, education, environmental sustainability, food security and agriculture; as well as humanitarian assistance in the wake of natural and man-made disasters, and helping societies prevent and recover from conflicts (USAID, 2013, USAID, 2015). With its stated core values being: passion for mission, excellence, integrity, respect, empowerment, inclusion, and commitment to learning.

In the past decades USAID used to proved the largest bilateral funding for housing initiatives, from public housing of the 1970s and 1960s sites and services programs, policy development, technical assistance, among others. For instance, its Housing Guarantee Loan Program (HG) programmes focused of families below the median income, and provided loan guarantees for housing that totalled US$ 2.7 billion in loans to 44 countries. Nonetheless, in 1993 the Office of Housing and Urban Programs was placed in a new ‘Environment Center’, and the staffing drastically reduced, besides the HG being terminated. In 2001, the overseas Regional Housing and Urban Development Officer positions were eliminated altogether; retaining only a four-person Urban Programs Team. Hence
USAID role in housing was greatly diminished. Nevertheless, with advent of the MDGs, the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) funded several project, however focused only on land titling but not any specific funding for housing projects (Shea, 2008, USAID, 2013, USAID, 2015).

Since independence in 1963, USAID has provided colossal financial and technical assistance to Kenya, working closely with the Kenyan government as well as the private sector and civil society to pursue various development and governance objectives over the decades. In the 2000s the priorities included to:

- Strengthen democratic institutions, improve governance, and protect human rights
- Spur economic growth, trade and investment through inclusive, market-driven environmentally sustainable economic growth
- Advance peace and security
- Promote opportunity and development
- Health and human capacity strengthened

Concerning housing USAID played a central role of over the decades in policy directions and initiatives, including the Umoja I and Umoja II in the 1970s and 1980s, Matrix surveys in the 1990s, and the National Land Policy (NLP), donor coordination, and land reforms in the 2000; driven with values of an inclusive, market-driven, and environmentally sustainable economic growth led by the private sector; enabling environment, good governance, and democracy (Hoek-Smit and USAID, 1989, Matrix, 1993, USAID, 2005, USAID, 2013, USAID, 2015).

10.1.7. Department for International Development (DFID)

With its headquarters in London and East Kilbride the Department for International Development (DFID) is a United Kingdom government agency for administering overseas aid; with goals of ending extreme poverty and the need for aid by creating jobs and unlocking the people’s potential; as well as saving live in time of humanitarian emergencies (DFID, 2015). DFID was established in 1997 when it was separated from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Nevertheless, depending on the government in power, the department in its previous forms has been either independent of the foreign since the 1960s. DFID’s predecessor, the Ministry of Overseas Development(ODM) was established in 1964, when most of the British colonies had gained independence, to take over the aid policy functions of the Foreign, Commonwealth Relations, and Colonial Offices; as well as those of the Department of Technical Cooperation, among others. This was during the Labour government. However, when the Conservative government took over 1970, the Ministry had its mandate diminished and relegated to a department the Foreign Office. When a Labour government was returned to office in 1974, ODM became a ministry again, only to be relegate back into a department the Foreign Office when the Conservative government Margaret Thatcher in 1979 came to power, until 1997 when the Labour government separated it again from the Foreign Office to create DFID (Bose, 1991, DFID, 2015). Nevertheless, DFID in its current and previous forms have provide much technical, financial, and humanitarian assistance to many Global South countries, and especially the Commonwealth.
Since independence in 1963 Kenya has remained one of the largest recipients of technical and financial assistance from DFID and its precursors. In the 2000s the goal of DFID in Kenya was to “support the unleashing of Kenya’s potential by: promoting stability and security; stimulating inclusive growth, led by the private sector and with a focus on job creation to reduce poverty and aid dependency; and improving service delivery, by supporting greater choice and accountability, innovative approaches to private-sector provision of basic services, and reduced vulnerability” (DFID, 2012). Thus the priority areas were wealth creation based on market development and financial access, governance and security for the people to have control over development and hold decision-makers to account, humanitarian assistance to conflict and disaster-affected people, health, education, gender issues, and climate change (DFID, 2012, DFID, 2014, DFID, 2015). Additionally, since independence, Kenya was one of the largest recipients of technical and financial assistance towards housing initiatives and policies, with a significant portion of the funds going to ‘housing finance’. (CDC 2010). However after the 1980s, the it is funding to urban and housing programmes has dwindled rapidly.

In the 2000s, DFID through its CDC was involved in the US $25 million and 13-hectare mega-development called ‘Garden City’, comprising hundreds of luxurious apartments, a business hotel, and what will be east Africa’s largest shopping centre; in the name of poverty alleviation and improving the socio-economic siltation of Nairobi’s slum dwellers (Guardian, 2014, Garden City, 2015). Certainly, this project and approach to development and use of aid funds has come under intense criticism, not only from the civil society, but also from other bilateral and multilateral organisations. According to Dearden
(2014) this was "highly financialised, highly unequal, highly ideological form of 'development' which helps big business, not ordinary people"; furthermore "If you live in a slum in Nairobi, seeing development money pouring into a luxury block of flats is an insult." Moreover, Murphy (2014) laments that "CDC was established to help foster growth and tackle poverty. It is hard to see how funding luxury apartments and gated communities is the most effective way to do either"; with a senior official of UN-Habitat decrying that the outcome of such approach would be a more segregated and differentiated urban pattern; as such, this approach was “not socially admirable or economically productive”. In response, the CDC defended the project, asserting that this approach would create massive construction and services low skill jobs that would benefit the poor and the slum dwellers, leading to poverty alleviation, economic development, and improvement in the lives of many slum dwellers; and that this approach had been formulated in conjunction with development academics and economists (Guardian, 2014). In sum, in the recent years, DFID had drastically reduced its involvement in housing; but instead concentrated in luxurious developments, driven by values of trickle down, private sector led growth, and job creation to reduce poverty and aid dependency (DFID, 2012).

10.1.8. Powerful and influential exogenous stakeholders and funding reductions

Since most Global South many countries are highly depended on multilateral and bilateral organisations for their housing initiatives; these organisations have over the decades had a colossal influence in the policy direction and the form housing initiatives take. Working in conjunction with the government, civil society, and private sector, most of this organisations operate from a international to grass roots scales, as several organisation have their field office in the slums, while they are headquarter mostly in the Global North. Hence they link various scales and actors, often provoking conflicts and misunderstandings among the involved stakeholders, especially those with conflicting and competing interests. Even though, these organisations had stated objectives of improving the lives of the urban poor and the slum dwellers, their main priority was pursuing the foreign relation interests of their mother countries. For this reason funding to housing has greatly diminished over the years, following the ruling governments interests and perspectives in every epoch.

Box 7: Reasons for funding reductions towards housing initiatives since 1990

- The organization has other, higher sectoral priorities for funding.
- It is difficult for a long-term housing or slum upgrading project to maintain the visibility that a funding country might want.
- Housing development is very complicated and much slower than many other types of programs a donor country can fund. Donor countries want short-term results.
- Housing and slum upgrading programs are riskier to implement than other types of programs.
- Bilateral countries follow trends, and they saw the leader, the United States, cut back its funding for housing drastically.
- International housing programs do not have a large constituency for funding in the donor countries and other programs with an active constituency, such as funding for HIV/AIDS, take priority.
- Slum upgrading and housing development can be very difficult to implement successfully because of land titling issues and local political problems.
- A number of the donor countries have older, experienced staff that have a rural focus and do not have the urban expertise.
- Donor countries seem to have an inability to stay focused on long-term goals and move rapidly to various short-term goals.
- Decision making from the donor country capital to regions and developing countries has been decentralized.
- A problem that several multilateral and bilateral lenders raised is the lack of coordination in funding projects in developing countries. They have tried to coordinate lending programs for housing and slum upgrading with other multilateral lenders and were not successful. A better mechanism for coordinating the funding of loans in developing countries needs to be established.

Source (Shea, 2008)
Technical and financial support through the multilateral and bilateral organisations comprise a substantial proportion of the official development assistance (ODA) and Official Aid (OA) from the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to Global South countries. However, throughout the decades, this has remained around 0.3% of OECD gross national income (GNI), much less than the international target of 0.7%; most of which increasing becoming equity investments and loans which must be paid back as opposed to grants; perspectives of aid austerity take hold (OECD, 2015).

Furthermore, since the advent on Neoliberal development orthodoxy, the proportion of ODA and OA dedicated to housing has dwindled to less than 2%; with the donors citing the complicatedness and difficulty of conducting housing initiatives; due to diverse vested interests, divergent perspectives, and numerous local political problems; in addition to difficulty of coordination between the multilateral and bilateral lenders as well as the target country agencies (OECD, 2005b, Shea, 2008, OECD, 2015).

Apart from pursuing their countries foreign relations and sometimes hegemonic interest, most of these multilateral and bilateral organisations have similar and non-competing interests, and often engage in joint activities and alliances. However, despite the commonality of non-competing interests, many concerted efforts to coordinate, align, and harmonise their actions such as the Paris Declaration and Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS) other have not borne much fruit (OECD, 2005b, Pers.Com1, 2011).

10.2. Governmentals

Under the broad category of Governmentals is the Government of Kenya, with its ministries, parastatals, local government, political and bureaucratic entities, among other agencies. Whereas, the government is composed of numerous and diverse entities, it is also a unified system under a defined leadership with set our rules, resources, hierarchies, and a discernible organising principle; and is often referred to as one entity such as ‘the government of Kibaki’; or when referring to the almost synonymous concept of nation as ‘nation state of Kenya in the 2000s’. Among others. As observed in chapter 9, the government most driven by the interests of the politicians; and concerning slums and urban poor housing and issues some politician are more concerned with attracting business and aesthetics of the city, while other seem to be genuinely interested in the improvement of the housing conditions and lives of the urban poor. However, all politicians seem to be interested mainly in gaining power, with others seemingly only interested in the opportunity for massing enrichment that public office avails through corruption. Hence, despite the fact that, some politicians, bureaucrats, and even entire departments and ministries of the government have put much effort and shown great enthusiasm in dealing with the housing problems; when taken as a whole, from colonial times to date, the government has treated the housing problems with hostility or apathy, and at best with tokenistic initiatives aimed at manipulating the populace. The urban poor were mainly treated with disdain, suspicion hostility, being viewed as purveyor of political dissent, crime, and disease, they were segregated against, and constantly collectively subjected to punitive action. (Elkins, 2005a, K’Akumu and Olima, 2007). While the urban poor were need for their labour in the urban areas, their presence in the cities was at best barely tolerated. They were subjected to brutal evictions and demolitions of housing, harsh laws and regulations, and often followed by collective fines and punishments, compulsory communal-labour, and confiscation of land and property (Hake, 1977, Myers, 2003b, Elkins, 2005a). The concerns of the poor gain priory as election time approaches, but are not given
much thought after those elections. The government is seemingly very elitist biased mainly serving the interests of a minority elite, while neglecting those of the ‘others’. In fact, government practices and the interests of those wielding power and running the government have been blamed for causing and perpetuating the housing crisis, from the colonial times to present. Most policies and initiatives have been inappropriate, ineffective, or badly implemented, while practices such as allocation of public land to connected individuals and land grabbing had greatly worsened the housing situation. As a consequence, apart from regular rhetoric and token gestures, the Government of Kenya has more often than not been depicted as having a fundamental lack of political will to effectively and constructively engage with the issues concerning the urban poor and slums. Apparently the government is more concerned with a achieving a ‘world class’ city, and more emphasis is placed upon super highways and ‘technology cities’ to attract trade, investment and promote business and tourism. This is exemplified in the proposed development of the multibillion dollar Konza “Techno City” where there will be “a ten kilometres buffer zone around Konza that is to protect property values by warding off mushrooming of slums” (GOK, 2011b, GOK, 2011c).

To start with the government was composed of a number of ministries, with each being responsible for a particular mandate, portfolio, function, or sector to provide certain public service; in pursuit of the ruling government’s interests. The ministries were composed of varied departments, agencies, and personnel. Even though in any ministry many diverse vested interests could be readily observable, for each ministry a particular overarching interest could be generalised. Nevertheless, in Kenya the ministries are extremely fickle, constantly changing in number, form, designation, personnel, mandate, policies and actions, among others, at the whims of the president and ruling elites, depending on their prevailing interests and priorities. For instance, since independence the Ministry of Housing, has sometimes been a fully dedicated ministry, and other times a department in other ministries depending on the position housing issues held in the order of priorities and interest of the ruling elites at a particular time. Accordingly, at the time of the study, Kibaki’s government was composed of elements who had great interest, vested or not, in housing issues; thus housing had a dedicated ministry. Additionally, other ministries such as the Local Government, Nairobi Metropolitan Development, Provincial Administration and Internal Security, and Lands were substantially involved with or their mandate specifically mentioned the slum issues. Others such as the State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030; Finance; Public Health and Sanitation; Water; Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs; Environment; Cooperatives Development; Information and Communications; Medical Services; Public Works; and Roads; were also indirectly involved and interested in housing. Their mandates partially mentioned housing and slum issues, and were included in KENSUP’s ‘Inter-Agency Steering Committee’ and ‘Multi-Stakeholder Support Group’ (GOK, 2005). Nonetheless, even though the mandates of all these directly or indirectly ministries specifically mentions housing and slum issues; in practice other interests are openly observable.

Most of these ministries seem to be more interested in the order and attractiveness of the city to investment, business, and tourism; while engagement in housing issues seem to mainly “to show the Government is doing something”, to placate the citizens, or to meet donor conditionalities (Agevi, 2011,
In pursuit of this order and attractiveness, several of these ministries have been involved in policies and practices that have worsened the situation of the urban poor and slum dwellers. At the time of the field study the Ministry of Housing seemed to be enthusiastically pursing slum improvement with dedication and commitment; however the ministry had low budgetary allocations. In fact the ministry seemed peripheral compared to the attention given to others dealing with defence, security, finance, trade, industry, or tourism (GOK, 2012, GOK, 2013a). Moreover, slums and housing for the urban poor comprised only a small part of the Ministry of Housing, since the Ministry was charged with addressing a whole array of the country’s housing concern; with housing, finance, civil servants housing, and other housing issues of the middle and upper classes seeming to getting more priority.

Table 45: Government ministries: Mandates, stated and observable interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Vision</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Mandate and Functions (in relation to housing and slums)</th>
<th>Stated interest and potential for involvement</th>
<th>Observable interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Housing</td>
<td>Excellent, affordable, adequate and quality housing for all Kenyans</td>
<td>To improve the livelihoods of Kenyans through facilitation of access to adequate housing in sustainable human settlements</td>
<td>Housing policy, slum upgrading, coordination, finance, appropriate low cost technologies</td>
<td>Adequate shelter for all Coordination and leadership</td>
<td>To show government is doing something</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Ministry of Local Government</td>
<td>To have viable, autonomous, accountable and responsive Local Authorities.</td>
<td>To facilitate Local Authorities to achieve good governance and improved service delivery for enhanced social-economic development</td>
<td>Guidance to local authorities on infrastructure, project planning, urban and regional development policies and urban growth strategies, long term development plans, Improvement of slums. Liaison with other housing stakeholders, employment creation and poverty reduction.</td>
<td>Performance of Local Authorities Improve performance and capacity building of local authorities</td>
<td>Local authorities comply to the wishes of the ruling elites. - increased revenue collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development</td>
<td>To be World class African metropolis.</td>
<td>To manage the Nairobi Metropolis by providing sustainable infrastructural services and high quality of life to all its residents, visitors and investors.</td>
<td>Transforming Nairobi Into a Global Competitive World Class City for Investment and Tourism through: Transport, slum elimination, adequate housing, spatial planning and zoning regulations, public utilities, services and infrastructure, funding framework</td>
<td>A beautiful city Coordination</td>
<td>Attract investment and business and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Lands</td>
<td>Excellence in Land Management for sustainable Development of Kenya</td>
<td>To facilitate improvement of livelihood of Kenyans through efficient administration, equitable access, secure tenure and sustainable management of the land resource.</td>
<td>Land policy, physical planning, register land transactions, land surveys and mapping, land adjudication and settlement, land valuation and administration of Government and trust land. Settlement of poor landless Kenyans</td>
<td>Land Management Security of tenure and regularisation</td>
<td>Protect land interests of the ruling elites, and avail more for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security</td>
<td>To be a leading agency in the provision of excellent leadership and governance for Kenya’s prosperity</td>
<td>To provide strategic leadership policy direction, a secure environment and set the agenda for achieving socio-economic and political development of our people</td>
<td>Co-ordinate field development and administrative leadership, state functions Maintain law and order, peace building and conflict resolution, Dissemination of Government policies. Monitoring and appraising of performance of Government departments/officers in the field</td>
<td>Ensuring law, order, and government policies to all levels. Grassroots mobilisation and implementation</td>
<td>Wishes of the ruling elites observed in all levels. Patronage and clientelist channel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (GOK, 2013a)
Related to the Ministry of Housing is the National Housing Corporation (NHC), a parastatal with the stated objectives of producing affordable housing for the urban poor. This agency was established in the late colonial period, under the influence of the British Labour government's Attlee's welfarist perspectives, with the mandate to promote the development of low-cost housing for the Natives. With independence NHC became the Government's main agency through which public and donor funds as well as technical assistance could be channeled to housing initiatives, either directly or through to the Local Authorities (NHC, 2009). However the houses produced through NHC can only be afforded by the upper middle classes, and cannot be described in any way as slum upgrading or housing for the urban poor. In fact the some of the beneficiaries of the produced housing were senior government officials (NHC, 2005, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Syagga, 2011b, Mayoyo and Mathenge, 2012, Michira, 2012). For the other ministries, even though they mentioned slum improvement, eradication, prevention or elimination in their objectives, their programme documents; when read as a whole, these documents had a clear elitist interests, and issues of the urban poor were included seemingly for purposes of completeness, placating critical voices, or meeting donor requirement. Furthermore, the way the ministries conducted their practices seemed mainly in pursuit of the vested interests of the elites, pursuit of personal wealth and power, maintenance of the status quo, and improving the environment for ‘big business’ but the not ordinary and poor citizens.

The City Council of Nairobi (CCN) being the local authority in charge of Nairobi governance, development, and other related issues such as housing was supposed to play a key role in housing initiatives and policy; since the site and services schemes of the 1970s to the ongoing KENSUP and KISIP. For instance in CCN, the Housing Development Department (HDD) was created to implement the site and services schemes; and in KENSUP the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) was created CCN to be part of the implementing agencies, However, in general, during the study, the involvement of CCN in KENSUP and other initiatives was very minimal; CCN had virtually withdrawn from the initiatives, with some officials citing conflict over interests, competition over power and access to resources, and control over the programme and the direction it would take, as some of the reason for this withdrawal (Pers.Com1, 2011, Pers.com.MHous, 2011). Nevertheless, since its creation in the colonial times, the Town/Municipal/City Council of Nairobi has been known to be extremely hostile and intolerant to the presence and activities of the urban poor in Nairobi. In the colonial time the Council was dominated with what can be described a ‘right wing extremest’ in today’s terms; and after independence the Council continued to be dominated by individuals with highly elitist interests and view, as well as highly corrupt individuals; whose main interest seemed looting public resources and grabbing public lands for themselves, their associates and clients. However, more importantly, the Council was the main vehicle for pursing the elites interests in the city; including their visions of slender of Nairobi and its attractiveness for business, tourism, investment, and trade. Accordingly, the Council was mainly identified with razing of ‘unauthorised settlements', segregation bylaws and regulations, and the racist and class based Master plans of the colonial times; as well as the ‘city clean-up’, ruthless evictions and demolitions of the post colonial period. In fact, most of the eviction and demolition bulldozers, as well as the personnel belonged to CCN. Hence, running battles with the slum dwellers and informal traders seemed to be a daily occupation of the City Council askaralis, in
which the many slum dwellers have lost their meagre possessions and even lives; especially in the of clearing lands for use by ‘private developers’ or other politically connected individuals (Ngau, 1995, COHRE, 2006, Omenya and Huchzermeyer, 2006, Amnesty Int., 2009, Pamoja Trust, 2009, Pers.Com1, 2011, Hornsby, 2012, Omenya and Lubaale, 2012). All these, with the stated vision of making Nairobi “to be recognised as one of the most attractive cities of the world” (CCN, 2013).

Similar to the Town Council of Nairobi, the Provincial Administration (PA) was also setup in the colonial era to ensure the interests of the ruling elite; often in contradiction and detriment to the interests of the majority citizens; a function that persisted into the post colonial era. The PA not only remained colonial both in design and content, it become one of the main pillars of all the post colonial presidencies. The PA was a devolved system running all the way from the grassroots to the presidency directly; with agents at various scales who were not accountable to any other persons or arm of the government apart from the presidency itself. It also had its own parallel police force and court system. The wishes of the presidency flowed directly to the grassroots, through the Provincial Commissioners (PC), District Commissioners, the District Officers (DO) in the division, the ‘Chief’ in the location, the Sub-chief in the sub-location and the ‘Village Elder’ at the village scale. Hence, Nairobi City fell under the jurisdiction of a PC, while a typical slum was often under a Chief or Sub-chief, with its various ‘villages’ under the Elders. This system was set up at colonial times to ensure the total subjugation and control of the natives, to maintain ‘law and order’, to collect colonial taxes and forced labour, and pursue other interests of the settlers and the colonial government. The system was setup to contradict the traditional governance systems which had legitimacy and respect of the people, and supplant it with colonial system comprising of ‘chiefs’ and ‘elders’ without any legitimacy and respect, often chosen based on the characteristic of individuals would could betray their own communities in pursuit of self interest.

Lacking legitimacy, some of these individuals often and ruthlessly invoked the force of the ‘crown’ or state power to enforce and maintain compliance; often using fear, threat of force, and confiscation of property. Thus the PA had antagonistic relations and lack of trust with the citizens, with its oppressive, coercive, extractive and exploitative character. At independence PA retained all these, becoming a valuable vehicle for not only devolving oppression at all scales, but also corruption, patronage, clientelism. Through the PA the presidency and the ruling elites had access and control of the grassroots. Thus the PA became involved in issuing the quasi-legal permits for using public land for building slums, leading to the multimillion dollar slumlordism in Nairobi; working in cohorts with certain politicians, government officials, and members of the City Council (Syagga et al., 2001a, Weru and Bodewes, 2001b, Weru, 2004, COHRE, 2006, Kedogo, 2009). Accordingly, with some of the PA officials have being implicated in the allocation of land, issuance of building and repair ‘permits’, as well as enforcing slum rents and evictions; parts of the PA have been observed to be interested in maintaining the status quo, and oppose covertly the ongoing housing initiatives that stand to jeopardise their lucrative slum business. According to the Ndung'u Land Commission (2004a), the illegal/irregular allocation of public land and ‘land grabbing’ were not just driven by interests of personal enrichment, they were driven mainly by political motives; these activities intensified around
the time of elections; and involved the PA, ministers, senior civil servants, politicians, and politically well-connected businessmen (Southall, 1999, Klopp, 2000, GOK, 2004a, Southall, 2005). Hence, even thought the stated interest of the PA is the maintenance of law and order, and the provision of "excellent leadership and governance for Kenya’s prosperity" (GOK, 2013d); the actions of some of its officers was directly opposite to this, as they seemed to be in pursuit of a contrary objective.

Ultimately, apart from the bureaucrats, the government is controlled and run by the politicians. At the time of the study, the government and its opposition comprised of individuals with observable extremely diverse political interests and viewpoints. There were the conservatives mainly interested with investments, property rights, business environment, and economic growth; while the radical were interested mainly in the improvement of the socio-economic situation of the ordinary citizens and their welfare. There were overtly corrupt and 'power hungry' politician acting with impunity; while others strived (or clamed) to curb corruption and curtail the excessive powers of the governors. Some politicians were accountable only to the country’s powerful elites, while others were depended on the masses for political power. Accordingly, relating to the housing arena and in finding meaningful solutions to the problem, three broad categories of politicians could be observed based on their interests. Firstly, these who were apathetic and whom the issues of the urban poor were of no particular concern to them. Even though slums fell within some their constituencies, they seemed least concerned, as though the slums were nonexistent; either dwelling on elitist issues, or focusing politico-ethnic manipulation for power. Secondly, they were those who were directly or indirectly involved in slumlordism and its politico-ethnic and patron-client networks; and had greatly contributed to their formation, growth, and persistence. Some even ‘owned’ thousands of slum units, which served as the source of wealth and power; while other were greatly depended on the criminal gang networks and militia in the slum settings for their political survival. Among other motives, driven by these interests these politicians were greatly opposed to many housing initiatives that could upset this lucrative status quo. Some even organised protests and formed civil society organisation to support their interests, or at least steer the initiatives in the directions the politicians wanted. Thirdly these who were actively engaged in finding meaningful solutions to the problem, or at least purported to. Some were driven by personal convictions and altruistic motives, while others using the concerns of the poor only to ascend to power. Indeed, at the time of the studies, several civil society luminaries and politicians had won elections and joined the government based on their credentials as civil rights crusaders and agitators for the right of the poor. However, once in power, they made a total turnabout and even started engaging in corrupt and oppressive practices. It can be assumed that these individuals did not change their convictions, but were deceitful from the onset; issues of the poor were only as a means to access state power and opportunity for enrichment. Some did it ‘to help my people’ focusing only on a narrow constituency of their clients, often disadvantaging the ‘others’ in these selective initiatives. Nevertheless, some politicians, even when in power, continued to strive hard for the improvement of the situation of the urban poor, and even made many personal sacrifices for the sake of the ordinary citizens.
In sum, even thought the government displayed a wide array of interests as concerns slum and housing issues of the urban poor, when taken a whole, what is observable is apathy, manipulation, and hostility. The poor are treated with populistic narratives and tokenistic initiatives, whose main interest seems to be to entrench the government and its politicians and elites in poor and advantageous positioning; but not to meaningfully deal with the problems of the urban poor. The government seem to be more interested in ‘World Class’ endeavours that would bring more wealth to the elites; and the urban poor can be simply swept away if there presence might put the elite’s interest in jeopardy.

10.3. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) encompasses a huge variety of associational forms that are distinct from government and business, and are formed by members of the society to pursue, protect, or manifest their interests, will, or values. (Clark, 1991, White, 1994, Fisher, 1998). These include the Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), formal and informal Community Based Organisations (CBOs), religious bodies and Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), as well as many other forms of association such as foundations, charities, professional associations, pressure and advocacy groups, politico-ethnic groupings, patronimial and clientelistic allegiances, among many others; all of which are active in Nairobi’s arena. The formation of modern Nairobi also came with modern forms of CSOs in the shape of missionary activities and FBOs, which mediated the realm between state and private sector, by providing social services, and sometimes defending the rights of the Natives against the excess of the settlers and the colonial state. Furthermore, the urban dwellers organised themselves into CSOs to held deal collectively with several problems that they faced, especially those problems arising from them being far away from their families and communities. In the post colonial period a few NGOs entered the arena, a played some roles in the 1970s site and services schemes. However, the advent of Neoliberalism dominance in the 1980s saw a massive in the number of CSOs, which came in to fill the void left by the retreating state, by providing some basic services and safety nets for the urban poor. Furthermore, in pursuance of the Neoliberalist doctrine of a minimal state as well as citing rampant corruption and red-tape of the government, many multilateral and bilateral organisations began channelling aid, and implementing initiatives through the CSOs. Moreover, the 1990s saw also the increase of CSOs that championed for the rights of the urban poor, besides criticising the practices of the government, donors, and private sector; that were detrimental to the welfare of the ordinary citizens. According the state’s NGOs regulatory body, the NGOs Coordination Board (GOK, 2010), since 1990 at least new 400 organisations have been registered each year, without counting the numerous unregistered informal CSOs that continued to emerge, and others that go by other names such as self-help groups, cooperatives, trusts, and foundations. Hence, by the year 2000s, the Nairobi’s housing arena was awash with thousands of CSOs that acted as providers, social mobilisers, and activists; ranging from tiny associations, to global organisations, some with worldwide networks and alliances. All in all, while most of the involved CSOs had they stated interests as helping or protecting the urban poor, they were also driven by other main interests and perspectives. The FBOs were ultimately interested in spreading their faiths. The NGOs advanced the interests and perspectives of their financiers, owners, or mother countries. The CBOs were often driven narrow
interests of the founders and leaders. These among others, contributed the highly fragmented and antagonistic with an ever increasing number of actors with different interests, perspectives, and perceptions.

The stated interest of most of these CSOs was to improve the welfare of the urban poor, by providing lacking services, fighting for certain rights, preventing particular injustices such as evictions, in addition to organising the urban poor into a formidable societal grouping and mobilising their savings to access credit; amongst other means. However, the CSOs also became a vehicle for advancing other vested interest including pursuits of personal wealth and political power, or shaping the society in particular ways. Ideally, the CSOs are supposed to be independent, for them to perform their stated watchdog rolls or stand in the gap between the state or private sector and the citizens. However, a cursory look at Nairobi’s arena reveals that most CSOs in the arena are highly depended on funding from multilateral and bilateral organisations, the state, and the private sectors; hence the CSOs indirectly become conduits for furthering the interests of their financiers, but not those urban poor they purport to advance; unless this considers with the interests of the financiers. Hence, as soon as donor priorities shift, the CSOs follow suit, abandoning their pervious courses of action. The government has also formed certain CSOs for implementing certain programme; these CSOs would most likely not be neutral. Furthermore, several politicians were influential in the formation of certain CSOs to advance their political careers or criticise their political opponents; while others to oppose initiatives that my jeopardise their slum political bases, or lucrative slumlordism syndicates, and politico-ethnic clientelist networks. Additionally, there were the prevalent case of ‘briefcase NGOs’ that seemed mainly interested in personal benefit of the ‘owners’, but not the community (Ajuulu, 2000, Murunga, 2004a, Pers.Com1, 2011, Pers.com.MHous, 2011, Syagga, 2011b). Thus despite the important role the CSOs perfume in the slums and in the lives of the urban poor, when looked at from another perspectives, some CSOs seem to be mainly a vehicle for personal wealth and power, societal control, placating and manipulating the citizens, as well as social engineering to advance interests and perspectives of the government, hegemonic powers, the private sector, and other powerful societal actors. All these greatly diminish the legitimacy, credibility, trust, and credence, some CSOs may claim as they call for transparency from the state and the private sector; or CSOs” claim as the advocate of the urban poor and their concerns

The ‘briefcase NGOs’ exited metaphorically or even literally only inside a briefcase, with little or no presence on the ground. Some had offices and staff, but most of the funding goes to running the organisation. Nevertheless, they have with well-written proposals, websites, documentation, and access to donors; however most of the funding received goes to the pockets of the NGO ‘owners’ (local, expatriate, and abroad) but not to the stated programmes. Seemingly, these CSOs were formed with the vested interests of accessing funds but not helping the poor as they claimed to (Burger and Owens, 2008, Pers.Com1, 2011, Syagga, 2011b). However, interviews and informal conversation with some individuals implicated in running ‘briefcase NGOs’ revealed another dimension to the problem beyond vested interests. These individuals blamed the ever-changing donor priorities; claiming that most briefcase NGOs were started by genuine people with noble intentions. However, sifting donor
priorities coupled with lack of funds, forced them to move away from their areas of expertise and convictions, changing their strategic visions and objectives, in pursuit of funding and making commitments they were not able to fulfil. Thus they inadvertently joined the league of briefcase NGOs, spending most of time of writing proposals, and most of the funding on running their organisations (and probably also on themselves) instead of the projects (Pers.Com1, 2011). Furthermore, the donor priorities tended to be short-term; with demands to show quick results despite dwindling funding, and with little regard to long term effects. The funding priorities and initiative approaches were usually communicated in a top-down manner without taking into account the perspectives and interest of the NGO personnel on the ground. Hence the NGOs depended on their funding had very short-term project cycles and competed for resources from the same donors; leading to wasteful competition, acrimony, infighting, mistrust, and duplication of efforts among the NGOs; who focused on getting ahead of each other instead of solving societal problems. However, this is not only caused by observable vested interests, it can also be clearly observed that conflicts over approaches, perspectives, perceptions contribute also greatly to this.

In general the numerous forms of CSOs in Nairobi’s arena can broadly be categorised as being either pragmatic or right-based. On the one hand, the pragmatic CSOs are mainly concerned with immediate observable problems with tangible measures such as mobilising saving, building sanitary units and houses, or providing some expertise and services. On the other hand, the right-based CSOs are concerned with the underlying roots of the problems, and hence confront authorities and the private sector agitating for the rights and justice of the urban poor and pursuing systemic changes. Nonetheless, concerning the improvement of housing conditions for the urban poor and slum dwellers, some CSOs are striving hard to solve the problem, while other to maintain or even worsen the situation, depending on their vested interests and perspectives. Some CSOs support and are involved in the ongoing initiatives, while others are vehemently opposed, mounting protects and disruptions and legal challenges. While some of these antagonism is driven by vested interests, for example of those benefiting from the slums, or competing to be involved in the projects; not all opposition is driven these interests but by convictions, perspectives, and perceptions. Some CSOs oppose initiatives not because they are against the improvement of the slum dwellers welfare, but because they believe the approaches or the programmes are not in the best interest of slum dwellers; and viewed against background of past failed initiatives and approaches the led to the worsening of the slum dwellers situation; this perspective and opposing positions can be justified to some extent.

In sum, whereas the Nairobi’s arena is teeming with thousands of highly diverse CSOs, whose presence in the arena is crucial, as they play a very vital role in the lives of many slum dwellers as providers, mobilises, and advocates; the effectiveness, legitimacy, and credibility of many CSOs are greatly compromised by the involved conflicts and misunderstandings, over interests, perspectives, perceptions
10.4. The private sector

From the 1980s, the emerging dominant development orthodoxy and housing approaches espoused the increased role of the private sector in providing housing and dealing with the problem of slums. Neoliberalist policies that include ‘enabling strategies’ and new forms of ‘self-help’ based on neoliberal principles involved a ‘minimal state’ approach in which the state was to withdraw from engaging directly in productive activity; with the state’s role being limited to providing regulatory frameworks that would ‘enable’ the private sector to do so (UN-Habitat, 2006a). With emphasis to new urban management, deregulation, and privatisation the private sector would invest in, provide, and manage housing, utilities, infrastructure, and services; presumably in a more efficient and effective manner. The 1990s Sustainabilism shifted emphasis to regulating the private sector activities. Nonetheless, the private sector became a key stakeholder in pursuit of sustainable urban development and housing, in which the private sector was urged to extending services into poorer locations, provide better and safer working environments, engage more in Corporate social responsibility (CSR), avail credit to the poor, and invest in rental housing for the urban poor; among other solidarity practices. Furthermore, in the 2000s Governism the private sector became even more important in the proposes public–private partnership (PPP) and public social private partnership (PSPP) approaches. However, a cursory look at the Nairobi’s arena quickly reveals that despite all the above policy prescriptions, and even numerous ‘enablement’, invectives, and encouragement efforts by the government and donors, positive private sector involvement in improving the housing conditions of the urban poor has been very minimal.

In fact, directly or indirectly the private sector from the global scale to the grassroots, formal and informal, has contributed immensely to the Nairobi’s housing problems. The private sector comprises of a whole array of formal, informal, legal, and extra-legal entities; with great variances in size, function, compositions and scale; whose main interest is making profit. The emergence, growth, and persistence of slums in Nairobi and other parts of the world has been attributed to this pursuit of profit private sector often in cohorts with state officials and politicians; at both at local and global scale (Amis, 1984, Gilbert and Gugler, 1992, Sassen, 1998, UN-Habitat, 2003, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Dafe, 2009). On the one hand, extremely low and exploitative wages, ‘investment’ in slum housing, pollution, land grabbing, evictions to pave way for more lucrative development, among others have directly contributed to increasing number of slums and the duration of the living environment further, greatly worsening the housing conditions of the urban poor. On the other hand, the private sector has not been involved meaningfully in housing the urban poor or its improvement, concentrating on mainly on higher income group housing. For the poor, only extremely low quality, high price slums are provided (Amis, 1984, Gulyani and Connors, 2002, Huchzermeyer, 2007a, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008).

Moreover, in the 1970s, in a bid to increase their profitability, competitiveness, and attract investments, through the lobbying of Federation of Kenya Employers (FKE) and other actors, the law requiring the provision employee housing was removed. This alongside low wages and casual employment practices directly contributed to the explosive slum growth that ensued (Malombe, 1992, Nevanlinna, 1996, Syagga et al., 2001b). Thus, arguably, the slums and slum dwellers of Nairobi, could be there drivers of the prosperity and higher standards of living the higher income groups enjoy at a lower cost,
the profitability of firms, and the world class endeavours of Nairobi. Accordingly, there are various private sector entities such as formal and informal employers, slumlords and illegal service providers, large multinational corporations and tiny local enterprises, sellers of certain goods, and ‘merchants of misery’ among others, who gain immensely from slums in terms of profits, labour, and markets. These have been observed striving to maintain the exploitative status quo, and vehemently opposing housing initiatives that may alter the situation.

Furthermore, there are private sector entities such as real estate developers, landlords, investors, financiers, professionals, contractors, and legal service providers, as well as other business and industry who may engage directly or indirectly in the slum arena. They tend to oppose or support ongoing initiatives based on their vested interests; even with some developing and implementing their own initiatives directly or supporting and working with the civil society and the government. Some private sector entities engage in various Corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and charities, while other have formed associations, foundations, and trusts. While it could be argued that these activities such as CSR are motivated by advertisement and profit motives; it can also be observed some of these activities not driven profit motives alone, but also with altruist motives driven particular convictions, worldviews, perspectives, and perceptions. Indeed, it can further be observed that to engage knowingly in an activity that would improve or worsen the living condition of another human being, whether for profit or not, requires one to have certain perspectives and perceptions, the sustain those interests. For instance, it would requires to have a particular world view, for to be either an effective ‘merchant of misery’ gaining from the suffering of others; or a philanthropist engaging in activities that would benefit others without direct self benefit; all these beyond the pure pursuit of vested interests.

The private sector is part of the society’s economic system that is run by individuals, groups, or companies usually with the intention of making profit. Nonetheless, private sector actors and entities are extremely diverse, in size, motive, role, and degree of formality or legality. Indeed the legality of many of the private sector entities and their actions in the slum and housing arena is often in held question, and many are designated as being illegal, quasi legal, or informal. Accordingly, the private sector is broadly categorised into formal and informal, though the distinction and relationship between them are highly blurred (Herrle and Fokdal, 2011); with majority of the actors in the slum arena often being categorised as being informal or illegal. Furthermore, many actors when dealing with slum dweller seem to be above or beyond the law such that they can in fact be categorised as being extralegal. Even the formal and legal private sector entities often act with impunity, when it comes to slum dwellers and slum; either unilaterally, or in collaboration with the reigning government and governors. Indeed some multinational corporations have in the past negotiated deals that allowed them to do unjust and harmful practices to the slum dwellers (Perscom, 2011, Egondi et al., 2013). Thus the private sector interests have in the main been seen as being detrimental to the welfare and housing situation of the urban poor.
In Nairobi’s arena these private sector entities range from giant multinational corporations to tiny individual or family run enterprises, which not only play a crucial role in the lives and housing situations of the slum dwellers, but also present a great opportunity for the improvement (or worsening) of those conditions. These private sector entities entail business and industry depended on the slums to house its employees, those selling and buying goods and services from the slum dwellers, current and potential investors and financiers of housing for the urban poor, among others. These include contractors, suppliers, property developers, banks, micro-finance and housing-finance institutions, service providers, micro-finance institutions, and utility companies, landlords and institutional and individual investors who may play a crucial part either in the delivery of housing or the lack of it.

Recent development and housing paradigms have emphasised increasing the role of the private sector in dealing with the urban South housing problems. Whereas the state is supposed to mainly provide the legal framework, the private sector apart from providing employment, income and economic growth; is supposed to create value and welfare for society by converting the inputs of capital and labour into the outputs of goods and services related to housing. This includes supply housing and related services either for profit and for their employees, or through corporate social responsibility (CSR) and philanthropy. This could be through the private sector working independently, or in mutually beneficial collaborative relationships and partnerships with the government, the civil society, and the donors. Doing this by means of business ventures and charitable activities in housing and infrastructure finance and construction; as well as providing reasonable wages and responsive labour practices that would allow it workers to access adequate and decent housing. Hence the responsibility of providing decent housing for the urban poor has systematically been shifted from the government to private sector entities such as the investors, landlords, banks, housing finance institutions, and housing cooperatives. Indeed the private sector has often been touted as the means to achieving efficient, productive and inclusive urban areas as they avail goods and services within the market mechanism (World Bank, 2008, Cities Alliance, 2011, UN-Habitat, 2012a, UN-Habitat, 2014b). Thus the private sector has been presents as being able to increase access to adequate shelter for the urban poor by investing in low-income and affordable rental and owner-occupied housing, extending services and infrastructure to slums, facilitating access to housing finance, innovations, and other forms of participation in the real estate industry.

In view of the above, Nairobi and many other Global South urban areas have seen numerous efforts by the governments, bilateral and multilateral organisations to promote the role of the private sector in housing. However there has been generally a great aversion by the private sector to investing in housing for the urban poor, but instead focused on the middle and high income strata; with the provision of housing though overtly relying on market mechanisms usually resulting in an acute shortage of low-cost housing for the low income stratum and the proliferation of slums. The direct involvement from the formal private sector in improving the slum housing conditions has been very minimal. The efforts have tended mainly to concentrate on charity and corporate responsibility by sponsoring social services and amenities, with the vested interest of getting advertisement opportunities for their business. Thought the past six decades, private sector entities have continued
to benefit immensely from the slums and slum dwellers, but at the same time excluding the slum dwellers and the locations from benefits accruing from the private sector activities. The formal sector private sector in the main has avoided investing in housing for the urban poor, who at the same time been excluded from accessing formal credit and formal housing facilities. The slums provide cheaper shelter which enables the wages and prices to be kept very low and thereby increasing the competitiveness of goods and services in a globalised word. It also provides a pool for cheap labour which is necessary for attraction of investments which include industries and Export Processing Zones (EPZ) among others. The private sector entities also include the so called ‘merchants of misery’ who gain and profit from the continued high poverty levels and misery of the slum dwellers, among others that exploit the urban poor and worsen their situations. Conversely, the private sector entities include individuals and organisations who have contributed greatly to the improvement of the housing conditions through philanthropy, CSR, responsible investments and employment practices, setting up foundations and associations, funding the civil society and government programmes, and also initiating their own initiatives. In sum, the private sector entities in Nairobi’s area have in general not played a very positive role in the improvement of the housing conditions for the slum dweller. In fact some of their interests and activities have gone a long way in creating and perpetuating the housing crisis. Nevertheless, a few of the private sector entities in the arena have made some efforts (beyond profit motive) to improve the lives and conditions of the urban poor. There exist a great unrealised potential for more positive private sector insolvent in the housing arena. All in all, the observed activities of the private sector as well as the opportunity for further private sector involvement, cannot be said to be motivated by the pure pursuit of vested interests alone; they are also depended on certain perspectives and perceptions that go beyond competition for profit, power, and control.

10.5. Extralegals

Related to the private sector but also straddling the realms of the public and civil society sectors are the ‘extralegals’; who occur and operate outside confines of the existing legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks; such that their presence and practices are mostly not regulated or sanctioned by the existing laws. Indeed almost all issues related to slums and slum dwellers have elements of extra- legality. The slums locations, land ‘ownership’, the houses, and the people involved are categorised as being quasi-legal, illegal, unauthorised, or informal; breaking most of the building and planning regulations, and general law of the country. Even many housing initiatives by the civil society (and even the government and donors) often do not meet required standards and regulations; while many CSO are informal or even illegal. Furthermore, many private sector entities, including the large multinational corporations either act with impunity or follow negotiated laws and regulations, that fall below the countries framework and requirements. In sum, in most slums, the extralegals act as the ‘de facto government’, controlling business, security, basic services, land ownership, levels of rent, and determining who can live there or not, as well as even controlling the actions of the government officials, politicians, civil society, and private sector entities. In fact, some extralegals ‘owned’ a number of state agents whom they gave orders to and issued regular payments. Indeed, the reorganised spaces, such as slums, there was often a crisis of rule imposition and control that created opportunities that naturally attracted informality, illegality, and extra- legality. In fact by the descriptions
of slum dwellers as being unauthorised, squatters, unwanted, informal, or even illegal also makes them part of the ‘extralegals’. Most of their existence and day to day living and activities are often criminalised, forcing many slum dwellers and other actors to operate outside the law and other formal systems. Accordingly, many of the actors in the slum arena have a degree of extra-legality to them. Nonetheless, this section concentrates on the slumlords, criminal gangs, and service providers who have a colossal influence on the day to day life of many slum dwellers, and the form the slums take.

Typical slumlords are wealthy, powerful, and politically connected individuals, who emerged following the 1970s politico-ethnic patronage-clientelism practices, and their successors. Their main interest is the maintenance of the lucrative status quo, and the massive profits and power generate from controlling slums. Through unconfirmed statements, a number slumlords were alleged to each own over 20,000 units that generated an average of US$ 10 per unit every month, representing a colossal income and political influence stream. With programmes such as KENSUP threatening to jeopardise this, the motives for opposing such initiatives through legal means, criminal gangs, demonstrations, and others could be related. Hence, the slumlords were able to successfully legally obtain court injunctions stop the activities of KENSUP in Kibera slums for over two years. However, a major problem in dealing with the slumlords is due to the fact that majority of them are not known and operate secretly but forcefully behind the scenes, mainly through ‘agents’, ‘enforcers’, ‘managers’ and other proxies. Furthermore, slumlords did not live in slums, and had little interest in the improvement of the living environment if there was not increase in income to themselves. However, apart from the interests of profit and power, slumlordism is also driven and maintained by perspectives and perceptions of entitlement and prebendalism; by which the slumlords and their associates claim the ‘right’ to access public land and other resource only for their ‘own’ in exclusion of the ‘others’ (Amis, 1984, Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006, Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008, Dafe, 2009, Agevi, 2011, Pers.Com1, 2011, Syagga, 2011b).

Related to the slumlords are the vigilante, criminal gangs, politico-ethnic groupings, and militia, who are sometimes involved in providing ‘security’, ‘protection’, ‘discipline’, rent collection, controlling transport, ‘regulating’ business, evictions and demolitions at the behest of the slumlords, as well as illegal electric power and water connections illegally diverted from the mains; amongst other ‘services’. Whereas these gangs have existed in one form or another for many years in the slums for many years performing the above functions, they were low key and concealed until the mid1980s, when they activities intensified and became open; with some politicians openly indentifying with some groups. According to Ngunyi and Katumanga (2014), the explosive increase in the number and activities of the gangs was occasioned by the abences and abstinence of the state and its agents. During Kenyatta’s regime in the 1960s and 1970s, carjacking, narcotics, poaching, cattle rustling, and bank robberies could used to underwrite political projects by certain politicians. However from the 1980s during the Moi’s regime, the Neoliberalist policies and aid conditionality led to state shrinkage that produce unregulated gaps that gangs came to fill in. For instance the reduce police force concerted mainly in the affluent areas, and gang became the de-facto police in several slum, acting as vigilante and keepers of order in the slum. Furthermore, state resources available for maintain the patron-client
networks shrunk. During one party system it had been easier and cheaper to maintain a tight patronage network. However, the advent of multipartyism increased the options available to the clients of Moi’s regime, and the price of maintaining political clients went up. Accordingly, organised crime became even more a way of maintaining political networks of patronage and underwrite political projects; going beyond the 1970s activities to direct extraction from the community.

Furthermore the criminal gangs usually had a powerful politico-ethnic elite as its patron, and were usually part of the patronage-clientelist governance networks in the country; they were a grassroots replications of the big politico-ethnic oligarchs controlling the government and large multinationals in the country. In the end, state agents were either ‘overpowered’ by the gang or were partakers of the gangs’ illicit activities. For instance, some state agents either allowed the gangs a free hand, or worked in cohorts with them. It was alleged in various slums, that several police officers regularly received payment from such gangs; while some officers claimed the gangs reduced crime and kept order in most of the slums, most of which were the grossly underprovided as the government allocates very few officers in slums compared to the affluent areas. In sum the extralegals we driven by interests of profits, power, control; among other perspective and perceptions necessary for such practices.

10.6. Slum dwellers
The focus of housing initiatives is ideally supposed to be the slum dwellers and the urban poor, who are often designated as the target group, beneficiary, primary stakeholder, or the essential partner. Indeed they are the focus of housing studies, policies, and initiatives; which are formulated and implemented for them or against them.

Even thought slum dwellers are often treated as a homogenous group or class, in actuality they are not. They are an extremely diverse group with huge differences in levels of wealth and poverty, needs and concerns, employment and livelihoods, politico-ethnic and religious affiliations, among other attitudes and attributes. Hence their interests, perspectives, and perceptions concerning housing issues are also highly varied. Furthermore, not all the urban poor are slum dwellers, and all the slum dwellers are not necessarily poor; hence it might be sometimes inaccurate to treat the urban poor as being synonymous with slum dwellers. Nevertheless, the majority of the slum dwellers are extremely poor and desperate, living in very dire and deplorable condition, in need of urgent relief and resolution. Nevertheless, while most initiatives are supposedly aimed at improving the housing situation of the slum dwellers, some slum dwellers will oppose or support the initiatives, based on their past experiences, long term and short term interests, and perceptions of the situation and themselves. Indeed, some slum dwellers had became apprehensive of these initiatives, which seemed to cause much disruptions in their lives but benefit only benefited others, while the slum dwellers themselves were left worse off (COHRE, 2006, Pers.Com1, 2011). Despite the observed increased awareness, boldness, and organisation among several slum dwellers; many still remained easily manipulatable, without a voice or class consciousness. Probably due to their desperate situations, many focus only on short term goals, and survival objectives to get from one crisis or another. For instance, a slumlord was able to rally slum dwellers to oppose an initiative, that was in the long run highly beneficial to the
slum dwellers, only with promises of wavering one month’s rent. Thus some residents became cannon fodder for the politicians’ and slumlords’ political fights and completion for power, resources, and control. They were source of cheap labour, votes, and militia; which could be obtain for very little short term promises. Whereas most slum residents belonged to some sorts of welfare groups, politico-ethnic associations, church groups, mosque affiliations, and other like CBOs with aim of solidarity and dealing with problems that need mutual support; a cursory observation of the arena revealed that very few slum dwellers were affiliated to the NGOs and CBOs dealing with housing issues. Seemingly, these CSOs only dealt with a tiny fraction of the slum dwellers such as those who could afford regular savings, resident structure owners, and ones with time for regular meetings. In Nairobi, most studies have shown that around 92% slum dwellers were tenants and 8% structure owners (the typical squatter); however many initiatives such as those that focus on land tenure or ownership seem to ignore this fact, and assume that all slum dwellers are squatters. (Matrix, 1993, Ngau, 1995, UN-Habitat, 2008b, Pamoja Trust, 2009, Karanja and Makau, 2010, GOK, 2011a, Syagga, 2011a). In sum, the slum dweller have very different interests, and were guided by extreme diverse perspectives and perceptions; which all initiatives and studies should strive to capture, instead of assuming uniformity, for them to yield meaningful outcomes.

For instance, while some slum dwellers were interested in slum improvement, some residents did not consider themselves slum dwellers; the slum was only a temporary place. Once their income improved, they would move to a better housing location. Hence their main interest was improvement in their incomes. For others they did not see any escape from the life in the slums, and improvement was welcome; however they were still fearful that the said improvement would lead to their displacement to even worse locations. Some residents were members and beneficiaries of the patron-client networks and some even belonged to criminal gang; while the majority were victims of the activities of such groupings. Some had lived in the same slum for several generations, while other were extremely transient depending on opportunities and problems they faced and had lived in various slums. Some had been evicted numerous times, as suffered demolitions and loss of property; while other have had relatively stable lives. In summation, the problems and deprivations slum dwellers face on their day to day lives are many and severe and have been well documented by various studies. However, the emphasis here is that these are not experienced uniformly, but each individual has a unique experience that influence their interests, perspectives, and perceptions. Nonetheless, this study observed two broad categories of slum dwellers that seemed to influence many other of their aspects. First, the slum dwellers that were affiliated to the NGOs, government initiatives, politico-ethnic patronage-clientelist network, criminal gangs, foundations, and other powerful entities. Second, these who were not, i.e. the unaffiliated. While the affiliated seemed more interested in the affairs of the slums, and had more boldness and awareness, probably arising from their affiliations; the unaffiliated seemed to be more concerned with their day to day survival, and avoiding the gangs and authorities; longing for the day they will move out of the slum to a better place. In general the affiliated slum dwellers appear to be the ‘elite’ in the slums, and captured the voice of all slum dwellers, even though they are the minority. The unaffiliated residents and the voiceless and unseen majority whose makeup, concerns, and aspirations are never captured by many studies and practice; which manly focus on the
affiliated- since they have access to other organisations and actors. Indeed, snowballing techniques in research often end up capturing only the affiliated since they are in the networks of the referees, and have time for interviews and studies; while the unaffiliated are busy queuing out of the gate of certain factories or construction sites, with the hope of being selected among that day’s causal labourers.

10.7. Beyond interests, influence, and networks

Generally following the principles of the classical ‘stakeholder analysis’, this chapter endeavoured to provide a structured inventory of the key stakeholders in the Nairobi’s housing and slums arena, with their interests, influence, and networks; and how they impact the housing arena based on their priorities and overt value. However, the observations made seem to suggest that the situation was more complicated than could be explained by those interests and overt values; the stakeholder relations and outcomes of their actions and interrelations were seemingly being conditions by other hidden and underlying factors beyond those overt issues and interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 46: Stakeholders interests, influence, coherence, gains, and support</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholder</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilaterals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governmental</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extralegals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slum dwellers</td>
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<th>Table 47: Stakeholder’s interests and actions: Coherence with the change objective</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholder</strong></td>
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<td>Multilaterals</td>
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<td>Bilaterals</td>
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<td>Governmentals</td>
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<td>Civil society</td>
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<td>Private sector</td>
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<td>Extralegals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slum dwellers</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- The change objectives is an initiative towards to improvement of housing conditions which KENSUP was used as an example
- Each category is composed of a heterogenous mix organisations, groupings, and individuals; sharing several characteristics that binds them together
- Conflicting positions within the same category of stakeholders, as well as between the constituent organisations, groupings, and individuals
- The some entities changed their interests and positions in the course of time, e.g. from opposing to supporting.
Three broad stakeholders categories were observable in Nairobi's arena. First the powerful exogenous stakeholders that had colossal financial resource, knowledge and expertise, and with great influence over the normative directions of housing initiatives in the arena. These included the multilateral and bilateral organisations, experts, international NGOs and alliances, private sector entities, foundation and trusts, among supranational organisations and individuals. Secondly, the powerful endogenous stakeholders who controlled the local arena, and which include government entities, politicians, civil society organisations, and private sector entities at a national and local scale that greatly influenced situations on the ground. Furthermore, this included extralegal entities that were usually intricately networked with other legal and illegal state and non-state actors. Thirdly, there were the ordinarily weak and voiceless slum dwellers, CBOs, small informal business among others; of whom all the above powerful actors worked for or against depending on the vested interests, perspective, and perceptions of those powerful actors. Nevertheless, depending on their positioning, networks, issue of interests, as well as particular perspective, and perceptions, the usually weak stakeholders often attained influence over course of actions concerning their housing issues. Accordingly, the powerful seem to be juxtaposed with the powerless. However, the dynamics involved in and between these grouping are far more complex and nuanced; especially with issues of patronage and clientelism, entitlement and prebendalism, manipulation and control, among other attitude, attribute, perspectives and perceptions; that transcend issues of interests and competition for power. Hence, both sides of the divide contended with conflicts, misunderstandings, and misperceptions, within and across the divide, that highly complicated the situation in the arena.

Table 48: Winners and losers: Positive and negative impacts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Winners: Positively affected</th>
<th>Losers: Negatively affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Slum dwellers: If they benefit from the housing and welfare is improved</td>
<td>• Slum dwellers: If initiative results in displacement, gentrification, loss of livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multilateral and bilateral development organisations, some CSOs, government agencies, foundation etc when they achieve their targets, gain legitimacy, recognition, better rating and funding,</td>
<td>• Slumlords: loss of income and power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Private sector and government: better business environment, beautiful city, investments, and trade</td>
<td>• Criminal gangs: lose money, power, strategic locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• General citizenry: more affordable housing, better living environment, crime rate reduction etc</td>
<td>• Some CSOs loss of relevance, income, and power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some Politicians: loss of power base, militia, votes, income</td>
<td>• Some government agents; loss of income and power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Private sector entities and merchant of misery loss of cheap labour, unregulated market,</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 49: Winners and losers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Loser</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multilaterals</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilaterals</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmentals</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extralegals</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slum dwellers</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tbody>
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Various broad categories of stakeholder such as governmentals, extralegals, or slum dwellers were observed. Nonetheless, in actuality, none of these entities are homogeneous blocs. They comprise a highly diverse mix of organisations and groupings; splintered into numerous subgroups, and division of subgroups, divisions that go up to the individual level; with each of those divisions and entities encompassing a host of divergent points of view, competing vested interests, and significant
cleavages. Nevertheless, the justification for using such groupings and simplistic abstractions stems from the fact that those grouping share some common characteristics, and are bound together by their shared circumstances. These include societal structural forces and their individual actor’s interactions modes within those entities in time and space. Moreover, they are usually perceived and treated a monolithic entities. For instance, a slum dweller would state ‘the government’ does not care for ‘us’, we’ are relevant to ‘them’ only at election times; while a government official would comment ‘those lazy people’ are expecting everything from ‘us’ to do everything for ‘them’. Nonetheless, these generalities and groupings do not seem to adequately capture the crucial issues at stake. Consequently, meaningful appreciation of the situation and formulation of effective solution necessitates going beyond those broad categories to capturing the critical interests, perspectives, and perceptions at appropriate sub categories, and if necessary up to the individual level of the identified key actors.

**Figure 35: Highly heterogeneous and amorphous stakeholder categories**

The stakeholder analysis revealed numerous conflicts, misperception, misconceptions, misunderstandings, mistrust, disdain, and hatred among the stakeholders in Nairobi's slums and housing arena, such that the great proportions of interaction and interrelations between the stakeholders were extremely unhealthy. Thus the arena was characterised by unhealthy and wasteful competition, intrigue and manipulation, deceit and ‘labelling’, arm-twisting and coercion, fear and resentment, exploitation and oppression, as well as apathy and lack of good will, among many other negative situations. The outcomes of these unhealthy relations were clear evident in the arena, especially with the magnitude of animosity and that was often present in many housing initiatives, besides the prevalent outright violence that occurred in slums due to politico-ethnic incitement, or as a result of how the initiatives are conducted. Thus many initiatives suffered from lack of common ground and mutual understanding, lack of collaboration and cooperation, failing partnerships, and many other problems that resulted in failure or poor performance of most of housing initiatives in Nairobi. Indeed as observed here, many initiatives aimed at improving the housing conditions of slum dwellers produced winners and loser; certainly, as consequence, not all actors would be interested in the successful execution on the initiatives. There are thus supporters and opposers. In conducting initiatives, several actors pursued the same goals but each had different objectives, making their cooperation a tenuous one. For example a state agent would be interested in the project only for the rent seeking opportunities it provided, while a politician for the votes and influence the project would
bring, among other interests. As a consequence, many of these interests among the various actors, from the global to the grassroots levels, were not usually be compatible, thus contributing to conflict. Furthermore some the interests totally not be conducive to the betterment of housing conditions. Apart from unhealthy stakeholder relations, these interests could in fact produce bad polices and cause policy failures of existing ones, besides generating and propagating housing problems and slums. Nevertheless, interests alone seem not to give the full explanation for these problems.

On the one hand, the causes of this animosity and conflict was clearly evident such as competition for the same resources, conflict of interests, power struggles, or tussle over territory and control over the people and the resources. On the other hand, even when they shared the same interests and it was seemingly mutually beneficial to cooperate; there were still many conflicts, misunderstandings, and lack of common ground among these actors. Many joint initiatives, eventual collapsed, even when all the stakeholders were interested in the same outcome, and had fully agreed on how to conduct the initiative. Moreover, a closer look at the situation reveals there was a great variance between the official and actual position. Many actors did not actually do what they said they did. Official policies and positions were rarely fully adhered to. Thus the interests of individuals differed from the interest of their official interests, making the prediction of inter-organisational relations difficult to predict based on official interests and stated values.

This also relates to the many observed cases of ‘labelling’ where by an initiative or policy would be renamed to suit the demands of the donors, but the practices remained the same. Hence, there were numerous ‘paper policies’ which would never be implemented, created to fulfil donor conditions and receive funding. Conversely, the ‘road side policies and declarations’ which were made in accordance with the powerful endogenous actors’ interest usually became the de facto ‘paperless’ policies and initiatives, that would be carried out, often in contradiction of existing policies. However, despite some of the relabeling in Nairobi’s arena being interest driven and conscious, evidenced suggests that a great proportion of that was not conscious, nor interest driven. Many stakeholders believed that what they did was what they said they did. As a consequence, what is clearly stated and openly visible could be very different from the actual underlying conditions. The prevalent unhealthy relations, lack of common ground, misperceptions, and misunderstandings, could be as a result of hidden and unconscious motivations for action, which even the stakeholders themselves are not aware off. Interests and competition seem to only partially explain why the housing problems in Nairobi seem impossible to solve. This underscores the importance of appreciating these motivations, as they could be a great contributing factor to unhealthy stakeholder relations, the genesis of housing problem, failure of initiatives, and thus the persistence of the problems. Consequently, these hidden and unconscious motivations are the focus of the next chapter.

The issues in Nairobi’s housing arena seem to be conditioned with issues that cannot be adequately captured by issues of interests, influence and networks alone. The arena was comprised of a very large number of amorphous stakeholders groupings and networks; with the membership of these groupings and networks constantly changing and with asymmetric interdependence such that key
actors were also constantly changing and thus hard to identify over a period of time. The interests and composition of the stakeholders was hence very unstable and fickle. Furthermore, because of these, mutually exclusive and commonly exhaustive categories may not be possible; as the stakeholder my straddle various categories, interests, and networks; with overlapping organisational roles and distribution of influence in shaping particular outcomes.

Table 50: Stakeholders interest-influence-support (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Role, mandates, and actions</th>
<th>Interests</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Legality</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Loser</th>
<th>Coherence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multi/Bilaterals</strong></td>
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<td>Shelter</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
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<td><strong>Governmental</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>Improve shelter</td>
<td>Power capital</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>Beauty &amp; Function</td>
<td>Power capital</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
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<td>Lands</td>
<td>Land Management</td>
<td>Power capital</td>
<td>Legality</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
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<td>World Class</td>
<td>Power capital.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
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<td>Governance nation</td>
<td>Power capital.</td>
<td>Order</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
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<td>Nairobi City Council</td>
<td>Governance local</td>
<td>Power capital.</td>
<td>Aesthetic glory</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
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<td>The politicians</td>
<td>Represent/develop</td>
<td>Power capital.</td>
<td>Power/people</td>
<td>HIGH-LOW</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>WIN-LOS</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
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<td><strong>Civil Society (CSOs)</strong></td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Common good</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>Rights/humanit.</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
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<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<td>Community goals</td>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td>Rights/self-help</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
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<td>FBOs</td>
<td>Morality/influence</td>
<td>Proselytising</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<td>Altruistic</td>
<td>Philanthropy</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
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<td>WIN</td>
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<td><strong>Private sector</strong></td>
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<td>Formal</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
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<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<td>Informal</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
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<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affiliated</td>
<td>Self improvement</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Self improvement</td>
<td>House</td>
<td>Survivalism</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<td>Structure owners</td>
<td>Self improvement</td>
<td>House/profit</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
<td>WIN-LOS</td>
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<td>Slumlords</td>
<td>Invest/control</td>
<td>Profit/ power</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>WIN-LOS</td>
<td>YES-NO</td>
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<td>Supply</td>
<td>Profit</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>HIGH-Low</td>
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<td>Criminal gangs</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Profit/ power</td>
<td>Laissez faire</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>NO</td>
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NOTES: (1) Indifference: In 2000s DFID/CDC no longer fund slum upgrading but invest development funds on luxurious gated communities and shopping centres so that the benefits would ‘trickle-down’ to the poor (Guardian, 2014, Garden City, 2015)

Both internal and external factors seemed to influence stakeholders behaviour beyond pursuits of vested interests. These could include, internally the perspectives concerning the situation, perceptions of themselves and others, besides other attitudes and attributes; and externally, the perspectives, attitudes, opinions, and perceptions of others concerning the stakeholders and the situation at hand. Stakeholders are traditionally analysed based on criteria such as interests, power, and influence; and are often classified based on their capacity to influence issues as well as their relative importance to
other stakeholders in the network. However, all these human attributes; and their application to non-human entities may be problematic and risk missing out on key fundamental issues that condition practices and interrelations, as well as the effectiveness and outcomes of these practice and initiatives.

**Figure 36: Stakeholder relations in Nairobi housing arena 2011-2013**

In sum, observations made in this chapter seem to contradict some commonly held assumptions concerning ‘stakeholders’. Contrary to those assumptions, this above discussion suggest, inter alia, that: Firstly, actors with similar and non-competing interests did not necessarily cooperate or have cordial and harmonious relations, they also had conflicts and misunderstandings. Secondly, the expected winners did not usually support an initiative, while even those who did not stand to gain any material benefit participated in certain initiatives; suggesting other motives beyond vested interests. Thirdly, the initiatives did not always go in the directions determined by those with influence or control.
over resources, power, and networks; other forces seemed to be at play, beyond the control of the actors, with their actions having many unintended consequences, and conditioned by hidden, unacknowledged, and unconscious factors. In sum, the observed unhealthy stakeholder relations cannot only be blamed on interests, competition, and other observable differences, words and actions alone. Observations on the situation and interrelations in Nairobi’s point to the possibility that the actions, of the stakeholders and their various subcategories are also conditioned by invisible, underlying, unconscious, and unacknowledged motivations; that include perspectives and perceptions.

Figure 37: Intra-Stakeholder relations (Governmentals)

Figure 38: Intra-Stakeholder relations (Slum dwellers)

NOTES:
- Similar interest: Improvement of housing and living environment in the slums; but always have conflictious relationships and interactions in day to day living (etc) and in initiatives e.g. KENSUP, Mathare 4A, KSUP etc
- Dissimilar interests: Cannot agree on the direction and form of the initiative, e.g. lose rent and start repaying loans may be acceptable to a rent paying tenant but not a resident structure owner; conflictious albeit legitimate interests
- Tenant-landlord disputes, politico-ethnic incitement, resident structure owner gang up with absentee slumlords against tenants

Figure 39: Intra-Stakeholder relations (structure owners)

NOTES
- Similar but competing interests: To owns structures and earn rent in the slums
- Improvement of housing conditions could benefit Resident structure owners if they can stay in the location after upgrading, but absentee slumlord may lose ownership
- If Absentee slumlord retains ownership, and the settlement conditions improve, rents increase, the location might gentrify, slumlord gains, residents displaced.
- Resident structure owners gang up with tenants against absentee slumlords when it comes to ownership after slum upgrading
NOTES

- They had conflicting interests: officially the provincial administration is expected to work towards the improvement of the living environment in slum, which the slumlords ordinarily oppose.
- But seemingly the provincial administration (at least some elements of it) collaborate and cooperate with slumlord to perpetuate slums (officially there is a conflict of interests, but at individual level similar interests, perspectives, and perceptions)

NOTES

- Change objectives: To improve lives of slum dwellers in Nairobi through Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), collaborative initiative between the Government and UN-HABITAT
- All the actors have the same interest in the project, they support it, and will be winners if the project succeeds
- The UN-Habitat and NGO X have same values in their objectives (probably formulated to attract support of UN-Habitat); in their documents, all the actors share same values such as accountability, democracy, and human rights; however there are some other different values.
- However their relations were characterised by misunderstanding, disagreements on the form and direction of the initiative and even conflict
- Eventually of the four stakeholders only the Ministry of Housing remained, as the others pulled out.

“The government of Kenya and the ministry haven’t engaged with us on the issues faced by Soweto East residents. We need to hear from them officially to be able to help,” Maviti of UN-Habitat quoted in (IPS, 2014)
PART III: INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS
11. The urban South crisis in a Structurationist perspective

The preceding chapters in this thesis have discussed some of the critical issues in the urban South namely: development, housing, and governance; firstly, from a global paradigmatic shift perspective, secondly, through the examination of the same in Nairobi’s informal housing arena and its politico-historical and time space contexts, and thirdly, by an observation of the key stakeholders’ interests and interrelations in that arena. From these, several observations could be inferred. First of all, Nairobi’s housing arena, and in fact most of the urban South, has been conditioned in one way or another by the globally dominant perspectives or paradigms of ‘underdevelopment and development’ (decadian development orthodoxies) which in turn could be the result of the prevailing geo-politico-economic issues, global concerns, and hegemonic interests. The globally dominant paradigms seem to condition much of the societal aspects in the Global South, and the day to day lives of majority of its peoples, including their housing issues, both positively and negatively. Secondly, the deteriorating socio-economic and housing conditions of many are clearly evident, despite numerous global and local prescriptions, initiatives, principal commitments, good intentions and rhetoric; these actions have largely been ineffective or have failed to produce the expected outcomes. Thirdly, the arena is highly complex and fragmented, with numerous actors and stakeholders with different and sometimes conflicting interests, perspectives, and approaches which contribute to their unhealthy interrelations that in turn play a significant role in the growth and persistence of the urban South housing problems and slums as well as the failure of initiatives. Furthermore, conflicting vested interests as well as competition for power and resources played a major role in this.

Nevertheless, as observed in the preceding tenth chapter, these unhealthy relations cannot only be blamed on interests, competition and other observable differences, words and actions alone. Evidence suggests that the actors’ interrelations are also conditioned by invisible, underlying, and mostly unconscious motivations of the actors and perspectives. For instance, actors with complementary interests (and not competing ones) failed to have healthy relations, while those with seemingly conflicting interests experienced cooperation and collaboration. Certainly, those invisible, underlying, and unconscious motivations could be very critical aspects of the urban South arena, and its housing crises. Consequently, the focus of this chapter is those unconscious motivations and unacknowledged conditions for action as they relate to the housing situation and arena.

This study is carried out in the discursive context when ‘good governance’ is the globally dominant development orthodoxy for the urban South, with the expectation for the actors to comply with it. However, the situation in the housing arena seems to be far more complex than simply this. Therefore, to start with, examinations of the actors, their interactions, and interrelations in the urban South’s housing arena are done against the background of the prevailing dominant paradigm. As observed in the preceding chapters, in the 2000s, ‘good governance’ became the central focus of hegemonic development thinking; with many varied prescriptions, but most of which coalesced around achieving a judicious blend of state, market, and civil society, with special attention being given to people’s participation and the strengthening of institutions. This was after five observable paradigm shifts, one each decade, since 1950s. However, whereas clear paradigm shifts at a general level can be readily
observed with a cursory look at the arena’s policy documents and official statements; a deeper or nuanced observation quickly reveals that identifying clear trajectories in the arena becomes difficult as the actions of the actors and stakeholders, who are ostensibly interacting according to a prevailing paradigm, elicit mixed and sometimes, contradictory messages. Accordingly, it is the argument of this study that these paradigmatic discourses and actions concerning the ‘correct’ development ideologies and approaches: their discursive formation, their implementation, their shifts, and finally their complex interrelations and outcomes; are not simply reflections of the ‘current debates’ or simply the outcomes of powerful actors shaping mainstream development thinking; but as a result of complex structure-agency dynamics at various societal levels, from individuals, groups, organisations, nations to entire societies. In fact, these structure-agency dynamics could constitute a very significant part of those invisible, underlying and unconscious motivations that are a critical aspect of the urban South housing crises. In sum, due to these and other factors, the urban South’s housing arena and the issues that surround them, even though they may appear straightforward at first, in reality they are blurred with numerous complexities and contradictions that probably explain why the urban South problems seem unsolvable. All these necessitate a deeper and more nuanced appreciation of the issues, for meaningful solutions to the problems to be found and effectuated.

In an attempt to unravel these complexities and contradictions in the urban South arena, elements of Structuration theory are applied in this chapter as follows, in an endeavour to uncover the invisible and unconscious motivations, paradigmatic issues, and other structure-agency dimensions in the urban South housing nexus.

- Firstly, deductions are made of the actors/stakeholders’ static paradigmatic dimensions which represent a snapshot of their paradigmatic stances at the given time, space and interaction situation, during the period when the study was made.

- Secondly, inferences of the quality of the actors’ interrelations and their impact on the housing arena as well as situation are made; not only on the basis of their paradigmatic stances, but also on their perceptions, i.e. how they perceived themselves, others, and the situation.

- Thirdly, bearing in mind that the stances and perceptions are not static, elucidations of their dynamics are pursued; given that paradigms have been observed to emerge, rise and fall in their dominance, be accepted and rejected, as well as having been observed to shift or persist.

- Finally, these three issues above are explored further with the application of certain elements of structuration theory, to interrogate the questions of structure-agency as well as the material and discursive issues surrounding the actors’ relations, effectiveness of initiatives, and the constitution of the urban South housing crisis as a whole.

Accordingly, these issues are pursued with the aim of uncovering their implications and explanatory value to the persistence and possible resolution of the urban South crisis, in both theory and practice.

11.1. Static paradigmatic dimensions

This section examines the static paradigmatic dimensions of the actors and stakeholders in Nairobi’s informal housing arena which were observable at the time the study was conducted. Accordingly, the
paradigmatic stances and perceptions of the actors and stakeholders are mapped against the background of the prevailing dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s urban housing arena. As observed before, the study is conducted when ‘good governance’ is the globally dominant paradigm and the central focus of hegemonic development thinking that permeates most aspects of life in the Global South including housing policy and initiatives. Moreover, discussions in chapters nine and ten showed that Nairobi’s housing arena and its actors have responded promptly to the decadian global paradigmatic shift in development orthodoxy. Probably, due to Nairobi’s almost central position in Sub-Saharan Africa, the fact that it was the de-facto capital city of the East African region, and that Nairobi hosted the global or regional headquarters of several development related organisations; the arena in Nairobi was mostly in step with the prevailing paradigms and global zeitgeist, especially in official narratives and discursive practices. Indeed, as soon as a global paradigm shift occurred and a new development paradigm emerged, these paradigms became dominant in Nairobi almost immediately. Policies and initiatives were renamed, changed, modified, or even halted; several actions were relabelled, and sometimes, objectives of the initiatives were even modified to promptly suit the new paradigm; and old associations and descriptions were rapidly dropped. National policies and five year development plans were always written in conformity with the prevailing paradigm. In fact Nairobi was the testing and launching ground for many global initiatives in the urban South. Thus almost all actors and stakeholders observed in Nairobi’s arena, asserted that they subscribed to the good governance paradigm. Consequently, this globally prevailing paradigm was also the dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s informal housing arena, at least in discursive practices and labelling of policies and programmes. Most actors believed or at least claimed that they were acting and interacting according to the good governance paradigm.

Just like in the urban South housing arena in general, even though good governance was the dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s informal housing arena, and that all the actors and stakeholder were in one way or another affected or influenced by it, a more nuanced and deeper examination of the arena reveals a rather complex scenario. Although most of the actors and stakeholders officially subscribed to the good governance paradigm, their descriptions of the same and its applications were highly varied. Even when the actors/stakeholders had similar narratives, their resultant actions were dissimilar. There was also an observable time lag in the acceptance or rejection of the paradigm, during the paradigm shift; while the documents changed promptly, for several actors the mode of action changed much slower or remained unchanged. Furthermore, cases of ‘relabelling’ were prevalent, where the policies and names of the initiatives were changed to conform to the prevailing paradigm but the actions continued in the old manner. There were also ‘paper policies’ and initiatives which were never meant to be implemented, but only served populistic and tokenistic purposes, to manipulate the citizenry or the donors. This is in addition to the cases of ‘road side policies’ which became the de facto policies and initiatives, and other donor driven initiatives which did not comply to the existing policies or paradigms. Seemingly dominant paradigmatic discourses did not mean societal consensus. These and other factors highlight the complexities in the arena that demand a more nuanced appreciation of the situation. Consequently, in view of this, the DHG matrix (see chapter 7) is applied to examine the static paradigmatic dimension of various actors and stakeholders in Nairobi’s
housing arena at the time of the research; against the background of the currently prevailing good governance paradigm.

**The DHG Matrix as a mapping device**

The DHG matrix integrates three of the urban South’s critical defining themes: development, housing, and governance; in conjunction with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions through Structuration theory. As discussed in chapters six and seven, each paradigm can be associated with a certain structuration set. According to Giddens (1984) structures exist both internally within agents as memory traces, and externally as the manifestation of social actions; and that they are both the medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices. Therefore, static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions can be seen as enabling or constraining the actors and their actions. At the same time, these actions maintain or modify those paradigmatic dimensions following the principles of ‘the duality of structure and agency’. Indeed, according to Structuration theory, the relation between structure and agency is not one of dualism but that of ‘duality’, since structures and human action are causally linked and cannot be separated. Hence, the constitution and mapping of the actors’ attitudes and attributes in the DHG matrix in this chapter is based upon various dialectics, such as how the particular actors described themselves versus how they were described by others, official versus de facto positions, and their narrations; what they said they did versus what they actually did, among others. Thus through the DHG matrix it could be shown how the structures condition the actors and their actions, and how those actions create, maintain, or modify those structures in a paradigmatic sense. The matrix is used here to map the paradigmatic positions of actors, actor groups, organisations, and other entities; to analyse not only the overt actions and narrations of the actors, their acknowledged conditions for actions and intended outcomes, but also their unconscious motivations and unacknowledged conditions for action and unintended outcomes; and how all these systematically feedback and become conditions for further actions, interactions, and interrelations. As such, the DHG matrix serves as a conceptual, analytical, and interpretational framework. It can be applied to infer the static paradigmatic dimensions that include stances, perceptions, and their compactions at a particular time; and by comparing these over a given period of time, the dynamic paradigmatic dimensions can also be deduced. Accordingly, all these could lead to valuable inferences that could be of aid in furthering an understanding of the urban South housing situation, and could play a critical role in the endeavour for more effective and meaningful solutions.

By means of the DHG matrix, various paradigmatic phenomena of any individual actor, organisation, epoch, region, time-space, or other entity can be mapped to produce numerous interpretational matrices. Firstly, the Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM) presents the paradigmatic stance of an actor or organisation at a particular time, space, and situation; based on a nuanced observation and synthesis of the actor’s/organisation’s attitudes, attributes, and actions. This is derived from a critical analysis of the actor’s/organisation’s documents, scholarly works, media reports, staff explanations, and more importantly the observations of the actor’s/organisation’s actions, interactions, and modus operandi. Emphasis is placed upon what the actors or organisations actually did (as observed by the researcher) rather than what the actors said about themselves or what was described by other actors.
Hence the PSM represents an endeavour to produce the most accurate picture of any given entity at a particular time of observation by the researcher; but is also subject to the researcher’s own biases and paradigmatic lenses. Secondly, comparisons of actors’ paradigmatic stances, by the juxtaposing of two or more PSMs which highlight areas of congruence and incongruence, produce the Paradigmatic Congruity Matrix (PCM). These may reveal the consistencies and contradictions between mutual actors, organisations, actors and their organisations, actors across organisations, actor or organisation against the time-space (dominant paradigm and zeitgeist); among other numerous possibilities for comparisons. For instance, these can be used to highlight the opportunities of cooperation as well as the potential for conflict and misunderstanding. Thirdly, the actors or organisations perceive themselves in a particular way, giving rise to internal perceptions; but are also perceived by other actors in another way generating external perceptions. Thus internal perceptions of any actors or organisations of themselves; as well as their external perception of other actors, their own or other organisations, or time-space can be mapped to produce a Perception Stance Matrix (PeSM); i.e. PeSM$_{\text{internal}}$ portraying the actor’s self description, and PeSM$_{\text{external}}$ depicting how they were described by others. Fourthly, various comparisons of these perceptions can be made by juxtaposing two or more PeSMs to produce Perception Congruity Matrix (PeCM) that would reveal consistencies and inconsistencies in those perceptions. Ultimately, from these matrices, numerous analysis and interpretations can be made. For instance, comparisons of matrices of actors at different times, spaces, or situations may be useful in highlighting the involved dynamic paradigmatic dimensions. Furthermore, these matrices can be compared further in various combinations amongst actors and organisations, or for the same actor in different time-space situations, depending on the interpretational objective. Hence, comparing an actor’s PSM and PeSM internal can reveal the differences between their narratives and interaction modes, and between their discursive conscious and unconscious motivations for actions, among other numerous interpretational possibilities. Consequently, using the DHG matrix several observations, analyses, interpretations, and recommendations can be generated.

**Box 8: DHG Matrix: Mapping devices and outcomes**

- **Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM):** A nuanced observation and synthesis of the actors’ attitudes and attributes based upon interviews with several actors, document analyses, and on the basis of what the actors actually did (as observed by the researcher) rather than what the actors said about themselves or what was described by other actors.

- **Paradigmatic Congruity Matrix (PCM):** Comparisons of actors’ paradigmatic stance, by the juxtaposing of two or more PSMs highlighting areas of congruence and incongruence.

- **Perception Stance Matrix (PeSM):** How the actors perceived and described themselves (PeSM$_{\text{internal}}$) or were perceived and described by others (PeSM$_{\text{external}}$).

- **Perception Congruity Matrix (PeCM):** Comparisons of the perceptions by the juxtaposition of two or more PeSMs highlighting the consistencies and contradictions in those perceptions.

In this study, the DHG matrix based on the paradigms of Global South development orthodoxies has been used as a heuristic device to examine the hidden perspectives and unconscious motivation for action, and to assist in the exploration of social phenomena in the urban South’s housing arena and situation. The DHG matrix in itself is a preliminary analysis of the arena and situation. However, it is further employed in this study as a model, in an endeavour to obtain analytical clarity and explanatory value. The paradigms have been used as ‘ideal types’ here as a way of setting out the defining
characteristics of the actors, situations, time-space, and other social phenomena in the arena. The aim of this is to examine both the salient and subtle features, to define bench-marks around which variation and differences among the actors can be identified and situated, as well as the quality of their relations to be deduced. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that whereas paradigms and paradigmatic positions have been chosen in the construction of the heuristic device for this study; the urban South issues and other constituent perspectives as well as motivations for action can also be examined through numerous other ways.

All in all, the mapping of the actors’/organisations’ positions into the DHG Matrix and the resultant matrices is based on a synthesis of interviews, documents, and observed actions. The elements in the tables for each actor/stakeholder are worked out on the basis of the researcher’s interpretations of the actor/stakeholder based on their official positions and documents, what they say about themselves, and inferences from their modus operandi and interactions as observed in the field; on the basis of the researcher’s paradigmatic categorisations and understanding. For instance, organisations’ official positions are obtained from careful reading of the organisations’ documents, how they define their missions and objectives, how they describe the projects they are involved in, and how they conducted themselves in those projects and interacted with other actors/organisations. This was augmented by the description of the officials in those organisations, especially when they explicitly stated that was the organisation’s position. Much effort and emphasis was placed on distinguishing between personal positions and official positions; necessitating much discretion from the researcher which posed a challenge. Furthermore, the difficulty was compounded whenever the official narratives did not match with the official actions, obligating the study to use interpretations of the de facto policies and actions. Nevertheless, the subsequent sections probe further into the differences between the official narratives and official actions, official and personal positions/narratives/actions, and also the contradictions between how they perceived themselves and how they were perceived by others, amidst the inconsistencies that are hereby examined and which help form the basis of this study’s conclusions. Consequently, the DHG matrices in this chapter are constituted on the basis of nuanced interpretations that are adapted to the observable ambiguous situations in the arena. Thus, the selection of each element in these matrices arises from a synthesis of descriptions and experiences that attempt to aptly capture the scenario and convey a more precise and realistic understanding of the situation in its time-space (historical-spatial) context; amidst numerous observable anomalies and incoherencies. Accordingly, the study endeavours to delve deeper into examining those anomalies and incoherencies, and other subtle differences and diverse interpretations that have profound effect both on actors’ relations and the urban South housing situation, the focus of this study.

In sum, the mapping of the actors’ and organisations’ positions in the DHG matrix to generate the Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM), the Paradigmatic Congruity Matrix (PCM), the Perception Stance Matrix (PeSM), or the Perception Congruity Matrix (PeCM) involves colossal amounts of information. Hence what is presented here is only a very brief synopsis of the key information that formed the basis of the mapping. Thus, the World Bank and UN-Habitat, being some of the key agenda setting organisations in the arena, have the generation of their DHG matrix elements shown to exemplify the mapping, while for other actors and organisation the explanations are briefer. Accordingly, this section
continues to examine the actors’ attitudes and attributes on the basis of the categorisation derived from the actor/stakeholder analysis in chapter ten; however, here focus is mainly on the probably invisible, underlying, and mostly unconscious and unacknowledged motivations and conditions for action; especially as represented by the static paradigmatic dimensions inferable in organisations, groupings, and individual actors.

As observed above, the good governance paradigm was not only the globally dominant development orthodoxy for the urban South in the period of this study, the years 2011-2013; but also the prevailing dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s informal housing arena. Hence it is often the basic assumption that actors, organisations, and groupings are expected to comply with it. Indeed their self descriptions, discursive practices and labelling of actions, policies, and programmes point to this. Thus mapping their positions in the DHG matrix would be expected to yield a matrix similar to PSM 1. However, the actual mapping of these passions in the arena, presents a rather more complex and different picture. Accordingly, this section presents the mapping outcome of organisations and groupings that also partly condition the actions or interrelations of actors in the arena; and that also have a profound impact on the persistence or resolution of the urban South housing crisis.

Table 51: PSM 1: Prevailing dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s housing arena (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Domination</th>
<th>Legitimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Authoritarianist</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Exclusivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Neoliberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbol</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Quite</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretive</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>Conferrer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Placer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Persuader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Persuader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Persuader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Persuader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
<td>Persuader</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

NOTES
- All the actors and organisations are in one way or another influenced by the prevailing ‘good governance’ paradigm, and many claimed to subscribe to it. Thus, it was the ostensibly dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s arena (at least discursively) that defined the zeitgeist.
- However, no single actor or organisation fully subscribed to ‘good governance’. Even though they consciously or unconsciously labelled their practices under the current paradigm, in fact, for most, their primary paradigm was entirely different.

11.1.1. Multilaterals and Bilaterals

In Nairobi and in most Global South cities, multilateral organisations have played a very significant role in the housing arena. This is not only in the formulation and implementation of initiatives, but also in the creation and restructuring of housing related institutions from national to grassroots levels through financial and technical support. Indeed it can be argued that by setting the tone for desirable normative actions globally, the multilaterals have in a large way contributed to the creation and establishment of new paradigms, and the accompanying paradigm shifts from older to newer ones. Correspondingly, several bilateral organisations have in many cases been the avant-garde of several new paradigms, especially if they comply with the espoused policies of the ruling regimes in their countries. Indeed the bilaterals usually reflect the foreign policies, values and priorities of their mother countries; however, these bilaterals and multilaterals usually work in collaboration in several initiatives, supporting the government, civil society, and private sector actors. Furthermore they attempt to
coordinate their activities through joint actions such as the Paris Declaration and Joint Assistance Strategy (JAS). As such it would be ordinarily expected for the paradigmatic stance of the multilaterals and bilaterals to be in tandem with the prevailing good governance paradigm. However, contrary to this expectation, the analyses and interpretation here through the DHG matrix present somewhat, a different picture.

**UN-Habitat**

To begin with, UN-Habitat’s mission is “to promote socially and environmentally sustainable human settlements’ development and the achievement of adequate shelter for all” (UN-Habitat, 2014d). Adequate housing was defined as a crucial element of sustainable development, a basic need, and a basic human right to which all humans were entitled to. This definition that arose from ‘the Habitat Agenda’ of the Habitat II Istanbul conference in 1996, is at the core of the constitution of UN-Habitat’s policies and programmes in addition to the United Nations Millennium Declaration (UN-Habitat, 1996, UN-Habitat, 2012c). This signification of housing as both a basic need and sustainable development led to or arose from the interpretative scheme that designates to the government the role of a provider of certain housing inputs (UN-Habitat, 2014f) and the regulator of actors in the housing arena in order to ensure sustainable practices and the realisation of housing rights. Furthermore, governments were required to set up strong national housing policies, and to create an enabling environment that would increase the supply of affordable housing. On the face of it, the enablement terminology stems from the neoliberalist paradigm that recommends the withdrawal of the state from direct involvement in the housing arena, though the focus was aimed only on ‘enabling’ the housing to work more efficiently by use of demand and supply side instruments (Mayo and Angel, 1993). However, UN-Habitat’s definition of enablement does not absolve the state from the responsibility of ensuring adequate shelter for all its citizenry. In fact UN-Habitat insists that the state should “recognize, promote, protect and ensure the full and progressive realization of the right to adequate housing” for example, by “mobilizing resources - both public and private - for housing development” (UN-Habitat, 2012a p 4). Moreover, the state has to play the role of regulator between the market’s forces and its players in order to ensure the protection of human rights, both socially and environmentally, as this is necessary to achieve sustainable towns and cities (UN-Habitat, 1996, UN-Habitat, 2008a, UN-Habitat, 2009a, UN-Habitat, 2012a, UN-Habitat, 2013b). Nevertheless, governments should not only regulate the other sectors, but should also partner with other ‘key stakeholders’ in the civil society and private sector; operating within clearly given frameworks and well-defined institutional and operational conditions, to contribute to the provision of affordable, adequate housing for all (UN-Habitat, 2012d, UN-Habitat, 2014d). These requires strong political will, adequate regulations, and sound guidelines (UN-Habitat, 2012d).

The resultant governance-arrangements/domination entail: First of all, Welfarist, which pursue pro-poor approaches and ensure basic needs of the poor, vulnerable, and marginalised; with the governors being charged to ensure the protection and promotion of the socio-economic well-being of all citizens; especially those in deprivation. Secondly, Inclusivist, to ensure meaningful inclusion and participation of all citizens, especially the poor, vulnerable, and marginalised on the basis of equity, justice, and solidarity. Thirdly, Pluralist, which require the appropriate involvement of other ‘key
stakeholders’. These define the resources/facilities that are required and made valid by the arrangements which include expertise and funds from the stakeholders, assistance to the poor, marginalised, and vulnerable to meet the basic need shelter, and incentives to other stakeholders in creating an enabling environment.

Table 52: PSM 2: UN-Habitat paradigmatic positions (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Positions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>

When adequate housing is defined as constituting sustainable development, then housing becomes one of the inalienable rights of all human beings, including the poor. Thus this right becomes the key resource for the urban poor; not only does it become a source of empowerment, it also in one way or another obliges other actors and organisations to play a role in the realisation this right for the poor, weak, and vulnerable in society. All these stem from the justification/legitimation that pursuit of adequate housing is the basis for equity, progress (environmental, social, cultural and economic), and would ensure our common future. Thus the governors should be guided by the norms of: protecting the poor, vulnerable, and marginalised as well as guarding the environment and our common future; civic engagement to ensure inclusive practice and appropriate involvement of ‘key stakeholders’; participatory and inclusive planning, since housing problems arose from failure of urban planning and inadequate governance systems, institutions and regulations. Pro-poor activities as a means of reducing social inequalities involved redistribution. Hence, means to monitor and sanction the actions in this arrangements include regulations, need for accountability, and one has to merit the assistance or involvement in the participatory arrangements. The prescribed power relations between the governors and governed is that of benevolence, in which the governors strive for the provision and protecting the needs and rights of the poor, the poor, marginalised, and vulnerable. Furthermore, the stakeholders are required to work together in a collaborative way to achieve shared goals, beyond just the intersection of common goals, but also consensus building and mutual learning towards sustainable development to ensure our common future. Accordingly, the communication modes entail intercession whereby the governors speak for the poor citizens, safeguard their interests and ensure their basic needs and protection; and argumentation by which the stakeholders (both weak and strong) argue on the basis of equal rights, equity, justice, and solidarity; toward decisions that benefit the whole society. Indeed, the UN-Habitat documents, staff, and actions contend that participatory and inclusive approaches, that put the slum dwellers at the centre of decision making, are the most viable, realistic and efficient means of dealing with the housing problems (UN-Habitat, 2013b). As a consequence, partly based on the above sentiments amongst many other sentiments obtained from the scrutiny of the organisations’ documents, field interviews, scholarly evidence, and including the observation of UN-Habitat’s involvement in the Nairobi’s arena numerous activities, that include the
Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP) and the Sustainable Neighbourhood Programme (SNP), the UN-Habitat’s Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM 2) was deduced and mapped.

The World Bank

The World Bank’s mission is “a world free of poverty” (World Bank, 2014d), and “to fight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results - to help people help themselves and their environments by producing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity, and forging partnerships in the public and private sector” (World Bank, 2011f). This entailed fostering the income growth (World Bank, 2014d). Moreover, its articles of agreement maintain that its decisions must be guided by a commitment to the promotion of foreign investment and international trade and to the facilitation of capital investment (World Bank, 2011a, World Bank, 2014b). Accordingly, despite the fact that World Bank’s approaches have highly varied over the decades, it association with neoliberalism according to various other actors and scholars persists. This has been attributed to the fact that the World Bank was the main agent for the introduction the of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the Washington Consensus policies in the Global South in the 1980s and 1990s (Harvey, 2005). Moreover, persistent institutional memory from the previous decade have seemingly permeated the current approaches, such that even the World Bank’s version of ‘good governance’ has been labelled the ‘neoliberal good governance’ (Yeboah, 2006, Myers, 2011). Nevertheless, where as this categorisation may be true to some extent, it may also not be entirely true; as revealed by its Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM 3), other paradigms are also prominent in World Bank’s current characterisation. For instance it objective statements such as “promote shared prosperity by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% for every country” (World Bank, 2014d); and involvement in some pro-poor programmes, do not fit neatly with neoliberalism. However, the key question remains whether the actions of the organisation and its personnel in Nairobi’s arena and the ongoing initiatives reflect those stated missions and objectives.

Additionally, as observed in the previous chapters, since the 1970s, the World Bank has played a very prominent role in the Nairobi’s housing arena; influencing not only the housing policy, but also the entire development program and economic direction of the country. Apart for the direct involvement housing projects and programmes in formulation, funding and implementation, the organisation has also be involved in the reforming of existing institutions and the creation of one. Certainly, since the World Bank is seen a change making institution and a source of paradigm shifts, it would be expected that the organisations and its staff should be the avant-garde of the current paradigm, and should not be stuck in the paradigms of the past. Again the PSM 3 shows that to an extent that could be true, but it also shows that this is not necessarily the entire truth. In the recent years the World Bank has been involved in the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project (KENSUP), Cities Alliance, Railway Relocation Action Plan (RAP), and the Water Supply and Sanitation Improvement Project (WaSSIP) under the Urban Slums Upgrading Project; with the Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP) being one of the most outstanding current involvement of the Word Bank in Nairobi’s arena. Accordingly, on the basis of World Banks programme and project documents, interviews with several actors inside and
outside the organisation, scholarly writings, and observations of its actions in the ongoing initiatives in Nairobi’s arena its Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM 3) was mapped.

For instance, in Word Bank’s formulation of KISIP the objective is to improve the living conditions in informal settlements “by enhancing security of tenure and improving infrastructure based on plans developed in consultation with the community”; with focus on institutional strengthening and programme management, land titling, improving access to financing, lowering housing and planning standards to encourage investment in housing (World Bank, 2011b). This programme and other recent policy recommendation and housing initiatives by the Word Bank placed a strong emphasis on a well functioning market and appropriately targeted incentive to encourage the private sector to invest in improving the housing situation. Thus in this view housing meant neither basic need nor right, but a commodity to be supplied by the market if the conditions were right.

Table 53: PSM 3: World Bank paradigmatic positions (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stuct.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signification</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>Force/plunder</td>
<td>Force/planer</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretative</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Interrogative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

Hence, while World Bank’s signification in the past decades have varied greatly, in the recent decades that the most prominent signification of housing has been as a commodity, for the private sector to invest in and produce if the conditions right, and the public to appropriate and use at the right price. This generates or arises from the interpretative scheme that designates the government the role of an enabler, to make these conditions right, by creating enabling environment that would encourage not only the private sector to invest, but also the slum dwellers themselves to improve their own housing situation. However the government should partner with other interested actors in the arena, especially in public-social-private partnerships (PSPP) to ensure this, but also take a leadership role as a planner and manager in these arrangements. Accordingly, in these arrangements communication forms are consultative between the governors, the interested actors, and slum dwellers; and also negotiations between the partners. These in turn, arise from or generate governance arrangements or domination that entail managerialist modes towards achieving effectiveness, efficiency, and an enabling environment; and pluralist modes that accommodate partnerships. With numerous freely acting actors, guided by public choice and forces of demand and supply, the power relations become autonomous, but also those of partnership are prescribed (due to partnership arrangements). To achieve the desired outcomes, the resources or facilities include expertise and funds from the government, donors, civil society and private sector, incentives provided by the governors to create an enabling environment, and assistance targeted to the poor in pro-poor initiatives such as infrastructure and water and sanitation projects especially in slums. Nonetheless, in negotiation arrangements voice (with influence) becomes the most crucial resource, such that if the poor gain a voice they can negotiated a
better deal with public or the private sector actors. These involve the norms of planning and management to ensure the ‘supply and demand’ issues are right, and the efficient and ‘proper functioning’ of the free market; laissez-faire to avoid undue interference of the market mechanisms, and civic engagement in the pluralistic and public choice arrangements and monitoring of actors’ activities. Indeed World Bank has been in the forefront of emphasising accountability by the governors and other actors to the public and donors, as a means of sanctioning their actions and interactions. Nevertheless, the organisations prescription involve the market force being as sanctioning device; with assistance going to those who merit it or meet a certain criteria. The legitimation of these actions involve the claim that the ‘free market’ with unbridled but incentivised private sector are best placed to efficiently provide housing, and provision of housing in this way entails freedom and democracy; nonetheless, pro-poor initiatives are also needed towards the reduction of poverty and improvement of equity, however through market mechanisms. Emphasis was hence placed on reforming government institutions and creating appropriate legal, institutional and regulatory environment to ensure this. Furthermore, in recent programmes and initiatives in Kenya, high premium is placed on accountability issues, by all the involved actors and institutions, and especially through citizen voice, civic engagement and partnerships between the state and non-state actors. For instance, in the ongoing KISIP programme, the project documents stress consultative and participatory process (World Bank, 2011c, World Bank, 2013c). Nonetheless, during field interviews many interested and affected state and non-state actors indicated that they had not been adequately involved in the project (Pers.Com1, 2011). Consequently, on the basis of these observations and many others the PSM 3 matrix was mapped.

**GIZ: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit**

In the past decades, the GIZ, working as GTZ, DED, and InWEnt and in cooperation with other organisations such as the KfW Development Bank on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has been actively involved in comprehensive housing initiatives such as the Mathare 4A, and in support of numerous policies, programmes, and projects by the government as well as by the civil society; providing them both financial and technical support. However in the 2000s, GIZ toned down its activities in the housing sector, and is currently focusing on good governance, water and sanitation programmes. Whereas the Mathare 4A based on sustainability paradigm, the water and sanitation programmes represent a ‘stripped down’ version of the classical slum upgrading in both the both the basic needs and neoliberalist enablement approach (Cronin and Guthrie, 2011). Typically, comprehensive slum upgrading involves the improvement or provision of more infrastructural components like roads and power, social amenities such as educational and health facilities, ‘regularising’ the security of tenure, and sometimes even employment opportunities, socio-economic, organisational and environmental improvements (Abrams, 1977, Cities Alliance, 2011). Conversely, the ‘stripped down’ slum upgrading approach aims to fulfil what it considers to be some of the most basic, pressing and crucial needs for the urban poor, while at the same time using the available funds to cover as many poor households as possible (Gulyani and Bassett, 2007, UN-Habitat, 2008a).
GIZ rationale for intervention in the urban areas and issues is that problems faced by the urban poor and their rapidly deteriorating conditions stems from unprofessional and centralised top-down management of the urban poor’s situation with destructive political influence (GIZ, 2013a, GIZ, 2013b, GIZ, 2013c). Additionally the urban areas are growing rapidly without the benefit of adequate governmental or municipal planning. There is profound lack of pro-poor policies. Hence the poor are left to depend on informal, unregulated services, often provided by cartels using unlawful practices, where they are highly exploited, paying so much for so little, and living in unacceptable conditions. As such, there is great need to deal with those issues that “hampered development and lowered the chances for people in urban, low-income areas to break out of the poverty cycle” (GIZ, 2013c).

Table 54: PSM 4: GIZ paradigmatic positions (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Exclusivist</td>
<td>Modernisation</td>
<td>Basic needs</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable</td>
<td>Good Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Controler</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accordingly, the objective is for the slum dweller to achieve “sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, and water resource management has improved”, for all to achieve the human right to water and sanitation, ending the discrimination of the urban poor so that they can enjoy the same benefits as people in the higher income brackets i.e. redistribution. Indeed, GIZ programme documents explicitly state the organisation is “guided by the principles of sustainability” (GIZ, 2013c); however based in the promotion of market-oriented, ecological and social economic order and corporate responsibility (GIZ, 2013c). This is with the belief “that only by combining social responsibility, ecological balance, political participation and economic capability will current and future generations be able to lead secure and dignified lives” (GIZ, 2013c). The organisation operated by the principle of ’partnership as equals’, espoused poverty-oriented programmes, balancing diverse interests, fair negotiation processes, the rule of law, and civic participation. Furthermore, “GIZ supports capacity development for individuals, organisations and institutions, to enable the people to improve their lives through their own efforts” (GIZ, 2013c). As a consequence, on the basis interviews, documents, and observation of GIZ participation in the Mathare 4A and Water Supply and Sanitation programmes, the PSM 4 was mapped.

As a consequence, based on the above, GIZ signification of housing comprises a both a basic need and sustainable development. Indeed GIZ vision is to be “the world’s leading provider of international cooperation services for sustainable development” (GIZ, 2014). Nonetheless, housing is also seen as a commodity to be provided through market mechanisms by the private sector and the slum dwellers themselves. This generates or arises from the interpretative scheme that designates the government the role of a provider to pursue pro poor initiatives to ensure the basic needs of the poor, and enabler to enable the people to improve their lives through their own efforts, regulator in pursuit of sustainable
development, and a partner to work in close cooperation with the civil society and private sector to ensure these. The prescribed communication mode is firstly, negotiations with the aim of balancing diverse interests among the actors; and secondly, intercessions on behalf of the poor and vulnerable. Thus the domination is pluralist to accommodate diverse interested the actors, and welfarist in pursuit of pro-poor programmes. The key facilities become assistance to the poor, and voice for negotiations. Indeed, GIZ documents stress the need for the slum dwellers to be empowered for example through the formation of ‘action groups’, that will give them voice to negotiate with the other key actors, including the governors, whose role should be to protect the interests of the slum dwellers. The action group can then become formalised negotiating vehicles for air the slum dweller concerns and providing feedback to the governors, who then take appropriate corrective measures and regulation. Moreover, GIZ stresses on multilevel participatory development processes to improve service delivery including networking activities of public sector, civil society and private sector actors in urban poverty areas. Thus the norms to be pursued include Civic engagement, integration of environmental issues in planning and long term development concepts assessment of initiatives’ impacts on target groups, improving administrative and management capacities, and protecting the poor and the environment in pursuit of sustainability. Nonetheless, GIZ promotes a market-oriented, ecological and social economic order. The legitimation for all these is to ensure the current and future generations would be able to lead secure and dignified lives, i.e. our common future. These involve the sanctions regulations, accountability, and merit, and power relations of benevolence between the governor and slum dwellers, collaboration and partnerships among the actors.

Italian Development Cooperation (IDC)

Based on IDC’s involvement in various activities in Nairobi such as the Korogocho Slum Upgrading Programme (KSUP), in which the UN-Habitat and the Ministry of Local Government are also involved, several interpretations observations were adduced, and mapped in the PSM 5. The programme documents are structured in the language of sustainability, which include capacity building, social participation, and environmental protection. In fact the main projected output of KSUP is a consultatively prepared Sustainable Integrated Upgrading Plan (GOK, 2011d).

Table 55: PSM 5: IDC paradigmatic positions (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signification</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Authoritarianist</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretative</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomus</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

The programme endeavours to “combine technical assistance, community mobilisation and organisation, as well as capital investment and ensures partnerships between the community, the Government and the private sector” (UN-Habitat, 2014e). However the programme places most emphasis on constructing roads for improved access in Korogocho, to improve disaster response in
case of emergencies, security and more importantly business activities in the area. Indeed, roads construction takes the bulk of the budget funds, 1.41 Million Euros out of total of 2.1 Million Euros (KSUP, 2009a, GOK, 2011d). Additionally, health facilities and other services and infrastructure such as foot bridges utilize a sizable proportion of the funds. Moreover KSUP prioritises the provision of security of tenure, while the Civil Society is supposed to provide services and improvements, in addition to community organisation and sensitisation. It is expected that once the slum dwellers or structure owners have been provided with an enabling environment, they will improve the housing condition, for themselves or for rent (GOK, 2011d, UN-Habitat, 2014c). Accordingly, in its approach, the signification of housing comprises a both a commodity and sustainable development. This generates or arises from the interpretative scheme that designates the government the role of enabler to enable the people to improve their lives through their own efforts and housing provision by the private sector through market mechanisms; and a partner to work in close cooperation with the civil society and private sector to ensure these. This is mainly through the facilities of incentives, and assistance. Thus the domination modes entail managerialist to facilitate the work of the civil society and private sector, inclusivist and pluralist to accommodate the other actors.

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

SIDA’s goal and strategic dialogue include achieving economic growth, equity and justice and human rights of all, and especially the for the poor, in addition to fighting corruption and addressing historical obstacles to development (SIDA, 2009). Hence, improving the living conditions and the prospects of the slum dwellers is very crucial for the country’s future (SIDA, 2014a). The goal of SIDA is “a Kenya in which all poor people have the opportunity to improve their living conditions, and where their human rights are realised” (SIDA, 2014a). In the urban arena, the aim is to achieve an “improved urban planning which allows for the participation of poor residents”(SIDA, 2013b). Since it considers the main causes of poverty and slums to structural in nature, due to lack of democratic governance and the inequitable distribution, it stresses democracy, human rights and pro-poor perspectives, and inclusive participatory approaches (SIDA, 2014b).

Table 56: PSM 6: SIDA paradigmatic positions (2011-2013)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struc.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signification</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretative</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
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<td>Norms</td>
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<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<td>Power</td>
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<td>Consultative</td>
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<td>Sanction</td>
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<td>Authoritative</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
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</table>

Furthermore it places emphasis on improving institutional capacity, provision of infrastructure and basic services, the role of the civil society, and the voice of the slum dwellers in policies and initiatives from the grassroots to the national and international levels. SIDA’s human rights’ perspective espouses participation, civic engagement, non-discrimination, accountability and transparency throughout the program cycle, while the poor peoples’ perspective endeavours to include the points of
view of the poor in decision making, planning, and implementation, through social mobilisation. Thus base on SIDA’s documents, interviews, and observation of SIDA’s participation in KENSUP, KISIP, CSUDP, and its funding of and technical support to numerous NGO activities; whose main focus was poverty and oppression, democracy and human rights, and equality and sustainability the PSM 6 was mapped.

11.1.2. Governmentals

The ‘government’ is often conceived and presented as a single entity, despite numerous points of heterogeneity within itself. Nonetheless, government is usually treated as a single system that creates, determines, and enforces certain policies; stating its intentions and carrying out its activities in a particular way under a definite political and bureaucratic leadership. Indeed, the government can be seen as a very powerful entity, which conditions not only the actions and interactions of those working inside it, but also significantly affecting almost every human activity within a given country, and also those in other counties. Certainly, some governments have global influence. Nevertheless, the government is not a monolithic entity. It is composed of numerous and highly varied departments and personalities, some being harmonious and collaborative, while others exceedingly contradictory and antagonistic.

The Government of Kenya

As discussed in the previous chapters, since the founding of the nation-state of Kenya in the ending of the 19th century, the government’s housing policies, initiatives and attitudes have gone through various phases. Nevertheless, from colonial times to the present, government has in general displayed a either hostile or apathetic attitude towards the housing issues of the urban poor and slum dwellers. Throughout the history of Kenya, the urban poor and slum dwellers have in the main been subjected to hostile and unfavourable laws, evictions, demolitions and wanton destruction of their meagre property and livelihoods, while at the same time being subjected to extreme exploitation and suppression from the other actors; usually directly through government agents, or through other actors working in cohorts with these government agents. This has often been with the express permission, sanction, or encouragement by the reigning governments, or facilitated by the state turning a blind eye the plight of the slum dwellers, and these actions, even when they contravene existing laws and policies. Even though after independence, the government’s policies and rhetoric have shifted dramatically towards a more sympathetic attitude towards the slum dwellers; in practice, a more apathetic and hostile attitude is most prominent event in the present times.

By the 2000s the governments’ development plans and housing polices had greatly evolved to present a very optimistic outlook for the urban poor and slum dwellers; and to embrace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and targets, and good governance principles. The development plans and housing polices stated that housing for the urban poor was a right and basic need for which the government committed itself to ensure. Housing was also seen as a social good for dignity and an economic good for capital and labour productivity (GOK, 2008a). Government commitment was shown by enactment of a new Housing Policy of 2004, establishing a new Ministry of Housing with an
enhanced mandate, creating the Kenya Slum Upgrading Programme (KENSUP), and development plans with pro-poor housing goals. The government promised to build 200,000 ‘modern’ housing units annually, through direct public funds or PPP arrangements (GOK, 2008a p x) (GOK, 2013c); give incentives to the private sector, provide serviced land, facilitate better urban planning, formalise slums, and establish and strengthen partnerships with the private sector, civil society, and donors. With theme of “adequate and decent housing in a sustainable environment” (GOK, 2013c), the government undertook to promote enabling policies, poverty alleviation, integrated participatory slum-upgrading; improve the policy and regulatory environment and put a moratorium on demolitions and evictions, and an end to further allocations of settled land. In the 2004 housing policy adequate housing was described variously as being: a basic need, human right, and important component of sustainable living environment; in addition to being a profitable investment and component of economic growth. The goal of the policy was “to facilitate the provision of adequate shelter and a healthy living environment at an affordable cost to all socioeconomic groups in Kenya in order to foster sustainable human settlements”; to curtail the proliferation of slums and minimising the number of those living below ‘habitable living conditions’ (GOK, 2004d p 4).

Nevertheless, like many other policies in Kenya and many other places in the Global South, these remained merely ‘paper policies’, which may never be implemented. For instance, in the entire 2000s period only a few hundred housing units were built for the urban poor through all public, civil society, and private sector effort (GOK, 2013b, GOK, 2014). Demolitions and evictions even became more brutal and widespread; while new slums continued emerged, and older slums continued to grow and densify (COHRE, 2006, Amnesty Int., 2009). Additionally, despite much rhetoric and mention in policy and programmed documents, very little civic engagement, inclusive, or participatory practices were actually seen in the ongoing initiatives. For the most part, the government seems to be more concerned with ‘world class’ projects, such as new technology cities, super highways, and high speed railways; serving the interests of elite and wealthier classes, while issues affecting the urban poor are relegated to the background. Slum dwellers are usually treated with tokenism, duplicity and manipulation. Nevertheless, sections of the same government were involved in several positive and meaningful initiatives, were enacting pro-poor policies, and several government departments and actors were keenly and deeply involved in finding genuine solutions for the problems facing the urban poor and the slum dwellers. Accordingly, the government seemed to working in self contradiction and cross purposes. One department evicting slum dwellers soon after another department had improved the area. One department pursuing hostile policies and actions while another one supportive actions.

On the basis of observation such as one above, government documents, media and press statements of the key politicians and bureaucrats, scholarly works, and observation of government actions in the period, including its conduct, modus operandi, attitudes and attributes such as in the KENSUP, KISIP and other recent initiative, the government’s Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM 7) was deduced and mapped. For instance its signification of housing included a privilege for only a chosen few, modernity as a sign of progress towards ‘world class’ status, and a commodity as a vehicle for investment and economic growth. Nevertheless, other sections of the government presented housing a basic need to be provided to those who could not afford it. Most government main roles seemed to control
unauthorised activities, and pursuit of an image that would boost trade, tourism, and economic growth. The justification for these actions where the pursuit of order and progress, with claim to that its actions were democratic.

Table 57: PSM 7: Government of Kenya (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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<td>Signification</td>
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<td>Basic need</td>
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<td>Domination Legitimisation</td>
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<td>Welfareist</td>
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<td>Inclusivist</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Progress</td>
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<td>Free market</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpretative</td>
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<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
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<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<td>Segregation</td>
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<td>Red distribution</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Protection</td>
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<td>Interpretative</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
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<td>Facility</td>
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<td>Authoritative</td>
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<td>Interpretative</td>
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</table>
- Even though the government is often referred to as a single stakeholder (e.g. the government of Kibaki / the state of Kenya) it displays numerous positions simultaneously, suggesting a highly heterogeneous entity: Some of these positions are contradictory and should ideally be mutually exclusive.
- Even though the policy documents refer to housing as being both a basic need, a right, and sustainable development these are seldom put into practice are not visible in most of government’s actions and initiatives. Much rhetoric such as creating enabling environment is also not visible in the arena.
- While some sections of the government are providing housing and doing slum upgrading, other sections are demolishing settlements and brutally evicting residents.
- [Slum dwellers' perception of government (PeSM external) closer to the PSM than governments self perception (PeSM internal)]

The governance arrangements in housing issues observed in recent times thus include authoritarianist (in brutal evictions and non-participatory housing, privileging, exclusion and segregation) representativist (when acting on behalf of constituencies, supporters, clients), and welfarist (in pro-poor activities). Nevertheless, the government exhibited extreme heterogeneity within itself. Arising from the government’s observable profound tokenistic or populistic attitude towards the urban poor and slum dwellers, the PSM 7 exposed critical variance between what the government intended as stated in its policies, documents, and rhetoric of the governors; versus what was eventually practiced and produced. Thus the observable paradigmatic position, perspectives, and attitudes in practice were not those that were usually presented in its documents and rhetoric of key governors. In sum, the government is composed of various ministries, departments, politicians, administrators, and bureaucrats; some seemingly working in close adherence to the main government positions, while others seeming to be actually working in total contradict of these positions, as exemplified by the observations upon some of the key ministries that are presented here.

Ministry of Housing

Guided by the vision of “Excellent, affordable, adequate and quality housing for Kenyans” (GoK 2011), the Ministry of Housing has been involved in production of housing units, infrastructure, water and sanitation, policy directions, ‘appropriate technology’, and collaboration with other actors and organisations in various slum upgrading activities. This was premised on the idea that dealing with the slum problems and promoting sustainable urban development is crucial to ensure and long term national stability and security (GoK 2011). Consequently, through KENSUP, the Civil servants housing scheme, and other similar initiatives, the ministry has attempted to deal with the Nairobi’s housing
problems with the objective of improving the livelihoods of people living and working in slums, and preventing the growth of informal settlements in urban areas (GoK 2010). However, while community participation, civic engagement, and partnership with other non-state actors has been stressed in its documents, and policy statements, other stakeholders in the housing arena have decried the fact that their involvement the ministry led initiatives has been only nominal or informational and instrumental at the very best. Nonetheless, more importantly, the Ministry of Housing was the government’s main agency for tackling urban housing issues; however curiously, the positions of the Ministry did not seem to be in concordance with those observable in the government as a whole, nor follow the positions of key politicians and bureaucrats in the government. This seems to suggest the peripheral position such pro-poor activities, policies, programmes, and therefore ministries and department occupy in the main government’s thinking and priorities; thereby highlighting the apparent tokenism.

Table 58: PSM 8: Ministry of Housing (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Sustainable dev</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpretative</td>
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<td>Provider</td>
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<td>Regulator</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<td>Communication</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercension</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

Notes:
- Even this was the government’s key ministry mandated and dedicated to deal with housing problems, its position seem not to be in full tandem with the main government’s agendas and positions.
- This could be a pointer to the peripheral position such pro-poor ministries and department occupy in governments hierarchies.

Ministry of Local Government

Guided by the vision of “creating viable autonomous, accountable and responsive local authorities” (GOK, 2013a); and with the mission “To facilitate Local Authorities to achieve good governance and improved service delivery for enhanced socio-economic development” (GOK, 2013a); one of the Ministry of Local Government’s goals was to reduce reducing the percentage of the population in urban areas living in slums (GOK, 2013a). This is to be achieved through improving standards of planning in local authorities and the provision of physical and social infrastructure; by means of a ‘Strategic Model’ with a “broad framework of creating an attractive environment for investors for employment creation, poverty reduction, improved income distribution and gender equity”(GoK, 2009, GOK, 2013a). Even though the ministry espoused community participation in its document, in actual fact this was merely token, nominal and instrumental (Werner et al., 2011). Nonetheless, Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) involved citizen participation in formulation, implementation, and monitoring in some initiatives (World Bank, 2013d). All in all, since independence, this Ministry has been the key implementation agent of various housing initiatives, including the ongoing KISIP and the Korogocho KSUP playing the role of guiding the local authorities in planning, urban management, and the provision and maintenance of physical and social infrastructure (UN-Habitat, 2008b).
Table 59: PSM 9: Ministry of Local Government (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
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<td>Progress</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
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<td>Commodity</td>
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<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regulations</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 60: PSM 10: City Council of Nairobi (2011-2013)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Domination</th>
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<tr>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
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<td>Regulations</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

City Council of Nairobi

City Council of Nairobi (CCN) aims to provide public services and order and safety to the city residents, guided by the vision “To be recognised as one of the most attractive cities of the world” and the mission “To facilitate coordinated development and improved service delivery to stimulate economic activity, high quality of life and become one of the most attractive cities of the world” (CCN, 2013). While CNN has been involved in various housing initiatives, it has mainly displayed an elite biased attitude, against the urban poor and slum dwellers, who are also depicted as degrading the attractiveness of the city.

Provincial administration

Is guided by the vision “To be a leading agency in the provision of excellent leadership and governance for Kenya’s prosperity” (GOK, 2013a), the Provincial administration is involve in the maintenance of law and order, co-ordinating field development, administrative leadership, and dissemination of government policies from the presidency to the grassroots level. While the Administration is involved in various slum upgrading activities, it has also been implicated for paying a major role in the creation and persistence of the housing problems in Nairobi. Some of its officers have been accused of having greatly contributed to Nairobi’s Slumlordism system and are even allegedly belong to it (Syagga et al., 2001a, Weru, 2004, Omenya and Huchzermeier, 2006, Pers.Com1, 2011). Hence while the administration is supposed to facilitate the implementation of government policies; in many cases the sections of the administration have been seen to be vehemently opposed and actually even impeded various initiatives aimed at improving the lives of the slum dwellers; contrary to their mandate. Furthermore, owing to its colonial legacy and persisted colonial views and approaches; many of the actions originating from the administration seem to be to the detriment of the welfare of the slum dwellers and the urban poor; in the name of maintaining ‘law and order’. Current practices of
some of its officers, the Administration has often been depicted as wanting to maintain the status quo, which keeps the slum dwellers under subjection, oppression, exploitation, manipulation and constant surveillance. Thus in various cases, the slum dwellers have been treated with both disdain and suspicion, either as criminals and dissidents, or as weak, ignorant, and exploitable resources (Syagga et al., 2001a, Weru, 2004, Omenya and Huchzermeyer, 2006, Agevi, 2011, Pers.Com1, 2011, Syagga, 2011b).

Table 61: PSM 11: Provincial administration (2011-2013)

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<tr>
<th>Stuct.</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
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Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development

With the vision of Nairobi “To be a World Class African metropolis” (GOK, 2013a) and mission “To manage the Nairobi Metropolis by providing sustainable infrastructural services and high quality of life to all its residents, visitors and investors” (GOK, 2013a), the ministry aimed at “eliminating slums” and replacing them with standard housing. As stated by its first Minister Kilonzo, “We want to transform Nairobi into a major wealth creation hub that will change the lifestyle of its residents” (GOK, 2013a), by creating wealth to improve the lifestyle of residents so that “no resident of Nairobi will have any reason at all to live in a slum” (GOK, 2013a).

Table 62: PSM 12: Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development (2011-2013)

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<tr>
<th>Stuct.</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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<td>Modernisation</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
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<td>Basic needs</td>
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</table>

Main Positions

Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development

Since according to the Ministry, slums were as a result of lack of integrated spatial framework, it proposed the development and enforcement of planning and zoning regulations and the preparation of spatial planning for Nairobi Metropolitan area. Its ‘Housing and elimination of Slums Programme’ proposed the creation of a “comprehensive urban regeneration & renewal plan, fast tracking and up scaling KENSUP; implementation of Targeted Housing Incentives for the middle and lower income households and facilitating increased supply of Serviced Urban Land. Location of housing will be tied to economic investment decisions in pursuit of transit oriented development and to obviate growth and proliferation of slums. This will be implemented under the aegis of the Housing and Quality of Life
Working Group”. All this with the goal of transforming Nairobi into a Global Competitive World Class City for Investment and Tourism (GoK, 2008, GOK, 2013b, GOK, 2014)

Ministry of Lands
The vision of the Ministry of Lands is “Excellence in Land Management for sustainable Development of Kenya” with a mission “To facilitate improvement of livelihood of Kenyans through efficient administration, equitable access, secure tenure and sustainable management of the land resource” (GOK, 2013a). Its mandate and functions in relation to slums and slum dwellers include land policy, physical planning, register land transactions, land surveys and mapping, land adjudication and settlement, land valuation and administration of Government and trust land. The mandate also specifically mentions land management the settlement of poor landless Kenyans, hence its potential for involvement in the slums upgrading arena includes provision of security of tenure and regularisation, and fair land management that could stem ongoing brutal evictions and also the formation of new slums. Indeed, land issues are among the most contributory factors to the problem of slums and lack of adequate shelters for majority of Nairobi’s population. Accordingly, the ministry is included as a vital stakeholder in various ongoing initiatives such as KENSUP, KISIP, KSUP, and others. Its roles have included being one of the implementing agencies specifically dealing with land tenure, survey and physical planning. Moreover, the objective of the new ‘National Land Use Policy’ (NLP) and ‘National Spatial Plan’ proposed by the Ministry is to guide and control land use so as to prevent slum growth in the future; through recognising slum dwellers’ land ownership rights and the protection of those rights through slum upgrading and formalisation of titles through its ‘Land Information for Informal Settlements programme’ (LIIS) (GOK, 2013a). This is in addition to adopting internationally-accepted eviction and resettlement guidelines in consultation with relevant stakeholders. Conversely, the policy objectives also include establishing measures for preventing “slum development on private land and open spaces and facilitate informal commercial activities to be done in a planned manner” (GoK, 2010).

Table 63: PSM 13: Ministry of Lands (2011-2013)

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<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
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<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
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<td>Managerialist</td>
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<td>Pluralist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order</td>
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<td>Progress</td>
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<th>Planner</th>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Enabler</th>
<th>Regulator</th>
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<tr>
<td>Force/ plunder Segregation Planning</td>
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</table>

Main Positions

Nevertheless the Ministry has been vehemently blamed by various actors for contributing to the housing problem at various points of time, through playing a role in poor land management, corrupt practices, illegal allocations of lands and land grabbing, and causing actions at the behest and whims of the of the elite, rich and powerful, mostly at the expense of the urban poor. These have resulted in evictions and relegation of the urban poor to the most unsuitable and hazardous lands. For instance in
Konza Technocity project, the ministry’s role has been spelt out as “providing a ten kilometre buffer” around the city to keep out slums and slum dwellers (GOK, 2011b, GOK, 2011c)

Politicians

Kenya political landscape is largely conditioned by Kenya’s widening poverty-gap that has increasingly became a sharp wedge framing political contests a war between social classes and also the presumed politico-ethnic identities. While, there are politicians who are supporting the initiatives, there are these who are vehemently opposed, while others are indifferent. Some are actively involved in the arena putting significant effort with tangible outcomes, while other are merely engaged in tokenism and rhetoric. Many of those supporting the initiatives have had a history of being in Civil Societies, religious organisations, or have been many years outside the government in the Opposition. They have been very vocal in demanding for more budgetary allocations, recognition of the rights of the slum dwellers, opposed evictions, supported and participated in various ongoing slum upgrading activities.

Table 64: PSM 14: Politicians supporting initiatives (2011-2013)

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<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
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<td>Basic need</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Rights</td>
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<td>Norms</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
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<td>Voice</td>
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<td>Interpretative</td>
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<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
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<td>Argumentation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power</td>
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<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
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<td>Authorisation</td>
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<td>Market forces</td>
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</table>

Additionally, they have not only negotiated with private sector actor especially towards corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in the slums, they have also lobbied the government and bilateral and multilateral organisation for action. Indeed, some of the ongoing initiatives are as a result of this lobbying. Additionally they have tended to side with tenants in landlord-tenant conflicts, and have in several occasions been involved in asking for reduction of rents. However, what cannot be ascertained is whether these actions and expressions are out of belief or merely for the sake of gaining political power among the slum constituents.

In contrast, the opposing politicians have been antagonistic to various initiatives, sometimes in conjunction with some elements of the provincial administration, by use of criminal gangs. Indeed some politicians allegedly have their own private militia, or at least a militia which pledges allegiance to them. These relations are in many cases the basis of the intricate system patron-client relations that compose the Nairobi’s Slumlordism assemblage and culture of political cronymism. Some of these politicians have been in the government or had powerful connections during the previous presidencies, where power bases were mainly cultivated through patronage and clientelism. As such some are opposed because the initiatives are likely to disrupt their political bases and income stream. Indeed it is alleged that some of these politicians own thousands of ‘houses’ in various slums. Accordingly, some of these politicians have sided with the slumlord in conflict involving tenants, and have been fierce advocates for the ‘property rights’ of the slumlords, and their right to increase rent based on ‘market forces’ because “no one forces anybody to stay Mr. X ‘houses” (Pers.Com.Pol, 2011).
are also others, some new, who are opposed to several initiatives especially those supported by the governments because “it is not the work of the government, my taxes should not be used to subsidize other peoples laziness, the government should concentrate only on high economic potential areas” (Pers.Com.MLG, 2011). Some have argued that interventions by the government, civil society, or benevolent private sector entities only serve to disrupt the housing market; and that the slum lords are best placed to produce rental housing for the urban poor. Others have been said to have formed or sponsored some CBOs to oppose some initiatives on the basis the initiatives might cause displacement, or will result to high rent (Huchzermeier, 2011, Pers.Com1, 2011, Pers.comCSO, 2011). Some of these concerns might be genuine, since Nairobi is awash with evidence of negative outcomes of several initiatives. However, as in the case of supporting politicians it is hard to tell if their actions are out of belief or political and other vested interest. Indeed the clash between the opposers and supporters has often culminated in vicious bloody conflicts (Mueller, 2008, Shilaho, 2008). In sum, the opposing politician have been hostile to several government or civil society led initiatives that seem to change the status quo, or improve the welfare of the urban poor; usually based on various beliefs, justifications, interests, and political reasons.

Table 65: PSM 15: Politicians opposing initiatives (2011-2013)

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<th>Short</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Domination</th>
<th>Legitimation</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
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<th>Neoliberalism</th>
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<th>Good Governance</th>
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<td>Prilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
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<td>Sustainable dev</td>
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<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
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<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
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<td>Pluralist</td>
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<td>Provider</td>
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<td>Regulator</td>
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<td>Provider</td>
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<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<td>Regulator</td>
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<td>Pluralist</td>
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<td>Partner</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
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</table>

Main Positions

11.1.3. Civil Society

As observed in the forgoing chapter 10 there are several forms of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) comprising mainly of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), formal and informal Community Based Organisations (CBOs), religious bodies and Faith Based Organizations (FBOs), as well as many other forms of association, foundations, charities, and groupings. Nevertheless, all the CSOs in their various forms can broadly be categorised as being either pragmatic or right-based.

Pragmatic Civil Society

The pragmatic CSOs are mainly concerned with tackling the observable problems mostly by trying to bridge the gaps and insufficiencies deemed to be causing the problems in the lives of the urban poor. Thus these CSOs are usually engaged in activities that are aimed at directly alleviating or ameliorating the housing problems of the urban poor; however, irrespective of whether the roots of the problems were being dealt with or not. They engage in the provision of goods and services but do not engage directly with the more fundamental socio-politico-economic issues the lead to the problems in the first place. Following the Neoliberalist 1980s decade, the pragmatic CSOs were designated the role of stepping in to the void left by the withdrawal of the state, especially in the provision on basic services.
In Nairobi’s arena, this was precipitated further with donors channelling development aid through these CSOs, following the breakdown of trust with the Moi’s regime and the extremely high levels of corruption in that government. To date these CSOs continue to be a major implementing agent of most donor funded projects, in addition to being the channelled for Corporate Social Responsibly (CPR) activities by the private sector, and also some of the government’s initiatives. Accordingly, most pragmatic CSOs enjoy a cordial relationship with the government, the private sector, and the donors.

Table 66: PSM 17: Pragmatic Civil Society (2011-2013)

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<th>Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>Common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
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<td>Information</td>
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<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
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<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
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Main Positions

To the typical pragmatic CSO, housing represents a basic need which the poor lack, that should be provided by societal good will and generosity especial for those who have more, the private sector and also the government. Thus a welfarist mode of governance is preferred, with the relations between the governed and governed being benevolent/giver-recipient. The slum dwellers are often described as the ‘target’ groups by these COSs, with the risk of them becoming perceived often as perceive partaker of aid or assistance. These CSOs often act as intermediaries, soliciting for funds and interceding or negotiating on behalf of the slum dwellers.

Right-based Civil Society

The right-based CSOs are concerned mainly with the underlying roots of the problems and pursuing systemic changes. Thus in addition to the direct resolution of the problems, provision of goods and services, and the pursuit of other direct positive changes in the ground; they are place emphasis on dealing with the roots of the problems being tackled. For instance beyond merely opposing eviction, some of these CSOs agitate for basic rights of the slum dwellers, democracy, government reform, justice, equity, justice and fairness, as well as pressuring the government, private sector, donors and others to take seriously takes the concerns and needs of the urban poor. Thus they are involved in activism, agitation, and lobbying around policy, legislation, and the ‘right’ state-societal relations; as well as engaging in the ‘politics of voice’, demand for ‘inclusion’, ‘empowerment’, and also civil education with the aimed at ensuring the right government is in place and serving the needs of the people. Hence they incorporate watchdog and advocacy in their roles, which go beyond merely giving direct support to communities in housing initiatives. They agitate for citizen-led initiatives, such that the slum dwellers should have some influence policy, decision-making, and implementation processes; such that the slum dwellers are ‘empowered’ to have to exercise voice in issues affecting their lives, in addition to holding the governors and office-holders to account
In Nairobi, many of these right based CSOs in pursing those rights and better quality of democratic governance have often been antagonistic to the government and the private sector entities, and have mostly aligned with the opposition politicians. They have been involved in several demonstrations, protests, and other mass action activities such that some of the CSOs and their action have often been deemed by other actors as being contentious, disruptive – and even violent. By engaging the citizens in political process and altering their roles involve in effect redefining the existing governance arrangements and power structures. Accordingly many of these CSOs have been intense harassment or sanctioning by the government, private sector entities, and even sometimes the donors. Even though these CSOs have contributed immensely to improvement of the quality of lives of many, protected public lands, prevented and reduced wanton eviction, they were often pejoratively labelled ‘those noise makers’ by many actors. They have variously been considered as obstacles to the formulation and implementation of initiatives, and labelled ‘enemies of development’. The government and some of it politicians and bureaucrats did not seem comfortable with an ‘organised poor, and especially the CSOs which facilitated this. The CSOs seem to be ‘interfering’ by giving voice to the hither to unorganised and voiceless slum dwellers, and their concerns and fears such as those arising from evictions, conflict, corruption, and misuse of state resources. Even while acknowledging the vital role the CSOs have played, some actors in multilateral and bilateral organisations deemed them obstacles to the professionalised and technocratic process and smooth running of initiatives through.

According the right based CSOs, housing for the urban poor is a right, of which the government must guarantee and facilitated the achievement of that right. Housing was thus seen as an entitlement and part of the ‘social contracts’ a pact between the government and the citizens. State assistance was not a donation or gift, but the state and the society fulfilling their obligations to the poor citizens, who have in turn fulfilled their obligations and played their by working hard in various economic activities (often in very exploitative conditions), that generated enormous surpluses for the government and other members of society. These CSOs call for better policies and regulations that would protect the poor and vulnerable in society, facilitate their attainment of their rights. Thus the role of the state becomes that of a regulator, enabler, and provider. The ‘voice’ of the urban poor becomes a valuable resource, and these CSOs strive to make these voices heard, and to be influential at the negotiating tables. These CSOs emphasise the empowerment of the urban poor, and enhancing their class consciousness. Accordingly, they CSOs modes of communications involve agitation, protests, lobbying, and other forms of negotiations that may compel the government, the private sector, or
donors to take seriously the concerns of the urban poor. Ultimately, they serve as the societal watchdog by demanding accountability from the involved actors; and pursuing politics of voice, aimed at enhancing the ability the slum dwellers to express their view and interests to influence policy and decision-making processes.

None the less, these positions of being pragmatic or right based are never static; they can shift with changing times, personalities, or situations. As exemplified in Kenya, the end of Moi’s regime led to several individuals associated with some right-based CSOs joining the government in Kibaki’s regime. These CSOs became so close to the government the some lost their credibility as fighters for justice and fairness. Thus, some right-based CSOs ceased to exist or were transformed into pragmatic ones. Whereas these CSOs were subject to intense harassment during Moi’s regime; in Kibaki’s era these CSOs formed good relations with the Government, leading to state sponsored initiatives and ‘commissions’. Nonetheless, this comradeship with the government carried the risk of reducing their watchdog roles as well as lessening their legitimacy and trust among the citizens and slum dwellers.

11.1.4. Private sector

The private sector comprises of numerous and extremely diverse entities mainly drive by intention of making profit. They greatly vary in intent, roles, motives, composition, size, and character. Nonetheless, in Nairobi’s housing arena, two broad categories can be identified. On the one hand, there is the business and industry comprising employers and sellers who depend on the slum for labour and markets, and in turn provide income, employment goods and services. Thus their involvement with the slums and the urban poor housing issue is mostly indirectly, unless they offer employee housing, CSR, foundations, charity, and other related functions. These comprise the majority of the involved private sector in the arena. On the other hand, there are those entities that are involved directly with housing issues such as the developers, real estate entities, landlords, investors, financiers, professionals, contractors, and service providers.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Process</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signification</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
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<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
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<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Planning</td>
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<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
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<td>Argumentation</td>
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<td>Autonomous</td>
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<td>Partnership</td>
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<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

As aforementioned, the first category of the private sector, comprising employers and sellers is extremely varied such that a singular attitude may be difficult to observe; however in general among them they see housing for the urban poor mainly as basic need, but which the government or the slum dwellers should provide for themselves. Apart from paying the least possible ages to the urban poor, extracting the most value from their labour, and obtaining the post possible prices for the goods and services they sell to the slum dwellers, most private sector entities in this category have very little
concern with housing issues. Prior to the 1970s the employers were obligated to provide employee housing, a provision as repealed. To the government and private sector entities this obligation discourages investment and reduces competitiveness, thus many are hostile to any suggestion of employee housing. Indeed it has been argued that the removal of this obligation contributed significantly to housing shortages and the explosives slum growth in Nairobi in the 1970s (Malombe, 1992, Nevanlinna, 1996, Syagga et al., 2001b). These actors drew immense benefits form the slums and the slum dwellers, but were usually unwilling to put any effort in the housing situation. Accordingly, these private sector entities preferred least government interference, and other obligations; nonetheless, some of these entities if given incentives were ready to partner with the government and other actors to improve the housing situation. Furthermore, a small number were involved in CSR, charities, and foundations; some as means of advertisement, and others from altruistic motives.

Table 69: PSM 19: Investors and financiers (2011-2013)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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<td>Order</td>
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<td>Free market</td>
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<td>Sustainable dev</td>
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<td>Free market</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
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<td>Basic need</td>
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<td>Sustainable dev</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
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</table>

The second category of the private sector comprises investors and financiers who are already involved or should be involved in the provision of housing and services to the slum dwellers. These actors are also extremely diverse, but in the main they see housing a being a commodity to be supplied through market mechanism, if the conditions are right and profitable. Government interference, and regulation are often not preferred, unless the government is partnering with them or providing certain incentives and privileges. In them these actors have either avoided housing issues, or when dealing with the urban poor, engaged in highly exploitative practices. Slum dwellers usually paid more for poor quality goods and services. Thus an absent and non-interfering state is preferred, unless the state and its officials are working in cohorts with them. Nonetheless some of these actors are also involved in humanitarian investments whose main goal is not profit.

11.1.5. Extralegals

Most of the issue around the slums and housing for the urban poor are usually categorised being illegal or ‘informal’, often happening outside confines of the existing legal, institutional and regulatory frameworks. Indeed if the existing laws Nairobi and other urban South locations were to be strictly applied, the slums as well as the physical structures, activities, and people in them would be considered illegal. Accordingly some of the main actors in the slum and urban poor housing arena can be described as being since many their actions, interactions, and interrelations are often beyond the authority of the existing formal and legal governing systems, and are neither sanctioned nor regulated by the existing de jure laws. Furthermore most of the recourses in case of grievances or disagreements are also by means of somewhat illegal (or quasi-legal) means, such us the deployment
of gangs and militia, bribery, patronage, among others. Some of the notable actors and entities in this category include the slum lords, illegal service providers, criminal and politico-ethnic gangs and militia, some politico-ethnic CBOs, and mafias among others. The entities benefit immensely from the status quo, and in fact the existing slum conditions are either their raison d'être, and they greatly contribute to the perpetuation of the deplorable housing conditions in Nairobi. In deed some of these entities have also played a significant role in thwarting numerous housing initiative, through both legal and illegal mean. For instance KENSUP saw major delays that arose from several legal and court actions by the slum lords, in addition to the deployment of gangs, and ‘demonstrations’ (Fernandez and Calas, 2011, Perscom, 2011). Many of these entities prefer the absence of the government in the housing arena. However many of these entities mainly operate in cohort with some key politicians, bureaucrats, and government officials as part of patronage clientelistic systems; depended on unfair privileging and othering politico-ethnic practices.

Table 70: PSM 20: Slums lords and other extralegals (2011-2013)

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<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Domination</th>
<th>Legitimation</th>
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<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Voice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
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<td>Civic engagement</td>
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<td>Powers</td>
<td>Power</td>
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<td>Authoritative</td>
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<td>Collaborative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
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<td>Market forces</td>
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In summation, these actors see often housing as a privilege arising from their patronage systems and politico-ethnic-criminal activities; which once acquired becomes a key resource for more power, wealthy, and control. They prefer and thrive in laissez-faire regulatory system where the government turns a blind eye to their activities, but at the same time privileges them at the expense of others. Thus they thrive under highly authoritarian and exclusive systems. In recent times, probably owing to their usually powerful positions and connections, some of these actors and entities have requested negotiations with the government, the civil society, and the private sector especially when their interests are threatened by an initiative, and some have ‘participated’ in some ongoing initiatives. Nevertheless, some of the extralegal have taken over stakeholder forums, CBOs, and occupied all positions in initiative committees reserved for the community or residents (KSUP, 2009a, Perscom, 2011). On the face of it, these positions my seem to be solely interest driven, however the pursuit of one’s interests in this particular way necessitates certain attitudes and perspectives. For instance, holding certain beliefs would make it difficult for someone to join a criminal gang. Nonetheless, even though these actors are really considered in may housing initiatives, they are very influential in determining the success and failure of initiatives, thus it is imperative that their positions should considered carefully and dealt with appropriately for any future initiative to succeed.

11.1.6. Slum dwellers

As observed in chapter 10, slum dwellers are not a heterogeneous homogenous group, they extremely heterogeneous. Their socio-economic status varies greatly. There are various extremes of wealth and
poverty, enormous differences in terms of employment status, literacy levels, types of livelihoods, politico-ethnic associations, religious affiliations and levels of religiosity, level of adherence to law and criminality, interests, perspectives, as well as among many other attributes and attitudes. Accordingly, whereas the slum dwellers are often treated synonymously as the urban poor, it is in accurate to assume that all the urban poor are slum dwellers or that all the slum dwellers are poor. Furthermore it would also be inaccurate to presume that all some dwellers would support any housing initiative in the same way, nor that all are interested in the improvement of the housing conditions, as was observed during the study. In fact some slum dwellers were observed to be extremely apprehensive of any interventions, since according to their experiences, initiatives often led to conflicts, evictions, and generally worsening of conditions and in some cases even the loss of life (COHRE, 2006, Pers.Com1, 2011, Pers.comCSO, 2011). In many studies and programmes slum dwellers are often categories on the basis of the structure ownership or tenancy, as either being resident structure owners, or tenants. In Nairobi several studies depict slum dwellers as comprising 8% structure owners and 92% tenants (Matrix, 1993, Ngau, 1995, UN-Habitat, 2008b, Pamoja Trust, 2009, Karanja and Makau, 2010, GOK, 2011a, Syagga, 2011a). They are further categorised depended on their economic status and relative wealth and incomes. Additionally some slums (and by extension the slum dwellers in them) have been described in terms of hope and despair (Stokes, 1962, UN-Habitat, 2010c, Parks, 2014). Thus there are slum dwellers are not only extremely diverse, there are also numerous categories. Nonetheless, for this study, two broad categories of slum dwellers were indentified: the affiliated and the unaffiliated.

**Affiliated residents**

The affiliated slum dwellers have affiliations to civil society organisations, government initiatives, politicians and government officials, and often belong to recognised CBOs, a stakeholder forums, and participation programmes. Thus they have experienced relatively more ‘empowerment’, ‘awareness’, and ‘class conscious’ compared to other slum dwellers. Thus they have more ‘voice and influence’. Indeed these are the most vocal and visible slum dwellers, and who are often available and contacted by researchers, studies, and programmes. Their views, concerns, interests, and perspective have often been taken to represent those of all slum dwellers. Nevertheless, these are only tiny minority of the slum dwellers. The affiliated slum dwellers are relatively more secure and have time to attend several meetings. Some are structure owners, or have more stable employment or business. Some are already leaders in various CBOs or in religious organisations. Some were more educated, eloquent, and had contact and access to various key donor, NGO, or government personalities. Some belong to patronage systems and have connections to powerful politicians; while other ‘knew somebody’ who could facilitate their inclusion or access into a project, ‘enumeration’, loans, or allocation of housing. What's more, during the study, some actors claimed that some of the ‘participatory forums’ and ‘community representative’ positions, ‘resident's committees’, and ‘settlement executive committees’ had been completely hijacked by members of criminal gangs. Accordingly, whereas a good number of the affiliated slum dwellers were genuine, some could not be said to represent authentic concerns and needs of the ordinary slum dwellers. In fact some make a living from attending meeting after meeting and participating in various NGO, donor, or government
activities such as they are pejoratively described as ‘professional participators’ by other actors. They did not attend meetings unless some benefit or some form of ‘sitting allowance’ was assured. Some have become ‘gate keepers’ and taken whole ‘community’s concerns captive. Indeed, in the course of this study and its field work, the researcher encountered the same set of individuals in different forums and initiatives by different organisations or government departments. Consequently, more discretion and prudence needs to applied when selecting slum dwellers for an interview, research or a programme, to ensure a more representative samples; and not just a segment of the more readily available ‘slum dwellers’.

Concerning the perspectives, attitudes, and paradigmatic stances of the affiliated residents, these were highly varied among them. However some common positions could be identified among all the affiliated residents despite some variations attributable to their affiliations. They saw housing either as a pact between them and the governors and even sometimes a privilege accruing from their affiliation and association with certain personalities or organisations. Among the facilities they considered vital for effective housing initiatives were voice and rights; that allowed them the request, lobby for, or demand incentives, assistance, expertise and funds. They usually utilised negotiations with their affiliates and patrons, of whom a high level of benevolence was expected from. With their relatively higher levels of awareness, connectedness, and unified positions (for instance in CBOs, politico-ethnic groupings, or gangs); they preferred pluralistic governance arrangements and partnerships with the other actors and organisations to achieve the objective of improving their housing conditions. These affiliated residents formed the ideal of civic engagement, and often demanded accountability their patrons or affiliates depending on their arrangements and pacts. For all these, democracy was usually cited as the legitimation. These positions are exemplified by the mapped stances of Slum dwellers affiliated to right based Civil Society Organisations in Nairobi’s arena.

Table 71: PSM 21: Slum dwellers affiliated to right based civil Society (2011-2013)

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<th>Neoliberalism</th>
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<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

Unaffiliated residents

In contrast the affiliated slum dwellers, the majority of the slum dwellers can be considered ‘unaffiliated’. They are more concern with their day to day survival, eking out a living in various ‘informal and formal activities (and sometimes illegal), and trying to avoid harassment from the government authorities as well as from the extralegal entities and criminal gangs. The typical genuine slum dweller can scarcely afford time to attend various meetings, and in fact they were ordinarily not aware of such meetings nor opportunities for be involved in housing initiatives. Their focus is mainly their day to day living, and having a place to live- a rented premises. Thus long term initiatives such as
tenant purchase scheme are not practical and affordable. Many NGO and donor led initiatives are based on regular contributions that require a stable income, which most of these slum dwellers are not guaranteed. Additionally, many of the initiatives are geared towards ‘squatters’ who at least own the structures, this cuts out over 90% of slum dwellers in Nairobi who are tenants, and know nothing about the land they occupy or the structure they live in apart from the ‘agent’ who comes to collect rent monthly, or the ‘enforcer’ who comes threaten or evict them whenever they are late with the rent. As a consequence, the majority of the ‘ordinary’ or ‘typical’ slum dwellers are never visible, available, influential, or consequential. They lack a voice, and are usually never studied, or captured in ‘enumerations’, stakeholder analysis, field surveys, research, and studies. They are never included in programmes nor are their concerns heard. Despite much ‘glorification’ the of ‘slum’, and several approaches to ‘improve’ or ‘upgrade’ the slum; many of the unaffiliated residents interviewed stated that ‘no one wishes to live in a place like this’ many were working hard to ‘get out’ of the slum, and if not themselves, at least for their children should ‘get out’. They wished for ‘help’ from the government and donors, but lamented that no one cared about them until election time when they given many false promises, or forced to flee election violence. Many felt left out as projects which they said only went to a select few, the initiatives had their ‘owners’. When asked, many were only vagely aware of ongoing initiatives such as KENSUP and KISIP but did not know what they were about and for whom they were meant for. Certainly, they had seen the President launch the construction of the 900 units of KENSUP in Kibera, and also when the Prime Minister (who was also the parliamentary representative for Kibera) help load the property of ‘those lucky residents’ as they were relocating to the newly constructed 600 units at the decanting site in Kibera. Indeed, the residents could right, to be part of the 600 households selected for the slum upgrading programme, out of a possible 600,000 to 100,000 Kibera households one had to be very lucky. In main many unaffiliated residents felt ‘unlucky’, hopeless, and doomed in life unless ‘somebody’ intervened for them. In sum, for there to be a realistic appreciation of the housing concerns, there is need to delve deeper and uncover the issues and concerns of this ‘unseen majority’ of unaffiliated slum dwellers that actually represent the bulk of the residents in many slums of Nairobi, and probably the whole urban South; however they have scarcely been examined, and their concerns are really heard; probably because the affiliated slum dwellers tend to capture all the available voice options and are prominent in studies and initiatives.

Related to the above the very uncertain nature of the lives of a typical slum dwellers. Many of them have a very unstable existence, and they cannot say for sure if they will be living in the same slum in the next few months. Indeed some of the residents interviewed did not consider themselves slum dwellers, considering their situation as only being temporal until they got a job, better job, or steady income when their business improved. Some were in the city living with a relative for a brief period, and if their situation did not improve in good time, they would go back to their rural areas. Accordingly, by viewing their hosing situation and residence in the slums as only being temporary, and also not considering themselves as being slum dwellers, housing initiatives, especially those involving ‘ownership’ or ‘tenure’ would not mean anything to them. Probably rental schemes of with dignified and improved housing would be more appropriate for this group.
Nonetheless, even though some considered themselves transient and temporary residents, they had lived in the slums for several years. Furthermore, some had experienced various evictions, and had moved from one slum to another, sometime follow a housing initiative, or land grabbing by politically connected individuals. These slum dwellers were part of the highly apprehensive group, who were greatly afraid of any housing initiative. They were suspicious of any intervention, and a laissez-faire situation was more preferable than ‘interference’ in their lives by the politicians, government, NGOs, and donors; who come promising much, but in the end left them worse off. All in all, in view of this study the ‘unaffiliated’ slum residents represent vary a huge gap in theory and practice that must be delved into appropriately, as a sine qua non for understand and resolving the urban South crisis.

Even thought perspectives, attitudes, and paradigmatic stances of the unaffiliated residents are also highly varied, some common positions be identified amongst most of them. To them housing mainly a basic need, and its improvement represented progress and modernity. Even though many of the apprehensive unaffiliated resident preferred a laissez-faire attitude from the government and other actors, many other unaffiliated resident preferred more involvement of the government to provide decent and affordable housing, or at least protection from exploitative and unscrupulous slumlords and illegal service providers. Indeed they welcome reductions of rent such as those proclaimed by politicians. Thus they saw the role of the government as being that of a provider and protector. The often required intercession by their politician, government, donors, and other power actors concerning their plight.

Table 72: PSM 22: Slum dwellers unaffiliated (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signification</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modernity</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Force/plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Enabling</td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

As opposed to the affiliated residents, the unaffiliated residents did not see interventions as their right, but as being assistance and help. According to some of these residents, they had done their best, and here was were all their efforts had got them there, thus to proceed further they need help but at the moment they felt helpless. Accordingly, these residents were very vulnerable to manipulation and machinations by politicians and other actors. In one instance, some of these residents were promised a waiver of half of one month’s rent, if they participated a demonstration to oppose an initiative, surprisingly a number of residents took up the offer; gaining very little in the short-term, while contributing to the downfall of an initiative that would have benefited them immensely in the long run. There is need to appropriately reach out to the unaffiliated slum dwellers and include them in way that would make studies and initiatives more appropriate and effective; in addition to increasing their consciousness in pursuit of genuine long term improvement in their conditions.
11.1.7. Paradigmatic stances and their ramifications

In recapitulation, in this section the attitudes and attributes of organisations and actors in Nairobi’s housing and slums arena were mapped in to the DHG matrix to generate their Paradigmatic Stance Matrices (PSMs) which indicated their main paradigmatic subscriptions. This mapping was based upon nuanced reflective and reflexive synthesis of the researcher’s observations and interpretations of the actors’ statements, modus operandi, and interactions; as well as an ‘interpretation of their interpretations’ of situations. Accordingly, this entailed continuous questioning and acknowledging multiple answers, being sensitive to the participants and data, and remaining open to discoveries; but at the same time relinquishing statements, ideas, and rhetoric that were not supported by data and observable evidence. From these analyses and interpretations, several key insights emerge that are pursued further in subsequent sections of this chapter.

To start with, all actors, organisations, and groupings in the Nairobi’s housing arena that were examined in this study were in one way or another and in varying degrees influenced by the prevailing good governance paradigm. Some had adopted elements of the paradigm into their actions and interactions while others had simply relabelled their practices and changed their narrations and rhetoric. Thus even for those who not changed their actions, they had been influenced enough to change their discursive practices, narrations, vocabulary, representations, and framing of issues. Moreover, for some actors who had not subscribe to the paradigm, their actions and interactions included resisting the paradigm and the changes its was it was causing. Therefore, it could be argued that observable evidence suggests that ‘good governance’ was the dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s housing arena.

Secondly, whereas ‘good governance’ was the dominant paradigm in Nairobi’s housing arena and that all the all actors, organisations, and groupings in the arena were consciously or unconsciously influenced by it, none had fully or solely subscribed to the paradigm. In fact for most, even though they subscribed to some elements of the good governance paradigm, their main paradigmatic stance was either not good governance or they subscribed to elements of other paradigms concurrently. Therefore, not only was the dominant paradigm not fully followed by the actors and organisations, there were massive difference in paradigmatic subscriptions among them. However, closely working and cooperating actors and organisations, clusters, and those in a particular category seemed to share some elements of their paradigmatic stances.

Thirdly, it became clearly evident during the mapping of the PSMs that how the actors perceived and described themselves in many cases differed greatly from their observable actions and interactions. Furthermore, their self descriptions and perceptions also differed greatly from the way they were perceived and described by other mutual actors.

Fourthly, the PSMs captured only a snapshot of the actors’ and organisations’ attitudes and attributes at a particular time and space. However, over time, these stances cannot remain static as the actors interact and interrelate with one another in time-space. This was suggested by the apparent
paradigmatic heterogeneity amongst the actors and organisations, and with evidence to suggesting that parading shifts, persistence, acceptance, and rejection were occurring among the actors and organisations and probably at different rates. Thus they are not only paradigmatic differences but also unpredictable dynamic dimensions which further complicate the situation in the housing arena.

Fifthly, the PSMs seem to reveal hidden, unconscious, and unacknowledged conditions and motivations of actions, which often differed from the discursive explanations, rationalisations, and narrations for the actors. Thus the ensuring stances, perceptions, static and dynamic dimensions not only involve unacknowledged conditions for actions but could also have unintended consequences of high significance in the Nairobi’s housing arena and the urban South housing crisis.

Table 73: Paradigmatic stances for organisations and groupings in Nairobi’s arena (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation/ Grouping</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The World Bank</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td></td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIDA</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Housing</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Local Govt.</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council of Nairobi</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Administration</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>■</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Metropolitan</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Lands</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>▲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician Supporting Initiatives</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politician Opposing Initiatives</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>▲</td>
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<tr>
<td>Right based Civil Society</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>▲</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pragmatic Civil Society</td>
<td>▲</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business and industry</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>●</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investors and service providers</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td>●</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slums lords &amp; extralegals</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>▲</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliated residents</td>
<td>▲</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated residents</td>
<td>▲</td>
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Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
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<td>Exclusivism</td>
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<td>Basic Needs</td>
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<td>Sustainabilism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Good Governism</td>
<td>○</td>
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</table>
Table 74: Unified Stakeholder’s Paradigmatic Matrix in Nairobi’s arena (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation &amp; Grouping</th>
<th>Exclusivism</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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<td>Ministry of Housing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Metropolitan</td>
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<td>Ministry of Lands</td>
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<td>Ministry Local Authorities</td>
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<td>Provincial admin.</td>
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<td>Politician Supporting</td>
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<td>Politician Opposing</td>
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<td>Rights Civil Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pragmatic Civil Society</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business &amp; industry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investors &amp; services</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slums lords &amp; extralegals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Affiliated residents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

- Primary
- Secondary
- Tertiary

All the five observations above highlight some of the complexities and contradictions encountered when attempting observe, understand, and interpret situations in the Nairobi’s housing arena, and probably also other arenas. Consequently, the subsequent sections of this chapter delve further into those issues through pursuing and examining:

- The role of the different paradigmatic stances upon the interrelations, mutual influence, and interactions of the actors and organisations and their implication in the urban South housing crisis, it persistence, resolution, and effectiveness of initiatives. This involves not only examining issues of discord and discord between organisations, organisations and actors, and between actors; but also the role of internal and external perceptions; thus the congruence and incongruence of their paradigmatic stances perceptions and the their implications.

- The dynamic paradigmatic dimensions and their role the Nairobi’s housing arena and the urban South housing crisis: including dynamism involving the dominant paradigm, organisational and individual actors paradigmatic subscriptions; as well as issue of time lag, contextual changes, and fickleness of actors and organisation.
Paradigmatic morphologies and processes as examined through a structurationist perspective. This examines further the static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions, the interrelations between actors and organisations, the acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions for actions and their consequences and implications in the Nairobi’s housing arena and the urban South housing crisis. All these are done with a view of furthering an appreciation of the urban South housing crisis, and especially the role of ‘paradigms’ and their implications to theory and practice.

11.2. Interrelations, mutual influence, and interactions

The foregoing section 11.1 revealed extreme heterogeneity amongst the actors and organisation in Nairobi’s housing arena, as far as their paradigmatic stances were concerned as highlighted thought the Paradigmatic Stance Matrices (PSMs). Their positions were highly diverse and sometimes mutually contradictory; in additions to other numerous observed oddities and complexities. Hence, the next logical step is to systematically compare these positions amongst the involved entities, and infer the implications of this to their interrelations, mutual influence, and interactions in the arena; and ultimately the probable effect of all these in the effectiveness of initiatives, and the persistence or resolution of the urban South housing crisis. Accordingly this section pursues and elucidates the issues of:

- Comparisons of the paradigmatic stances of organisations/groupings highlighting their areas of congruence and incongruence, and the implication for this for their options for interactions, interrelations, and thus accord or discord; and the impact of all this on initiatives and the housing situation
- Similarly comparisons are made between individual actors, against the background of their own organisations/groupings, and compared to those of other organisations organisations/groupings their actors. Thus involving not only comparisons of organisations, but also comparisons of actors within and across those organisations, as well as the relationships these actors have with their own organisations/groupings.
- Internal and external perspectives and descriptions are examined, compared, and analysed and inferences made concerning the areas of congruence and incongruence among the actors and those persecutions, and the impact of this on the initiatives and the housing situation.

All these are pursued to highlight the role of paradigmatic stances and perceptions the actors’ or organisations’ opportunities for interactions, interrelations, and mutual influence; and its impact on effectiveness and potential success or failure of initiatives, and the housing situation as whole.

11.2.1. Paradigmatic correlation: accord and discord between organisations

The Nairobi’s housing arena had numerous interested and mutually interacting actors and organisations with highly differentiated paradigmatic stances. Systematic comparisons of their paradigmatic stances by means of juxtaposing their Paradigmatic Stance Matrices (PSMs) generated for each set a Paradigmatic Congruity Matrix (PCM). Thus the PCM showed the consistencies and contradictions between the entities under comparison. Accordingly, all the actors and organisation
examined in this study had some areas of congruence as well as areas of incongruence, with some actor and organisations shared more areas of congruence than others. These could probably elucidate not only the potential for conflicts, misunderstandings, and lack of common ground, but also the potential for cooperation, collaboration, and mutual understanding; and thus could have implications in the effectiveness of initiatives as well as their probability for success or failure. Indeed in the arena, actors and organisations sharing more areas of congruence and less areas of incongruence seemed to cooperate and collaborate more and better, than those that did not as illustrated below.

Table 75: PCM 1: UN-Habitat and World Bank (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stuct. Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domination Order</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order</td>
<td></td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 76: PCM 2: UN-Habitat and Ministry of Housing (2011-2013)

<table>
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<th>Stuct. Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domination Order</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order</td>
<td></td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 77: PCM 3: Ministry of Housing and World Bank (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stuct. Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domination Order</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
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<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Order</td>
<td></td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td>common future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As an illustration, KENSUP was launched as a joint programme between the Government of Kenya and UN-Habitat, with the Ministry of Housing being the key agency. World Bank also joined the programme. PCM 1, 2 and 3 show the comparisons of the three organisations’ paradigmatic stances. There was more congruence between the Ministry of Housing and UN-Habitat compared with between the Ministry of Housing and the World Bank. Indeed it was observed in the arena, the Ministry of Housing tended to have more collaboration with UN-Habitat than the World Bank, which mainly focused on funding. This is despite the fact that the World Bank and UN-Habitat have been involved in numerous joint programmes such as the Urban Management Programme and the Cities Alliance. Nonetheless, in KENSUP this three organisations seemed to have major areas of paradigmatic incongruity that probably contributed to the UN-Habitat and the World Bank withdrawing from the programme; World Bank to form KISIP and UN-Habitat concentrating on the Mavoko SNP project (funded with a dept swap though SIDA which had also withdrawn from KENSUP). KENSUP had been envisioned as the umbrella programme through which all slum upgrading activities in the country involving the government, donors, and even the civil society and private sector would go through and be coordinated. However the donor and other actors seemed to withdraw from KENSUP and went on to form their own programmes as exemplified above, and also KSUP of the Italian Development Cooperation. All these projects and programmes had more less similar objectives, locations, and target groups as KENSUP, however, following a different approaches and paradigmatic directions.

Accordingly, it is seemingly plausible to assert that collaborated or concerted actions involving actors and organisations with high levels of paradigmatic incongruity may in the long run prove impossible to pursue; especially when the main actors withdrew their efforts halfway through a project and channel it elsewhere, where their perspectives can be carried out. Over the decades there exist several the situation like the one above, where the actors and organisations have ‘capitulated’ from or ‘abandoned’ existing programmes but went on to form and pursue others with similar objectives and target groups; running parallel to the programmes they have just existed from; and especially when pursuit of vested interest cannot fully explain this. This has resulted in massive duplication, wastefulness, inefficiency, and ineffectiveness (Matrix, 1993, Syagga, 1999, Syagga et al., 2001b, Huchzeremeyer and Karam, 2006, Huchzeremeyer, 2008, Agevi, 2011, Cronin and Guthrie, 2011). Accordingly, conflicting paradigmatic positions could probably could be of explanatory value for these situations above, that are prevalent in the urban South housing arena, and have also probably contributed to the failure or ineffectiveness of initiatives and the persistence of the urban South housing crisis.

Conversely, slumlords and structure owners tended to work well with elements of the Provincial Administration but not with the Ministry of Housing. On the face of it, cooperation between some elements of the Provincial Administration and the slumlords may appear to be solely interest driven. However it requires certain paradigmatic stances to pursue certain interests. Subscribing to certain views may predispose the actors towards certain practice, and preclude them from undertaking others. For instance, unless forced to act against their will, it would be reasonable not to expect actors truly subscribing to ‘Sustainabilism’ to engage in ruthless evictions and demolitions. Additionally,
cooperation between the Ministry of Housing and Nairobi City Council was very limited, as well as with the Ministry of Nairobi Metropolitan Development and Ministry of Local Government, all of which were supposed to collaborate in housing and slum upgrading activities.

Table 78: PCM 4: Ministry of Housing and Provincial Administration (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modesty</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Representativist</td>
<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 79: PCM 5: Ministry of Housing and Slumlords (2011-2013)

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<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Modesty</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
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<td>Welfarist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
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<td>Pluralist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seemingly, even organisations with seemingly conflicting interests and values, tended to have better cooperation when their paradigmatic stances were similar or closely related; while these with similar or complementary interests seemed not to cooperate or collaborate well whenever their paradigmatic positions have wide variance. Much incongruence seemed to increase the potential for

Table 80: Provincial Administration and Slumlords (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modesty</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
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<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Congruence

Legend

Min. Housing/incongruence
P.Admin/incongruence
Congruence (MoH & P.Admin)

Min. Housing/incongruence
Slumlords/incongruence
Congruence (MoH & S.lords)
misunderstanding, conflict, lack of trust, and ultimately the failure of initiatives. Nonetheless, even when organisations had largely conflicting primary paradigms and interests, they also shared some attribute, with the areas of congruence presenting opportunities for achieving a common ground, mediation, and convergence of ideas and beliefs, as exemplified by the Ministry of Housing and UN-Habitat largely sharing a basic needs perspective. Thus, potentially problematic relations could be mitigated by the points of congruence, as where highly dissimilar stakeholders might find areas of agreement as the points of congruence open doors for better mutual understanding; and possibly of the actors or organisations ‘to meet each other in the middle’ or alter their perspectives leading to dynamic paradigmatic dimension, or individual actors action as bridges in two discordant organisations.

11.2.2. Individual actors in organisations and groupings

Even though organisations and groupings are usually the most visible and prominent entities in the housing arena and situations, the individual actors in them play a very critical role the ensuing actions, interactions, and interrelations. According to Giddens (1984b) agency is the capacity of human beings to make choices and act in society, consciously or unconscious, producing intended and unintended consequences. Thus agency is human action and to be human is to be an agent. Thus, whereas entities such as states, organisations, and groupings might appear to agentive entities, in actual fact they cannot act in physical ways by themselves, action must be undertaken by a representative human agent, who acts and interacts with others in the name of that organisation.

In view of the above, Paradigmatic Stance Matrices (PSMs) were mapped for selected actors in some of the key organisations and groupings; and these stances compared against their organisations and other actors to produce various Paradigmatic Congruity Matrices (PCM) some of which are highlighted in this section. While most organisations had their paradigmatic stances and stands coded in their texts and official positions, for most of the individual actors their perspectives and positions were mainly captured during interviews and field observations. However, a number of individual actors have had their views expressed in their writings, publications, public statements, and political rallies other expressions in the media and in literature. Accordingly, PSMs of four individual actor are presented here followed by PCMs depicting comparisons of the actors stance as well as those of their organisations. From these a number of observations, interpretations, and implications could be inferred. These include:

- The individual actors only partially followed the dominant parading and their organisations positions.
- Generally there were always some contradictions between the individual actors’ stances (personal positions) and their organisations’ stances (which often served as the official position) which the actors were supposed or purported to adhere to.
- However, some actors’ stances were more consistent with their organisations’ stances, while other held highly divergent positions as illustrated by PCMs 7 to 10. Whereas the stances of Actor I and III were generally congruent to those of their organisations, the stance of Actor II and IV were not.
This could imply that Actor II and IV often faced internal contradictions in their day to day work in their respective organisations. Indeed it was observed many actors’ were implementing initiatives they did not fully believe in; but which had in effect been imposed upon them by either the donors, government, NGOs, bosses, or other more powerful actors who controlled resources, knowledge, or policy directions.

Working in the same organisation and project, comparisons of Actor I and II paradigmatic stances reveals large variance. This could portend serious misunderstandings and lack of agreement on critical issues in the project, that could potentially compromise the efficient or effective implementation of the project thereby putting the project success and achievement of its laid out objectives in serious jeopardy.

However the positions of Actors II, III, and IV are highly congruent, despite being in different organisations with highly divergent paradigmatic positions. This provides the opportunity for easier mutual understanding and finding of common ground especially will engaged in collaborations, joint programmes, and other concerted efforts. Indeed, Actors II, III, and IV were an epistemic community, having several joint formal and informal connections and engagements, in their involvement in the Nairobi’s informal housing arena.

With a serious implication to the methodology, Actors II, III, and IV were accessed through the ‘snowballing’ technique, by which one actor referred the others to the researcher. Seemingly the actors were in the same ‘social network’. While this method permits access to others wise inaccessible and unknown subject, there is a risk of obtaining only a ‘single story’ in the arena, whereas as observed here, there are numerous stories. Thus it is imperative to uncover the different ‘networks’ in the arena, and appropriately deal with them for a better understanding and resolution of the problem.

Ordinarily, it would be expected that the individual actors would adhere to not only the dominant paradigm, but also, and more importantly, their organisations’ position. However, this was not the case in most instances encountered in the course of this study. Firstly, it was generally observed that, just like their organisations and groupings, the individual actors did not fully adhere to the prevailing paradigms. Nonetheless, they could not avoid the influence of the dominant parading, and were to certain extended partially influenced by it; however with much variance between the actors. Secondly, the organisations had laid out certain paradigmatic positions which its personnel were expected not only to subscribe and adhere to, but also the personnel were charged with propagating those positions in the arena. Nevertheless, in most cases the actors did not fully subscribe to their organisation’s positions; these actors only partially adhered to those positions, with highly varied degrees of adherence among the actors to their organisations’ positions. Thus in the same organisations some the individual actors (staff) followed closely the organisation official paradigm, while others held contrary beliefs to those of their organisations. Therefore, given actors in an organisation shared similar paradigmatic stances with some colleagues, but which were had highly contradictory to the stances of other colleagues. This probably explains the lack of common ground and heterogeneous and conflicting approaches that emanated from some organisations and entities, and lack of effectiveness in certain initiatives. Indeed, many of the actors interviewed were implementing initiatives they did not believe in, but had to do, since it was the official approach. Statements such “according to
the organisation... however according to my own opinion” were very common during interviews. Certainly, the contrasting actor positions exacerbated the already problematic condition arising from contrasting organisational positions. On the other hand, several actors in different organisations (or actor groups) shared similar positions, probably explain why actors in dissimilar and contradicting organisations seemed to cooperated well and also form epistemic communities. In sum, whereas in most cases the individual actors did not fully adhere to the dominant and other organisational paradigms, they could not avoid being influenced by both to a certain extent. Thus the actors were subjected to various paradigmatic influences: from the dominant paradigm, own organisations, other organisations, other organisations,

### Table 81: PSM 23: Individual Actor I in the World Bank (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Domination</th>
<th>Legimation</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Welfareist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusive future</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
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<td>Market forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

### Table 82: PSM 24: Individual Actor II in the World Bank (2011-2013)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
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<th>Domination</th>
<th>Legimation</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
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<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Morality</td>
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<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Welfareist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusive future</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Decree</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
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</table>

### Table 83: PSM 25: Individual Actor III in UN-Habitat (2011-2013)

<table>
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<th>Legimation</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Welfareist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusive future</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
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### Table 84: PSM 26: Individual Actor IV in Right Based Civil Society (2011-2013)

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<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
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<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Morality</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Welfareist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusive future</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
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</table>
### Table 85: PCM 7: Individual Actor I and the World Bank (2011-2013)

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<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Regulator</td>
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<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
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<td>Planning</td>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
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<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
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<td>Argumentation</td>
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<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Congruence: [ ]

Legend
- Actor I /incongruence
- World Bank/incongruence
- Congruence (Actor I & WB)

Notes: The actor’s and organisations stances are highly consistent.

### Table 86: PCM 8: Individual Actor II and the World Bank (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
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<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
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<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
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</table>

Main Congruence: [ ]

Legend
- Actor II /incongruence
- World Bank/incongruence
- Congruence (Actor II & WB)

Notes: The actor’s and organisations stances are not very consistent.

### Table 87: PCM 9: Individual Actor III and UN-Habitat (2011-2013)

<table>
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<th>Basic needs</th>
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<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Authorisation</td>
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<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
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</table>

Main Congruence: [ ]

Legend
- Actor III /incongruence
- UN-Habitat/incongruence
- Congruence (Actor III & UN-Habitat)

Notes: The actor’s and organisations stances are highly consistent.
Table 88: PCM 10: Individual Actor IV and Right Based Civil Society (2011-2013)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
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<th>Basic needs</th>
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Main Congruence

Legend

Actor IV /incongruence
R-CSO/incongruence
Congruence (Actor IV & R-CSO)

Notes: The actor’s and organisations stances are partially consistent

Table 89: PCM 11: Individual Actor I and Actor II in the World Bank (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
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Main Congruence

Legend

Actor II /incongruence
Actor I /incongruence
Congruence (Actor I & II)

Notes: Two actors are in the same organisation but have highly contradictory personal positions

Table 90: PCM 12: Actor II, III, IV from different organisations :Epistemic community (2011-2013)

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Main Congruence

Legend

Actor II /incongruence
Actor III /incongruence
Actor IV /incongruence
Actor II & III congruence of 2
Congruence (Actor II, III & IV)

Notes: There actors are in three different organisation with unique organisations’stances but the actors have highly consistent personal positions and cooperate across organisations.
and other actors; all these through other actors; and in turn they also influenced other actors, organisations, and ultimately to dominant paradigm. All these could be contributing to misunderstandings, ineffectiveness of initiatives, and the difficulty of meaningfully dealing with the urban South housing crisis.

As observed above, even though actors embedded in given actor groupings or organisations are expected to act in a certain way and are mostly expected to adhere to their organisations stated paradigmatic positions, this was often not the case in Nairobi’s arena. Many actors expressed fact that they personally held positions and beliefs that somewhat differed with their organisations official position. However, most of those actors would not openly express those sentiments. They continued to work under the organisation performing its tasks and objectives following the laid out procedures, though, whenever possible from time to time they modified the initiatives to confirm to their personal convictions, especially if it is within their power to do so. For instance a field staffer stated “those bosses at the office do not know what they are saying, they sometimes do not fully understand what is happening on the ground, if we were to follow faithfully what they are telling us to do nothing will happen, in fact we shall be chased out of here, what they are telling us is theory, ‘practicals’ are different” (Pers.com.UNHab.field, 2011). Additionally, this is also illustrated by an evaluation of World bank’s urban programme of the 1970s and 1980s which involved a review of the field staff’s reflection. Generally the staff expressed the pressures they felt to accommodate to the institutional position, whereas, they believed improvisation was a prerequisite for project implementation, let alone the achievement of the desired outcome. They asserted that the initiatives would certainly fail if done according ‘to the book’ (Mattingly et al., Kapur et al., 1997b). Indeed the implementing officers decried the fact that the official position required them “to make the context conform to the project rather than the project conform to the context” (Cohen, 1980 p. 35). Apparently the experiences these implementing officers had encountered on the ground had led them to develop different paradigmatic stands from the official position they once held, thereby generating internal contradictions.

Nonetheless, the staffers would not ordinarily express those sentiments and conflicting positions publicly, since most organisations expects their staff to adhere to a certain laid down positions, failure to which they might be subjected to certain sanctions. For instance Joseph Stiglitz who served as the senior vice-president and chief economist of the World Bank from 1997 to 2000, was fired by the organisation for openly expressing dissent and criticising its policies (Palast, 2001). This is also exemplified by the case of Ramgopal Agarwala in Box…, depicting the rewards and sanctions subjected to individuals depending of the congruity of their individual paradigmatic positions, and those of their organisations. Examples such as these were rife in the Nairobi’s housing arena, and in the housing initiatives. In follow-up to the field work within a few year some of the actors which stances which contrasted their organisations had left or had their contracts not renewed, however the majority were still in their organisations continuing to practice what they did not full believe in, while others were transforming their organisations. All these play into the paradigmatic dynamic that shall be discussed in subsequent sections.
In sum, the consequences of these internal paradigmatic contradictions between official and personal positions are numerous. They could in the long run be either detrimental or beneficial to the effectiveness of the pertinent initiative. On the positive side, those contradictions might lead to improvements in the implementation of the initiatives and also tremendously improve their outcomes and impacts. It permits the culture of ‘learning by doing’ if organisations adapt following its staff experiences and feedback. It also enables ‘personal unions’ where a single actor can act and interact in various organisations and different capacities, potentially providing quick resolution to alternatively very complicated situations involving actors from diverse organisations and groupings.Box 10 highlights an example where an actor was able to quickly and amicably resolve an otherwise very volatile situation between conflicting stakeholders. It is also through these paradigmatic contradictions the epistemic communities that allow actors cooperate effectively across the boundaries of their organisations, thereby potentially greatly improving the implementability and effectiveness of. As such epistemic communities and personal unions may present great opportunities for improve cooperation and mutual understanding across institutions, enhance the project outcome, generate new ideas, and ultimately bring positive change to both institutions and individuals. Indeed it can be argued that most of the sifs in globally dominant societal paradigms in the various decades were effected to a large extend through the work of certain epistemic communities (Haas, 1992a). Moreover, these epistemic communities and personal unions offer a way out of the problems caused by paradigmatic incompatibility in space-time, i.e. not only between countries, sectors and organisations but also across time. They also pave way for paradigm shifts and adoption of new paradigmatic stance in both individuals and organisations.

However, in contrast to those positive consequences, there also many negative ones. To begin with, not many actors can afford to openly voice their contradictory perspectives, let alone having personal
unions or belonging to epistemic communities. These require facilities, of which may actors lack. Hence they are compelled to act or interact externally in a manner that contradicts their internal convictions, leading to lack of enthusiasm or tokenism in performing the certain tasks. Alternately, the implementing staff will modify the initiative to comply to their beliefs. It goes without saying that whenever the staff modified the initiative, be it for better or worse, the initial objective of the initiative is compromised. The programme, the project or even its outcome will somehow be different from what was envisioned by those senior officers who designed the project in the first place. An actor is quoted saying “we are supposed to do ‘participation’, but is just a waste of time, how is one supposed to work with some of these noisy NGO people. They are just interested in shouting the loudest, instead of offering tangible solutions. In fact some are busy campaigning against us” (Perscom, 2011). Lack lustre performance and lack of political will that plagues most of the housing initiatives could be attributable to this coercive transfer of paradigmatic positions between countries, organisations, and between the staff in organisations, that produces internal paradigmatic contradictions. Moreover, with actors inside organisations having diverse and sometimes confliction paradigmatic stands, there is bound to be severe conflicts and misunderstandings within the organisations or project that could be highly detrimental to the initiative.

Box 10: Personal unions and resolution of conflicts

A conflict have been ranging over the years over the ownership of a piece land in which hundreds of individuals had occupied, lived and worked informally as mechanics, vendors, and other informal and quasi-legal activities. Even though the land was partly in the Nairobi’s river valley, it was very strategically located, next to the CBD, it was a ‘prime land’. In due course, this land was formally allocated to a leading mosque in Nairobi who wanted to use the land, and therefore sought the eviction of the ‘squatters’ who had occupied the land for many years. Predictably, the ‘squatters’ refused and a bloody protracted conflict ensured that drew in several politicians, the police, criminal gangs, and the squatters themselves that lasted for several years with numerous battles, that resulted wanton destruction of property, injuries and deaths, and often violent forceful evictions followed by resettlement soon after the violence quelled. However the entry in to the situation of a politician, who was also a senior government official, a church leader, and a somewhat respected mother figure, seemed to help quickly and amicably resolve the situation. The mosque agreed to acquire another piece of land to which the squatters agreed to move to. Apparently the personal unions and the various capacities (an many hats) the politician occupied permitted the connections with various group, expedited negotiations and attainment of an acceptable agreement to all parties. Being a politician enabled the meeting of the squatters at their level, explaining the situations to them and articulating their concerns to other parties. The politician need votes of the squatters and also the support of the powerful mosque leaders. Being a government official permitted access to state organs and other key an powerful personalities; it also carried an element of power and influence that could be brought to bear in the negations. Being are religious leader commanded respect in society, and among the squatters some of whom belonged to the politicians religious organisation, however more importantly religious leaders of various faiths in Nairobi usually shared various forums and activities and were colleagues for many years. In some, the balancing of not only interests and networks, but also perspectives that was permitted by the politician’s personal unions seemed to play a significant rol in the resolution of the hitherto protracted conflict.

While epistemic communities and personal unions offer several positive opportunities, they can also have downsides. They have the potential of become informal groupings in themselves, with some becoming ‘exclusive clubs’, and turning antagonistic to other epistemic communities. Indeed, Nairobi’s arena is awash with these groupings, which in some cases result in the escalation of misunderstandings, conflicts and other forms of infighting within and across organisations, with some epistemic communities looking upon others with disdain. Accordingly, they have the potential of making it even more difficult for actors to productively interrelate with others, and in this way play a role in perpetuating the urban South housing crisis.

In summation, all these could explain potential for conflict and misunderstanding; but also cooperation and mutual understanding; as well as effectiveness of initiatives and probability for success or failure. However these differences and implications between organisational and individual positions cannot be
captured by the standard stakeholder analysis. For instance, statements such as “according to the 
organisation... however according to my own opinion” were very common during the interview in the 
field study. However, they present a perplexing situation that is normally difficult to deal with in the 
typical stakeholder analysis approach, especially concerning which view to factor in between the 
official or personal positions. For instance two organisations (or nations) may have problematic 
relations and lack of trust, but the some individuals interviewed from the two organisations have 
cordial relationship, presenting the researcher a dilemma. Accordingly, these highlight the 
development of more nuanced and appropriate methodologies and approaches in attempting to 
understand or deal with the urban South housing crisis.

11.2.3. Internal and external perceptions

In examining the Nairobi’s housing arena, it was observed on the one hand that the actors and 
organisations perceived and described themselves particular ways that resulted in certain internal 
perceptions; but on the other hand these actors and organisations perceived and described by other 
actors and organisation in others ways that generated certain external perceptions. Accordingly the 
various internal and external perception were deduced on the basis of a critical analysis and 
evaluation of the actors’ statements and descriptions regarding themselves and others; given during 
the interviews and empirical survey, press reports and media statements, and following a scrutiny the 
of the actors’ documents. In addition, studies by actors on other actors, ongoing discourses and 
debates, and other scholarly evidence and sources were also consulted. These were augmented by 
critical observations of how the various actors and stakeholders treated and considered each other in 
the ongoing or planned initiatives. These were mapped in the DHG matrix to produce internal or 
external Perception Stance Matrix (PeSM), with the juxtapositions of PeSMs to show comparisons of 
the perceptions producing Perception Congruity Matrix (PeCM). Generally, there were massive 
differences between internal and external perceptions. Furthermore, these perceptions often differed 
radically from the stances observed by the researchers.

The observations above are exemplified by the internal and external perceptions of the government 
versus the affiliated slum residents of themselves and each other. The government, according to its 
own policy statements, reports, rhetoric by its bureaucratic and political leadership has showed deep 
concern with the urban housing problem, and had directed its efforts and priorities to solve the housing 
problem, and to improve the welfare of the urban poor and slum dwellers (Perscom, 2011). In contrast 
the affiliated residents scoffed at those governments statements terming them “an insult to our 
collective intelligence” (Perscom, 2011). According to the residents, the government was involved in 
token projects or initiatives just to improve its image amongst donors and foreign investors, and to 
pacify the vocal politicians and NGOs agitating for tangible action. To illustrate their point the cite the 
size of ongoing initiatives, which only target and also boast of addressing the needs of “only 0.01% of 
Nairobi’s slum population in the course of last ten years” (Perscom, 2011). In comparison, the 
government had secured or was in the process of securing funds, and had initiated or planned to 
initiate projects worth billions of dollars, such as Techno cities, high speed railways and 
superhighways in the same period. What’s more, those superhighways are traversing slum areas or
their connections to places of work, without any regard for the needs of pedestrians, resulting in numerous fatal road accidents almost on a daily basis (Standard, 2013b, Standard, 2013a). The “tiny government housing initiatives” (Perscom, 2011) are just to get votes, and meant to benefit only a small section of privileged slum dwellers, “using money collected from all of us, or for all of us” (Perscom, 2011). Moreover, while the government insists it has institutionalised participatory and inclusive practices in slum upgrading activities, these residents describes governments involvement with them in projects as merely informational, decree, manipulation and instrumental at best. The in the residents’ view, some the stakeholder forums were just like “being in a classroom” (Pers.com1, 2011). Moreover, the face of government that the residents encountered more often was that of the Provincial Administration and its police, who have often subjected them to intense harassment. In sum, while the government's documents and officials assert government’s commitment to effectively engage with the housing problem, the affiliated residents do not agree, they hold a contrary opinion.

Similarly, these residents describe themselves as extremely hardworking and most exploited people in Nairobi who contribute a fair or even greater share to the national wealth. Hence, they demand or expect fair treatment from the government and other stakeholders, and mostly protection from exploitation, marginalisation, oppression, and injustice, meted upon them by other societal actors and stakeholders, including some government officials. However, several government agencies, and personalities in the government, have treated and described them as “lazy and worthless individuals, who spend their whole day in illegal alcohol dens, waiting for the government to do everything for you, loafing around just waiting for donations and handouts from the government… and when you fall into a ditch because your drunkenness you still blame the government for it” (Senior.Govt, 2012). Some slum dwellers have also been depicted as “career participators” moving from one NGO activity to another, and attending ‘all’ government sponsored forums with the hope of soliciting donations and “participation allowances” from the officials (Pers.com.MHous, 2011). Other residents have also been described as purposely living dangerously, living in hazardous location of free choice, and being engaged in perilous occupations due to their “greed”. A case in example is the 2011 oil pipeline fire explosion the killed and injured hundreds of slum dwellers in Sinai, Nairobi (UNEP/OCHA, 2011). Several studies and a law court process pointed out that the slum dwellers were not to blame for the tragedy; they were going on with their day to day activities, when colossal amounts of oil from a leaking nearby pipeline spilled into a river following through the slum and exploded, as the residents were preparing breakfast on open fires. However, government reports and statements of its officials (and also some news reports), squarely blamed the slum dwellers for the tragedy claiming they had gone to collect the spilled oil for sell, and in the process one of the had lit a cigarette, triggering the explosion (BBC, 2011, UNEP/OCHA, 2011). Consequently, contrary to their own positive self perceptions, the affiliated residents are not viewed in a very positive light by many government officials.
Table 91: PeSM 1 internal: How the government perceived itself (2011-2013)

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Main Positions

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Table 92: PeSM 1 External: Government as perceived by affiliated slum dwellers (2011-2013)

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<td>Inter</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Positions

Table 93: PeCM 1: Government internal vs external perceptions - aff. slum dwellers (2011-2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Struct.</th>
<th>Signification</th>
<th>Exclusivist</th>
<th>Modernisation</th>
<th>Basic needs</th>
<th>Neoliberalism</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Good Governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Domination</td>
<td>Privilege</td>
<td>Modesty</td>
<td>Basic need</td>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Sustainable dev</td>
<td>Pact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legimation</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Welfareist</td>
<td>Managerialist</td>
<td>Inclusivist common future</td>
<td>Pluralist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model</td>
<td>Interpretative</td>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Progress</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Free market</td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Facility</td>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>Provider</td>
<td>Enabler</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Force/ plunder</td>
<td>Expertise/ funds</td>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>Incentives</td>
<td>Rights</td>
<td>Voice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Segregation</td>
<td>Civic engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Decree</td>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Intercession</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Benevolent</td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Collaborative</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
<td>Regulation</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Congruence

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal perceptions/incongruence (how Govt. perceived itself)</th>
<th>External perceptions/incongruence (how Govt. was perceived by aff. residents)</th>
<th>Congruence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Notes:
- Out of 43 positions, only 6 have congruence
- The government claims Basic needs, Sustainability and Good governance, but slum dweller see government as subscribing to Exclusivism
- There is some congruence in Modernisation and Neoliberalism though scantily.
Notes:
- Out of 33 mapped positions, only 2 have congruence.
- The affiliated residents see themselves as extremely hardworking but exploited citizens demanding their fair share of the governmental output, protection, and inclusion, to be fairly assisted to overcome the difficulties.
- To the government, the affiliated residents are seen as lazy individuals waiting, expecting, and demanding handouts, but at the same time criminals and 'eyesores' negatively impacting the image of the city, tourism, investment, and trade.
For most of the actors and organisations observed in course of the study, there were massive differences between internal perceptions (PeSM internal) and external perceptions (PeSM external); which also often differed greatly from the stances deduced by the researchers Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM). Hence in addition to contradictions between the actors revealed through the Paradigmatic Congruity Matrices (PCMs), there were also colossal contradictions arising from the perception as uncovered by the Perception Congruity Matrices (PeCMs). Indeed, even from preliminary observations and analysis, it could readily be observed that most of the actors to a certain extend either tended to misrepresent themselves and others, or exhibited various degrees of misperception concerning themselves and others. Indeed many actors expressly stated that more often than not, they felt that their organisations and themselves were usually misperceived, misunderstood, and misrepresented by other actors in the arena; such that their roles and actions where usually mistaken, and their intentions misconstrued. Apparently, it is highly probable that the actors often viewed themselves and other mutual through their own paradigmatic lens that contributed to the distortion of those perceptions and images. As a consequence, and probably more importantly, it most likely that it is on the basis of these distorted images of each other, produced by their divergent lenses (probably reflecting their own paradigmatic tensions) that these actors acted, interacted and interrelated with each other. Hence, these perceived paradigmatic positions play a very significant role in defining relations in the housing arena, and could greatly impact the outcome of an initiative.

Certainly, actors’ perceptions may play a very significant and critical role in conditioning their interactions and interrelations, since these perceptions also constitute the stocks of knowledge and memory traces these actors inform themselves concerning other actors and the external contexts (Giddens, 1984b, Sewell, 1992). As such, these perceptions became the basis upon which the agents evaluate the potential results of their actions and interactions, and for which they make accounts of and offer reasons for, in their production and reproduction of interaction (Giddens, 1984b, Darley, 1991, Sewell, 1992). These perceptions are also implicated in the formation of ‘rules and resources’ embedded in agents' memory traces, the agents draw upon these memory traces to perform actions, based on their ‘Knowledgeability’; the perceptions thus become both the main ‘medium and outcome’ of their practices which constitutes social systems that influence those ‘knowledgeable’ agents to act in a certain way (Giddens, 1981 p. 27).

In summation
The actors or organisations perceived themselves in particular ways that resulted in certain internal perceptions; but were also perceived by other actors in others ways that generated often different external perceptions. Comparisons of these perceptions by juxtaposing two or more PeSMs produced Perception Congruity Matrix (PeCM).

- Almost all actors perceived themselves different from how they were perceived by other actors (differences internal and external perceptions)
- The actors often viewed themselves and other mutual through their own paradigmatic lens that contributed to the distortion of those perceptions and images.
In many cases both the internal and external perception differed from the PSM (the researcher’s observations)

This reveals the differences between their narratives and actual actions, and helps explain inconsistencies between their discursive conscious and unconscious motivations for actions

These perceptions are mostly not the accurate positions, but formed the basis of most interactions, and even stakeholder analysis. Most actors make decisions based on these perceptions have the potential of leading to massive misunderstandings profound lack of common ground. Thus actors who should ostensibly cooperate often fail to do so. Accordingly, the complexity and contradiction wrought by these perceptions highly increase the likelihood of actors talking past each other, that could result resulting in ill-founded misunderstandings and pointless disagreements to the detriment of initiatives and the housing situation as a whole.

**The consequences of perceptions**

In as much these preconceptions and descriptions are partially based on some truth, and even evidence can be adduced for the same, they are highly distorted, stereotypical and prejudicial notions of each other, and cannot be said to be a fully accurate picture. Entering a collaborative initiative with these false notions of other actors would most likely jeopardise a project, ether reducing its envisioned effectiveness or actually thwarting it all together from the outset or in the course of the project. It is probable that these faulty notions and perceptions could have caused the premature termination of various initiatives in Nairobi.

The contradictions between the internal and external perceptions have the potential to generate a number of problems at various levels. For instance, the distorted perceptions can make two actors who are in actual fact closer to each other paradigmatically, suppose that they are much further apart, thereby creating unnecessary tensions and mistrust, especially at the beginning of initiatives. These faulty preconceived perceptions and notions of other actors could produce a total breakdown of communication or cooperation, preclude opportunities of positive engagement, thwart productive initiatives and tremendously increase the conflict potential. Similarly, mismatches in approaches, wrongly targeted initiatives, lack of ownership or acceptance in certain initiatives could be attributable to these faulty ascriptions or misconceptions of other actors. Most of the past initiatives from public housing, site and services schemes, and slum upgrading have often ended up benefit higher income groups, rather than the target groups. In the final analysis “down raiding” and gentrification could also be partial attributable to these misperceptions relating to the paradigmatic stances and role of all the actors involved in the arena. Additionally, the slum dwellers and slumlords have not improved the housing conditions even after the provision infrastructure and land titles as expected by other actors (Gilbert, 2002, De Soto, 2009). In the same way private sector actors have failed to get actively involved in producing shelter for the low income groups despite massive outlay of initiatives by the government. Correspondingly, various actors faulty project certain roles to other actors. They expect them to act in a definite way or play a particular role which is not what they envisioned for themselves, this could ultimately lead to programme failures.
Conversely, these misperceptions could also make a set of given actors envisage themselves as being closer paradigmatically while in actual fact they are much further apart. Initially, this could bring them together and lead to collaborative or joint initiatives. However, in the course of the initiative the actual positions became apparent and great expectations eventually turn to huge disappointments, erosion of trust, disagreements, antagonism, animosity, and even violent conflicts as experienced in various slum upgrading projects in Nairobi (Otiso, 2003, Kusienya, 2004, Maupeu, 2004). Consequently, the actors’ perceptions or misperceptions of other mutual actors and stakeholder have the potential of greatly magnifying the problems already posed by the heterogeneity and contradiction in paradigmatic stances. The often highly distorted images of other actors becomes the basis of structuring actions, interactions, and interrelations, thereby further exacerbating and escalating a situation that is already highly complicated.

11.2.4. An illustration: Paradigmatic Modalities of Interaction

In summing up the discussions in this section, an illustration of a situation in KESUP is highlighted. Most of the actors and stakeholders at various levels in the Nairobi’s housing arena are not in complete agreement as to what constitutes the best or effective approach towards the housing problem. A case in point is a strategy report for Kenya by SIDA that states that “Although KENSUP aims to scale nationally, programme implementation does not conform to tested approaches and the KENSUP strategy itself” (SIDA, 2010 p. 11). There the report goes on to propose more technical support to the Ministry of Housing to shift its approach. It is also worth noting that SIDA in conjunction with other Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies had played a role in developing the KENSUP strategy. This simple statement could have many connotations that could be subjected to various interpretations. For instance, this could mean KENSUP and SIDA did not share the same perspective concerning the housing problem in question, and believed the other was not perusing the right approach. Conversely, it could also suggest that the two organisations did not share the same internal and external perceptions of each other, they viewed each other through certain lenses, that produced various images each other that were probably not consistent with the true picture. The fact the KENSUP appeared not follow its own strategy could have meant either KENSUP did not have ownership of the strategy, or its paradigmatic positions had changed in the course of the project, or it was not the same as what was proposed in the document. It could also mean the implementing staff did not share the same perspective as their Ministry. Accordingly, in the following year SIDA report states that “The main problems during the year included weak capacity of implementing partners and poor coordination with the government” (SIDA, 2011 p. 16). These are just but a few revelations that point out to paradigmatic contradictions and inconsistencies that play out in addressing complex multifaceted problems like the urban South housing crisis. It could point out as to why it effective solutions and outcomes have been elusive.
Table 97: Interactions: Paradigmatic Complexities and Contradictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario setting</th>
<th>Dominant paradigm (DP)</th>
<th>Organisation I (OP₁)</th>
<th>Organisation II (OP₂)</th>
<th>Actor I (IP₁)</th>
<th>Actor II (IP₂)</th>
<th>Actor III (IP₃)</th>
<th>Actor IV (IP₄)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideal situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is usually assumed that individual actors and organisations subscribe to the dominant paradigms such that the dominant paradigm (DP) is similar to the organisation’s paradigm (OP) and the individual’s Paradigm (IP), i.e. DP=OP=IP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observed situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>However in most cases the dominant paradigm (DP) was not fully followed by the organisations, and the group’s/organisation’s paradigm (OP) was not fully subscribed to by the individual actors (staff); individual’s Paradigm (IP) i.e. DP ≠ OP ≠ IP.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 1: Typical actor</td>
<td>Most actors did not fully subscribe to both the dominant paradigm (DP) and the group’s/organisation’s/official paradigm (OP₁) i.e. DP ≠ OP₁ ≠ IP₁.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2: Two organisations</td>
<td>Organisations did not fully subscribe to the dominant paradigm (DP), nor share their stances (OP₁) with other organisations and groupings i.e. DP ≠ OP₁ ≠ OP₂.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3: Two actors in the same organisation</td>
<td>The actors do not share their paradigmatic stances, not fully subscribe to the organisations official paradigm (OP₁) which they shared, and also the dominant paradigm (DP) i.e. IP₁ ≠ IP₂ but share OP₁.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 4: Two actors in two organisations (double incongruence)</td>
<td>Not only are their official/organisational paradigmatic stances different, but also their individual stances i.e. OP₁ ≠ OP₂ and IP₁ ≠ IP₃.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 5: Two actors in two organisations (Epistemic community)</td>
<td>Even though their official/organisational paradigmatic stances are different, their individual stance are similar i.e. OP₁ ≠ OP₂ but OP₂ = IP₃.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Role of internal and external perceptions
All the scenarios above are completed further as actor viewed themselves, other actors, and organisations through paradigmatic lenses which distort their perceptions; the resultant distorted images partly form the basis of their interactions. In most cases the internal and external perceptions were different, as well as both differed from the observed stances i.e. OP¹ ≠ OP₂, IP¹ ≠ IP₂, etc.
Since all action and interaction solely takes place through the individual actors, their modalities of interrelations are of utmost importance especially when dealing with multifaceted and complex phenomena such as the urban South housing crisis, which by the way of its nature has attracted myriads of interested actors. Accordingly, the Nairobi’s informal housing actors, in the courses of their day-to-day actions and interactions in the arena, encounter several structures and interaction modes at various levels which are sometimes consentient but sometimes inconsistent. As observed in this section, the actors are confronted with a multiplicity of antagonistic structures and interrelations beset with numerous contradictions:

- Firstly, they encounter the societal dominant paradigm, which may not be consistent their personal positions, that of their organisations, or those of other actors with whom they interact in the arena.
- Secondly, either as individuals or when representing their organisation or actor groupings, they are they confronted with the contradiction between their internal self perceptions and external perceptions, as they are viewed by other actors or stakeholders.
- Thirdly, the individual actors have their own pragmatic positions that might either be enabling or limiting their fruitful association with other actors. Thus, their positions might lead either to harmonious or discordant interrelations with other mutual actors in the arena.
- Moreover, whereas it is those contradictory structures that condition the actions and interactions these actors, it is these very actions and interactions maintain, reproduce, or modify those contradictory structures.

It is in these milieux that initiatives take place, highlighting the difficulty encountered in attempting to achieve sustained concerted efforts towards the urban South housing crisis. As consequence this heterogeneity and contradictions arising from inconsistencies between societal dominant paradigms, organisations, perceptions, individuals, and their interrelations, escalate the problems. In as much as the Urban South housing crisis is complex and multifaceted and requires sustained concerted effort, this state of affairs could dramatically diminish effectiveness of initiatives probably contributing to the housing problem to seem ‘unsolvable’ (Orbit, n.d.)

Another point illustrated by strategy report and related statements above is the role of the actors and stakeholders with more facilities to propagate some sort of paradigmatic shift in the societal dominant perspectives, in organisations, and individuals. Through financial and technical support, that often involves staff training, ‘indoctrination’ and suggestion of ‘best practises’, entities such as the multilateral and bilateral organisations, and also powerful governmental, civil society and private sector players, often attempt to change the perspectives of relatively weaker actors and stakeholders, either through coercion or persuasion. Nevertheless, as observed here, these actions often result only in changes of official positions, organisational positions, or sometimes only in name, while the individual actor’s paradigmatic stances of many remain unchanged. This also points out to the dynamics of paradigmatic change as shall be discussed in subsequent sections.
11.3. Dynamic paradigmatic dimensions

Paradigm shifts have been observed in the problem-solution conceptualisation of numerous societal issues in both theory and practice. Concerning the urban South development, governance, and housing issues, this study observed decadian paradigmatic shifts that produced six dominant paradigms since the 1950s. The expectation was that the dominant paradigm would be fully adhered to by all involved organisations and individual actors. Nonetheless as pointed out in this study, this was not the case; there was great variance in the paradigmatic stances amongst the actors, groupings, and organisations, and most of their positions did not fully comply with dominant paradigm. Accordingly, the dominant paradigm emerged, rose to prominence, and then lost its position as it was replaced by the next one. Organisations adopted new positions and dropped others. Individuals accepted some positions and rejected others, which were sometimes not consistent with the official position stated by their organisations, or expected on their grouping. There were also observable different rates of change and persistence and in paradigmatic stances and perceptions among the actors and organisations. In the course of actors interactions the individual, official, and dominant paradigms were constantly changing such that observed positions could only be valid for a particular time-space. There was extreme dynamism. Hence as observed by Ley (2010) the actors’ attitudes and attributes were ‘moving targets’ in any analysis or initiative. This dynamism could be attributable both to the actions of actors, structural and contextual issue. The paradigms they were constantly conditioned by numerous agency and structural forces that led to their persistence or change. All in all these dynamic paradigmatic dimensions further complicate the actors’ interrelations and interactions, increasing the potential for misunderstanding, lack of common ground, ineffectiveness of initiatives, and persistence of the urban South crisis.

11.3.1. Dynamism at the dominant, official, and individual levels

In view of the above, it can be said that dynamic paradigmatic dimensions are implicated at the dominant, official, and individual actors’ levels. Paradigms do shift or persist, are accepted or rejected, and gain prominence or lose it; in time-space, locations, organisations, and actors. Thus the paradigmatic stances, perceptions, and their comparisons are never static but are constantly changing as the actors interact and interrelate with one another in time-space. New paradigms emerge and become dominant, but are subscribed to by the different organisations and actors at different rates and depths, depending on various factors; similarly, as the actors continue to interact and engage with their contexts, these paradigms either remain prominent or lose their appeal and the actors and organisations became more convicted or disenchanted, dropping or holding onto the paradigms at different rates and intensity. Nevertheless, how new paradigms emerge, become prominent, shift, and lose prominence is beyond the scope of this study, whose main focus is largely the probing the existence of static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions, and their implication in the urban South housing arena.

**Dominant paradigms**

Dominant paradigms comprise of system of thought and values that are considered the most standard at a given historical moment, influencing the definitions, framings, justification, governance
arrangements, problem-solution and approaches that are considered most appropriate for that epoch. This study examined the decadian shifts in the dominant paradigm that took place at a global scale and permeated to almost all societal aspects and lives of individuals in the urban South. Since 1950s, and with deepening globalisation, the dominant paradigms and their shifts influenced the behaviour and circumstances of the actors and organisations either directly or indirectly as well as in large or small degrees. Changes in political, production and regulation regimes in hegemonic countries induced drastic changes in urban housing conditions and approaches even in very peripheral countries. Consequently, on the one hand, it could be argued that shift in the dominant paradigms are brought about by the context of the historical moment and zeitgeist; on the other hand it could be argued that it is the actions and interactions of actors that shape those historical moments and precipitate those paradigm shifts.

In many cases shifts in the dominant paradigms have been attributed to the interests to the powerful actors with more access or resources; however this may not always be the case, convictions of even weak actors might also have a significant impact. In urban South housing issues, new approaches and attitudes towards housing have been mainly attributed the powerful multilateral and bilateral organisations such the World Bank, UN-Habitat, and UNPD among others with massive financial or signification might, as well as colossal framing, norming, or legitimating power. The conduct of these multilateral and bilateral organisations is in turn greatly influenced by the interests and convictions of the hegemonic countries, their governments and political leaders in a given era. Furthermore apart from powerful exogenous government and their agents, multinational corporations, and international civil society, powerful endogenous actors in the government, civil society, and private sector have also played a significant role in this.

In this way, dominant paradigm shifts have been seen to be precipitated by entry of new dynamic leaders, governments, and other powerful actors or organisations that introduce or support new paradigms, outlining, propagating, and giving legitimacy and credence to certain normative directions. This may involve funding certain approaches and initiatives, as well as funding further research towards that paradigm; extensive and positive media coverage; conferences and global summits devoted to discussing and disseminating ideas central to a given paradigm. Thus scholars and researchers produce more works on the paradigm, with journals and editors publishing more on the line of thought for the academic community, while journalist and mass media actors widely disseminate the paradigms information to the wider public community. Furthermore, in educational institutions, the educators propagate the paradigm's ideas by teaching them to students. Thus non-hegemonic ideas often fall out the syllabus and syllabus and curriculum, and it becomes difficult to publish academic works or get positive media coverage for ideas that go against the dominant paradigm, thereby contributing to the persistence and dominance of a given paradigm for a certain epoch. Seemingly, actors with more access to resources, either material goods or authoritative, would influence more which system of thought would become the dominant paradigm.
In the neoliberalist era, the above was exemplified by conduct of the World Bank, IMF, and other organisations in private, public, and civil society sector, to make neoliberalism the dominant paradigm, and the acceptable perspective for organisation and individual actors. These included aid conditionalities, ‘shock therapy’, and ‘executive training programmes’ for the key indigenous actors in Global South governments. In that period both prospective governors and those already in government, some without any previous economic training, were regularly ferried to the international organizations head offices and functions by economic policy think tanks, investment banks, and foreign business schools; where they were ‘fed a steady diet of neo-liberal ideas’ (Gumede, 2007 p 72). In some Global South countries leaders who had undergone these type of training such as ‘the Chicago Boys’ were helped to ascend to power as zealous advocates of neoliberalism (Kolodko and Brand, 2013). Furthermore in that era, the projects and funding were aimed at influencing the relationship between governments and their citizens for instance by reframing their entitlements, and placing constraints over the political engagement modes (Mattingly et al., 1984). Global South government we supposed to learn to “understand things the Bank’s way” (Mattingly et al., 1984 pp 9-10); and adopt the bank’s language, conceptions and approaches; and gain ‘institutional competence’ such that they could ‘educate’ others on the same. The funding for initiatives also included specific ‘tool kits’. Accordingly, these actions, which involved massive control of authoritative and allocative resources, were aimed at precipitating paradigm shifts not only at the dominant level, but also at organisational and individual levels.

The situations described above seem to give credence to the idea that paradigm shifts and dominant paradigms are merely expression of the ruling classes’ ideas i.e. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas”, since this class not only controls the means of both material and mental production, it also regulates the production and distribution of those ideas. Thus dominant paradigms and shifts could merely be the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, of with those lacking the means of production become subject to (Marx and Engels, 1970 p 64). However, the previous analyses, interpretations and discussions in this study adduce evidence that suggest that this many may not always be the case.

Ordinary citizens and lay actors also played a significant role in producing and making some paradigms dominant, and contributed to the fall of others. Thus dominant paradigms are not always the ‘ideas of the ruling class’. The paradigmatic processes are not always top down, but they can also be bottom up or horizontal. ‘Several decades have seen dominant paradigms which were contradictory to the interests of the ruling classes. Even though they were fiercely opposed by the ruling classes, these ‘underdog’ ideas reigned supreme in some decades. This is exemplified by the Basic Needs and Sustainability paradigms which went against the grain of the interests of the power global capital interests. Indeed, the hegemonic Neoliberalism was overthrown with the ensuing paradigm shift to the largely counter-hegemonic Sustainabilism. Consequently, it may be inaccurate to equate dominant paradigms with the ruling class power, or vested interests’; as is typified by the role of lay actors, civil society and epistemic communities in the rise of Sustainability paradigm. Furthermore, the dominance of a paradigm depends on the genuine acceptance of the paradigm by other actors. Whereas
‘retraining’, education and convictions through good arguments and reasons may result in changes in paradigms in society, organisations, and individuals, use of coercive means, negotiations, bargaining, and conditionalities, as is usually the case, usually results on in the ‘relabeling’ of practices, which in fact remained unchanged as ‘old wine in new bottles’. This relabeling of practices could be consciously, so as to access new funds, to remain relevant in the new dispensation, or please the more powerful actors or manipulate the ordinary citizens and mutual actors. It could also be unconscious; as the actors believed and claimed they followed the current paradigm but in fact unconsciously continued with their old practices and perspectives, as uncovered by the analyses in the preceding parts of this chapter. Thus existence of a ‘dominant paradigm’ does not mean that all members of society subscribe to it, in the same magnitude and at the same time, but this varies, across time, space, organisations, groupings and individual actors. Nevertheless all actors and organisations, both weak and powerful, will in one way or another be influenced by the dominant paradigms and react to it. For instance powerful multinational corporations began to engage in ‘greenwashing’ practices to remain relevant in the sustainability era (Kahle and Gurel-Atay, 2013).

Organisations and groupings
Organisations and groupings can be observed to subscribe to particular paradigms at given time-space, and also be subjected to paradigm shifts over time and space as well as within themselves; in relation to the dominant paradigm, the stances and perceptions of other mutual organisations, as well as the stances and perceptions of actors in that particular organisation and other mutual organisations. Actors in an organisation are required and expected to conduct themselves in a particular way based on rules and regulations of the organisations. In groupings, such as slumlords, slum dwellers, a group of civil societies, and others, the actors are grouped based on their roles in the arena which are most likely to predispose the actors to behave in a certain way. Being assigned to or associated with a group or organisations automatically comes with expectations of certain perspectives and actions. Indeed, according to Giddens (1984) all organisations involve some sort of co-ordination of interaction flows in timespace and some channelling of relations through regularised contexts and locales. Consequently organisations are usually associated with certain paradigms, which influence the interactions of actors with and outside the organisation. These often become the actors’ official paradigms for a particular time, space, and situation. The actors are expected to adhere to these official paradigms, and often discursively proclaim them. However how much of the official paradigms the actually subscribe to often remains in question; some actors adhere more closely to it than others, while other actors hold stances that are completely different and even contradictory to their organisations. Similarly, organisations had written and publicly proclaimed stances that were different from the actual modus operandi that was observable and gave the de facto paradigms of the organisations. The differences or shifting from the official to actual paradigms, as well as from de jure to de facto paradigms could be indicative of two things; either there were differences from the onset, or the position have changed in course of interactions especially with experiences and relations that challenge the initial stances. Accordingly, just like the dominant paradigms, organisations’ and groupings’ paradigms are continuously subjected to change and transformation, especially due to shifts in dominant paradigm and individual stances.
In the same manner as the dominant paradigm shifts, shifts in organisations’ paradigms may emanate from within and without, from numerous sources and scales. These shifts may be induced by shift in the dominant paradigm and those of individual actors; conversely organisations are the main sources, propagators, and vehicles for the dominant paradigm shifts through the actions of individual actors; but also organisations influenced paradigms shifts among individual actors. As individual actors interact within an organisation and with actors from other organisations, they may be influenced by, or induce paradigmatic changes in their own organisations, in other organisations, and ultimately in the dominant paradigm. This could be facilitated by epistemic communities, personal unions, joint programmes, training, funding and ‘toolkits’, among other myriad ways. Indeed many paradigmatic dynamics became visible in society because certain organisations espoused and propagated them. For instance approaches such as ‘site-and-services’ or ‘enabling policies’ became prominent as they were espoused by the World Bank and other organisations, and this influence passed down to government ministries, departments, and sections, which in turn became part of the propagators and implementers on the ground. In this way organisations seem to be one of the main carriers and vehicles for paradigmatic shifts, as they influence the conduct on their own personnel, of other organisations, and ultimately make the dominant paradigm visible. By large dominant paradigms are espoused through programme documents as well as objectives, visions, and mission statements of organisations.

The World Bank provides a good case for discussing paradigmatic dynamics of and in organisations since it has been deeply and continuously involved in development and Global South issues for several decades, and its cases have been well documented and extensively studied by numerous scholars from various angles. Nevertheless all the organisations in the urban South arena involve various degrees of paradigmatic dynamics; that further complicate issues in arena.

It might be had to establish what influence the other between the dominant paradigm, the actors, and the organisations. For example, the shift of World Bank’s towards meeting the basic needs of people in the Global South and dealing with urban South issues has been attributed to entry of Robert McNamara in 1968; while the Bank’s shift Neoliberalism has been attributed to entry of A.W. Clausen and replacement of many members of McNamara’s staff. This arose from and contributed to a shift from the need to address social inequalities and provision of basic needs by government actions towards emphasis of free markets and private sector based on a new conservatism in economic policies. However, did the changes in World Bank and other organisation result only from the entry or new key personnel, or did the dominant paradigm shift from basic need to neoliberalism demand change not only in the mission, objectives, and practices of the organisation; but also a change in its staff composition and leadership.

Additionally, in the 1970s and 1980s, the success of World Bank’s initiatives presented as being predicated upon the organisation building up a body of staff who ‘know the game’ and producing a ‘kit of tools’ that permitted the fine-tuning of the organisations product line such as sites-and-services and full cost recovery. The trained staff embarked on field missions with zeal to propagate the Bank’s
perspectives, but due to their experiences, they soon realised the Bank’s perspectives had to be modified and adapted to the realities on the ground. From the perspective of the field mission staff, the borrowing countries’ actors and their organisations seemed to just to ‘put up’ with the ‘technical assistance’ because they needed the financial part. Therefore field mission staff and the borrowers began negotiating and agreeing to conditionalities with the understanding that in their execution there will be a degree of ‘softness’ (Mattingly et al., 1984). Some of the field staff’s reservations and accommodations made their way into project reports that went back to the headquarters, contributing to assessments and evolution of the programmes. As a consequence, whereas the actors in any given organisations are expected to conduct themselves in a certain manner so as to enhance the mandate of the organisation; in course of interactions the actors contribute to the shifts in the organisational de facto paradigm, which may eventual feed back to the documents and de jure paradigm, and may even precipitate a shift in the dominant paradigm.

Alternatively, paradigm shifts at the dominant, organisational, or individual level may result not only in the changes or enhancement of roles in the existing organisations; it may also lead to the emergence of new organisations grouping. As a case in point, Neoliberalism and Sustainabilism lead to emergence of numerous civil society actors and saw their mandates and roles in society increase, both to step in the space left by the withdrawal of the state, and also to act as the defender of the ordinary citizens. At the same time the increasing role of the civil society contributed to the rise so Sustainabilism as shown in the Rio Earth Summit, Agenda 21 and Istanbul Declaration. The civil society agitation contributed to the revision of the Washington Consensus, the birth of Neoliberalism with a ‘human face’, and fight against corruption and impunity, that played a role in the rise of Good Governism in other organisations and groupings as well as the dominant paradigm.

Some organisations and groupings have institutional memory, mandates and roles in society, histories, composition of actors, which predisposes them not only to accept or reject other paradigms, but also predisposes them to certain degrees of paradigmatic persistence and shifts. For example, it might not be reasonable to expect a slumlord to embrace wholeheartedly the good governance or sustainable development approach to housing that would see the slumlord lose power and access to lucrative slum business. New organisations tend to embrace new paradigms, while old ones cling to older paradigms, as exemplified by the PSMs in the foregoing sections. Organisations which have more collaborations and cooperation with others and whose personnel interact more often with others from other organisations, will be more inclined to more and rapid shifts, than a closed organisation with no much contact with others. Organisations with more resource and wider societal reach e.g. international, may influence paradigm shifts in others and in it the organisation itself, and its staff (due to numerous interactions, experience, and reach), at the same time organisations and grouping lacking resource and depended on others may be susceptible to more paradigm shift from others whom they depend upon funding and training. Nonetheless, even though at some levels organisations appear to be homogeneous entities, organisations are usually composed several individual human actors, usually with high heterogeneous paradigmatic positions and perspectives; and the official organisation position though it guides the individuals actors, it is never full adhered to. Thus there are more
dynamics as the organisations and grouping are not only shaped by the dominant paradigmatic stances of the time-space, those of other organisations, its own personnel, and those in other organisations, but also vice versa as the organisations attempt to shape the paradigmatic stances of other involved entities. As illustrated by the ‘government’ being an entity in itself with a particular paradigm, but composed of ministries, department, sections, sub-sections, and other divisions down to the individual level; with each of these level and sub-levels not only being indentified with different paradigmatic stance and perceptions, but also persisting and changing at different rates. Thus are not only the organisations themselves subjected to paradigmatic dynamics, they are also subjected to numerous and hard to predict internal dynamics within themselves.

**Individual actors’ level**

Ultimately, dynamics in the dominant and organisational paradigms became possible and are enacted at the individual actors’ level. Indeed according to Giddens (1984) it is only human actors who can act, as they have reflexivity and knowability, which entails the ‘capacity to understand what they do while they do it’ (Giddens, 1984b p xxii). The time-space, organisations, countries, government, and other entities in society in themselves cannot act; rather it is the interacting human agents while accepting and rejecting certain elements of the paradigms, that those paradigms and their shifts at all those other levels become visible. Accordingly, paradigmatic dynamics involving both the stances and perceptions are observable in individual actors, between different actors, as well as within each actor in themselves (such as the consciousness levels that shall be discussed later); and all these against the background of the dominant and organisational paradigm shifts.

Furthermore Giddens (1984) asserts that human actors are ‘situated but not clueless’. They are influenced by the social structure, circumstances and conditions that surround them, yet they have a high degree of self-awareness and reflexivity. They are grounded in a social reality yet also capable of shaping it. Accordingly, factors influencing and determining paradigmatic dynamics at the individual levels include myriad factors; both inherent and extrinsic. For instance, based on actors attributes such as age, it has been observed or might be expected for older actors to hold on to some paradigms which they are familiar with and have come to trust; while younger ones may be predisposed to experimentation and thus more easily and quickly accept new paradigms, and drop old ones. The same goes to other attributes such as the actors’ positions in society, gender, wealth, training, religion, exposure, educational and cultural background, and many other innumerable factors. Furthermore, who the actor interacts with, the organisations they work in or relate to, their time of entry into those organisation and interacted with particular actors and in which situation and location, their epistemic communities and personal unions, among others will also play a key role in the paradigmatic dynamics. As highlighted before, by the staff’s reflection in World Bank housing initiatives and through their ‘learning by doing’, experience garnered in the field was fed back in to the organisation and lead to a slight shift the organisational paradigms; however the field staff underwent a more rapid shift that the office staff, such even thought their initial position was similar, in a short time the there was marked difference between them.

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In the case of Agarwala (in Box) a more nuanced and in-depth study of the application of his earlier economic theories and beliefs and based on experiences of their outcomes led a radical paradigm shift at the individual level, faster than his organisation and colleges could accommodated, leading to sanctions against him. Cases such as this, in which some actors after undergoing particular experiences, exposures, reflections, or changes in circumstances radically changed their position, or at different rates than others, were prevalent in Nairobi’s housing arena. Indeed it is the individual actors who are involved in the negotiations, learning, policy formulation, implementing initiatives, sanctioning certain actions and actors, interrelations, and all other interactions and practices that contribute to paradigmatic dynamics at the individual, organisational and dominant level. They are the ultimate carriers and shapers of paradigms and their dynamics. Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether it is individual inherent attributes or their circumstances that condition these dynamics. Certain inherent attributes of particular actors (and their practice) would make them rise to prominence, persist or shift in a particular rate in a given space and time. However, it was also other societal factors beyond anybody’s control that permitted this. The entry of new actors in a given arena and time-space my lead to certain dynamics, but also these dynamics may also lead to the entry of new actors. For instance, the coming to prominence of the Neoliberalist paradigm as a globally dominant paradigm was attributed to coming to power of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher; however it can also be argued there was already a paradigm shift taking place already, and it is this paradigm shift that brought the two leaders to power and not the other way round. Change in paradigms could lead to the purging of some actors and the entry of others in some organisation inducing different dynamics in those actors that leave, join, or remain in the organisation. Thus structure, agency, and contextuality issues may influence not only the paradigms the actors subscribe to and perceive, but also the rate at which they accept and reject them. In sum, these dynamics at the individual level highlights the complexity and difficulty of trying to understand a housing arena, and crafting effective and acceptable meaningful solutions. All in all the dynamism at the dominant, official, and individual levels involve other complexities and implications, some of which are highlighted below.

11.3.2. Rates of shifts and time lag

Cursory examinations of the housing arena in Nairobi and most of the urban South may present a sort of time lag in the acceptance of new paradigms depended on the level of the organisations’ or actors’ interaction in society scales. New paradigms are seen to emanate from the international scales and percolate steadily to the lower grassroots scale. Multilateral organisations and actors in them seem to always the avant-garde of paradigm shifts while those at the grassroots more conservative and ‘backward’. However this may not always be entirely true. As observed in the discussion above, paradigm shifts in dominant, official, and individual positions may happen at different rates and scales, with differences in of paradigmatic acceptance and penetration. As a consequence, individual actors at lower societal scales and ‘backward’ organisations often subscribed to more ‘recent’ paradigms than those at the upper scales and in ‘avant-garde’ organisations and vice-versa. This arises from or contributes to the formation of epistemic communities; contributing to further dynamics in actors’ positions, relations, and effectiveness of initiatives. Thus cursory observations and categorisation organisations and actors attributes mainly based on the scales of their operations might be misleading.
Due to this heterogeneity the actors and organisations are constantly bombarded by multiple influences regardless of their scales and levels, and the situation might be more complicated; but not as linear as it might appear at first.

11.3.3. Fickleness of actors and institutions

In most of the Global South situations change rapidly, further completing an already complex situation. Many urban South arenas are in the process of rapid transitions demographically, socio-economically, politically, culturally, and in many other numerous aspects. There also rapid and sometimes radical changes in government, national constituents, policy and regulatory framework, and approaches; induced by both endogenous and exogenous factors. The vulnerable positions of many of these countries make them highly susceptible to global geopolitical and economical forces; and their overly dependence of donors for financial and technical support for housing initiatives exposes there organisations, institutions, individuals, and their whole housing arena to more paradigmatic dynamics.

In the course of this study several actors and organisations changed, not only in form and composition, but also in perspective. Some actors and organisations disappeared all together and new ones appeared on the scene. For instance following the change on Kenya’s presidency in 2013, the Ministries of Housing of housing was relegated to a departments of the new Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban development, which apart from having new key persons and mandates, it had a changed philosophy, approach, and perspective towards the informal housing issue. NGOs has also seen drastic changes, with time some have changed from being right based to pragmatic ones, some from being antagonistic and confrontational with the government and multilateral organisations to cooperating with them in doing projects. At the same time, some personalities not being able to agree to the changes in their organisations, have left and formed or joined others which carry on with their previous approach and agenda. Some NGO personalities have joined the government and radically shifted their positions from being defenders of the poor and joined the ranks of those causing suffering and oppression. Some politicians have lost power, in have been replaced by those with different approaches. Some slum dwellers situations and status have improved have left the slums, while other have gotten poorer and disillusioned, some have become activists. Some organisation have ceased to exit, or some have stopped being involved in slum issues altogether. Because of paradigmatic shifts their raison d'être has ended.

11.3.4. Due to contextual changes

As observed above, most of the urban South is constantly subjected to radical, massive, and rapid contextual changes, with significant consequences. These changes induce induces the actors (and in turn organisations to behave in certain ways, including changes in their paradigmatic stances and perceptions. The urban South arena is not only affected by what happens locally, but also due to it dependencies changes in hegemonic countries have massive impacts in the local situations. This is exemplified by the stagflation and collapse of Fordism in the 1970s in Western countries that precipitated colossal paradigm shifts in numerous aspects in the Global South, including the issues of development, governance, and housing. In Nairobi, the exit of Moi’s regime, led to many NGOs lose
raison d'être; many had emerged solely to oppose the regime and its excess. Thus once this was
accomplish, many exited the scene and others changed from being right based and opposing the
government, and became pragmatic, and cooperated with the new government. Furthermore, during
Moi’s regime donors had withdrawn their support from Moi’s government and instead channelled this
aid through the civil society. However, there was resumption donor funding to new government of
Kibaki for initiatives. This shift could have been driven by interests and need to remain relevant in the
dispensation; however they also created or resulted from paradigmatic dynamics that could have
induced genuine shifts in perspectives and in actors and organisations. The Cold war led to many local
conflicts, resulting in many displaced people and growth of slums. Climate change induced problems
aggravated the housing situation even as these problems contributed to the rise of sustainability
paradigm. End of Cold war contributed to the rise of good governance. Accordingly, contextual issue
greatly contribute to the dynamics (and are also a result of these dynamics); necessitating the better
appreciation alongside paradigmatic issues.

11.3.5. Paradigms based on disciplinary foundations

Differences in training and experience may generate different paradigmatic stances and dynamics
among the actors, and the organisations they belong to. For instance, the UN approaches to
development has often differed from the economic orthodoxies of the World Bank, which could be
partly be attributable the staffs disciplinary or professional backgrounds. While the World Bank is
mainly staffed with economists with preference to neoliberal policies and other economic models,
[been dominated by single schools of thought, for the most part neo-classical economics as developed
in the Anglo-Saxon world](Jolly, 2004a, Ghai, 2008) [In contrast to the Bretton Woods institutions,
many UN agencies have staff from professional backgrounds in health, agriculture, education, social
protection, and labour standards who often adopt non-economic or multidisciplinary perspectives to
policy making, and who focus on problem-solving] in such as urban planning, housing and
environment. Accordingly, the nature of actors, and the composition of organisations my influence their
paradigmatic dynamics.

11.3.6. Role of dynamic paradigmatic dimensions in the urban South crises

This dynamism and different rates of shift could be a contributory factor of paradigmatic stance
discordance between actors, organisations, and the dominant paradigm. Accordingly, paradigms rise
or fall and they persist or change, among the diverse actors and organisations, and in the time-space
at different rates. Seemingly, some actors hold on to old paradigms, while other shift to new ones
quickly. Furthermore, paradigm shifts not only alters the roles and power relations of the existing
actors, it may also bring in new actors and organisations in the arena as well as lead to the exit of
others. Thus paradigm shift leads not only to changes in approaches but also meaning and definitions
of housing, power relations, justification for actions, normative and operational frameworks, among
others. For instance, in one paradigm ‘voice’ has is nothing, in another, voice becomes the most
important resource. For instance in one paradigm the civil society is not relevant; in another it is the
most important institution. Hence, on the one hand, a paradigm shift may lead to the entry of new
actors, and on the other hand the entry of new actors may lead to a paradigm shift at various levels. For instance, the coming to prominence of the Neoliberalist paradigm as a globally dominant paradigm was attributed to coming to power of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher; however it can also be argued there was already a paradigm shift taking place already, and it is this paradigm shift that brought the two leaders to power and not the other way round. All these means the paradigmatic positions are only valid at a particular time-space, they are moving targets. In the course on interactions paradigms are constantly conditioned by forces that either lead to their change, or in their maintenance. Consequently, these dynamics complicate the actors’ interrelations and interactions further, increasing misunderstanding, lack of common ground, and ineffectiveness of initiatives. On the other hand, it is through these dynamics that the actors can bridge the gaps between them, for instance through collaborative arrangements and good arguments, towards the attainment of common ground and better mutual understanding amongst themselves.

The dynamics contribute to the contrast between the official versions and the realities in actors’ stances and perceptions. These realities are often notoriously at variance with the moral, constitutional, legalistic, scientific, and other significations and justification that are given for that actors’ and organisations practices and behaviour. Nevertheless, the actors and casual observers are often oblivious of these differences necessitating deeper and more informed observations. What is regarded as common knowledge in never common, and with the dynamics these become even more contested. This make concerted effort difficult, as it often requires consensus, with the actors, organisations, politicians, bureaucracies, and targeted communities readily accepting the emergent paradigm shift are pertinent practices. However the dynamic may reduce the actors’ readiness to accept certain positions and perceptions that are required to make those prescribed practice possible.

Dominant paradigms may lead to the failure to question research findings, policies, approaches, and initiatives that agree with prevailing political and philosophical ideology and the validity of those finding are not questioned rigorously, compared to researches that question the dominant paradigms and approaches. Approaches based on the dominant paradigms usually assume a societal consensus, whereas in actual fact housing initiatives happen in a highly diverse and fragmented society. For instance, good governance and sustainable development based approaches, as well as the conceptualisation of many ongoing housing policies, programmes, and projects; either demand or presume a unanimity of paradigmatic stances and perceptions amongst the actors and organisations. They demand or presume a unanimity that is often inconsistent with the dynamics, fragmentations, and contradictions characterising the urban South housing arena as observed here. Whereas there is a dominant paradigm that in some way influence the interactions of most actors and organisation, assumptions of a singular static perspective or stance amongst all actors make several tools such as stakeholder analysis problematic for analysing interrelations or making interpretations concerning the same. Accordingly, paradigm shifts often lead to questioning what was once held as a given. Thus heterogeneity in paradigmatic dynamics, predisposes actors to constantly question what other mutual actor hold on as the truth or ‘best practice’; contributing to loss of trust, misunderstanding, conflicts, ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives. Actors who were once in agreement, some find themselves in
wide variance due to these dynamics. The dynamics lead to abandonment of initiatives, as exemplified by the floundering of the Basic Needs approaches with the rise of Neoliberalism; and also exit of personalities such as the ouster of Jimmy Carter’s presidency. The arena of Nairobi is awash with initiatives that lost their effectiveness, with changes in approach or actors. The dynamics induce changes the composition and roles of organisations, and the actors in them.

As a consequence, dynamics make it difficult to capture and predict actors and organisation positions, interrelations, and interactions over a long period of time, even the entire length of a project. What were once good relations may flounder as shifts take place differently in the organisation and among the actors. Hence, the dynamics make actor or stakeholder analyses only valid for a short period of time necessitating several probes in the course of the project or study. All in all, the paradigmatic dynamics may contribute to the failure of initiatives or loss of their effectiveness, worsening actor relations, and perpetuation of the urban South crisis. On the other hand the dynamics may help bridge the gap between actors and organisations and lead to better relations and mutual understanding, common ground, more effective initiatives, and ultimately contribute to the resolution of the urban South crises, if these dynamics can be better appreciated and handled in a more appropriate way, and applied optimally.

11.4. Structuration paradigmatic morphologies and processes
The preceding sections have explored issues of static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions in the urban South housing crisis in the Nairobi’s arena, by the applications of elements of Structuration Theory, especially by means of the DHG Matrix. Elements of the theory was therefore used to facilitate the creation of a theoretical thread that binds three critical urban South’s themes of development, housing, and governance; with their encompassing paradigmatic dimensions; as well as their implications on actors’ attitudes and attributes, their interrelations, and the ensuing consequences for the urban South crisis and housing situation. This section goes on to apply elements of the theory, to explore and interrogate the questions of structure-agency and the material and discursive issues surrounding the urban south housing and governance arena, its critical themes, as well as actors’ and interactions. On the basis of this theory’s perspectives on human behaviour premised upon a synthesis of structure and agency effects through its concept of ‘the duality of structure’, the theory is used to explore not only the social order and the patterning of human behaviour across space and time, but also the way structures are created, maintained, or modified in society, through human action and interaction. Accordingly, this section delves further into the discussion with further Giddensian elements in examining the urban South housing crisis; focussing on the mutual constitution of the urban South housing crisis on the one hand by the interactions of actors, and on the other hand by the existing or resultant social structures that condition those interactions; all these in relation to the various paradigmatic dimensions observed in this study. This is based on the Giddensian premises that agents and structures being mutually constitutive entities. Accordingly, following those premises, paradigms can be seen as seen as structuring, enabling, and constraining certain actions, interrelations, and interactions of the involved actors; and conversely, those actions, interrelations, and interactions can also be seen as constituting, reconstituting those paradigms and thereby either
transforming or maintaining them. Thus paradigmatic positions could be seen as encompassing structuration elements. Indeed it was on this basis that unique structuration sets were mapped for each paradigm through DHG Matrix, and actors’ stances, perceptions, and their comparisons were mapped.

As a consequence, this section pursues further the question of pertinent static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions that condition the actors’ interactions, interactions, and opportunities for action. These include issues the actors’ conscious and unconscious motivations, overt and hidden motives, as well as their acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions for action; followed by their rationalisations, ‘routinized’ tacit actions, well as their knowledgeability; and how all these relate to their actual actions, interrelations, and interactions versus their discursive descriptions of the same. As follows, these could have ensuing intended and unintended consequences that feed back to the above motives, condition, processes, and description, which result in either their maintenance or transformations following principles of ‘the duality of structure’. In this way, the study seeks to shed more light and make sense of the observations, analyses, and interpretations derived from the Nairobi’s housing arena and the revealed paradigmatic dimensions; how these condition the actors’ options for interactions such as cooperation, competition, conflict, misunderstanding, common ground, schisms, and factions; and finally, how those interaction options are related to the situation in the housing arena and the effectiveness of involved initiatives in Nairobi and the urban South. This is with the ultimate aim of uncovering the implications of all these to the entire urban South housing crisis, and the involved problem-solution nexus, both at a theoretical and practice level. Nevertheless, in Nairobi and most of the urban South housing arena, the structuration processes are mainly visible in the transformation or maintenance of structure and interaction modes as exemplified by the paradigmatic shifting or persistence, as well as the acceptance or rejection of paradigms.

11.4.1. The mutual constitution of structure and agency

The static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions discussed here, and in fact all the issues surrounding the urban South housing crisis, cannot be adequately explained by either structure or agency positions on their own, but by the mutual constitution of the two and close interrelationship between them; as implicated by the Giddensian ‘the duality of structure’ concept. Indeed the paradigmatic dimensions discussed in this chapter, for instance by means of the DHG matrix, contained but elements of structure and interactions, and modalities between them; with each paradigm being identified its own unique set of defining elements. Since a paradigm involves sets of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality for an individual actor, groups, organisations, or the society as a whole at a particular time; paradigms represent the underlying beliefs and theories as well as their resultant practices, actions and interactions. Paradigms served as cognitive maps and frameworks that helped actors to organise and make sense of ‘reality’, thereby constituting their visions of that reality, meanings, and other structural features; which in turn influence the actors’ actions, interactions, and relations with other actors. Correspondingly, dominant paradigms consist of widely held societal norms, meanings, and justifications in a given epoch. This
defines what perceived to be is wrong or right, and what should be done, by whom and to whom at a particular time. Thus its shift denotes a radical change how this society goes about understanding, organising, and dealing with societal issues; a replacement of the prevailing belief system for discussing, questioning and dealing with societal core issues. Hence dominant paradigms and their shift comprised part of the existing societal structures and their modifications, through the interactions of individual actors at various societal scales. Consequently, the paradigmatic dimensions in the urban South housing arena, at the dominant, organisational/group, and individual actors’ level, entail intricate structure and agency interrelationships.

On the one hand, the paradigmatic dimensions and involved structures served as part of the actors’ conscious and unconscious motivations, as well as acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions for actions; conditioning the actors’ interactions and interrelations. The paradigmatic dimensions comprised definitions, dominations, justifications, and other ‘rules and resources’ that facilitated or constrained certain actions of the actors, and influenced them to think, act, or perceive things in a particular way. Thus they comprised the frameworks within which the actors operated, and the actors were neither fully knowledgeable nor entirely free to choose their own actions, interactions, and interrelations. For instance, actors who see decent housing as being a privilege of a certain class or a preserve of a few might be inclined towards segregative and exclusivist practices; while actors who see it a basic need or right may learn in the direction of more empowering, inclusionary, and distributionary practices.

On the other hand, the paradigmatic dimensions and involved structures were only brought into being through the interrelating actors’ interactions. It was the interactions of actors led to the formation of paradigms, their reconstitution, maintenance, or modification. It was the actors’ agency that reproduced, maintained, or changed those paradigmatic dimensions. Hence, those paradigmatic dimensions existed only through the actors’ agency; though being socially constructed these dimensions did not have any inherent stability outside human action. The actors have to do certain actions for a paradigm to exist in society. In addition to creating the paradigm, accepting, and spreading it; the actors have to order their practices in a certain manner, for them to be said to be subscribing to a given paradigm. For instance, actors demanding accountability while engaging in negotiations and partnership as means of dealing with societal problem could be roughly characterised as those propagating the principles of the good governance paradigm.

Accordingly, whereas actors operated within the context of ‘rules and resources’ as partially defined by the paradigms they subscribed to, it was through the exercise of reflexivity that those paradigmatic dimensions were reinforced by the actors acting in a compliant manner, or modified when that actors acted in a manner that defied or degrade a particular paradigm. The actors were situated but not clueless, they had a degree of self-awareness and reflexivity that allowed them not only to be influenced by the paradigms, but also for them to influence the paradigms. Thus paradigmatic dimensions and involved structures were on the one hand the partial determiners of activity, and on the other hand they were activity dependent. They were both the medium and the outcome of actors’
practices in time and space; with neither the actors’ individual experiences nor the social totality having precedence over the other. In this way, the actions and interactions of actors in the housing arena was not solely the expression of the ‘will’ of the actors, nor solely a function of societal feature such as paradigmatic dimensions, but a dynamic relationship between structure and agency; involving the interaction of meanings, power and, values. Actors’ autonomy was influenced by the structures, and the structures maintained or modified by the actors exercising agency. Thus actors’ interactions, interrelations, their paradigmatic dimensions, and consequences encompass issues of structure, agency, and the interface between them. They involve ‘structuration’ processes that entail the ways in which social systems are produced and reproduced in social interaction; the way social relations are structured across time and space through the ‘duality of structure’; and the conditions that govern the transmutation or continuity of structures and the reproduction of social systems (Giddens 1984).

Structuration processes with their duality of structure or the mutual constitution of structure and agency are thus implicated in both the static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions. At any particular point in time and space, the static paradigmatic dimensions are instantiated in the actors’ actions and interactions, as they are conditioned by structures, and at the same time modify or maintain those structures. For instance, at any particular time-space, a certain mode of domination produces certain power relations, by means of certain resources; but the exercise of those power relations during interactions through those very resources reproduces the domination mode. These are only made possible through certain significations of meaning, that evoke certain communication forms; but which are also depended on certain norms, justifications, and modes of sanctioning. For example authoritarianist as the structure, results in authoritarian power relations as the mode of interactions. This is made possible by the use of the authoritative resource of force such as military, and police; both in the maintenance of the authoritarianist structures, and the enactment of the authoritarian power relations. The communication between the governors and the citizens becomes mainly confined to decrees. The legitimation of these interactions may be the preservation of a certain orders. Thus all these paradigmatic elements defining the structures and agency issues of the actors are intrinsically and inextricably linked. Accordingly, whereas the static paradigmatic dimensions may at any given time-space form part of the unacknowledged and unconscious motives for several actions, interactions, and interrelations of the actors; some of the unintended consequences these actions, interactions, and interrelations could be the maintenance or transformation of those paradigmatic dimensions. In this way the dominant paradigms became apparent based on how the actors globally interact with one another and use resources and relations at their disposal to create and exercise certain claims, meanings, norms, and sanctions among others. Similar processes take place in and between organisations, groupings, and individual actors making certain paradigmatic stances or perceptions visible at any particular time and space.

Correspondingly, it is through actions, interactions, and interrelations of the actors that the dynamic paradigmatic dimensions emerge; as the actors go on with their practices with other mutual individual actors, in or against the context of organisations and groupings, and with or against the background of the prevailing dominant paradigm. It is through these interactions that paradigms are created and
spread to other actors either consciously or unconsciously. Dynamic paradigmatic dimensions arose when the actors interacted, interrelated, and came across certain information, knowledge, or practices course of their interactions that caused them either to reinforce or change their perspectives. In this way not only were the decadian paradigmatic shifts produced, but also a particular paradigmatic perspective made and maintained as the dominant paradigm throughout its decade, or epoch. Similarly, organisations, groupings, and individual actors, were seen to acquire and accept new paradigms, and reject and drop others in the course of time through the actors interactions.

Thus the structure and agency issues implicated in the paradigmatic dimension in the urban South housing arena are a duality that cannot be conceived separately. Structures shaped motives into practices and created agency, while the actors' practices and routines created the structures; such that neither would come to being without the other. Structures and agency were mutually constitutive entities with both being the medium and the outcome of the other. The paradigmatic dimensions not only influenced the patterns of action, they also formed part of the principles that generated action. Since human actors were knowledgeable and reflectively monitored their actions and structural conditions, they developed routines based on their paradigmatic stances and perceptions, which would enable them to deal efficiently with societal issues and provide them with a sense of security. Thus, these motives influenced their overall plans of action, routine practices, and the shape those actions, interactions, and interrelations took; and also through these interactions created, modified, or maintained their consciousness and the structural conditions that make those interactions and future ones possible. Additionally, according to Giddens (1984 p 29) "human actors are not only able to monitor their activities and those of others in the regularity of day-to-day conduct; they are also able to 'monitor that monitoring' in discursive consciousness". These for instance, contributed to the dynamic paradigmatic dimensions and also the 'labelling' of initiatives prevalent in the housing arena. Consequently, the actors' interactions in the housing arena usually involved actors 'monitor that monitoring' and 'double hermeneutic' as the actors made choices and revised their understandings, worldviews, and practices, using new information they received, which they entered constitutively in to their perceptions, perspectives, descriptions, and practices. However, inasmuch as these actors could partially shape of their own actions and interactions, and some of the consequences of their actions was what they intended; often times, they were also not fully aware and conscious of their own motives and paradigmatic conditions that influenced their actions, and many of the consequences their actions were usually unintended. These include the resultant paradigmatic dimensions, actor relations, effectiveness of initiatives, and the persistence or resolution of the urban South housing crisis. Thus the paradigmatic dimensions, whether acknowledged or not, defined the rules and resources that constrained or enabled certain practices and gave them a systemic form as reproduced relations between the mutual actors; relations which were either transformational or preservational. Accordingly, the paradigmatic dimensions become part of the social practices that are chronically reproduced, and link actors across time and space; binding their interactions in time-space such that certain systematic action patterns are generated or reproduced; in the mutual constitution of structure and agency.
Nevertheless, these structuration processes are not only implicated in the paradigmatic dimensions, they are also implicated in all aspects of the urban South housing crisis and the surrounding development and governance issues. In all these aspects, actors' interactions and practices produce certain conditions, but also these conditions form the basis of the interactions and practices. The condition of the urban South crisis is influenced by certain actors' interactions and practices, which serve to either maintain it as it is or change it for better or worse; but at the same time those changing or persisting condition of the urban South crisis and arena are the ones that influenced the actors' interactions and practices. Consequently, the Giddensian (1984 p 376) definition of structuration as being "the structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure" can be seen to come into play in the issues surrounding the urban South crisis such as the actors' interrelations, effectiveness of initiatives, and persistence of the crisis, through the various paradigmatic dimension observed here.

11.4.2. Role of structures

From the Structurationist perspective, structures are the enduring ‘patterns’ of action arising from actors using certain rules and resources while being guided by those very rules and resources. Thus the structures govern the transformations of social relations by enabling and constraining certain practices and interaction form. The Giddensian structures are encapsulated in the various paradigmatic dimensions discussed here when the paradigmatic stances and perceptions facilitate the determination of rules and resources to be used in the pertinent practices and interaction; but the same time being the paradigmatic dimensions that arise when those rule and resource are applied in a certain way.

On the one hand, in regard to the rules, the paradigmatic stances and perceptions provide the basis for adopting certain procedural rules on ‘how’ the practices and interactions are to be performed, and certain moral rules as to ‘what’ are the appropriate or permissible ways of undertaking these practices and interactions; i.e. as methodical and generalisable procedures for enacting practices and interaction. In this way the paradigmatic dimensions guide the actors' behaviour consciously or unconsciously as they deal with situations in their interactions, through rules that pertain to meaning, modes of social conduct and relations, their justifications and sanctioning.

On the other hand, in regard to the resources, the paradigmatic stances and perceptions relate to the how, what, who and by whom the human actors and material objects are controlled during the interactions. Thus determining which actors’ power relations and uses of available resource are appropriate or not. The paradigmatic dimensions therefore contribute in determining which human attributes and nonhuman objects can or cannot be used in generating, enhancing or maintaining power. This relates to the abilities, attributes, and possessions, the actors may bring to bear during interactions, and which relations of power as domination or submission will ensue.

Nonetheless, the paradigmatic dimensions involve linkages of ‘rules and resources’ as certain resources require specific rules to activate and validate them; and certain rules can only be enacted and validated with particular resources in any given paradigm. Furthermore, the rule and resources
become materialised only through actors’ interactions. For instance ‘voice’ of a ‘poor slum dweller’ becomes a resources only when it is recognised as such in certain democratic arrangements and in this way it can be valuable in ‘negotiations’, resulting in the slum dweller having immense ‘influence’ and achieving various gains. However, when ‘purchasing power’ is used as determinant, the slum dweller has very little ‘influence’ on societal issues. In this way, through the various paradigmatic dimensions, resources can be seen as both the causes and effects of rules, and vice versa; with the resources and rules instilling, justifying, reinforcing, and empowering each other. The ‘rules and resources sets’ can be transposed to other arenas, situations, organisations, and actors either due to or resulting in dynamic paradigmatic dimensions. Structural futures of any given paradigm can therefore be created from scratch or simply be appropriated from other existing structures and various combinations or ‘rule and resources sets’; leading to the coexistence of several paradigmatic stances, in any given time and space, as exemplified in this study. In summation, the ‘rule and resources’ arising from the various paradigmatic dimensions involve codes of meaning, allocation and authorisation, as well as normation and justification. In the course interactions the paradigmatic dimensions involved the interlacing of meaning, power, and normative elements. Accordingly, paradigmatic dimensions relate to the three Structuration structural forms of signification, domination, and legitimation.

Signification and paradigmatic dimensions

Signification entails a system of semantic rules and codes through which meaning is produced, understood, and communicated. Each paradigm carries with it is own signification with specific interpretative rules, organised webs of language, syntax and vocabulary, as well as meanings and labels; in addition to the way these should be communicated and understood by other actors through specific symbolic orders and modes of discourse. A particular signification resulting for a given paradigm enables or constrains the actors to understand and make sense of their context in a certain way, and also to communicate their views, perceptions, understandings, and meanings in a particular manner. Thus the significations arising from the actors’ paradigmatic stances and perceptions generate certain interpretations of reality that allow the actors to understand or misunderstand the conduct of other actors; thereby providing regulative and interpretative rules on social conduct and use of material and authoritative recourses. For instance describing a slum dwellers negatively as a criminal, dissident, evil, dirty, illegal, or unauthorised becomes the justification for inhumane and violent treatment, allowing the used use of military or police force and segregation laws against them. Evictions, slum clearance, and city clean-ups were often conducted in Nairobi to ‘remove the dirt’ and enhance the ‘attractiveness’, ‘dignity’, and beauty of city. Similarly, when slum dwellers are seen as ‘vote’ they become only relevant at election time, and treated with merely populist or tokenistic initiatives. On the other hand, when they are seen as stakeholders or partners this necessitates different resources and approaches in handing their housing issues. Nevertheless, the significations of actors with more resources gain prominence and contribute to certain paradigms becoming dominant in a given epoch. Actors controlling more resources of ‘knowledge’ and fund such as the multilateral organisations therefore play a major role in providing these significations. However, as seen in this chapter, most of the actors and organisations do not usually fully subscribe to the dominant meanings
at any given time or space. In society, the meaning are often not necessarily understood the same way nor shared equally by all actors, contributing to different paradigmatic stances and perception among actors. Furthermore, other actors label their practices according to the prevailing paradigm without changing the contents of their practices; thus the syntax and vocabulary changes but the old meaning remains; greatly contributing misperceptions and misunderstandings not only of the situation, and other actors, but also of themselves. This was exemplified in Nairobi’s housing arena where the way some actors perceived themselves differed extremely from the way they were perceived by others, or even the researchers in this study. Nonetheless, it through the interactions of these actors under with influence of certain paradigmatic stances and perceptions that certain semantic rules, codes, and meanings and therefore signification are produced, modified, maintained, and spread to other actors, or transposed to other situations, arenas, and time space.

**Domination and paradigmatic dimensions**

Domination entails the application and production of power arising from and for control of resources. Each paradigm has its own defined set relations of autonomy and dependence, authority and subordination, superiority and submission, i.e. the political and economic institutional orders as well as the mode of governance that designate certain the power relations between the actors. Thus each paradigm conveys messages about the degree of power particular actors wield during a given interaction moment and using which resources. These determine which actors and resources are relevant or not, and who or which ones will influence the conduct of other actors during interactions. For instance a Welfarist mode of domination implies asymmetric relations of benevolence between the giver (e.g. governor) and recipient (e.g. slum dweller) were the resources employed here are in the form of aid or alms; often arising from guilt, pity, moral obligation, or good will on the side of the give but sometimes resulting in feelings of helplessness and dependence on the side of recipients. Thus each paradigm influence the specific way the transformative capacities of resources are employed as power during interaction. On the face of it this seemed to be related to interests and competition over power and resources; however in the Giddensian (1979) view, domination is not about ‘will’ or intentions; thus in many cases the actor exercise power without intending to do so unconsciously. Apart from the methods mobilisation resources it also involves the tolerance amongst given actors of how much power may be wielded by other actors in the arena. This could be conscious or unconscious. For instance, an actor subscribing to inclusivist paradigm will tolerate and encourage more power to those deemed ‘powerless’ in other paradigms such as the authoritarian one. Nevertheless, due to the different paradigmatic stances and perceptions, as well as dynamics, the actors in the arena had often conflicting domination subscription and ascriptions contributing immensely to misunderstandings, and conflict potential. This was aggravated further by the inherent asymmetries in the resources the various actors controlled according to the different paradigms, some actors attempted to make their domination forms prominent in the arena (consciously or unconsciously), while the other actors resisted this. Nonetheless, it through the interactions of these actors under with influence of certain paradigmatic stances and perceptions involving the use of the particular allocative and authoritative resources that given modes of domination were produced, modified, or maintained; and also transferred or transposed to other actors and arenas.
Legitimation and paradigmatic dimensions

Legitimation comprises methodological procedures for governing human behaviour (Giddens 1984); as embedded normative rules regarding societal norms and values for sanctioning actors’ interactions, interactions which also produces, reinforces, or modifies those rules. Relating to legitimation, each paradigm relates to unique mode of normative regulation and legal institutional orders regarding the expectations and evaluations of what the actors can or cannot do, should or should not do, as well as which actor this relates to; thus the institutionalisation of the actors’ rights and obligations and their sanctions (rewards and punishments) in a given setting. Hence each paradigm is based upon certain justifications concerning which conduct behaviour, or procedure is proper and appropriate; what is important or trivial, and the actors to be held accountable in that situational setting; and therefore providing moral guidance. In this way the paradigms relate to the normative constitution of interaction, designating the norms which sanction certain forms of conduct. They stipulate the standards and codes for the actors to draw upon to endorse, authorise, sanction, or justify their actions and those of others. Thus by particular paradigms given actors can stake or sustain their claims to certain legitimate status as well as deny others that status. For instance by legitimisation based on maintaining ‘order’, summary evictions become ‘normal’ while slum dwellers lose any claim or right to stay in a certain location. However, it is through the actors’ interactions (consciously and unconsciously) under the influence of certain paradigmatic stances and perceptions, following certain norms and values, while employing particular sanctions that given legitimisations are produced, modified, or maintained; passed to other actors, or made dominant in the arena. Nonetheless, owing to dissimilar paradigmatic stances and perceptions among the actors in the interaction settings in urban South arena, there are numerous and conflicting legitimisations with highly varied normative expectations and perceptions; contributing to high conflict potential and misunderstandings. At the same time these often conflicting legitimisations serve as the ‘moral lens’ by with the actors view each other contributing to misperceptions as well as conflicting internal and external perceptions amongst that actors, which aggravate their already tenuous relations.

11.4.3. Role of Interactions

According to Giddens (1984b) interactions are the ‘fitful yet routinized’ activities of the actors with each other within the social system; interactions are constantly reconstituted and therefore dependent on the attributes and attitudes of the mix of the actors co-present their conditioning structures. Thus the various paradigm stance and perceptions the actors could have play as significant role in the ensuing interaction forms influencing the modes of communication, power, and sanction the actors in a mutual time-space, situation, arena, or other interaction setting will take; whether face to face, or faceless over vast distances. Correspondingly, by the actors interacting under the influence their paradigmatic paradigm stance, perceptions, and dynamics leads to the production, reinforcement, or modification of the structures of meanings, domination forms, and justification. Thus through interaction, the paradigmatic features are defined and commutated, empowered and enforces, as well as sanctioned and regulated; and therefore the paradigms are passed from one actor to another, others modified or maintain, influencing the mutual actors to act, interact, interrelate in a particular manner; all with various intended and unintended consequences in the urban South housing crisis and arenas. As
follows then, these interactions their paradigmatic dimensions and other human agency aspects of society would involve both consciousness and unconsciousness features.

**Communication and paradigms**

Communication is the means by which the actors give and receive meaning, governing relations, and justifications with other mutual actors; forming their bases for bridging experiences, obtaining understanding and creating social reality (Giddens 1976). Under influence of their various paradigmatic stances, perceptions, and dynamics the actors draw upon the designated rules of signification and reflexively apply the related stocks of knowledge arising from those paradigms to make sense of their own actions and those of other mutual actors; thereby reinforcing or modifying their own meanings and stocks of knowledge and that of others. Communication can be face to face or faceless, verbal and nonverbal, conscious or unconscious; and many times unintended meanings are sent or received contributing to the perpetual misperceptions and misunderstandings that pervade the urban South housing arena. Each paradigm influences the form of ‘what’ is communicated, by ‘whom’, and ‘how’; as well as the expected response and results of those messages; influencing how the actors make accounts of their actions and offer reasons for them. In this way, are not only the transmissions of information concerning what is intend it conveyed, but also the information concerning the paradigm intentionally and unintentionally. Communication becomes paradigmatic as the actors incorporate ‘what went before’ and anticipate ‘what will come next’ during their interactions; through the ‘double hermeneutics’ involved in any given paradigm, the actors reflexively incorporate new information as they communicate and maintain or revise understandings, meanings, codes, and communication precipitating dynamic paradigmatic dimensions in themselves and other mutual actors.

Thus the actors create, acquire, transform, lose, understand or misunderstand particular information that guides their interactions and those of mutual actors under the influence of their paradigmatic stance and perceptions. They receive and send particular knowledge, expectations, emotions, justifications, skills, meanings, and many more other pieces of information that influences their actions, interactions, and interrelations in a certain way that not only reinforces or modifies their paradigmatic stances and perceptions in certain way, but also influence the housing situation in the arena. Thus particular meaningful, relational, and normative contents are convey between actors, in a stipulated way. For instance, by the governors engaging the slum dwellers in meaningful discussions sent the message that the governors hold the slum dwellers and their concerns in high regard; on the contrary when the concerns and lives of the poor do not matter the communication forms involve mainly commands, decrees, threats, ultimatums, and derogatory massages, and even worse, actions may be performed upon them without their consultations or warning; as is common when the slum dwellers are awoken by bulldozers flattening their shacks without warning in the middle of the night. The paradigms influence and are influenced by the asymmetries in power relations and thus the flow of information between the dominating and the dominated actors. Equal relations may involve negotiations; giver-recipient relations may sometimes involve intercessions but other times condescensionary massages; while disdain may involve issuances of ultimatums and threats. The different paradigms involve different sense making narratives and discursive arguments that may privilege some actors but not others.
The paradigms often the results of actors attempting to deal with uncertainty and doubts in meanings of information; thus the paradigmatic stances and perceptions become means for making certain interpretations and distinctions in information. Nevertheless interpretations and distinctions are sometimes inaccurate or not equally accepted by other actors contributing to misunderstandings and unhealthy relations. This is aggravated by the fact that much communication takes place even in the absence of intent. So much unintended messages are conveyed and received; while much of what is sent is never received in the way it was intended or even conveyed at all. Beyond the explicit intentional transmission of messages are what actors ‘meant’ to ‘say or do’ the actors mutually influence the actions of others without knowing it resulting in numerous unintended consequences; both positive and negative, as far as the paradigms, relations, initiatives and the housing situation is concerned. More importantly, the different paradigmatic stances and perceptions may cause the same information sets to produce extremely different meanings, interactions and interrelations, and also to be understood and conveyed differently compounding the confusion. For instance, based on the paradigmatic perspective, one actor may see the provision of standard housing to the slum dwellers as being empowering and helpful, while another would see this as being disempowering and creating relations of dependence and pure manipulation of the poor. Thus good intentions could easily be misinterpreted resulting in unexpected responses. Furthermore, apart from the individual actors’ paradigmatic stances and perceptions the prevailing dominant and their organisational official paradigms also form the contextuality that influences the communication between actors and their expectations of one another, with either positive or positive consequences. The dominant and official paradigms are supposed to form the basis of the common knowledge which all the involved actors are supposed to incorporate in their processes of constituting, conveying, and receiving meaning. However the paradigmatic stances and perceptions being not common or mutual make it difficult for the actors to understand each other. Nonetheless, it is thought certain modes of communication that actors build their stocks of knowledge and create certain meanings that leads to the production of new paradigms, spread of the new ones, and the maintenance of demise of other paradigms.

**Power and paradigms**

Giddens (1976) defines power is both transformative and relational. It is firstly, the capability of given actors to intervene and alter the course of events; and secondly, the capability of these actors to secure those outcomes using the agency of other actors. Power is mobilised using resources with the involved actors being enable or constrained by particular structures of domination. Thus each paradigm has its stipulated modes of exercising power between the actors; influencing how and which actors have more ‘capability’ than others to decide about courses of events and which concerns may count despite the objections of others. Each paradigm influences how much each of the involved actors influences world around themselves, the situation, and other mutual actors; by making some resources, meanings, justifications, and actions count more than others; while others can sanction others more, or resist sanctioning processes of others. Hence, some paradigms enable some actors but constrain other actors, as well as influencing which sanctions may be applied by whom and upon whom. For instance in a paradigm where voice is a valuable resource, negotiations may result in equal partnership power relations for those with equally influential voices, will those without voice lose in the
negotiating tables and are excluded further. Thus the main preoccupation become making ones voice more influential and valid. Accordingly, each paradigm may influence the modes by which the various actors deploy to mobilise resources during a given interaction setting so as to achieve certain outcomes, unleash certain capabilities, and therefore wield varying amounts power; contributing to power being seen as dynamic and processual. Thus the actors may be able or not to 'act otherwise' influence their situations and those of others in the interaction setting.

According to Giddens (1984) power is not a possession or some actor having predetermined control over others; but it is a relational dynamic force that can only be affirmed and executed in interactions. It is not about ‘who’ has the power, but ‘how’ the involved actors employ the resources depending on the prevailing domination structures; all of which are can be greatly influenced by the various paradigmatic dimensions. The exercise of power involves a two-way relationship that expresses autonomy and dependence in both directions; actions of the ‘more’ powerful actor can only be enacted with some kind of acquiescence from the ‘less’ powerful or subservient actors. Hence outward signs of compliance in oppressive situations could be one of the causes of labelling, whereby actors renamed their practices or belief systems rational assessment of the situation; but persisted in their old practices and beliefs. Thus the exercise of power here is not complete but is based on misrepresentations that may generate severe misunderstandings, conflict, and ineffectiveness of initiatives. In sum, it is through the exercise of power in a particular way by means of certain recourses and domination structures that certain paradigms emerge, transmitted, modified, or maintained in any given setting. Dominant and official organisational paradigms are mainly functions of power and control of resources such knowledge, and funds; but how these translate to the individual actors’ paradigmatic positions and perceptions and ensuing actions, interaction, and interrelations in the arena, involve far more complex structuration dynamics and process.

Power is inherent and present in all human actions and interactions (Giddens 1976). Nonetheless, this does not imply that all actors are equally powerful, during interactions, asymmetries in access to resources and the rules may enable or constrain some actors more than others (Giddens 1984). Power derives from asymmetries in the distribution of actors' abilities and access to resources; these asymmetries are greatly influenced by the paradigmatic dimensions which may greatly alter the validity of some resources; such that the magnitude of power accruing from the same set of set of resources by the same actors will vary greatly depending on the paradigm. An actor having specialist knowledge may be very powerful in one paradigm, but have a very weak position in another, even in the same setting and actor mix. Thus contrasting paradigmatic stances and perceptions may generate severe, disagreements, misunderstandings, and a huge conflict potential. In deed paradigm shifts my result or at least require the hitherto less powerful actors managing the resources in such a way that the begin to exert control over these who were previously deemed more powerful in the already established power relationships; greatly increasing the conflict potential in the given arenas.
Sanctions and paradigms

According to Giddens (1984b) sanctions are the reactions by actors towards their own behaviour and that of others to ensure conformity to the norms, justifications, and ‘correct performance’ during interactions. The various paradigmatic stances and perceptions invoke particular modes of rewards and punishments to reinforce the ‘appropriate behaviour’ required for each actor interacting according to that paradigm, and what they expect of the behaviour of other mutual actors. Thus actors draw upon particular legitimation and reflexively use the related norms to ensure the stipulated appropriate behaviour by themselves and others and actualise their rights and obligations. Each paradigm has what is deemed appropriate encouragement, coercion, enforcement, response, and the means of encouraging conformity and guarding against non-conformity as well as the related rewards and punishment in case of compliance or deviance. Accordingly, the expectation and what is deemed appropriate action will vary greatly according to the paradigms; and there being varied paradigmatic stances, perceptions, and dynamics these could play a significant role in aggravating the conflict potential and misunderstandings. A particular action may be rewarded in one paradigm but punished in another. Sanctions are not only invoked to check against non-compliance and ensure compliance, they are also invoked to ensure the desired objective and outcome of the initiative would be achieved. Thus they include actions the actors do upon themselves and other mutual actors to guard against failure and ensure success. Indeed, according to Giddens (1984b) all interactions in society involve certain sanctions, which are conditioned by and produce legitimation. Correspondingly, where as the paradigms influence the sanctions that given actors will apply in particular time-spaces and situations; it is by the actors applying particular sanctions to articulate and sustain what they consider is right or wrong, legitimate or illegitimate, and just or unjust among others that certain paradigms are produced, reinforced, spread, modified, or dropped altogether.

The various paradigmatic stances and perceptions may invoke different normative sanctions in dealing what contradicts social norms; specific statistical sanctions to deal with uncommon behaviour; certain absolutist sanctions to deal with what is deemed negative in all societies; particular relative sanctions that vary with contexts; and unique reactivist sanctions that arise from labelling through power (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989, Cassel, 1993). The absolutist sanctions relate to the dominant paradigm and the reactivist sanctions to rebelling. Nonetheless all these forms of sanction either lead to persistence of paradigms or precipitate changes in paradigmatic stances and perceptions thereby evoking dynamic paradigmatic dimensions.

According to the paradigmatic stances and perceptions specific set of sanctions will be deployed to maintain or modify the paradigms significations and dominations; but also those resultant significations and dominations will condition the sanctions. It is by the actors interacting under the influence of particular paradigmatic stances and perceptions that these sanctions will be defined, codified, and communicated depending on the designated signification; and resources deployed as power to reward, punish coerce, or encourage action through the designated domination. Thus sanctions are involved in the constraining and enabling aspects of power and are related to the asymmetries of power and resources among the actors, depending on the paradigmatic definitions and justification of the same.
Therefore, particular sanction will be communicated in particular way among the actors, using particular resources and justifications. For instance exclusion may require police force to enforce it and it will be communicatedoften through decrees and ultimatums, while accountability require citizen voices to enforce through civic engagement, negotiations, activism or protests. Hence, each paradigm links the sanctions intricately to power and communication in exceptional way. Furthermore, in the same time-space and situation different sanctions are applied to different actors according to each paradigm. Thus paradigms shifts may also changes the designations of ‘who can sanction whom’ and ‘which sanctions can be applied to whom and when’. Accordingly, different paradigmatic stance, perceptions, and dynamics have the potential to drastically complicate the situation in any interactions arena, and could therefore be one of the contributing factors in the failure of initiatives and persistence of the urban South housing crisis.

In the propagation of dominant paradigms, certain actors attempt to promote some norms, justifications, and their sanctioning modes as being the universal truth; but this is not necessary accepted by individual actors or organisations equally. Thus some actors may deploy some sanctions to enforce their perspectives, while others may deploy other sanctions to resist or counter this; all these sanctioning processes involving both conscious and unconscious components with both intended and unintended consequences. Sanctions may be applied either to maintain or change the situations, leading to dynamic paradigmatic dimensions; as the actors attempt to protect their identities, social roles and positions; as well change their situations, with reference to themselves and other mutual actors. .

The various paradigm have exceptional sets of constraining and enabling sanctions, and also each of these sanctions will enable some actors while at the same time constrain others. By the demand accountability involves empowering the citizens to monitor the actions of the governors, while reducing the options of the governor to engage in corruptions or impunity. Each paradigm involves sanctions that places placing limits on the range of options open to certain actors in a particular way; and in doing this remove the barriers of the other mutual actors correspondingly. Depending on the paradigm, the sanctions serve as a barrier or criteria for determining who is to be excluded or engaged in the interactions; and also who the sanctions apply to, thereby giving ‘identity’ to the actors. Thus changing the paradigm means changing the involved actors’ identities’ and ‘social positions’; a fact that will be welcomed by some actors but resisted by others.

Actors’ paradigmatic positions are contingent upon their internal and external sanctions. Internal sanctions my involve moral commitments, anxiety, fear, or guilt of the actor; while external ones may involve rewards, persuasions, inducements, coercion, punishment, and threat of violence from other actors; all these being both conscious or unconscious. Nevertheless these sanctions my cause either genuine paradigmatic stances or only a mere labelling of practices. Usually, official and organisational positions are involved in the external sanctions of the actors, but these are often not fully transmitted to the internal sanctions leading to variance in official and individual positions. The personnel in an organisation are expected to comply to certain laid our ‘formal’ sanctions ‘officially’ recognised norms,
rewards, and punishment. However the paradigmatic variances contribute to the emergence of informal sanctions, which emerge in face-to-face social interactions between actors, as exemplified by epistemic communities. Indeed very strong formal sanctions often result to informal sanctions, as the actors are forcefully enjoined interactions and norms they not really 'believe' resulting in them only 'playing roles'; as shown by the various difference in personal and official positions.

In sum, sanctions for actors behaviour include both positive reinforcing aspects of encouragement and inducement, and also the negative constraining aspect of discouragement and resistance that may include force, fear, and violence. Accordingly, much of the visible and invisible conflicts and misunderstandings amongst the actors in the various arenas often happen in the form of sanctions.

11.4.4. Role of Modalities

According to Giddens (1984b) modalities the features of actors and societies that mediate between and interaction. Modalities are at the intersection between structure and agency and employed in their mutual constitution and enactments. Through modalities structures condition interactions, enabling or constraining their enactment in interactions, while the enactment reconstitutes or modifies the structure. Thus, modalities are the media for reproducing both interactions and structures enabling both the repetition and modification of practices and related structures. Accordingly, the paradigmatic stances and perceptions correlate with particular way in which the knowledgeable capacities of agents are linked to structural features and vice versa. Each paradigm relate to a unique way of how certain meanings, normative elements, and power are interlaced, and thus the paradigms are therefore related to unique sets of the three modalities of interpretative schemes, facilities, and norms. Consequently, the actors depending on their paradigmatic stances and perceptions will make sense of their interaction, empower and enact their roles, and legitimise their actions in a particular way. By providing linkages through which structures and practices are generated based on the various paradigmatic dimensions, the modalities therefore constitute the fulcrum of all societal processes.

Interpretative schemes and paradigms

Interpretative schemes are the typification modes within the actors' stocks of knowledge that they use to interpret situations, to obtain meaning, and to communicate (Giddens 1984). Using interpretative schemes the actors draw upon significations not only to communicate, but also to constitute, maintain, or modify that very significations by means of that communication. Interpretative schemes are built up by assumptions, semantic codes, and expectations concerning situations based on the actors’ experiences and narrations they encounter during interactions. On the face of it, paradigmatic stance and perception seem to relate only to interpretative schemes; however these interpretative schemes are inextricably linked to all other structuration elements for each paradigm with same applying to the related paradigms. The 'stocks of knowledge' in themselves are resources, and are derived from the application of norms as sanctions and legitimation, as well as the use of resources as power and domination. But also all these norms, rules, and resource sets are contained as part of the 'stocks of knowledge'. Interpretative schemes comprise the paradigmatic perceptions actors have of themselves and others, and also the situation. As the actors interact they garner more experience and information.
that adds to their stocks of knowledge. This may either reinforce their interpretative schemes or alter them leading to paradigmatic dynamics among the actors and the society as a whole. Furthermore, societal interactions are often based on the assumptions ‘mutual knowledge’ and similar interpretative schemes among all the interaction actors. This assumption of ‘mutual knowledge’ is the basis of dominant paradigms, and official organisational positions. All the actors are expected to interpret the same situations in the similar way, with common meaning, communication and expectations from other actors. This is epitomised by the widespread assumption that nodding up and down indicated ‘yes’. Nevertheless, this is not always true. Even though some assumptions and interpretive schemes were wide spread in a give epoch; as exemplified in this chapter, there are wide variances in paradigmatic stance and perceptions among the actors, organisations, groupings, and societies. This implies extreme diversity in interpretative schemes among the actors that could contribute to massive misunderstandings, misperceptions, and conflict; with devastating results for actor relations, initiatives, and the resolution of the urban South housing crises.

Facilities and paradigms

Facilities or resources are the media and capabilities with transformative capacity that actors bring into their interactions to alter course of events, attain certain outcomes, and make the themselves and other actors to ‘act otherwise’ (Giddens 1979). Using facilities the actors draw upon domination, not only to wield power, but also to constitute, maintain, or modify that very mode of domination using that power. Different paradigms in the same arena evoke different power relations and asymmetries of power between actors.

Based on the Giddensian (1984) distinction of facilities into ‘authoritative’ and ‘allocative’ resources, the each paradigm relates to a particular set of human capabilities and material objects which are considered valid and important during interactions to generate a particular command over other actors to make the actors act in the desired way according to the paradigm, and to achieve the desired goals. Thus according to the paradigmatic stances, perceptions, and dynamics the human capabilities which may include knowledge, rank, charisma, kindness, cruelty, strength and others; as well as the material resources such as funds, land, weaponry, raw materials and others; may vary greatly. For instance, phenomena such as ‘voices’ and ‘rights’ which are ordinarily not considered resources in some paradigms, attain great importance in other paradigms, generating colossal amounts of power for the actors controlling them in conjunction with the accompanying signification and legislation according to the paradigm.

Thus the paradigms will influence type of resources used, how they are used, as well as by whom upon whom and with whom. This will in turn influence the co-ordination, organisation, and interrelations of actors during interactions, as well as their productivity, life chances, self-expression, and effectiveness in a particular initiatives. Accordingly, the co-presence of several paradigmatic stances, perceptions in any arena could greatly increase the conflict potential and misunderstandings. For example, the actors attaching different values to the same resources may precipitate power struggles as actors may fail to recognise the worth the other actors attach to certain phenomena. This
could be a contributory factor to misperceptions and differences in internal and external perceptions. Nevertheless, whereas conflict is usually blamed on conflict over resources and power, from a Structurationist perspective this is not necessarily straightforward. The value attachment to resources and their perceived importance by the different actors involve both varying conscious and unconscious process. Hence actors could enter into misunderstandings and conflictious situation unconsciously; and not necessarily based on their overt interests and narrations.

Furthermore, since the different paradigms relate to which resources are important, those actors controlling resources deemed important are established at the centre while relegating the others to the periphery; leading to centre/periphery relations. Those at the centre often consciously or unconsciously attempt to make their individual paradigmatic stances, the dominant one in society, but often with the resistance of other actors in the periphery (and also other centres and peripheries) complicating further the situation in the arena. Nevertheless, paradigm shift means a change in this centre, which may be supported by some actors but resisted by others. This varied support and resistance by different actors in the arena both consciously any unconsciously may result in the persistence or change in paradigms, thereby precipitate various dynamic paradigmatic dimensions and their accompanying conflict potential and misunderstandings; with significant impact on the urban South housing crisis.

**Norms and paradigms**

Norms are the rules of conduct which specify appropriate behaviour for each actor in a given interaction setting; typically involving the reflexive monitoring and rationalisation of the actor’s own conduct and that of other mutual actors (Giddens 1984). By means of norms the actors draw upon legitimation to sanction their own actions and that of other mutual actors; but in doing so using norms those legitimation modes are created, maintained or modified. Each paradigm consists of practices, actions, and relations that are deemed normal, appropriate, and acceptable as well as the suitable sanctions for their enforcement. These include the ‘oughtness’, appropriateness, and expectations; alongside the actors’ rights and obligations. For instance, according to some paradigms, the governors are expected and ought to be transparent and practice accountability in their actions; this becomes the basis of evaluating the governors’ performance. Thus it becomes normal for the citizens the monitor the actions of the governors and demand that they behave accordingly. On the contrary, in authoritarian modes the citizens do not have this right. Nevertheless, the norms are related to power and meaning. In each paradigm, the norms define with the types of meaning, interpretations, power relations, and resources are deemed appropriates in any given situation. Conversely, in each paradigm certain resources, power relations meanings, and interpretations are required to define and enforce the norm for use in the monitoring of social conduct.

Depending on the paradigm, norms express structural asymmetries of domination in society by designating the rights and obligations of the actors. Thus paradigm shifts may alter these asymmetries and reallocate the power equilibrium; a fact which may welcomed by some actors but resisted by others. Nonetheless the norm may be subject to change and manipulation by use of certain facilities.
contingent to particular paradigms, precipitating paradigm shifts especially at the dominant and official level. However the individual level change in norms is more depended on ‘convictions’ and less by the manipulation of facilities. This could contribute to the different rates of paradigm shifts in the various levels, and paradigmatic dynamics in society. Furthermore, incongruent formal and inform norms emerge from these paradigmatic differences and dynamics. The formal de jure norms are laid out publically for the actors are expected to adhere to; but instead informal de facto norms emerge which actually guide the conduct of the actors. Variances in these informal norms could also be a further source of conflict and misunderstandings.

The various paradigmatic stances and perceptions involve particular norms that impose certain restrictions on the actors so as to accomplish the societal gaols deemed important in that paradigmatic stance or perception. Therefore the dominant, official, and individual actor’s paradigms may evoke different norms, resulting in ambiguities and inconsistencies not only between the actors, but also within the actors themselves consciously or unconsciously; as exemplified in the incongruity of perceptions and expectations of the actors of themselves and others, which could result in misunderstandings and conflictious situations. Thus due to different paradigmatic stance and perceptions, as well as paradigmatic dynamics in the arena, actors are confronted with conflict norms, contributing to the observable colossal differences concerning: what they are expected to do, what they believe should be done, what they claim or think they are doing, and what they actually do; all these involving conscious and unconscious process. These could be very detrimental to the success or effectiveness of any initiatives.

11.4.5. Continuum of consciousness and consequences

Whenever actors interact, they are confronted with the question of ‘what is going on here?'; which they may address with or without conscious acknowledgement to ‘make sense what is going on here’ and act accordingly. Consequently, in Structuration theory posits that interaction comprises of a continuum consciousness in three levels: the unconscious, practical consciousness, and discursive consciousness; which providing guidelines for their actions and they way they engage in social activities as well as confront their contextuality (Giddens, 1979, Giddens, 1984b).

Unconscious motivation of action

At the unconscious level, the actors are unaware of their motivation for acting in a certain manner. These motivations are based on ‘stocks of knowledge’ and deep seated fears, needs, and desires acquired by the actors in their life histories; but which the actors are not aware of as they are suppressed from consciousness. Thus even when the actors are questioned about these motivations which dispose them towards acting in a particular manner, they cannot readily give an account of them. Accordingly, it is at the unconscious level that paradigms are contained, as unconscious motivations of action that guide the perceptions, actions, interactions, and interactions of the actors themselves and with other mutual actors.
The paradigmatic stances and perceptions are based on these deep seated ‘stocks of knowledge’, experiences, fears, needs, and desires. However the actors are usually unaware of them, let alone the resultant paradigmatic stances and perception. Thus questioning them directly concerning these may not yield any meaningful answer, as the actors lack the awareness of. Nevertheless these motives, stances, and perceptions are extremely significant in conditioning the actors’ relations, effectiveness of initiatives, and the urban South crisis as a whole. Uncovering and dealing appropriately these motives, stances, and perceptions gain utmost importance if meaningful understanding and resolution is desired, thus necessitating the development of tools and approaches for uncovering and dealing appropriately them; as exemplified the use of the ‘DHG matrix’ here and the resultant matrices; which are rudimentary and preliminary tools that can be improved for better understanding of problem-solutions’ and initiatives’ arenas.

Furthermore, according to Giddens (1979, 1984) these motivation may arise from the actors’ pursuit of ‘ontological security’ i.e. ‘sense the trust’ that things are as they appear to be to the actors, including their self and social identity. This ‘sense the trust’ relates to the paradigmatic stances and perceptions the actors have. It provides the actors a feeling of security in the reality they have created; and the assurance that interactions have a degree of predictability and stability over time and are ordered in space. Without this ‘sense of trust’ actor suffer acute anxiety. This leads to routinisation of actions and interactions as routine become integral to the continuity of the actors’ personality and the constitution of society; the pursuit of ontological security reproduces, sustains or modifies societal structures. Accordingly, on the one hand, this pursuit of ontological security could account the persistence of paradigms; and one the hand, the loss of the ‘sense of trust that things are as they appear to be’ could precipitate a paradigm shift; leading to paradigmatic dynamics and the accompanying consequences that can be either beneficial or detrimental the actors relations, housing initiatives, and the resolution of the crisis as whole.

**Practical consciousness and rationalization of action**

At the practical consciousness level the actors ‘know what to do’ but they cannot fully explain this in words. They may be aware of the conditions of own action but unable to express them express discursively. The actors know tacitly ‘how to go about’ actions and interactions ‘automatically’ but cannot give these actions and interactions direct discursive expression, since the actors employ their ‘tacit knowledge’ and usually ‘know more than they can tell’ (Giddens, 1984b, Cohen, 1989, Bryant and Jary, 1997). Nevertheless, according to Giddens (1984) majority of actors interaction involve tacit knowledge which relays on the practical consciousness; and thus at this level much of the actions and interactions of the actors are conditioned by societal structures, as they tacitly apply their ‘stock of knowledge’ to implicitly interpret and monitor situations and their own actions’ and those of others, orient themselves, and then act accordingly. Consequently, ‘practical consciousness’ in conjunction with the ‘unconscious cognitions’ contain the paradigmatic stances and perceptions the actor have. However, they cannot give discursive expression of or meaningful articulation; necessitating the deployment of apt tools and approaches for uncovering, understanding, and dealing with them appropriately. Furthermore, dominant paradigms rely on mutual knowledge which is largely tacit, which
is also responsible for paradigm shifts and other dynamics at the dominant, official, organisational, group, and individual level. All these, the actor are usually not able to meaningfully articulate and give adequate verbal expression.

From the practical consciousness level, the explanations that actors give for their actions are only ‘rationalizations’; which are basically teleological i.e. giving accounts on the purposes of their actions, aimed at achieving particular ends. These ‘rationalizations’ invoking the actors’ paradigmatic stances and perceptions became the basis of the actors ‘keeping in touch’ with what they are doing, supplying reasons for their actions, evaluating their actions and that of others, and maintain a tacit understanding what these actions and interactions accomplish. Nevertheless, actors are not able to fully acknowledge the conditions of their actions and consequences of their actions, and though the actors are purposive, a significant outcome of their actions and interaction are unintended. Accordingly, in the course of practice or empirical observation and questioning, the explanations that the actors give are mostly merely ‘rationalizations’ which do not capture the entire scenario meaningfully. Basing an analysis, an interpretation, a practice, or an initiative based solely on these rationalisations risks missing out on key critical aspects the condition the behaviour of actors, their relations, and the consequences of these on the problem situation and arena. Indeed a considerable number actor and stakeholder analyses are based on these ‘rationalizations’ that the actors give, which could compromise the usefulness of those analyses and resultant interpretations. Accordingly, this calls for more nuanced approaches and methods, that seek to go beyond this rationalizations, towards uncovering what these rationalizations imply and the deeper motives conditioning the behaviour of actors in any given arena.

For instance, in the course of conducting this study, on the basis of what could be identified as the practical consciousness, some actors give certain rationalisations for their actions; such as “slums give the city a bad image”. However the actors could not explicitly state their positions and ‘why they did what they did or said’; necessitating the uncovering of meanings of these actors justifications and explanations. These rationalisations formed the basis for generating the elements and codes used for mapping the actors attitudes and attributes in the DHG matrix, and to generate the resultant matrices, as a basic attempt at uncovering the actors deeper meanings and motivations.

Discursive consciousness and reflexive monitoring of action
At the discursive consciousness level the actors are able to verbalise their intentions. They can reflect on their actions, interactions, and conditions for these actions and interaction, and comment on them rationally; express them verbally, and elaborate discursively upon the reasons for their actions, including lying about them (Giddens, 1984b p 3). Thus at this level they can produce discourses that sustain or modify societal structures and lay down conditions of further actions. The discursive consciousness involves all the knowledge, awareness, and justifications the actors can explicitly verbalise and express discursively; all of which relate to the paradigmatic description and perceptions of the actors themselves and upon other mutual actors. The actors can say ‘why’ they perform certain
actions and interactions giving suggestions of their paradigmatic stances and the paradigmatic perceptions they have of themselves and others.

As a consequence, under the influence of their particular paradigmatic stances and perceptions the actors at this level of consciousness engage in reflexive monitoring of action and self-regulation. Firstly, the actors situate their own actions and discourses in relation to those of other actor as well as the context; monitoring the behaviours of actors and their settings to maintain a sense of how to ‘go on’ in those situations; based on their paradigmatic stances and perceptions. Secondly, following that sense-making, they feedback that knowledge to their actions and discourses resulting in causal loops. However, how they feedback that knowledge and reflexively apply their ‘stocks of knowledge’ to sustain communication, power, and sanctions is greatly influenced by paradigmatic stances and perceptions. Thus by reflexively applying this knowledge in a particular way, certain meanings, dominations, and justifications can be sustained or modified contributing to paradigmatic dynamics. Accordingly, by in reflexive monitoring of action and self-regulation, through the discursive consciousness the actors not only monitor actions (theirs and others), they also ‘monitor that monitoring’. Hence they are able to pay attention to ongoing events and contexts and relate their own actions to them consciously.

Consequently, discursive consciousness relates more to issues the actors is aware of and can consciously react to and their intended action; such as interests, negotiations, networks, and other issues the actors can explicitly verbalise and express discursively. Issues arising from discursive consciousness are the ones that are usually captured by stakeholder analysis as well as many pre-initiative and feasibility studies. However, as observed here discursive consciousness only touches on a small part of the critical issues that condition actors’ relations and performance of initiatives. Much of these critical issues take place at the unconsciousness and practical consciousness levels. Furthermore at the discursive consciousness the actor may either ‘inadvertently lie’ or ‘wilfully lie’ in their narrations as they reflexive monitor their action and narrations and adapt them to the context, or their perception of the situation, other actors, the researcher, power relations, and many other context related issues both in the course of empirical research, and in practice when formulating and implanting initiatives. As exemplified by the interpretations in this chapter through the DHG matrix; the self descriptions and internal perceptions of the actors on the basis of their discursive expressions differed greatly from their actual actions and the descriptions and external perceptions by other actors.

11.4.6. Continuum of consciousness and its implications

In Structuration theory, three levels of consciousness are identified; firstly the unconscious were the actor act ‘automatically’ unaware of how and why they do it; secondly, practical consciousness where the ‘know what to do’ but cannot tell why they do it; and thirdly, the discursive consciousness where they can say ‘why’ they do it. Interactions at these three levels emanate from both acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions of actions, and produce both intended and unattended consequences. By duality of structure, these consequences form condition for further actions. For instance, a given paradigm will make actors interact in particular way that may lead to the success or failure of a certain
initiative. Leading to wider acceptance or rejection of the paradigm (this may not be their intended outcome), which frames their future actions. However, since human agents are reflexive, they can shift from one mode of consciousness; such that interactions involved the constant switching between the three levels, in a continuum of consciousness; generating and arising from static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions which could have significant consequences of the actor relations, performance of initiatives, and the urban South housing crisis as a whole. Thus these issues of consciousness may be of critical importance for theory and practice in the urban South housing problems and other societal issues.

On the basis of the observations above, it may be of utmost necessity to engage adequately with these issues of consciousness in both theory and practice.

Firstly, many analyses overly rely on the discursive verbal elaborations of the actors arising mostly from their discursive consciousness. However these may be highly inaccurate and unreliable. As exemplified by comparisons of the actors’ stances and perceptions through the DHG matrix and resultant matrices, there were discrepancies in self descriptions, internal and external perceptions, as well as the observed positions. Indeed several actors modified their narratives depending on the contextual issues and relabelled their practices to reflect the current paradigms or to respond to pressure for donors and the citizens, leading to numerous incidences of ‘old wine in new wine skins’. Certainly, these factors hint at the inaccuracy on these descriptions and the danger of overly rely upon them, without a nuanced and deeper observation of the actors and their interactions.

Secondly, at the practical consciousness, that actors give certain rationalisations for their actions which often do not explicitly state the actors positions and why they believe, behaved, interrelated and interacted in a particular way. The rationalisations may therefore be inadequate to form the basis of any interventions. This necessitates the meaningful uncovering of those rationalisations and justifications that the actors may supply, and integrate and interpret them appropriately for use in the in research and initiatives. For example in this study, actors’ rationalisations where used as coding systems to map actors into the Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM).

Thirdly, unconscious motivations of action were conditioned by the pursuit of ontological security by actors, to guard against chaos and anxiety and protect their identities and social potions and roles, leading to the persistence or change in routines, structures, and paradigms. Nevertheless these motivations were usually by unknown the actors themselves, and it may be difficult for empirical research to uncover them. Since, these unconscious motivations are not readily visible in the arena, nor can they be captured by the actors’ narrations, interests, networks, or competition for power and resources. Accordingly, doing analyses only based on interests, networks and competition for power and resources captures only the discursive and practical consciousness levels, but misses out on the unconscious levels which could in fact be the most critical level. Most aspects of actors’ interactions and interrelations relate to the unconscious level, and the actions and motivations cannot be fully discursively expressed.
In view of the above, analyses and interpretation solely based on issues arising from discursive and practical consciousness may be insufficient and inaccurate, necessitating the uncovering of hidden and unconscious cognitions and motivations. Discursive and practical consciousness refers to ‘psychological mechanisms of recall’ and may relate more to interests and other issues the actors can verbalise. As observed here, interests and overt issues cannot fully explain the urban South housing crisis; with the possibility that paradigms also play a critical role. Thus focusing mainly on issues of interests, competition for resource and power, networks, and other overt features may lead to inaccurate or incomplete observation, analysis, assessments and interpretations of the situation. Nonetheless it is at the unconscious level that paradigms are contained, as unconscious motivations of action that guide the perceptions, actions, interactions, and interactions of the actors themselves and with other mutual actors. Furthermore, these unconscious motivations may have a significant influence of both the discursive and practical consciousness; thus the actors’ paradigmatic stances may actually influence their interests. Certainly holding certain perspectives may preclude given actors from having certain interests. For instance it would be inconsistent for an actor truly believing in sustainability to be interested in land grabbing and displacement of poor citizens. Thus the paradigmatic stances that actors hold may hint at the interests the actors may be more disposed towards. Accordingly, in this study the mapping of actors’ rationalisations (derived from their practical consciousness and tacit actions and knowledge) into the DHG matrix, and the interpretations of the resultant Paradigmatic Stance Matrix (PSM) as whole give a hint to some of the unconscious motivations and cognitions of actors in the housing arena. These unconscious motivations were related to their paradigmatic stances. Correspondingly, the actors’ discourses and other verbal elaborations (derived from their discursive consciousness) were used to map the internal and external Perception Stance Matrices (PeSM) of the actors as they perceived themselves and others an monitored their actions and narratives, based on lens influenced by their paradigmatic stances. In sum, understanding and addressing issues in any multi-actor problem-solution arena necessitates deeper nuanced observation and methods, which can facilitate the uncovering of hidden and conscious motivations beyond the actors’ narratives and claims.

11.4.7. Consciousness in negotiations, arguments, interests, and convictions

In view of the continuum of consciousness discussed above, interactions of actors involving negotiations and arguments may have varied intended and unintended consequences depending on the level of consciousness evoked during those interactions. To start with, most of the current dominant approaches and prescriptions for dealing with many societal problems such as the urban South housing crisis and hinged upon the actors negotiating to resolve the points of difference towards producing a settlement and gaining some advantage; presumably with the agreement of the involved parties.

Ideally negotiations should produce outcomes that satisfy various interests of the involved parties, in an agreed manner. Nevertheless, negotiations are often based on ‘agreement’ using promises and threats, such that the actors are usually ‘forced’ or ‘induced’ to the point settlement. Indeed many
negotiations are adversarial and contestational, often crafted with to produce ‘win-loss’ outcomes that favour those who wield more power in a given situation, such as partnership, decision-making and implementation of initiatives. Accordingly, whereas negotiations are conditioned by the unconscious motivations and practical consciousness ‘unacknowledgably’; negotiations mainly take place at the discursive consciousness. The actors thus agree to positions they do not fully agree to, but have been forced to by the negotiations. Thus the actors may agree undertake some actions but lack the will, resolve and conviction to implement it. This has often been exemplified be agreements derived from negotiations based on donor conditionalities, pressure from civil society, or citizen demands, which have usually failed to yield genuine change in state actors; but only resulted in tokenistic initiatives, and with a profound lack of political will.

Certainly, this highlights the futility of ‘forcing’ change in the governors’ attitudes though negotiations involving pressure. Genuine change can only be attained if either the governors change their convictions (at deeper levels of consciousness) or the governors are replaced with others who already have the sought after convictions. Indeed this could explain the persistence of old paradigms and lack of rapid uptake of new paradigms by organisations and actors; dominant paradigms are often propagated through negotiations, conditionalities, and coercion; resulting in unpredictable paradigmatic dynamics and incongruences. The ‘weaker’ actors may ‘agree’ to change, however they only revise their narrations but their convictions and practices remain unchanged, in a process of ‘labelling’. Thus negotiations at best may only produce ‘labelling’, since the actors are coerced act in a manner. If negotiations had not taken place, the actor would rather have acted otherwise. These labelling involving probably untrue narrations based on discursive consciousness but not in genuine change of convictions and practices. Thus actions will fail to match the words resulting in further misunderstandings, disagreements, conflicts, ineffectiveness of initiatives, and perpetuation of the problems.

Interests may play a major role in negotiations, as so does labelling as actors discursively adopt these labels to achieve certain aims, such as gaining funding, attaining political power, or maintaining self relevance. Nonetheless labelling may also be conditioned by unconscious motivations as the actors interact with others in the arena. In the first instance, prevailing terms are maintained such that the same old terms are applied to new emerging theoretical, practical or normative phenomena. In the second instance emerging vocabulary and discourses are applied to same range of phenomena, prevailing policies and practices are relabelled with the new terms. These could be due to firstly political reasons, for instance to comply with donor conditonalities, gain approval and acceptance by the public, or re-legitimate discredited practises; or secondly due to the various actors paradigmatic stands that unconsciously or tacitly influence their practices.

In contrast to the above, actors have been known to change their paradigmatic positions based on their experience in the arena, including words, action, observations, and experiences which induced change at their unconscious and practical consciousness levels. These changes in convictions led them to act in manner that was detrimental to their interest. They changed their convictions despite
severe sanctions as exemplified by the case of Agarwala. Furthermore, by means ‘education’ and ‘training’ of actors that targeted their core basic beliefs and perspectives, the actors have radically changed their approaches. According to Gumede (2007), economic policy ‘think tanks’ ferried the key personnel a government-in-waiting (some of whom had no economic qualifications at all) to the head offices of international organisations where they were ‘fed a steady diet of neo-liberal ideas’ through ‘executive training programmes’. Thus when these governors eventually gained power, enacting neo-liberalist policies had became second nature to them regardless their previous anti-neoliberalist convictions. However, when the field staff and implementing officers tried to implement their official policies, they encountered issues that led to depart from their previous convictions and adopt new ones. Accordingly, all these factors and other that may lead to change of convictions are referred to in this study as ‘good arguments’. Good arguments influence the actors at the unconscious level leading to changes in their unconscious motivations. These good arguments (from words, actions, experiences, etc) may lead to convictions and conversion that generate genuine paradigm shifts at the unconscious level. Here belief play a central role compared to interests.

Hence, while arguments and good reasons may cause individuals to genuinely shift their paradigmatic positions; negotiations may only result in actors acting (or pretending to act) according a paradigm they genuinely do not subscribe to. Arguments may affect change at a the unconscious, subconscious, and practical conscious levels; where most actions takes place, and affect rationalisation and routinisation of actions and interactions, negotiations may only affect discursive consciousness, where often actors may lie (without knowing) about what they do and why they do it. All these increase the likelihood of actors talking past each other, resulting in ill-founded misunderstandings and pointless disagreements. Accordingly, this study argues that good actor relations in initiatives are not be easy to arrive at based only negotiations and commonality interests alone; but that by means of good augments and commonality of convictions better relations and effectiveness of initiatives could be achieved.

11.4.8. Inferences of Structuration paradigmatic morphologies and processes

From the discussions it this section, it can be inferred that actors’ paradigmatic stances, perceptions, congruities, and other paradigmatic dimensions are also critical elements in actors’ relations, performance of initiatives, and the persistence or resolution of the urban South housing crisis. These paradigmatic dimensions can be seen as entailing both structural and agency issues as mutually constitutive entities, following the principles of ‘the duality of structure and agency’ as posited in Structuration theory. The paradigmatic dimensions are in this way involved in the emergence, growth and possible resolution of the urban South housing crisis through the interactions of actors and the existing or resultant social structures that condition those interactions. Examining the housing arena through a Structurationist and paradigmatic perspective and involved morphologies and processes highlighted the importance of both acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions for action as well as the intended and unintended consequences of actors’ actions and interactions. Furthermore these interactions involved both unconscious and conscious levels. However many of the existing methods for examining the actors and their arenas in theory and practice mainly rely and concentrated on the
conscious verbalisations, acknowledged conditions for action, and intended consequences of actions; mainly neglecting the unconscious, unacknowledged, and unintended aspects of interactions. Nonetheless, these could also be very critical in urban South housing crisis and other problem-solution arenas. Thus any analysis and interpretation, for either theory or practice, that does not meaningfully engage with these risks missing out on key critical aspects being highly inaccurate, inadequate, and misleading. These could help explain the ineffectiveness of initiatives, unhealthy actor relations, ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives, and persistence of the urban South housing crisis. Additionally, these analyses should strive to understand the individual actors, since it is the individual actors who act and interact, but not organisations and groupings. These only serve as a background and one of the elements conditioning the behaviour of actors. Indeed evidence suggests that very few actors religiously adhered to their organisations' positions. Focusing mainly on organisations and groups as units of analysis may also lead to misleading conclusions. In sum, meaningful understanding and dealing with the urban South housing crisis and other societal problems require more nuanced and deeper observations, analyses, and interpretations that seek to uncover issues beyond those that are openly visible and verbally stated or claimed.

11.5. Implications: The constitution of the urban South crisis

In examining the urban South housing situation on the basis of the static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions and Structuration perspective the key observation that emerges is that there is more than meets the eye; necessitating more nuanced and deeper observations. The situations are conditioned by several unacknowledged factors that are usually hidden and underlying not only to the cursory observer, but also to the actors themselves. These have a critical impact in the potential for interactions and interrelations: that include cooperation, understanding, conflict, competition, misunderstandings, and others. Thus, they may play a critical role in the ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives and therefore the persistence and constitute the urban South housing crisis.

Based upon the observations made in this chapter, the role of the individual actors in society, organisations, and the constitution dominant paradigm become extremely relevant in this case. Paradigms do not necessarily originate from above; bottom-up processes are also involved and as the actors at the grassroots induce changes at the global scale. There are coexisting and competing paradigms with either conflictual or symbiotic relations. With their being a flow of discourse across institutional boundaries, e.g. through epistemic communities and personal union, even as global debates are being done in Nairobi, there is a possibility of subordinate networks creating or modifying these paradigmatic discourses at a global and dominant level.

Typically stakeholder analyses are overly preoccupied with resources, interests, and networks. However these risk missing the bigger picture, and may actually be insufficient and inaccurate to understand the situation. As a consequence, this study attempts a totally different approach beyond conflict of interest, with the aim of uncovering and examining the belief structure of the actors in terms of their various paradigmatic dimensions; that lie much deeper underneath interests.
Actors and organisations with confliction interests seem to collaborate when they share paradigmatic stances, and also when epistemic communities and personal unions were prevalent. Thus cooperation is more than just about interests and influence (need to go beyond stakeholder analysis). Interests and bargaining/ negotiations depend on discursive consciousness and practical consciousness which involve explanations and rationalisations which might miss out on the actual issues. Paradigms arise from the unconscious level. Arguments target the unconscious level with the aim to shift the paradigm of the individuals.

Paradigmatic dimensions at the individual actor, organisation, and dominant paradigm help provide explanations in the housing situation. For example ineffectiveness of organisations policies could arise from the fact that most of its actors did fully support the official positions; and that the organisations modus operandi in most cases differed greatly from the official positions. The effectiveness of many large organisations was lowered by heterogeneity of actors within, and across institutional boundary associations such as epistemic communities and personal union. In summation, the paradigmatic and Structurationist perspectives could provide valuable insights in the Urban South Housing Crisis.
12. Conclusions

The overarching goal of this study was to contribute to broadening the understanding of the urban South’s housing arena and its crisis as explicated by the problem and responses in the setting of Nairobi, together with the involved policies and practices. This encompassed an endeavour to seek an understanding concerning the persistence and continued worsening of the crisis despite many global and local initiatives which have mainly been ineffectively implemented and have mostly failed to yield the envisioned outcomes; such that some actors in the arena have deemed the urban South’s housing crisis as one of the ‘worlds unsolvable problems’ (UN-Habitat, 2006a, Orbit, n.d.). This has been amidst conflicts, misunderstandings, and generally unhealthy relations between the involved actors; relations which have been observed to precipitate the crisis and failure of initiatives.

In the theoretical examination of the urban South crisis as well as its responses and milieus across time and space, the triad of development, housing and governance; coupled with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions emerged as the urban South’s critical defining themes. These were integrated through elements of Structuration theory to generate a conceptual, methodological, analytical and interpretational framework that guided the study; as well as the construction of the ‘DHG Matrix’ that served as a heuristic device to prod issues in the urban South and especially Nairobi’s housing arena, in order to generate further understanding.

In examining Nairobi’s housing arena including its problems and responses, against the background of the Kenyan politico-historical trajectory and global geopolitico-economic milieu since the dawn of the 20th century, various combinations of interests, perspectives, and perceptions emerged as recurring themes. These were implicated in the emergence, maintenance and perpetuation of the housing crisis; as well as in the conflicts and misunderstandings amongst involved actors, and in the ineffectiveness and failure of initiatives. Thus, over the decades, Nairobi’s housing arena has seen the entry of myriads of highly heterogeneous actors having very varied interests; with conflicts and misunderstandings, in a very fragmented arena.

Accordingly, observations based on the classical ‘stakeholder analysis’ of the arena provided a structured inventory of the key stakeholders, with their interests, influence, and networks; and how they had impacted the housing arena based on their priorities and overt values. These observations revealed that the interrelations amongst the stakeholders were generally unhealthy and conflict laden, comprising competition for the same resources, characterising conflicts of interests, power struggles and tussles over territory, as well as control over the people and the resources; notwithstanding misunderstandings and the lack of common ground. This situation predictably contributed to the ineffectiveness and failure of responses as well as the emergence, growth and persistence of the crisis. However, these did not seem to sufficiently account for the issues in the arena as other forces seemed to be at play that were hidden, unacknowledged, and unconscious; and that were beyond interests, influence, and networks.
Consequently, the arena and emerging issues were analysed and interpreted further through a Structurationist perspective that pursued further the role of various paradigmatic dimensions, from which several observations and interpretations were made including the following:

There were not only visible, overt, conscious motivations and acknowledged conditions for action, but also invisible, underlying, unconscious, and unacknowledged ones that played a very critical role in the urban South housing arena’s crisis. These conditions were encapsulated by the various paradigmatic dimensions detailed here below.

The paradigmatic dimensions occurred at the macro, meso, and micro scales as illustrated by the fact that even though at a given time and space, there was a dominant paradigm; it was not fully followed by the organisations or by individual actors. Thus there were contradictions at various societal scales, and as a result, at any given time, space, or situation, the actors were confronted with a multiplicity of contradictory unacknowledged conditions for actions that led to several unintended consequences. These were compounded by the presence of epistemic communities and personal unions. Accordingly, it was highly probable that contradictory paradigmatic stances at various scales not only greatly contributed to the potential for conflicts, misunderstandings, and the lack of common ground, but they also could have created the potential for cooperation, collaboration, and mutual understanding that could have had impactions in the actor relations, in the effectiveness of initiatives, and the probability of success or failure of the involved initiatives.

Apart from the contradiction in the paradigmatic stances, there were also contradictions in the way the actors perceived themselves and how they were perceived by other actors, resulting in contradictory internal and external perceptions; both of which were often contradictory to observations made by the researcher as there was usually a wide variance between their narratives and actual actions. Nonetheless, even though these perceptions and narratives could be inaccurate, they were the basis of most actors’ interactions (as well as most surveys, analysis, and interpretations in theoretical and practice realms). These perceptions most likely increased the likelihood of actors talking past each other, ill-founded misunderstandings, and pointless disagreements; that could be highly detrimental to the actor relations, the effectiveness of initiatives, and the housing situation as a whole.

However all the above are not static, but are constantly changing, usually at different rates in the various scales and entities; also producing contradictory dynamic paradigmatic dimensions that compound the complexity of the situation and actor relations. Furthermore, it makes it very difficult to capture or predict the course of interactions over a period of time; especially in organisations, projects, and the actors themselves; as well as the consequences of their actions.

Finally, all the above paradigmatic dimensions entailed structure and agency issues as mutually constitutive entities involved not only in the emergence, growth, initiatives’ failures, and persistence of the crisis, but also the possible resolution of the urban South housing crisis with more effective solutions; through the interactions of actors and the existing or resultant social structures that condition
those interactions. Among others, this included highlighting the role of paradigmatic dimensions as societal structures, actors’ interactions, and the interface between them i.e. modalities; besides the role the observed continuum of consciousness and consequences played in negotiations, arguments, interests, and convictions; all this with critical implications to the conduct of the actor, their interrelations, effectiveness and outcomes of initiatives, and the urban South housing situation as a whole. In sum, in addition to other issues, the various paradigmatic dimensions also formed part of the acknowledged and unacknowledged conditions for action, as well as, part of the intended and unintended consequences of actors’ actions and interactions; that formed not only the basis of the urban South crisis, but also its possible meaningful resolution.

As a consequence, in line with the hypothesis postulated in this study, the various observations, analysis, and interpretations arising from the study’s theoretical and empirical aspects strongly suggest that:

Apart from conflicting interests and competition over power and resources, there exist ‘diverse paradigmatic positions’ amongst the many different interested actors in Nairobi’s informal housing arena, that greatly contribute to their apparent lack of common ground and mutual understanding which reduces the effectiveness of involved initiatives, and therefore play a significant role in perpetuating the ‘urban South crisis’.

This conclusion could have profound implication for both theory and practice, with possible contribution to furthering the understanding of the situation, improving actor relations, enhancing effectiveness of initiatives, as well as a step further in the meaningful resolution of the urban South crisis. However, it is important to note that conclusions made here may not represent the situation in the entire urban South, rather this study was conducted in an urban South setting of Nairobi’s housing arena in the period between 2011 and 2013. Nevertheless, some of the findings could be transferable to other settings in time and space, with caution, for instance, once the necessary strategies to achieve quality and trustworthiness have been followed, such as those pointed out by Lincoln and Guba (1986) or Stake (1995).

12.1. Implication to theory

The discussions in this study clearly pointed to the fact that the urban South housing problems were highly complex, multifaceted, and surrounded by many contradictions and paradoxes. Over the past six decades, the problem of slums has continued to grow unabated despite many global and local initiatives, principal commitments, good intentions, and also rhetoric. Prescribed policies and initiatives have largely been ineffective or have failed to meet the expected goals, exhibiting great variances between the stated goal, expected results and the actual outcomes. Consequently the overarching goal of this study was to contribute to broadening the understanding of these problems and their prescribed solutions, firstly, through theoretical discussions of the urban South’s housing situation and context, and secondly, empirical investigations of those issues in the setting of Nairobi’s housing arena. This was premised on the belief that effective tackling of these complex urban South challenges
required their better appreciation both in theory and in practice. Hence, the study began with specific observations of the urban South arena and the detection of certain patterns and regularities that led to the formation of a tentative hypothesis, followed by an analytical and interpretative frame, with the aim of generating certain general conclusions regarding the urban South situation, especially based on the empirical examination of Nairobi’s arena.

Accordingly, the key objectives of this study were first, to point out some of the underlying causes for the apparent ineffectiveness of initiatives and persistence of the urban South housing crisis; with the view of generating an understanding concerning the same; and second, to explore the possible existence of static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions in the urban South problem-solution nexus and their implications on the involved actors’ interrelations and the urban South’s housing arena; guided by the two major questions:

- What were the underlying causes for the apparent failure and ineffectiveness of initiatives as well as the persistence of the urban South housing crisis despite a seemingly deeply-felt universal concern and the concerted efforts by myriads of actors from the global to local scales?
- What is the role of the postulated static and dynamic dimensions of paradigms in the urban South crisis, especially on actor’s interactions and interrelations; firstly do they exist, and secondly, what is their impact on the actors’ interaction and relations, initiative effectiveness, as well as the urban South housing situation and arena as a whole.

The three critical defining themes of the urban South of development, housing, and governance; coupled with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions were integrated through Structuration theory to produce a conceptual, analytical, and interpretational framework. This framework guided this study’s theoretical discourses on the urban South crisis, and an empirical case study in Nairobi, Kenya which informed the resultant implications to both theory and practice. However, the question remained concerning what actually ‘development, housing and governance’ were. Since the 1950s, as explicated by the various paradigmatic dimensions, myriads of meanings have emerged as numerous scholars and practitioners have articulated and promoted their own alternative definitions; most of which are fundamentally contradictory and irreconcilable, such that universally acceptable and immutable meanings could appear impossible. As observed, some meanings and conceptualisations often became meaningless in practice and only served to promote tokenism, ineffectiveness of initiatives, and lack of genuine political will to meaningfully address the housing problems; with rhetoric in many cases being confused with intent. Nevertheless, the sticking point remains on how to handle those diverse meanings and paradigmatic dimensions that are contradictory and dynamic in space and time among the heterogeneous and complex sets of involved actors.

12.1.1. Diverse paradigmatic positions: Static dimensions
Arising from the interpretations of urban South housing theoretical issues and an empirical study of Nairobi’s housing arena, evidence suggests that there are dominant, organisational/official, and individual/personal paradigms. Firstly, the dominant paradigm relates to a given space-time and
defines the ‘zeitgeist’ of a particular epoch. Theoretically, only a single paradigm dominates a particular space-time, before it is replaced by another i.e. there is only one dominant paradigm at a given space-time. However, paradigms have a static dimension; i.e. they exist in a changeless and timeless way. All paradigms exist at the same time, however, certain factors coalesce to make certain paradigms dominate others and eventually one paradigm becomes dominant for a particular time, before it loses its prominent position to another. Accordingly, this study identified six general paradigms that defined the Global South development, housing, and governance issues. Secondly, certain paradigms can be identified characterising certain organisations, locations, groupings, among other entities, of which actors associated to those entities are subjected to them in various degrees; often they comprise official positions actors hold or should hold in particular situations. Thirdly, individual actors subscribe to certain personal paradigms that largely serve as their main unacknowledged motivations for their actions, and how they interact and interrelate with other actors. Consequently, at any given time and space, individual actors are subjected to multiple meanings transformation and regulation, that condition, enable and constrain their action. However, in many cases as observed in this study, the dominant, official, and personal paradigmatic positions are not usually congruent, both with a given individual, and with their interactions with other mutual actors. Hence the arena in Nairobi, and many other urban South locations, untimely resembles a choir whereby the singers are “always singing from different song books” (Agevi, 2011), and the actors following different scripts, resulting in a very incoherent and mumbled up noise, producing disjointed and unintelligible actions, to the detriment of the housing situation. This could contribute greatly to misunderstandings and the lack of common ground among actors, greatly reducing the effectiveness of initiatives, and the perpetuation of the urban South housing crisis.

12.1.2. Paradigmatic complexities: Dynamic dimensions

Paradigms not only have the above mentioned static dimensions, they also have dynamic dimensions. Paradigms in themselves are static; and when examining an actor at a given time, space, and situation, a particular paradigm can be identified; including the coexistence of multiple competing neutral, or complementing paradigms at a given time-space-situation. However, individual actors, organisations, situations, and space among other entities are never static in the course of time; they are constantly changing, and also modifying the conditions that condition them; hence paradigms have a dynamic dimension to them. Indeed, as observed, the actions and interactions of the actors are conditioned by the paradigmatic structural elements. However, by acting and interacting in time and space, the actors produce those paradigms and reproduce them, either maintaining or modifying them, leading to the production of new paradigms, retention of others, and the acceptance or rejection of others. Thus the dominant paradigm shifts, official paradigms change due to various reasons, and the individuals also shift their paradigmatic positions as they receive information that alters their perceptions and world views, and get new convictions. Whereas an individual is at any given time subjected to the dominant, official, and personal paradigms which are often dissimilar, whenever paradigm shifts occur, they are usually not at the same rate. For example individuals while undertaking particular actions in the housing arena, may come across certain facts that may alter their convictions; and through their arguments, they may induce change of the official positions, leading to shifts in the paradigmatic
stands of their epistemic communities, and finally inducing a shift in the dominant paradigm globally; as exemplified by the sustainability paradigm. These processes can happen in bottom-up, top-down, or horizontal manner in the mutual constitution of paradigms, actions, interactions, interrelations, and the housing situation. Hence the situations, interactions, relations, and the paradigms, are constantly changing, at different rates between the individuals and individuals, individuals and organisations, organisations and organisations, individuals and the dominant paradigm, and the organisations and the dominant paradigm; which in turn has been subjected to decadian paradigm shift. Certainly, as Ley (2010) rightly observed, perusing the urban South's housing issues in fact becomes “searching for moving targets”. These paradigmatic dynamics play out themselves in the shifting perceptions, roles, relationships, modes of governance, among others; all these with significant ramifications to the effectiveness of initiatives and the urban South housing situation as a whole.

12.1.3. Beyond the six paradigms

Whereas this study identifies six major particular paradigms in the urban South’s housing arena, other studies and researchers can also identify totally different sets of paradigms. In fact in actuality those paradigms exist with less sharp and ‘pure’ distinctions between them; and with some of the characteristics used to illustrate a particular paradigm being applicable to other paradigms. In fact, as evidenced in this study, it might not be possible for any given actor, organisation, time, or space to display a ‘pure’ paradigm, rather they usually display an assortment of elements from various paradigms, however, with one or two paradigms standing out. Furthermore, sharp and clear paradigmatic distinctions amongst the interacting actors at any given time and space may not be readily apparent or explicitly displayed and might be hard to observe and uncover, necessitating appropriate methods and tools to facilitate the uncovering of these paradigms; however, according to this study uncovering of those paradigms are vital for the effectiveness and success of any analysis, interpretation, policy, programme, or project. Hence, the DHG matrix, and its various modifications, adaptations, and improvements, could serve as such heuristic devices for uncovering of those hidden, unacknowledged, and unconscious dimensions and perceptions.

Indeed due to various paradigmatic forces, actors (both in theory and practice) find themselves in camps and in sets of circles from which are hard to break free from and to discern with clear eyes the complexities of what is ongoing in the urban South arena; and hence it might be tempting to quickly categorise particular actors in a certain paradigm, based on overt observation. For instance, several World Bank staffers complained of being readily labelled, neoliberalist even though they were not, as a result of the dominant prevailing narratives and perceptions (Pers.com.WB, 2011). Thus what is important is the co-presence of multiple paradigms and even sometimes conflicting paradigms, in any time-space, organisation, grouping, and even with an individual actor. Furthermore, these stances were not static, but were constantly being reconstituted, maintained, or modified, as the actors interacted with others (including the researcher observing them), and as they encountered certain experiences, arguments, and convictions in the course of their practices. Accordingly, the six identified paradigms should be seen only as ideal types, rather than empirically precise accounts of
development, housing, and governance situations in the Global South, in any particular decade or as practiced by any given actor or organisation.

12.1.4. Hidden unacknowledged motivations

As observed in Nairobi’s arena, the paradigmatic positions were usually hidden, even to the actors themselves. They were often at the unconscious levels, such that many actors may not be aware of the paradigms they subscribed to. At a practical consciousness level, they tacitly acted in a given way and rationalised their actions, for example, an official ordering the bulldozing of the slums with the rationalisation of attracting tourists. At a discursive consciousness level, the actors may give certain labels to their actions, often in compliance with the dominant or official paradigm, however as observed here this is not always the case. What they said they were doing, was not always the same as what they were actually doing.

As a consequence, any stakeholder/actor analysis, or any study that involves actors, for it to be meaningful, needs to delve deeper and uncover the often hidden motives and other nuances, for which even the actors themselves may not be aware of. Analysis and interpretation should not just stop at what the actors say, but also seek to understand their rationalisations, and why and how they say what they say. This includes uncovering the paradigmatic dynamics surrounding the actors’ actions, interactions, and interrelations. Since these are not dependent on interests alone, but also on paradigmatic positioning, stakeholder/actor analyses should not only deal with interests, but also with paradigms.

Whereas class conflict and struggle, and their constituent tensions and antagonisms due to competing socioeconomic interests and desires among different actors/actor groups play a significant role in the housing problems, this study suggests that this is just a part of the picture, and there is need to focus beyond class conflict and also examine issues of convictions and paradigms that could be independent of those interests. In many cases interests, class, and paradigms may seem to coalesce, but this is not always necessarily true. Hence in attempts to achieve cooperation, dealing with only class issues and interests may not be enough to uncover all the dynamics surrounding the problem, nor guarantee the successful execution of the initiative, mutual trust, or common ground. Furthermore, it would most likely be therefore, erroneous to automatically ascribe an actor a particular paradigm only on the basis of the actor belonging to a certain class or group; thus looking beyond class conflicts and interest, as well as ‘social conflict’ based theories and practices. Actors being in the same group, institution, class, time, space, etc. do not necessarily mean they share the same perspectives. It might sometimes be erroneous to treat groups or juxtapositions such as land lord vs. tenant, colonialist vs. colonised, elite vs. hoi polloi as being homogenous, for such groups in themselves carry numerous variations in perspectives and world views. For instance, different elite actors may have different perceptions of what they consider as the under-class which may influence the particular elite actor treatment of the particular under-class and the interactions and interrelations with each other.
In this study the ordinary/powerless/poor citizens/actors and actor groups have in many cases been juxtaposed with the powerful/elite actors, actor groups, organisations, and entities such as the state or government ministries. The justification for using such groupings and simplistic abstractions stemmed from the fact that those groupings share some common characteristics, and are bound together by their shared circumstances, societal structural forces and their individual actor’s interactions modes in time and space. They were also often perceived and treated as monolithic entities, as societal groupings or organisations with collective statements such as ‘they don’t care about us’. Nonetheless, in actuality none of these entities are homogeneous blocs. Each of those groupings or entities encompasses a host of divergent points of view, competing vested interests, and significant cleavages. They are therefore splintered into numerous subgroups, subgroups of subgroups, and even more divisions even with those subgroups often up to the individual level; each conditioned by certain unacknowledged motivations.

Since each of the identified six paradigms carries with it, its own types of preferred governance modes relating to power relations, participation, and communication form; in addition to meanings, definitions, norms, justifications, resources, and instruments among others, they play a significant role in determining the actors’ objectives, methods, conduct, relationships with other actors, and ultimately the outcomes of the initiatives. For instance, some dominant paradigms provide opportunity for need and voices of the urban poor to be heard. For instance, the Sustainabilism espouses the right of all actors both weak and strong to be respected, ensured, and realised with no regard to class, gender, power, or wealth. The good Governism looks at how various interests can be accommodated for the benefit of the involved actors; however this may favour those with more power and voice. These highlight the need to look at means of coalescing the various divergent perspectives, for the benefit of the urban poor. Thus, each paradigm could have not only its own organizational logic but also its own constituency. Hence, some paradigms might be more suitable to some interests more than others; and thus more relevant to some actors, organisations, or sectors more than others. For instance, the condition of being a slumlord makes it highly unlikely that slum lord would prefer a paradigm that either gives more power to the slum dwellers, or advocates for slum clearance, or public housing; but the slumlord might find a paradigm that prescribes a laissez faire state’s attitude to be more conducive. Nevertheless, this relationship should not be taken as being necessarily true at all times, some actors may hold on to paradigms that may at face value contradict their interests. Paradigms act at a much deeper unconscious levels and practical consciousness, while interests more at the discursive consciousness levels. Ordinarily, it would not be expected for a social worker to support a pro-neoliberalist growth initiative, or a private sector for profit actor to support a welfarist -sustainability oriented initiative. Nevertheless, in several cases, the relationships between paradigms and perceived interest may not be that simple and direct. This necessitates a more nuanced and deeper examination of the actors and situations to meaningfully uncover their positions. Furthermore, over time, actors and organisations may either hold on to their paradigmatic stance, or change them following a paradigm shift either consciously or unconsciously. However, there might also be relabeling whenever there are changes in regimes locally or globally, either to protect their interest, or without conscious motives. Paradigm shifts in dominant paradigm may result from political regime change as exemplified by
Regan-Thatcher ascendency to power, nevertheless, that regime change could have been sparked in the first place by a paradigm shift. Such that all these changes were not out of deliberate actions, but a build up of various combinations of unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences that led the leaders to power, and made them act in particular ways. Hence, the involvement of these hidden unacknowledged motivations for action also highlights the dilemma as to the source of paradigm shifts, and dominant paradigms in each epoch.

12.1.5. Methodological observations and contributions

The conducting of this study includes the construction of a conceptual, theoretical, analytical, and interpretational framework, from which several methodological observations and contributions could be inferred. This included observing issues that could jeopardise the study’s quality such as asymmetries in respondents and cases, and a researcher’s relation with the respondents, case issues, and location. The role of the researcher in any survey, interview, observation, analysis and interpretation can be much greater than what is acknowledged. Since every individual has a paradigmatic position or worldview, it goes without saying that every researcher has his or her own paradigmatic stand that influences the choice of issues to investigate, the subject matter, the interview respondents, the data to be collected, and finally the analysis and interpretations of the results. Indeed while interacting with other actors and people under investigations of interviews, the paradigmatic position of the researcher might become apparent to the respondent (or misconstrued) which will play a role in influencing the answers given. Indeed as the problem with snowballing, a researcher’s paradigm might unknowingly lead him or her to a certain epistemic community; the researcher may be accepted or rejected by these epistemic communities on the basis of their researcher’s perceived paradigm. Furthermore, the issue of double and triple hermeneutics needs to be given adequate weight in any analysis and interpretation; and any ensuring interpretations are in fact interpretations of other interpretations. Moreover, as a critique to the snowballing research technique, there grave danger of getting only ‘one side’ of the story, as this techniques that relies on networks, and without knowing often following actors in one epistemic community, with similar paradigms; while missing out completely on other sets of actors, who could have very critical attributes and attitudes for the matter at hand.

The analytical model outlined here not only helps to accord objective and meaning to urban South development, housing, and governance issues, it also offers an opportunity to examine further and understand the tensions involved in those issues; especially those arising from the numerous and diverse actors in the arena pursuing them in different and contending forms, with different priorities, objectives, and strategies. For instance, these could result in ‘governance gaps’ due to inadequate inter-actor and inter-organisational coordination, organisational insufficiency, and ultimately ‘ungovernability’ thereby rendering initiatives, all of which are dependent on some sort of governance, utterly untenable and impossible to implement.

From the forgoing discussion, it was apparent that development, housing, and governance issues can never be value free or neutral; rather they reflect and sustain certain socio-culturo-political values. Hence in order to understand these development, housing, and governance issues, it is imperative
that these values’ dimensions be brought into the analysis. Hence, this theoretical and analytical framework was aimed at highlighting those overarching values that gave meaning and understanding to those issues; and also as a vehicle for understanding those values and objectives that give the development, housing, and governance issues and processes direction, objective, and meaning.

The DHG matrix, and methodologies developed and applied in this study could be modified, improved upon, adapted and applied in other contexts, situations, time and space. These include: firstly, replication of the process in the same context for simple comparison or even longitudinal studies. Secondly, in another urban South housing context for instance, in examining the housing crisis amidst the problems of governability or ‘governance gaps’. Thirdly, even though the framework was constructed on the basis of the urban South housing crisis as the substantive issue; however by creating new codes for any other substantive issue in the Global South, myriads of other issues can be examined in a paradigmatic way. Fourthly, by only retaining the framework and the concept, with the Matrix serving mainly as an exemplar or prototype, the Matrix can entirely be constructed by a complete set of other codes, formulated on the basis of other societal issues, contexts, and conceptualisations; thereby opening an opportunity for unlimited application of the Matrix.

This frame can be used for firstly, uncovering the nature of the involved actors, their actions, interactions, and their hidden and unacknowledged motivations for actions, i.e. their paradigmatic characteristics; and therefore elucidate on their meanings, governance forms, and legitimation, on the basis of their envisioned roles, resources, and values; and through communication, power, and sanction forms. Secondly, for observing what actors do tacitly at the practical level versus what they say they do at the discursive level, and how their explanations and ‘labels’ relate to their actions, and their unacknowledged motivations for actions. Thirdly, relating the above to the intended and unintended consequences of the actors’ actions, such as the effectiveness of initiatives, relations with other actors, and paradigmatic dynamics. Fourthly, how all the above relate across time, space, scales, organisations, and amongst the involved actors; including comparing paradigmatic dynamics across them. Hence, this methodological frame can be improved on and modified to combine and examine discrete aspects in a given time-space in an issue, but which may seem correlated; as exemplified here by the synthesisisation of the aspects of politico-economic context, development discourse, governance debates, housing theory and practice, politico-historical issues, and their changes over time and space; all this as they are invoked into and by the actors, their actions, interactions, interrelations, interests and perspectives. Hence, this methodological frame developed here, after necessary improvements and adaptation has the potential of allowing future researchers to insert themselves into various study matters, contexts, and levels; to perform hermeneutic elucidations of frames of meaning and the interpretation of actions and interactions; the investigation of interactions and contexts in the view of various levels of the continuum of consciousness (unconscious, practical, and discursive) and to identify bounds of knowledgeability; among others. Furthermore, in both theory and practice, this framework could be used for examining relationships amongst the actors and exploring the nature of their potential interactions and relationships, such as the cooperation or conflict potential, propensity for achieving common ground or misunderstandings, and the effectiveness of the
ensuing initiatives from those interactions; all with significant conceptual, analytical, and interpretative utility in the understanding and resolution of the urban South crisis. In sum, this study endeavours to provide one more way of looking at the urban South housing problems and solutions.

Table 98: Examining critical themes in a multi-actor arena

Table 99: Structuration in urban South housing (or any other subject matter)

Table 100: Structurationist paradigmatic matrix for specific issue in a given time

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12.2. Implication to practice

In formulating and implementing policies, programmes, and projects, there is a need to go beyond focusing on interests alone, but to also endeavour to uncover the paradigmatic positions and their impact on the situation. Focusing on only interests and competition for resources stands the risk of missing out on the broader picture. Consequently, stakeholder analyses which mainly focus on issues of interests, influence and networks, may not be sufficient to ensure the smooth running, building up of trust, or the effectiveness of an initiative as there is a need to also uncover the paradigmatic dimensions and issues that are pertinent to the initiative.

12.2.1. Focus on individual actors

Focusing on organisations and groups as units of analyses might be imperative. However, what is more important, are the paradigmatic positions of the individuals directly involved with the initiative. Whereas it is the organisations or group dynamics that frame the actions of the actors, the individual actors do not necessarily comply with the rules of their organisations and official positions. Hence, a stakeholder analysis might reveal conflict between two organisations, whereas the staff of the two organisations work amicably through their epistemic communities, or by means of personal unions, which are prevalent in the urban South housing arenas. Consequently, there is a need to focus more on the individuals actually directly involved with an initiative, if effectiveness is to be achieved.

Indeed, despite the large sizes of certain organisations, or vast numbers of those presumably interested organisations with many individual actors; ultimately the actual initiatives, key actions, and interactions are carried out and articulated by a disproportionately small number, and group of actors. In fact some of those individuals regularly reappear in different roles, in different groups and organisations, either in the form of personal unions or owing to the duplication of initiatives in many urban South arenas. This is also highlighted by the case of the pervasive ‘gatekeepers’ and ‘professional’ participators. Consequently, stakeholder/actor analyses should pay key attention to the individuals who will ultimately make key decisions and play a key role in the actual implementations, ensuring their concerns, views, values, insights, misgivings, and perspectives among others, are adequately addressed.

12.2.2. Not only what they do and say, but also why

Pursuing a more empathetic understanding of not only what the actors do and say; but also why they do it; give certain explanations, justifications, and rationalisations; as well as, their hidden, unconscious, and unacknowledged motivations; potentially removes one more obstacle towards better comprehension and resolution of the urban South housing crisis. This could aid the endeavour to avoid win-loss solutions, towards more win-win initiatives. Uncovering the hidden motivations and perspectives may lead to a better understanding of one another, and even lead to shifts in perspectives, following better arguments, convictions, and also the accommodation of other mutual actors, once everything is clear and over the table. The problems arising from the paradigm positions contribute towards many unnecessary conflicts and misunderstandings, as actors fight each other when they fail to realise they are on the same side. With a proper understanding of the other actors’
positions, it may lead to more genuine and fruitful engagement. Ordinarily, many pre-programme and pre-project studies usually depend on the material influences and discursive narratives and articulations of the actors; however, there is a need to engage adequately with their rationalisations and unconscious motivations for their actions. Since these material and discursive components rarely reveal the real issues; the motivations which are very influential, are usually hidden, even to the actors themselves.

12.2.3. Beyond negotiations towards good arguments

Governance in numerous conceptualisations has been normatively presented as involving negotiations aimed at achieving a mutual understanding amongst the involved actors as well as resolving points of difference and crafting outcomes that optimally satisfy the various interests of the involved actors. Nevertheless, governance based on these negotiations carry the risk of some actors using their resource-advantage to obtain benefits to the detriment of weaker actors, resulting in win-lose situations; most likely with the overall effect of reducing the effectiveness of the involved initiatives, and worsening of the pertinent situation. Thus the challenge is how to achieve principled and integrative negotiations with higher degrees of trust, with a creative problem-solving approach that achieves mutual gains equitably for all the involved actors in a win-win manner, thereby ‘expanding the pie’ rather than just sharing the pie in a zero sum game. Negotiations that are accommodating, compromising and collaborating are preferable to those based on competition, avoidance, or threats. Accordingly, crucial to governance are shared or commonly accepted norms and dominant assumptions about causality, factuality, interpretivity and normativity. Indeed, an ideal situation in most governance conceptualisations is when the actors share some commonality in their dominant assumptions concerning both factual and normative matters. Nevertheless shared norms cannot be negotiated by bargaining that is interest driven. Actors may adopt new norms and therefore paradigms by coming across ‘good reasons’ to do so, and probably being convinced through ‘argument’. Negotiations may only succeed in producing actions and interactions that the actors do not ‘believe in’, with this carrying the risk of drastically reducing the effectiveness of the involved initiatives, or even worsening the problem they are trying to solve.

In examining the urban South housing situation through governance (especially using the notion metagovernance) which is constitutional; governance could be linked to the formation, retention or modification of certain images (e.g. general or policy-specific) of the situation and arena as paradigms, by the involved actors, organisations or the society in general (Ostrom, 1990, Jessop, 2002, Heinelt, 2012). This development of images involves the linguistic coding of problem definitions and appropriate solutions, the normative appropriateness and legitimation of those solutions, the requisite resources and optimal power relations deemed necessary for best resolutions of the problems according to a given actor. Nonetheless, the maintenance of the status quo or even the worsening of the problem could also be a desirable outcome depending on the world views and notions held by the involved actors. Hence, the images may arise from the assumptions the actors hold (and believe to be true) about causality and descriptive ‘factual matters’ of how the world works, and also their prescriptive value and normative assumptions about how the situation ought to be or be tackled, and
also how the problems and solutions should be evaluated, either by themselves or in comparison with others in time-space.

Since governance entails certain images concerning problem definitions and ‘appropriate’ patterns of action becoming binding for the interactions of the involved actors in a given situation, time and space; and also governance being both constitutional and paradigmatic, it impacts the actors, their relations and resultant initiatives in three orders of governance through ‘framing’. The first order determines how the initiatives would be carried out, the second order determines who participates, and in the third order how they participate i.e. the norms, values, and principles of the ‘governing of governance’. This influences the voice options and the conditions for arguing and bargaining. Hence, governance in housing is not only about how involved actors use their ‘voices’ to communicate their ‘good reasons’ arising from their images, to influence the course of actions, interactions and interrelations; but also the distribution of ‘voice-options’, and the conditions under which it is possible for the actors (both weak and strong) to voice their ‘good reasons’ and have some influence on the course of events in the situation. These conditions and voice-options could either be formally laid down by law or legitimised informally in the course of interactions.

Since governance in a paradigmatic sense entails clarifications of actors’ perceptions of what the problems ‘are’ or ‘are about’, and the ‘appropriate’ way to solve them; it therefore, involves firstly cognitive questions of how ‘the world works’ and secondly, normative questions of how ‘the world should work’. The answers to these questions could be based on communicative rationality involving discursive practices or arguing (at the discursive consciousness level), that entails not only the exchange of reason and but also justifying the validity of the claim or ‘good reasons’ (Giddens, 1984, Habermas, 1984, Elster, 1991). Indeed, Elster (1991) differentiates between ‘arguing’ and ‘bargaining’ (negotiating) during communication. Actors argue aiming to persuade and convince others to change their beliefs concerning certain factual or normative issues, claiming that they are ‘valid’. On the other hand, actors negotiate to induce or even force others to accept their claims, often by relying on threats and promises. Seemingly, on the face of it, impartiality and ‘good reasons’ appear to ordinarily go well with arguing, while interests appear to go well with negotiating (Elster, 1991). Hence, whereas arguing depends upon ‘better’ argument and providing ‘good reasons’ and justifications, negotiating is dependent upon power which is derived from material and authoritative resources. In negotiating, the actors endeavour to make their counterparts believe that they can carry out those threats or promises. For instance, a private sector actor may threaten to exit the arena, if a certain piece of legislation is not removed, or if the standard is lowered. Apparently, shared norms or understandings cannot be negotiated by bargaining, but rather, their relevance in a certain situation can be argued and agreed upon through the prevailing mode of communicative interaction (Elster, 1991, Heinelt, 2012). In sum, much can be gained by even a little better understanding of one another, beyond merely balancing of interests or just sharing ideas.
12.3. Insights and recommendations for further research

The global geopolitico-economic situation, the condition of the Global South, and the development approaches in the past six decades have seemingly not been forces for the good of the urban South poor, nor do they portent a positive outlook for them. Over the decades in the Global South, many development, housing, and governance initiatives have been seen by several actors as actually being in fact self-defeating, ‘anti-developmental’, adversely impacting the poor, who are under oppressive regimes, forcing them to pay double, first to their local oppressors, and secondly to repay the debts of their oppressors to the exogenous actors and organisations. The situation paints a very pessimistic picture for the urban South poor, and the slum-dwellers. The need for effective resolution of the urban South housing crisis is becoming even more desperate with the increasing failure of initiatives and the persistence and worsening of the problem, calling for a better understanding of the problem, and more appropriate means of dealing with the problem.

12.3.1. Need for concerted joint action and citizen voice

The need for concerted joint action cannot be understated. The prevailing paradigm of Good Governism espouses the use of partnerships. Indeed, partnerships could be useful in alleviating an individual actor’s weaknesses by taking advantage of the other mutual actors’ strengths, creating mutual oversight, fostering efficiency and rational resources by diminishing needless competition and duplication. Whereas collaboration by numerous actors with varied objectives, interests, perspectives, strengths and weaknesses could be difficult, it is probable that by uncovering their motives for actions and paradigms this could permit the achievement of common ground, improving their relations, and producing significant improvements in dealing with the urban South housing problems. Nevertheless, partnership may only yield meaningful results for the citizens, if those citizens have genuine bargaining influence; and especially if they have an organised power-base in the community to which the citizen leaders are accountable, and have adequate resources to fund their activities including hiring professionals and mobilisation of activities. This highlights the need for the promotion of paradigms which empower the citizens, and make their voices legitimate, influential, and to be heard. However, the problem which remains is who and how these agenda would be set. More often than not it was angry citizens’ demands, rather than initiatives from ‘above; that led to the negotiated power sharing. The currently ‘powerless’ citizens had to get organized and demand for fair redistribution of power, between them and the ‘power-holders’. This is bearing in mind that, historically, power has seldom been proffered by the powerful; rather it has in most cases, had to be wrested from them by the powerless; since those who have power normally want to hang onto it. In both time and space, where power has come to be shared, it has often been taken by the citizens, rather than been given to them by the power-holders. The citizens have had to get sophisticated enough to refuse being used, manipulated, and ‘conned’ again and again by the power-holders who are solely pursing their own vested interests. Nevertheless, with societal issues being conditioned by issues beyond vested interests such as the hidden and unacknowledged paradigmatic issue, citizen action often becomes fragmented and ineffective.
12.3.2. Fog of war

It highly probable the many conflicts, misunderstandings and unhealthy relations among the actors in the urban South arena, and the subsequent initiatives’ ineffectiveness are mainly as result of ‘fog of war’ (McNamara, 1996, Von Clausewitz, 2008); by which the actors are beset with uncertainty in situational awareness. This includes uncertainty and lack of adequate or accurate information concerning their own and that of other mutual actors’ real intents, motives, capabilities, strengths, and positions; not only of their foes, but also of their friends. Indeed, according to McNamara (1996), a key architect of the Vietnam War, had it not been for the ‘fog of war’, this war could have been avoided altogether. In retrospect, subsequent facts revealed the goals of Vietnam and the United States were similar, and that this extremely devastating and costly war was entirely unnecessary. In the prelude to this, the key actors of the United States’ world views were so clouded with cold war perspectives such that they misjudged the geopolitical intentions of their presumed adversaries and friends, exaggerated the sense of danger to the United States and failed to recognise their own limitations of reliance on military strength. Furthermore, they underestimated the will of the people (presumed adversaries) to die for their beliefs and values; such that McNamara and other policymakers, in retrospect, have felt that they were ‘terribly wrong’ to have allowed this conflict to escalate to a full scale war and last so long. Certainly, if misunderstandings caused by paradigmatic complexities can result in protracted wars, it is not hard to imagine the impact of these complexities to the initiatives aimed at the urban South housing problems.

The extremely complex and multifaceted Urban South housing issues undoubtedly require the participation of diverse actors and their concerted actions. Nevertheless, these actors come with diverse interests, perspectives, values, goals, and paradigmatic positions; necessitating the finding of a meaningful way for reconciling those diverse and often opposing attitudes and attributes towards a new synthesis and subsequent coordination of the mutual action towards the achievement of multiple values either simultaneously or even synergistically. Nonetheless, in practice it is often difficult to achieve agreement on these interests and paradigms, often demanding difficult and painful work by which actors’ values and paradigmatic positions are forced to the surface, compared and contrasted, criticised, argued, and debated; in which possible new convictions and compromises are made to accommodate others; towards the pursuit of effective, accommodative, and emphatic solutions. However, this process might be seen by some actors as being too difficult to undertake or too threatening to their own paradigmatic positions and values, leading them to reject the process or critique it ideologically, pursuing their own narrow goals and avoiding discussion and compromise with others.

The dynamics involved in these groupings are far more complex and nuanced such that participation has to go over various roadblocks any side of the divide, between the ‘power-wielders’ and the ‘powerless’. Both sides of the divide have to contend with distrust, misunderstanding, misperceptions, competing interests, and conflicting perspectives both within and across the divide. This may also include issues of patronage and clientelism, paternalism, ethnocentrism, discrimination, segregation, competition for power, and resistance to power redistribution. Moreover, the poor actors’ inadequacies,
in terms of socio-politico-economic infrastructure, knowledge-base, and other resources that could enable them participate meaningfully; all in the face of futility of their previous actions, and the alienation they are currently facing.

For this study a few points became very clear. The urban South's housing and governance issues are far more complex and nuanced than we could begin to address them in any single study, action, programs or approach, by any given actor or entity; and thus the need for sustained concerted action is vividly evident. Nevertheless, this sustained concerted action may be difficult or even impossible to achieve for any effective solution, unless the issues of different perspectives or paradigms are adequately addressed. Whereas it might be impractical to suggest that consensus on perspectives can be achieved; this study posits the mere recognition and acknowledgement of the existence of the differences will go a long way in facilitating mutual understanding, and improved relations among the involved actors, and ultimately contribute to better working of sustained concerted actions and thus effective solutions.

Due to the ever-present paradigmatic related conflicts, many actors are forced to work with only one hand; since the other one is used for dealing with a continuous barrage of opposition and misunderstandings; not only from actors in other organisations, but also from their own organisations, fellow co-workers, and actor groups. Moreover, they may also have to deal with their own internal contradiction from within themselves as individuals.

12.3.3. Beyond pluralism and compromise; towards using ‘good’ parts

Meaningful solutions could be arrived at if approaches attempted to go beyond the traditional pluralist approaches of bargaining between two opposing viewpoints, or just striving for compromises, but towards making best uses of the ‘best’ parts and dismissing the ‘bad’ parts of the opposing viewpoints; and not just compromises which diminish the good in each of them; thus permitting all actors to act and interact based on their values, principles, paradigms and interests; and not on a blanket ideological bias or paradigmatic stand of the power players. For example, a way can be found such that actors believing in pursuit of profit as the ultimate motive could find ways of working with actors pursuing fairness and justice or conservation of the environment, such that while each actor pursues their values, the common good of society is achieved. By laying the paradigmatic positions openly, this could facilitate such an arrangement, as all the actors know beforehand the intentions and beliefs of other mutual actors, thereby reducing ambiguity, misunderstandings, misperceptions, and the pervasive ‘fog of war’. One more step towards more meaningful and effective initiatives could be inclusiveness (that encompasses inclusive governance) which brings the involved variety of paradigms (as perspectives, frames, etc) to light, involving processes that accommodate those different actors’ paradigmatic positions and influences their ways of thinking, talking, acting, and relating with other mutual actors. Ultimately, initiatives should be formulated with the recognition and affirmation of extreme diversity amongst the involved actors in both interests and paradigms (encompassing values, worldviews, beliefs etc); and those initiatives be designed to foster the peaceful coexistence of those diverse interests and paradigms, towards the facilitation of synergistic relationships amongst those
actors. This necessitates going beyond the balancing of interests and the forcing of ideas, towards mutual respectful sharing of ideas and learning, for instance, through hybrid forms of governance built on the basis of mutual acceptance of duelling or interpenetrating paradigmatic orders. Experiences in the urban South housing arena suggest that no single actor or organisation has all the resources, knowledge, authority, legitimation, or enforcement capacities necessary to adequately deal with the housing problem alone. Furthermore, it is more prudent to involve the slum dwellers meaningfully and adequately in decisions and actions that touch on their lives and that address issues of concern to them. Hence it is imperative to foster interaction among the different actors, organisations, and networks that would facilitate arriving at well-founded, inclusive, transparent, fair, sustainable and effective decisions; that are complementary and appropriately involve the relevant actors.

12.3.4. Laying the cards on the table
By opening up and bring to the fore the actors’ paradigms and interests, in addition to their values, strengths, weakness, misgivings, and capabilities among others, and fostering genuine discussions, arguments, and negotiations; and with more of the facts being uncovered and laid on the table, this could lead to more open and candid relationships amongst the actors, with lesser ambiguity, misunderstandings, and suspicions. All this can be very beneficial to better decision making and implementation of initiatives. In bringing these paradigmatic and interests’ issues to the open and by laying them on the table, as well as identifying and bringing in all the key actors, this can be a slow and tedious process that takes place under a heavy cloud of suspicion and rancour. However, once that is accomplished, it is highly probable that the subsequent decision-making and implementation could be smoother, more predictable, and acceptable, having adequately taken into consideration the contentious issues, leading to more genuine and effective partnerships, which would most likely, yield the intended outcomes. It might in some instances be beneficial to allow the prevailing diverse meanings of housing issues; thereby permitting housing to be conceptualised as an open, malleable, dynamic, and evolving idea; that can be adapted to fit the prevailing greatly differentiated situations and contexts across space and time, with highly heterogeneous and complex sets of involved actors. This openness to interpretation could enable actors from different scales and sectors to redefine and reinterpret its meaning to fit their own situations, values, paradigms, interests, and different challenges. What is important is how those diverse meanings can be made to work together in a synergistic manner in the housing arena.

12.3.5. Significance of paradigms and paradigmatic thinking
In sum, there is a need to embrace paradigmatic thinking in theory and practice when examining various societal issues. This could uncover various critical issues and dimensions that could greatly influence the understanding and interpretation of the subject matters, as well as the probable effectiveness, impacts, and chances of success of any envisioned actions. For instance, examining issues using a paradigmatic view could help shed light as to why certain approaches are so fiercely defended, with the discussions between advocates resembling ‘religious fights’; or some actors holding on to some approaches as the panacea for the problem, despite much visible evidence to the contrary. The answer could lie in the fact that these approaches are not just ‘scientific’, but are derived
from certain value and belief systems, forms of social coordination, patterns of interpersonal relations, and cultural images, among others that are encapsulated in the various paradigmatic dimensions and perceptions. Accordingly, while paradigmatic dimensions are usually not seriously considered in many studies and programmes, as observed in this study, they could potentially be one of the most important determining factors for the condition of various aspects of societal issues, including development, housing, governance, research, politico-economy, and many others. In fact, it is highly probable that interests are just an outward symptomatic expression of deep held various paradigmatic dimensions and perceptions. Thus the various paradigmatic dimensions involved, might make or break initiatives. As a consequence, just as ‘systems thinking’ allows the appreciation of how issues influence each other within a complete entity; ‘paradigmatic thinking’ has the potential to provide a better and clearer understanding of issues, by surmounting numerous commonly held assumptions and perceptions that could in fact be inaccurate. This may probably lead to a better understanding not only of the issues but also of other actors, with potential for improved relations and more effective initiatives. Indeed according to Asimov (?). “Your assumptions are your windows of the world. Scrub them off every once in a while, or the light won’t come in.” Paradigmatic thinking could potentially enlarge one’s vision of issues that could lead to better decision making and relationships. Certainly, many assumptions concerning the urban South situation and in fact most societal issues have a tendency to fall apart once a deeper and more nuanced examination is employed. Nevertheless, while it is important to gain broad understandings, it is even more important to avoid sweeping generalisations.

12.4. Desiderata

This study is by no means exhaustive, nor does it seek to provide any answers. Rather, the study endeavours to open up debates concerning the identified urban South’s critical themes of development, housing, and governance coupled with their static and dynamic paradigmatic dimensions. The goal is to highlight the need for the pursuit of a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the urban South’s housing issues.

To facilitate the transferability of its conclusions, interpretations, analyses, methods, and observations, this study endeavoured to furnish ample contextual detail including background information and relatively detailed descriptions of the surrounding phenomena; such that other researchers and practitioners can make informed decisions on how, whether, or not to apply this study’s findings and conclusions to their contexts of interest and the modifications necessary for such applications. Furthermore, they can choose which elements they can apply on the basis of the given information and inherent limitations pointed out in this study, vis-à-vis their own contexts and limitations.

In line with its design, this study generates more questions than answers; some of the emergent questions that could be explored further include:

- Where do dominant paradigms come from, and why and how do they become dominant, or lose dominance, and their trajectories in space-time, in organisations, and in actors?
• Which methods can be used to adequately uncover unacknowledged motivations for actions and bringing those issues to the fore, both in theory and practice?
• Why the paradigms are sometimes so fiercely defended, and the discussions between advocates of different paradigms seem like religious fights?
• Why do some actors consider particular paradigms as a panacea for all problems?
• What is the relationship between interests and paradigms?
• How can meaningful and candid debate amongst actors be actualised?

The answers to these questions could lie in the fact that the paradigms comprise not only the politico-administrative structures, but also belief systems, social coordination, images of cultures, and sets of shared values and beliefs that also determine the patterns of interpersonal relations. However, how is this so? Furthermore, there is need to examine several recurrent themes in the arena, such as the reason why ‘labelling’ or ‘putting old wine in new bottles’ is so prevalent in dealing with urban South issues, as well as the motivations for this and how to deal with it both in theory and practice.

Even though the role of interests has been emphasised in both theory and practice, evidence suggests that perspectives and perceptions as encapsulated by the actors’ paradigmatic subscriptions and ascriptions, also play a crucial role. In fact it could be argued that the actors’ paradigmatic stances and perceptions influence the types of interests they can hold and pursue, and how they go about pursuing or defending them. Indeed, holding certain paradigms may preclude or make it difficult for actors to have certain interests or pursue particular courses of actors. For instance, actors believing in justice and fairness may not easily engage in an oppressive policy or action against a disadvantaged segment of the population; on the contrary those actors believing in their superiority and privileged entitlement of their own class or group, may find it easier to accept inhumane treatment of the ‘others’.

Given that there are usually diverse interests and paradigmatic positions in the arena, initiatives attempting too much coercive narrowing in terms of paradigmatic positions as dictated by particular powerful actors could probably be the reason why many initiatives lose relevance, legitimacy, acceptance, effectiveness, and thus risk failure. Consequently the challenge is to look for more inclusionary ways of consensus-building and collaborating; that include solidarity, civility, dignity, tolerance, understanding and foster mutual trust and respect. Appreciating paradigmatic positions could be very valuable in this case. More importantly, it is critical not merely to try to solve the problem in itself but to confront and transform the processes that gave rise to the problem in the first place. Indeed, as observed in this study, it is of crucial importance to uncover the paradigmatic dimensions in any study or initiative in both theory and practice. However, what is more challenging but necessary, is how to adequately and appropriately deal with those paradigmatic dimensions once they have been uncovered and for example, apply them for the improvement of knowledge, actor relations, the search for solutions, effectiveness of initiatives, and ultimately the meaningful resolution of the urban South crisis.
There are infinite perspectives and perceptions concerning various aspects of the urban South, while it may always be possible to judge the superiority of some perspectives and perceptions over others; one should endeavour to lookout for the danger of embracing ‘a single story’. Nevertheless, as exemplified by the case of Nairobi, some perspectives and perceptions are obviously harmful to the welfare of the ordinary citizens. The challenge then becomes which perspectives and perceptions to promote and which to discourage, by whom and how. In an increasingly pessimistic situation and world, there is a desperate need to strive towards means of fostering ways of ensuring genuine sense of hope and optimism in the urban South housing situation; and indeed in all situations concerning the Global South as a whole. Beyond mere rhetoric, ‘good’ intentions and half-hearted tokenistic approaches; there is a need to strive towards significantly engaging with the situations, gaining a better understanding of issues, and arriving at solutions that bring meaningful improvements to the lives of many in the Global South.

Ultimately, diversity or divergency in the paradigmatic dimensions is not the problem; in fact it should be embraced. The examination of the urban South’s arena point to the fact that the problem lies firstly in failing to adequately acknowledge this diversity and assuming uniformity; and secondly, when divergence is recognised, trying to impose that uniformity upon other actors, groups, and organisation by means of coercive means and ‘negotiations’. This only produces outward conformity and produces more assumption of uniformity with resultant conflicts and misunderstandings. Accordingly, what is vital is the adequate recognition of this inherent diversity, followed by its proper identification and appropriate engagement with, towards more meaningful and effective understanding and resolutions of the urban South crisis and possibly other societal problems.
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Appendices

Appendix I: Interview Guides

Check list

- What is Housing
- Role of government
- Participation
- Governance
- With what resources
- how who tells/do who Governing interaction
- Because, rationale, justification
- It (ought) to be rules
- Sanctioning and Criteria
- Perceive themselves
- Perceive others (govt. slum dwellers, and particular actors/organisations of interest)

General Questions

1. Introduction: Brief description of yourself
   a. What is your role
   b. Who do you relate to and how

2. What does housing mean to you
   a. The housing problem signifies?
   b. Cause of the problem
   c. What is being done or right
   d. Is it solvable
   e. The best way forward and approach
   f. Which resources are needed
   g. How do you ensure/should ensure actors do what they are supposed to (sanctioning)

3. Relations and participations (generally how you see it in the arena)
   a. How is the relations between actors generally (you and X, X and Y)
   b. Is good or bad
   c. What are the consequences
   d. How should it be
   e. How can the relations be improved
   f. How can conflicts and misunderstandings be reduced
   g. Your own experiences and actions to reduce conflicts and misunderstandings
   h. Who should control the other
   i. Which actors should be involved or not (e.g. govt. slumlords, NGOs, church, etc)
j. What should they do
k. Participatory approaches: what challenges do you face, what should be done

4. Which actors do you relate to mostly
   a. Describe them and their roles
   b. How do you relate to them
   c. What are they doing, and what should they do
   d. What are they doing right or wrong
   e. How can the relations be improved

5. The government
   a. What should be its role
   b. How do they relate and communicate to the residents
   c. Which government agencies do you relate to and how
   d. What are they doing, and what should they do

6. The residents
   a. What is a slum dweller (poor, lazy, unfortunate, weak, unorganised, exploitable etc)
   b. What is their role in solving the housing problem
   c. What should they do/ be done to them for a way forward

7. Governance
   a. What does it mean to you?
   b. Is it good, important, relevant, or just a fad?
   c. How is it in the arena?
   d. How can it be improved?
   e. What is the role of ethnicism and corruption?
   f. What should be done about it?
   g. Your own experiences?

Summary snapshot questions
(Asked quickly in a moment of opportunity)

1. What should be done to solve the housing problem and why has it been difficult to solve it?
2. Who should do it, and what is the role of the government?
3. What is your dream concerning the housing situation and the slum dwellers?
4. What is the role of governance in all this, and how can it be improved