LOCAL GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN SO-CALLED 'INFORMAL' URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS

Comparative Investigation in Cairo, Kathmandu, and Ulaanbaatar

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ХУРААНГУЙ

EINFÜHRENDE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

INTRODUCTIVE SUMMARY

Оршил

Хотжилт эрчимтэй явагдсанаас үүдэж ядуурал бий болдог нь шинэ үзэгдэл биш юм. Дэлхий дахины хот суурин газруудад олон хүн ядуу зүдүү нөхцөлд амьдарч байгаа нь зайлшгүй шийдвэрлэх чухал сэдэв байсаар байна. Ялангуяа Өмнөдийн[1] хотуудын хүн ам тасралтгүй өссөөр байгаа нь дэлхийн улс орнуудын төрийн бодлогод дээгүүр байранд ордог (НҮБ-ХАБИТАТ 2008он: XI, Дэлхийн банк, 2015он). Нийгмийн үйлчилгээний байгууллагууд хотыг дэд бүтцээр хангаж чадаагүй нөхцөлд (асуудлыг үр дүнтэй шийдвэрлэх боломж муугаас) тус суурьшлын оршин суугчид нөхцөл байдлыг хүлээн зөвшөөрөхийн оронд амьдрах нөхцөлөө сайжруулахын төлөө зүтгэж, өөрсдөө зохион байгуулалтад ордог. Тиймээс хотын суурьшлын бүсүүд, дүүргийн хэмжээнд өөрийн удирдлагын тогтолцоог[2] хөгжүүлэх буюу орон нутгийн удирдлагатай хосолсон хотжилтын бодлогыг тодорхойлоход төрөл бүрийн байгууллагууд ямар үүрэгтэй оролцох тухай, мөн хот суурин газрыг хөгжүүлэх нөхцлийг тодорхойлоход орон нутгийн хүн амд тэд хэрхэн нөлөөлөх талаар судлах шаардлагатай байгаа юм.

Хотжилтын үйл явц болон суурьшлын хөгжил голдуу албан бусаар явагддаг гэсэн ойлголт хотын захиргаа, улс төр, хот төлөвлөгчдөд нийтлэг байдаг. Гэвч хот төлөвлөлт нь албан бус хэлбэрийг үгүйсгэдэг. Учир нь хотын хүн амын нийтлэг эрх ашиг хөндөгдөхөд нөлөө бүхий шинэ-либерал хэсгийн шийдвэр бүх талаар тэнцвэртэй байхаас илүү шийдвэрлэх шинжтэй юм. 2009 онд Ейфтачел *саарал орон зай* хэмээх зарчмыг боловсруулж, хот төлөвлөлтийн бодлогууд болон албан бус суурьшлын хэлбэрт нөлөөлдөг хүчин зүйлүүдийн тухай авч үзсэн.

Засаглалын хэлбэр, хот суурингийн хөгжил болон иргэд төвтэй хандлага

Энэ тухай хэлэлцүүлэг шинэ зүйл биш. 1960, 1970-аад оны үед хөгжлийн загваруудыг боловсруулснаар хамтын ажиллагааны бодлогыг хөгжүүлэхэд тодорхой хэмжээний нөлөө үзүүлсэн байна. Жанис Пэрлман, Мануэль Кастеллс, Жон Тернер болон бусад хүмүүсийн хэрэгжүүлсэн хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрүүд нь Өмнөд Америкийн албан бус суурьшлыг сайжруулахад асар их дэмжлэг болсон. 1980-аад оноос хоёрдмол хандлагыг

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[1] "Өмнөдийн хот", "Өмнөдийн улс" гэсэн ойлголтонд дэлхийн бөмбөрцгийн урд хэсэгт байрладаг хөгжиж буй улс, хотуудыг төлөөлөх шинжлэх ухааны хэллэг ба судалгааны ажилд энэ утгаар хэрэглэв. Хойд хэсэгт байршилтай улс, хотыг аж үйлдвэржсэн гэх ба голдуу дэлхийн бөмбөрцгийн хойд хагаст байрладаг. "Хөгжиж буй улс орон", "Хөгжиж буй хот" гэдэг нэр томъёог судалгаа хийж буй гурван хотод мөн ашиглав. Монгол улсын Улаанбаатар хотын хувьд газар зүйн байршлаар хойд хэсэгт хамаарагдах боловч хөгжих буй орон юм.

[2] Албан бус суурьшлын нэг шинж чанар нь хотын дэд бүтэц хангалтгүй байх явдал байдаг тул "өөрийн удирдлагатай" гэдэг нэршил нь зөвхөн засаглалын зохион байгуулалттай хамаатай төдийгүй "дэд бүтэц муу" гэдэг утгаараа суурьшлын биет хэлбэр болох юм.

дэлгэрүүлэн судлах болж, дарооос дээш чиглэсэн бүтэцтэй үйл ажиллагаанд илүү анхаарал хандуулах болсон. Өнгөрсөн туршлагаас харахад иргэдийн шууд оролцоотой хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрүүдийг хэрэгжүүлж байгаа өөрийн удирдлагатай суурьшлын хувьд нийгмийн болон техникийн дэд бүтэц дутмаг байгааг ТББ-ууд онцолж байна. Эдгээр хөтөлбөрүүд нь ихэнхдээ одоо байгаа бүтцэд тулгуурлан хэрэгждэг тул хүн амын хэрэгцээг бүрэн хангаж чаддаггүй ба хөтөлбөрийн зорилго, үр дүнг урьдчилан тооцсон байдаг учир оршин суугчдын эрэлтэд нийцсэн уян хатан байж чаддаггүй. Өнөөдөр хотжилтын бодлогод дээрээс доош чиглэсэн хандлага давамгайлсан хэвээр байгаа ба дарооос-дээш болон дээрээс-доош бүтцийн завсарт орших олон хэмжээст нийлмэл хэлбэртэй (Саняал 1998 он) хэд хэдэн талын оролцоотой, өргөн хүрээний шийдлийг олоход хот төлөвлөлтийн хөтөлбөрүүд чиглэдэг.

Энэ нь 2015 онд батлагдсан Тогтвортой хөгжлийн зорилтын 11 дүгээрт тусгагдсан хотуудыг шаардлагатай хэрэгцээ бүгд багтсан, уян хатан, аюулгүй, тогтвортой болгох тухай зорилттой адил юм. 2016 оны 10 дугаар сард иргэн бүрийн тэгш эрхийг хангасан "Хотын эрх"-ийн (Левебвре, 1974; Харвей 2008; Унгерс 2009) зарчмын дагуу уг зорилтыг хэрэгжүүлэхээр Хотжилтын шинэ хөтөлбөрийг гаргасан юм. Орон нутгийн удирдлагын хувьд оновчтой шийдлийг олох, цогц хөгжлийн стратеги (Хабитат III, 2016)-ийг нэвтрүүлэхэд орон нутгийн иргэд болон засаг захиргаа гол үүрэг гүйцэтгэх хэрэгтэй гэж үздэг. Орон нутгийг хөгжүүлэхэд уламжлалт, уян хатан бус бодлого, төлөвлөлт зонхилж байгаа нь олон хэмжээст аргыг ашиглахад саад учруулдаг ба тухайн орон нутгаас оролцогч талуудыг адил түвшинд шийдвэр гаргах боломжоор хангах явдал нь Хотжилтын шинэ хөтөлбөрийн шалгуур сорилт болдог.

Одоо яригдаж байгаа бас нэг мэтгэлцээн бол хотыг болон хөрш орчныг бүрдүүлдэг олон талт цогц хэлбэрүүдийн тухай авч үздэг хотын орон зай, үйлчилгээг бий болгох асуудал юм. Үүнтэй холбогдуулан 2016 онд Филипп Миссэлвицийн тайлбарласнаар хотын уламжлалт засаг захиргааны системээр хотын үйлчилгээг орлого багатай бүлэгт хүргэх боломж муу, мөн үйлчилгээ харилцан адилгүй үйлчилдэг тул засаг захиргаа болон өөрийн удирдлагын тогтолцооны хоорондын завсарт "хамтын ажиллагаатай түншлэлийн хэлбэр"-ээр ажиллах нөхцөл бий болдог байна.

Судалгааны ажил явуулсан зургаан хөрш орчны хувьд хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр хэрэгжүүлэгчдийн үзэл санаа өөр өөр боловч, иргэд өөрсдийн асуудлыг шийдвэрлэхийн тулд хотын захиргаа болон ТББ-уудтай харилцан тохиролцохыг оролдсон. Тиймээс

хамтын ажиллагаа болон хэлэлцээрийн төрлийг сонгох явдал шийдвэрлэх үүрэгтэй байна. Жишээлбэл гүний худаг барих, сургалтын хөтөлбөр боловсруулах зөвшөөрөл авах үед гэх мэт. Тухайн суурьшлыг хөгжүүлэх асуудалд нэг талаас олон нийтийн болон олон улсын байгууллагууд, нөгөө талаас өөрийн удирдлагатай иргэдийн хамтран ажиллах хэлбэрийг тодорхойлоход тус тусын ашиг сонирхол гарч ирдэг. Тохиролцоо хийх явцад олдсон боломжийг хувaaрилдаг ба танил талтай хэсэг нь хамгийн их үр өгөөжийг хүртдэг. Тиймээс засаг захиргааны бүтэц нь талуудын сонирхолд нийцэх асуудалд хэт хөшүүн байдаг тул хэлэлцээр хийх үйл явц нь орон нутгийн удирдлагын түвшинд илүү чухал ач холбогдолтой болсон.

Судалгааны зорилго болон дутагдалтай тал

Зөвшөөрөлгүй бий болсон суурин газрын иргэдийн амин зуулга, амьдрах нөхцөлийг тодорхойлоход болон дахин төлөвлөлтийн хөтөлбөрүүдийн алдаа, оноог үнэлэж дүгнэхэд хэд хэдэн салбарын хэмжээнд олон төрлийн судалгаа хийгддэг ба үүнд: газар зүй, социологи, угсаатны зүй, эдийн засаг, байгаль орчны шинжлэх ухааны салбаруудорно. Энэхүү ажлаар барилга архитектур, орон сууцжуулах хөтөлбөр, оролцогч талуудын бүтэц зохион байгуулалт, ялангуяа тэдний танилын сүлжээ, мөн түүнчлэн оролцогчдын туршлагыг нарийвчлан судалж үзлээ.

Энэхүү судалгааны ажлаар нэгдмэл байдал, нийгмийн идэвх, хамтын ажиллагаа, мөн түүнд нөлөөлөх гадаад, дотоод хүчин зүйлүүд буюу оршин суугчид өөрийн удирдлагын зохион байгуулалтад ороход нөлөөлдөг тодорхой үйл ажиллагаанд чиглэж байгаа нь судалгааны ажлын дутагдалтай талыг гүйцээж байгаа юм. Эдгээр суурьшил үүсч бий болсон цагаасаа эхлэн тогтмол хөгжиж байгаа тухай түүхэн үйл явцыг дүрслэн үзүүллээ. Цаашилбал, хот суурин газрыг хөгжүүлэх хөтөлбөрийн үйл ажиллагаанд оршин суугчдын хэтийн зорилт буюу нийтийн зорилгыг биелүүлэхэд авч хэрэгжүүлж буй арга хэмжээг тусгасан. Ийм хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрийг иргэд амжилттай хэрэгжүүлсэн бөгөөд биет байдлын судалгааны үеэр дээрх хөтөлбөрүүд хэрэгжиж дууссан буюу дуусах шатандаа орсон. Хөтөлбөр хэрэгжиж дуусч байгаа суурин газруудын хувьд гарсан нааштай үр дүн бол олон төрлийн хамтын ажиллагааны хэлбэрүүд бий болсон явдал ба төрийн болон өөрийн удирдлагын тогтолцооны хоорондын завсрыг тодорхой үр дүнд хүрэх хэлэлцээрээр шийдэж, түүнийг Сэллийн харилцааны зарчим (2010он)-аар үнэлсэн юм.

Өөрийн удирдлагатай эдгээр суурьшил, тухайн газарт хэрэгжүүлэх хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрүүдийг судлаж, оролцогч талуудын хооронд хийгдсэн хэлэлцээрийн үйл явц болон оршин суугчдын дунд тэдний гүйцэтгэх үүргийг олж мэдэх замаар тус хөтөлбөрүүдийг амжилттай эсхүл алдаатай хэрэгжих шалтгааныг олох боломжтой. 2013 онд Генрихийн тодорхойлсноор орон нутгийн удирдлага нь олон талын оролцогчдоос бүрдэх ба тэдний боломж, чадварыг тодорхойлох хэрэгтэй болдог. Зөвхөн олон улсын хамтын ажиллагааны үйлчилгээний салбарт төдийгүй дэлхийн хойд хэсгийн улсуудын хот байгуулалтын үйл явцад хот суурингийн хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрийг хэрэгжүүлэхийн өмнө тухайн хөтөлбөр амжилтгүй болж оршин суугчдын бухимдлыг төрүүлэх эрсдлээс сэргийлж орон нутгийн удирдлагын бүтцийг нэн даруй судалж мэдэх хэрэгтэй болдог. Шинэ хот хөтөлбөрийг хэрэгжүүлснээр оршин суугчидтай хамтран хөгжлийн төлөвлөгөө боловсруулах боломж бүрдэх юм.

Судалгааны ажлаа хотжилтын судалгаанд өргөн ашиглагдаж байгаа гурван хотын суурьшлыг харьцуулах арга (Робинсон, 2011 он)-аар гүйцэтгэсэн бөгөөд хот төлөвлөлтийн судалгааны болон засаглалын хэлбэрийн талаарх шинэ чиглэлийг танилцуулах юм. Оршин суугчдын амьдралын нөхцөлийг сайжруулах, хамтын ажиллагааг үр дүнтэй хэрэгжүүлэхэд өөрийн удирдлагатай суурьшилд шаардлагатай байгаа нөөцийг тодорхойлоход угсаатны зүйн судалгааны аргыг хэрэглэж, оролцогчдын дундын эзэмшлийн нутаг дэвсгэр, олон талт үйл ажиллагаа, хэлэлцээрийг онцлон тэмдэглэв.

Энэхүү судалгааны ажил нь эдгээр суурьшил дахь амьдралын нөхцөлийг сайжруулах хөрш орчны хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрүүдэд чиглэсэн. Орон нутгийн удирдлага, ТББ-ууд, тухайн газар оршин суудаг иргэд зэрэг шат шатны төлөөллийг уг төсөл хөтөлбөрүүд нэгтгэсэн. Судалгааны ажлын хүрээнд гурван хот (Катманду, Каир, Улаанбаатар)-ын хөрш орчны өөрийн удирдлагын тогтолцооны хөгжлийг ерөнхийд нь судалж, хотжилтын бүтцийг нарийвчлан авч үзсэн ба тэдгээрийн шинж чанар, хөгжлийн үйл явцыг судласан.

Тиймээс энэхүү судалгааны зорилго нь дэлхийн өмнөд хэсэгт байршилтай их хотуудын өөр хоорондоо ялгаатай өөрийн удирдлагатай хөрш орчны хөгжлийн үйл явцыг судлаж тэдгээрийн уялдааг олж, төрийн болон төрийн бус оролцогчид тухайн газрыг хөгжүүлэхэд хэрхэн нөлөөлж байгааг олж мэдэж явдал байв. Орон нутгийн удирдлагын хэлбэрээс хамаарч тус газрын иргэдийн орчноо сайжруулах гэсэн хүчин чармайлт энэ

ажилд чухал ач холбогдолтой. "Албан бус" суурьшил бий болоход байгууллагуудын гүйцэтгэх үүргийг онцолж, албан ёсны бус гэсэн ташаа ойлголт байдгийг онцолмоор байна. Энэ судалгаагаар иргэд, олон нийтийн байгууллага, төрийн бус байгууллага хоорондын хэлэлцээрт гол ач холбогдол өгсөн ба оролцогч талууд болон хэлэлцээрийн төрөл, засаглалын хэлбэр хоорондох хамаарлыг судалсан.

Кейс судалгааны гол үр дүнг иргэд, олон нийтийн зохион байгуулалтыг судласнаар олж авсан. Үүнд: Зохион байгуулалтын хэлбэрээс хамааран тухайн суурьшил цаг хугацааны туршид хэрхэн хөгжсөн болон иргэд өөрсдөө орон нутгийнхаа амьжиргааг дээшлүүлэх чадвар орно. Суурин газрыг өөрийн удирдлагатай болоход хүргэдэг шалтгаан болон их буюу бага хэмжээний хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр хэрэгжүүлсэн суурин газруудын хооронд нийгэм, эдийн засгийн ялгаа гарахад хүргэдэг шалтгаанууд өөр өөр байгаа нь судалгаанаас харагдав. Судалгаа хийсэн суурьшлуудыг харьцуулахад тэдгээрийн тус бүрийн хөгжил, харилцааны онцлог, оролцогч талуудын нөлөөлөл, оршин суугчдын нийгмийн идэвх нь тус хөрш орчинд үзүүлдэг гадны туслалцаа их, бага эсэхээс болон оршин суугчдын бүтцээс хамааралтай байсан. Тиймээс орон нутгийн удирдлагын бүтэц нь оролцогч талуудын бүтцийн өөрчлөлтөд нийцсэн динамик системтэй байх хэрэгтэй ба ялангуяа тухайн газрын оршин суугчдын бүтцийн талаар ойлголтгүй төрийн болон төрийн бус байгууллагууд оролцох үед энэ нь илэрч байв. Харилцааны төрөл болон уламжлалт хүчин зүйлүүд нь хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрийг амжилттай хэрэгжих эсхүл үргэлжлэх асуудалд шийдвэрлэх үүрэг гүйцэтгэнэ.

Хот тус бүрийн өөрийн удирдлагатай хоёр хөрш орчинд судалгааг явуулсан. Эдгээр хөрш орчнууд түүх соёл, хотын бүтэц, статус, хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр хэрэгждэг талаараа ялгаатай юм. Катманду хотод хоёр зөвшөөрөлгүй суурьшилд, Кайр хотод албан бус хоёр сууринд, Улаанбаатар хотод хоёр гэр хороололд судалгаа хийв. Уг судлаач 2003 оноос 2008 оны хооронд Непалд, 2012 оноос 2014 оны хугацаанд Улаанбаатар хотод ажиллаж амьдарч байсан нь хотуудын соёл, уламжлал, нөхцөл байдалтай танилцах боломж олгосон. Эдгээр хотуудад түр хугацаагаар мэргэжлээрээ ажиллах явцад зөвшөөрөлгүй суурьшил болон гэр хороолол их чухал үүрэгтэй танигдсан. Тухайлбал олон нийтийн орон сууцтай, давчуу, дэд бүтэц дутмаг, эрүүл мэндэд нийцэхгүй орчин нөхцөлтэй, өвөрмөц шинж чанартай суурьшлын албан бус хэлбэрүүдийн ялгаа тод харагдсан. Тиймээс албан бус суурьшлын нийтлэг хэлбэр болсон Каир хотын сууринг

сонгон авч, өөр хоорондоо эрс ялгаатай эдгээр 3 төрлийг харьцуулахын зэрэгцээ ижил төстэй талыг олж тогтоохыг зорив.

Судалгааны ажлын бүтэц

Энэхүү судалгааны ажил нь гурван бүлгээс бүрдэнэ. Үүнд: Нэгдүгээр бүлэгт онол арга зүйн талаар тайлбарласан ба Хоёрдугаар бүлэгт судалгаа хийгдсэн гурван хотын зургаан өөрийн удирдлагатай хөрш орчныг тодорхойлох үндсэн хэсэг багтсан бол Гуравдугаар бүлэгт судалгааны асуултууд, цаашдын судалгааны талаарх хэлэлцүүлгийн дүгнэлт орсон. (Эванс, Груба болон Зобел нар 2011он: хуудас14). Эдгээр суурьшлууд нь хотын нэг хэсэг болсон учраас судалгааны ажлын бүх бүлэгт эхлээд дээрх хотуудын хотжилт, нийгмийн бүтцийн үйл явцыг судалж, түүний дараагаар сонгосон суурьшилд төвлөрөх замаар нарийвчлав.

Судалгааны ажлын Нэгдүгээр дэд бүлгийн эхэнд өмнөдийн хотууд болон тэдгээрийн албан болон албан бус сууринуудын хотжилтын чиг хандлага ба албан бус байдлын талаарх хэлэлцүүлэг орсон. Цаашид уг судлаач хотжилтын албан бус байдал гэсэн ойлголт цаг хугацаа өнгөрөхийн хэрээр хэрхэн хувьсан өөрчлөгдсөн, хэрхэн албан бус байдлын дүрслэл дуалист төрхөөр бүтэцчлэлд шилжин нео-либерал хандлагатай болсон талаар үнэлж дүгнэв(AlSayyad болон Роу, 2005, Turner, 2009). Тус хэсгээр хотжилтын нийгмийн үлэмж ялгаатай байдал түүний учир шалтгаан болон үр дагавруудын талаарх хэлэлцүүлгийг дүгнэсэн ба Орен Ейфтачелийн "саарал орон зай" (2009) үзэл баримтлалыг танилцуулав. Хоёрдугаар дэд бүлэгт, хот суурин газрын бодлого, хотын хуваагдлын үзүүлж буй нөлөөллийг хэлэлцсэн. Албан бус хот сууриийн үүсэл дээрээс доош чиглэсэн хөтөлбөр, ядуусын хороллыг сайжруулах хөтөлбөр, доороос дээш хандлага тогтвортой хотын загвар (Стрен, 1992)-т тодорхойлогдсоны дагуу Бразил улсад албан ёсны суурин бий болгохоор туршиж хэрэгжүүлсэн талаар оруулав. Үүний дараагийн Гуравдугаар дэд бүлэгт "орон нутгийн засаглал"-ын үзэл баримтлалын үүсэл (Хейнричс нар. 2013 он) болон "оролцооны засаглал" (Гавента, 2002), түүнчлэн шинээр сэргээх эрх мэдлийн хэрэгсэл тэдгээрийн холбоосын талаар шинжилж дүгнэв (Файнстейн 1996, Барааны тэмдэг, 2000; Лей, 2009). Энэ судалгаа нь өмнөдийн хотуудын өөрийн удирдлагатай хөрш орчинд бэрхшээл тулгарах үед эдгээр хандлага нь уялдаа холбоотой байгаа эсэхийг тодорхойлох зорилготой. ТББ-уудын гүйцэтгэх үүргийг нийгмийн хөдөлгөөн "хотын эрх" (Левебвре, 1974; Харвей 2008; Унгерс 2009)-ийн дагуу харьцуулсан. Хотын ядуус өөрөө өөртөө туслах тухай Милтинь

таван стратегийг SHI болон CBO-үүдийн хэрэгжүүлсэн төслүүдийг жишээ болгон үнэлж дүгнэхийн тулд танилцуулсан. Дөрөвдүгээр дэд бүлгийн онолын хэсэгт орон нутгийн засаглалын хэлэлцээр хийх үйл явц, түүний бүтцийг тайлбарласан бөгөөд харилцааны гурван төрөлтэй Селлегийн үзэл баримтлалын (Селле, 2010) "харилцаа" гэсэн ойлголтыг оруулав.

Хоёрдугаар Бүлэг нь Тавдугаар дэд бүлгээр эхлэх ба цуглуулсан эмпирик мэдээлэл судалгааны тайлбар, судалгааны загвар, хэрэглэсэн арга зүйн тайлбарыг судалгааны асуултуудын хамт оруулсан. Эдгээр гурван хотууд, тэдгээрийн нийгэм, эдийн засгийн хуваагдал, тэдгээрийн өөрийн удирдлагатай хөрш орчин, хотуудын түүхийн талаар Зургаа дугаар дэд бүлэгт тайлбарлав. Биет судалгаанд өөрийн удирдлагатай хөрш орчинд хэрэгжүүлсэн хот байгуулалтын хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрийн талаар товч танилцуулсан. Суурин газрын хөгжлийн талаар мөн оршин суугчдын авсан арга хэмжээний тухай Долоодугаар дэд бүлэгт дэлгэрэнгүй тайлбарласан. Тухайн орон нутгийн хүмүүсийн амьдралын түвшинг сайжруулахын тулд ямар үйл ажиллагаа хэрэгжүүлсэн тухай мөн хотын Засаг захиргаа, ТББ-уудтай хэрхэн хамтран ажилласан зэрэг оршин суугчид тэдгээрийн нийгмийн үүргийг дүрслэн гаргав. Энэ судалгаанд иргэд хоорондын хэлэлцээр, хамтын ажиллагаа мөн гадны оролцогчидтой хийсэн хэлэлцээр зэргийг үнэлж дүгнэхдээ хоёр хотын өөрийн удирдлагатай хөрш орчныг харьцуулсан бөгөөд бүлгийн төгсгөлд олсон үр дүнгүүдэд товч тойм дүгнэлт өгөв. Наймдугаар дэд бүлэгт орон нутгийн хөгжил, оролцогчдын үүрэг зэрэгт нөлөөлөх олон төрлийн нөлөөллийн талаар ерөнхий дүгнэлт өгөв. Түүнээс гадна тэдний хэлцэл хийх бүтэц, Селлегийн харилцааны үзэл баримтлал, хотыг хөгжүүлэх хөтөлбөр тэдгээрийн олон талт оролцогчдын хамт дүн шинжилгээ хийж тайлбарласан. Оршин суугчдын оролцоонд тулгуурласан орон нутгийн хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр дээр суурилж Ейфтачелийн саарал орон зайн онол болон "Хотын Эрх" хөдөлгөөний үндсэн зарчимыг үндсэн бүтэц болгон ашиглав. Дүүргийн иргэдийн зохион байгуулалтад орох хэлбэрийг хотын ядуу ард иргэдэд зориулсан Милтиний өөрөө өөртөө туслах таван стратеги дотор ангилав. Дүүргийн хөгжилд үзүүлэх нөлөөлөл, түүний доторх олон талт оролцогчдын үүрэг зэргийг онцолж тэмдэглэв. Уламжлалт болон туслах хүчин зүйлс, харилцааны завсрын арга хэмжээний дагуу харилцааны бүтцүүдийг харьцуулав. Эдгээр элементүүдийг хөрш орчин дахь хамгийн үр ашигтай харилцааны хэлбэрийг олж мэдэхэд ашиглав.

Гуравдугаар Бүлэгт эргээд албан бус гэдэг ойлголтын тухай хэлэлцэв. Албан бус гэдэгт илүү нарийн ойлголт хэрэгтэй гэж судлаач үзэв. Цаашилбал, өөрөө зохион байгуулагдах дэмжлэг (*self-organised support*)-ийг ашиглаж хөгжлийн хөтөлбөрийг сайжруулах бололцоо, түүнчлэн харилцааны бүтцийг харилцааны алдаа гарах болон хөгжил саарахаас сэргийлэхийн тулд ашиглаж болох талаар хэлэлцэв. Наймдугаар дэд бүлэгт бичсэн үр дүнтэй хамаарах судалгааны асуулт тус бүрийн талаар товч дүгнэлт хэлцэгдэв. Сүүлийн дэд бүлгээр хөгжлийн хөтөлбөр, харилцааны салбарт цаашид судалгаа хийх боломж, хотыг хөгжүүлэх цогц хөтөлбөрийн загварыг боловсруулж, улс төр, засаг захиргааны оролцогч талуудад хандсан санал зөвлөмж гаргав.

Хавсралт материалд хот, хөрш орчны хөгжлийн үйл явцын ерөнхий ойлголт, улс орон тус бүрийн товч тойм, улс төрийн статус болон түүх, нийгмийн бүтэц ерөнхий тойм болон хотуудын засаг захиргааны хуваарилалт зэргийг дүүргийн хөгжлийн үйл явц, хотжилтын талаар ерөнхий ойлголт өгөх зорилгоор хавсаргав. Хөтөлбөрүүдээс гарах үр дүн тэдгээрийн бүтэц, хөрш орчны газар ашиглалтын газрын зураг, барилгажилт болон материалын зураглал зэрэг мэдээллийг багтаав.

Hintergrund

Das Problem der rapiden Urbanisierung und der damit verbundenen städtischen Armut ist nicht neu, dennoch leben viele Menschen weltweit immer noch unter unwürdigen Bedingungen. Es ist deshalb ein sehr aktuelles Thema, welches einer Auseinandersetzung bedarf. Auf Grund dessen steht es auf der globalen politischen Agenda ganz weit oben. Besonders in den Städten des Südens[3] wächst die städtische Bevölkerung beständig an (UN-Habitat, 2008: XI, World Bank, 2015). Die Einwohner dieser Siedlungen finden sich nicht immer mit ihren Lebensumständen ab, sondern kämpfen für die Verbesserung ihrer Lebensbedingungen und organisieren sich selbst, wenn öffentliche Institutionen ihrer Versorgungspflicht nach städtischer Infrastruktur nicht nachkommen (aus einem Unvermögen heraus, die Lage im Griff zu haben). Dabei drängt sich die Hauptfrage dieser Arbeit auf, welche Rolle die verschiedenen Institutionen in lokalen Governance-Systemen bei Verhandlungen mit Akteuren aus informellen, sich selbst versorgenden[4] Nachbarschaften einnehmen.

In Stadtplanung, Politik und Stadtverwaltungen herrscht die generelle Ansicht vor, dass sich Siedlungsentwicklung und Urbanisierungsprozesse informell abspielen. Die Stadtplanung stellt sich gegen diese Informalität, da neoliberale Marktinteressen entschiedener zu vertreten sind als eine integrative Balance mit Vorteilen für die mehrheitliche Stadtbevölkerung. In seinem ‚Grey-Spacing' Konzept diskutiert Yiftachel (2009) eben diese Stadtpolitiken und Akteure, die die Stati der informellen Siedlungen beeinflussen.

Governance, Stadtentwicklung und gemeinschafts-zentrierte Ansätze

Blickt man ein paar Jahrzehnte zurück, erscheint die Debatte nicht neu. Der Paradigmen-wechsel vollzog sich in den intellektuellen Diskursen schon in den 1960er und 70er Jahren und beeinflusste zu einem gewissen Grad auch die Entwicklungspolitik. Eine intellektuelle Bewegung (basierend auf Janice Perlman, Manuel Castells, John Turner und anderen) erzielte große Fortschritte, die informellen Siedlungen in Südamerika positiv in Wert zu setzen. In

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[3] Die Begriffe 'Land des Südens' und 'Stadt des Südens' werden heutzutage für gewöhnlich benutzt, um Länder und Städte zu beschreiben, die in der südlichen Hemisphäre liegen und sich in einem Entwicklungsprozess befinden. Diese beiden Begriffe werden auch in dieser Arbeit benutzt. Länder und Städte des Nordens beziehen sich auf industrialisierte Nationen, die sich meist in der nördlichen Hemisphäre befinden. Dennoch werden die älteren Begriffe ‚Entwicklungsland' und ‚sich entwickelnde Stadt' auch benutzt, wenn sich auf die drei Kontextstädte bezogen wird, da die Mongolei und Ulaanbaatar geographisch in der nördlichen Hemisphäre verortet sind, sich aber immer noch in einem aufstrebenden Prozess befinden.

[4] Das Adjektiv 'selbstversorgend' bezieht sich nicht nur auf Governance-Strukturen, sondern auch auf bauliche Aspekte der Siedlungen und ist gleichbedeutend mit 'unterversorgt', eine Charakteristik informeller Siedlungen, die sich auf den Mangel an städtischen Dienstleistungen bezieht.

den 1980er Jahren wurde der dualistische Ansatz immer weiter in Frage gestellt und strukturalistische, bottom-up Praktiken fanden größere Beachtung.

Bezüglich der baulichen Aspekte stellt sich die Frage, welche Kriterien zur räumlichen Entwicklung von sogenannten informellen Siedlungen enscheidend sind und wie diese Siedlungen in den städtischen Kontext eingebunden sind. Damals hatten Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen (NROs) versucht, dem Mangel an sozialer und technischer Infrastruktur in selbstversorgenden Siedlungen durch Entwicklungsprogramme mit direkter Einbeziehung der Einwohner zu begegnen. Dennoch werden letztendlich viele dieser Programme durch vorgeprägte Strukturen reguliert, die nicht in vollem Maße die Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung decken können, da sie mit vorgefertigten Zielen und Ergebnissen aufwarten und damit nicht flexibel genug sind, diesen Bedarfen Rechnung zu tragen. Stellt sich die Frage, wie die Bewohner informeller Siedlungen diese Programme annehmen und ob bereits bestehende lokale Initiativen einbezogen werden. Auch heute noch sind viele Stadtpolitiken geprägt von top-down Ansätzen, während Stadtplanungsdiskurse versuchen Lösungen zu finden, die zwischen den totalen top-down und bottom-up Ansätzen liegen – dem multiskalaren *Allianz*-Ansatz (Sanyal, 1998) – um verschiedene Akteure an Bord zu nehmen und umfassende Lösungen anzubieten. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wichtig, die Rollen der verschiedenen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteure im Entwicklungsprozess zu kennen.

Diese Ansätze gehen konform mit den Nachhaltigkeitsentwicklungszielen (SDGs), die 2015 beschlossen wurden mit dem Ziel 11, die Städte offen, resilient, sicher und nachhaltig zu gestalten. Im Oktober 2016 wurde die Neue Stadtagenda (New Urban Agenda) ins Leben gerufen, die das Ziel 11 der SDGs ergänzt, indem sie sich auf die Grundsätze der 'Recht auf Stadt'-Bewegung (Lefebvre, 1974; Harvey, 2008, Ungers, 2009) bezieht und somit 'Städte für alle' und Gleichberechtigung sicherstellen. In Bezug auf lokale Governance-Praktiken sollten dabei lokale Gemeinschaften eine Schlüsselrolle im Finden von geeigneten Lösungen einnehmen, die in die integrativen Entwicklungsstrategien eingebettet sind (Habitat III, 2016). Dennoch besteht für die Neue Stadtagenda die Herausforderung, die lokalen Akteure bei Entscheidungsfindungen auf Augenhöhe zu involvieren, wenn wieder traditionelle und oft unflexible Planungs- und Managementstrukturen lokale Entwicklungsprozesse steuern wollen und damit multiskalare Ansätze gefährden.

Eine andere aktuelle Debatte ist die der Ko-Produktion von Stadträumen und städtischen Dienstleistungen, die sich mit den komplexen Mustern der vielen Akteure, die die Städte und ihre Nachbarschaften formen, beschäftigen. Dazu hat Misselwitz (2016) angemerkt, dass traditionelle städtische Governance Systeme oft nicht in der Lage sind, mit Gruppen aus dem Niedriglohnsektor zu kooperieren, die aber die städtischen Dienstleistungen anbieten, mit dem Resultat, dass Dienstleistungen unregelmäßig bereit gestellt werden. Diese Lücke zwischen staatlichen und selbstversorgenden Parteien eröffnet einen Interaktionsbereich der Möglichkeiten für ‚Formen von Ko-Produktionspartnerschaften' bereithält.

Die Einwohner der sechs Nachbarschaften in dieser Arbeit haben selbst versucht, mit den Stadtregierungen und NROs zu verhandeln, um ihre Probleme zu lösen. Aber welche Aushandlungstypen, im Sinne von Selle's Kommunikationskonmzept, werden von den Akteuren lokaler Governance-Systeme angewendet und wie wirken sich die einzelnen Aushandlungstypen auf die Beteiligung der Nachbarschaft bei Entscheidungsfindungen aus? Dabei variieren die Ansichten der Entwicklungs-Stakeholder stark. Die Wahl über die Art der Verhandlung und der Interaktion ist dabei entscheidend, wenn es zum Beispiel um die Genehmigung zum Bau eines Brunnens oder eines Ausbildungsprogrammes geht. Kommunikations- und Interaktionsmuster zwischen öffentlichen, nationalen oder internationalen Institutionen und der Bevölkerung der selbstversorgenden Siedlungen sind von spezifischem Interesse, wenn es um Entwicklungsbemühungen für die Siedlungen geht. Während der Verhandlungsprozesse geht es meist um Ressourcenverteilung, und die Akteure mit einem Netzwerk von Leuten auf jeder Ebene haben dabei die besten Vorteile. Da die vorherrschenden Regierungsstrukturen zu starr sind, um auf die vielfältige Akteurslandschaft zu reagieren, gewinnen Verhandlungsprozesse mit lokalen Governance-Praktiken mehr und mehr an Bedeutung.

Forschungslücke und Forschungsziel

Verschiedene Studien unterschiedlicher Disziplinen, wie der Geographie, der Soziologie, der Ethnographie, der Wirtschaft und der Umweltwissenschaften, wurden erstellt um die inhumanen Lebensbedingungen in informellen Siedlungen, die Überlebensstrategien ihrer Bewohner und die Erfolge und Misserfolge der Stadtentwicklungsprogramme zu beschreiben. In der Architektur wurden Wohnungsprogramme und Akteursstrukturen, speziell ihre Netzwerke und Partizipationspraktiken, im Detail erforscht.

Diese Arbeit schließt im Besonderen eine Forschungslücke, die speziell auf Nachbarschaftsereignisse eingeht, die auf Selbstversorgungsmaßnahmen bezüglich Solidarität, soziales Engagement und gemeinschaftliche Aktionen, und ihre Antriebskräfte dahinter, abzielt. Dabei werden sowohl Auslöser für die Existenz dieser Nachbarschaften wie auch ihre Historien in ihrer beständigen Entwicklung dargestellt. Die Stadtentwicklungsprogramme werden von der Perspektive der Einwohner reflektiert, die die Maßnahmen dieser Programme für ihre Gemeinschaftszwecke nutzen sollen. Um darzustellen, welche Maßnahmen dieser Entwicklungsprogramme erfolgreich implementiert wurden, wurden Programme untersucht, die entweder im Prozess der Abwicklung waren oder kurz vor der Arbeit im Feld beendet waren. Die Arbeit in den Nachbarschaften mit beendeten Programmen hat eindrucksvoll die vielfältigen Typen von Interaktionen herausgestellt und wie dieser Interaktionsraum zwischen staatlichen und selbstversorgenden Gruppen mit Verhandlungen für spezifische Ergebnisse gefüllt wurde - analysiert mit dem Kommunikationskonzept von Selle (2010).

Die Sicht aus den selbstversorgenden Nachbarschaften heraus und die Anwendung der städtischen Entwicklungsprogramme auf die komplexen Nachbarschaftsstrukturen lässt Rückschlüsse auf die Gründe für den Erfolg und Misserfolg dieser Programme zu, indem Akteurskonstallationen und Verhandlungsprozesse der lokalen Akteure analysiert werden. Lokale Governance-Strukturen, die der Definition von Heinrichs et al. (2013) folgen, bestehen aus verschiedenen Akteuren mit unterschiedlichen Befähigungen, die es zu identifizieren gilt. Nicht nur im Bereich der internationalen Kooperation, sondern auch in den Stadtentwicklungsprozessen des globalen Nordens besteht ein dringender Bedarf an einer vorherigen Auseinandersetzung mit den gegebenen lokalen Governance-Strukturen, bevor ein anderes Entwicklungsprogramm mit erneut hohen Risiken wieder zu Misserfolg und Frustration der Bevölkerung führen. Die Einführung der Neuen Stadtagenda bietet dahingehend die Chance, Verbesserungsmaßnahmen gemeinsam mit den betroffenen Einwohnern zu entwickeln.

Diese Arbeit nimmt sich einem neuen Trend in der Stadtforschung an, bei dem der Fokus auf dem Vergleich zwischen Städten und Siedlungen (Robinson, 2011) liegt, indem eine neue Perspektive aus der Sicht der Stadtplanungsforschung und dem Governance-Ansatz eingeführt wird. Die Akteurslandschaft mit ihren teilhabenden, multiskalaren Aktivitäten und Verhandlungen wird durch die Perspektive der selbstversorgenden Siedlungen

hervorgehoben, indem ein ethnographischer Forschungsansatz benutzt wird. So sollen innerhalb der begrenzten Ressourcen der selbstversorgenden Nachbarschaften, gemeinschaftlicher Aktivitäten identifiziert werden, die effektiv sind, um die Lebensbedingungen der Bewohner zu verbessern.

Das Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht deshalb darin, Verbindungen zwischen der Entwicklung unterschiedlicher Typen der selbstversorgenden städtischen Siedlungen in Metropolen des Südens unter dem Einfluss staatlicher und nicht-staatlicher Akteure heraus zu arbeiten. Die Verbesserungsbemühungen der Bewohner in Beziehung zu ihren Formen der lokalen Governance sind hier von besonderem Interesse. Die Arbeit thematisiert und hinterfragt einige vorherrschende Mythen und Vorurteile in Bezug auf Informalität, indem die Rollen der Institutionen im Entwicklungsprozess der sogenannten informellen Siedlungen dargelegt werden. Der Schwerpunkt liegt dabei auf der Kommunikation zwischen Einwohnern, öffentlichen Institutionen und nicht-staatlichen Organisationen. Die Studie untersucht die Korrelationen zwischen Kommunikationstypen und verschiedenen Akteuren wie auch die vorherrschenden Bedingungen als Teil von Governance.

Folglich liegt der Fokus der Untersuchung auf den Entwicklungsprogrammen, die gestartet wurden, um die Lebensbedingungen in diesen Siedlungen zu verbessern. Alle Programme haben, in unterschiedlichem Maße, lokale Regierungen, NROs und Nachbarschaftsinitiativen zusammen gebracht. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Entwicklung von selbstversorgenden Siedlungen in den drei Städten (Kathmandu, Cairo, and Ulaanbaatar) generell und mit urbanen Mustern ihrer Siedlungen im Detail, um Charakteristika und Entwicklungsprozesse zu untersuchen.

Schlüsselergebnisse der Untersuchung wurden im Bereich der Organisation von Nachbarschaftsgemeinschaften erzielt, wie sich die Nachbarschaft historisch entwickelte, wie sich dadurch auch die Formen der *selbst-organisierten Unterstützung* wandelten, und damit die Fähigkeit der Gemeinschaft, den Lebensstandard der Nachbarschaft in Eigenregie zu verbessern. Die Fallstudien zeigten die unterschiedlichen Gründe auf, die zur Bildung von selbstversorgenden Siedlungen führen, wie auch die sozio-ökonomischen Unterschiede zwischen Siedlungen mit voller Förderung durch Entwicklungsprogramme und denen mit wenig Förderung. Der Vergleich der Siedlungen ergab weiterhin, dass der Grad ihrer Entwicklung und der Einfluss von Akteuren und Kommunikation wie auch das soziale Engagement ihrer Bewohner hauptsächlich darauf basieren, ob die Nachbarschaft mehr oder

nur wenig gefördert wurde. Lokale Governance-Strukturen wiesen sich als dynamische Systeme aus, die auf Veränderungen der Akteursstruktur reagieren, besonders wenn staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure, die die lokale Gemeinschaftsstruktur nicht kennen, von außen einwirken. Hemmende Faktoren und Kommunikationstypen sind entscheidend, wenn es um die Kontinuität und den Erfolg von Entwicklungsmaßnahmen geht.

Fallstudien wurden in zwei selbstversorgenden Nachbarschaften pro Stadt durchgeführt. Diese Siedlungen unterscheiden sich in Bezug auf ihre Historie, ihre Stadtmuster, Status und Entwicklungsunterstützung voneinander. In Kathmandu wurden zwei Landlosensiedlungen, in Kairo zwei informelle Siedlungen und in Ulaanbaatar zwei Jurtensiedlungen untersucht. Ich lebte und arbeitete in Nepal von 2003 bis 2008 und in der Mongolei von 2012 bis 2014 und war dadurch in der Lage, die Kultur und die Bedingungen in Kathmandu und Ulaanbaatar aus erster Hand zu erfahren. Landlosen- und Jurtensiedlungen spielten eine wichtige Rolle während meiner Arbeit in diesen Städten. Keine der Siedlungen wies jedoch ausgeprägte Merkmale von informellen Siedlungen auf, wie Massenwohnungsbau, mit beengten, unterversorgten, ungesunden Lebensbedingungen. Daher wurden die informellen Siedlungen in Kairo ausgewählt, die zum Teil diese Charakteristika abbilden, um zum einen den Kontrast zwischen den drei extrem unterschiedlichen Typen hervorzuheben und zum anderen Ähnlichkeiten herauszukristallisieren.

Aufbau der Arbeit

Die Arbeit gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil I führt in die theoretischen Rahmenbedingungen ein, Teil II beinhaltet die Kernuntersuchung mit der Beschreibung der drei Städte und der sechs Nachbarschaften und Teil III schließt mit einer Diskussion der Forschungsfragen und den Ausblick für weitere Forschungsarbeiten ab (Evans, Gruba and Zobel, 2011: 14 et seqq.). Da die selbstversorgenden Siedlungen und deren Städte als Einheit untersucht wurden, werden in allen drei Teilen die urbanen und die sozialräumlichen Prozesse der Städte als erstes betrachtet, und nachher den Fokus auf die Nachbarschaften gelegt.

Teil I startet mit einer Diskussion über urbane Informalität und Urbanisierungstrends in den Ländern des Südens und ihre formalen und informellen Stadtquartiere. Sie gibt eine Einschätzung darüber ab, wie sich die Vorstellung von urbaner Informalität und das generelle Image von Informalität herausgebildet und mit der Zeit verändert haben. Das erste Kapitel schließt mit einer Erörterung von Ursachen für und Folgen von städtischen sozialräumlichen

Ungleichheiten und führt Oren Yiftachels Konzept des 'grey spacing' (2009) ein. Im zweiten Kapitel werden Stadtpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf die urbane Spaltung diskutiert. Das Entstehen der informellen Siedlungen wird historisch reflektiert durch die Einführung von top-down Slum-Umbaumaßnahmen und bottom-up-Ansätzen, wie beschrieben im Modell zur nachhaltigen Stadt. Weiterhin wird im Kapitel 3 das Entstehen der Konzepte von Lokaler Governance und Participativer Governance beleuchtet und in Verbindung zum wieder belebten Empowerment-Ansatz gebracht. Die Arbeit untersucht, ob diese Ansätze ihre Relevanz halten können, wenn sie auf die Herausforderungen in selbstversorgenden Siedlungen der Städte des Südens treffen. Die Rollen der NROs und der Selbsthilfeinitiativen werden miteinander verglichen, bezugnehmend auf die soziale Bewegung 'Recht auf Stadt'. Mitlins (2007) fünf Strategien der Selbsthilfe städtischer Armer werden vorgestellt und mit fünf Beispielen von Entwicklungsprojekten, die von Selbsthilfeinitiativen implementiert wurden, evaluiert. Zum Schluss des theoretischen Teils werden im Kapitel 4 die Verhandlungsprozesse und lokalen Governance-Strukturen beschrieben und anhand des Kommunikationskonzeptes von Selle (2010) mit seinen drei Kommunikationstypen weiter spezifiziert.

Teil II beginnt mit Kapitel 5 und der Beschreibung der Methodologie, die dieser Arbeit zugrunde liegt, einschließlich der Forschungsfragen, des Forschungsdesigns und der Interpretation der gesammelten Daten. Die drei Kontextstädte werden im Kapitel 6 hinsichtlich ihrer Geschichte, ihrer sozial-räumlichen Spaltung und ihrer selbstversorgenden Siedlungen beschrieben. Die städtischen Entwicklungsprogramme, die die Fallstudien bilden, werden ebenfalls kurz erläutert. Die detaillierte Nachbarschaftsentwicklung der Siedlungen wird in Kapitel 7 dargestellt, einschließlich der Maßnahmen, die von den Bewohnern aus den Entwicklungsprogrammen übernommen wurden. Hier wird auch das soziale Engagement der Bewohner beleuchtet und wie sie mit den Stadtregierungen und den NROs kooperiert haben und welche Aktionen von den Bewohnern durchgeführt wurden, um ihre Lebensbedingungen zu verbessern. Es werden Kommunikation und Gemeinschaftsaktionen innerhalb der Nachbarschaften erläutert, die um die Verhandlungen mit externen Akteuren ergänzt werden. Die zwei Nachbarschaften pro Stadt werden miteinander verglichen und am Ende jedes Teilkapitels ein Überblick über die Ergebnisse des Vergleichs gegeben. Kapitel 8 beinhaltet die abschließende Zusammenfassung, die verschiedenen Einflüsse auf die nachbarschaftliche Entwicklung und die Rollenverteilung der verschiedenen Akteure in den Siedlungen. Des

Weiteren werden ihre Kommunikationsstrukturen, dem Konzept Selles folgend, zusammen mit den verschiedenen Akteuren der städtischen Entwicklungsprogramme analysiert und interpretiert. Die Grundsätze der Bewegung ‚Recht auf Stadt' und Yiftachels Theorie des 'grey spacing' bilden den Rahmen, um die Ansätze der nachbarschaftlichen Entwicklungsprogramme in Bezug auf die Beteiligung der Bürger zu reflektieren. Die *selbst-organisierte Unterstützung* wird mithilfe von Mitlins fünf Selbsthilfestrategien der städtischen Armen kategorisiert. Die Einflüsse und Auswirkungen auf die nachbarschaftliche Entwicklung und die Rolle der verschiedenen Akteure werden heraus gestellt. Die Kommunikationsstrukturen werden anhand der hemmenden Faktoren und der Kommunikationslücken verglichen, um den erfolgreichsten Kommunikationstypus der sechs Nachbarschaften herauszustellen.

Teil III führt zurück zur Diskussion über Informalität und zeigt den Bedarf an einem nuancierteren Verständnis von Informalität auf. Des Weiteren werden die Potenziale für Entwicklungsprogramme erörtert, *selbst-organisierte Unterstützung* anzuregen und Kommunikationsstrukturen anzuwenden, um Kommunikationslücken zu verhindern und damit ein Abbremsen der Entwicklung der Siedlungen zu vermeiden. Die Diskussion beinhaltet auch eine kurze Zusammenfassung jeder Forschungsfrage bezugnehmend auf die Ergebnisse des Kapitels 8. Das letzte Kapitel hebt die Forschungsmöglichkeiten im Bereich der Nachbarschaftsentwicklung hervor und zeigt wichtige Punkte für politische und behördliche Akteure auf, die das Ziel verfolgen, eine kommunikationsfreundliche und somit auch integrierte Gestaltung von städtischen Entwicklungsprogrammen einzuführen.

Der Anhang gibt einen kurzen Überblick über jedes der Länder, ihren politischen Status und ihre Geschichte, einen generellen Überblick über die soziale Zusammensetzung der Gesellschaften und die räumlich administrative Aufteilung der Städte für ein besseres Verständnis der nachbarschaftlichen Entwicklungsprozesse. Des Weiteren beinhaltet der Anhang detaillierte Abläufe und Ergebnisse der Entwicklungsprogramme sowie Pläne der Nachbarschaften mit Informationen zu Flächennutzung, Gebäudezustand und verwendeten Baumaterialien.

Background

The problem of rapid urbanisation and the associated poverty is not new, but, as many people in urban areas around the globe still live under abject conditions, it is a very urgent topic to discuss. Consequently, very high on the political agenda worldwide, particularly in the cities of the Global South[5], where urban populations are continuing to grow (UN-Habitat, 2008: XI: World Bank, 2015). The inhabitants of these settlements do not always accept their circumstances; instead, they fight for improvements in their living conditions and organise themselves when public institutions cannot fulfil their responsibility to provide, for instance, urban services (due to an inability to cope). Consequently, the main question arises as to what roles state and non-state actors in local governance systems play in negotiations with so-called informal, self-provisioning[6] neighbourhoods.

The common thinking in urban planning, politics, and municipal administrations is that settlement development and urbanisation processes take place mostly informally. Urban planning comes up against informality because powerful neo-liberal market interests are more decisive than integrative balance when it comes to broad-based benefits for urban populations. In his grey-spacing concept, Yiftachel (2009) discussed these urban planning policies and actors influencing the statuses of informal settlements.

Governance, urban improvement, and community centred approaches

Looking back a few decades ago, the debate appears as nothing new. A paradigm shift took place in the 1960s and 1970s in intellectual discourse and, to some degree, also influenced development cooperation policies. One intellectual movement (based around Janice Perlman, Manuel Castells, John Turner, and others) made great progress in giving informal settlements in South America a positive connotation. In the 1980s, the dualistic approaches were questioned further, and structuralist, bottom-up practices gained more attention.

Regarding physical terms, the question arises: What criteria are decisive in the spatial development of so-called 'informal' settlements, and how are these settlements embedded in the urban context? In the past, NGOs have attempted to improve the aforementioned abject

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[5]The terms 'country of the South' and 'city of the South' are commonly used today in scientific texts when referring to countries and cities located in the southern hemisphere that are in the process of developing. These terms are also preferred in this work. Countries and cities of the North refer to industrialised nations that are mainly located in the northern hemisphere. However, the older terms 'developing country' and 'developing city' in the developing world are also used when referring to the three case-study cities, as Mongolia and Ulaanbaatar are geographically in the northern hemisphere but are still in the process of emerging.

[6] The adjective 'self-provisioning' addresses not only governance structures, but also the physical aspects of the settlements and is equivalent to 'underserved', as one characteristic of informal settlements is a lack of urban services.

living conditions by addressing the lack of social and technical infrastructure in self-provisioning settlements with development programmes and the direct involvement of inhabitants. However, ultimately, many of these programs have been regulated through pre-existing structures and thus have not been able to fully meet the needs of the population, as these programmes, often with pre-scheduled aims and outcomes, have not been flexible enough to respond to the demands of the inhabitants. This begs the question, how do the inhabitants adopt such programmes, and do these programmes integrate already existing local initiatives? Today, urban policies are still largely dominated by top-down approaches, while urban planning discourses are trying to find solutions that lie between absolute top-down and bottom-up approaches – the multiscale, *alliance* approach (Sanyal, 1998) – to bring several actors on board for a comprehensive solution. In this regard, it is necessary to know what roles the different state and non-state institutions play in the development process.

This is in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015, with their goal 11, for making cities inclusive, resilient, safe, and sustainable. In October 2016, the New Urban Agenda was declared, accomplishing the SDG goal 11, by referring to the principles of the 'Right to the City' (Lefebvre, 1974; Harvey, 2008; Ungers, 2009) in ensuring 'cities for all' and equal rights. In the case of local governance, it implies that local communities and governments should play a key role in finding appropriate solutions, embedded in integrative development strategies (Habitat III, 2016). So, to fulfil this aim, the organisation of the communities should be known, as well as what kinds of improvement measures the inhabitants have already initiated. However, the challenge of the New Urban Agenda is to involve local actors at eye-level in decision-making when traditional, often inflexible planning and management modes are still steering local improvement processes and thus endangering multi-scale approaches.

Another current debate is that about the co-production of urban spaces and services, which is concerned with a complex pattern of various actors who create the cities and their neighbourhoods. In this regard, Misselwitz (2016) has noted that traditional urban governance systems are often unable to cope with low-income groups providing urban services, and, as a result, services are delivered irregularly. In this gap between governed and self-provisioned bodies, a field of interaction provides opportunities for 'kinds of co-production partnerships'.

Inhabitants of this work's six context neighbourhoods themselves have tried to negotiate with the city governments and NGOs to solve their problems. So, what types of negotiation, in the

sense of Selle's communication concept, exist between the actors in local governance systems, and how does this negotiation affect the participation of the neighbourhood community in decision-making? Meanwhile, the views of the various development stakeholders can vary strongly. The choice of the type of negotiation and interaction employed is therefore crucial, for instance, when seeking permission to construct a well or set up training programmes. Negotiation and interaction patterns between public, national, and international organisations and the population of self-provisioning settlements are of specific interest when it comes to improvement efforts for the settlements. During negotiation processes, resources are distributed, and those actors with a network of people at every level benefit the most. Thus, government structures are too rigid to capture the landscapes of the various actors, and, instead, complex negotiation processes are gaining more and more importance within local governance practices.

Research gap and aim

Various studies across several disciplines, including geography, sociology, ethnography, economics, and the environmental sciences, have been performed to describe the inhumane living conditions in informal settlements, the survival strategies of their inhabitants, and the failures and successes of the different approaches of upgrading programs. Within the discipline of architecture, housing programs and actor structures, particularly their networks, as well as participatory practices, have been researched in detail.

This work fills the research gap by focusing on specific neighbourhood actions towards self-provisioning efforts in solidarity, social commitment, and collaborative action, as well as its inner and outer drivers behind. The trigger for the very existence of these neighbourhoods and their histories in continued development is depicted. Further on, the actions of the urban improvement programmes are reflected from the perspective of the inhabitants and efforts to utilise their measures for community purposes. To depict which improvement programme tools were successfully adopted by the community, the programmes investigated either were in the process of being phased out or had been phased out shortly before my fieldwork. The work in neighbourhoods with programmes that were ending has revealed, impressively, the manifold types of interaction and how the space of interaction between governing and self-provisioning bodies is filled with negotiations for specific outcomes – analysed using Selle's concept of communication (2010).

The view from inside these self-provisioning settlements and the application of urban improvement programmes to the complex neighbourhood structure allows one to learn the reasons for the success and failure of these programmes by analysing the actors' constellations within these neighbourhood communities and the negotiation processes among the local actors. Local governance structures, following the definition of Heinrichs and colleagues (2013), consist of various actors with different identifiable abilities. Not only in the field of international cooperation services, but also in urban development processes in the Global North, there is an urgent need to observe the existing local governance structures **before** implementing another urban improvement programme with, again, high risks of failure, leading to frustration on the inhabitants' side. The implementation of the New Urban Agenda offers the chance to develop improvement measures collectively with the inhabitants.

This work picks up a current trend in urban research of focusing on the comparison of cities and settlements (Robinson, 2011) while introducing a new perspective from the urban planning studies approach and the governance approach. The actors' landscape, in its sharing, multi-scale activities, and negotiations, has been highlighted from the perspective of self-provisioning settlements by using an ethnographic study approach to depict the limited resources of self-provisioning neighbourhoods that are effective in their path towards collective action to improve their inhabitants' living conditions.

Therefore, the objective of this study is to find links between the development of different types of self-provisioning urban settlements in metropolises of the Global South and the influence of state and non-state actors on neighbourhood development. The improvement efforts by their residents with respect to their forms of local governance play a vital role in this work. This paper addresses and questions some myths and prejudices with regard to informality by highlighting the role of institutions in the process of so-called 'informal' neighbourhood development. Emphasis has been placed on the negotiation between the residents, public institutions, and non-governmental organisations. This study has examined the correlations between the types of negotiation and the various actors and conditions as part of governance.

Hence, the foci of this study are the urban improvement programmes launched to improve the living standards of these settlements. All the programmes have, to varying degrees, brought together local governments, NGOs, and grassroots initiatives from the local neighbourhoods themselves. The work deals with the development of self-provisioning neighbourhoods in

three cities (Kathmandu, Cairo, and Ulaanbaatar) in general, and the urban patterns of their settlements in detail, examining their characteristics and development processes.

Key findings of the study were obtained in the field of community organisation, including how a given neighbourhood developed over time, depending on the type of *self-organised support*, and the ability of the community to raise the living standard of the neighbourhood itself. The case studies showed the different causes leading to the establishment of self-provisioning settlements and the socio-economic differences between settlements with more and with less support from improvement programmes. Further, the comparison of the settlements showed that their respective development and the influence of actors and communication, as well as the social commitment of the residents, was mainly based on whether the neighbourhoods were more or less supported from the outside and based on the community structure of a given neighbourhood. Local governance structures were revealed to be dynamic systems responding to changes in the actors' structure, especially when outside state and non-state actors who were unaware of the local community structure intervened. Inheriting factors and the type of communication were decisive for the continuity and success of the improvement efforts.

Case studies were conducted in two self-provisioning neighbourhoods in each city. These neighbourhoods were different with regard to history, urban patterns, status, and development support. In Kathmandu, two squatter settlements were surveyed, in Cairo, two informal settlements, and, in Ulaanbaatar, two *ger* (yurt) settlements. I lived and worked in Nepal from 2003 to 2008 as well as in Mongolia from 2012 to 2014, and so I was able to experience first hand the culture and conditions within the cities of Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar. Squatter and *ger* settlements played important roles during my professional sojourn in these cities. However, neither settlement displayed the distinctive characteristics of informal settlements, namely, mass housing, exhibiting cramped, underserved, and unhealthy conditions. Hence, the informal settlements in Cairo were chosen for this work so as to introduce a typical informal settlement type for the purposes of highlighting the contrasts between these three extremely different types, as well as to trace similarities.

Structure of the study

The study is divided into three parts: Part I introduces the theoretical framework, Part II includes the core study with the description of the three cities and the six self-provisioning

neighbourhoods, and Part III concludes with a discussion of the research questions and the prospects for further research (Evans, Gruba and Zobel, 2011: 14 et seqq.). Since the self-provisioning settlements have been examined as in unity with the cities they are part of, in all three parts of this paper, the urban and socio-spatial processes of the cities are examined first, with the focus then shifting to the neighbourhoods.

Part I of the study begins with a discussion of urban informality and urbanisation trends in cities of the South and their formal and informal urban quarters. It assesses how the notion of urban informality and the image of informality have evolved and changed over time. The chapter concludes with a discussion of reasons and consequences for urban socio-spatial disparities and introduces Oren Yiftachel's concept of 'grey spacing' (2009). In Chapter 2, urban policy and its impacts on the urban divide are discussed. The emergence of informal settlements is historically reflected in the implementation of top-down, slum-upgrading programs and bottom-up approaches, as described in the sustainable city model. Following this, in Chapter 3, the study examines the emergences of the concept of 'local governance' and 'participatory governance', as well as links with the newly revitalised empowerment approach. The study examines whether these approaches hold relevance when dealing with the challenges of self-provisioning settlements in cities of the South. The roles of NGOs and SHIs are compared with reference to the social movement of the 'Right to the City'. Mitlin's (2008) five strategies of self-help by the urban poor are introduced for evaluating five examples of upgrading projects implemented by SHIs and CBOs. At the end of the theoretical part in Chapter 4, the negotiation processes in local governance structures are described and specified via the term 'communication' after Selle's concept (Selle, 2010) with its three types of communication.

Part II begins in Chapter 5 with an explanation of the methodology, including the research questions, research design, and interpretation of the empirical data collected. The three context cities are described in Chapter 6 with regard to the history of the city, its socio-economic divide, and its self-provisioning settlements. The case-study urban-improvement programs implemented in the self-provisioning settlements are also briefly introduced. The neighbourhood development of the settlements is described in detail in Chapter 7, including the measures adopted by residents. The inhabitant's social commitment is depicted, how they cooperated with city governments and NGOs, and what types of actions were initiated by locals to improve living standards in the settlements. It also examines negotiation and

collective action within the neighbourhoods, in addition to negotiations with external actors. The two self-provisioning neighbourhoods in each city are compared to one another, and, at the end of each chapter, a short concluding overview of the findings is given. Chapter 8 contains the overall conclusion, the various influences on neighbourhood development, and the roles of the various settlement actors. Moreover, their negotiation structures, following Selle's communication concept, along with the various participants from the urban improvement programs, are analysed and interpreted. The principles of the movement 'Right to the City' movement and Yiftachel's theory of grey spacing are used as a framework to reflect upon the approaches of the neighbourhoods' urban improvement programmes towards the involvement of residents. The *self-organised support* within the neighbourhood communities is categorised in Mitlin's five self-help strategies for the urban poor. The influences and impacts on neighbourhood development and the roles of various actors in it are highlighted. The communication structures are compared according to supporting and inherited factors and the extent of communication gaps to uncover the most successful type of communication within the neighbourhoods.

PART III returns to the discussion of informality and shows the need for a more nuanced understanding of informality. Furthermore, the potentials for improvement programmes to stimulate *self-organised support* are discussed, as well as how communication structures can be used to avoid communication gaps and a slow-down in development. The discussion also contains a brief conclusion for each of the research questions referring to the findings in chapter 8. The last chapter highlights further research opportunities in the field of neighbourhood development and communication and offers some pointers for political and governmental actors in pursuit of a communication-friendly, and therefore more inclusive, design of urban improvement programs.

The Appendix includes a brief overview of each of the countries, their political statuses and histories, a general overview of the social composition of societies, and the administrative division of the cities, for a general understanding of urban and neighbourhood development processes. Information is also provided for the procedures and outcomes of programmes as well as maps of the neighbourhoods regarding land-use, building conditions, and materials.

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Abbreviations

ACCA	Asian Coalition for Community Action
ACHR	Asian Coalition for Housing Rights
CBO	Community-based organisation
HHs	Households
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
Inh.	Inhabitants
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
SDI	Slum/Shack Dwellers International
SHI	Self-help initiative
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UN DESA	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Programme

Kathmandu:

BLR	Bagmati Link Road
CDS	City Development Strategy
CWIN	Nepali NGO: Child Workers in Nepal Concerned Centre, Kathmandu
DUDBC	Department of Urban Development and Building Construction
EHDAG	Nepali NGO: Environment Health Development and Advisory Group
ICIMOD	International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development
KMC	Kathmandu Metropolitan City

SPOUSH	Society for Preservation of Shelters and Habitations in Nepal (Squatter's Federation)
SLC	School Leaving Certificate
SSLC	Secondary School Leaving Certificate

Cairo:

CG	Cairo Governorate
CP	Cultural Palace
GCR	Greater Cairo Region
GOPP	General Organisation of Physical Planning
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
ISDF	Informal Settlements Development Fund
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KfW	German Development Bank (German: *Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau*)
LA	Local Administration
LAAP	Local Area Action Plan
LPC	Local Popular Council
MN	Manshiet Nasser
MoED	Egyptian Ministry of Economic Development
MOHUUD	Ministry of Housing, Utilities & Urban Development
NDP	National Democratic Party
PDP	Participatory Development Project in Urban Areas
PEMA	Centre for Project Evaluation & Macroeconomic Analysis

Ulaanbaatar

| ADB | Asian Development Bank |

BCR	Building Coverage Rate
BZD	Bayanzurkh District
FAR	Floor Area Ratio
GAR	*Ger* Area Redevelopment Programme
HDC	Human Development Centre
KUD	Khan-Uul District
LRP	Land Readjustment Programme
MRER	Mongolian Real Estate Report
MUB	Municipality Ulaanbaatar
MUST	Mongolian University of Science and Technology
NSO	National Statistical Office
UDRC	Urban Development Resource Centre

Measuring units

%	per cent
ha	hectare
km	kilometre
m	metre
m^2	square metre

Language expressions

Egypt:

fellachs	Egyptian farmers
shiakhat	neighbourhoods

ashwai	random, also word for informal settlement
ashwaiyyat	Egyptian word for unplanned settled places, informal settlements

Nepal:

Attaché	chairperson
Tol	neighbourhood
Sukumbasi	landless person

Mongolia:

Duureg	administrative district in MUB
Ger	Mongolian word for yurt
Khaan	king
Khashaa	fence or plot
Khuree	traditional round formation of nomadic camps, monastery town
Khoroo	administrative micro-district in MUB
Khoroolol	district, quarter
Kheseg	smallest administrative unit in MUB
Yurt	English word for *ger*; round felt tent

Glossary

Community:	In this work, understood as a unity of households of various families, mainly without kinship, and individual inhabitants. However, a community may also include, to some extent, related families.
Empowerment:	A decentralised bottom-up process (Brand, 2002). Friedmann (1984) defined it as the 'redistribution of power to control sources of power for a group' (cited in Ley 2009: xxii). Empowered communities are able to

Ger settlement:	Otherwise known as a yurt settlement, contains, at the settlement stage, mainly yurts and, later, mainly wooden, wood-brick, or cement-brick houses, often self-built. The *ger* settlement is the historical settlement type in Mongolia.
Family, extended:	A group of nuclear families from several generations acting together as a virtual unit (Gans, 1981: 45), but with separate family budgets.
Family, nuclear:	Contains parents, or a father or a mother, and their unmarried children.
Family, joined:	Is comprised of at least two generations in one household.
Household:	'[...] is defined as a group of two or more persons living together who make common provision for food or other essentials for living' (United Nations Statistics Division, 2013). One or more people may contribute to the common household budget. A family cannot be comprised of more than one household, but a household can consist of more than one family (ibid).
Informality	'[...] is unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated' (Castells and Portes, 1989: 12). Related to the urban context, it 'can occur in terms of access to land, layout of sites, shelter construction and infrastructure provision' (Ley, 2009: xxiii).
Informal settlement:	An officially unplanned, unauthorised settlement established on illegally occupied land for mainly residential purposes (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 5).
Local governance:	In this work, defines the interaction of various actors at the local level, but also includes national and international state and non-state actors involved in measures within the settlements, thus influencing these local actors.

(top of page, continuation) organise themselves collectively for the improvement of their living standards.

Neighbourhood: In this work, understood as a unity between the physical structure and community attached to a place of living. The neighbourhood is a 'felt' socio-spatial local area.

Neighbourhood development: A time-based process in which the physical, social, and economic structure of a local area is altered. As in urban development, it includes current and historical changes.

Self-help-initiative: organised by the neighbourhood community itself to improve their standard of living, for example, via the provision of technical infrastructure. This genuine self-help should not to be confused with the self-help-concept of donor agencies ordered from the top down.

Self-provisioning neighbourhood: Defined as a local area lacking in social and technical infrastructure. Consequently, the neighbourhood community itself provides, to a certain degree, decisive, basic infrastructure. Squatter, informal, and *ger* settlements are self-provisioning neighbourhoods.

Settlement: In this work, understood as a group of buildings and is related to the physical structure.

Squatter settlement: An area of primarily residential purpose founded illegally on public land and inhabited by landless people. The term 'squatter' (*sukumbasi*) in Nepali refers to a person without farmland, a genuine squatter. However, the majority of squatters have farmland elsewhere in rural areas, although it is too small to feed a whole family, forcing people to make a living elsewhere.

Urban development: A process that alters the physical structure and spatial pattern of a city within a specific timeframe and includes not only recent but also historical changes (Bähr and Jürgens, 2005: 299).

Urban improvement programme: An intervention to provide or improve the physical and social structure of the respective area and to raise the living standard of its residents. Urban improvement programmes are upgrading and urban renewal programmes, site-and-service projects, integrative development programmes, etc.

PART I

Informality and Governance in Urban and Local Development

1_The rise of informality

2_ Informality as a cause of governmental action

3_Governance approaches and empowerment

4_Negotiation processes in local governance structures

1_The rise of informality

Informality is an unregulated process in an environment otherwise legally and socially regulated by societal institutions (after Castells and Portes, 1989: 12) and is inevitably intertwined with rapid urbanisation. Its causes and consequences are reflected in the current situation in cities of developing countries and are described in this chapter, followed by a discussion of the debates of scholars of urban theory, as well as studies, in pursuit of explanations of the phenomenon of socio-spatial disparity, informality, and the differentiation of urban space.

1.1_Informality and urbanisation

Informality is closely related to unequal, rapid urbanisation. It results from the failure to provide enough legal land or shelter for the migrating, and mostly poor, rural masses, especially in Asia, where cities have been seeing rapid growth since the end of the 1970. As a result, the 'urban century' is, to a large extent, the 'Asian urban century'. In China, the liberalisation policy allowed coastal cities to grow first, followed by inland cities. In India, cities have been growing since the 1990s as a result of economic reforms that have attracted foreign investment. Over the past century, migration has become not only a domestic phenomenon, with movement from rural areas to cities, but also an international one (Kraas and Bork, 2011: 14; UN-Habitat, 2013: 30). The huge wave of migration in the 19th century in Europe and North America was caused by industrialisation. Likewise, migration in the South today is propelled by globalisation.

At the same time, however, there are striking differences between the experience of the North in the 20th century and the migration taking place in the South today. In the North, the level of growth in cities was much lower than the level seen today in cities of the South. Urbanisation in the South while taking place under difficult conditions with larger numbers of migrants, has led to issues stemming from inadequate supplies of housing and employment. Colonial urban structures, relatively low levels of industrialisation in the South, and economic dependency are some factors responsible for the different urbanisation processes in the North and South (Ribbeck, 2005: 16).

Rapid urbanisation, along with emerging informal settlements, is often mainly carried out in capital cities. Many states in the developing world operate under a 'top-heavy' city system, which means that, to a large extent, a large proportion of the population is concentrated in capital cities. This is, to some degree, also the case in countries of the North, but is more

characteristic of countries of the South. Not only demographically speaking, dominance lies in capital cities due to political, cultural, and economic life being concentrated there. Capital cities also consume the majority of public and private investments, which are not evenly distributed across all the regions or provincial towns in the country (ibid). Surpluses generated by the provinces flow directly into the capital. In these capitals with primacy, all elites are united and have access to the best education, highest growth, highest standard of living and capital accumulation, better career opportunities, and the highest urban population in the country (Smith 1996, 8).

In light of economic growth particularly in the capital regions of many developing countries, urban economies have gained increased significance for national economies; meanwhile, there is a widening division between the formal and informal sectors. The enormous increase in jobs in the formal sector has had significant effects. At the same time, an enormous expansion and differentiation in types of activity in the informal sector has resulted in new opportunities for employment. For migrants in particularly, this has been driven by the necessity of opening new economic niches and of developing survival strategies (Kraas, 2004: 105).

This indicates that, when given options for economic improvement, low-income groups are capable of using them. On the other hand, many poor people are prevented from raising their standard of living by their low incomes and economic insecurity. This condition forces them to live on a hand to mouth basis, making planning and saving impossible (Gans, 1982: 284). However, informally established settlements can also offer people migrating from rural areas the chance to escape poverty. In that sense, Saunders agrees with Gans that those settlements act as stepping stones, enabling migrants to gain access to adequate education and then arrive at a higher, more stable income level and a higher standard of living (Saunders, 2011: 36).

Furthermore, the urban socio-economic organisation of cities is highly influenced by the history of urbanisation and the current pattern of migration. One major aspect of urban centres in developing countries is that the great majority of residents of such centres were born and raised in rural areas. Only the first generation of migrants have significant ties with their kin and those remaining in their birthplace. Kinship patterns affect urban social organisation in terms of support and exclusion. Religion and its practices also shape social relationships and cultural identities and may coincide with ethnic identities. In China, the state policies for job security and public allocation of housing have led to high stability in social relations within neighbourhoods (Gugler, 1996: 8).

Again, the huge wave of people seeking escape from rural poverty by moving to the cities of the South has resulted in a new phenomenon, the 'arrival city' (Saunders, 2011), which affects either parts of a city, impoverished urban agglomerations, or entire former villages that receive and accommodate the rural migrants.

As a result, 'slum areas', which is what these areas are called by UN-Habitat, are growing, as they are often the first homes of people arriving in cities from rural regions. Although the percentage of so-called 'slum dwellers' declined between 2000 and 2010, falling from 46.1% to 32.7%, the total number of slum dwellers rose during this period, from around 657 million to 828 million (UN-Habitat, 2010: 32).

These informally established settlements differed in many respects from legally constructed suburbs where the elites and the middle classes were dwelling. Due to this imbalance within the urban population, the World's Cities Report for 2012/2013 highlighted the theme 'prosperity'. That report introduced the Cities Prosperity Index (CPI), which ranks cities based on measures of urban productivity, quality of life, infrastructural development, ecological sustainability, equality, and social inclusion. According to this index, Cairo is at a 'stable' level (0.7), Ulaanbaatar is at a 'moderate' level (0.6), and Kathmandu is at a 'weak' level (0.5) (UN-Habitat, 2013: 21-23).

Low levels of prosperity are mostly due to inequality in the distribution of economic growth. Political and economic elites and a growing middle class maintain secure positions in the formal economic sector, along with the freedom to choose their place of residence, and they have access to good health care and education services. The poorer members of the population have fewer opportunities, and many work as day labourers in the informal sector. They often live in unhealthy and hazardous living conditions, and their children receive only basic education, if they receive it at all (Environment and Urbanization, 2005: 4; UN-Habitat, 2006a).

This situation also leads to the polarisation of populations, with gated communities on one side and marginalised quarters on the other. The marginalisation and extreme polarisation of metropolitan societies in developing countries is growing. Inhabitants of the deprived areas of cities are often stigmatised and are placed at a disadvantage in terms of access to education, urban services, and employment (UN-Habitat, 2013: XVII).

In terms of economic development indicators, urbanisation, particularly in mega-urban areas, is associated with considerable increases in gross national product (GNP) and income,

growing proportions of secondary and tertiary activity, and the extensive development of transport and communications infrastructure (Kraas, 2007: 16). While these higher GNP figures are supposed to indicate heightened well-being, this is not the case. In fact, urbanisation often leads to a lower quality of life for many people across the board. Those affected are subject to socio-economic vulnerability due to increased poverty, socio-spatial and political-institutional fragmentation, and often extreme forms of segregation, disparities, and conflicts. Mega-urban societies disintegrate and are destabilised by the close proximity of vastly different local livelihoods and lifestyles, including different ethnic and social groups (Bradshaw and Noonan, 1997: 9; Kraas, 2007: 13). As a result, crime is higher in cities with high inequality, such as in Cairo, Sao Paolo, London, and Chicago (UN-Habitat, 2013: 87).

The 'Arab Spring' is an example of the destabilisation of society brought about by unequal urbanisation. This uprising was fuelled by the imbalance between poor and rich populations. There was, and continues to be, a wide divide between those living in informal areas or arrival cities, who have to focus on day-to-day survival, and middle- and high-income people, who have access to all public and private services, especially job opportunities. The Arab Spring took place in countries that had made huge efforts to improve living conditions in informal areas and to bring infrastructure to the settlements, but the continued extreme inequality led people to demonstrate in the streets. Inequality is also linked with lower economic performance in general. 'Researchers are increasingly finding that regions marked by higher levels of inequality, in fact find their economic performance damaged' (OECD 2006 cited in UN-Habitat, 2013: 86). Lack of education opportunities for the poor lead to high unemployment rates among youth worldwide. In Cairo, for example, more than 50% of first-time job-seekers are left unemployed (UN-Habitat, 2013: 7). As a result, the informal settlements are decisive for housing poor and low-income households, as the poorest households cannot be supplied with affordable housing but continue to grow.

This urban expansion is mainly characterised by two aspects: the formal provision of land and infrastructure does not keep pace with the rate of urbanisation, and the cost of authorised housing is disproportionately high in relation to wages. The growth of informal settlements can be explained as the product of an imbalance between the rate of urbanisation and the nature of urban development (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 38).

1.2_Urban Informality - A paradigm shift

The discussion of urban informality, coined as the 'informal sector' concept, had already begun in the early 1970s, describing the migration of labour to the cities in the 1950s and 1960s in developing countries (AlSayyad and Roy, 2004: 10). Moreover, the informal sector is inevitably related to informal, unregulated economic activities in a parallel world dominated by street vendors, cleaning staff in private households, laundry personnel, restaurant staff, et cetera, in the countries of the South. Consequently, in the 1970s, Hart identified the difference between types of employment for the wage-earning and the self-employed. In 1972, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) further characterised informal activities, in its dualistic way, as family-owned, work-intensive, small in scale, unstable, and so on, and this description has since became popular in the following years (ibid: 11). The influence of public and societal institutions barely played a role at that time. These dualist notions drew a picture of the informal sector's exclusion from the modern economy, as people's skills did not fulfil the requirements of the structure of said modern economy (Chen, 2012: 5; Biles, 2009: 222). Inevitably, criticism of Hart's and ILO's formal/informal sector approach raised by neo-Marxists in the 1970s, who saw informality as a consequence of the unequal development of capitalism and the informal economy as a reserve of low-wage labour, was driven by the thoughts of Marx's theory of a 'mode of production' (Turner, 2009: 368).

However, the research, based in urban theory and undertaken in Latin America at the end of the 1960s by Perlman and Castells, fuelled the theoretical debate on urban informality via mainly two strands: the first dealt with the 'internal structure and function of the informal sector', and the second covered the 'nature of the informal sector more in general'. The second strand generates two comprehensive theories: the first considers informality to be of a temporary nature and characterised by the 'survival activities of the urban poor', while the other considers the informal sector to be closely connected to the formal sector and consequently also a 'permanent component of a modern economy' (Chen, 2012: 5; Biles, 2009: 222). These important theories contributed massively to the viewpoint that, instead of being backward and autonomous, the informal sector provided creative solutions for the urban poor to improve their situation. Further on, the informal sector was seen as part of the whole economy, a perception also carried by structuralist theories.

Two approaches from the debates on urban informality in the 1980s emerged: those of the structuralist and the legalist group (AlSayyad and Roy, 2004: 11). Structuralists, with a strong

link to neo-Marxist thought, see interdependence between the formal and the informal working sectors; as one primary interest of capital development, the formal one outsources to subordinated producers in order to reduce wages, taxes, and prices and thus be more competitive than other enterprises. Consequently, the formal economy promotes the informal sector because it is driven by the nature of capitalist growth. In other words, the formal sector exploits the informal one, and the state has a duty to balance this inequality by regulating commercial and employment relationships (Biles, 2009: 222; Chen, 2012: 5). Accordingly, the structural approach was also a response to the emerging worldwide economic dynamics of structural adjustments in developed countries, releasing workers from formal employment to into an informal economy (Turner, 2009: 369).

By contrast, the legalist, neoliberal approach seeks to deregulate economic processes and to simplify bureaucratic procedures in order to give informal enterprises the chance to legalise themselves and to escape informality and assets converting into real capital (ibid). The economic model focuses on 'efficiency' and 'rational process', stressing the importance of income-generating measures and expenditure/saving activities for marginalised groups (in AlSayyad and Roy, 2004: 12). The Peruvian economist De Soto (1989) greatly influenced the debate on informality when he described it as a 'survival strategy' and 'a safety valve for societal tensions'. He argued that the rise of informality is caused by over-regulation by the state and not by the dynamics of the labour market (in Turner, 2009: 369). As a result, informality is 'a natural response to real market forces, and not to the rise in unemployment and the need for jobs' (AlSayyad and Roy, 2004, 13). Informality shifted from the dualist subsistence approach to neoliberal self-employment, or micro-entrepreneurship, in response to changing labour markets. The legalist approach heavily influenced the work of NGOs and international donor agencies in supporting micro-enterprise interventions and credit programmes in order to reduce poverty (Biles, 2009: 222). Biles (2009) explained that, in order to overcome the economic crisis in the 1980s in Latin America, and despite neoliberal market reforms such as structural adjustment, trade liberalisation, and privatisation resulting in economic growth, trade, and foreign direct investment, work in the informal sector has not been reduced (ibid: 215) but has instead increased, born by vulnerable groups according to the worldwide economic dynamics mentioned above (Turner, 2009: 369).

All three approaches describe different explanation models for informality. Although, today, dualist thought plays a minor role in the discourse and the adoption of the neoliberal, legalist policy seems to better serve the globalised economy, the dualist thought highlights the

heterogeneity of informality (Biles, 2009: 232). As in all three approaches, the informal and the formal sectors have been examined separately. AlSayyad and Roy have argued that 'urban informality' should be described as a mode of urbanisation or, more precisely, 'an organising logic, a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself' (Roy, 2005). According to them, informality is not a separate sector, but rather a 'series of transactions connecting different economies and spaces with each other' (Ibid: 148). McFarlane and Waibel (2012) have described urban informality as complementary to formal arrangements and as contributing 'to formal institutions by organising social interactions in the absence of the state [...] during rapidly changing socio-economic contexts, rapid urban development, and economic restructuring strategies' (ibid: 2). By the absence of the state, McFarlane (2012) meant governmental influence to be understood as direct interventions in informal areas while the influence of overall structuring policies is ignored (ibid: 92).

Consequently, to categorise the 'informal' as a 'sector' does not reflect today's complexity of urban processes. In addition, the declaration by Hall and Pfeiffer (2000) describing the phenomenon as a 'continuum' with the two extremes formal/legal and informal/illegal does not reflect the realities of the game of actors for power, legitimacy, and resources (Herrle and Fokdal, 2011: 5). Moreover, Herrle and Fokdal have argued that the continuum model does not include the importance of connectivity between sectors, levels, and actors and neglects the aforementioned massive imbalance and conflict resulting from social and economic dynamics (ibid).

Furthermore, in 2005, Roy described a persisting trend in the cities of developing and industrialising countries that land occupation by squatter settlements exists alongside informal land subdivision which is put in value by legal ownership and market transactions, and thus also violating land-use regulations (ibid: 149). These two types of housing are informal and show differentiation within informality, including not only the urban poor but also the middle and high-income ranks of the society. Consequently, Roy (2011) has defined this process as 'subaltern urbanism' that 'provides habitation, livelihood, self-organisation, and politics' (ibid: 1).

1.2.1_Disambiguation - A shift in spatial terms

This section of the work includes a discussion of some frequently used terms to describe self-provisioning settlements, as well as the values attached to these terms and the ways in which they contribute to socio-spatial separation. Usually, the first generation of migrants from rural areas settles in 'low-income' or 'deprived' areas. The term '**deprived areas**' includes,

inevitably, segregation and exclusion. This exclusion from swaths of urban areas deprives the less fortunate population of the capacity to improve their living conditions, meet their basic needs, and be recognised as part of urban society (Borsdorf, Bähr and Janoschka, 2002: 300 et seqq.).

'Marginality' is another term, described by Perlman and Castells (in AlSayyad and Roy, 2004: 9) as instrumental for 'social control of the poor'. Bayat (ibid) contends that the urban poor are not marginal or excluded from society, but rather, they are fully integrated – however, on terms that often cause them to be economically exploited and to be repressed, socially stigmatised, and culturally excluded. However, as Castells has emphasised, the poor do not stop aiming for 'social transformation' through their everyday struggle for urban services or 'collective consumption'.

This is related to the varying definitions of '**marginal settlement**' and '**slum**', as well as to the differences in the types of dwellings within these areas, of which not all can be classified as marginal settlements. Marginal quarters vary significantly in terms of their forms, locations within the city, space, and legal statuses (legal, semi-legal, illegal). Slums in the city (i.e., buildings abandoned by the original residents and dilapidated residential buildings) differ in their physical and social structures from marginal settlements in inner cities (e.g. those constructed on railway embankments, channels, or riverbanks) and from those on the outskirts of a town (on fallow lands or future building sites) (Kraas, 2004: 106).

The term '**slum**' has a long history and was originally used to categorise low-quality, working class housing constructed privately for rental tenure. According to Prunty (1998), the term 'slum' originated in 19th-century Dublin (see Huchzermeyer, 2014: 86). In 1845, Friedrich Engels discussed the appallingly unhealthy living conditions in British working class slums (ibid: 87). As a result of colonialism and town planning, the word 'slum' is now a globally ubiquitous term used pejoratively to categorise all kinds of underserved and marginalised settlements. Its use was further reinforced by the 'Cities Without Slums' objective contained in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 (ibid: 95). Meanwhile, inhabitants of informal settlements in Indian and African cities refer to themselves as 'slum dwellers' and are connected globally via the 'Slum Dwellers International' federation to fight for their rights.

According to the UN-Habitat (2008: 33), a **'slum household'** consists of one person or a group of individuals living under the same roof in an urban area, lacking one or more of the following five amenities:

1. *durable housing* (a permanent structure providing protection from extreme climatic conditions),
2. *sufficient living space* (no more than three people sharing a room),
3. *access to clean water* (water that is sufficient, affordable, and can be obtained without extreme effort),
4. *access to improved sanitation facilities* (a private toilet, or a public one shared with a reasonable number of people),
5. *secure tenure* (*de facto* or *de jure* secure tenure status and protection against forced eviction).

In a number of countries, data for the fifth category are not available, so only data for the first four were taken into account in defining slum households (ibid).

Contrary to other terms focusing on the development and social status of people living in these areas, **informal settlements** clearly consider legal status; Huchzermeyer (2004) defined them as officially unplanned and illegally occupied land for mainly residential purposes (ibid: 5). Furthermore, they are far from 'slum' settlements in marginal spaces, as they are decisive for the logic of urbanism contributing heavily to the debates on urban society and law (McFarlane and Waibel, 2012: 3). Although there are overlaps with informal settlements regarding legal status and some physical conditions, this definition of a slum rarely reflects the complexity found in informal settlements. The slum stereotype may apply to some households within these settlements, but not to the settlement as a whole, with some families living in durable houses with sufficient living space and secure tenure, as described in Chapter Two. The UN-Habitat definition of a slum household can be applied to fewer than fifty per cent of the households in the consolidated settlements described. Consequently, the term 'slum' is avoided in this work, since it implies prejudices that do not necessarily reflect the realities of the neighbourhoods. Instead, the terms 'informal settlement', 'squatter settlement', and '*ger* settlement' are used, pursuant to their legal status.

Referring to all of those settlements, the term '**neighbourhood**' is used. Although the word is not primarily associated with deprived settlements, those spaces nonetheless fulfil the criteria of a neighbourhood, as it is defined as 'a social group which primarily interacts because of its

similar living space' (Hamm 1973; cited in Hamm, 2000: 174) and indicates an attachment to the location of housing. The neighbourhood is an extension of the household (ibid). It is a more 'felt' socio-spatial, everyday world with no strict administrative boundaries. In 1923, McKenzie differentiated between the 'general', the 'quarter-like', and the 'personal' neighbourhood of everyday contact. Alisch (1999) declared local areas or quarters as social spaces, smaller than the administrative district but more diverse than a residential area as defined by planning order. Mostly, the boundary is derived from the action space, social relationships, and local identification. Thus, the scope of a neighbourhood can vary widely when it comes to physical expansion, the size of the population, and functionality. In summary, a neighbourhood can be defined as an identity-giving (through external and internal actions), socially-constructed but diffuse place – an everyday, lived world comprised of individual social spheres, in which intersections are projected onto a spatially identifiable relation within an assessable living area (Schnur, 2008: 40).

In this study, the term 'neighbourhood' is used to describe both dimensions: the physical and spatial structure and the population living in it. The term 'community' is used to refer to the collective group of people living in the neighbourhood, while the term 'settlement' describes more physical aspects of the local area.

The adjective '**self-provisioning**' focuses clearly on the social and technical infrastructure lacking in the settlement that the community provides itself, to a certain degree, with this infrastructure remaining largely insufficient. This view allows for a truer picture than do the aforementioned socio-economic and legal terms that frequently misrepresent these neighbourhoods. Consolidated neighbourhoods in particular consist of groups of various income levels and opportunities, as well as lifestyles. Impoverished and affluent residents, rural and urban migrants, and people of different ethnicities and classes all dwell in informal settlements and play decisive roles in the economy, politics, and cultural life of the city; they consequently constitute ample potential in terms of urban development. Nevertheless, informal areas are a product of socio-spatial disparities.

1.3_Socio-spatial disparities, grey spaces, and the differentiation of urban space

Causes and impacts of socio-spatial disparities have been discussed in urban theories and studies. Some of the strongest voices in the debates have originated in the post-structuralist, Neo-Marxist corner, including figures such as Lefebvre and Harvey, followed by Yiftachel,

who especially contributed to the formal-informal argument and to the discussion of some spatial models that have provided explanations for the differentiation of urban spaces in cities of the South.

For Lefebvre, the economic and societal system as a whole caused these separations. In the discussion of the socio-spatial divide, Lefebvre and his theory of the 'Production of Space' (1974), with a focus on space rather than time, is necessary to mention. Cities are divided into three spaces by socio-spatial and economic disparities: the perceived, the conceived, and the lived (see Schmid, 2010: 207). *Perceived space* is the space people encounter in daily life. *Conceived space* is a mental idea of space; people's ideas and concepts of space. *Lived space* is the combination of perceived and conceived space, represents modified everyday space, and is the platform for social life. Thus, lived space is intertwined with social relations (Purcell, 2002: 102).

Lefebvre analysed the kinds of organisation of space in capitalist societies. For him, space is changed into merchandise, with different levels of access to urban space (depending on social affiliation), the subjective appropriation of space, and the establishment of socially-significant and culturally-symbolic relationships. He pointed out some profound aspects of socio-spatial separation: spatial correlation and allocation of different social groups within the city and their access to collective consumer goods; cultural effects on the development of urban spaces with socio-economically homogenous populations (e.g. the estimation of one's own living space and the self-esteem of poor social groups, as well as the difficulties of social interaction within these communities) (ibid: 101 et seqq.).

Harvey (2008) has shared a similar approach but has clearly pointed out the reason for the partition of cities. The urban structures result from the capacity of certain groups to enforce their interests. The perception of powerful societies creates socio-spatial separation within the urban landscape, and relationships of power are the vital socio-spatial parameters for action and order. Thus, control over the spatial organisation of urban landscapes and power over the usage of space are the crucial instruments for the reproduction of the social balance of power. According to Häussermann and Siebel (2004: 125), urban structure and urban development have to be observed in their overall societal contexts. Plans and models for urban planning do not decide the structure and development of cities; rather, cultural and social factors, and particularly political and economic conditions, do.

However, even before Harvey developed notions regarding the socio-spatial divide, he came up with six principles of social justice relating to planning and policy practices. These six principles mainly deal with the phenomenon of marginalisation, empowerment of the oppressed, and self-expression rather than exploitation (1996: 431 et seqq.) and are obviously not practiced. Evidence suggests a different reality for disadvantaged population groups.

Yiftachel (2009a) agreed with Harvey and Marcuse that the production of space is related to integration, equality, and citizenship, which are violated by the state causing 'autonomous ethnic spaces of development and identity', and Yiftachel conceptualised as 'grey spaces' (ibid: 242). Such grey spaces are the places of urban informality and are positioned between the 'whiteness' synonymously used for legality/approval/safety and the 'blackness' associated with eviction/destruction/death (Yiftachel, 2009a: 243 and 2009b: 88). Grey spaces are 'neither integrated nor eliminated, forming pseudo-permanent margins of today urban regions' (Yiftachel, 2009b: 88). This oppression by the state creates a destabilising process that leads to alternative developments away from the state, and, as a result, grey spaces are connected to radicalism, being of 'public danger' (ibid). These criminalising and delegitimising discourses separate urban groups, and the shifting boundaries between 'accepted' and 'rejected' preserve grey spaces in 'permanent temporalities' waiting 'to be corrected' (ibid, 89, Yiftachel, 2009a: 243 et seqq.).

However, communities in grey spaces are far from powerless and instead generate new mobilisation of survival tactics, utilising the informality for self-organisation, negotiation, and empowerment while the state continues to support the interests of elites and the middle class (Yiftachel, 2009a: 243). There are two dynamics that aid in understanding the system of grey space: the 'whitening' and the 'blackening'. 'Whitening' describes a process of the legalisation and legitimisation of grey spaces used and created 'by powerful and favourable interests', whereas 'blackening' indicates intolerance towards grey spaces and their elimination via state power (Yiftachel, 2009b: 91). Nonetheless, grey spaces can also provide potential for societal transformation, as Gans and Saunders also pointed out (see section 1.1). However, for Yiftachel, some marginalised groups can be 'whitened' through a social upgrade, but for most of those groups, grey spaces are the only opportunity for survival, despite the danger and insecurity of being removed, followed by financial and property loss and even punishment. However, in many cases, grey spaces remain and are maintained by the 'politics of un-recognition' (ibid).

Such grey spaces characterise cities worldwide, but especially cities of the South (Yiftachel, 2009b: 89). Although grey spaces, when translated into a spatial context, contain informal settlements as 'peripheral, weakened and marginalised spaces' (Yiftachel, 2009a: 243), Yitafachel has not stated where such marginalised spaces might be located within the urban layout.

However, urban models do so when dealing with the phenomenon of the differentiation of urban space within the urban fabric. The Chicago School in the 1920s described dynamic urban growth as an organism with the socio-spatial divide triggered from the inside, calling it 'social ecology' (Krätke, 1995: 158; Lindner, 2004: 125). The approach was mainly focused on industrialising cities, whereas the Los Angeles School of Sociology described the dynamics of the post-Fordist city as influenced by outside factors like the world trade market, expressed as the 'globalisation of the local' (Schmid, 2010: 59). Be that as it may, both schools noted that basic factors of the inner differentiation of cities include socio-economic status and family status, with a close relation to the life cycle and the various demands of living and ethnic segregation; they also come to expression in the concentration of minorities in spatial clusters (Bähr and Jürgens, 2005: 61). However, they do not describe the dynamics of a city of the South.

One model for explaining urban segregation in Latin American cities, from a socio-spatial point of view, is the '**fragmented city**', which describes the foremost divisions that have not been influenced by industrialisation but by globalisation. Islands of luxury in gated communities are surrounded by the settlements of the poor. Segregation happens in local areas and is not divided into rich neighbourhoods and poor neighbourhoods. The previous linear-sectorial model of the urban development of the 19th-century was reshaped through dense highway corridors, making peri-urban areas attractive to upper- and middle-income residents. Another factor that fragmented the cities was the construction of shopping malls, urban entertainment centres, and large, closed-off housing complexes for the upper and middle classes with their own functional and socio-spatial elements. Social and technical infrastructures are then only accessible to the inhabitants; those gated enclaves are highly homogenous and segregated in their populations. A further factor leading to fragmented cities has been the revitalisation of city centres, which has led to gentrification.

Again, while this model for explaining socio-spatial divisions of population groups is useful, it might not be applicable to each and every city in the South, because lifestyles and working styles vary vastly (Borsdorf, Bähr and Janoschka, 2002: 302 et seqq.). Widely neglected is the

fact that the majority of the surrounding poor population does not have any access to services, and the protected, affluent community does not desire social exchange. In this segregating urban development, where '**islands of wealth**' are located in a '**sea of deprived areas**' (Scholz, 2002: 11), exclusion is more visible than ever. It is clear that cities in the developing world have different initial situations and development parameters, as well as different social structures and interrelations.

The most obvious form of informality is the informal housing market, with consolidated and newly emerging squatter settlements. The social structure is characterised by a small elite and a large number of poor people. The broad middle class is largely missing, but it is fast-emerging in economically important cities in developing nations. Industrialisation in countries of the South is only marginal and is mostly located on the fringes (ribbon development) of metropolitan areas and along the arterial highways. The numbers of workers holding industrialised employment are low compared to the number of those employed in the informal sector. While gated communities are being built on the city periphery, a large part of the fringe urban growth is the result of squatter settlements.

Due to high migration into cities, as well as inner-city alterations, all low-income areas act as reception quarters, or '**arrival cities**' (Saunders, 2011), for migrants. Areas near commercial centres and city centres are highly frequented by people in search of low rent (Bähr and Jürgens, 2005: 51). The move to squatter suburbs happens later when a stable job and income has been established.

These two phases of the itinerant model by Turner in 1968 are described as '**province-city centre- suburb**'. According to this model, residential preferences, and thus demand for housing, changes as time passes and in accordance with people's socio-economic positions and lifestyles. In big cities today, all low-income settlements have become reception quarters and are stations of inner-urban migration – and it is not only migrants who move, but also natives (in ibid: 52). It is more a question of where the settlements are located within the city and how they are integrated into the urban socio-spatial fabric.

The contemporary metropolitan city in the developing world faces functional and spatial overlays. The central city district is divided into the historic core area and new business districts. The sharp functional division of living and working has, as is still true today, traditionally not been planned, and many quarters are mixed areas. However, they are separated in terms of different social ranks, ethnic groups, and classes, and are shaped as more

or less homogenous local areas. Underprivileged areas exist in the centre, but the huge squatter settlements are located on the periphery. Cultural-regional characteristics, with reference to historical legacy, structure the metropolitan cities of the South (ibid: 308).

Bähr and Jürgens (2005) studied urban development in cities of the South and the North to identify whether there are any convergences or divergences. They found that some elements from the postmodern city regarding urban development exist globally and are prevalent. The expansion of particular lifestyles and consumption patterns takes place independently of the state of economic development in a given region or country. Different spatial patterns emerge from an overview of these three dimensions: historical legacy, economic conditions (including consumption patterns), and lifestyle. These dimensions are similar throughout different cultural regions and can be described as cultural-regional city types.

2_Informality as a cause of governmental action

Distribution of power has a crucial impact on the development of cities and their settlements. The ruling elites formulate policies based on their own self-interest, which usually does not match the needs of the general population (Smith, 1996: 57). When nations have a weak state, with governments that do not undertake city planning or management, this can lead to the formation of informal settlements and ungovernable metropolitan areas (Kraas, 2007: 81; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1997: 270). Nonetheless, for Roy, 'the planning and legal apparatus of the state has the power to determine when to enact this suspension, to determine what is informal and what is not, and to determine which forms of informality will thrive and which will disappear' (2005: 150). Looking at the mere physical structure of informal settlements Illberg argues, that the emergence and growth of informal settlements could be regulated through planning decisions and respective land law systems and owning of land (2009: 220). That means that it is not a weak state or an absence of planning, but the state itself that produces informality via deregulation. 'Deregulation indicates a calculated informality, one that involves purposive action and planning, and one where the seeming withdrawal of regulatory power creates a logic resource of allocation, accumulation, and authority' (Roy, 2009: 83).

This indicates that some informal actions become legalised while others remain illegal. Consequently, legalisation of such practices through the state reflects the power of the ruling political and economic elites (Roy, 2011). Regarding these ruling elites, Smith (1996) mentioned that 'urbanisation is a political economic process hinging on explicit or implicit policymaking by societal elites who are tied to the international system in particular ways' (ibid: 148), and Ghertner (2008) agreed that developments have a 'world-class look' that turns into informal action building byelaws are violated for economic interests (Roy, 2009: 80). Additionally, Holston (2007), cited in Roy, and Lanz (2014) have described an uncertainty of informal and formal actions leading to confusion among other urban actors (Roy, 2009: 80; Lanz, 2014: 130). Observing urban planning processes in India, Roy consequently described them as land management through dynamic processes of informality. Furthermore, by informality, she meant 'a state of deregulation, one where ownership, use, and purpose of land cannot be fixed and mapped according to any prescribed set of regulations or the law' (Roy, 2009: 80). Stated in the words of Yiftachel (2009b), the 'politics of un-recognition' maintain and criminalise informal settlements through the instrument of urban planning. The planning 'from above', with its design for 'white spaces', serves the neo-liberal approach of being

efficient, managed, and profitable and rarely opens up space for inclusion or recognition of informal areas and their inhabitants (ibid: 91).

Several of these urban policy programmes have been adopted to manage these unplanned, unauthorised localities. The most popular one in the international donor world is the slum-upgrading programme in its varying scales and scopes, from minor improvements to major transformations (Patel, 2013: 178). These slum-upgrading programmes in countries of the South, and redevelopment or regeneration programmes in countries of the North, supposedly improve the living conditions and job opportunities of the residents of slums and underdeveloped districts. In reality, those government-initiated projects foster, to a large extent, segregation and gentrification in these so-called 'improved' areas. According to Serra (2003), gentrification even takes place in informal areas and adopts the social transformations of the authorised city. Among other adverse impacts, these projects raise rents and retail prices to such a degree that low-income households can no longer afford to live there. Thus, these inhabitants are forced to leave in search of more affordable housing. Nevertheless, there were also other improvement programmes designed to solve different problems, such as 'sites and services' projects or the self-help concept, which is discussed in the following section.

2.1_Urban policy programmes – solutions to house marginalised groups?

One of the first ever slum-upgrading programmes was launched in the late 1960s in Indonesia as the governmental Kampung Improvement Programme, with huge support from the World Bank. Instead of evicting the inhabitants, minor and major infrastructure (water taps and water supply lines) was provided to various parts of the slum, and the settlement was thereby transformed into a legal residential area. Since then, slum upgrading has become popular among city and national governments, as it shows their constituents that they are willing to upgrade the precarious living situations of slum inhabitants (Patel, 2013: 178).

However, common practice in the 1960s was the policy to move impoverished groups into **social housing projects**, in the form of both low-rise buildings of four or five storeys and high-rise blocks of 15 to 20 storeys, as in Cairo. This did not bring the success desired. Slum clearance and the relocation of populations to social housing complexes with the use of massive police operations was not enough to stop the problem of growing slums. The rural population was not able to cope with the vertical housing scheme, which stands in harsh contrast to the rural lifestyle, where people live in one- or two-storey buildings (Bähr and Mertins, 2000: 22).

In the 1970s, **site-and-service projects** sought to overcome this problem by meeting the needs of people at a 'human scale'. Such projects provided serviced land parcels on cheap terms with reasonable credit for the purchase of building materials to build houses, taking self-help approaches, such as in South Africa. At the same time, measures to upgrade slums were taken to provide solutions to issues in marginalised quarters. The approach to improving housing conditions was '**self-help**' and focused mainly on improving technical infrastructure. Such projects, mainly initiated and financed by the World Bank, focused on the support of national programmes. However, many of these 'low-cost housing' initiatives in the 1980s did not reach the 15% to 30% of the urban poor that it was meant to (ibid: 23).

Fichter, Turner, and Grenell argued in the 1970s (predating Saunders) that housing autonomy in low-income settlements had a much more positive impact than did dependence on housing providers. According to them, autonomy implied the freedom of housing action, that is, the liberty to build based on available, affordable resources and the control over essential living necessities would define housing priorities. A network of mutual relationships entails a 'maximum of individual initiative, discretion and responsibilities in the housing process' (Fichter, Turner and Grenell, 1972: 252). Access to networks means access to information and to goods and services (ibid: 265). Conversely, dependency, as it is perceived in highly standardised countries in the North, can be 'destructive' in the sense that these kinds of equal relationships cannot be enjoyed between those in need and those who supply needs. Housing providers decide how much housing is provided, where it is provided, and what function it should have, and the user is pushed into a passive position rather than a self-reliant, decision-making one (ibid: 246).

The reason that slum dwellers prefer to sell or do not move into readymade houses constructed by companies, according to Grenell (1972), is that the needs of the people have been 'oversimplified' in an otherwise hierarchical caste system with various demands. Low-income people would like to satisfy their own needs but are blocked by administrative, legal, and economic setups. The poor are obliged to accept institutionalised housing products that they cannot afford and that instead serve middle-income households. 'This gap between dwellers' needs and resources on the one hand and institutional standards and values on the other is the root of the problem faced by the [...] people. And development policies which widen this gap instead of seeking to close it threaten everyone's freedom to build' (ibid: 121).

Turner's thoughts also fell on fertile ground, as the constant expansion of marginal settlements led to a turning point. The HABITAT-I conference in Vancouver in 1975

designated housing as a basic human right. It was also determined that the groups affected should be involved in improvement measures, and costs should be reduced. The criteria of the 'new' **self-help concept**, essentially influenced by Turner (1968), were self-administration, participation in planning processes, and management and implementation of the projects (ibid: 23; Huchzermeyer, 2004: 31). Informal settlements, with the construction of shacks, were tolerated because they cost the government nothing and they helped house the poor. The self-help concept was criticised, however, because, when it was delegated from the top, it only included the community as a labour force (Bähr and Mertins, 2000: 24).

In the 1980s, due to budget constraints, the self-help concept shifted to housing and infrastructure improvement programmes for informal settlements. These upgrading measures with the self-help component had the advantage of using the existing structures of intact neighbourhood communities (ibid). By the end of the 1980s, the focus of development programmes in informal settlements had finally switched from 'externally designed comprehensive upgrading' (slum upgrading and 'sites and services'), belonging to the out-dated informal-sector concept, to alternative support-based approaches through the urban poverty debate. These approaches were implemented to find housing solutions in close alliance with the poor (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 54). Huchzermeyer (ibid) differentiated between two types: the government-initiated approach within an institutional framework and the non-governmental-initiated approach by NGOs. Both foster the support of collective initiatives in organised communities, the difference being that the government channels its support through its bureaucratic system and the NGOs through the resources of the poor and external, mainly international, funding. Support via funding is often equally challenging, as the requirements set up by the donor agencies are also bureaucratic in nature, although a little more reliable. Regarding the involvement of inhabitants and institutional arrangements, support-based approaches provide long-term support for gradual changes in social and physical structures. Such collective community-centred dimensions feature in the urban development regulations of most developing countries (ibid: 76).

However, there were also contradictory developments in the 1990s. While the debates over the informal sector diminished, the term 'informal' was adopted by planners and architects to explain unplanned, illegal settlement processes mainly driven by rural migrants and those from low-income ranks. Such 'spontaneous settlements' gave the impression of growing without coordination or strategy on illegally occupied public or private land. This statement granted politicians an official argument for massive evictions (Herrle and Fokdal, 2011: 5).

Nonetheless, by the end of the 1990s, slum upgrading with clearance had been transformed into **integrated neighbourhood development** with the improvement of social infrastructure, the creation of job opportunities, and improvement of living conditions (Bähr and Mertins, 2000: 24).

The approach gained support in 2000 when De Soto gave the informal settlements a positive connotation on their capacities. Further, if informal settlements would be recognised, tenure would be legalised and state policies would be liberalised, so the massive potential of informal settlements would be released (Herrle and Fokdal, 2011: 6).

In the same year, the UN declared the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and called for 'Cities Without Slums' (goal number 7, target 11) to significantly improve the living conditions of 100 million slum dwellers by the year 2020. This goal has given licence for the radical eviction of squatters and the removal of informal settlements to the periphery of cities to make way for urban development, thus attracting foreign investment, as stressed by the World Bank. With respect to the neo-liberal approach, the cities supposedly should be made competitive for the global market (Huchzermeyer, 2014: 93). It followed that, instead of supporting SHIs in whatever form, the improvement programmes reverted to simple slum eradication or upgrading by forcing residents out of the settlements, contrary to De Soto's assumptions in liberalising the housing market, as demonstrated by the Indian example described by Patel below.

Slum upgrading with clearance is still the preferred answer to housing problems in India, although it has failed to provide any significant, long-term solution. Still, it is difficult to change the long political tradition of slum clearance. Many programmes allegedly aim to house the poor, but in fact are mainly designed to support building and investment companies. In 2005, the Indian government announced the ambitious 'Basic Services for the Urban Poor' (BSUP) programme in eleven cities in India. This programme supposedly included the active involvement of the slum dwellers, but, in practice, the inhabitants were not very involved in planning processes; instead, they were just given information. One project has been completed so far, but only 10% of the 44,400 units are occupied, because they do not meet the requirements of the residents (Patel, 2013: 177et seqq.). This urban planning reality shows that the old standards still persist today with only slight variations, while overly rigid bureaucracies are unable to respond with flexible systems to heterogeneous, low-income households.

In assessing whether or not the campaigns to reduce marginal quarters of the city succeeded, Bähr and Mertins (2000: 25) emphasised that quantitative large-scale projects were implemented but failed to achieve their goals. That such large-scale projects obviously fail may also be due to the fact that the human component is not given a value, and hence acceptance and adoption of such projects is rarely achieved. The comprehensive upgrading approach also fails to react to the vital dynamic of growth in informal settlements or to accord value to the people's demands (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 76).

In September 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to be implemented for the first time worldwide in January 2016, were approved. They are based on the MDGs and were initiated at the Rio+20 conference held in 2012 as part of the 'post-2015 development agenda'. Their aim has been to foster a holistic approach comprised of such elements as inclusive economic growth, social development, and environmental protection for all (UN DESA, 2015). The MDGs have been fulfilled only to a small extent, if at all. One criticism was that the environmental debate was more or less excluded. Seventeen goals were identified as SDGs that are supposed to be fulfilled by 2030. Goal 11 aims to 'make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable'. Target 11.1 includes further slum upgrading and affordable housing, while Target 11.3 speaks of participation and inclusion in urban planning and management processes and Target 11.b of integrated policies related to climate change and resilience (ibid). However, these targets fail to strengthen local resources and potentials, because government approaches to 'planning' and 'management' imply administration 'from above' and cost effectiveness. Over the next fifteen years, residents of self-provisioning neighbourhoods will continue to depend on the goodwill of governments and to hope for 'good governance', not to mention that, in all the examples cited, slum upgrading has resulted in exclusion and socio-spatial separation, with the poor pushed to the periphery. So, although environmental aspects related to disaster-risk reduction might be met, the self-provisioning neighbourhoods, or so-called 'slums', continue to be marginalised.

2.2_Urban policies – two approaches to meeting the people's demands

Political theory is grounded on the power of the self-design of agglomerations. Urban planning prepares maps for the spatial development of the city, and building by-laws are instruments for controlling and steering the physical development for areas not yet built up and for alterations in built-up areas. The instruments of urban land-use planning represent the planning regulations of municipalities. Under rational economic conditions, the price of land and the pressure of realisation characterise the utilisation of land, having an impact on the

spatial allocation of different user groups within the city. The land market connects kinds of use and user groups to those who demand appropriate locations. Between as well as within different user groups, competition for locations and the advantages of locations raise the price of land. If not regulated by planning by-laws, economically weak user groups cannot compete with high-yield user groups for suitable locations. This leads to the establishment of commercial centres in profitable inner-city areas and yield weak user groups on the periphery. Consequently, the land market, via price and planning by-laws, controls the use of each piece of land and characterises the functional differentiation and intensity of land use in a city (Häussermann and Siebel, 2004: 128 et seqq.). However, in many developing countries, spatial regulation instruments have not been adjusted to southern city dynamics, and thus, economic factors, and with them powerful private interests, as stated by Harvey, determine land prices and deciding which land is valuable.

Moreover, adopted western zoning and density regulations have imposed 'superficial characteristics' on residential areas, thereby conferring power on centralised political systems rather than on those in need (Fichter, Turner and Grenell, 1972: 270). Fichter, Turner, and Grenell therefore suggested that housing laws should be reshaped to allow housing to be conceived as a process that generates the support of networks of open housing services (ibid: 278). These suggestions influenced the World Bank in their approach to informal settlements, but clashed with their existing 'self-help' housing strategy and were therefore discarded (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 30). Autonomous dweller control would only be possible with a massive change in power structures and the release of resources (ibid: 34). Turner changed his self-building approach to a self-organised process, placing the focus on community development (Ley, 2009: 14).

To obtain human development that is more broad-based than for a few elites, sustainable development was proposed in the Brundtland Report in 1987, and, today, there is even greater pressure for it. Sustainable development aims to meet the needs of people in the present without risking the needs of future generations. It seeks balanced development with fair access to resources and thus a fair share for everybody (United Nations, 1987). Sustainable development should be achieved through 'collective independency' (Schubert and Altrock, 2004: 353).

In that regard, in their book ***Sustainable City***, White and Whitney (1992) proclaimed the concept of the 'extended metropolis' that was put forward by Ginsburg, Koppel, and McGee in 1991 as a new type of more sustainable urban development. Their concept was based on

development trends in India and China, where urban agglomerations had emerged. The growth of major cities is declining while the regions outside the urban periphery are growing faster, with higher employment rates and higher living standards, followed by more densely-populated rural areas and sparsely-populated frontier regions. The extended metropolis (see figure 1) implies a new model of rural-urban economy, with a high carrying capacity (White, Whitney 1992, 40 et seqq.). At the same time, self-help and grassroots initiatives have led to the autonomous improvement of urban life whenever local administrations are strengthened (decentralisation) and support such initiatives. Local solutions, tailored to the very urban areas, supported by local knowledge and resources, and implemented by active local communities, have led to social, economic, and environmental sustainability (Stren, 1992: 308). Consequently, this approach is in line with Turner's autonomy housing approach.

Figure 1: The extended Metropolis Concept. Source: Own elaboration based on White and Whitney, 1992: 41

In Brazil, after the forced eviction of informal settlements or '*favelas*' to the urban peripheries (imposed by the capitalist-oriented military regime in the 1960s and 1970s), a shift in approach occurred, and these settlements were tolerated and later serviced, legalised, and incorporated into the urban structure as permanent neighbourhoods (Huchzermeyer, 2014: 89). Through '**settlement formalisation**', housing construction is now allowed without standardisation, and sometimes even with government assistance, as in the case of Fortaleza. Early permanent house construction is understood as the right to have a house legalised. In other words, the 'right to occupation' is emphasised through permanent houses, which are formalised after construction. In the city of Belo Horizonte, this law is called PROFAVELA (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 77 et seqq.) and is referred to as the 'Right to the City' movement, which is described in the next chapter about approaches to governance.

3_Governance approaches and empowerment

Governance includes not only state actors but also non-governmental actors; consequently, the term 'governance' inevitably arises with the subject of urban government, participation, urban planning, and how they are all intertwined. For this study, governance is strongly related to the urban context and is characterised by the interaction of the various actors beyond public institutions. Urban governance is characterised by the interactions of actors in making and implementing decisions on spatial relevance at the urban scale (Altrock, Bertram and Fischer, 2012: 10). Ergo, actors in the local governance for improvement of self-provisioning neighbourhoods are governmental and non-governmental institutions and the neighbourhood community.

Heinrichs, Krellenberg, and Fragkias discuss local governance in cities of the South with regard to set-up capacity and adaptability in tackling the effects of climate change. They also refer to settlement development and the improvement of living conditions through the active involvement of residents. When local governance adapts in practice, three aspects are of importance: ability, willingness, and an enabling/disabling context. *Ability* covers the resources, such as human and financial, that a city government allocates in order to take action (2013: 1871). *Willingness* is decisive when it comes to the activities of local actors; it describes a 'range of motivational factors'. And enabling/disabling structures are linked with conditions of societal framing, such as the acceptance of or commitment to specific actions. Regional differences and the combined effects of the three aspects have resulted in variations in the types of actions taken, along with their intensity and the degree of involvement in these actions (ibid: 1872).

This chapter provides a brief overview of terms such as 'governance approaches' and 'empowerment' and discusses how they are used in practice and, hence, why they are important for this study. It is not meant to give a full overview of the history (for that, see Ley, 2009) or the on-going debate over the terms.

3.1_Two governance approaches towards social equality

Accountability and transparency, emphasis on process, and participation are the centrepieces of good urban governance: an enabling approach that ensures that cities carry out their functions with maximum effectiveness. The concept highlights 'desired standards of practice', and, thus, organisations also define good governance based on their own interests.

Governance is not government; governance includes government, the private sector, and civil society. According to UN-Habitat, **good urban governance** is characterised by three principal strategies: 'decentralizing responsibilities and resources to local authorities, encouraging the participation of civil society and using partnerships to achieve common objectives' (UNCHS/Habitat, 2000: 199). This approach is part of the global campaign for urban governance to achieve the goals of the Istanbul Declaration and the Habitat Agenda.

Brenner (2000) pointed out that, in reality, good (urban) governance leads and restructures states and city institutions in Europe towards a more liberal market-oriented approach, in order to maximise profits and to be competitive in the global market. The 'urban poor' and 'ecological sustainability' are merely terms that are included to satisfy civil society; ultimately, those 'good' aspects have to fit into the market-oriented governance strategies (ibid).

When there is public involvement in government processes, it is called '**participatory governance**' and implies direct citizen participation. This involves citizens making decisions that affect the wider public and examining the implementation of those decisions. In such situations, a wide range of civic actors emerges alongside governmental institutions, and such situations feature political representation by civil society actors (Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle, 2009: 7).

Participation in governance processes must have two components for it to function. Firstly, all citizens must have the right to participate and be willing to do so. Secondly, governments must have the transparency necessary to ensure full participation by citizens. In many cases, even though the underprivileged are willing to participate, the local governments are corrupt and feel neither responsive nor accountable to the public, as noted by Gaventa (2002: 29). Mistrust by the public widens the gap between the local government and the underprivileged population.

Apart from an active civil society and a committed government, effective participatory governance also requires a direct connection between the parties; this interface has been neglected. The connection between the citizenry and the government is based on participation and inclusion. Participatory governance links empowered bottom-up processes with top-down forms of governance. Various participatory approaches have been implemented successfully, be it participatory planning at the local government level in India, participatory budgeting in Brazil, citizen monitoring committees in Bolivia, or public referenda and citizen consultation

in Europe. All these approaches are incorporated into a new legal framework for local governance, which bears a mix of direct forms of citizen participation with more representative forms of democracy (ibid: 31).

On the other hand, decentralisation can strengthen local elites and hence minimise the chance for the underprivileged to get involved in governance processes. However, there are several success stories wherein participatory governance at the local level has also been inclusive of marginalised groups, in India, Brazil, and South Africa. They all have three enabling conditions in common:

- strong central state capacity,
- a well-developed society, and
- an organised political force (such as a party) committed to social movement (ibid: 31).

In countries and regions that do not hold the ideal pre-conditions, necessary steps include awareness-building and preparing the local government, as well as measures to make civil society more collective and inclusive in their approach. At the same time, a national legal framework for participation is necessary to prepare the foundation for local interventions. In fact, all administrative levels should be involved as vertical links and should be committed to participative governance. In the absence of an aware local and national government, links to global civil society potentially provide strong input for the empowerment of marginalised groups to utilise the bottom-up approach in favour of a more inclusive, participatory political environment (ibid: 35).

3.2_Social movements and the 'Right to the City'

The fight against socio-economic inequality and capital-driven urban redevelopment processes that seize valuable land from marginalised communities in favour of the interests of a few elites is expressed in **social movements**. 'Urban social movements seek to overcome isolation and reshape the city in a different image from that put forward by the developers, who are backed by finance, corporate capital and an increasingly entrepreneurially minded local state apparatus' (Harvey, 2008).

Castells describes urban social movements as struggles for improved collective consumption and for community culture and political self-determination. They transform the 'urban meaning' in the sense that they undermine social hierarchies and instead organise the city in terms of 'use values, autonomous local cultures and decentralised participatory democracy'

(cited in Mayer, 2006: 202). He derived his definition from his research in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, social movements have undertaken a cycle of transformations in goals, strategies, and organisational structures (ibid).

Mayer observed two strong mainstreams in social movements. The first is that social movements, as they become recognised by governmental institutions, become instrumentalised as local stakeholders with local identities and competent partners in the fight against neighbourhood decline, crime, social exclusion, et cetera, although the organisations behind social movements want to implement their own agendas and visions (not those of the government). The second is that urban social movements become involved in anti-globalisation campaigns as part of their protest in the national political debate against the privatisation of public goods and the eroding social welfare state. For that purpose, they form broad local coalitions with other movements (ibid: 203).

Social movements have been very successful in Latin America, for example, the movement for housing for the low-income population in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In 2002, Argentina was hit by an economic crisis and public institutions could not satisfy the demand for social housing. Social movements, or 'picket' movements (*piqueteras)*, started fighting for the social rights of the urban poor, and the government was open to dialogue as well as public participation. Social and political movements were directly involved in producing social housing, and thus achieved an important public presence and became strong organisations, to the extent that some activists even gained government positions. Hence, the movement for social housing for low-income groups achieved visibility to the political and societal audience.

Generally, the organisations follow a two-fold approach in creating job opportunities through productive enterprises and demand for a minimum aid programme from the government. Simultaneously, they are in on-going dialogue with the various stakeholders of the government and enterprises (Scheinsohn and Cabrera, 2009: 110 et seqq.). The remarkable success of the Argentinian social and political movements in meeting the demand for the housing of the urban poor while also playing an active political role in agenda-setting would not have been possible without a responsive government – not to mention willingness to cooperate on both sides.

Another success story from the socio-political movement is the formation of loose cyber platforms and networks, globally but especially in the Arab world. The 'Arab Spring',

including the mass protests in Egypt against the regime, would not have been possible without urban blogger activists calling for street protests, rallies, boycott campaigns, et cetera, and reclaiming urban public spaces. The Egyptian emergency law enacted in 1981 prohibits the organisation of public rallies and the gathering of more than five people in public spaces. Hence, the Egyptian blogosphere has developed into a virtual platform for the expression of socio-political issues. At the blogosphere's inception there in 2005, bloggers called for political reform and for the exposure of security violations, which resulted in rallies in various crowded places to reach people throughout that year, as well as pro-democracy protests in 2006. For that purpose, open public spaces in Cairo's European Quarter in the centre of the city were appropriated in the spirit of the 'Right to the City' (Fahmi, 2009: 89).

The '**Right to the City**' movement is a strong worldwide social movement. The slogan 'Right to the City' was first proposed by Henri Lefebvre in 1968 in his book *Le Droit à la Ville* (Ungers 2009). His idea was a 'call for a radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relations' and restructuring decision-making processes away from the state and towards the production of urban space, or stated more literally: away from the capital and the state and towards urban inhabitants. While governments let people participate only to a certain extent in specific given legal frameworks, the 'Right to the City' empowers every urban resident. Two main principles underpin the movement: the right to participation and the right to appropriation (cf. Kummel, 2014: 105). 'Participation includes the active involvement of urban inhabitants in decision-making processes towards production of urban space. The right to appropriation for urban inhabitants includes the physical access, occupation, and use of urban space. This is the main aspect, to advocate the right of inhabitants who are using and being present in the urban space; to allow inhabitants to occupy space in order to produce space for their own needs. These rights can be carried out regardless of the inhabitant's nationality, ethnicity, class, et cetera' (after Purcell, 2002, in Kummel, 2014: 105).

In 2005, the International Alliance of Inhabitants declared a 'World Charter for the Right to the City', in which the two principles were integrated. According to Harvey, the movement is a performance of 'collective power' in restructuring the cityscape. As such, city dwellers have the right to 'make the city' and their neighbourhoods according to their common needs (Harvey, 2008). 'Right to the City' organisations are located all over the globe, including the shack dwellers movements in South Africa, the 'Right to the Cities Alliance' in the United States, and the '*Recht auf Stadt*' network in Germany (Kummel, 2014: 106).

Ungers (2009) claimed that Lefebvre never desired that the 'Right to the City' become institutionalised, as has happened already with the World Charter prepared for the World Social Forum in 2006 and with a city statute inserted into the Brazilian Constitution in 2001, following pressure from social movements stating a collective right to the city. Instead, the 'Right to the City' was proposed as 'a framework for a utopia of urban social struggles', but was turned into a political slogan, especially in Latin American cities (Harvey, 2008). Goethert has emphasised, likewise, that the 'Right to the City' movement is 'a change of participation which does not try to integrate the informal into the formal framework, but instead assumes a convergence towards the informal' (Ley, 2009: 330). Nevertheless, it can be stated that the movement is a human rights struggle and is addressed to public institutions (Ungers, 2009).

3.3_Empowerment and the power of grassroots organisations and self-help initiatives

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proclaimed at the beginning of the 21st century that the empowerment of impoverished populations was to be a central development task (2004: 16). Empowerment is one of the operational components of the Good Urban Governance approach taken by UN-Habitat and is one of the keys to poverty reduction. Empowerment includes, aside from reducing poverty, effective participation in decision-making processes by the poor, the increase of their self-help capacities, and the development of social resources (Addicks, 2003: 45 et seqq.). **Sustainable empowerment** is defined as a situation wherein people are empowered socially, economically, and politically (UNDP, 2004: 13).

Brand (2002) formulated a broader political comprehension of the empowerment approach to including diversity, concrete experiences, and different living conditions. It is understood as a decentralised bottom-up process and formulates a critique of the top-down approach. The representatives of the empowerment approach focus on equality, justice, alternative economies, and reproductive rights. Brand noted that the term 'empowerment' was integrated into global politics by institutions like the World Bank as well as various UN institutions and hence has been instrumentalised.

Each city has the potential for regeneration, which depends on the actions of its constituent groups. The capacity to follow a sustainable growth strategy also depends on the city and the city's commitment to target low-income groups, on the consequences of political struggle,

and on internal forces for fostering empowerment (Fainstein, 1996: 175 et seqq.). Noting that developments in favour of empowering marginalised groups occur only when the ruling interests are pushed back, Brand criticised what had happened with the empowerment approach: that it meant people should solve their problems on their own. However, the different interests of both the marginalised and the powerful hinder any progress in upgrading. In Europe in particular, city governments at different administrative levels have instrumentalised the interaction of the state with civil society actors (Brand, 2000).

At this point, it is necessary to briefly mention the **organisation of civil society**. When civil society becomes organised, not necessarily for building social movements, but for offering services to bridge a supply gap, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are formed. NGOs play a crucial role in some self-provisioning neighbourhoods, as they act as mediators between the government and civil society, though sometimes more in their own favour than on behalf of the affected groups. On the other hand, they provide civil society with necessary (social) services that the government fails to or simply cannot offer.

Mitlin (1999) described NGOs as '[...] professional, non-profit, non-membership intermediary organisations that are independent of the state and which undertake a range of activities in order to further development' (cited by Ley, 2009: 72). The range and the degree of 'activities' vary based on their level in the national, regional, or local dimension. In Egyptian informal settlements, for example, local NGOs hold a strong share in social service provision and act as regionally recognised powers with the financial and technical support of donor agencies.

Capturing the reality in self-provisioning areas, Ruby Papeleras, a community leader of the Homeless People's Federation in the Philippines, pointed out that 'because we're poor and because we live in slums, nobody trusts us, nobody believes in us. We don't have money, our jobs are illegal, our communities are illegal, our connections to electricity and water are illegal' (cited by Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2012: 397). She has also noted that donor agencies never meet the people's eye or trust them to make their own decisions on how to best implement the limited funding. At the same time, national NGOs compete with each other regarding who may enter the informal neighbourhoods, but their social workers and community mobilisers want to fit such visits with their agendas and not with the residents' agendas (ibid). Sanyal also mentioned that NGOs avoided linking themselves with institutions necessary for the project's effectiveness in order to safeguard their competitive edge with other NGOs in pursuit of donations (Sanyal, 1998: 9).

Consequently, with the rise of good governance approaches, the role and legitimacy of NGOs were questioned, and thus the focus shifted towards community-centred organisations and initiatives. NGOs were perceived as more accountable to their donors (top-down), while community-centred organisations were seen as more related to their members (bottom-up) (Ley, 2009: 79 et seqq.).

Grassroots or community-based organisations (CBOs) and **self-help initiatives (SHIs)** are, like NGOs, civil society organisations, supporting the rights, needs, and wishes of local interests or groups in society Mitlin (1999) described grassroots organisations as follows: 'Grassroots organizations are membership organizations which are also independent of the state. As membership organizations, the risks, costs and benefits are shared among the members, and the leadership may be called to account by members. Most are non-profit although some operate as cooperative commercial enterprises. Many are informal and operate as loose associations' (cited by Ley, 2009: 79).

To obtain resources, CBOs create relationships with governmental institutions, which implies patronage by local politicians and governmental staff. As local organisations are often informally formed and social relationships in the community play a vital role, some marginalised groups are again excluded. In general, Mitlin recognised two types of CBOs: (1) those that represent the whole community for local development and (2) those that represent specific groups of residents (ibid: 81 et seqq.).

A widely recognised international social movement and network of several homeless and landless federations is the Slum/Shack Dwellers International (SDI), founded in India 1996, which represents the needs of the poor and poorest urban groups. The SDI approach was initiated in India and includes the empowerment of communities and the city- or nation-wide networking of federations to strengthen the capacity for negotiation with governmental institutions. The federations themselves are organised into local savings groups, as in the squatted areas of Nepal. They are active in policymaking, pushing for policies that support their right to land and housing. Furthermore, the SDI approach fosters greater collective solidarity and organisation among the marginalised groups. They are more independent of external support and more proactive when it comes to issues concerning the neighbourhood (Ibid, 86 et seqq.). Federations are considered CBOs because they are founded by the communities themselves in order to develop their neighbourhoods on their own.

In many cases, because residents of informal areas have no land titles or other legal documents stating that they are entitled to obtain credit from a bank, savings groups enable residents to gain access to finance, and money is put into cooperatives. Often these financing schemes are introduced to communities by national NGOs, but are implemented in CBOs, such as women's and mothers' groups. This is the case with many savings groups in self-provisioning areas of Nepal, where the groups were introduced by the national NGO Lumanti; it is also the case in Mongolia, where the groups were introduced by the UDRC. Both of these national NGOs also introduced and hosted the aforementioned ACCA project in self-provisioning neighbourhoods in their countries. Urgent problems such as insecure tenure, inadequate housing, and insufficient infrastructure are forcing those communities to unify and to establish registered organisations in order to be heard by the local administrations and to acquire funding. One serious problem after unification is that not everybody in the community gets involved in improvement processes, as not everybody can belong to the steering group. It is a challenge to open up space and allow a variety of skills to contribute to the overall goal, and this is how new leaders rise (Papeleras, Bagotlo and Boonyabancha, 2012: 468 et seqq.).

The network of CBOs is important for the unity of common interests and goals. The leaders are decisive with regard to community mobilisation, networking, and advocating (Schwegmann, 2013: 304). A charismatic leader can promote community demands and seek relationships with those who have similar problems. However, external actions by political and private forces and internal factors within CBOs, such as self-interest and mistrust, as well as political, ethical, and religious conflicts, lead to the crumbling of social movements and CBOs (ibid: 314).

Political parties have strong influence in self-provisioning neighbourhoods. They, *per se*, usually do not have headquarters in the settlement, but can mobilise resources and run social facilities that are not provided by the government. Thus, they can be relatively sure that, during elections, they will get a high number of votes from these settlements (Misselwitz, 2009: 275). These factors can be observed in the informal settlements of Cairo, in the squatter settlements of Kathmandu, and, to a lesser extent, in Ulaanbaatar's *ger* areas.

SHIs are less organised than CBOs. They are usually formed to address a particular, present problem in a neighbourhood and are strongly member-oriented. If the initiative is successful in implementing activities or has strong leaders, they often unify or network with other initiatives in the region or city.

3.4_Self-help initiatives in self-provisioning neighbourhoods

In 2009, in 165 Asian cities across 19 countries, the Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA), along with the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights (ACHR), initiated 950 small improvement projects, which showed that it was possible to upgrade self-provisioning settlements at a community scale and then, in the next step, work together at the city level and involve the local governments as partners. The projects were community-driven, and the residents chose the interventions, decided how they would be implemented, and also financed and managed them. The programme was mainly aimed at establishing a new financing system to reduce poverty. The successes of these small-scale projects have been of interest to other low-income communities that have adopted the scheme, as well as to local governments, which has often led to a citywide platform where representatives from communities sit together as equals with government officials and politicians. In many cases, revolving City Development Funds (CDF) have been established in which city governments were involved and in which community organisations had a strong say and could help implement larger projects. Throughout the experience, the communities implemented both small- and large-scale projects while networking at the citywide level with other federations or organisations (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2012: 395 et seqq.). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the community-based projects were supported financially as well as technically by the ACCA, and, without their initiative, it would not have been possible to garner significant attention from the city governments. Insofar as it was an awareness-building campaign to empower the marginalised, low-income groups and bring them into the political urban mainstream, it was a great success. ACCA projects have been implemented in Nepal and Mongolia (Boonyabancha and Mitlin, 2012) as well and will be described in their respective chapters in Part II.

Other than the typically initiated and supported SHIs from top-down, Mitlin (2008) analysed the strategies developed by marginalised groups as real bottom-up approaches to improving their living conditions. SHIs are understood here as real initiatives organised by the residents of the self-provisioning neighbourhoods themselves. They formulated their needs and formed initiatives to coordinate improvement measures. To fulfil their demands, Mitlin categorised the efforts adopted by these marginalised groups into five strategies for securing access to basic services:

(1) **Individual market-based strategies**, like income generation, employment, and education, are undertaken individually or are household-driven, utilising opportunities offered by existing structures.

(2) **Collective self-help strategies** of residents in a stable neighbourhood come about when residents unify to provide basic needs and services to improve their individual situations without any government involvement.

(3) **Dependency-based strategies** accept the structural situation and try to benefit from the existing institutional framework by using patron-client relationships, such as those forged through participatory approaches, wherein the allocation of resources and services benefits influential groups or people, as well as loyal clients, with the ability to distribute these resources.

(4) **Exclusion strategies** are methods connected to criminality, because, in such a case, the urban poor find it impossible to improve their lives through legal or socially accepted means.

(5) **Social movement strategies** are politicised mass actions initiated through collective initiatives by the urban poor. The groups make political demands and have social interactions and a clear collective nature.

The mixing of the different strategies takes place and links are evident between the second, third, and fifth strategies (ibid: 342 et seqq.).

Social movements and the organisations they form, such as federations and associations, contend for land tenure and basic services. Collective self-help strategies are fairly common in informal settlements as means of improving living conditions and establishing technical and social infrastructure, in some cases without any help from the outside. In higher-income countries, such provision of infrastructure is the duty of the state.

Categorisation of CBOs and SHIs in self-provisioning neighbourhoods

Five upgrading projects in self-provisioning neighbourhoods in different countries were analysed according to their different approaches to the improvement of living conditions and the establishment of technical and social infrastructure. These projects were located in India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil. The projects were categorised by Mitlin according to the five strategies by examining the main actors and their roles in the project, how the neighbourhood organised its CBO or SHI before and during the project, and the measures undertaken in the neighbourhood (for further details about the projects, see also Appendix, Chapter I).

All five projects used collective self-help strategies; three of the projects combined them with dependency-based strategies, and three even shifted beyond upgrading the settlement to a

social movement strategy. However, it is also a question of how enthusiastically a given strategy is followed. The two most successful projects were those in Indonesia and India. The CBO in the former and a strong local leader in the latter formed a strong collective community to fight against eviction and upgrade their settlements: a squatter settlement in the former, a slum settlement in the latter. In Surabaya, Indonesia, the inhabitants were included in the decision-making, while NGOs and universities granted support from the outside. A strong sense of unity and togetherness under the slogan 'Renovation not Relocation' also stirred awareness among the urban civil society and the government for negotiations (Some, Hafidz and Sauter, 2009: 463 et seqq.). All three strategies were followed. In Mumbai, India, a network involving other slums, various NGOs, and churches was established to create awareness and to support the community in procuring infrastructure. To be heard by the politicians, the Bombay Slum Dwellers Federation was founded in 1969, later followed by the National Slum Dwellers Federation, organising protests and debates. The movement was publicly documented (Arputham, 2008: 321 et seqq.). In particular, collective self-help and social movement strategies were strongly followed.

In Bangkok, Thailand, the SHI did not follow the social movement strategy, but successfully implemented social programmes for women and children and for solid waste management (Wenk, 2008: 8 et seqq.). Local female leaders, for the most part elected, followed dependency-based and, later in the project, collective self-help strategies.

The two less successful projects in Karnataka, India, and Curitiba, Brazil, mainly lacked the collective self-organisation required to follow either a strong dependency-based or an individual social-movement strategy. In Karnataka, the women-led self-help groups, introduced by an ADB programme, failed to empower women, as those benefitting from individual loans were mainly men. Missing was an umbrella organisation to unify the established self-help groups (Sitaram, 2007: III et seqq.). In Curitiba, a collective SHI was initially installed with the 'Council of Settlers', which, under the umbrella association 'Council of representatives', was active in fostering improvements in infrastructure, education, and employment. Due to a conflict of interests and low participation, the association split up and the municipality took over (Ranke, 1997).

3.5_Interdependence between governance approaches and the empowerment approach

This chapter discusses self-help housing in informal settlements, how urban policies deal with this topic from 'above', which impressively shows that governance approaches ordered from the top are rarely successful at the community level when the community is not included to an appropriate extent in decision-making processes. Instead, Turner suggested autonomous housing processes, which he later on extended to self-organised community development, which is heavily dependent on SHIs. This empowerment approach seemed to be the solution to overcoming the severe lack of infrastructure and the poor living conditions in self-provisioning areas because self-help-initiatives were formed in nearly every such neighbourhood to solve such problems. However, an examination of the history of SHIs has shown that those initiatives can be taken over by external actors and instrumentalised, and thus can fail as community-based, member-related initiatives. SHIs have been made an instrument of international development aid to eradicate informal settlements or so-called 'slums'. Figure 2 illustrates the reality of carrying out development projects. As shown in the figure, the arrow pointing from the community to NGOs and on to governmental institutions is weak, as represented by a dotted line.

Figure 2: The interdependence between good or participative governance approaches and the empowerment approach. Source: Own elaboration

The community has to be made aware of its collective power. When a community is empowered, it can form initiatives and movements to improve local living conditions and to fight for the rights of the residents. When governments are not aware of the potential of such self-organised groups, the empowerment approach cannot achieve success. If a government with a participatory approach meets an empowered community represented by its organisations and both meet face-to-face to communicate with each other, then projects for the improvement of self-provisioning neighbourhoods have a much higher chance of success. In such cases, the necessity of NGOs is questioned.

Sanyal argued that bottom-up approaches were only successful if they were linked to political, governmental, and non-governmental institutions. In these self-provisioning neighbourhoods, economic growth could not happen via bottom-up income generation if the top economy was in stagnation, because the two were intertwined in multiple ways (1998: 8 et seqq.). Instead, she suggested a triple alliance between the government, grassroots-NGOs, and market institutions with their different institutional strengths. The government provides the appropriate policy environment; the NGOs ensure citizen participation, and the market institution supports with its knowledge of consumer and producer preferences. Further on, she questioned why these alliances were not formed more frequently. To answer this question, the different interests of the actors and how these interests change and coincide, creating synergistic effects, need to be observed (ibid: 14).

4_Negotiation processes in local governance structures

Herrle (2006) has argued that 'negotiation and consensus-building form vital parts of contemporary local governance systems particularly in the Global South' (Herrle and Fokdal, 2011: 9). The independent groups who are not part of the system are alleged to pursue conflicting interests. One could assume that the motivation for negotiation is a positive outcome in favour of the common interest, be it on the side of the administration, the societal organisation, or the community. However, the protection of individual interests is the primary aim, and the common benefit is just a side effect (ibid). The formal and informal spheres themselves, too, succumb to constant negotiations and, according to Castells and Portes (1989), are a result of contention and conflict (Elsner, 2014: 14). When the dualistic, solely economic approach to informality shifted to informal governance arrangements, the perspective also shifted from a legal and organisational relationship between public and private actors to negotiations between various actors (Altrock, 2012: 172). Roy (2005: 154) has spoken of 'scale-jumping', when alliances are made by informal actors at higher hierarchical levels to secure influence in decision-making for the benefit at the local level. Such interfaces at multi-scales have become familiar, for instance, in negotiations for urban infrastructural projects.

4.1_Co-production of urban spaces by various actors

So, when Selle (2008) asked, 'Who develops the city?', the answer was 'everyone'. Urban sprawl is connoted by single-family houses in the US and Europe, as well as by informal

Figure 3: Influence of urban actors on urban development
Source: Selle, 2008: 30

settlements on the periphery of cities elsewhere in the world. However, moving to the city centre to shorten the distances between people, thereby increasing urban density, is a conscious decision made by residents.

Citizens' income-levels, lifestyles, and decisions influence city development in various ways, both directly and indirectly. For example low incomes shape the appearance of the city. So-called 'private households' also include civil society organisations. Meanwhile, other actors influence urban development, including 'city producers' such as construction companies, the land development and real

estate industries, building investors, land owners, industrial and retail enterprises, and providers of transport services, supply and disposal authorities, banks, architects, advisors, et cetera. The third dimension of urban actors is comprised of politicians and governments, with their divisions and departments, such as the district and local administrations, which prepare master plans and urban laws, issue building permits, preserve urban green areas, and receive complaints from other urban actors (ibid: 29). All of these actors naturally have different stakes, and they argue with each other in defence of their interests. The pressure to develop land in accordance with the many different interests is manifold, since, in urban areas, many different interests are expressed by various actors (see Figure 3).

The different land utilisation interests of landowners can be traced in the layout of many cities (see also figure 4). In many cases, industrial enterprises have had an immense influence on the city's development and even establishment, such as the coal mining industry in the Ruhr region of Germany, and the

Figure 4: Urban actors and their different interests, interacting with each other.
Source: Own elaboration based on Wiechmann, 2008: 117

copper mining industry in Mongolia, which precipitated construction of the country's second-largest city, Erdenet, during the socialist era. Nowadays, cities are strongly influenced by powerful private actors, such as the real estate and construction industries (ibid: 32). Co-production by several urban actors has been revitalised. It is not a new phenomenon, but it has been given a value once again so as to meet multiple contemporary urban challenges.

In urban development, it is important to understand not only actors and their interests, but also their contributions to the processes. Not all actors contribute to a specific spatial topic, like neighbourhood development, to the same extent, if at all. Those actors and their interdependencies have to be recognised in order to identify shared development goals. This task- and actor-driven approach needs to be understood as complementary to the official urban planning process. This approach is relevant wherever various private actors contribute to urban development. The formal planning process cannot cope with the informal processes

of negotiation, arrangement, and cooperation to bring different actors together and coordinate their activities (ibid, 39 et seqq.).

Mayntz (2002: 31) distinguished between the individual, the collective, and the corporative actor at micro, meso, and macro levels. The various collective actors motivate each other in their interactive relationships; individual actions and the sequential reactions of other actors cause collective interactions (ibid: 25). The constellation of the collective and corporative actor is characterised by 'benefits'. Additionally, the availability of resources for the actors and their obligation to distinctive decision-making rules influence their constellation. The 'outcome' is the result of the interaction process carried out under certain preconditions (ibid: 32).

Hence, 'actors are characterised by capabilities (to achieve outcomes), perceptions and preferences with regard to a policy problem (action orientation)' (Ley, 2009: 113). Ley stated in her research of Cape Town, South Africa, that politically driven housing agendas face difficulties in implementation due to power games between political and administrative actors, and, on the local government level, a lack of political commitment and of administrative capacity. As there was no participation in accessing the land, people found alternative ways to occupy land, like illegal occupation, the acquisition of private land, and allocations from private owners to negotiate later relocation. Moreover, during the project preparation phase, the participation of affected residents was restricted; hence, negotiations for their preferences or negotiations for post-approval were carried out. During project development, the standardised participation of CBOs as part of the 'institutional framework' was foreseen for housing design to prepare for self-built developments. The local government did not encourage participation approaches due to 'institutional resistance in decision-making and by political patronage'. Empowered self-help initiatives were seen by the local government as more of a burden than an opportunity to provide housing. These institutional approaches to participation have led to mutual mistrust between actors, resulting in low participation in Integrated Development Plans (ibid: 295 et seqq.).

To overcome these issues, civil society organisations have opted to build capacity in grassroots networks for lobbying and advocating participation, as well as to sensitise local governments to people-driven activities (ibid: 308). Ley argued for 'oscillating structures' and actors as 'moving targets' in local governance, rather than institutionalised and rigid aims that cannot respond to changing actors; she also called for shifting roles towards hybrid structures (ibid: 330).

Ley's study showed another important aspect when speaking about the various kinds of actors, which is that not every actor has the same capacity to act or the same chance to integrate, due to unequal societal distribution of income, possessions, and property (Selle, 2005: 113).

Three main modes of action are available (see also table 1):

- Indirect: urban land-use planning, financial incentives, communication.
- Direct: implementation of projects for transportation, social and technical infrastructure, green areas, regeneration, et cetera.
- Structuring: a precondition for indirect and direct modes of action, institutions or organisational infrastructure such as networks and redevelopment companies (Selle 2005, 118).

	Mode of action	Indirect			Direct		Structuring
	Type of instrument	regulative instruments	convincing communication	financing support	market participation	site development	process steering / organisation development
	Steering mode	hierarchical					
		collaborative					

Table 1: Instruments, modes of action, steering modes Source: Selle, 2005: 120

4.2_The communication concept by Selle

This chapter describes the communication instruments for urban development. Selle (2005) studied communication patterns mostly in German and European urban planning and development processes, but the findings are relevant to every part of the world because communication takes place as soon as different types of people with certain interests begin work towards developing a city or neighbourhood. Communication is an essential part of planning and development processes. Collaborative action is the steering mode, and communicative processes are used as forms of work (ibid: 446). The three modes of action (as shown in the table above) are used in a collaborative way by the various actors. However, collaboration is rarely achieved when there are gaping differences between the interests of the actors (ibid: 327).

The term 'communication', as Selle (2010) has used it, is a collective term of individual activities of 'mediation' in planning processes. It corresponds with the meaning of the Latin root words mentioned by Donald Keller (1996): to confer (information), to involve (participation), and to make together (coordination, collaboration) (cited in Selle, 2010: 371). The four types of communication, according to Selle, are listed in the table below.

Information	Participation	Coordination	Collaboration
to confer	*to involve*	*to make together*	
A precondition for all types of communication	Involvement of other actors in planning and development processes	Poll of measures, programmes, between actors	Cooperative work of individual actors

Table 2: Types of communication. Source: Selle, 1996: 17

With *information,* two types are represented: to be informed and to inform others. Information is necessary to gain knowledge about the development site as well as to get to know the potential actors and their interests and motivations. Possible tools for collecting this information are: interviews, questioning, and site visits. To inform others and to form opinions about the project, two methods can be followed: diffusion of information through media, posters, brochures, et cetera (one-way flow of information) and sharing information via meetings (two-way flow of information). Using the second method, the information is spread at the same time that opinions about the project and its approach are gathered (Selle, 2010: 371).

Participation means involvement, namely in decision-making procedures. It does not mean being directly involved in parliament meetings, but rather being indirectly involved in the making of decisions. The decisions are ultimately made by political leaders, who are influenced by other actors and the information they present. Again, two methods of participation have been recognised: citizens express their interests and offer suggestions, and citizens communicate with decision-makers and give them information. The citizens who 'participate' in this way are mostly community leaders, elected board members, et cetera. Participation tools include workshops and focus group discussions (ibid: 372).

Coordination and *Collaboration* imply working together on the same level to solve a problem. All actors possess the same decision-making competency, a levelling that can be achieved in roundtables and workshops, which bring together experts, politicians, and citizens to discuss and resolve problems and solutions together. Because coordination and collaboration both imply doing activities together, this study does not differentiate between them. The difference between both words is that coordination means adjustment within a

group of people about decisions and activities. Typical tools for collaboration are roundtable meetings, workshops, and forums, in which participants engage in mediation pursuant to the solution of conflicts (ibid).

Analysis of the communication practice is characterised by questioning to obtain a precise description of the situation and therewith an image of the communication situation. Communication is the interface for the understanding of the whole process of development. The communication practice involves:

- Actors and their relations to each other (Who communicates?)
- Content, the planning task, and the communication issue and purpose (What is communicated?)
- Goals, interests, and reasons (Why and for what is it being communicated?)
- Results and impacts (How far and with what consequences?) (Selle, 2005: 407)

There are supporting and inhibiting factors for the development of the different communication forms. Due to **supporting factors,** communication forms develop because they are needed in response to new work forms and local requirements. The supporting factor 'participation' was introduced, for example, in urban planning processes due to the massive resistance of citizens against the destruction of green areas and the demolition of buildings and neighbourhoods and so forth. Thus, early information as well as other types of informal participation, like workshops, local advisory committees, et cetera, were necessary to avoid conflicts or for the dissolution of conflicts. For instance, to create investment security for a construction project, the various stakeholders had to be involved in the early stages of planning so as to avoid conflicts at the onset. However, the planning process can also be opened up to citizens' opinions later on. Thus, citizens' willingness to contribute and act is an important supporting factor for active participation in information exchange, negotiation, and consensus building (ibid: 433 et seqq.). There are various handbooks about participation methods in Germany. In the following chapters, this study discusses the participation methods used in the three context cities (Ulaanbaatar, Kathmandu, and Cairo) and the types of communication used.

Inhibiting factors include the lack of a culture of knowledge sharing, exclusory alliances among small circles of decision-makers, and unwillingness to open-up the process. Informal means of communication for influencing decisions are preferred over 'open processes', and thus some actors are excluded. There is also the fear, noted by Ley, of losing power in a game

of competition. The overloading of administration staff with the additional workload of communication, as well as different understandings of tasks also lead to rifts in communication. However, the most important inhibiting factor is that decisions are often made before participation and negotiation (ibid: 438et seqq.).

Communication gaps can be avoided by clarifying whether decisions have already been made. This prevents disappointment among actors who had had expectations of being included in the decision-making. A fruitful conversation is possible if the other seeks a benefit; expectations should be communicated beforehand to the other actors to counteract the attitude of '**not in my backyard**'. To avoid such misunderstandings, the whole communication process has to be designed so that most of the interests are represented and to ensure fairness and competence. Another misunderstanding is that underprivileged groups are generally not included in communication processes. To avoid such socially-selective situations, (additional) target-group-oriented communication strategies have to be initiated (ibid: 454 et seqq.).

PART II

The Case Studies in Urban and Local Contexts: Cairo, Kathmandu, Ulaanbaatar and their Self-Provisioning Neighbourhoods

5_Research questions and methodology

6_Contextualisation of the case studies

7_Comparative analysis of application of the case studies in the neighbourhoods

8_Conclusion: comparison of empirical findings in cities and neighbourhoods

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5_Research questions and methodology

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5.1_Introduction to main research question and methodological approach

At this point, it is necessary to briefly recall the essentials of this work from the introductory chapter to formulate the main research question. Considering that government structures lose more and more importance, and governance systems take over with a range of various actors, complex negotiation processes play a decisive role in the improvement of living conditions in self-provisioning neighbourhoods. The trend has shifted from top-down improvement programmes to a sharing and multi-scale approach. Consequently, the work focuses on a community-centred perspective with its main research question:

What roles do state and non-state actors in local governance systems play in negotiations with so-called informal, self-provisioning neighbourhoods?

This study aims to give an overview of the influences of institutions and organisations on neighbourhood development and of the communication patterns involved in this development. The study also aims to provide a basis for further in-depth research.

The general approach of this study is a **comparative urban study** (Robinson, 2011) with a neighbourhood-based investigation in three countries and cultures using an **ethnographical research method**. The focus is on 'exploring the characteristics of a specific, social phenomenon' rather than on the generation of hypotheses (Flick, 2012: 297). A hypothesis-led approach would involve making assumptions that could skew the findings.

The study follows a **case-study approach** to three different urban improvement programmes initiated by state or non-state actors. In Cairo, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) introduced its Participatory Development Programme; in Kathmandu, the national NGO Lumanti implemented its Urban Community Empowerment Programme; and the Mongolian government launched the *Ger* Area Redevelopment Programme in Ulaanbaatar. The case studies positioned the frame for negotiation processes, as well as the cities with their respective neighbourhoods functioning as the contexts in which these programmes are implemented. Besides the case-study programmes, programmes from other stakeholders are also embedded in the study, as they penetrate the case-study programmes and also influence the neighbourhood communities. In each city, two contextual neighbourhoods were selected. They were surveyed individually, but the findings were compared and contrasted with each other (Flick, Kardoff and Steinke, 2000: 254) for each city in the evaluation stage. Relevant

quantitative data has been collected from maps and other literature to document the spatial and physical structure, land use, equipment, and the appearance of the settlements.

A mix of quantitative and qualitative research methods is used, reflecting the lack of available data on the settlements, especially those without on-going development programmes and recently-settled *ger* districts. The mix of methods also reflects the limited time available to collect primary data. The research is designed as a crosscutting analysis to cover and to analyse the spatial, socio-economic, socio-cultural, and ethnic differences between the neighbourhoods.

This overall question is divided into five research areas, each with its own set of questions, as described below.

5.2_Specific questions and methods

These five research areas cover three different perspectives: the urban context that sets the frame conditions for the emergence of informal areas, the perspective from inside the neighbourhood to characterise the settlement and community structure, and the perspectives of outside actors (state and none-state) working via their improvement programmes with the community. Later, the three perspectives aid in understanding the different roles actors play in negotiations for the improvement of living conditions in self-provisioning neighbourhoods.

(A) Informality and emergence of self-provisioning settlements in the urban context

What criteria are decisive in the spatial development of so-called 'informal' settlements, and how are these settlements distributed throughout the urban fabric? How do informal settlements, squatter settlements, and *ger* settlements differ from each other in their physical, social, and economic aspects?

The urban context describes the factors of urban dynamics and the emergence of self-provisioning neighbourhoods based on its cultural background. Data are extracted through the review of secondary literature and expert interviews.

The **expert interviews** with representatives from local political spheres, NGOs, and planners have been carried out to capture the dynamics of the formation and development of informal settlements and *ger* areas, and to collect information about the results of improvement programmes and about future development strategies. These interviews primarily serve to

provide a general understanding of local urban development processes and how they are linked with each other.

(B) Urban improvement programmes implemented by state and non-state organisations

What types of improvement programmes were initiated by the city governments and by NGOs in the settlements, and how have the inhabitants adopted these programmes? How do such initiatives from the inhabitants become integrated into other development projects?

The outside context is described by introducing, firstly, the various improvement approaches conducted by the city governments and national or international organisations in the neighbourhoods and secondly, how the residents react to such interventions. Data are collected via a secondary literature review, expert interviews, and semi-structured interviews.

(C) Community organisation and cultures of self-mobilisation

How is the neighbourhood organised? What kind of self-provisioning exists in the neighbourhoods? What were the reasons behind initiating these self-provisioning initiatives, and what functions do they serve within the community?

Accordingly, the inside context describes, on one hand, neighbourhood dynamics and, on the other hand, the different means of self-provisioning and the commitment of residents to collective activities for the common good of the community. With the field investigation, including structural surveys, participant observations, and semi-structured interviews of inhabitants and key people, relevant data have been collected.

Structural surveys include those of the physical structures of buildings and open spaces as well as land-use patterns. Observations during field visits have brought the sequences of daily life, interactions, and dynamics within the settlements more into focus. Field visits and structural surveys have also led to informal conversations with residents. **Semi-structured interviews** generate qualitative data that capture the social and economic situation, modes of communication, self-help initiatives, and their integration, as well as the historical development of the settlements.

(D) Changing roles and the influence of state and non-state actors during different phases of neighbourhood development

What roles do state and non-state institutions play in the different phases of settlement development? Do they have a direct influence on the unauthorised act of people settling?

This research area combines the results of the second and third research areas to highlight the various influences of outside actors on settlement processes and residents' contribution to it, with the categorisation of settlement development by Goethert (1986), described further in Section 5.2.4 below.

(E) Negotiation processes between the actors and local governance structures

What types of negotiation, in the sense of Selle's communication concept, exist between the actors in local governance systems, and how does this negotiation (or lack of negotiation) affect the participation of the neighbourhood community in decision-making?

This research area combines those presented previously and describes how external and internal factors intertwine in the local governance system. Accordingly, data have been taken from observations, informal talks during field investigations, expert interviews, and semi-structured interviews and have been analysed using a stakeholder analysis matrix and a negotiations matrix, described further in section 5.2.4 below.

5.2.1_Selection criteria for the context cities and neighbourhoods

The cities in which the case studies were conducted were primarily selected for their different degrees of organisation of self-provisioning of social and technical infrastructure, as well as for their different degrees of state involvement and of legality. As a result, the study shows a range of how local governance systems deal with self-provisioning by the neighbourhood communities in different cultural contexts and how other various negotiation approaches lead to manifold solutions.

Consequently, the cities are different in terms of their types of self-provisioning settlements, their current legal statuses, and their local cultures. Cairo operates as a typical example of a well-known, stereotypical informal settlement, established on state-owned desert land. The settlements in the two other cities are unique; for example, in Kathmandu, the squatter neighbourhoods are small in size and located on state-owned riverbanks, and, in Ulaanbaatar, the *ger* districts consist of mobile yurts (*gers*) and houses, with the land belonging to the

settlers. The cultural differences between the settlements are reflected in, for instance, their forms of living, language, and religion: Cairo - Arabic language, Islamic religion, tribal and clan structure; Kathmandu - Nepalese language, Hindu / Buddhist religion, caste system; Ulaanbaatar - Mongolian language, atheist / Buddhist / shamanistic religion, clan and family structure, formerly a socialist economy. The cities have just one major characteristic in common: they are all the capitals of their respective countries.

A maximum variation in cases (maximum variation sampling) was prepared in order to involve fewer cases that were still as different as possible, so as to obtain the broad variety and differences in the field (Kleining, 1982 in Flick, 2012: 165).

The **selection criteria for the settlements** (squatter, informal, or *ger* settlements) included: the degree of consolidation, the year of initial settlement, whether the settlement was supported in its development by a public or civil society institution; of second priority for selection were location within the city and the number of households or population size. Table 3 provides an overview of the selected neighbourhoods and its selection criteria. With the degree of consolidation and the year of foundation, the settlement is no longer as influenced by population mobility as during the first years of foundation, and thus a neighbourhood can grow. The support of neighbourhoods is important in terms of the role of the various actors and to describe their influence on development processes. The location within the city should be near the city centre and thus with proximity to job opportunities. The size of the settlement could provide indices for the development of neighbourhood-like unity.

In Kathmandu, the selection process was supported by the local NGO Lumanti. Both of the selected settlements are located centrally at the Bagmati River. In Cairo, the selection process was supported by the German Technical Cooperation Agency (formerly the GTZ, now the German International Cooperation (GIZ)). Both of the selected settlements are centrally situated in the district of Manshiet Nasser (MN). Although the settlements are located in the same district, they differ in their physical structures and their various actors and respective roles. In each of the four selected settlements (in Kathmandu and Cairo), data from the NGOs were generated; this was also done in those settlements with less support, but the selection was additionally influenced by existing material. In Ulaanbaatar, the settlements were selected in cooperation with the Municipality of Ulaanbaatar (MUB) local government. In the case of Amgalan/Janjin, data already existed from when the city government implemented the Ger Area Redevelopment programme (GAR). The neighbourhood acts as the one with support by an urban improvement programme. Yarmag is the only peri-urban settlement in the study and

consists of two settlement portions: a consolidated section and a newly populated, unauthorised section. The motivation and the process of land acquisition were documented.

City	Settlement	Selection criteria			
		Household/ population size	Location in the city	Year of settlement/ consolidation	Improvement Programme
Cairo	Masakin	45,000 inh.	central	beginning of 1960s/ recognised	yes
Cairo	Khazan	20,000 inh.	central	mid-1970s/ recognised	Not to full extent[7]
Kathmandu	Sankhamul	140 HHs	central	1973/ consolidated	yes
Kathmandu	Bansighat	156 HHs	central	1983 / consolidated	Not to full extent
Ulaanbaatar	Amgalanbaatar/ Janjin	177 HHs	central	historical settlement Amgalanbaatar/recognised	yes
Ulaanbaatar	Yarmag	590 HHs	Peri-central	since 2010/ not consolidated, since 1966/ recognised	Not to full extent

Table 3: Criteria for the selection of the settlements. Source: Own elaboration

5.2.3_Methods of data collection in the field

The **field investigation** in the individual settlements consisted of an observational part, involving observation and documentation of public life in the settlements, and an interview part, involving collection of information to explain the observations.

The field investigation was carried out in Kathmandu with two assistants in September 2008. The assistant living in each respective settlement provided the contacts for the interviews with the inhabitants. A second field visit was conducted in September 2014, including the interviews of two key individuals and one inhabitant to update the data. In Cairo, two translators were made available by the GTZ. The fieldwork in Cairo took place between March and April 2009. In the *ger* settlement of Amgalanbaatar in Ulaanbaatar, the structural survey was carried out in April 2013 and the interviews with the residents in November and December 2013. In the Yarmag settlement, in September 2013, the physical structure and social aspects were surveyed and interviews with the residents were held. Both settlements were visited during different seasons to observe the impact the climate was having on life in the settlements. The interviews with the key people in both settlements were held from November through December 2014.

In (exploratory) case studies, at least two sources of evidence are needed to triangulate the data reliably, and confirm or revoke data. Yin took the direct observations of cases, as well as interviews with the people involved in the cases, as evidence resources (Yin, 2008: 11). In the field studies, a third quantitative evidence source was collected, the structural survey.

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[7] "Not to full extent" indicates that either just parts of the Urban Improvement Programmes in the respective cities were implemented or, in case of Yarmag, local NGOs had been active, but on a very low scale of support.

The structural and spatial structure was documented with a **structural survey**, which examined:

- the condition and type of construction of the buildings in the settlement,
- building heights,
- land use, and
- important public spaces and meeting points for the inhabitants.

The structural survey findings made it possible to divide the settlements into three types of residential areas: 'better-off', 'middle-income', and 'poorer'. The 'better-off' residential areas are characterised by their security, proximity to transportation and the city centre, and relatively good infrastructure and services. The 'poorer' residential areas, however, are those that are threatened by natural disasters (such as landslides in MN or flooding in Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar) and where residents have difficult access to central structures, means of transport, and infrastructure. The 'middle-income' residential area falls between the two extremes.

The **participatory observation** was carried out during visits in each settlement. *Informal talks* with residents took place during these visits, and these talks were of the utmost benefit for the recognition of social contexts within each settlement. They took place on the street and in people's living spaces. Since the neighbourhoods were visited at different times of the day and during different seasons, daily life could be captured. The visits also made observable how inhabitants communicated with each other and how everyday situations and problems were experienced. The researcher interacted with the observed field by talking off the record, after the interviews, during the structural surveys, and through field notes (Gläser and Laudel, 2006: 37; Flick, 2012: 288).

Structural surveys and observations were conducted prior to the interviews, so the initial findings had already been derived. These were deepened, confirmed, and consolidated by the interviews.

The interviews with the five key players and 10 residents in each settlement were conducted using **semi-structured interviews**. The approach of the semi-structured interviews was chosen to maintain a flexible question-answer system. The questionnaire contains two parts: The first part with themes 1-3 is more structured, because the acquisition of technical and social infrastructure has been used to supplement the collected maps. The second part with themes 4 and 5 is less structured, in order to obtain maximum information about socio-

cultural and socio-economic aspects, the development, and types of communication between the actors. In Ulaanbaatar, the interviews with the key people were particularly focused on the fifth theme. Detailed information was requested regarding cooperation, specifically the intensity of cooperation, problems, et cetera.

An interview guide for the semi-structured interviews allows the respondents to answer 'more or less openly formulated questions' (Flick 2005, 143). The interviews with the residents were about 25 to 30 minutes long, while those with the key individuals were at least 60 minutes long. All interviews were held in the local native language and translated into English by a translator.

The five themes covered by the **thematic priorities / dimensions of the interviews in the field**:

1. History and development of the neighbourhood
2. Social and technical infrastructure
3. Standard of living / city government projects that affect the settlement
4. Empowerment of the inhabitants (their initiatives, involvement)
5. Communication

The interviews with the key people were recorded on audio files (audio tape), while those of the residents were recorded in writing (as minutes). Two people recorded the answers, one person in English and the other in the local native language. This ensured that all the information was collected and that nothing was lost in translation. The interviews of the residents were not recorded on audio files (audio tapes) because many residents refused to be recorded, out of fear that their testimonies would be used against them by third parties.

In the transcription of the recorded interviews, extraneous noises, such as laughter, coughing, et cetera, were deliberately not transcribed. Conversation breaks were labelled and sentences or words that could not be understood were marked (Gläser and Laudel, 2006: 188). The report of all the interviews contains the names of the places, the times, the descriptions of the living environments, and the conditions under which the interview was conducted, along with other expository information. Notes were made after each informal conversation to record the information gathered (ibid: 187).

Selection of interviewees: The residents to be interviewed were selected based on their outwardly apparent standard of living (good, medium, low), the assessment of which was based on the appearance of their house or apartment; this selection was made after some

engagement in the settlement. Each selection criterion was more or less evenly distributed among the 10 interviews. The key individuals were selected because they were either active in volunteer work in the areas of women's, youth, or children's activities in the settlements, or local leaders (local or elected leaders), or representatives of the NGOs working in the settlements.

The **expert interviews** were conducted as non-standardised, open-ended interviews with predetermined topics. The questions served only as means of obtaining an open atmosphere for conversation (ibid: 40). In each city, at least eight interviews were carried out with experts who worked intensively in the fields of urban planning and community development, including representatives of the city government and ministries, planners, and representatives of NGOs. The interviews were held in English and were recorded. The expert interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. An interview report was prepared, documenting the information that was collected.

The four **themes of the expert interviews** were as follows:
1. Former and future spatial development of the city
2. Municipal projects and their effects on urban development
3. The role and perception of the self-provisioning settlements in urban society and in planning processes
4. Means of negotiation with the representatives of self-provisioning settlements (Ulaanbaatar)

In each city, **the interviews were tested prior** to being conducted, in order to verify the clarity and completeness of the interviews for the inhabitants, key people, and experts.

5.2.4_Interpretation of data

The explorative research approach is neither inductive nor deductive, but serves to describe facts and to get an overview of the current situation in terms of the 'themes' listed above.

The responses to the questions related to 'social and technical infrastructure' and 'standard of living' have been analysed using a quantitative evaluation, in that they were counted, as these parts have been standardised. Its results realistically represent the supply of services and quality of life of the inhabitants.

Figure 5: Strategy of analysis. Source: Own elaboration

The method of **comparative analysis** is used for the interviews with residents and for the maps generated from the structural surveys. The development of the settlements is described, and the neighbourhoods of the same city are compared. An assessment is made of the current living conditions in the self-provisioning neighbourhoods in terms of past, present, and future settlement development. This approach makes it possible to obtain a realistic idea of the different facets of the development of the settlements and to highlight the characteristics of each settlement, including the actors, self-help initiatives, and development programmes being implemented by governmental institutions and NGOs.

Consequently, Theoretical Coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990/1996) was used and interpretations were made of responses to questions relating to the themes: 'history and development of the neighbourhood', 'empowerment of the inhabitants', and 'cooperation/communication'. However, this method is not used to develop theories (in Flick, 2012: 386 et seqq.). It is used to analyse the collected material via coding, as well as to

summarise and categorise in order to facilitate interpretation and, later on, to highlight *phenomena* (ibid: 391).

This method was used in all of the selected settlements. The settlements have been compared (similarities and differences) in terms of their development, the influence of the participating actors and their communication with each other, and the self-motivation/empowerment of inhabitants. Subsequently, recommendations have been made regarding other research topics and regarding areas in which more in-depth research on the demonstrable phenomena can be undertaken.

The **units of analysis** are: (1) Neighbourhood development

(2) Actors/ stakeholders

(3) Communication

(1) Analysis of neighbourhood development: This is mainly based on the data collected via the structural survey and through the interviews with the inhabitants and key people. For most of the settlements, barely any written historical information exists, so the information provided by the inhabitants has been used as the main resource.

According to Goethert (1986: 63 et seqq.), the spatio-temporal development of informal settlements and self-provisioning neighbourhoods generally takes place in three phases:

1. **Settlement:** This is the starting point, physically characterised by low density and horizontal growth, with scattered single-storey houses and diffuse street routes. The social structures are characterised by strong family and village orientation, young families, many small children, and very low incomes.

2. **Consolidation:** The local community is establishing itself, with increasing density and multiple-storey houses built by small contractors, and with vertical growth and clear street routes. There is construction of supply networks and services. The social structure is oriented more towards community establishment through village-like relationships and religious groups. The income is higher than in the first phase.

3. **Recognition:** The neighbourhood is recognised legally and by the neighbouring communities. The urban structures have high density with multiple-storey houses and blacktopped or paved roads, with vertical saturation. The government is responsible for the supply of social and technical infrastructure. The social structure is characterised by strong community structures, a balanced age structure, and new

settlers with lower incomes living as tenants. As a result, the informal status is
obsolete.

On one hand, the spatial development of the neighbourhoods is recreated and spatially fixed
for each phase in form of a schematic illustration; On the other hand, the current spatial
structure of the context neighbourhoods is presented in urban maps. Improvements to the
infrastructural facilities of the settlements are also recreated.

The social development of the settlements refers to the relations of the inhabitants to each
other and their relationships with the surrounding community, perceptions of crime and
safety, and the development of self-help initiatives. The reasons for settlement precisely at
this or that location is derived from secondary literature and verified by information gathered
through the interviews. Information about the level of economic development of the
settlements is derived mainly from the narratives of the inhabitants and their descriptions of
how, by creating financial opportunities over the years, the standard of living of the individual
families had improved. Last, but not least, information about material improvements reflected
in the construction of the houses and of the apartments, the quality and types of building
materials, and the sufficiency of space have been derived from observations and interviews.

(2) Analysis of actors and stakeholders: The self-help initiatives are described in terms of
their structures, roles, and activities in the settlements. In addition, possible further
developments are described in the sense of Yiftachel's 'grey spacing', 'Right to the City'
(Harvey) and the *social movement* (Mitlin). The **NGO and/or the city government**
programmes are evaluated in terms of target groups, acceptance/boycott of the measure(s),
and the influence of the measure(s) on the physical neighbourhood development of the
settlements.

The data obtained from the interviews and observations for all relevant actors, who
significantly influence the development of the neighbourhood, are summarised and
categorised in a **Stakeholder Analysis Matrix** for each settlement. Actors are either public or
private institutions, organisations, communities, or individuals. Thereby, the different actors
are ranked on different hierarchy levels: national governments (macro level), city
administrations (meso level), and settlements (micro level). The next step presents the
possible interests and motives of each actor for the development of the settlement. The third
step shows the importance of the actor in the development of the neighbourhoods. Support or
boycott by an actor of a development project can affect whether it is a success or a failure.

The last step illustrates the established alliances between the actors and with outsiders, while it also describes any conflicts that exist between them. This analysis aims to uncover possible reasons for acceleration or deceleration of the development initiative. The individual steps are listed in a table that is partially based on the stakeholder analysis matrix created by the 'Joint Effort of Management Science for Health and the United Nations Children's Fund' (see table 4).

Actor	Role in neighbourhood development	Interests in neighbourhood development	Assessment of influence of the actor (low, medium, high)	Alliances with other actors	Conflicts between actors

Table 4: Stakeholder Analysis Matrix. Source: Own elaborations based on MSH/UNICEF, 1998

(3) Categorisation of the modes of negotiation using the communication concept by Selle (2008a, 6): To understand the modes of communication between the actors, as well as who communicates with whom and why, it is important to carry out a stakeholder analysis. In this analysis, each type of actor and their interest is represented and given a value of influence (see table 4). It is necessary to identify these types before evaluating communication patterns.

According to Donald Keller, the Latin root of the word 'communication' means 'to confer (information), let involve (participation) and put together, make together (coordination, cooperation)' (Selle, 2010: 317). To inform is understood as 'to inform oneself' or 'to inform others'. To inform oneself (information procurement) is the meaning that is relevant to this work concerning actors, who gain knowledge about relevant projects, the procedures, costs, problems, and successes, as well as about stakeholders and their motives and attitudes. Other actors are informed (informing) about future projects and measures or about individual activities. Mutual informing (information exchange) takes places in meetings, workshops, et cetera.

In this context, Selle (2005) mentioned that reactions are usually not documented. Nonetheless, as this study is about the mode of communication and its influences on the neighbourhood development, the reactions to the information received are also captured.

Involvement or participation means being in dialogue with other actors and giving suggestions, expressing interest, taking part in discussions, and impacting decision-making processes. Additionally in this study, a distinction is made between statutory or formal participation and informal participation, such as citizen initiatives and so on.

The third form of communication, *cooperation*, is taken as having the meaning 'to collaborate'. Actors meet eye to eye and contribute equally to solutions to problems or to the success of a project. All participants are jointly responsible (Selle, 2010: 371 et seqq.).

The forms of communication are summarised and categorised in a communication matrix. This matrix thus describes the communication situation in a given neighbourhood and shows how the forms of communication can influence the development of the neighbourhood.

		Initiator	Recipient	Object/ reason	Aim	Mode of communication	Reaction/ effect
Information	procurement						
	informing						
	exchange	Between:					
Involvement/ participation	formal						
	informal						
Cooperation		Between:					
No information							

Table 5: Negotiations matrix. Source: Own elaboration

From the synthesis of the results of the evaluation of the various data and the case-study information, an overview of the specifics of the development and communication processes for each settlement is derived. These are then compared, and the substantial differences for each city and neighbourhood are identified.

5.2.5_Generalisations

As this study is concerned with contrasting juxtapositions, and because it has many aspects that underscore the differences (maximum variation), generalisations about the cities based on the similarities and differences between them have been omitted (Flick, Kardoff and Steinke, 2000: 259). Regarding the quantitative aspect of the neighbourhood development, comparisons are also made between the cities, allowing for generalisation.

Limitation to only a few main dimensions (listed above) is useful in order to avoid having a large number of dimensions considered in the juxtaposition, which would make the study unmanageable (ibid). Comparisons between neighbourhoods within the cities allow for conclusions to be reached about what the settlements have in common, and how they differ. It is then possible to provide general assumptions in the analysis of the key contents within the dimensions (Mayring, 1993: 86). The study is intended to highlight the quality and intensity of activities within the neighbourhood and to discover and assign communication patterns; so, generalisations are not made based on similarities and differences in terms of neighbourhood development, empowerment, or self-help initiatives or communication.

Internal **validity** of the case studies is achieved by noting any recurring responses. These allow for generalisations within each case study. External validity is achieved with an interpretative step in the analysis of the case studies, which involves identifying common factors and differences within the neighbourhoods.

5.2.6_Limitations of the study

Neighbourhood development is measured by the spatial-physical, social, and economic characteristics of the neighbourhood. Furthermore, the interviews with inhabitants, key individuals, and experts help bridge the lack of secondary literature on the history and establishment of these self-provisioning settlements. Given the lack of written information on these settlements, precise dates and periods are not included unless clearly documented historical accounts exist. Instead, the development of the settlements is described from the perspectives of the interviewed people, and the descriptions therefore include personal perceptions.

Information compiled in this study about development programmes is mainly focused on the types of infrastructure and social services and does not cover financial aspects or monetary success. The programmes initiated in the settlements are just a hook for describing interactions and communication between the actors and to emphasise the matter of negotiation, how programmes are negotiated, and how those people involved have a hand in decision-making. Special focus is placed on the type and purpose of communication. The focus of the discussion lies on which components of the development programmes (from the perspective of the inhabitants and key people) led to the development of the neighbourhood. Less emphasis is placed on the possible impacts and sustainability of the programmes.

The development of self-help initiatives is described in this work, including the formation of, coordination of, and reasons for the self-help initiatives, as well as their roles and tasks within the neighbourhood and during negotiations with the different institutions. The general description of the neighbourhood is the main focus. To that end, the measures for the improvement of social and technical infrastructure are emphasised. Personal obstacles faced by the inhabitants are only mentioned if found necessary to emphasise some aspects of the process. Organisational analysis has been avoided, as it is not the objective of this study.

The types of communication are surveyed and described from an urban planner's point of view. Psychological and social communication theories are mentioned only where relevant. The main focus is on how the actors communicate, who communicates, and why (for what)

the communication takes place, as well as on eventual cuts in communication between the different actors. Variation in types of communication that relate to differences in culture are not part of the study, but could be researched in detail in an ethnographical study.

5.2.7_Constraints during the study

This study was partially hindered by the **political circumstances** that existed at the time of the field research, particularly the *Arab Spring* 'uprising' of December 2010, which affected the fieldwork undertaken (in Egypt, January 2011). In the Cairo settlements, the political situation was tense, especially in Khazan, so that settlement could not be fully observed at various day times. Additionally, the field research was conducted not long after a landslide occurred, on 6 September, which killed over 100 people. At the time of the interviews, the Cairo Governorate had already started to demolish the highest-risk homes in that settlement. The residents and homeowners feared being evicted and that the whole settlement would be demolished. This led to severe tensions within the settlement, as well as between the state authorities and international NGOs. It was extremely difficult to make contact with the residents, the distrust and fear was too great. In addition, the interviews with residents in Khazan were partly biased by the venue of the interviews, which was a room that belonged to the People's Party. However, in the second half of the field research, it was possible to gain sound data via participatory observations and interviews with residents in their homes.

A similar issue was faced in the Ulaanbaatar settlement of Amgalanbaatar/Janjin, where the situation had become tense during the implementation of the '*Ger* Area Redevelopment Programme', after the government selected an investor and construction company by tender. The inhabitants' elected representative was accused of supporting the interests of the municipality over the interests of the residents of the settlement.

In the Bansighat settlement in Kathmandu, the field research was restricted due to **conflict** between representatives of the NGO Lumanti and some of the residents and local leaders. In this case, the structural survey was taken over by the local assistant to avoid any further conflict between NGO staff and settlement inhabitants. In spite of this issue, the participatory observations could be fully implemented. Moreover, the interviews were carried out in their homes, with the exception of interviews with two of the families.

The acquisition of secondary literature and information in Cairo was limited by the **obfuscation of knowledge** and **denial of access to information** on the part of actors. Even the PDP (implemented by the former GTZ) staff refused to grant information to the author.

Therefore, outside sources, such as other experts from the National University, had to be asked for information.

5.3_Structure of the case study

The analytical part of the study is structured in three parts and is not structured contextually by neighbourhood but topic-wise, wherein the situations in the neighbourhoods in each city are presented.

The first part consists of the introduction to the cities (Chapter 6) and provides a perspective on how the self-provisioning neighbourhoods are embedded into the urban context. For each city, an overview of the historical urban development, socio-spatial separation trends, and the current situation of self-provisioning neighbourhoods are presented. After each description of the urban context, the case study improvement programmes implemented by state and non-state actors in the context neighbourhoods are introduced with their general structure and implementation tools (Section 6.1 for Cairo, 6.2 for Kathmandu, 6.3 for Ulaanbaatar). This is followed by a critical look at the overall approach and implementation methods.

The second part (Chapter 7) consists of the empirical comparative analysis of the context neighbourhoods, starting with the introduction of the six context neighbourhoods (section 7.1). A view of the situation before the application of the urban improvement programmes, with the historical development of the neighbourhoods is reflected by the inhabitants and graphically visualised (section 7.1.1). The status quo of the neighbourhoods is reflected by the spatial analysis of the building structures and the land use of the neighbourhood. A

Figure 6: Structure of the case study. Source: Own elaboration

description of the living conditions of the families is followed by a socio-economic analysis and the structure of the community (sections 7.1.2 and 7.1.3), which is crucial to understanding which measures have already been undertaken by the programmes to improve the neighbourhoods and which will be conducted later. The following chapter, 7.2, provides insights into the self-provisioning power and the collective commitment of inhabitants. It starts with local community leaders, and it continues with various community groups (section 7.2.1), an explanation as to how self-help and solidarity are applied by the community for the improvement of the living conditions in the neighbourhoods (section 7.2.3), and whether and to what extent spatial and organisational facilities exist to support the self-provisioning initiatives of inhabitants (7.2.2). The ways in which social facilities were implemented to mobilise the community is represented in Chapter 7.3, which focuses particularly on the outside influences on how the case-study improvement programmes were implemented, on what other organisations provided support, and on how the community self-help initiatives were dealt with. The perspectives of the inhabitants and key individuals on the approach and the results of the programmes are presented. However, technical and social facilities were also potentially provided by the communities themselves. To highlight the reach of the influences of various internal and external actors on neighbourhood development, Chapter 7.4 starts with the analysis of power relations and various interests in the improvement process (Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2), which is visualised. What negotiation tools state actors apply to communicate with the community, the level of intensity of the negotiations, and which groups from the community were involved in negotiating are all included and visualised in the Sections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4.

The third part (Chapter 8) provides the conclusion, juxtaposing the urban contexts of the cities with each other and with the neighbourhoods, as well as elaborating on the extent to which the programmes are adjusted to the current neighbourhood situations (Section 8.1.1). Section 8.1.2 is focused on how and if self-mobilising culture meets the urban improvement programmes and on what differences exist between the neighbourhoods. Highlighted in Section 8.2 are the differences and similarities between the actor structures and in Section 8.3 which type of negotiation is preferred by which community structure.

6_Contextualisation of the case studies

6.1_Greater Cairo Metropolitan Area – Informal settlements and new towns

Cairo, the capital of the Arab Republic of Egypt, operates as an economic and political decision-making centre in the Middle East, with the Arab League based there. One of the most important centres of Islam and home to the Sunni Al-Azhar University, Cairo is also the cultural centre of the Arab world, as well as an international tourist destination. The city is the largest and most populous on the African continent and counts 20.49 million inhabitants for the Greater Cairo area, which includes the three governorates of Cairo, Giza, and Qalioubia. Unofficial estimates suggest a number of around 25 million inhabitants in the agglomeration. Sixty per cent of Greater Cairo's population lives in informal settlements with limited access to basic infrastructures such as water supply, sanitation, and schools (GIZ, 2013). Land use plans are frequently drawn up with the aim of preserving the scarce agricultural land, but, since these plans are not oriented towards the requirements of the population, unplanned settlements are built on valuable farmland without building permits or illegally on government-owned land (Dreetz, 2005: 61). Fifty-seven per cent of the population is rural. As a result of rural-to-urban migration, urban centres in Egypt such as Cairo have experienced a staggering annual population growth rate of nearly two per cent, mainly in the form of informal settlements (Séjourné, 2009: 17).

Towns develop beyond planning, driven by informal market forces and mostly without the benefit of governmental or municipal planning. The extreme density gives rise to significant environmental pollution. Since the 1970s, centrally-steered attempts to solve Egypt's urban problems have not gained sustainable results. Housing schemes in the 22 'New Towns' built in the desert stand partially empty because they are not attractive to poor or low-income households. However, in the last 15 years, Egypt has not only managed to reduce slum growth, but has also made considerable investments in improving slums (UN-Habitat, 2006). Thus, the mega-city has experienced a longer period of urban poverty reduction than Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar. Since 2004,

Figure 7: Annual urban population growth in Egypt, 2002-2013. Source: Own elaboration based on tradingeconomics.com, 2014

Egypt has taken steps towards a reform and decentralisation process. Some international agencies, like the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)[8], have been working since 1998 to improve basic infrastructure using a participatory approach 'to reach the needs of the population in the informal settlements' (GTZ, 2007). However, there are no reliable statistics available on the current number of informal settlements and inhabitants living there. Some statistics compiled by governmental institutions offer somewhat contradictory information, so it is difficult to know exact population numbers in informal areas (Sabry, 2009: 30).

The former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak launched a programme in 2006 to build 500,000 new low-cost housing units over six years. Other schemes in the New Towns seek to harness the dynamic that has been at work in the informal areas, by providing small plots of land, awarding the beneficiaries cash subsidies, and allowing them to build their homes (Saleh, 2007; Elmouelhi et al., 2015: 333). With the political changes of 2011, the inhabitants of informal areas came to expect rapid improvement of their living conditions (GIZ, 2013).

6.1.1_Urban transformation through foreign and rural influences

Cairo was founded as a well-planned, rectangular-walled city, divided into four main quarters, which Jawhar the Sicilian established north of al-Qata'i for his troops in 969 CE (Abu-Lughod, 2004: 21). In the 11th century, two thriving but symbiotic cities were distinguishable:

1. Misr-Fustat, the larger of the two, with its northern limits at the Ibn Tulun mosque, built in Byzantine/Coptic style and completed in 878 CE, was the commercial and industrial centre and inhabited by an indigenous population.

2. Al-Qahira, was a well-designed community of a large and complex courtly society, divided into 10 separate quarters (*harat*) for the defending army and their dependents; it consisted of gardens, palatial residences, and mosques (ibid: 22).

With the conquest of the Ottoman Turks in the 16th century, Cairo's urban development was influenced by foreign interests; European power in the 19th century changed and expanded the urban fabric dramatically. From 1907 onwards, as colonial influences diminished and the impact of global economic crises was felt in Egypt, a phase of reorientation towards true Egyptian identity awakened (Morgan, 1999: 80).

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[8] Since 2011, GTZ has been renamed GIZ – the German International Cooperation – as a fusion of three other German development agencies. In this work, it is always referred to as GTZ, as it had not yet merged with the other organisations by 2009.

At the end of the 1930s, Cairo was enclosed within a traditional core, which consisted of the historical area and its extensions, made up of European developments in the west of the old city, today's downtown area. Basic infrastructure was in place, including roads and bridges, water and sanitation systems, and power grids. The city was ready to expand on a scale never before seen in its history (Antoniou, 2004: 31).

The urban area of the Greater Cairo Region (GCR) has been expanding constantly **since the end of World War II**. By 1947, a huge migration wave, resulting in an annual population growth of 4%, led to massive overcrowding of the existing housing stock. Between 1947 and 1967, Cairo grew rapidly, mainly on private cultural land. Public housing and construction began in the early 1950s with substantial direct subsidies. After the 1952 revolution, laws were introduced to reduce the rents of new and existing housing units. Currently, about 52% of Cairo's residential units remain under rent control at extremely low rates (ibid: 32). In the 1950s, the state introduced 'council flats', similar to the Western European concept, for the lower-income population, at extremely low rents. Nowadays, the buildings suffer from a lack of maintenance and are seriously overcrowded. Some families extend their flats via the unconventional means of adding storeys on top or adding onto the sidewalls of the buildings (Herding, 2008). After 1945, spatial development was mainly concentrated in the north and west. Fifty-five per cent of the built-up area replaced agricultural land, and 45% replaced desert land. The villages account for 25% of the built-up area of the GCR. The upper and upper-middle classes mostly founded new settlements in the surroundings of Cairo. Land use is divided between the three governorates, with the service sector in Cairo and, to a lesser extent, in Giza, which is mainly residential. Qalioubia is also mainly residential, with some manufacturing spaces (Gado, 1991: 67 et seqq.).

During the second half of the 20ᵗʰ century, urban growth in the GCR was defined by the expansion of informal settlements. The government ignored the tremendous building activities until they reached an overwhelming 80% of the total housing stock. The government was forced to take notice and responded with new ordinances making it illegal to build on agricultural land and to encroach on state-owned desert land. These interventions had little effect on controlling the informal growth of urban settlements (Antoniou, 2004: 33). In fifty years, the population in the informal settlements increased more than twentyfold, initially around the core villages and then along the main streets, so as to be able to use the existing infrastructure; later, they filled the gaps between the settlements (see also map on development of informal settlement in the Appendix, section II.I.II).

To reduce the high density of the main agglomeration, the vision of the Master Plan 2050, prepared in the 2000s by the General Organisation of Physical Planning (GOPP), is to relocate urban facilities, governmental institutions, manufacturing industries, and cemeteries to the new urban centres (NUCs), as the new towns in the desert are called (see Figure 8). The gap is to be filled with greenery, office quarters, and high-end housing (CEUP6, 2009) to become a 'world city' (CEGO5, 2009). If this vision were to be applied, it would have radical consequences, not only for the urban fabric, but also for the urban population, as the low-income groups would be displaced from the inner city informal settlements to the periphery (CEUP6, 2009).

6.1.2_Socio-economic mixture of urban population

The history of the Egyptian population is that of consistent transformation under the influence of foreign conquerors, ethnic groups, and religions. The ethnic background and rank of Cairo's population in the second half of the 19th century was that of the *fellachs* (farmers) living in villages on the urban periphery, Christian Copts, Bedouins, Berbers, Christian Syrians, and Armenians (Morgan, 1999: 56 et seqq.).

The Cairo society consists of various ranks, classes, and ethnics of Egypt. Most of the residents have their roots in rural areas, most coming from the Nile Delta and less from the Nile Valley. The GCR is an agglomeration of grown villages that have merged together. Thus, the socio-economic basis of Cairo is the rural lifestyle with farming and breeding (Gado, 1991: 226).

Figure 8: New towns and urbanised areas between 2001 and 2007. Source: Own elaboration based on Sims, 2007: 4

The social organisation in Cairo for the poor, first-generation of urban dwellers compensates for the lack of a broad set of kin, with a greater reliance on the nuclear family and the establishment of kin-like relationships with friends, colleagues, and neighbours (Gugler, 1997: 200). The focus of social and spatial relationships is based on interpersonal

relationships in local societal areas – the neighbourhood, the family, the clan, the language and regional origin, and religious and professional integration (Boie, 2005: 15).

The construction boom of the past three decades has increased the housing supply at double the rate of population growth, and flats often remain vacant for years. Despite that, the new housing was not made accessible to the poorer population, and Cairo has become a city of '**flats without tenants and inhabitants without flats',** as a survey put it in 1990 (Herding, 2008). Data collected by Piffero (2008) underscore the paradox of over-serving higher income levels while leaving those in need to live in overcrowded, informal areas. In 2006, 2 million dwelling units stood empty, as in the New Towns of Badr (95.7% empty units) and 6 October (58.4% empty units). In 2008, the informal areas were still growing – in Manshiet Nasser (MN) by 4.5% and in Markaz Qalioub by 3.3% (ibid: 89).

To understand the development of this paradox, it is necessary to scrutinise the different kinds of housing in Cairo. In his survey on living conditions in Egypt's capital, Meyer distinguished between seven types: the old city, the City of the Dead, areas of state-sponsored housing, squatter settlements on state-owned land, informal settlements on agricultural land, relief cities, and guarded residential blocks. All but the last two are inhabited by the poorer population and are characterised by some degree of informality (Meyer, 1989: 8).

In Cairo, urban poverty is not noticeably concentrated in particular geographical areas. Poor and ultra-poor families are found living side by side with lower- and middle-income families residing in a wide number of older core neighbourhoods and in the vast informal areas of Greater Cairo. In most informal areas, there are a small percentage of well-off entrepreneurs and professionals. This spatial income heterogeneity is due to such historical factors as lack of residential mobility, and rent control, and flawed real estate markets (Sims, 2008).

Quarters with low socio-economic conditions are located on the periphery or fringes of the city, as well as in the city centre, and are similar than quarters with high socio-economic standards, such as Zamalek and Garden City in the city centre and Maadi and Heliopolis on the city outskirts. These quarters are neither fenced nor isolated from quarters where standards are lower. There is no sign of the typical 'ghetto', cut off from the rest of the town. Moreover, the term 'slum', indicating poverty, neglect, isolation, and exclusion, is redundant in Cairo, as the impoverished quarters are characterised by social integrity and are not comparable to socially deprived areas in South or North America (Boie, 2005: 12). Slums in the sense of physically dilapidated areas can be identified in the medieval city core, built before 1860.

Some sections suffer from lack of maintenance due to ownership disputes, rent control, and conversion to commercial purposes. Usually, the extremely poor live in these areas (Sims, 2008).

El-Shazly (2005: 391) attributed census data to the digital map of metropolitan Cairo and correlated information about GDP per capita and population data with the spatial layout of the city. His major observation was the concentration of high population densities on the northern and western edges of the city. This is associated with the lowest level of income and a high rate of illiteracy. The process of development transforms the pre-existing agricultural basins at the edges of the city into urbanised areas. This kind of urbanisation takes place as a consequence of socio-economic pressure from booming numbers of squatters rather than institutionally planned development. One of the major causes is rural migration from regions of Upper and Lower Egypt in search of employment. These rural migrants form the poorest social strata of Cairo and tend to settle in the peripheral squatter settlements of the city.

Figure 9 shows urban growth in the GCR in the 19th and 20th centuries, including the location of different quarters and their locations within the city to underscore the generally mixed distribution of high-, middle-, and low-income neighbourhoods. Additionally, Figure 10 provides detailed information about the various quarters depicted in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Greater Cairo urban growth, with the settlements in an overview of different urban structures. Source: Own elaboration based on Meyer, 1988 and GTZ, 2009. Drawings G. Enkhchimeg, O. Kummel

Overview of the different urban structures, investment types, and population ranks

	Traditional settlement	Informal settlements		Planned private settlements between 1870-1960				Public (economic) housing after 1952
Area	Medieval Cairo EL GAMALIYYA	MASAKIN (on desert land)	EL MOUNIRA (on agricultural land)	GARDEN CITY	HELWAN	MAADI	NASR CITY	AIN EL SIRA
Building age	969 A.D	1960s	After 1950	1906	1871	1904	1958	1952-1956
Income classes	Low, middle	Low, middle	Low, middle	High	Middle higher	Very high	Middle, high	Low, middle
Housing types	Multistorey housing complexes	Multistorey housing complexes	Multistorey housing complexes	Mainly multistorey appartment housing	Town villas, appartment housing	Mainly villas, appartment houses	Multistorey appartment housing	Multistorey housing complexes
Urban pattern								
Parcelling								
Land use								
The grid								

Figure 10: Urban Pattern Cairo. Source: Own elaboration based on Goethert, 1986: 228-229, changes made: addition of Masakin, deletion of Shoubra, Dokki, and Heliopolis. Drawing: G. Enkhchimeg

6.1.3_Informal settlements on agricultural and desert land

Several publications have struggled with the terms 'unofficial' and 'informal', because this type of housing characterises traditional and common development types (Goethert, 1986; Boie, 2005). In Egypt, the terms '*baladi*' for village-like and '*ashwai*' (plural: *ashwai'yyat*) (English: random) are commonly used to describe informal settlements (Sims, 2008).

The population of informal settlements is heterogeneous in terms of income and educational background. Most are from low-income groups, ranging from unskilled, illiterate workers to academics. These groups represent an active population that does not want to or is not able to participate in the official housing market (Goethert, 1986: 42 et seqq.).

The GOPP defines informal settlements more in detail, as they were developed with individual efforts in 'the absence of legal and layout planning […] on lands not assigned by the city's master plan for building and […] might be environmentally or socially unsafe and lack basic services and utilities' (Safey Eldeen, 2014: 2). In Cairo, two different types of informal (unplanned) settlements exist: areas that were established legally but became illegal, and areas that were established illegally and remain illegal. The latter can be divided into two types:

1. The settlements are developed from the purchase of parcelled agricultural land. The areas built-up on fertile land are illegal, unplanned settlements (Sims, 2008). Of informal settlements, 81.6% are built on private agricultural land (Boie, 2005: 16). Usually, these settlements have grown out of existing villages outside the city (Sims, 2008).

2. Informal settlements built on desert land owned by the state account for 15.1% of informal settlements (Sims, 2008; Boie, 2005: 16). These lands used to be squatted and are now semi-legal, as land rent is paid to the district administration (Sims, 2008). Usually, the only option open to the poorest levels of society is to occupy state-owned land.

The first informal settlements were built after World War II due to massive population growth; however, they were not properly acknowledged until the mid-1960s and early 1970s, when their numbers increased as a result of the cessation of public housing brought about by the 1967 military conflict (ibid). In the villages surrounding Cairo, no building permission used to be required to construct a house. Agricultural areas used to be preferred by the migrants coming from rural areas who started to settle unofficially on the periphery. In these

settlements, occupants found social structures and surroundings that were familiar (Gado, 1991: 77 et seqq.). From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, informal building construction was booming due to remittances from workers employed in the Gulf States (Boie, 2005: 18; Sims, 2008; Séjourné, 2009: 17). In 1987 and 1988, informal settlements constructed on agricultural land in the built-up areas of Greater Cairo accounted for 85% of the total informal housing. From 1986 to 2000, a decline in foreign remittances and stricter controls of agriculture-to-residential conversion led to a reduction in the purchase and occupation of non-built-up land and a phase of consolidation (Sims, 2008).

El-Mounira in the Imbaba quarter is an example of an informal settlement built on cultivated land on the fringes of Cairo. Most of the dwellings were built between 1973 and 1978, and the land was purchased from the *fellach* owner. The advantage of settling there was that services, workplaces, schools, et cetera were close by, while water and electricity supplies could be obtained from the neighbouring settlements (Goethert, 1986: 59). El-Mounira is inhabited by the lowest social class, as they are the greater proportion of people in need of housing (Gado, 1991: 155).

Informal housing offers several advantages, since it can be easily adjusted to suit living circumstances, especially for lower income groups: the construction allows the family to maintain their way of life, while it also supports family structures, adjustments in investments, efficient usage of material, and possible additions to buildings. Moreover, when rented out, it can provide a retirement pension and additional income. Informal houses are also cheaper than those official ones on the housing market (Goethert, 1986: 90 et seqq.). Another advantage is that informal settlements are walkable, offering inhabitants reasonable work-home proximity, as well as easy access to other everyday requirements (Shehayeb, 2009: 37).

However, the reaction of governments all over the world to informal settlements is more or less the same: first, officials ignore the residents, then they evict the residents, and, eventually, they develop the site, putting up new buildings and developing services (Goethert, 1986: 73). In this context, AlSayyad (2004) identified a significant difference between the informal housing sectors of Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, which he has linked to certain cultural specificities. Whereas informality in Latin American countries have given rise to intense political interactions between squatters and the state, informal dwellers in the Middle East have remained rather apolitical and distant from the state in order to better secure their advantages. These contrasting attitudes are derived from the fact that political activism in urban Latin America has supported the achievement of rights, whereas, in the Middle East,

it has been advisable to refrain from involvement with any formal or public sphere if land is to be illegally subdivided and built on. Struggle in the informal sphere has been about finding a way to survive rather than about political protest and '[…] followed two main goals: the redistribution of social goods and opportunities, and the attainment of cultural and political autonomy' (Bayat cited in AlSayyad, 2004: 14).

The inhabitants of Cairo's informal settlements live under constant threat of eviction or fines. Because the settlements were established without planning or servicing, basic infrastructure is lacking, especially wastewater disposal and solid waste management. Another danger is that of buildings collapsing due to the low quality of building materials and construction; unfinished houses may already be in use, housing an overload of people. Healthcare and educational services are extremely undersupplied (Boie, 2005: 20). Some informal areas were also built on unsafe land with the danger of landslides or rock falls (Shehayeb, 2009: 39), as happened in Manshiet Nasser. Immediately after that incident in October 2008, the former president Mubarak established the Informal Settlements Development Fund (ISDF), to group what are now called 'unplanned areas' in 'legal and illegal areas, categorised into acceptable physical structures (unplanned) and deteriorated physical structures (old quarters, legal villages, shanty towns, and unsafe areas)' (Safey Eldeen, 2014: 3). In reality, this meant that informal settlements in unsafe areas were put on a list for removal in order to fulfil the Cairo Master plan 2050 (Hamilton et al., 2014: 29). These unsafe areas form five per cent of the total number of the informal settlements, but presice data about household or resident numbers are still not available. After the 25 January Revolution in 2011 the Ministry of Urban Renewal and Informal Settlements (MURIS) was founded in 2014 but after on year of work abolished and merged with the Ministry of Housing due to overlaps in the responsibilities and duties of the ISDF (Elmouelhi et al., 2015: 330).

Many NGOs work in informal areas to support inhabitants, but there are also other types of NGO formed with a specific purpose of serving the people. Some act as savings cooperatives to provide funds for marriages and burials, while others have been founded in order to recruit donor support for leisure activities for children and training programmes for women, among other deeds. Some are praised with positive feedback while others are accused of failing to perform their jobs. According to the Egyptian government, NGOs, as civil society organisations, should encourage participation by involving inhabitants in development projects and social programmes for empowerment. The reality of it is very different, as most of them do not follow a community-based approach (Abdelhalim, 2009: 125; Piffero, 2009:

159). However, young people and women who are active in NGOs involved in community issues benefit through increased self-confidence, as well as, in the case of young people, improved job opportunities in the legal employment sector. So far, however, very few have been given the chance (CMIK6).

The general conditions of the informal settlements in Manshiet Nasser (MN)

Manshiet Nasser is a district west of the governorate Cairo with its own local administration. Before the establishment of the district in 1991, the settlement was part of the Wali district. MN is situated between the Moqattam Hills and the road and rail traffic axis leading to the south. On the western side opposite is the City of the Dead, which partially belongs to the district known as Kaitbay and Barkook. Situated on the eastern side is the district Duweika, a public housing area. The settlement is located close to the city centre and thus sits on highly valuable land. For the launch of the GTZ Participatory Development Project (PDP), Manshiet Nasser was divided into nine planning zones.[9] However, the focus of development lay in *shiakhat* (neighbourhoods) MN1-5.

'The area, owned by Cairo Governorate, was first settled in the early 1960s. The first inhabitants had been pushed out of huts in nearby inner city locations around Fatimid city and told by the authorities to relocate in the abandoned quarries, which, at the time, were on the extreme eastern limits of the city. By the end of the 1960s, the population had reached several thousands and, upon hearing about the settlement, President Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered that water and power be extended to it, giving his name to the settlement. In 1972, Cairo Governorate ordered the relocation of the mainly Christian garbage collector community (Zabalin) to one part of Manshiet Nasser. By the end of the 1970s, the area had over 100,000 inhabitants and was growing rapidly, with most people coming originally from Upper Egyptian villages' (GTZ, 2001). In 1993 a massive upgrading programme brought basic infrastructure to the MN and to most of the other consolidated informal settlements (Illberg, 2009: 41).

Before the improvement interventions began in 2004, there were 400,000 people in Manshiet Nasser and no public health services. Islamic and Coptic community centres offered medical treatment to relieve the lack of medical services. The public educational institutions of Manshiet Nasser were also in a bad state, with classes of 50 or more pupils, along with poor equipment and dilapidated buildings. The drastically underpaid teachers did not even provide

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[9]MN1-Ezbet Bekhit, MN2-Masakin, MN3-Asfal Razaz, MN4-Gamia, MN5-Maadissa, MN6-Khazan, MN7-El-Zarayib, MN8-Aala Razaz, MN9-Wadi Faraoon, (GTZ-PDP, 2005: 3)

a minimum level of education. As a result, most of the children preferred working over attending school, and parents saw no point in sending their children to school, in spite of their belief that education was the key to accessing a better standard of living. A high proportion of people were illiterate, only 2% of inhabitants had a secondary school education, and 40% of children left school early to go to work. These days, in informal settlements in general, half of the population is under 20 years old. However, due to a high unemployment rate and a lack of marketable skills, these young people have very few prospects, which has led to juvenile crime. Most of the families live beneath or just hovering above the poverty line and work in the informal sector. Micro-enterprises provide enough money for most everyday requirements, but not enough to permit saving for extra expenses (Boie, 2005: 20 et seqq.). Furthermore, the overhanging limestone cliffs of the Moqattam Hills pose a serious danger to life and property; rockslides in 2006 and in 2008 killed several people and destroyed many houses. On top of all that, the various small recycling enterprises in planning zone MN 7-El Zarayib have caused massive environmental problems due to the processing and burning of waste. There is a saying in Cairo that one can recognise MN by the smoke rising from the hills (field note, March 2009).

In 2009, different stages of development were identifiable in the MN district: planning zones 1-5 along the Autostrad were better developed than the others due to the fact that they were in the recognition-phase of acquiring land titles and had received massive support from the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Planning zones 8 and 9 upon the hills were the least developed, as they were the youngest settlements, were still growing, and thus were still in the settlement stage. Planning zones 6 and 7 received recognition status in 2008 and partially benefited from the projects undertaken by the GTZ. As of 2009, an estimated one million people lived in MN (PEMA, 2009: 29).

6.1.4_The GTZ Participatory Development Programme (PDP) in urban ureas in the Greater Cairo Metropolitan Area

In light of the activities of Islamic fundamentalists in the 1990s and the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the Egyptian government, along with the international community, perceived a risk of future fundamentalist activities in socially-deprived areas. Therefore, programmes for poverty reduction and social development gained priority. The Participatory Development Programme (PDP) in urban areas aimed at a sustainable solution for informal urban areas in Egypt and was financially supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The project was cooperative between the GTZ and a German financial

cooperation, the German Development Bank (KfW), and the Egyptian Ministry of Economic Development (MoED). It aimed to foster networking among public, civil, and private actors in poor urban areas and to introduce participatory methods. KfW financed infrastructure measures such as drinking water and sewage systems in project areas in the Greater Cairo Region.

In view of the profound lack of trust between the concerned groups, the PDP's main targets were confidence-building, the establishment of a clear division of roles and responsibilities, communication, and transparency (Boie, 2005: 36). The programme followed a comprehensive approach on three levels – national, district, and local - with the motto, 'Counsel from the top, empower from below' (GTZ, 2007). Policy advice was given to the ministerial governments and governorates; the pilot areas operated at the municipal and district administration levels, and the local Initiatives cooperated with the local district administration, local NGOs, CBOs, and residents.

The implementation phases of the PDP

Five tools were developed for a participative approach to improving living conditions, by: building trust with fast, concrete success in meeting the priority needs of the inhabitants, fostering transparency, supporting local efforts, reducing costs, and impact monitoring (Abdelhalim, 2009: 126 et seqq.).

The PDP was divided into three phases: (1) The pilot phase operated at the local level (1998-2003) in the informal areas of Bulaq Al-Dakrour in the Giza Governorate and in MN in the Cairo Governorate (CG). Local stakeholders were identified, as well as their potential to participate in various development projects. (2) In the second phase (2004-2007), the focus was placed on the local administrations as control institutions for local development projects. The participatory tools (see Appendix, section II.I) were introduced to enable local stakeholders to participate in the development measures being undertaken (ibid: 126). (3) In the last phase (2008-2011), the focus was placed on the governorates themselves as the approval institutions for all local development plans and budgets handing down orders to the local administrations. The aim was to institutionalise the participatory approach by such means as the redefinition of informal areas via a database, resulting in an information map and official register. Based on that classification and intervention, strategies for each informal area type were prepared that identified priorities in the upgrading of informal areas (ibid: 128). The PDP was further implemented in seven other urban districts throughout Egypt

(GTZ, 2007). From the experiences of the two pilot areas in Cairo and Giza, the 'Knowing Local Communities' tool was developed and since then have regularly featured in every new programme introduced in local areas.

The PDP in Manshiet Nasser (MN)

This problem of informal settlements in Egypt is usually tackled in three ways: demolition, containment, or upgrading. In 1997, the national government had plans to demolish the whole settlement but in the end decided to upgrade the area with foreign investment, starting in 1998.

In January 2004, the PDP was introduced to the settlement, and **Local Area Action Planning (LAAP)** was prepared for planning zones 1-5. As a prerequisite to all action planning, detailed information about the settlement was gathered and priority problems, potentials, and needs were identified along with the local community. This brought together local stakeholders, such as departments of local administration (*shiakhat*), NGOs, and local businesses to come up with solutions for the future development of the settlements. Detailed information was collected to identify the problems, needs, and potentials of the community by actively involving the local population through interviews and cognitive mappings (later introduced as Participatory Needs Assessment (PNA)). Upon completion of the analysis, the results were presented on 'public days' (GTZ-PDP, 2008: 1 et seqq.). Over the course of several meetings and workshops, the local stakeholders (*shiakhat*, the local administration, the local people's council, community development organisations, etc.) identified solutions to problems with the help of the **Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA)** approach (see Appendix, II.I.III). The improvement interventions were facilitated by the GTZ along with the Cairo Governorate, the MN Local Administration (LA), the Local People's Council (LPC), and the community, as well as by other partners according to the set priorities for the LAAP.

Challenges in the implementation process of the PDP

During the first two phases in the two pilot areas, a precise definition of 'participatory urban management', clear procedural steps, and the identification of specific participants in each step were missing, which led to difficulties in monitoring and evaluation measures (Piffero, 2009: 137). This was also pointed out in an evaluation report by the Centre for Project Evaluation and Macroeconomic Analysis (PEMA), which was launched by the Ministry of International Cooperation: 'The major initial difficulty was the ambiguity of project

documents, as project outcomes and indicators were not clear. In addition, it was difficult to identify the specific contribution of various stakeholders in the LAAP' (PEMA, 2009: 6).

Later on in their report, PEMA mentioned that the PRA failed to reach the vast majority of the inhabitants of MN, who were unaware of the measure introduced by the GTZ. Moreover, several participatory tools, such as the Stakeholders' Council and the Thematic Committee ceased operations after the approval of the LAAP, which should have been the main multiplier within the community for the fulfilment of the inhabitants' needs. In addition, the Stakeholders' Council was not approved by the LPC or the Cairo Governorate to avoid parallel structures and competition. Although the LAAP enhanced the participation of the inhabitants and built capacities, the main coordinator between the different stakeholders was the GTZ, and, thus, the sustainability of the programme was questioned as soon as it was phased out of MN. Other challenges faced were the unwillingness of the residents to participate, the persisting, deep mistrust between the local administration and the community, and the lack of networking between the various NGOs (ibid: VII-XI).

On the other hand, a rigid definition of each and every step misses flexibility and adjustments in the field. It was shown that small, quick interventions in these areas were more successful than those of large-scale upgrading. The inhabitants perceived small-scale projects as 'non-threatening by the local administration'. In these projects, the community shared the costs, gained the interest of local NGOs, and were rewarded with quick and visible benefits (Piffero, 2009: 138). Another huge challenge was the LA itself, with its frequently changing senior personnel and its highly personal character, which involved individual politicians being required to approve the project. Needing to safeguard their political careers, they were vulnerable to powerful local lobbies (ibid: 139). Flexibility in the programme made it possible to overcome these political difficulties, making the process 'less participatory' if necessary (ibid: 142). In fact, the programme in MN was perceived by members of the GTZ central management team as 'not participatory at all' due to the 'non-structured nature of resident's participation' with a strongly personalised area management (Ibid, 149). Even during the massive infrastructural project that connected 99% of households from MN1 to MN7 to the water and sewage systems, the residents believed that 'the Germans' were in MN to join with the government in evicting the area and selling the land (Piffero, 2009: 152; field note, April 2009). Thus the residents were not at all aware of the contribution of the GTZ-PDP and had not been kept informed. However, Piffero (2009) observed that the implementation of a participatory planning approach in a non-participative, strictly hierarchical bureaucracy is a

challenge in itself. The PDP failed to empower marginalised groups, while the groups that benefited were those that were already powerful, denying the chance for bottom-up decision-making in development programmes and strengthening existing political structures (ibid: 184 and 186).

In the meantime, a fourth implementation phase was added to the PDP for 2010-2016. In May 2013, the PRA for the informal areas of Ain Shams and Ezbet El-Nasr in the Cairo Governorate was published, based on the 'Knowing Local Communities' methodology. In Ain Shams, the focus was on the development projects in solid waste management that were to be followed by tackling the high unemployment rate, whereas, in Ezbet El-Nasr, the focus was on health services and lack of security (GIZ, 2013: 6 et seqq.). The question now is whether lessons have been learned and whether political circumstances are now more in favour of the adoption of a participatory approach after the 'Arab Spring'.

6.2_Kathmandu Metropolitan City - A development of massive urban sprawl

Kathmandu is the capital of the Democratic Federal Republic of Nepal and its biggest city, with a population of 1.26 million. According to the population census of 2011, the Kathmandu Valley with its three main cities of Kathmandu, Patan, and Bhaktapur and two medium-size cities, Madhyapur-Thimi and Kirtipur, merged to form an agglomeration with a total of 1.46 million inhabitants. Unofficial estimates suggest a number of around 2 million for the agglomeration because of the high number of unregistered migrants. The strong urbanisation trend has been caused not only by natural growth and economic reasons, but also by migration driven by a decade-long armed conflict, which came to an end in 2006 with the people's movement. The economy has been unable to absorb the increasing number of job seekers. Slightly more than one-fourth of migration

Figure 11: Population numbers in thousand in Kathmandu Valley including Lalitpur and BhaktapurCities. Sources: Own elaboration based on City Diagnostic Report, 2001: 14; Pokharel, 2006: 39; Nepal National Censuses; Census 2011

is rural-to-urban. In 1985, there were only 17 squatter settlements in the Kathmandu Valley, but, by 2003, there were already 64 settlements, accommodating nearly 14,500 people. The number of squatter settlements has increased at a rate of 25% per year (ICIMOD, 2007: 47). A study in 2005 identified about 2,700 squatter households and about 6,900 slum households,

with 31,460 people living in slums. More recent population numbers of slums and squatter settlements are not available (UNDAF, 2012). Thus, the squatter and slum problem is relatively small compared to other cities, but growing very fast. Several squatter settlements established in the 1970s and 1980s have been consolidated into residential areas with permanent housing. However, it is not only the increasing number of informal settlements that present a challenge to the control of urban development – so, too, does the historic city core area where a large number of rural migrants have been forced to live in dilapidated traditional houses under inadequate living conditions.

One of the most urgent problems in tackling the massive urban sprawl is land speculation. As in Cairo, it is mainly fertile agricultural land that is converted into built-up areas. Environmental degradation in the form of water, soil, and air pollution makes living in Kathmandu's city core difficult. In addition, the city is located in an area highly vulnerable to earthquakes. As a result, building regulations used to permit a maximum of eight storeys. However, this regulation was recently softened, and high-rise apartment blocks are now mushrooming, especially in the less dense southern suburbs. Most of the challenges faced by Kathmandu today are the result of an imbalance between population growth and investment. The city government is unable to cope with the 4% growth in population, and the result is the degradation of its natural resources as well as its image as a World Heritage Site. Furthermore, it lacks the capacity to force the decentralisation process[10], as no elected body has been able to implement the Local Self-Governance Act of 1999. Because of the political turmoil of recent years, Kathmandu Metropolitan City (KMC) has neither a mayor nor a city council nor a municipal board (see Appendix, II.II). For over 10 years, frequently changing executive secretaries, appointed by the Ministry of Local Development, have been in charge, with members of the four strongest political parties taking the place of municipal board in the form of an advisory board. At the community level, the squatter settlements have an established political presence with their own federations, which advocate the rights and demands of the squatters. The Nepalese NGO Lumanti began its 'support for shelter' programme in the 1990s. Through a variety of programmes, they helped improve living conditions while boosting self-confidence to motivate self-help initiatives. It was through their activities that the city and national governments became aware of the critical situation in the self-provisioning settlements in KMC.

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[10]1999 Implementation of the Local Self Governance Act to enable local governments to be responsible for their own development

6.2.1_Spirituality and foreign influences on urban development

The history of Kathmandu and the Kathmandu Valley is closely linked to the Newars ethnic group. The Newars settled in the Kathmandu Valley several centuries BCE and belong to the Tibetan-Burmese linguistic family, but their point of origin is not known. The Newars have their own culture, tradition, language, and script, which are totally different from the national language, Nepalese, a derivation of Hindi (Herrle, 1983: 182). With the establishment of the national state of Nepal in 1768-1769 under Prithvi Narayan Shah, the gradual dissolution of cultural, social, and physical identity was followed by an the overlay of traditional structures with patterns of Western physical planning and land use.

The formation of the Kathmandu Valley is the subject of a myth that claims that the valley was filled by a holy lake. According to Buddhist legend, the Bodhisattva Manjushri drained the water by cutting a large cleft into in the southern valley rim with his sword. Only after that could the oval valley be populated (ibid: 176). In fact, the foundation of Kathmandu dates back to the 9th century, during the Takuri Dynasty, when the village of Koligrama already existed on the site, which happened to be on the Tibetan trade route to India. The town was shaped like a sword, with the hilt facing south and the cutting edge facing north (Joshi, 2004: 2). For the layout of the town, the mandala was adapted as a 'map of the cosmos' with a clearly structured hierarchy, including three principle characteristics of the historical urban pattern:

1. Division of the town into the sacred and profane
2. The orientation of the town (the world) towards a centre (the world axis)
3. Zones with different degrees of sacredness, divided by clear thresholds (Herrle, 1983: 77)

Between 1200 and 1768, urban culture prospered. The traditional town and settlement structure was laid down during this period, the era of the Malla Dynasty. In the 14th century, the social structure of the town was reorganised into the Brahman-Orthodox scheme of the four Hindu Varnas (four main castes), which also had to be followed by Buddhist Newars. The structure remains to this day. Up until the 15th century, the Kingdom of Kathmandu played a minor role compared to the other two royal cities in the valley, Patan and Bhaktapur. However, Kathmandu controlled trade moving from India to Tibet and began to command a leading position among the three states as it accrued material wealth. Until 1482, Kathmandu was divided into twelve *tols* (neighbourhoods) (ibid: 194).

In the 16th century, the rectangular street grid was established, dividing the northern part into 10 equal quarters that were populated according to caste. The old north-south axis, the trade route, was preserved, and all 32 *tols* had their own town gate (ibid: 203) (see figure 12). The late Malla era was the zenith of historical Hindu urban development in the Kathmandu Valley. The social space of the castes was determined by birth, and traditional rules were fixed and followed. The symbolic and spatial centre of the town was the king's palace and the surrounding temples. Today's ritual feasts and processions date from these times, when they functioned as 'integration rites' in a society divided into caste-occupational groups. The boundary wall was both the spatial expression of this and a ritual boundary protecting inhabitants from an outside world filled with demons and untouchables. The compact structure surrounded by a boundary wall, while the abrupt passage into the agricultural surroundings was a primary characteristic of Malla City (ibid: 204). This era of cultural proximity came to an end with the invasion of Prithvi Narayan Shah.

In 1768-1769, his tribe conquered the whole of the Kathmandu Valley and founded the modern state of Nepal, with its capital in Kathmandu. Shah brought his own leading elites with him, and the Newars were downgraded to the third caste. After a number of coups amongst the ruling clans, the Rana clan took control in 1846 and ruled the kingdom until 1951. The cultural separation between the ruling elites and the populace widened during this time. The Ranas ignored the symbolically-centralised urban structure and built detached palace-like building complexes outside the ritual Newar boundary wall. One of these was Singha Durbar, today's parliamentary complex (ibid: 205 et seqq.).

Figure 12: Development structure of Kathmandu's old city centre. The diagonal of the sword layout is still visible. Source: Own elaboration based on Gutschow, 1982: 113

The physical structure of the **traditional neighbourhoods** (Nepalese: *tol, newari: twa*) does not have sharp boundaries, but rather squares, streets, and lanes that clearly belong to one particular *tol*. At its centre, each *tol* has a square with a deity, rest house, and sometimes a well. These squares also function as central meeting places for the *tol* inhabitants (ibid: 236).

In 1951, the Shah Dynasty king returned from exile in India, and 180 years of isolation politics came to an end. The country opened itself up to the modernisation and development strategies introduced by international advisors and experts, as well as to tourism and cultural adoption of Western behaviour and consumption patterns. Since the early 1970s, urban growth has born witness to a move to rural settlements near the city. This shift to rural areas was not caused by a land shortage, but rather by the enormous increase in land prices in the inner city and along the arterial roads. Since 1978, new administrative boundaries have been introduced to incorporate the neighbouring villages. Two types of urban structures have since been established: the densely built-up areas of the historic core area and the less densely built-up areas outside the core area, which have expanded into rural fringe areas especially since the opening up of the country (ibid: 224 et seqq.). In 1976, a ring road around Kathmandu and Patan was built, and, even before its completion, land prices along its length rose sharply, in spite of a prohibition of construction (ibid: 308).

The new building activities affected the newly incorporated villages. On the outskirts, agricultural activities were replaced by activities in the service sector. Between 1954 and 1978, urban expansion on the outskirts was mainly a result of the migration of people from the city core. However, after 1970, the migration of a young, educated, and affluent rural population increased thanks to tourism, the foreign sector, and governmental institutions. These migrants were motivated by a desire for better income and education opportunities. Due to massive population growth, urban expansion accelerated and two major problems occurred: the conversion of fertile agricultural land into built-up areas and a lack of instruments to control this land-consuming urban sprawl. In view of the dramatic rise in land prices, only the upper classes of the leading political and economic elites and foreigners could effort to build in these favoured areas. The low-income population was displaced, and the socio-spatial separation became evident. To control and solve these problems, Western-modern urban planning was introduced in 1962 (ibid: 309 et seqq.).

In the 1980s and 1990s, many industries were set up on the highway corridors at the entry points into the Kathmandu Valley on the western side and Kathmandu-Bhaktapur on the eastern side. The boom in the carpet and garment industries in the 1990s was a major pull for the rural population (Joshi, 2004: 9).

The land development process in Greater Kathmandu is carried out either by public or private investment and is either developed via formal planning or is informal. Most private land is still developed by landowners or brokers on a plot-by-plot basis. Private land

development companies were established during the 1990s and developed land in larger chunks, but the technical infrastructure was inadequately developed in terms of road width, water supply, sewage services, and open spaces (KMC, 2001: 22). Since then, **private housing companies** have developed apartment complexes for middle- and high-income groups around the periphery of Greater Kathmandu, a trend that is growing along with the expansion of those income groups that can afford to buy ready-built houses with all the amenities from housing companies. So far, twelve private land development projects have been realised since 2006, with the biggest project in the satellite town of Harisiddhi, south of Patan (Pokharel, 2006: 13). Real estate housing serves only the small segment of Kathmandu's population that is not in urgent need of housing and can simply hang on to it as an investment for future. **Public land development** projects are one aspect of urban development control with direct investment. Three strategies have been designed for housing and other purposes in order to control urban growth and activate un-serviced land within the municipal boundaries of Greater

Figure 13: Settlements of the 'Impure' at the western and southern side outside the town (*Kasai*-butchers, *Dhobi*-washers) and of the 'Untouchables' (Pore-sweepers). Source: Own elaboration based on Gutschow, 1982: 119

Kathmandu in order to densify areas of low density. However, in the 1990s, a trend developed of opening up areas of neighbouring villages. **Site and service projects** were implemented for civil servants and middle-income groups. Guided Land Development Projects could not be implemented, as they rely on the cooperation of landowners in providing access to unopened land parcels. The most successful land development strategy has been land pooling (the readjustment of land parcels). The first two projects implemented in 1979 in KMC were in Kuleshwor and Dallu. Since 2006, six land pooling projects have been realised, and more are in the preparation stage in the district of Kathmandu. Regardless of how encouraging the results of these projects may be, their contribution is very minor, accounting for only 10% of the developed land of the valley (ibid: 11). The **informal land development** process rarely takes into account whether infrastructure already exists or whether it can be saved in the event

of disasters like earthquakes or floods, and a public housing programme for low-income groups does not exist. As a result, families are entirely responsible for how and where they construct their houses. According to Shrestha, in 2005, more than 90% of houses were built informally on an individual basis (Shrestha et al., 2005: 5), but on land they already own.

6.2.2_Affluent urban fringe – An impoverished historic city core

Traditional **social organisation** in Newar culture, and thus in Kathmandu, used to involve division into three major groups according to one's purity status: 'pure' castes included priests, merchants, farmers, gardeners, craftsmen, and blacksmiths (90% of the Newar population); 'impure' castes included musicians, butchers, barbers, and tailors (7.6% of the Newar population); and the 'untouchable' castes included leather workers, sweepers, and fishermen (2.4% of the Newar population) (Herrle, 1983: 254) (see figure 13). These three major groups are still spatially expressed in the concentrically ordered **socio-spatial separation** of the town. 'Pure' castes used to live within the city boundary. 'Impure' castes used to live on the fringes of the town, for the most part within the boundary, and had no special quarter. The 'untouchable' castes used to live outside the boundary in caste-homogeneous neighbourhoods mostly situated on the southern and western fringes of Kathmandu. They were the poorest of the urban society and worked in badly paid, impure occupations. Within the town boundary, loosely **structured clusters** of 'pure' castes have formed, not based on social status but rather on rational thinking: the farmer castes (*jyapu*) live close together in the southern part to facilitate the organisation of work in the fields, and, among other castes, a rather market-oriented clustering can be observed. Even today, the northern part of the city is occupied by craftsmen and merchants because of the commercial and bazaar streets (ibid: 260).

In 2009, 35.6% of households in KMC lived below the national poverty line (Kanaka, 2009: 145). A survey on poverty, income, and employment conducted in 2004 by the Nepalese NGO Lumanti revealed the dimensions, at least ward-wise, of the socio-economic disparities that, in spatial and social terms, has not changed significantly 10 years on, rendering the study still relevant. Still on-going is the trend that more affluent groups move to the western and southern adjoining villages (Lumanti, 2005: 12). However, the ward with the highest income is located in the city centre, a traditionally affluent area established during the Rana period where the royal palace and many foreign embassies are situated. It is also the commercial and business centre and the site of the central government. The historic city core is divided into the affluent north, where the traditional bazaar zone and modern-day tourist centre are

located, and the middle-income southern area, a modern commercial zone. The south-western and western parts are the poorest areas, where the low caste and farming Newars were traditionally located (ibid: 25 et seqq.). The squatter settlements along the rivers adjoin affluent areas in the city centre, whereas, outside of Kathmandu, high-income groups have been moving to their new luxury settlements (see also Appendix, map on squatter settlements in section II.II.II).

Nevertheless, this trend shows once again that the caste system is still dominant and that spatial division depends on the residence patterns of the different castes, as is also illustrated in Figure 14, showing, besides the urban growth, the various living quarters of high-, middle-, and low-income quarters and their locations within the urban structure, shown in Figure 15. The Newars, as the ethnicity that has traditionally inhabited the valley, still own a large share of the economic and trade sectors, whereas the high caste Brahim/Chhetri generally earn their income from ruling, for instance, as politicians and in public institutions.

Figure 14: Kathmandu and Patan urban growth with the settlements in the overview of different urban structures.
Source: Own elaboration. Drawings G. Enkhchimeg, O. Kummel

Overview of the different urban structures, investment types, and population ranks

	Traditional Legal Settlement	Traditional Informal Settlement	Legally Unplanned Settlement			Legally Planned Settlement
Area	Layaku	Bansighat	Dilli Bazaar	Banasthali	Sanepa	Sitapaila
Building age	After 700	After 1970	1951	After 1980	After 1970	After 2000
Income classes	Lower middle and middle income	Low and lower middle income	Lower middle and middle income	Middle income	Higher middle and high income	Higher middle and high income
Housing types	Historical core area	Informal squatter settlement	Private commercial, residential development	Private residential development	Private development	Planned development
Urban pattern						
Parcelling						
Land use						
The grid						

Figure 15: Urban pattern of Kathmandu. Source: Own elaboration. Figure design after Goethert, 1986: 228-229. Drawing: G. Enkhchimeg

6.2.3_Slums and squatter settlements along the rivers

Urbanisation has caused an escalation in land prices, building costs, and rentals, putting both housing and land beyond the reach of the **urban poor**. The percentage of urban poor in Kathmandu City was estimated in 2000 to be 12-15%, mainly living in squatter or slum areas or in rented accommodation. The urban poor of Kathmandu can be grouped into five major categories:

1. Urban poor residing in squatter settlements
2. Urban poor of the deprived castes
3. Urban-poor tenants
4. Urban poor living in old satellite towns of Kathmandu Valley
5. Urban poor scattered in major settlements of Kathmandu

Of the five groups, the first two are highly visible; this could be one reason why their problems are, to some extent, being addressed by support organisations. Because of the way they live, squatters are relatively united and progressive. The neglected slum settlements of the deprived castes are also visible. The last three groups are not recognised by many NGOs and are left to compete with comparatively richer communities (Joshi, 2006: 2). **Slums** (Nepalese: *swabasi*) are legal indigenous settlements (Shrestha, 2008: 9) with historical dwellings in dilapidated condition, characterised by overcrowding and neglect. Some city core areas, like parts of the Newar neighbourhoods, could be considered slums due to their deteriorated physical and environmental conditions (KMC, 2001: 153); 6% of the population of KMC live there. These slums date back to ancient times and to the hierarchy of city structure described previously. **The squatter** (Nepalese: *sukumbasi*) settlements are informal in character and mainly located on the riverbanks of KMC. Koirala (2001) pointed out some of the main reasons for squatting, such as unemployment, insufficient income for renting, lack of farmland, and displacement due to development projects (ibid: 14). These settlements were also often built on hazardous land, vulnerable to floods or landslides. The population is heterogeneous and accounts for just 2.4% of the total households in KMC. However, the estimated number of squatters seems very small compared to those in other big cities in Asia (KMC, 2001: 25). Other low-income groups tend to live in **rented accommodations**. Many of the poor tenants live in the city cores of Kathmandu and Patan and work in factories and other formal sectors (Joshi, 2006: 2). As of 2006, approximately 33% (Pokharel, 2006: 35) of urban households lived in rented accommodation with relatively lower service levels compared to owner-occupied housing. About 95% of families of an average size of 4.8

members rent single rooms of approximately 11m^2. This indicates serious overcrowding (KMC, 2001: 153).

The oldest squatter community in Kathmandu City was founded in 1946 on the Bagmati River in the city centre, but many others date back 30 years and have since been developed with permanent houses, as well as businesses, schools, and other public buildings (Lumanti, 2001: 12). According to Pradhan, in the late 1960s, squatting was visible in old temples, *patis* and *bahals*[11], as in Bansighat. In the 1970s, ground floors were occupied with the consent of the homeowners in return for fetching water or helping with household chores. Only in the 1980s did visible squatter settlements occur on marginal land as the number of squatters steadily increased (Pradhan in Koirala, 2001:10) (see also Appendix, Chapter II.II). Squatters were classified by Tanaka in 1997 according to ownership and purpose:

ownership		purpose	
Ownership squatters	Owning houses in squatter settlements	Serious squatters	In urgent need of shelter
Squatter landlords	Renting houses or rooms to tenants	Speculator squatters	Occupation of land in order to benefit later
Squatter tenants	Renting from squatter landlord	Occupational squatters	Establishment of businesses

Table 6: Two classifications of squatters according to ownership and purpose. Source: Koirala, 2001: 14

Squatting was divided into five types by Joshi and Bjønness in 1987:

1. Occupation of underutilised government land
2. Distribution of plots by ward chairperson, even with waiting lists in some wards
3. Illegal land distribution by politicians (mostly before upcoming elections)
4. Sub-division of plots occupied during processes 1-3
5. Speculation of plots for renting out houses or rooms (ibid: 21)

Slums and squatter settlements demonstrate major differences with relation to cast, ethnicity, and language, due mainly to their different starting conditions. In slum communities, 90% of inhabitants are, by tradition, born into low-caste conditions, resulting in public and physical exclusion and isolation. Because of this historical background, the slum communities are low-caste Newars by ethnicity and have official land papers (*lalpurga*). Squatter communities are of mixed ethnicity as well as of mixed caste, as their inhabitants migrated to Kathmandu from other parts of the Kathmandu Valley and the surrounding hill areas in search of employment, better living conditions, and urban facilities. So, the common language is Nepalese. Ninety

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[11]*Patis* are traditional Newar rest or community shelters attached to neighborhood squares or temples. *Bahals* are historical Buddhist Newar courtyard houses originally built as monasteries but later converted to residential use.

per cent of people living in slum neighbourhoods were born there and have lived there all their lives, which is true for only 9% in squatter communities. However, 64% of squatters have lived there for between 10 and 30 years. Therefore, the inhabitants of slum and squatter settlements are usually more unified than migrants living in rented accommodation in the city centre, as their long-standing settlements have already been consolidated.

The average household size in slums is 5.5 people, slightly higher than the 5.3-person average for Kathmandu households, whereas the average of 5.0 people in squatter settlement households is slightly lower. The slightly higher household size in slums is the result of the traditional lifestyle of low-caste Newars living in joint families. In general, in both self-provisioning community types, the percentage of inadequate basic infrastructure and sanitary conditions, small housing units, low income, and poverty is relatively high. Slums and squatter settlements located on riverbanks are highly vulnerable to extremely polluted water and flood disasters. Moreover, because of their informal character and despite having permission from their local ward authorities, squatters live continually under the threat of eviction (Lumanti, 2001: 16 et seqq.). One of the reasons why squatters still do not obtain land titles is that they are not recognised by the government as squatters. The word *sukumbasi*, in the traditional rural context, refers to a person without farmland. In the debate over their legal status, this leads to confusion (Tanaka, 2009: 145). According to government regulations, a squatter, or *sukumbasi*, is a person who has not owned land for three generations, so, to a very large extent, these settlers are not *sukumbasi*, as they used to own some land in their place of origin, but not enough to feed a whole family, which was the reason they were forced to move to the cities. Recently, the government has even changed the status of the settlements from 'squatter' to 'illegal' (KELU9). As a result, the settlers are reluctant to reveal their places of origin, as they fear being sent back by the government. In January 2012, the Ministry of Physical Planning and Works (MoPPW) delegated to the DUDBC the registration of those squatters willing to move to other locations. Out of the roughly 8,000 families living on the riverbanks in KMC, 1,082 were registered in May 2012 (Ghimire, 2012). Those registered might be the so-called 'genuine squatters'.

At any rate, the legal status of the squatters is a challenge. Initially, family cards were issued, stating that those families were recognised as a community in KMC and thus liable to pay a small amount of land tax. The former mayor of KMC, Keshav Stapit, along with the parliament, signed a document in the mid-2000s to issue squatters identity cards that would recognise them as citizens of Kathmandu, but failed to supply the necessary migration

certificates (KELU8). In 2008, 78% of eligible residents above the age of 16 held citizenship cards in squatter settlements and 86% in slum settlements (Shrestha, 2008: 17). Since 2000 already the squatters have been organised and formally registered and are strongly united with their three main federations. These include the umbrella organisation for squatters, the 'Society for the Preservation of Shelters and Habitations in Nepal' (SPOUSH Nepal) (Nepal Basobas Basti Samrakshan Samaj) and its female offshoot, Nepal Women's Unity Society (Mahila Ekta Samaj), along with the squatters' Child Development Youth Network (CDYN). They are also still fighting for recognition within the urban society, which tends to make the squatters scapegoats for problems ranging from crime to dirty rivers. In fact, the squatters play a very pivotal role in the informal sector of the city's economy, since they carry out all the more 'lowly' services, like cleaning, street vending, and producing small handicrafts (KEUP4).

Although the new interim constitution policy (2007) prohibits the eviction of squatters without a proper resettlement plan, the government still tries to evict squatter settlements, as happened with the newly erected squatter settlement in Thapatali, founded in 2007-2008. During their election campaign in 2008, the Maoist Party UCPN (M) promised to provide squatters with a better place to live in Kathmandu in exchange for their votes. However, in May 2012, as part of the construction project for the Bagmati Link Road (BLR), the Maoist-led government bulldozed the settlement, which had been home to 251 households, sparking huge protests in the squatter communities. The people were forced to resettle the bulldozed land, because no proper solution was offered to them. The newly-built houses that the government planned to move the families into did not meet the demands of the impoverished people (KELU9; KIBA1; Ghimire, 2012). They were too expensive, and paying interest would have been like paying rent, in light of their unstable incomes. On top of that, the sites were far away from their workplaces and schools. Lumanti identified eleven settlements along the Bagmati River, with 32% of squatter households residing there. Squatters also settled on the banks of four other rivers, but 19% of squatter households did not live near rivers at the time of the study (Shrestha, 2008: 11). The Sankhamul case study was performed near the city centres of Kathmandu and Patan, in Ward Number 10, which was founded in 1971. Bansighat, the site of the second case study, is located south of the city centre, in Ward Number 11, and was founded in 1988 (ibid: 68).

6.2.4_The Urban Community Empowerment Programme of the Lumanti Support Group for Shelter in Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Lumanti means 'in memory' in Newari. The Nepali NGO was founded in 1993 with the aim of reducing urban poverty and improving shelter conditions in urban areas (Lumanti, without year). Lumanti initially began working in slum and squatter communities in the Kathmandu Valley by directly implementing the long-term integrated urban community development strategy known as 'Urban Community Empowerment Programme' and downsized to the neighbourhood level in the low-threshold '**Human Resource Development Programme**', which covered in total 60 slum and squatter communities in Kathmandu and Patan. Through a system of community organisers and community development workers, the programme, begun in the late 1990s, was facilitated under the topics shelter programme, micro-finance, education, gender equality, and good governance. Aside from social support, the programme also offered low-cost technical support with a share of the costs being contributed by the households benefiting from the support. The programme was launched in three phases.

Implementation phases of the programme

Entering the communities – The start-up phase from 1998 to 2000: Lumanti began with awareness-raising and orientation programmes aimed at promoting unity in the neighbourhoods, and it took community leaders on exposure visits to other countries such as India and Thailand. A link between the communities and the government, as well as other organisations and activists, was established. The savings and credit programme, as well as youth, children's, and health education, were introduced.

Implementation phase from 2000 to 2008: The savings and credit groups were established through the women's or mothers' groups that already existed in some of the neighbourhoods. Youth clubs were founded by the young people in the community, and childcare centres offered extra-curricular activities such as tutoring and theatre programmes. Technical support was also provided for toilets, drainage, community buildings, et cetera. The demand had to be identified by the community. Consumer committees had to be formed to carry out and coordinate the infrastructural projects. During this phase, Lumanti also began introducing the programme in other cities outside the Kathmandu Valley.

Phasing out from 2008 to 2009: During this phase, the community organisers were less involved in neighbourhood activities, and Lumanti started offering advocacy at the city and national levels. Federations and CBOs were supported in networking with other squatter

settlement groups and were connected to city and national institutions to claim their rights to land titling, inclusion, and equality (KSIK3, KBIK5). A more detailed description of the implementation and further use by the community is given in the next chapter.

Complementary tools for the programme

In addition to this programme, Lumanti also supports genuine squatter households badly affected by displacement in order to obtain compensation through the **Urban Community Support Fund.** This is a revolving fund and was initiated to finance the Kirtipur Housing Project in 2004. It is a cooperative project based within the KMC Administration with their executive officer as head and Lumanti as secretary. Other members include the Nepal Women's Unity Society, SPOUSH Nepal, and the Centre for Integrated Urban Development (CIUD) (Lumanti, 2014; KELU8).

Through housing projects such as the Kirtipur Housing Project, Lumanti has supported evicted squatter households in buying land for housing through the Urban Community Support Fund. The households have to repay the loan and, after 10 to 15 years, they own the houses (KELU8). In 2014, another 13 housing projects were under construction in other parts of Nepal (Lumanti, 2014; KELU9). Challenges in the revolving fund are that the people are not always able to repay the loan, as has happened in Kirtipur and Bharatpur, and revolving then becomes difficult. In order to allow Lumanti to buy land to offer to poor urban groups at a much cheaper price, the NGO was recently registered as a private company, facilitating access to banks and investing (KELU9).

Lumanti also advocates on behalf of the urban poor on issues such as the **Housing Bill**, which was prepared by Lumanti and is supposed to act as squatter policy in addition to the National Shelter Policy (KSIK3). The Housing Bill defines two types of squatters: the genuine ones as described above and people who have left their places of origin and have been settled for at least two years on public land with no other option. In the case of relocation, the first group is awarded new legal land to settle free of cost, and the second group is required to pay 10% of the land price (Tanaka, 2009: 156). The squatters are not legally recognised and, in the event of eviction, had no right to take the matter to court (KELU8). Only in the new interim constitution were the squatters partially recognised. Lumanti has supported the squatter federations in their quest for formal recognition under the law (Lumanti, without year). In addition, Lumanti has adopted the water, sanitation, and hygiene programme devised by

WASH United, an NGO with headquarters in Berlin, to promote, among other things, safe drinking water and sanitation facilities (KELU 9).

The Bagmati Link Road (BLR) and government resettlement plans

Not only did Lumanti have a strong influence in the squatter settlements of KMC, but so did the governmental institutions with their technical infrastructural projects. In the Three Year Interim Plan 2007/08–2009/10, the national government put forward the 'shelter for all' programme and allocated a budget to the DUDBC to upgrade and rehabilitate the squatter settlements along the Bagmati River. Lumanti prepared a proposal for utilising the budget as a public-private community partnership. For three squatter settlements, including Sankhamul and Bansighat, the land sharing programme with land pooling was offered to the residents, allowing them to officially rent a piece of land on the actual site of the BLR, a thirty-metre-wide corridor comprised of four lanes, supply and disposal lines, and a wall separating the settlements from the road and the river. Another plan was cultivated by Lumanti in 2008 – namely, the resettlement of a housing project of 220 squatter households, who were moved into apartments owned by a housing cooperative. Private companies were responsible for the construction of those buildings, and the government for land registration (Tanaka, 2009: 157). However, neither option offered by Lumanti and DUDBC was favoured by the squatters, who claimed that the Kirtipur Housing Project was not working in their interest, being too far from their workplaces and too expensive for them to afford in terms of the rent or loans required. This was revealed in interviews with residents and key individuals in September 2008. In September 2014, the settlements were still in the same place, while the corridor for the BLR had been bulldozed and construction work was in progress. In the case of Sankhamul, the residents gave up their vegetable gardens as a compromise to not be evicted from the neighbourhood (KIBA 1).

6.3_Ulaanbaatar – Between socialist panel buildings, luxury housing, and traditional *ger* settlements

Ulaanbaatar is the capital of the Democratic State of Mongolia and, compared to the other context cities in this study, is a very young city. The city exhibits many unique features, not only in urban development, but also in the appearance and development of its *ger* areas, a unique type of self-provisioning settlement that has evolved from a historically nomadic culture. Thus, the urban society there is also very young (Kummel, 2013: 4). Socialist urban planning began in the 1950s, and the regulated urbanisation of Ulaanbaatar started at a more

or less stable growth rate, but this changed with the political turnaround in 1990, at which time 44.6% of the Mongolian population were living in the city[12]. In 2010, the urban population was 68% of the total population and still growing (UNFPA, 2012: 62). The pressure of migration on the capital has been enormous due to its primacy, and, in terms of population numbers, it leaves the country's two other main cities, Erdenet and Darkhan, far behind.[13] The pull factors are, on one hand, the various job opportunities provided by the national and international enterprises that have their headquarters there, and, on the other hand, the diverse educational opportunities. The current growth rate of 4.2 per annum is particularly reflected in the expanding *ger* settlements, where 80% of migrants initially settle (Taraschewski, 2008: 247). Ulaanbaatar was hit by two main migration waves, one climate-induced, the other politically induced. In the winter of 1999, a *dzud*[14] hit the herders hard, and, in the following summer in 2000, they were hit by a *gan*[15], which resulted in them losing large numbers of livestock and consequently the very bedrock of their existence. In 2003, a land reform for privatising land guaranteed every citizen of Ulaanbaatar 700m^2 of land and the waiving of the registration fee (ibid: 244 et seqq.). As a result, in 2003, the population growth rate jumped to 5.5%.

Currently, 60% of the population of Ulaanbaatar lives in *ger* areas (Ulaanbaatar Statistical Office, 2015). Up until 2003, a greater number of inhabitants lived in apartments, but the land reform sent large numbers of migrants rushing to the capital to grab a piece of land, and so the number of households living in *ger* areas rose by over 50%. The constant growth of the *ger* areas ever since has been due to not only rural-to-urban migration, but also the nuclearisation of families and the lack of appropriate housing for low- and lower-middle-income groups. Both the public and private housing industries neglect lower income ranks when it comes to the provision of affordable housing. Even the introduction of an 8% interest rate on mortgages (compared to 12% inflation) (UESI8) and the offer of

Figure 16: Ulaanbaatar population numbers in thousand between 1956 and 2012. Source: Own elaboration based on Ulaanbaatar Statistical Office, 2012: 1

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[12] 2.839 million, total population of Mongolia (source: data.worldbank.org/country/Mongolia, 30/11/2014) and 1.267 million, total population of Ulaanbaatar (source: www.ubstat.mn, 21/10/2014)

[13] 87,118, total population of Erdenet in 2013; 75,504, total population of Darkhan in 2013 (source: mad-research.com/secondary-cities/, 30/11/2014)

[14] *Dzud*: harsh winter with extremely low temperatures and high snowfall

[15] *Gan*: high temperatures with extremely low precipitation

cheaper apartments have failed to meet demands. This is due to the fact that, in order to qualify for a mortgage, buyers are required to produce an employment contract, which most *ger* residents are unable to do, since they mostly work in the informal sector and cannot provide official proof of employment. Any kind of open discussion about dealing with *ger* areas as a part of traditional Mongolian settling patterns is largely absent amongst politicians, government officials, and experts. This thinking goes back to the socialist era, when living in *ger* areas was seen as backward and rooted in old traditions, which did not fall in line with contemporary socialist housing standards or living in prefabricated panel buildings (Kummel, 2013: 2). It is true, however, that *ger* areas lack such urban services as sewage disposal, heating, and private-tap water supply, with people having to make a 30-minute journey on foot to the nearest water kiosk. Especially during the eight months when heating is required, air pollution is atrocious, thanks to the use of unprocessed jar coal in traditional ovens, and this adds to the hardships of the inhabitants. Another problem in *ger* areas, especially in consolidated and traditional ones, is soil pollution due to open-pit latrines.

The national and city governments have tried to tackle these problems through various programmes, starting with *ger* area redevelopment in central *ger* areas, and later with readjustment and infrastructural projects in peri-urban *ger* areas. To tackle air pollution, the second phase of the distribution of subsidised smoke-reduced ovens was initiated at the beginning of the heating period in 2014. All these programmes have been realised with public, private, and foreign investment. However, the current economic crisis has resulted in a slowing down of public and private investments in *ger* areas.

The social organisation of the population during socialist times was dictated by the ruling elites and fell apart after the political change. Family and clan structures remain strong, and neighbourhood unity is all but absent in both *ger* areas and apartment housing, possibly as an effect of the aforementioned high physical mobility. However, in recognised, long-established and consolidated *ger* areas, unity of the community appears higher than in other areas. In this still young and rapidly developing urban culture, the nomadic word for 'neighbour' (*saakhalt*, *с а а х а л т)* is used to denote someone far away, in the countryside. Neighbours in the urban context, such as apartment neighbours, are called *hursh* (*хөрш*). However, the word for 'community' does not exist in the Mongolian language as, traditionally, a neighbourhood community could not develop in the absence of fixed, consolidated settlements (Kummel, 2013: 4) (for more details see Appendix, section II.III).

6.3.1_From nomadic Urgoo to fixed Ulaanbaatar

The early history of Ulaanbaatar describes the process of establishing a settlement in an otherwise nomadic culture. It starts in a totally different place, Shireet Tsagaan Nuur, in today's Uvurkhangai Province, around 340 km south-west of Ulaanbaatar. There, in 1639, the Urgoo Ger (the royal or palace yurt) was built for Zanabazar, who made Tibetan Buddhism popular in Outer Mongolia and who was selected by the Dalai Lama to become the spiritual leader of Mongolia, the Bogd Gegen. It was Zanabazar's and his successor's intention to reunify the different tribes of Mongolia. Zanabazar's reasons for moving were political and religious, and, in order to escape his enemies and reach his followers, the Urgoo was moved 21 times in 150 years. It was always constructed in the centre of a circle of other *gers* for protection (Sharkhuu, 2014).

In 1706, Zanabazar renamed the Urgoo 'Ikh Khuree' (big circle) (Taraschewski, 2008: 172; Munkhjargal et al., 2006: 22). The **khuree-system** is one of the oldest settlement structures in Mongolia and formed the basis of traditional Mongolian settlements. The *khuree* became defined in Chinggis Khan's empire: 1,000 *gers* made up one *khuree*, which was run by one nobleman of the *khan* (king). This *khuree*-system endured over centuries and further found expression in 19th-century Mongolia with the introduction of a network of Buddhist monasteries as fixed settlements (Fürst, 2010: 16). When it has a monastery at its centre, a *khuree* is referred to as a monastery town. Ikh Khuree consisted of more than one *khuree*, in the same way that the Urgoo as a religious centre was surrounded by a circle of *gers*, so also the monasteries themselves were surrounded by *khurees*.

Even before the establishment of the settlement in its present location in 1778, Ikh Khuree grew into a centre of religious education as Lamaistic schools were founded. Its position was strengthened with respect to Uliastai, the centre of the regional rulers of the Manchurian Empire (Taraschewski, 2008: 173). Ikh Khuree was constructed as a circle to avoid sharp edges where bad energy might be concentrated, and pilgrims were required to circle the *khuree* three times like a Shamanist *owo* (spiritual centre) before entering the town (ibid: 175). The Yellow Palace sat on the main axis between the peaks of the Bogd and Chingeltei mountains. The urban layout followed traditional planning principles. A complex of stupas was erected on the northern side of the settlement, and a vacant space was left on the south side to accommodate a wide avenue. In terms of spatial planning, this urban pattern followed the shape of an ancient Mongolian mobile palace (Daajav and Bayr, 2007: 42). The anchoring

of the settlement Ikh Khuree can be seen as the start of the slow urbanisation of Mongolia (Taraschewski, 2008: 97).

In 1911, Manchurian rule came to an end, and an autonomous Mongolia in the territory of Outer Mongolia was proclaimed; Inner Mongolia remained part of the Republic of China. The 8th Bogd Gegen, Jevzundamba Khutugtu, became the religious and political ruler as Bogd Khaan (Kollmar-Paulenz, 2011: 123). He renamed Ikh Khuree Niislel Khuree and made it the capital of the autonomous state that same year. With the invasion of Soviet troops and Mongolian partisans, in 1921, the so-called 'People's Revolution' ushered in the socialist era, with the setting up of a preliminary people's government. In 1924, the 8th Bogd Gegen died, the People's Republic of Mongolia was proclaimed, and Niislel Khuree was renamed Ulaanbaatar (English: Red Hero) (ibid: 123).

Ulaanbaatar became permanently fixed as a city in the 1920s (Sharkhuu, 2014: 24). The urbanisation process began slowly, as socialist reforms still had to be carried out. Additionally, the then feudal urban society had to be transformed into a populace free of rank, in terms of both labour and intellectual society. After 1930, the urbanisation process grew ever more dynamic.

Traditional setup of a ger: 1-oven, 2-tools for livestock, 3-leather sacks for drinks, 4-clothes of the male family head and the children, 5-the personal belongings of the male family head, 6-family sanctities, 7-the personal belongings of female family head, 8-family bed, 9-small chest with dowry, 10: wooden cupboard with cooking utensils. Source: Zimmermann 2010, 23 (after Zerenchand, 1971: 166)

New urban centre of Ulaanbaatar, master plan (general plan) 1954: 1-Sukhbaatar Square (now Chinggis Khan Square), 2-People's Parliament (now the National Parliament) (Ikh Khural), 3-City Hall with the mayor's office and the Ulaanbaatar people's council (Capital City Khural), 4-Lenin Museum (now the National Museum), 5-Opera House, 6-Cultural Palace, 7-National University, 8-green strip with children's park

Figure 17: Comparison between the traditional setup of a *ger* and the new socialist urban centre.

The traditional urban layout was drastically altered in favour of building a city after socialist ideals. The '*Bandstadt*' was taken as the model, and two circulation rings were added bordering the centre (Fürst, 2010: 22). As the main *khuree* containing the Yellow Palace had been completely destroyed, a new centre was created with a big urban square, on whose north side was the People's Parliament. The layout of the city centre refers to the setup of a *ger* (see also figure 17), with the central square and its monument of Sukhbaatar, the hero of the People's Revolution, echoing the centrally-located oven in a *ger*, the source of heat and hot food. The north-facing part of a *ger* is reserved for family sancties, so this is where the People's Parliament is located. The west-facing part of a *ger* is reserved for the male head of the family, and this is echoed in the placement of such governmental institutions as the *khural* (people's council) and, further north, the Lenin Museum (now the closed National Museum). The east-facing part of a *ger* is the intimate, family area, reserved for female family members, so, in the urban layout, this area is home to such cultural institutions as the Cultural Palace and the Opera House and, further north, the National University. As the entrance to a *ger* must face south, the central city square opens up onto a strip of parkland that faces south to the Bogd Khan mountain range, which is a nature preservation area.

From 1920 to 1950, the city developed without a plan (Sharkhuu, 2014: 24). The first buildings were constructed in the city centre in the 1940s by Chinese construction companies, but nobody wanted to move in because the Mongolian population was used to living in *gers*. Therefore, *gers* were erected next to newly built houses. The first general plan in 1954 was projected for 125,000 inhabitants (Narangerel, 2013: 18) and included buildings up to three storeys tall as well as technical infrastructure (see figure 18). For the first time, education was brought to the population.

Figure 18: Renovated building in the western part of Baga Toiruu. (© Olivia Kummel, 2012)

However, since the 1950s, housing demand has continued to grow (Sharkhuu, 2014). In 1959, central heating was introduced, and, at that time, there were 82 buildings in existence (Taraschewski, 2008: 188). The implementation of the **general plan** was spelled out in three- or five-year plans, which mainly structured the new city with the main residential areas in the north and east, the industrial area in the south-west, and green and recreational areas in the south. State institutions and the main cultural and educational areas were placed in the city centre.

The Soviet microraion model was adopted as an **administrative unit** to define residential

Figure 19: Narrow courtyards of the Altan Urgoo high-rise buildings in the 13th *khoroo*, the Bayanzurkh District. (© Google Earth, 16 December 2013)

areas, since traditionally-grown neighbourhoods did not exist in Ulaanbaatar. Each microraion, *khorin* in Mongolian, was equipped with schools and sports grounds, childcare facilities, libraries, and supermarkets (Kummel, 2014a: 182). Ulaanbaatar was divided into six administrative units called *khoroo* and 133 smaller *khorin*[16] units (Taraschewski, 2008: 184). In *ger* areas, even smaller units existed, the *khurshin kholboo*

(neighbourhood cooperatives), which were grouped according to streets.

With the peaceful **democratic changes in 1990**, triggered by the withdrawal of the Soviet army and therewith the Soviet elites from Mongolia, came a time of transition that brought both optimism and disorientation. In the 1990s, some optimistic urban inhabitants moved to the countryside to become herders, since much of the livestock was also privatised (Fürst, 2010: 25). As Sharkhuu has described it, in the planning and construction sector as well as in other sectors, the Soviets had always dictated the line of approach, and Mongolians were barely involved in any planning or decision-making processes. Thus, there is no doubt that

Figure 20: Bella Vista gated housing, Zaisan. (© Renato D'Alencon, 2013)

administrations were overwhelmed by the restructuring processes and set about creating new democratic regulations. Ownership of land and industrial production had to be regulated, and, as a result, many industries closed down, as also happened in other formerly socialist countries.

With the political about-turn and absence of urban planning regulations, a chaotic, disorganised building boom took place, and, in fact, continues to take place. At first, in the 1990s and in the early 2000s, the inner areas and courtyards of the perimeter

block structures were arbitrarily densified in order to satisfy private interests, regardless of light obstruction, existing playgrounds, and green areas (see figure 19). Particularly in the mid-2000s, thanks to the economic boom, extremely dense housing estates up to 17 storeys tall began mushrooming, clearly reflecting financial interests but lacking social infrastructure

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[16]The *khoroo* administrative unit was changed in 1993, in the post-socialist era, to *duureg* (English: district), and the *khorin* unit was changed to *khoroo* (English: micro-district) (Taraschewski, 2008: 185).

for the thousands of inhabitants and with no connection to public transport. In the 26th *khoroo* of the Bayanzurkh district, the level of density reached 1,350 inhabitants per hectare (Purev-Erdene, 2014: 57), violating, by almost three times, the existing urban planning norms, which were a maximum of 450 inhabitants per hectare in urban residential areas (Government of Mongolia, 2009, UBB 30-201-09: 2.14). This is an even higher density than can be found in the historic core area of Kathmandu or in the informal areas of Cairo. Whereas the new middle class resides in overly-dense and sealed, dark housing complexes, the new upper class and expats prefer to live in areas like the gated communities in Zaisan or Nukht (see figure 20) or in the protected area of Bogd Khaan Mountain, where building construction is prohibited, to escape the oppressive air pollution of the inner city and the *ger* areas, which surround the city like a belt. Today, 40% of the urban population live in apartments that cover 21% of the total urban area, while 60% live in *ger* areas that cover 78% of the total urban area (MUB, 2013); this is a unique phenomenon. In other cities, crowded living conditions are usually found in disadvantaged areas. However, in Ulaanbaatar, 1,111 m^2 of land (this includes public and private land) is available per person in *ger* areas, whereas, in apartment areas, where most of the middle and higher income classes reside, just 124 m^2 are available per person, less than one-ninth of the figure for *ger* areas.

Thus, the Master Plan 2030 (Master Plan 2020 and Development Directions 2030) was developed with an estimation of 1.7 million people and was passed as law by the National Parliament in February 2013; it is mainly a follow-up to the 2020 version. In it, eight development zones were identified. The sub-centres within the regions were specified by function and purpose, and the *Ger* Area Redevelopment areas (GAR) were defined as an initial twelve areas with partial master plans. The GAR is explained in the next chapter. However, severe urban planning problems tied to a lack of both density regulation and a socialist planning approach regarding *ger* areas still persists (MUB, 2013).

6.3.2_The northern belt of *ger* districts and the southern gated communities

During Ikh Khuree times, the socio-spatial division of the settlement was represented by the division of the country's four provinces into their own *khoroos*, which were placed south-east and south-west of the main *khuree*. People from the one western province settled on the south-eastern side, and people from the three eastern provinces settled on the south-western side (see Figure 21) (Taraschewski, 2008: 178). After the settlement was fixed and Ikh Khuree became the centre of trade, more rural migrants moved into the town and for the most part became craftsmen. Particularly after a series of harsh winters and herders lost their

livestock at the end of the 19th century, several migration waves hit Ikh Khuree. As a result, the impoverished population increased, and many people died of illness and malnutrition. The daily routine of the citizenry was described as burdensome with sharp social contrasts; the town looked miserable, with piles of waste and dirt and the accompanying bad smell (ibid: 178 et seqq.).

Figure 21: Division of *khoroos* that represented the four provinces.
1. Ikh Khuree, 2. Gandan Monastery, 3. West Market 4. East Market, 5.Choijin Lama Temple, 6.Dariganga khoroo, 7.Duke Daava khoroo, 8.Zasagt Khaan khoroo, 9.Tibetan khoroo, 10. Royal Daichin khoroo, 11. Royal Darkhan khoroo, 12. Tusheet Khaan khoroo, 13. Daichin khoroo, 14. Manchurian and Mongolian Officers, 15. Vicar's khoroo, 16. Royal Tsetsen khoroo, 17. Royal 'O' khoroo of Tsetsen Khaan, 18. Consul hill. Source: Daajav and Bayr, 2007: 91, 92

Within the *khuree*, general socio-spatial division was regulated by lama ranks. Lama ranks decreased with the distance to the main temple. High-ranking monks lived directly next to the main temple, while low-ranking lamas lived on the edge of the *khuree*. Around the Lamaist settlement, with its temple complex in the centre, was grouped the 'profane' settlement whose role was to support the lamas in their daily routine and to herd their livestock (Munkhjargal et al., 2006). The main *khuree* consisted primarily of high-ranking members of the Mongolian religious elites. The Manchurian political elites had their offices to the south-east. Foreign merchants and craftsmen settled in the east and west. In the rectangular-shaped Chinese trading town of Maimaa, a socio-spatial division similar to Chinese towns could be observed. The inner part was reserved for affluent merchants and *tushmels* (high-ranking officers); the outer parts were settled by Mongolian lumberjacks and blacksmiths in *gers*, and, later on, with Chinese craftsmen as well. The strict separation between Mongolian and Chinese inhabitants gradually diminished over time (Taraschewski, 2008: 177 et seqq.).

Today, the perception that people living in apartment areas have of those living *ger* areas shows that the city is divided into two parallel worlds, with apartment dwellers attributing high crime rates to the *ger* areas and describing them as dirty and ramshackle. Despite that, Taraschewski (2008: 132) showed that, in the case of crime, the exact opposite is true. In 2004, the recorded crime rate in a *ger khoroo* in the Khan-Uul district was 5.7 per 1000 inhabitants compared to 21.7 cases per 1000 inhabitants in an apartment *khoroo*. Almost 10 years later, the situation had not changed much: the crime rate in apartment districts was 4.6

times higher than in *ger* districts (the 3rd *khoroo,* 164 cases; KUD, the 5th *khoroo*, 35 cases) (Ulaanbaatar Statistical Office, 2013). Looking at income distribution, Taraschewski (2008) highlighted the fact that income disparities between *ger* areas and apartment areas are decisive, but that internal income disparities are higher in apartment areas. *Ger* settlements also show differences in income and poverty distribution. The more central and recognised *ger* settlements along the *ger*-apartment-area borderline are relatively more affluent than the peri-urban *ger* areas, where poverty is increasing (ibid: 140) due to the high immigration of impoverished people from the countryside. Thus, socio-economic disparities are increasing, and, against the background of the socialist ideal of socio-economic equality, the impression of an ever-widening gap is intensifying amongst the majority of the population. With regard to spatial distribution, it is fair to say that the apartment areas of the middle-income groups separate the low- and lower-middle-income groups of the north from the high-income groups of the south, with more affluent islands in between in the central apartment area. Fringe areas along the northern *ger* area belt are particularly lacking in access to economic centres, as well as to public and educational institutions, since public transport is expensive and commuting distances are too long (see also map on distribution of ger settlements within the city in Appendix, section II.III.VI). Thus, more people are excluded from the job and educational sectors (ibid: 145; Barkmann, 2014: 22).

The special situation of nomads migrating to the city must also be mentioned in this part. In an interview, Barkmann described how nomads who migrate to Ulaanbaatar had previous experience of the moving process. A nomad lives a free life and follows the rhythms of his animals. When the animals die due to harsh winters and dry summers, he has lost his livelihood and has no other option than to move to the city to search for a job. However, there is no demand for nomadic knowledge in a modern city, and so he loses his independence and his prospects, and the frustration this causes can lead to alcoholism, domestic violence, and crime. After harsh winters and huge losses of livestock, massive migration waves inevitably descend on the city, producing a *Verlandung* (an overspill of people from the countryside) (Barkmann, 2014). A word similar to the German word also exists in Mongolian: *khuduujikh* (хөдөөжих), which literally means that the town becomes more country-like than urban (Kummel, 2014a: 181). However, as Mongolian culture has always thrived in the countryside and is still deeply rooted there, the rural migrants have brought back to the city the traditions that, due to secularisation and europeanisation, had since been forgotten by the urban population (Barkmann, 2014).

Figure 22 provides an overview of the urban development after the people's revolution and figure 23 shows the different urban structures on the following pages.

Figure 22: Urban growth in Ulaanbaatar with the settlements in the overview of different urban structures. Source: Own elaboration. Drawings: G. Enkhchimeg, O. Kummel.

Overview of the different urban structures, investment types, and population ranks

	Traditional legal settlement				Publicly planned socialist settlement		Planned development
Area	Gandan Khuree	Amgalan	Yarmag	SKD/28th khoroo	1st 40 thousands	3rd Microdistrict	Crystal Town
Building age	Beginning of 19th century	19th century	1966	After 2000	1960	1970	After 2012
Income classes	Lower middle & middle income	Lower middle & middle income	Low & lower middle income	Low & lower middle income	Lower middle, middle & higher middle	Lower middle & middle income	Higher middle & high income
Housing types	Self-built & professionally constructed houses, gers	Self-built & professionally constructed houses, gers	Self-built houses, gers	Self-built houses, gers	Massive brick construction	Pre-fabricated panel houses high rise unplanned infill development	High rise development
Urban pattern							
Parcelling							
Land use							
The grid							

Figure 23: Urban pattern, Ulaanbaatar. Source: Own elaboration, Figure design after Goethert, 1986: 228-229. Drawing: G. Enkhchimeg

6.3.3_Land owners in *ger* areas

Due to the deeply-rooted tradition of nomadism, the land in Mongolia does not belong to anybody, and anybody can use it for his or her own purposes. Land in urban areas does not have that high of a value and can be sold quickly. Therefore, mobility in ownership and renting is relatively high. In nomadic culture, a family usually has fixed summer and winter

Figure 24: Arrival in the *ger* district – Typology of establishment of a plot. Source: Own elaboration.

pastures and moves between two and four times a year (Barkmann, 2014: 22). The amount of land a citizen can own is regulated: a citizen of Ulaanbaatar may own 0.07ha of land for family needs, as assured by the Law on Land. In the countryside, the amount of land a person is permitted to own is higher: in *aimag* (Mongolian for province) centres, it is 0.35ha and, in village centres, 0.5ha (Taraschewski, 2008: 244; Government of Mongolia, Law on Legislation of Land, 27 June 2002: Article 7, Land ownership and Land Use). The land of 0.07 ha is distributed to a family of four persons. The allowed 0.07ha of land is granted as land bonds to those citizens of Ulaanbaatar who are registered. To ensure that the citizens register themselves, the registration fee was scrapped in 2003, as the fee was too high and the majority of citizens had failed to register themselves (Taraschewski, 2008: 245). There is another law existing in regulating the issuing the land titles to the land owners (Government of Mongolia, Addition to the Law on Legislation of Land, 22 May 2008: Article 7, Citizens for Ownership). The elimination of the registration fees massively increased migration to Ulaanbaatar, and the urban sprawl became a phenomenon of unplanned and unregulated land possession.

When a rural family arrives at the fringes of the city, they can either live within the *khaashaa* (English: fence, plot) of a relative or friend until they find land of their own, or move on to some suitable land nearby that a relative or friend has found for them. Families who lack the support of relatives or friends must fend for themselves (UELM9). Through this process, the urban fringes are in a state of constant transformation and flux. In recent years, new *khoroos* have been created in areas where the consolidation process has begun. The usual process for acquiring a land ownership certificate consists of either buying land or settling illegally and then, via the registration process, making the land legal (UEDK6).

The *ger* settlement, *ger khoroolol* (*ger* district) or *ger surshil* (settlement), in Mongolian, characterises a historically unique phenomenon of citification in an otherwise nomadic culture. It is the expression of changing from a mobile life to a fixed one, and it is not a disadvantaged area by itself, as already highlighted in the previous chapter on historical development. This also describes how the *ger khoroolol* originally developed from a group of *gers*, but, in *ger* settlements today, especially in the consolidated, recognised ones, the vast majority of inhabitants live in fixed houses constructed of different materials depending on the owner's budget (see figure 24). Fürst mentioned that just one third of the population in *ger* settlements live in *gers* (2010: 52). The only season when *gers* are erected next to the houses is during the eight months when heating is required, between September and April, as *gers* are better insulated than the often self-built houses, and so are easier to heat, requiring lower coal consumption (see figure 25).

Kamata et al. divided the *ger* areas into three general zones, to which *ger* area development and improvement programmes also refer. The **city centre *ger*** areas are directly attached to the apartment areas and are, to some extent, already a mix of *ger* area and apartment housing.

Figure 25: Equipment in a plot in a *ger* district.
CP – car park, D – dog, F – fence, G – gates (for pedestrians and cars), L – living units (buildings and ger), P – path, S – storage, T – tyres outside the compound, To – toilet, V – vegetable garden, W – wastewater pit. The objects with dotted lines are optional. Source: Own elaboration based on Taraschewski 2008, 125

These are the most consolidated areas and, like Gandan *khuree*, also some of the oldest. Even back in the socialist era, these areas were reserved for apartment housing like the 8th and 9th *khoroo* of Chingeltei district, directly adjacent to Ikh Toiruu in the north. **Mid-tier *ger*** areas 'form the most continuous mass' between the central and peri-urban areas. Here, too, the areas have been consolidated for one or two decades and lie in a relatively flat area, as in the Amgalanbaatar case study area in the Byanzurkh district. The peri-urban or **fringe *ger*** areas are those most affected by migration and are less dense than those in the other two categories. These fringe areas are also less connected to social and technical infrastructure and are poorly served by public transport. In these areas, pastoralism can still be observed, as the steppes are in direct proximity. Pastoralism in urban areas is prohibited, but it is tolerated in fringe areas. *Khaashaas* are mostly constructed on inclines along the edges of the foothills and along flood gullies (Kamata et al., 2010: 10).

As already mentioned, Taraschewski (2008: 122) claimed that marginalising-terms like 'squatter settlement', 'slum' and 'marginal settlement' do not fully describe the character of a *ger* settlement, as they are characterised by different spatial, structural, and socio-economic patterns. However, the characteristics of self-provisioning neighbourhoods are met in terms of lack of technical infrastructure, as a running water supply to the *khaashaas* does not exist. *Ger* settlements also lack heating and sewage systems. In young peri-urban *ger* settlements, a lack of public transport makes life difficult, and social infrastructure like health clinics, schools, and childcare facilities are missing (Compare also Purev-Erdene, 2014). However, Taraschewski has also spoken of an 'image-like marginalisation', referring to apartment dwellers' perceptions of *ger* settlements (2008: 132), as already mentioned in Chapter 6.3.2. In terms of land tenure, spatial pattern, and socio-economic structure, they contradict the definition of slums. The vast majority of inhabitants, unless settled on hazardous land, hold a land ownership or land use certificate. Furthermore, the spatial pattern corresponds to the traditional east–west pattern, as *gers* must always open towards the south to greet the sun. Long-consolidated settlements are characterised by fixed immobile houses constructed out of brick or wood. Roads can have either one or two lanes (see also Figure 26). The *khaashaas*, wooden fences about two metres tall, give *ger* settlements their character. They indicate private property and are an important symbol of fixed settlements (ibid: 124), as mobile *gers* in the countryside are not fenced. The peri-urban fringes are characterised by inward and outward migration, reflecting the character of a nomadic settlement. In terms of socio-economic structure, *ger* settlements house the urban poor, but a huge number of middle-income families also live in long-consolidated neighbourhoods, as in the case of Amgalan/Janjin. The stability of a settled existence allows residents to concentrate on the well-being of their families. Newcomers can only enter the settlement through the purchase of land. The equipment of a *khaashaa* (plot) depends on its stage of consolidation, as Figure 25 shows. Ideally, the *khashaa* is equipped with a house, a *ger*, a toilet near the entrance, a bore hole for wastewater near the property line, storage, and, if needed, parking space for a car. Depending on the type of business the owners are engaged in, it can further consist of a workshop area (for example, for car maintenance or handicrafts), a storage area for construction material, or a vegetable garden. Workshops are primarily located along main

Figure 26: General spatial development in urban *ger* districts. Source: Taraschewski, 2008: 124

roads and can develop into a kind of mixed-use sub-centre with densely built-up two-and three-storey brick buildings, as can be found in Zuun Ail (the construction materials quarter), or in the 7th *khoroo*, the Sukhbaatar district, where car workshops line Ikh Toiruu's main street. The city centre and mid-tier *ger* areas in particular contribute significantly to the city's economy with the services they offer.

The communication and lived neighbourhood character of *ger* areas also depends on the degree of consolidation of the settlements. In stable settlements like Yarmag, the 5th *khoroo,* with little inward or outward migration, the neighbours know each other and help each other out when there are problems (UYIK1). In less consolidated settlements, neighbours barely know each other, and a neighbourhood character in the sense of a community does not exist. Spatial development can also foster or hinder communication between residents. In a double-row arrangement, where plots border neighbouring plots on three sides, there are more opportunities for communication, whereas, in a single-row arrangement, only two bordering neighbours are available for communication. In addition, the high fences, by blocking visibility, make communication almost impossible (Fürst, 2010: 65). Neighbours mainly meet on the street in front of their *khaashaa* or while fetching water. Meanwhile, there is far more contact with nearby relatives than with neighbours. Some NGOs have been active in establishing neighbourhood communities, and, often, the first task undertaken by the newly established community is the painting of fences and entrance gates (ibid: 72; UYIK5).

At the end of the socialist era, around half of Ulaanbaatar's urban inhabitants lived in *ger* areas, and, up until 2013, *ger* areas were the fastest growing settlements there. In 2013, 87 *khoroos* were located in *ger* areas (Asia Foundation, 2013) (for administrative division, see the Appendix, II.III.II). In coming years, the statistics are projected to show whether the national government's latest efforts in land distribution, housing, and redevelopment and readjustment can halt the urban sprawl and provide houses for poor households. The following chapter explains in greater detail the strategies adopted by the national and city governments to deal with the problems in the *ger* settlements. For other institutions working in *ger* areas, see the Appendix, II.III.III.

6.3.4_The city governmental *Ger* Area Redevelopment Programme (GAR) and Land Readjustment Programme (LRP) of the Municipality Ulaanbaatar

Unlike the Egyptian and Nepalese programmes, the one in Mongolia is in the starting phase, and, in 2014, areas were still being recruited for implementation. However, the first parts of

the programmes had already been implemented, and the negotiation processes with the inhabitants were already showing results and reactions.

To meet the demand for affordable housing, in 2013, the national government approved the **Government Housing Corporation Project**, which is financed by the Housing Finance Corporation. A mortgage is offered to individuals with a full-time employment contract, and a down payment of 30% of the apartment cost is required. There are also rental options available to public servants, young families, and disabled and elderly people who receive state pensions (see also Appendix, section II.III.V). The project lies within the responsibility of the Prime Minister and is designed for *aimag* or the Ulaanbaatar level; it is called the *aimag*, or the Ulaanbaatar Housing Corporation Project. The *Ger* Area Redevelopment and Land Readjustment programmes contribute to the project by supplying apartment units (see Appendix, section II.III.VI).

Phase	Stage	Area in ha	Number of households	Number of residents
First term with 12 locations	existing	970.4	11,161	54,250
	planned		38,870	182,428
Second term with 8 locations	existing	290.2	4,373	20,593
	planned		20,042	72,938
Total	existing	1,260.6	15,534	74,843
	planned		58,912	255,366

Table 7: Ger Area Redevelopment and Land Readjustment in numbers. Own elaboration. Sources: MUB, 2013; MUB, 2013a

In February 2013, with the passing of the Master Plan 2030 into law, implementation of the ***Ger* Area Redevelopment** and **Land Readjustment programmes** was approved. In Resolution Number 7/29, the city *khural* granted approval as of 31 January 2013 to the first twelve *ger* areas to be developed, with five locations in the central zone for *ger* area redevelopment and seven areas in the mid-tier zone for land readjustment (MUB, 2013). In July 2013, a further eight locations were approved (MUB, 2013a). Recently, four more have been added but have not yet been approved by the city *khural* (UEMP2). Three categories for *ger* areas, as defined by Kamata et al. (2010), were used to classify development zones:

1. Zone I → the central zone for redevelopment, re-planning, and construction of high rise housing
2. Zone II → the suburban zone with comfortable single-family housing, provision of infrastructure
3. Zone III → peri-urban areas for relocation of residents

Projected phases of implementation

Zone I refers to GAR, whereas zone II is to be developed according to the LRP. Although both case study areas are located in zone II, in Amgalan, the 12th *khoroo*, the GAR has been

implemented. In the first phase, around 54,000 inhabitants in the twelve approved areas were relocated to apartments or single-family housing, with an additional 28,000 living units needed later for 182,400 residents (see Table 7). In the **planning phase,** a citywide survey of all *ger* areas was required to be undertaken to define the twelve locations. However, at the beginning of January 2013, only 20 approved locations had been surveyed. Other areas were near central supply and disposal lines, and their need was considered to be less urgent. The 20 locations with their roughly 59,000 planned apartments cater to just 30% of the total number of households registered in *ger* districts in 2013. For the process, the survey results are first submitted to the municipality to prepare the partial master plan and then to the city *khural*, which has to approve the locations. Within the *khural,* a Project Management Organisation (PMO) consisting of *khural* members and the directors of the agencies and *khoroos*, has been established. The *Ger* Development Agency receives the approval for implementation (UEMP1).

In order to introduce the GAR, a public hearing is organised to inform the citizens and introduce the partial master plan. In a tender, the citizens vote for the most suitable project executer among those who have sent in applications to the city government (UEMP1). These executors are mainly investors or construction companies who, during the tender, introduce their own development design, which is not always in line with the partial master plans designed by the master planning agency of the municipality. According to the project assignment, they need to not only follow the partial master plan, but also include social and technical infrastructure. The next step is for the winning tender company to convince 75% of the households to sign the collateral contract between the land owner/user, company, and municipality. During the construction phase, all households are required to leave the land and live in rented accommodations until their new apartments are ready to move into. The executing company pays the rent for up to a maximum of one year (UEMP1). Control mechanisms for the implementation and construction phase seem to consist only of a programme that allows citizens to oversee the construction process and an invitation for them to work as labourers on the construction site. Residents are also deemed to be given control via the submission of the proposal and the power to vote in the tender (UEMP1). At the end of October 2014, 700 plots were released for reconstruction, as some of the inhabitants sold their land and others were waiting for the new apartments. The twelve first-term projects should be finalised in 2020 (DEMP1).

Especially successful was one GAR project in the Songinokhairkhan district. Those companies that succeeded in convincing 75% of land owners to change their land into apartments were constantly paying visits to build up trust (the company in interview UESI8 paid eight visits to each of the families). Another reason for the success is the income and occupation structure of the inhabitants. When a land owner depends on the land to generate income, much like in a workshop or shop, they are very reluctant to release their land. In contrast, the more successful areas are of considerable distance from the city centre, but close to the industrial estates where some of the people go to work, the lacking infrastructure and the fact that 70% of the inhabitants in the project area near Tolgoit have a low income.

The land readjustment centre has already visited all *ger khoroos* and distributed information brochures on land readjustment. At the beginning of November 2014, they had received 35,000 proposals out of the 186,000 ger households in Ulaanbaatar. At that time, two LRPs were in the implementation phase: in the Bayanzurkh district, construction work was in progress on some five- and six-storey buildings. The first apartment project consisted of 160 living units. In order for them to be built, 17 households had to release their land, but those residents later moved into some of the 160 living units in the Songinokhairkhan district (UEMP2). In the LRP, the participation of residents seems to be more highly valued than in ger area redevelopments; the formation of temporary councils is considered to be important in places like Amgalan, the 12th khoroo, as they are the only way for inhabitants to actively participate in the program (see the revised nine steps of the LRP in Appendix, section II.III.VI). In mid-December 2014, it is reported that the economic crisis had hit the redevelopment programme hard and that work had slowed down. Investors had withdrawn because of financial difficulties.

Challenges during the implementation of first projects

Critical points for a discussion of the GAR and LRP are the extremely short seven-year planning and implementation periods. Usually, when private property is involved and citizen participation is being fostered, the project period is extended over 10 to 15 years. A proper analysis of and a planning strategy for dealing with the various living circumstances of the inhabitants are largely missing. In the case of Amgalan, the 12th *khoroo*, the execution, design, and goal refer to a proper redevelopment project for central zones with high-rise construction, but, in Master Plan 2030, this area is declared zone II, with low-rise single-family housing, as is also in the partial master plan. Although field surveys were conducted on physical structures and the socio-economic situation in the settlements, the data were barely

used to adjust the locations. For instance, although income and expenditures were surveyed and poor and low-income families were identified as living in those locations, there are still no measures to support these families. The LRP could reduce the immense cost of the more than 1 million tugrug per heating period (see the comparison between a ger and an apartment household in Appendix, section II.III.IV). Other costs could be adjusted according to the budget of the family. The more profit-oriented investors are developing areas that used to be home to low-income groups and people who depended on their plots to earn their living. No social plan was incorporated for such cases, which may result in gentrification, as poor households are forced to move to peri-urban *ger* areas. Strikingly, although dealing with land, there is no land policy for the evaluation of land, no regulation for the evaluation of land that is exchanged for apartment owning. Thus, there is no fixed, officially evaluated price based on location and living standard. The exchange is handled via contract according either to the negotiated sale price or to the estimated size of the future apartment. An additional challenge is the need to find innovative local solutions to the overstretching of the technical infrastructure (UEMP1).

To supposedly make the Housing Corporation Project attractive for low-income households, the mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Mr. Bat-Uul, has announced that people unable to put up the down payment can deposit between 25% and 30% of their monthly salary into an accumulative fund to receive an apartment three to five years later; 20,000 proposals are expected. The fund was established as a revolving fund, and apartments in six locations have been envisaged on newly built-up land (UB Post, 2014). However, only people with stable income and who are working in the legal sector can apply for a mortgage, which excludes most families living in *ger* settlements, who mostly work in the informal sector. At the same time, people living in *ger* settlements who are employed in the legal sector usually earn too little to have any chance of securing an apartment.

National and international organisations particularly criticise the methods of participation and involvement of the citizens in the process, pointing out that community mobilisation and awareness-building has not been included, so citizens are not really aware of how the GAR will affect them. Just knocking on doors and asking people if they want to live in an apartment or two-storey house equipped with infrastructure (GAR or LRP) is 'highly unfair' (UEUD5). Naturally, the low-income groups immediately say 'yes'. The unreasonably fast implementation and the addition of new areas have also been criticised: 'There is quantity instead of quality'. Further down the line, the residents have been confronted with ready-made

plans and have had no chance to express their own demands except through standardised questionnaires. 'Community involvement is contradicting private investment' (UEUD5). Although there is a temporary council in place to ensure the implementation of the demands of the citizens in the case of Amgalan, their members, who are all influential people, have not actually been available to answer residents' questions and are more concerned with their own private interests than with the welfare of the community. This council has recommended all of *khoroo* 12 as a *ger* area redevelopment location, one of the next four locations to be approved. The programme involves very little participation and is more focused on profit and the need to show results before the upcoming elections in 2016. Another justified concern is that, after replacement, people are sometimes unable to pay the much higher bills requisite for running an apartment. When people live in a *ger* area, they are able to adjust their consumption. Therefore, the offer of apartments should be accompanied by job opportunities so that people can pay their bills. There is also the problem of residents who made their living by running workshops and shops within the *ger* area; the redevelopment process leaves these people jobless (UAIK1).

6.4_Summary of urban development, spatial separation, and the programme approaches

Historically, in each of the three cities, socio-spatial separation had the purpose of dividing the city into specific quarters according to such indicators as social class, caste, religion or occupation. From a historical perspective, socio-spatial separation was obviously a deliberately-contrived phenomenon, integrated into the planning and design of each city, and totally inconsistent with today's aspiration of an equal, inclusive, and sustainable urban planning approach. The contemporary cities are similarly far from this aspiration. Although the self-provisioning settlements in all cities are particularly heterogeneous in ethnicity and income, the urban improvement programmes are doing hardly anything to integrate their populations. In Kathmandu the squatters are partially integrated as they have grouped themselves into politically active federations.

Examining the historical development, it is apparent that the occurrence of the spatial separation of quarters in all three cities is rooted in their respective urban traditions, but follows different motivations. Either the indigenous population is separated from the ruling and military ranks, such as in Cairo, by caste and occupation, as in Kathmandu, or by religious ranks, occupation, and place of origin (mobility due to pilgrimage), as in

Ulaanbaatar. To ensure these separations in all three cities, well-planned urban models were adopted, along with the help of religious rules in Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar.

In the urban fabric of present-day Kathmandu, the indigenous settlements of the low castes are also still prevalent and located near the city centre along the river, as in the Fatimid quarters of Cairo, inhabited by low-income ranks due to dilapidated architectural conditions and cheap rent. Moreover, in Kathmandu, two criteria for spatial separation are still evident: in the old quarters, the separation by caste persists, while in other urban areas, the divisions are by income. In Ulaanbaatar, by contrast, the low-income quarters south of the city centre were removed after the political change. In Kathmandu and Cairo, high-, middle-, and low-income quarters are generally located in the city centre as well as on the urban fringe, whereas Ulaanbaatar is more polarised, with the built-up structures of the socialist and post-socialist era and the *ger*-district belt mainly located north of the city, where low-income groups also live. However, in all three cities, the outskirts are mainly populated by low-income populations, with partly-gated, high-income communities residing in prime locations far away from the city centre to escape the polluted, densely populated urban areas. The self-provisioning neighbourhoods in Cairo and Ulaanbaatar as such, especially in close proximity to the city centre, are of rather mixed income structure, consisting of successful entrepreneurs, public officials, and day labourers. In all three cities, today's type of self-provisioning settlements are a product of political and economic forces; the difference is that, in Kathmandu and Cairo, a new formalisation with regard to the informal and squatter settlements has emerged, whereas, in Ulaanbaatar, the *ger* settlements have become stigmatised.

The so-called 'informal' settlements characterise the city as such due to their relative share within the urban fabric and the population. In Ulaanbaatar and Cairo, informal and *ger* settlements house approximately 60% of the urban population. On one hand, in Cairo, these settlements are very densely populated, whereas, in Ulaanbaatar, the *ger* areas are characterised by their low density, and thus also have a huge spatial share of the urban fabric. In Kathmandu, the indigenous slum settlements along with the squatter settlements have a very low share, namely, 8% of the total urban population, which is mainly due to the cultural value that landlessness is to be avoided. The social structure in Cairo is that of a loose clan structure, similar to the family and place-of-origin structures prevalent in Ulaanbaatar's *ger* settlements. This is in contrast to Kathmandu, where the squatter settlements are very heterogeneous. The characterisation of the self-provisioning settlements via the perception of

the general population in all three cities is that of higher crime rates, drug addiction, or, in *ger* areas, alcoholism. In Kathmandu, squatters are not seen as part of society, but rather are seen as tricksters trying to get rich off of the urban society. The *ger* settlements show a similar situation of isolation; they are seen as a parallel world with a backward lifestyle.

When examining the urban improvement programmes in these three cities, the GTZ-PDP appears to have been a holistic slum upgrading programme that failed to adequately integrate the urban population and was stuck at the top-down level similar to that of the GAR, which is a mere urban renewal project with an obvious top-down approach. Lumanti instead applied a flexible approach with additional tools and was not directly linked with a governmental institution.

Land tenure is one of the most important factors in self-provisioning neighbourhoods. The Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods are in the position of having titles, but as Payne, Durand-Lasserve and Rakodi (2009: 443) mentioned, this is no guarantee that they can get bank loans if the home address is an area that is known as a formerly illegal area and no safeguard against being evicted and resettled in undesirable conditions, a danger that persists thanks to the GAR. The neighbourhoods in Cairo were at least recognised by the government and land titling was on the way. In Kathmandu the federations fight for land ownership, but the general question of landlessness still has to be answered. At the moment, the process of gaining full recognition as a formal settlement is long and difficult. In all three cities, the right to occupy and use urban space according to inhabitants' needs is doubtful. Previously in Ulaanbaatar, everyone had the right to occupy 700 m^2 of land for his own purposes, but the new resolution has made this illegal. The GAR convinces landowners to give up their land, and so they lose their rights. In Kathmandu, the illegal occupation of public riverbanks is partly caused by political forces but is not tolerated by the government, as these locations are highly vulnerable to floods. The new constitution gave the settlements more rights, but not the right to their land, and though in Cairo the occupants of informal settlements traditionally "own" their land, they do not do so legally. Land titling would give them this right. However, even in the absence of an official land title, the self-provisioning neighbourhoods should have the right to be officially recognised and to feel safe from eviction.

7_Comparative analysis of the application of the case studies in the neighbourhoods

7.1_Introduction to the context neighbourhoods

In Cairo and in Ulaanbaatar over half of the total population lives in self-provisioning settlements and has thus gained a considerable share in urban structures. These self-provisioning neighbourhoods are also loosely structured by clan and place of origin, whereas, in Kathmandu, neither caste or ethnicity nor place of origin seem to play a role in the settlements, as they are quite small in size. If anything, they are rather loosely structured by number of years of establishment and consolidation.

Cairo: informal settlements in Manshiet Nasser (MN), Khazan, and Masakin

El Khazan is named after the water storage facility found in an elevated position in this area. The *shiakha* is the sixth planning zone and the most southern one in Manshiet Nasser (MN). The Autostrad (a four-to-six-lane arterial road) borders Khazan in the south. Beneath the bridge, Sekka-El-Hadid Street connects Khazan with the rest of MN in a northerly direction. To the east, cliffs that are relatively low compared to those of Masakin separate Khazan from MN7's El Zarayeb, the Zabalin area (of waste collectors). The population was roughly estimated at 20,000 in 2009. Most of the area has been carved out of the limestone of the Moqattam Hills and describes a gentle upward slope towards the east. The area was defined by the several workshops inside the settlement. The main streets, even those that were paved, were in bad condition at the time of the case study visit in 2009. Garbage was piled on street corners. The buildings, however, were in good shape, although the unplastered facades were covered with the dust and dirt emitted by the workshops. The neighbouring settlements of planning zones 2 to 6 are, to the west, the City of the Dead, across from the Autostrad, and, to the north, the formal Nasr City, a residential and business area. Both settlements are located in the Manshiet Nasser district of the Governorate Cairo.

Figure 27: Location of Masakin and Khazan within GCR. Source: Own elaboration. Pictures Source: Google Earth, 6 September 2016

El Masakin is named after the location of public services catering to most of the northern area and is the second planning zone in MN. The Autostrad reaches Masakin via Seka-El-Hadid Street in the west and provides the best vehicular access into the settlement. A retaining wall separates Masakin from the Autostrad and regulates the entrance points into MN. To the north, high cliffs separate El Masakin from MN1 Ezbet Bekhit, where a rockslide occurred in 2008. The population of Masakin was roughly estimated at 45,000 inhabitants in 2009. Entering from the Autostrad, the paved main street, El-Masakin Street, leads east into the centre of the settlement, where the service area with renovated school buildings, the Cultural Palace, and a mosque can be found. At the time of observation in 2009, the main streets were in good condition and littered with less garbage compared to Khazan. The buildings were in good shape, although, as in Khazan, the unplastered facades were covered in dust. However, some of the balconies had been painted, providing colourful accents. The corner shops and

snack bars also brightened up the street. The neighbourhood received GTZ support from 2001 until 2009.

Figure 28: Location of Sankhamul and Bansighat within KMC. Source: Own elaboration. Pictures Source: Google Earth, 6 September 2016

Kathmandu: The squatter settlements Bansighat and Sankhamul

Bansighat, located on the banks of the Bagmati River, got its name from the holy *ghat* there. In Hinduism, a *ghat* is a flight of stairs leading down to a holy river whose waters are used for such religious rites as baths, cremation, and, for Sadhus, shelter during meditation. The shrines, the platforms, and the community shelter (Nepali: pati) border the settlement to the north and are no longer in use. The northern-adjacent formal settlement is attached to the city core and comprised a mixed area of commercial and residential houses, as well as of workshops and offices, such as the Nepal Telecom Building and the Bishwa Niketan School. The neighbourhood is situated in Ward No. 11, the quarter Tripureshwor, on the east-west Tripureshwor Road corridor, less than 100 m from the national stadium, and just a few

minutes on foot from the old city centre. To the south, between the settlement and the river, the BLR existed as a dirt road in 2014. The bridge, connecting KMC and Patan Sub-Metropolitan City, was already in use at that time. The *sukumbasi* (English: landless person) settlement consisted of 156 households in 2014 and was dominated by brick and wood houses of one or two storeys.

The **Sankhamul** neighbourhood is situated in the east-central part of Kathmandu in ward number 10. However, unlike in Bansighat, it is not near the city centre but is closer to the business street of Madan Bhandari Road, which connects the core centre with the International Airport and Bhaktapur. The famous Everest Hotel, the Birendra International Convention Hall, the centre for trade fairs and huge congresses, and several banks are based along this road. The historic core area of Patan Sub-Metropolitan City is situated on the other side of the Bagmati River. The Sankhamul (*mul* in English: bridge) pedestrian bridge, also travelled by motorbikes, connects the business centre to the historic core area of Patan. The area around Sankhamul is a modern, small, dense residential and business quarter. The settlement is connected by a tarmacked main road, the Buddha Marga. In 2014, one-to-three-storey houses on 105 plots belonging to around 140 families were nestled together like a string of pearls. The eastern entrance of the settlement is marked by a pipal tree, which bears a sacred fig. Between the river to the south and the settlement, the BLR, including a sewage pipe, was under construction in September 2014.

Ulaanbaatar: The *ger* settlements Yarmag and Amgalan

Yarmag[17] gets its name from the Russian word for celebration, *yarmaga*, as it used to be the site of the national festival of Nadaam, which features horse racing, Mongolian wrestling, and archery. The neighbourhood was comprised of 590 households in 2014 and is located in the north with *kheseg*s 2,3, and 4 of the 5th *khoroo* of the Khan-Uul District (KUD). South of Yarmag, Airport Road connects the settlement to the international airport and the city, which lies 11km away. New high-rise apartment blocks have been built in the surrounding area, and Viva City, east of Yarmag, is one of the most attractive new quarters of the city, with shopping, business, and residential facilities. Yarmag itself is dominated by single-family houses surrounded by fences, with a few workshops and grocery stores on the central main road.

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[17]In the document the name of the whole settlement is used for easier understanding but refers to the case study area of *khesegs* 2, 3 and 4 of the 5th*khoroo*, Khan-Uul District (KUD).

A market hall, a school, three day care facilities, and the *khoroo* administration building are

Figure 29: Location of Amgalan and Yarmag within MUB. Source: Own elaboration. Pictures Source: Google Earth, 6 September 2016

located near Airport Road. South of the road is an area of steppes and the Nukht Valley, a recreational area for the urban population. Some herders continue to live in Yarmag, using the steppes as pasture grounds. The settlement is bordered on the north by the green banks of the Tuul River.

Amgalanbaatar[18], along with the neighbourhood of Janjin, is a historical settlement, originally settled during the anchoring time of Ikh Khuree (Mongolian) era (1778-1911). The name Amgalanbaatar means 'silent, peaceful hero', and Janjin was the name of the first culture and amusement palace of Ulaanbaatar, built in the 1920s. The area is also characterised by a monastery (now demolished), a convent, and a monument with surrounded

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[18]In the document, the name of the whole settlement is used for easier understanding but refers to the case study area of *kheseg* 2 of the 12th *khoroo*, the Bayanzurkh District (BZD).

by a small park marking Sukhbaatar's birthplace. The Janjin neighbourhood is dominated by a small square in front of the Janjin Club, which is used as a bus stop. The area is rather mixed-use, as the inhabitants have set up a number of small businesses and workshops on their premises. In the north-eastern corner, a small salt factory is in operation. Amgalanbaatar is bordered to the south by the Trans-Mongolian Railway tracks. To the north is the green area and former '*Botanik*' botanical garden and, beyond that, a business and industrial area where Power Plant Number Five is under construction. The settlement is located in *kheseg* 2 of the 12th *khoroo*, the Bayanzurkh District (BZD) and, since January 2013, has been the location of the *Ger* Area Redevelopment Programme, which aims to convert the area by transferring 177 households from single-family housing to a high-rise apartment complex.

7.1.1_Historical development

The depiction of historical development is based on comments made in the interviews relating to physical, social, and economic development and described from the inhabitants' points of view.

Cairo neighbourhoods

Manshiet Nasser has been populated since the beginning of the 1960s. At that time, it was named Ezbet El Satih. Water was not available, and inhabitants of northern settlements like **Masakin** had to fetch it from a neighbourhood near Khan el-Khalili bazaar, about 2.5 km away. The settlement's name was changed after a few public housing blocks and electricity, sewage, and water systems were introduced by President Nasser in the late 1960s. MN was populated in the north-south direction, so Masakin was one of the first areas to be populated between the early 1960s and late 1970s. Schools and sports and cultural facilities for MN were built near the Moqattam Hills. Khazan was mainly settled in the 1970s, starting with the north-western part, which today is the densest area of Khazan. The area is extremely rocky and was therefore sparsely populated. Many of the first generation residents of Masakin and Khazan came from Upper Egypt and were simple, unsophisticated people in search of work; others came from the historic quarters of the Cairo Governorate, forced out by the housing shortage. At the end of the 1970s, more and more people were escaping from the congested areas of MN and settling in Khazan. There, they found not only peace and quiet, but also more space for industries and workshops that provided jobs, so unemployment decreased. Economic conditions under President Sadat (1970-1981) improved considerably. Initially, the houses were all built on cliffs, were only one storey tall, and emitted wastewater that ran out onto the street. The first sewage systems in Khazan were built by the inhabitants themselves

and did not work well. They often leaked and ended up hollowing out the limestone cliffs. As a result, the houses on and under the cliffs were extremely precariously placed.

By the end of the 1980s, the poor situation in the settlements began to improve. The Cultural Palace was built in Masakin. After building the Marwa School in Khazan, the Cairo Governorate added a new sewage system to serve all of MN, but it often broke down and sometimes flooded the streets, and water was not in regular supply. Meanwhile, the streets were uneven. Thanks to the new sewage system, the introduction of electricity, and an improved water supply, more people moved in and Khazan increasingly carved into the eastern and southern hinterlands. A lack of building space led to an increase in the number of building storeys. Khazan was host to a great deal of factories that caused a great deal of pollution.

After 1990, even more people arrived, and the economic conditions in Khazan deteriorated. Previously, almost everyone had had a job. Now, unemployment was increasing, especially among the youth. Although the workshops and factories continued to operate in the area, change in the overall economic conditions caused a hike in prices. Outwardly, Masakin and MN looked unmanaged and dirty. The settlement became more crowded, and there was an increase in social problems such as crime, robbery, and drug use and trafficking. People had no trust in the government. By the end of the 1990s, with virtually no empty space left, the construction of new buildings had come to a halt, and Masakin began to grow vertically. Now each family had to share a floor with at least one other family. Nonetheless, even though economic conditions had taken a negative downturn, by the mid-2000s, social conditions had taken a turn for the better, and problems like crime and drug use and trafficking had decreased. The children of the first generation of settlers were now grown up and had more education. The number of schools had also increased, as had an awareness of the need for better education. However, financial problems meant that a few children continued to drop out of school in order to work in the workshops. The obsolete educational system and its backward teaching methods led to pupils having to take expensive extra lessons, offered by the teachers.

When the GTZ moved into Masakin in 2001, the settlements' technical infrastructure started to improve with the renewal of the sewage and water systems, which was also carried out in Khazan. The schools and the Cultural Palace were renovated in 2002, and a cinema and a theatre were added. To give the settlement a new face on its Autostrad side, a retaining wall was constructed in 2008. The vast majority of the streets were paved, and only the small side

lanes still needed covering. The improved physical development of the settlement was appreciated by most of the inhabitants, but economic conditions in Masakin continued to be a problem. Daily expenses and the cost of working materials for the industries and workshops had risen considerably by the mid-2000s, and prices more than doubled. In an effort to tackle the problem, a number of NGOs started not only providing services to relatives but also employing women to sew clothes and offering machines for workshops to rent. Out of 62 NGOs in 2009, five or six changed their service in offering social support, for example, education for children. 'A few young people[19] boosted their self-esteem through involvement in social or improvement projects' (CKIK06, 8-9). Social conditions changed, and some people engaged in volunteer work, which made these active people more sensitive for societal problems and, at the same time, became self-confident to face the challenges of the job market. The crime and drug abuse rate was low compared to surrounding areas. In March 2009, the southern area of Masakin above the rocks was cleared, and the inhabitants relocated either to the neighbouring *shiakha* Duweika in the newly-constructed Susan Mubarak public housing block or to some other public housing block within the Cairo Governorate. The relocation was dreaded by the building owners but welcomed by the tenants. After the revolution in 2011 interventions for the settlement and the community were 'much shorter, more numerous and locally initiated primarly' (Elmouelhi et al., 2015: 338).

Kathmandu

The first dwellers of Bansighat settled between the bank of the Bagmati River and the religious Bansi Ghat, over the course of the 1980s[20]. The NGO Lumanti dated the year of the foundation of the settlement at 1988 (Lumanti, 2001: 67). Sankhamul had been settled between the Bagmati River and the rice fields 15 years earlier, at the beginning of the 1970s, according to Lumanti in 1973 (ibid: 67). Both settlements are highly vulnerable to monsoon floods.

The upper northern part of Bansighat was settled first. At the end of the 1980s, around twelve huts were erected. The settlers came from neighbouring districts of KMC, from southern Nepal or from Kathmandu. All the houses were made of wood, plastic, and paper with small, narrow entrances and only one small room for the whole family. There were no toilets, water, drainage, or roads. Nearly every year during monsoon season, the huts were flooded. The

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[19] In 2009 no exact numbers of young people who were once actively involved in activities during implementation of the PDP also were active after phasing out of the GIZ in MN at the same year.
[20] Dates were given according to the Nepalese Calendar which starts counting with the year of Bikram Sambat (B.S.) which was approximately 56 years and 8½ months ahead of the Gregorian calendar starting with A.D. (Anno Domini) (www.ashesh.com.np/nepali-calendar/, 09/01/2012).

settlement also suffered economic and social problems, such as unemployment, a high high-school dropout rates, alcoholism, drug abuse, and crime, so that people from the outside were afraid to enter Bansighat. The eastern part of Sankhamul was initially settled with living conditions similar to Bansighat, but, there, it was settled by construction workers working on the nearby bridge construction site. The settlers originally came mainly from the surrounding northern or eastern districts of KMC, then later from all over Nepal. The lower western part was settled later, at the end of the 1980s, by people who already had jobs. They were unable to pay rent but could afford to build houses out of brick and cement, initially with only one room, a typical phenomenon. At first, migrants settled in the historic quarters of KMC – in Bansighat, mainly in Lagan *Tol* or Tebahal, and in Sankhamul, in Old Baneshwor and Bijuli Bazaar. Later on, in search of cheap land, they ended up in squatter settlements, since friends or relatives already living there or political leaders keen to win their votes encouraged them to settle there. In the beginning, the people from upper and lower Sankhamul avoided each other because of the disparate living standards. The upper part was less developed than the lower. Because they settled on the riverbank near the rice fields, the farmers from Patan and Baneshwor often came and destroyed their houses. Increased unity within the community and political support finally put an end to the violence in 1988. In 1991[21], the ward office registered the inhabitants on the voters list during the first democratic election and supported the community's rights. As a result, the provision of technical infrastructure was also initiated much earlier than in Bansighat. Sankhamul enjoyed limited electricity service starting in 1985, with the outside households illegally tapping into it. Fortunately, every household has had its own legal electrical supply since 1997. In 1995, the *Tol* Development Committee (TDC) and *tol* attaché (English: neighbourhood chairperson) were elected and registered. From that time on, residents were able to officially apply for any urban service, so the KMC office, through the ward office, financially supported the installation of some street lights, as well as the sanctioning of an increased number of water tanks. At the beginning of the 1990s, since the farmland was no longer in use, political leaders suggested the inhabitants move to the upper part of the settlement, along the main street, where they are located to this day. The houses are now constructed of brick and cement.

A second wave of migration hit Bansighat in the early 1990s, due to political change. In 1997, after the election of local political leaders in Nepal, the ward office provided the dwellers with certificates of birth, marriage, and citizenship, as well as with family identity cards, transforming them into official citizens of Nepal. After that, the new chairperson provided

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[21]For more historical details please see appendix, chapter 'Brief political, economic and social overview' in each city.

land for housing, and the population increased. With the emergence of national NGOs such as Lumanti, CWIN, and EHDAG by the end of the 1990s, introducing their health care and education projects, the settlement began to change. Slight development could be observed from the beginning of the new century. Children were attending school again, as the NGOs encouraged young people to form a youth club and established a children's group with tuition classes. The main northern road was constructed, and water tanks and electricity were installed in 1998. Living conditions improved as construction procedures developed, and rooms were added to houses. Lumanti supported the construction of private or shared toilets in Bansighat and Sankhamul. With the introduction of the women's savings and credit programme by Lumanti in 1999 and 2000, more people were then able to renew their houses either by taking out a loan or by using their own savings. The last big flood occurred in the summer of 2004, and, after a difficult recovery, Bansighat started to develop in a more organised way with help from the outside. Compared to Bansighat, Sankhamul was more open to social involvement, as urban services had already been constructed, and education was held to be important.

However, things took another turn. During the civil war at the beginning of the 2000s, members of the Maoist Party entered the squatter settlements of KMC and solicited support for their party and in the fight for the area's future development. Bansighat supported the Maoists, the NGOs vanished, and the community almost fell apart. After the people's movement in April 2006, the inhabitants of Bansighat were able return to their normal, daily routines with more optimism. In 2008, forty more households settled with support from the Maoists. As the Maoists now had posts in the municipality, the construction of drainage and additional water tanks could be sanctioned more speedily in 2007/2008, and all inhabitants were legally supplied with electricity. Nevertheless, in 2008, Bansighat still had problems with education, employment, and its economic situation. In Sankhamul, the Maoists were unable to gain power, as the inhabitants comprised united, and socially active in different committees and foundations. After the Maoists lost power in Bansighat due to unsupported decisions made in 2012, the community became more united. Even though land titles still had not been distributed, the inhabitants of both neighbourhoods negotiated with the governmental institutions for the construction of the BLR and to avoid eviction so that a state of safety and lawfulness could be established in 2010. Subsequently, a bridge over the river was constructed in Bansighat, and the road was widened to link the settlement with the city's road network. Since then, both settlements have moved ahead in improving living standards and economic stability.

Ulaanbaatar

The two neighbourhoods in Ulaanbaatar have different reasons for their founding and are also unique among the other *ger* settlements in the north of the city. Before permanent settlement, **Yarmag** was used as a summer recreation area for government and *Kombinat* (people's owned company during the socialist era) staff. In 1966, a flood occurred and the affected people escaped to their summer homes in Yarmag. Each family was given a piece of land, and they – mostly industrial workers from the leather processing factory and the footwear and sewing factories – settled permanently. In 1969, school Number. 41 and, 10 years later, childcare centres Number 29 and 71 opened in the *khoroo*. In 1969, three deep wells were dug for drinking water, and electricity was also supplied. That same year, two public apartment buildings were built for 80 families on the southern border. A market hall and a bath house also began operation. In 1978, with the administrative reform, the name was changed from the 2nd and 3rd khorin to the '8th *khoroo* of residential buildings avenue'. **Amgalanbaatar** was a historical place related to Ikh Khuree as well as to Naima, the Chinese trading town. According to the residents, the Amgalanbaatar site was originally settled by their predecessors in 1910 as a place to plant vegetables and escape from the overcrowded town. Directly bordering the neighbourhood to the south and east, respectively, are the 300-year-old Dolmaling convent and the birthplace of Sukhbaatar. Sukhbaatar, born in 1893, was the hero of the 1921 People's Revolution. In 1922, the Janjin Club was built as Ulaanbaatar's first cultural building. The convent was used as a school after the purge in 1938. At the end of the 1960s, the elementary school Number 8 and an apartment building were built. In 1980, childcare centre Number 20 was added. At the start of the 1980s, inhabitants of the area around Janjin were relocated to northern districts (Sharkhad, 'seven stops') due to the laying of water and sewage pipes near the train tracks. The people moved back after the construction work was completed, but the households were not connected to the supply or disposal lines. In socialist times, the *khoroo* was called the 'Friendship Region'. Except for the inhabitants of the public apartment buildings in both settlements, the vast majority of the inhabitants had previously lived in *gers*.

After the political changes of 1990, the overall conditions changed. People were unemployed, and the poverty rate was steep. In Yarmag, in the 5th *khoroo* in particular, the industrial workers lost their jobs. Compared to Amgalan and other *ger* settlements in MUB, the unemployment rate was higher, while income levels and living standards were lower. As a result, the residents experienced virtually no improvement in social or economic terms

compared to the 10 previous years. Although both settlements enjoyed a stable community, migration affected the case study settlements, in Amgalan more than in Yarmag, where the second and third generation were then growing up. A first migration wave hit Amgalan in the mid-1990s and a second one at the beginning of the 2000s, with people from neighbouring *aimags*, Zavkhan and Khovd (respectively west and north-west of MUB), in search of employment or education for their children. Almost every newcomer already had relatives living in Amgalan. In Yarmag, migration followed the same pattern as in Amgalan, with people coming mainly from the MUB districts or the southern neighbouring Tuv *aimag* to Yarmag, the 5th *khoroo*. After 1995, the first houses were built in Amgalan, and, since the early 2000s, initially slow and then, after 2007, rapid development could be observed throughout the whole city. In the mid-2000s, the international NGO World Vision entered Amgalan, introducing the savings and credit scheme and several training programmes. In the 5th *khoroo,* the national NGO Human Development Centre (HDC) introduced the savings and credit scheme via family funds, but in neither of the settlements did it gain the same popularity as in the KMC neighbourhoods. In Amgalanbaatar World Vision built a small hospital as well a library and a water kiosk behind the Janjin Club and renovated the elementary school. Since 2010, a local NGO, with the support of World Vision, has been conducting training and recreational activities for the children. In addition, the Mongolian government invested in a two-storey extension of the childcare centre in 2004 and built the *khoroo* administration building in 2012. Yarmag's third childcare centre opened in 2007. The Korean NGO Good Neighbours started operations in 2013, offering training for unemployed people and childcare. Illegal settlers started occupying the strip between the slope and the river protection zone; they mainly came from Yarmag, but also from other *ger* districts in MUB. In both settlements, inhabitants were grateful for the tarmacking of the main roads in the late 2000s. In Yarmag, street lighting was a problem; it had been provided in socialist times but had not been extended beyond 1990. In 2010, the installation of streetlights was begun, and, thanks to the Regional Fund, most roads in both settlements could be served. The *Ger* Area Redevelopment Programme commenced in Amgalan in 2013. The old historic building of Janijn Club was demolished and replaced by a new one, and 17 families moved in at the end of the same year.

Visualisation of neighbourhood growth

Khazan and Masakin

| 1977 | 1991 | 2002 | 2009 |

Bansighat

Sankhamul

Yarmag

Amgalan

Maps Source: Own elaboration

7.1.2_The spatial analysis of settlement and residence patterns

(see also the spatial analysis maps of the neighbourhoods in the appendix, section III)

The condition and usage of buildings, as well as people's living conditions and the ways in which they use settlement structures, such as open public spaces, are described in order to provide an overview of the physical appearance of the settlements today.

Cairo - neighbourhoods

El Khazan is one of the most accessible settlements for vehicles in MN, as the paved El Khazan Street provides direct access from the Autostrad in both northerly and southerly directions. At the time of observation in 2009, the inner road network was characterised by a lot of narrow, dark branches, which came to a dead end at the eastern cliffs, leaving no space for squares or parks. Men would mainly gathered inside tea and coffee shops. The northern part was dominated by small plots and was almost 100% built-up, which was typical for MN. The southern part was characterised by larger plots suitable for factories and storage, which was unique in MN, and as such was less dense; it included 3% vacant land as well as the water storage facility, which occupied 19% of Khazan at the time. The area was predominantly residential, even though 40% of the buildings were of mixed use, with factories and workshops on the ground floors and dwelling units on the upper floors. Almost half of the industries and workshops processed metal products. Some of them were metal foundries, which posed a serious air pollution issue (GTZ-PDP, 2007a: 8). A public vocational training centre also existed in the south, and El-Warsha Street could potentially have been developed into a commercial strip. Within Khazan, a few social and religious facilities served the inhabitants. Ninety-four per cent of all houses had been constructed as permanent concrete buildings[22], and just 6% consisted of retaining wall constructions[23]. In the northern, denser part, there were some six-to-eight-storey houses, but half of the houses only had four or five storeys. Seventy-four per cent of all buildings were in good condition[24] and of mixed use. Just 5% were in bad condition[25] and vacant.

El Masakin is vehicle-accessible from the Autostrad via two main entrances from the main street, El-Masakin Street, in the north and, in the south, from Al-Kabari Street. Pedestrian

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[22]Concrete construction is a kind of construction system that uses supporting pillars and beams like a frame constructed in (reinforced) concrete.
[23] Retaining-wall construction or per-wall construction is a kind of construction system that works with retaining walls of concrete and brick with no supporting frame construction. This construction system is older and requires more building materials, as the building walls have to support the whole house.
[24]Good building condition: leak-proof roofs, resistant building materials, freshly painted surfaces, and few signs of wear.
[25]Bad building condition: ramshackle appearance, building materials show significant damage, like leaks in the roof, holey and unsound wood, cracks in the façade, broken windows, et cetera.

walkways, stairways, and lanes made the settlement more pedestrian-accessible. The entire settlement rose up to the limestone cliffs in the east, which dominate the settlement. Much of it consisted of winding paths that came to a dead end at some rocks. El-Masakin Street in the north widened into a square-like formation at the service area. It functioned as a meeting place for people worshipping at the mosque and using one of the social facilities, such as the schools, the Cultural Palace, the medical centre, and the sports ground and covered 20% of the settlement, resulting in a lower density than in the rest of Masakin. The middle and southern areas of Masakin were predominantly small plots, up to 100% built-up. The settlement was mainly residential. The western part, along the Autostrad and Al-Kabari Street, had the potential to develop into a commercial strip. Masakin was known for its auto workshops. Fifty-one per cent of the buildings were of mixed use, with commercial enterprises and workshops on the ground floors and dwelling units on the upper floors. The predominant industries in Masakin processed metal products (27%), wood products (15%), and clothing and textiles (12%) (GTZ-PDP, 2007a: 8). Forty-three per cent of residential buildings were found in the inner blocks of the settlement. Within Masakin, six mosques served the religious community, and a number of NGOs offered social services, mostly located in the northern part. Four per cent of the houses were of light construction[26], 54% consisted of retaining wall constructions, and 41% had been constructed as permanent concrete buildings. Thirteen per cent of houses had more than five floors, and half of them were four or five storeys tall. The condition of the houses was not as good as in Khazan; one reason was that the houses in Masakin were constructed earlier. Fifty-seven per cent of houses were in medium condition[27], 17% in good condition, and 26% in bad condition. This last category of housing was built as semi-permanent light-construction or retaining-wall constructions.

Social and technical infrastructure

The residents of Khazan have been socially underserved. As in Masakin, inhabitants were required to use outside **health facilities**. Eighty per cent of the families interviewed used private health facilities. Sixty per cent of public facilities could only be reached by car or public transport, but provided the cheapest treatment. A small private clinic was located in Khazan and another one in MN 7, just a 15-minute walk from Khazan. However, the quality of the service was poor. Marwa **Primary School** was the only one in Khazan. Thirty per cent

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[26] Light construction is a kind of construction without supporting walls or pillars, using such building materials as mud. This is the oldest kind of construction, and the first houses in MN were built in this style. These houses cannot be built higher than two or, at the most, three storeys.
[27] Middle building condition: traces of wear, like peeling paint, rusty roofs, weathered façade, et cetera.

of the families interviewed sent their children to this school. Pupils attending preparatory or secondary schools had to use either the nearby Sadat or Gabarti preparatory schools in MN 7[28]. Transportation was necessary to reach these schools. No sports club, cultural centre, or play area for children was provided in Khazan, but all of them were available in Masakin. There were several schools in Masakin; 50% of families interviewed sent their children either to one of the primary schools or to the preparatory school. The other families sent their children either to private primary or preparatory schools in Abbasiya or to a public school in the Bab El-Shariya neighbourhood.

With German financial support through the KfW, the Cairo Governorate renewed the main sewage system and water supply line in both settlements between 2005 and 2007. In addition, schools and sports and cultural facilities were provided. A new fire station was constructed for MN in 2009, on the opposite side of the Autostrad. A supply of drinking water was guaranteed by the installation of water taps in flats and houses. Ninety-nine per cent of flats were provided with electricity and connected to the sewage system, but just 50% of households interviewed benefited from solid waste collection. Another infrastructural problem was that just 25% of the streets in Khazan were paved (CKIK02, 13-13), as compared to 80% in Masakin. Additionally, the water quality was not sufficiently good, and, in summer, the supply would sometimes be cut for several hours. Public transportation was provided inside the settlements by private shuttle buses and along the Autostrad by public buses. According to the inhabitants of Khazan, unresolved problems in technical infrastructure included the unmanaged solid-waste collection, the insufficient sewage system, unpaved roads, and a fire station that was too far away to reach the area in time to actually put out a fire. Moreover, gaps in infrastructure in Masakin included a leaking sewage system, poor drinking-water quality, winding, narrow and steep streets, ramshackle buildings, and a lack of open space due to the extreme population density, along with its attendant problems of noise and pollution. Also lacking were waste collection, adequate medical services, and public transportation within MN.

Residence pattern

The actual **living conditions** of a family are determined by the condition and state of maintenance of the house or flat and the available living space. The ratio of homeownership to tenancy in the Cairo settlements was different from that in Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar. In

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[28]The school system in Egypt was divided into: primary school, 1st -6th class; preparatory school, 7th – 9th class; and secondary school, 10th – 12th class. Education is compulsory only at the primary level between the ages of six and twelve and is free, though children have to provide their own uniforms and textbooks.

Khazan, 56% and, in Masakin, 66% of houses were rented through the old rental system. In Khazan, 80% of the houses and flats where the interviews were carried out were in good condition, while 20% were in middle condition. The latter were single-storey houses and were leased. The two families living in them lacked sufficient living space[29], as did 50% of all the households interviewed. Three households consisted of more than four people living in one room, and, in one case, nine people were living in one room. On average, 2.2 people lived in one room. By contrast, the standard of living in Masakin was higher, with an average of 1.6 people sharing one room, although the condition of the houses was worse. Just 10% of the houses and flats in Masakin were in good condition, 70% in middle condition, and 20% in bad condition. However, 90% of households interviewed had enough living space. Twenty-two per cent of those with sufficient living space had as many rooms as there were people. The only family with insufficient living space was a tenant who was a single mother, living with three people to a room. The reasons for poor **maintenance** were lack of money and internal conflicts among tenants. In Khazan, two other reasons were also cited. In one case, an occupant was reluctant to invest in the house, as it was close to the cliffs and he might eventually have to leave (CKII03, 38-38). The other reason cited was the ending of the lease agreement in two years' time.

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

Bansighat is located on a small slope with its lowest part on the riverside, whereas **Sankhamul** is in a flat area. In the western and eastern parts of Bansighat, respectively, 25 and 24 new single-storey houses were built in 2008. One of the main squares and meeting places was located in the older northern part of the neighbourhood. The community building was situated in this square, as well as a tube well, a pipal tree, and a water tank, where women lined up to get water whenever the water tanker came. There were also some small grocery stores. A second important square lay to the lower eastern side and was not as frequented as the northern one. For the most part, women from the neighbouring houses met there to talk and wash clothes or to bathe at the well. Along the BLR, a pierced wall was constructed to divide the road from the settlement, and a number of small snack shops were used as meeting places, mainly by men. As a rule, the custom in Nepal is for people to meet in the morning before breakfast and again in the evening before dinner. The two lower parts of Bansighat were formed by narrow lanes and were more densely built up than other areas. Almost all the plots in the older upper part consisted of a house with a small garden at the back. The two

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[29] Sufficient living space was defined as being when no more than two people were sharing one room.

new parts were mainly characterised by temporary single-storey houses made of wooden planks. All buildings in Bansighat were being used as living accommodation, except for a few with shops on the ground floors. Most of the 42% of two-storey buildings could be found in the two older lower parts. A study by Lumanti analysed the construction types of houses in Bansighat: 31% of inhabitants lived in semi-permanent houses[30] and 69% in temporary houses[31]. None of the families in Bansighat lived in a permanent housing (Shrestha, 2008: 66). The condition of the buildings as a whole was 53% good. Fourteen per cent of the older buildings did not require renewal, but 4% were in bad condition.

Sankhamul is accessible via the tarmacked Buddha Marga Road, with the entrance at the Sankhamul Bridge. The Sankhamul settlement is divided into two parts: the older upper eastern part and the lower western part. All the houses nearest the road were terraced. The settlement was extendable only via the plots near the river. The eastern entrance area with a pipal tree in front was a meeting place, especially for the men. Four small corner shops and two snack shops provided everyday necessities and were also used as meeting places. The youth club was situated in the upper part, and the child-care centre and the former community building in the lower part. Three Hindu shrines and one Buddhist temple, built by the community, fulfilled religious needs and also acted as meeting places. Inhabitants sat outside and passed the time talking with neighbours and passers-by. Low brick walls had been built in front of the houses and were used for sitting and to define a private zone between the buildings and the road. Toilets were situated behind the houses, and vegetable gardens, now partially removed by the BLR, had been laid out for extended families. Most families lived together, with several generations sharing one plot. All buildings in Sankhamul were partially used for living. In one case, three different households bred cattle and other livestock in sheds behind the houses. The upper part of Sankhamul consisted mainly of single-storey houses; three three-storey houses were of recent permanent construction. The two-storey houses were located in the lower part. An analysis by Lumanti of the construction type of the houses in Sankhamul concluded that 99% were semi-permanent and just 1% were temporary (Shrestha, 2008: 66). The condition of the buildings was: 61% in good condition, 30% in medium condition, and 9% in bad condition. Particularly in the lower part of Sankhamul, most houses in bad condition were tenanted.

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[30]Permanent houses are constructed with walls made either of brick and mud or brick and cement, with corrugated iron sheets for roofs.
[31]Temporary houses are mainly made of wood.

Social and technical infrastructure

For emergency treatment, inhabitants from both settlements went to the **public hospitals** in the surrounding area. In the case of Bansighat, this meant Teku Hospital, 800 m away, or Bir Hospital, 1.7 km away. For the residents of Sankhamul, Patan Hospital was 2 km away and Bir Hospital 5.5 km, requiring transportation. To save money and avoid travelling, 70% of Bansighat residents and 50% in Sankhamul preferred to first visit a traditional healer (Nepali: *jaakhri*[32]). **Public and private schools** were in close proximity to both settlements. In Bansighat, most children attended either the neighbouring Bishwo Niketan School, which had a private and public part, or the Basantapur Governmental School, 1.6 km away. In Sankhamul, the children mostly attended the governmental Patan School, the directly neighbouring SV Private School and College, or the Crimson College 500 m away.

For the provision of **technical infrastructure**, a consumer committee of residents from the neighbourhood had to be formed, which was responsible for and acted on behalf of the whole community. All households in both settlements were served with electricity and drainage. In Sankhamul, the higher part had septic tanks, and all households had their own toilets. In Bansighat, 75% of the households had a private toilet. In Sankhamul, drinking water was provided by five (one was not in use) water tanks provided by several institutions, including the ADB and the Embassy of the Czech Republic. In September 2014, there were four water tanks in Bansighat, filled by water tankers daily and after a call of the responsible inhabitant at the water supply authority. Eighteen per cent of households in Bansighat and 40% in Sankhamul had their own tube wells for drinking water. In both neighbourhoods, the water had to be treated to make it drinkable, and water for washing purposes was provided by public tube wells constructed by the residents. Solid waste collection in both settlements was organised by the ward office with support from the residents, while street lighting was insufficient.

Residence pattern

The **living conditions** of the families in Kathmandu were, by some indicators, better than in Cairo. Thirty per cent of households interviewed in Bansighat lived in buildings in bad condition, 30% in middle condition, and 40% in good condition. Thirty per cent of households interviewed in both settlements did not have enough living space, with between six and 10 people living in two rooms. Seventy per cent had sufficient space, with a maximum of two

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32 The *jaakhri* is a medicine and spiritual person in Shamanism and originates from an ancient Nepalese culture. In most remote areas, the *jaakhri* is the only person serving sick, depressed, or anxious people, as health services are far away.

people per room. A total of 1.6 people shared a room in Bansighat, and 1.7 in Sankhamul. However, people in rented accommodation often lived in very cramped conditions, with a family of two parents and two children living all together in one room. In three cases, single rooms were rented to families. Living conditions in Sankhamul were better than in Khazan, with 70% of households interviewed living in buildings in good condition, 20% in in middle condition, and 10% in bad condition. These figures reflect the fact that some families were living in temporary wooden houses in newly-constructed parts of the settlement. The reasons given for the lack of **maintenance** were primarily a lack of money and the fact that the residents had no land ownership certificates and so could be easily evicted. This was also the reason why some households that, in 2008, could have made the investment in constructing their houses to a permanent standard, did not do so. However, since the 2001 arrangement with the BLR, affecting both settlements, three permanent houses of three storeys each have been constructed in Sankhamul. Other reasons given for lack of maintenance in Sankhamul were that all the income was being invested in the education of the children or was needed to cover rising daily expenses for cooking gas and food.

Ulaanbaatar – Neighbourhoods

The neighbourhood of **Yarmag** is located on a plateau above the Tuul River, and the settlement gently rises northwards in the direction of Airport Road. A steep slope separates the settlement from the green riverbanks to the north. The families who settled illegally found space just below the slope in a flood-prone area. The neighbourhood is accessible from Airport Road via two main streets that lead northward and border the settlement. Except in one case, all service roads follow the double plot development, atypical for a *ger* settlement. The service roads were, on average, over 300 m long, with no pedestrian paths to provide shortcuts in between. As the settlements were measured and planned after the flood, plots were sometimes just 240 m^2 in size. As a result, the older southern settlement is much denser than that in the north, in *kheseg* Number 4. The average plot size in Yarmag counts 451 m^2, and, in Amgalan, it is significantly higher, at 760 m^2. In general, the settlement had the feel of a village, surrounded by a landscape of a river, steppes, and hills. The typical appearance of an Amgalan-like *ger* area with detached houses was found mainly in *kheseg* 4. The southern part was comprised of more attached houses, some even attached to houses in neighbouring plots. In general, the *ger* settlements were denser in winter, when more *gers* were built in order to reduce heating costs. An uninsulated house of several rooms is more demanding to heat than one room in a felt-insulated *ger*. The south-facing plots had houses mainly located

on the northern border so as to receive as much sunlight as possible and allow for an open space in front, as described in the scheme outlined in Chapter 6.3.3. The northern plots solved the problem of lack of sunlight by placing the houses at either an eastern or western corner, or to the north, beside the entrance. The open spaces inside the plots were mainly unused and of bare soil. The settlement was predominantly used for residential purposes. One cattle herder in the neighbourhood lived near the slope, which was also used as an unofficial open-air dumping site by the residents. Five corner shops served the residents with everyday goods while also acting as social meeting places. Outdoor leisure areas or green spaces were rare, as most of the space was privately used or functioned as a circulation area. In summer, local residents used the riverbanks as recreational and meeting places. In both settlements, the water kiosks, which had fixed opening hours, were also used as meeting places. The majority of the houses, namely 77%, were made of brick or concrete blocks and cement, and were plastered, whereas 11% were constructed of brick and cement. A few massive wooden houses could also be found. All houses bar one had just one storey. Two of the families interviewed in the illegal settlement lived in *gers,* which was not the case in Amgalan. There, only one family lived in a *ger*, as they were hoping to exchange the land for an apartment. Twenty-two per cent of the houses were in good condition, 64% in medium condition, and 14% in bad condition. Those in bad condition were mainly those with plastered façades and a brick-cement construction, plus a few with visible brick-cement construction.

The **Amgalan** neighbourhood could be accessed from both the north and south by one tarmacked main road, which also made way for the buses that crossed the square in front of the Janjin Club. The service roads bordered in rather perimeter block structure than appeared as long lanes, typical for other *ger* settlements as well as for Yarmag. As it was a historic area, there were also some unique buildings, like the newly rebuilt Janjin Club and a privately-owned site of a former monastery in dilapidated condition, since demolished in 2013 to make way for an electricity substation. The settlement was on flat land and had the character of a single-family housing area, though the situation was actually more complex, as plots were being used by up to three families each. In addition, some elderly people each had plots of around 500m^2. The use of the area was predominately residential, with some centrally located public buildings, such as the school, the childcare centre, the *khoroo* administration building, and the two cultural buildings, the Janjin Club and the library, as well as the hospital. Fifteen per cent of the buildings were used for storage or as garages. Some of the residents also used their plots commercially: the daily needs of the inhabitants were catered to by six grocery stores, five of which were located on the main road. There was also one industrial building,

the salt factory, located in the northern part of town. A number of greenhouses were used for growing vegetables for additional income. By far, the dominant construction style was the façade faced with brick, which accounted for 95% of all buildings. Some administrative buildings had plastered facades with a brick and cement construction. The demolished monastery and the library had a wood-brick construction. A few of the public and commercial buildings were two storeys tall. Eighty-four per cent of the buildings were in medium condition, 13% in good condition, and 3% in bad condition. The last were mainly storage and garage buildings. As part of the Ger Area Redevelopment programme, 17% of the houses had already been demolished.

Social and technical infrastructure

The provision of **public health care** in both settlements was guaranteed through health posts. In Amgalan, there was a small hospital staffed by five doctors and six nurses; in Yarmag, a health post on the second floor of the *khoroo* building was provided. Amgalan was provided with a **public school** and a public childcare centre. Both were used by the residents and could be reached within five minutes on foot. In Yarmag, children were sent to the 41st School, which had elementary, secondary, and high school units; they were also sent to another neighbouring school with better educational standards. The three childcare centres in the 5th *khoroo*, however, were not nearby and required a 20-30 minute walk. Both settlements were underserved by educational institutions, as the childcare centres were overcrowded by over twice their capacity, a problem afflicting the whole city. Public institutions in both settlements were served by a decentralised coal-heating plant and their own septic tank.

In all the *ger* settlements, individual heating and **water supply** and sewage systems were non-existent. Electricity was provided to all households. Wastewater was emptied into a hole inside each plot, and toilets were mere pit latrines. In both settlements, the waste collector was supposed to come four times a month, but this was not reliable. *Khoroo* and *kheseg* leaders provided garbage bags for the collection of waste, which was then stored on the plot until the waste collector came. The drinking water supply was guaranteed by two public water kiosks (Sigel, 2010: 7;Uddin et al, 2014:405), which, in Amgalan, were refilled by water tankers. In the 5th *khoroo,* the northernmost kiosk was not working, another was a deep well, and the third was served by a water supply line, constructed in 2006 by the ADB. In all three cases, fetching water took 15 to 30 minutes, whereas, in Amgalan, it took just five minutes. **Public transportation** was provided by buses. Both settlements had one operating bus and a bus station terminal. In the 5th *khoroo,* along Airport Road, public buses and private minivans

provided a service every five to 10 minutes. The bus station was a 30-minute walk from the neighbourhood, so, in 2013, private minibuses were provided to wait for customers at the bus station. Other negative aspects in both settlements included the absence of direct supplies to the plots, which meant that, in winter, the houses and *gers* had to be heated with expensive, untreated coal, causing heavy air pollution. Moreover, in both settlements, the solid waste collector did not come regularly. The slope leading to the illegal settlement in Yarmag was slippery when it rained and even more treacherous in winter, when it was covered with ice. The whole settlement, as perceived by its inhabitants, was dusty, with roads piled with garbage, especially in the illegal part. Further problems in both settlements were the unhygienic conditions of the public apartment buildings, which had primitive pit latrines and garbage piles within the compound.

Residence pattern

The **living conditions** in Yarmag differed dramatically from those in Amgalan. The families in the illegal area had to travel long distances for all services and still lived in *gers*, with three people in each, whereas, in Amgalan, just one family lived in each *ger* while they waited for the *Ger* Area Redevelopment programme to exchange their land for an apartment. However, in both Yarmag and Amgalan, families were waiting for better opportunities to invest in the construction of their houses. In Yarmag, 30% of the households interviewed lived in crowded conditions, with three to four people in one room. On average, 1.9 people lived in one room; in Amgalan, the average was 1.2 people per room, and there were actually two households with more rooms than people, since the children had moved out. The condition of the houses was similar in the two settlements. Each had four families living in houses in good condition. Three families in Yarmag and five in Amgalan lived in houses in medium condition, and one family in Yarmag lived in the only wooden house, which was in bad condition. The main reason they gave for lack of maintenance was scarcity of money. In Amgalan, investment in and maintenance of housing was carried out by every household, with the exception of those living in *gers* and the renting families. For people living in *gers* and self-constructed houses, the risk of fire was constant, due to unprofessionally installed electric lines.

7.1.3_The socio-economic analysis of the neighbourhood community

This section begins by highlighting the living and working structures of the inhabitants, then goes on to examine relations between the inhabitants of the neighbourhoods.

<u>Cairo - Neighbourhoods</u>

The **composition of the families** interviewed offers further insights into the social structure of the neighbourhood. In Khazan in 2001, the average family size was estimated to be 4.5 people and, in Masakin, 4.1 people (GTZ, 2001, Table 5.2). This increased to five people and remained constant in both settlements until 2009. Almost 70% of inhabitants were under 30 years old (GTZ-PDP, 2005: 19). Households were raising between two and six children, with an average of 4.1 children in the families interviewed. In Masakin, the families interviewed were bigger, with two to eight children per family and an average 4.8 children. Thirty per cent of the families interviewed in Khazan consisted of single mothers. The typical family in both neighbourhoods was either the nuclear family[33] or the extended family[34], but there were also examples of the joint family[35].

In Khazan, people working in handicraft workshops as their main **occupation** accounted for about 19%, whereas, in Masakin, the figure was 8%. However, 36% in Khazan and 35% in Masakin were unemployed (GTZ-PDP, 2005a). These high figures reflect the fact that most of the married women had no income. Ten per cent of men were unemployed, whereas two-thirds of women had no occupation (GTZ-PDP, 2005: 20). The occupations of the interviewees included labourers, drivers, tailors, lawyers, teachers, shopkeepers, and factory or business owners. Occupations in Masakin included technicians, lawyers, and officials. In 60% of families interviewed, just one person was the breadwinner, and, in 40%, several people contributed to the family income. For 70% of workers in Khazan, their place of work was near their residence, either located in Khazan or inside their house. Twenty per cent of the people interviewed worked in the neighbouring district of Nasr City, and, in Masakin, 50% had to commute to other parts of Cairo. According to a 2005 survey, 73% of households in Khazan and 65% in Masakin had a monthly income below the average MN income of 500 LE (GTZ-PDP, 2005a). A high number of households lived below the poverty line, but Masakin had a higher income level than some other neighbourhoods in MN. One explanation for this could be the stable income of the officials. Literacy levels were not higher, however. For example, the illiteracy rate in both Khazan and Masakin was 38% (GTZ-PDP, 2005a). In

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[33]Nuclear family: parents and their children
[34]Extended family: a group of nuclear families from several generations acting together as a virtual unit (GANS, 1981, 45)
[35]Joint family: comprised of at least two generations in one household

Khazan, the high unemployment rate, especially among the youth, and the problem of child labour were the problems most often stated. The incivility of other inhabitants also caused dissatisfaction, as did the overall circumstance of being unemployed with no prospects, resulting in drug dealing, drug abuse, and the undermining of feelings of responsibility (CKIK04, 13-13).

A description of **living circumstances** draws a realistic picture. In Khazan, all families living in rented accommodation were comprised of single mothers, street vendors, or people receiving support from religious or public institutions (CKII05, 19-19, 21-21; CKII08, 19-19). By contrast, families with an income above 500 LE were homeowners running their own enterprises and leasing flats and workshops; in Masakin, some were also officials working outside MN or overseas and had more people contributing to the family income. Income inequality in Khazan was enormous, with the rich and poor often living side by side. Unlike in Khazan, the divide between the poor tenant and rich owner could not be confirmed in Masakin, as two home-owning families earned less than 500 LE per month, and two families living in rented accommodation earned more than 500 LE per month. However, the houses of these owners were the ones in bad condition.

Family networks were very strong in Khazan, and the community was characterised by the families or clans and their cohesion. Sixty per cent of families interviewed had other members of their family living in the neighbourhood. 'In Khazan, there are two categories of families, mostly from Upper Egypt, but one was from Assjud the other from Asswan. They all belong to one of the families. This was the main reason for trust between people' (CKIK02, 8-8). Even though two of the families with the single mothers were originally from Upper Egypt, they had no family ties within the neighbourhood. Some other low-income families also had no family ties, except in Masakin, where the low-income households had either kinship or friendship ties within the neighbourhood. On the other hand, people originating from Cairo, namely, the historic neighbourhood of Gamaliyya, had family bonds within MN and Khazan. In Masakin, 80% of the families interviewed had other members of their family or friends living in the neighbourhood. Some areas of Masakin consisted of families originating from one area. The family network was strengthened when married children also lived in MN.

Relations between inhabitants in Khazan were judged by the inhabitants themselves to be half positive and half negative, but, in Masakin, 60% were negative. The people who stated that they had good relations with other inhabitants were those with close ties. According to the leader of a local NGO, in Khazan relations between Muslims and Christians were positive

(CKIK03, 9-9). Relations between the two religions were frequently the subject of discussions after the interviews, and the impression given was that relations were still tense. The rockslide calamity of 2008, after which some were accused of benefiting from the misfortunes of others, was still a source of trouble and tension among the inhabitants (CKIK01, 11-11). Fights have been known to break out that have required police intervention (field visit in Masakin, March 2009).

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

In Bansighat in 2001, the average household was made up of 4.5 people (Lumanti, 2001: 67), increasing to 5.1 people in 2008 (ibid, 2008, 41), except in Sankhamul, where the household size decreased from 5.1 people in 2001 to 4.8 in 2008 (ibid, 2001, 68; ibid, 2008, 41), according to a list of inhabitants from the *Chairman* 4.4 in 2008[36]. **Family composition** in Bansighat varied from household to household: most of the families interviewed were raising four children, the average being 3.6; in Sankhamul, the average was 3.9. One family was an exception with 10 children. Since most of the households in both settlements settled in the 1970s or early 1980s, the children had grown up and migrated to other legal parts of the city or had married into other areas. Only the younger brothers and sisters were still living with their parents, or children of younger parents. In both settlements, the typical family was a nuclear family or, in the case of Sankamul, sometimes an extended family. The joint family also still existed in both settlements and was seen as a preferred living composition. Most of the inhabitants in both settlements owned the house where they lived, while only a few people rented.

The main **occupation** in Bansighat, at 45%, was in the service sector. Thirty per cent worked in small businesses, and the rest worked in other sectors (Shrestha, 2008:68). Interviewee occupations included labourers, cooks, technicians, drivers, street sweepers, salespeople, security guards, and members of the armed forces. In 70% of cases, several people contributed to the family income, and, in Sankhamul, this figure rose to 90%. There, interviewee occupations included labourers, cooks, bulldozer operators, office workers, tailors, and others who ran their own businesses or worked abroad.

Apart from those who had a shop within the settlements, other working people had to commute to different places in the city. In Bansighat, the average monthly **income** was estimated at 4,026 RS in 2008, and, in Sankhamul, 5,741 RS (Lumanti, 2008). Bansighat was

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[36]The exact Nepalese date of the document is: 20/05/2065 B.S. (5 September 2008 BCE)

in poor economic condition due to an unemployment problem caused by the low level of education (KBIK03, 24-24; KBIK05, 20-20), whereas people in Sankhamul had better job opportunities thanks to better education. In addition, the savings and credit scheme helped people go and work abroad. Lower income families in Bansighat had a very low standard of living, like the households in the new parts of the settlement, because they invested their money in their huts without getting loans from the cooperatives. As renters and new migrants, they were not allowed to save money. The other low-income households only had income from occasional work, or were widows. Households with higher living standards had permanent jobs, were renting out rooms, and had family members working abroad, as was also the case with the higher income households in Sankhamul. Additional income had previously been generated from growing and selling vegetables behind the building where the BLR was then under construction. Livestock was also being bred, and several male and female members contributed to the family income. Their children were able to attend private schools to get a better education. A common problem in both settlements was the rising cost of living, which was forcing people to take out loans. 'To gain more income, juveniles tend to work abroad or are very busy, so the youth was absent and could not contribute time to the community anymore' (KSIK02, 27-27).

In Bansighat, **a number of family networks** were able to develop since large numbers of people followed family members had already settled there. Seventy per cent of families interviewed had close ties in the neighbourhood, with other relatives also living there, and 30% had neither family members nor friends living in the settlement. In Sankhamul, 80% of families interviewed had other family members living in the neighbourhood. There, however, it was not only family members of those already settled who had moved in, but also other families who had all arrived at the same time, in huge numbers (KSII07, 11-11). Additionally, adult children with their own families tended to stay in Sankhamul on the same plots as their parents.

Relations among inhabitants barely existed in either settlement at first. In 2008, the Bansighat community was divided into the active and inactive members of the savings and credit scheme, or, in other words, supporters and non-supporters of the Maoists. In 2014, the neighbourhood seemed to be reunified under a strong female leader, the chairwoman of the women's group, who was also active in the national women's foundation of the squatters as its treasurer. The trigger for unification was the forced eviction in 2010 of another squatter settlement along the Bagmati River and the negotiations for the BLR (KIBA 1). In

Sankhamul, the spark for unification came much earlier due to the hostility towards the squatter community coming from neighbouring settlements and farmers. The squatters were forced to demonstrate unity and strength as a community. Even before Lumanti entered the neighbourhood, a *Tol* Development Committee already existed (KSIK03, 36-36). This unity was one of the big strengths of the Sankhamul community. In the event of problems, such as evictions or the threat of programmes that would dramatically alter the community's way of life like the BLR, the whole community would gather and discuss the matter (KSIK04, 21-21). Also discussed was how to integrate the new rental immigrants working jobs in night clubs, which were perceived as dishonourable. There were, for instance, no rules for newcomers regarding the number of water buckets they could have as there were for the other established families. On the other hand, the newcomers brought their own skills and were able to help the community. For instance, during the eviction case of the neighbouring squatter settlement on the Bagmati River in 2010, they supported the squatters (KISA 1).

Ulaanbaatar – Neighbourhoods

The **composition of the family** in both settlements was that of an extended family, for the most part with grandparents and/or brothers and sisters, with more extended families in Yarmag. There, the average household size was 6.4 and, in Amgalan, 6. If only nuclear families were counted, the numbers would be 3.9 in Yarmag and 3.5 in Amgalan. On average, families were raising two to three children; in both settlements, the families interviewed had between 2.8 and 2.9 children on average. In both settlements, there were single-mother families with two or three children. In Yarmag, this household was part of an extended family. Inhabitants usually owned their plots in the *ger* settlements. In Amgalan, all families interviewed also had land titles, with the exception of the one family who was renting. In Yarmag, the situation was different due to illegal settling, which affected 72 plots in the 5th *khoroo* in 2013. As they were settled on flood-prone areas, it was not realistic for the families to obtain land titles. One family leased their plot and built their house on it because the land title was not tied to ownership of land. In both settlements, the occupation of new land was no longer permitted. Plots could only be purchased, which was how most families in Amgalan attained theirs.

The residents of Amgalan and Yarmag had different **occupations.** In Yarmag, most of the people were employed as factory workers or in the service sector as salespeople, security personnel, or cooks. One family owned a small handicraft business; another owned a small vegetable preserving business. In three families, just one person worked, whereas, in

Amgalan, in only one household, of the single mother, just one person worked. In most cases, between two and three people worked, and, in two households, retirees were receiving state pensions. Most of the people were shop owners, workshop owners, handicraft business owners, drivers, or economists. Yarmag, to a huge extent, consisted of very poor households (9%) or low-income households (52%). The households interviewed tend to undermine this statistics, as no household earned more than 2 million Tugrik, unlike in Amgalan, where three households earned that amount. Three households in Amgalan and six households in Yarmag earned between 500,000 and 1 million Tugrik. In both settlements, four families earned between 192,000 and 500,000 Tugrik per month. In addition, four families in Amgalan grew vegetables for their own consumption or to be sold in local shops, and one family bred cattle in the countryside to sell in the city. Two families in Amgalan and one in Yarmag generated supplemental income by renting out *gers* or rooms. In general, people with a broader spread of sources of income in both settlements had higher overall incomes. Unlike in Yarmag, people in Amgalan used their plots for the income-generating potential by setting up shops or businesses, or by renting out the space. People in Yarmag relied considerably on low-paid jobs. On the other hand, in 60% of the cases in both settlements, there were family members living at home who were students and were anticipated to contribute to a higher family income in the future. With regard to the standard of living, the primary concern of families living in houses or *gers* was land security, as was the case in all three interviews; the families just lived in *gers*. In both settlements, land status was confirmed, so land titles were provided in Yarmag, while, in Amgalan, land titles for apartments were exchanged in the light of the GAR. In the second stage, the problem was financial resources. In Yarmag, around 20% of the population still lived in *gers* in 2010. Most low-income families lived in houses, but the *ger* provided cheaper winter accommodation in light of the high cost of coal for heating.

The **family network** in Mongolia is generally very strong. Only one family interviewed in Amgalan and two in Yarmag had no ties within the neighbourhood. This was because they had not come to the settlement on the recommendations of some family member but had found a plot by themselves during a search for suitable land.

In both settlements, **relations between inhabitants** were generally good, and the people knew each other and kept an eye on the property of their neighbours whenever homeowners were absent. In Amgalan, because people had been living there for a long time, they trusted each other and were happy to help each other out. In one case, a group of family members moved to Amgalan and settled right next to each other to be among their own kind. They

reported that they did not to know any other people but had not experienced any difficulties within the community. Only family members assisted during the construction of their houses. In general, the community was concerned with personal issues and tended to be inward-looking. As a result, an outsider could have gotten the impression that a cooperative community did not exist. Public spaces belonged to the outside world, were not private, and were the responsibility of the government. One social problem was mentioned, especially in Yarmag: an increase in alcoholism, which had spread to the younger generation, causing serious conflicts within the community and withdrawal from society on the part of those afflicted.

7.1.4_Summary – The physical, economic, and social situation of the neighbourhoods today

Looking at **social and technical infrastructure**, services are lacking in all the case-study neighbourhoods. In Kathmandu, there is a general lack of service provision with no differentiation between formalised and squatter settlements. Electricity is provided according to a schedule (a load-shedding schedule), and a reliable water supply is absent in all areas, the only difference being that formal residential quarters are supplied by water pipes and squatter settlements by water tanks. In the dry season, or in cases wherein formal quarters are not supplied by water pipes, drinking water is delivered by a water tanker. Solid waste collection is better organised in squatter neighbourhoods than in formal ones, thanks to greater unity of the community. A major factor is the small size of the squatter settlement units, which allows residents to utilise services in surrounding areas. The situation is more problematic in informal settlements in Cairo, where population sizes in these neighbourhoods are huge, placing a heavy demand on their own social and technical infrastructure. It is still insufficient, though the GTZ support programme has provided water and sewage lines. Solid waste management, drinking water quality, and health facilities continue to be the most severe problems. In Ulaanbaatar, there is a serious contrast between the apartment complexes and the *ger* settlements, where water, heating, and sewage systems are entirely absent. A general problem in post-1990 settlements throughout the city is a lack of educational facilities.

Living conditions with regard to sufficient living space show great variations. The place with the most space is Amgalan, with almost one room per person, followed by Masakin and Yarmag. In Bansighat and Sankhamul, a minority of households have insufficient living space. The most severe living conditions were observed in Khazan at the time of the study, with half of the households interviewed living in scant space, even though the condition of the buildings was good, with a very high percentage of permanent houses. In general, while in

other settlements living space is increasing, in the settlements of Cairo, it is decreasing – an alarming tendency caused by massive overcrowding in the informal settlements.

The **economic conditions** of the families varied significantly between the neighbourhoods supported by improvement programmes and those not supported. In Khazan, around 10% more families than in Masakin lived below the poverty line. Reasons for this could be that, in Masakin, more inhabitants have stable jobs as officials and more family members contribute to the family income. The same issue could be observed in the Nepalese neighbourhoods. In Sankhamul, each family had income that was over 1,000 NRS more than in Bansighat. One reason for this could be the higher education level and more stable incomes. In Amgalan as well, three of the families interviewed had an income of more than two million Tugriks, whereas, in Yarmag, none of the families earned that much, due to low-income occupations. The difference between the families in supported neighbourhoods and those in non-supported neighbourhoods was that more families in the supported neighbourhoods had multiple breadwinners and had more occupations with stable incomes. Additionally, supplemental income was generated by renting or farming, the family income was spread across several types of earning, and savings schemes were also used more often (in Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods).

Due to varying traditions, **community and family structures** differ greatly among the neighbourhoods. Whereas families in informal settlements are strongly organised into clans, in *ger* settlements, individual families show strong cohesion. Due to the high level of heterogeneity within squatter settlements, these communities are strongly unified, especially in Sankhamul. In Cairo and Kathmandu, the nuclear family is the predominant living structure, with some extended families living together on the same plot or in the same building. In all the neighbourhoods, most families have kin relations. In *ger* settlements, the extended family is the most prevalent constellation, resulting in the highest number of individuals per family, namely between 6 and 6.4 members, followed by Bansighat, with 5.1 people per family. The smallest families, between 4.1 and 4.4 members, can be found in Masakin and Sankhamul, which are the neighbourhoods receiving support from development programmes. For the detailed summary in table version, please see the appendix, section III.VII.

7.2_Local tradition of community mobilisation and collective action

This chapter describes the different ways in which the neighbourhoods have organised themselves and how individual and community problems have been solved. Informal social commitments within social groups, which have been partly established with the support of government organisations or NGOs, as well as self-help initiatives, are highlighted, and the role of local leaders is depicted. The question under consideration is whether or not the urban improvement programmes have integrated or reacted to pre-existing self-help measures and how their support has been adopted.

7.2.1_Community leaders, solutions to problems, and committed inhabitants

Cairo - Neighbourhoods

The question arises as to who leads the neighbourhoods, and the answer is very different for each country. Who guides the community? Who declares which NGOs are allowed to give support? Who do the residents trust and seek advice from in the event of a problem? Because the settlements were settled at a time when local administrations either were not established in these areas or did not feel it was their responsibility to react to the occupation of land, local community leaders took the lead informally. These leaders were either selected by the community, or, with the approval of the community, simply assumed their position. Usually, these people also communicated with outsiders on behalf of the community. During the Arab Spring, one important institution, the National Democratic Party (NDP), was dissolved after its headquarters were set on fire, and President Mubarak was forced to resign from his post in 2011. In spite of this, local leaders who were members of the NDP held onto their positions. Therefore, at the local level, there was little change in actors or roles.

A distinct **community leader,** in Egypt called a 'local leader', could not be identified in Khazan or Masakin. This was the role of active NGOs and parties, namely the NDP, to which local or natural leaders belonged, some also being the head of an NGO. So, they used institutional means to attain more power and gain recognition from state institutions. The NDP was particularly powerful in Khazan, and the NGOs, unless NDP-led, were not as strong as in Masakin. All the male, female, and young local leaders interviewed in Khazan were members of the NDP and had founded their own NGOs by doing volunteer work in the community over the previous 15 to 20 years. The female local leader worked in the vocational training centre in Khazan and used her position to offer vocational training in the industrial textile industry and services to drug addicts (CKIK01, 2-2). The male local leader was elected

as a Local People's Council (LPC) member in 2008 (CKIK02, 2-2). For the most part, the NGOs of the other local leaders offered training to raise awareness of educational and health issues, training for women and girls, and help for widows and divorced women. However, these local leaders had their critics, and some people alleged that they had used the subsidised money for their own benefit. In Masakin, the female, child, and young adult local leaders were all connected to the public institutions of the Cultural Palace and the Youth Club. In the role of an unofficial local leader, a senior staff member of the GTZ-PDP also had to be included, since he personalised the programme to a huge extent. The local leaders were, in most cases, involved in projects organised by the GTZ-PDP and were also members of an NGO. The male local leader was not involved in any NGO, nor did he launch any project of his own. If people needed his help, he tried to solve their problems. He tried to raise awareness and provided unpaid services to people applying for project permission from the police or the district. People tended to seek his support after their letter of complaint to the LPC had gone unacknowledged (CMIK04, 2-2).

In Khazan, people seeking **solutions to their problems** went either to the local NGOs or to the local leaders, who then dealt with them through public institutions, namely the LPC, the Local District Administration (LA), or the ministry, depending on the problem. This reflects the lack of trust that people had in public institutions. Most NGOs and local leaders had personal connections among the office staff of the LA and LPC. One official method of addressing a physical, social, or economic problem was an letter of complaint, which the inhabitants could address to the LA or LPC. In most cases, however, the sender never received a reply. Ways of solving problems were more diverse in Masakin, where people were often more active in seeking solutions on their own. Only if these efforts were unsuccessful did they consult the LA, though they tried to avoid it (CMII01, 38-39; CMII02, 37-39). The local leaders pointed out that they had also tried to fix things themselves in the case of infrastructural problems, or else approached the LA, the LPC, or another authority responsible. Then, the inhabitants would organise themselves into a group and seek help from the governor (CMIK01, 25-25; CMIK03, 26-26; CMIK05, 25-26; CMIK06, 34-34). For help with the waste collection problem, people also went directly to the local leader responsible, an NDP member and head of the waste collection organisation (CMIK02, 10-10). In the event of conflicts, the police were called. For other social problems, people also sought the help of the leader for female interests at the social centre within the Cultural Palace. For economic problems, they went to businessmen or NGOs. The mosques played a strong role, as they offered support for disadvantaged people (CMIK03, 26-26).

A **socio-economic survey** in 2005 also investigated the willingness to participate in upgrading projects. In Masakin, 59% agreed to participate. However, the result in Khazan was overwhelmingly negative, with 87% refusing to participate. This was the highest percentage among the nine neighbourhoods investigated (GTZ-PDP, 2005a). Any relationship between willingness to participate and education or income level was not evident (GTZ-PDP, 2005: 21 et seqq.). Nonetheless, in Masakin, it was observed that people of lower income were more willing to upgrade their living environments (GTZ-PDP, 2005: 11). This result was reflected to some extent in the current study: In families interviewed in Khazan, there was less commitment, with only 5%, compared to 10% in Masakin. **Socially-committed people** were those who contributed time to volunteer work for the improvement of the neighbourhood and who tried to organise community life for everybody's benefit. Active individuals interviewed in Khazan were mostly involved in the NDP, were active in one of the NGOs as a secretary or as members, or were active in the support of the elderly (CKII10, 40-40). In Masakin, mainly young people were active in providing recreational activities for children at the Cultural Palace, in coaching children's football teams at the youth club, or in supporting divorced women in organising their lives. Some had even founded their own NGOs, such as 'Beet El Aela', to support the community. The benefits for these active young people were that their networks were widened; their empathy with others improved and their confidence was boosted. None of the inhabitants interviewed in Khazan regularly used any of the programmes on offer, as described in the next chapter. One reason given was that the facilities were located in Masakin, more than 2 km away. In addition to those working as volunteers at the Cultural Palace or in the youth centre, 9% of people in Masakin used the social facilities made available. The reasons for people not participating were mostly that they were too busy with their daily work. One person interviewed said that he was not active as a volunteer because 'the NGOs do not do good work and do not help the area' (CMII10, 41-41).

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

The official **community leader** was known as the *tol* attaché (English: neighbourhood chairperson) and was the head of the registered Tol Development Committee (TDC). In Bansighat, this committee had never been registered, unlike in Sankhamul, where it was registered, in spite of the settlement's continued illegal status. Thus, the chairperson in Bansighat had no well-defined duties, but, for the sake of the community, he had demanded land ownership papers and worked on the consumer committee for the construction of road, drainage, et cetera (KBIK01, 22-22). He was the contact person for official institutions. The

real unofficial leader seemed to be another important person in Bansighat: a Maoist Party member, to whom people with social or crime-related problems came in search of a solution (KBIK03, 24-24). When the Maoists lost power in 2012, the leadership changed and the TDC was no longer active, so the women's group took over the role of the TDC with a female chairperson. In 2014, the women's group consisted of 11 board members. In general, one of them is selected by the board every two years to act as chairperson. During the period when Lumanti launched a number of projects in the settlement, the chairwoman was already an active member of the TDC, as well as chairperson of the women's group and a member of the national federation Women Unity Nepal, where she has also recently became treasurer (KIBA 1). She was the contact person in the settlement when Lumanti was not accepted by the Maoists. Compared to Bansighat, Sankhamul enjoyed very stable leadership since establishment of the TDC end of the 1990s. However, in both settlements, at least the chairpersons were politically committed. At the beginning of the 1990s, the UN Park was constructed on the other side of the Bagmati River, in Patan Sub-Metropolitan City, a development that was to require the eviction of the Sankhamul neighbourhood by the Urban Development Department of KMC. However, alerted to this, the neighbourhood founded the Buddha Marga Tol Development Committee to demonstrate unity. This TDC was comprised of a board. Since its registration as a TDC in 1995, the chairperson and local leader have never changed. Every three years, through a community-organised election, the leadership of the committee was confirmed or renewed. The chairperson founded SPOSH Nepal[37], of which he was a patron in 2014, as well as the Nepal Sukumbasi Party (Democratic) (KSIK05, 8-9, 37-37). However, even such a politically and socially active leader needed supporters within the community, and one of his friends from the neighbourhood actually co-founded SPOSH Nepal and initially sat on the community committee. There were also two very active female leaders, the wife of the community committee chairperson and the chairperson of the Gyanjyoti Women's Welfare Saving and Credit Cooperative (one of the four cooperatives in KMC serving the communities of five wards) and coordinator of the savings and credit group in Sankhamul. The latter helped coordinate the early initiation stages of the programme and contributed to its success. In addition, she was responsible for collecting the women's monthly savings, as well as additional money for people in need. The women trusted her not to misuse their money for her own purposes.

As the TDC in Sankhamul was founded by the community itself, its members were considered to be trustworthy people, and, so, people in search of **solutions to problems** first

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37 SPOSH Nepal is an abbreviation of Society for Preservation of Shelter and Habitations in Nepal

sought advice at the community office, whether the problem involved conflicts within the community or infrastructure. In the case of conflicts between neighbours, people first tried to settle things on their own or through the community office and, in the case of intractable problems, turned to the police (KSII03, 34-35). In cases of problems with water or electricity supplies, the community office would contact the authority responsible and collect money to pay a technician. In Bansighat, the Maoist Party member seemed to be the trusted person to whom people turned to solve social problems within the community. However, for problems with public facilities like water or electricity, the consumer committee was called and a meeting held to discuss the matter. The corporation responsible was then contacted. When it came to land-related problems resulting from poverty, all community members would meet to discuss the matter and decide on the redistribution of the land, as has happened in the new parts of the settlement (KBIK03, 26-26).

Socially-committed people in Bansighat were the members of the consumer committee doing volunteer work to procure or maintain public utilities, were those in the women's group who boosted women's confidence with the savings and credit scheme, were the members of the youth club and the children's club who organised football coaching and games and held tuition classes, and were also the active members of the Maoist Party. These aforementioned community groups consisted of a board. 'Only 10 people in the community care about the development of the tol. If they leave, there would be no development at all' (KBIK02, 16-16). Nonetheless, people who simply participated in these programmes and in the life of the community also contributed to neighbourhood development. Besides the five key people interviewed, two more interviewees were socially active as volunteers, namely the chairperson of the youth club and the vice-chairperson of the women's group. Thirty-four per cent of families interviewed were involved in one of the programmes mentioned. In Sankhamul, 40% of the families interviewed included the seven socially-active volunteers. A drinking water coordinator was elected to collect the monthly fees and to monitor water distribution in an effort to avoid conflict. Her son was an active member of the youth club (KSII03, 36-36). Besides hers, three other families interviewed were also active in the community. In these families, almost everybody had a volunteer job in the neighbourhood, whether as a member of the community committee, as chairperson of the savings and credit group, or as a teacher providing tuition in the childcare centre (KSII04, 37-37; 19-19). The children were particularly active in the children's group. All of these active children had passed the SLC, or even the SSLC, and were well aware of the importance of education. In every family interviewed, at least one family member was involved in some programme, and,

in 80% of the families, the children used either the youth or children's club, while the mother was a member of the savings and credit group.

Ulaanbaatar – Neighbourhoods

In Ulaanbaatar, there were officially registered **community leaders**, the *kheseg* leaders (for duties, see also 1.3.4). A leader was selected by the local administration on the basis of his or her level of activity within the *kheseg* and was paid a public salary. This was unique among local and local leaders. The leader was required to be in constant contact with the residents. In Yarmag in 2014, the *kheseg* leader visited an average of 10 households per day (UYIK1, 32-32). However, in both settlements, some households were seldom visited. Although the *kheseg* leader was supposed to visit them as well, households in the informal settlements in Yarmag said that they had had no contact with her (UYII10, 54-54). A change of the *kheseg* leader could mean that the service would change so that some people would no longer be served, as happened in Amgalan (UAII08, 57-58). To **solve problems** of an infrastructural nature, the inhabitants would visit the *khoroo* and the *district* administration (UAII1, 50-50). It would then be decided which department or authority in the *district* was responsible for solving the problem (UAIK5, 36-37). In cases of extreme inebriation, the police were called, especially in Yarmag. The *kheseg* leaders were not involved in such cases, but they had to report the incident to the *khoroo* (UYIK6, 32-32). The *kheseg* leader also listened to residents' problems during his visits and communicated them to the *khoroo* and *district* (UAIK4, 40-40).

Socially active people in both settlements were scarce compared to the Kathmandu neighbourhoods, especially in Yarmag, where NGOs were rarely involved in motivating the residents to become more committed to improving the settlements. The NGOs were a necessary trigger in opening up the residents' family-oriented, withdrawn view of life to a more outward and neighbourhood-oriented view. In both settlements, none of the residents interviewed were voluntarily active in the neighbourhood. Although, in Amgalan, the people had more events to attend, such as the programmes offered by the Janjin Club and the training programmes and workshops provided by World Vision, only people from three families were using them. Two were using the children's recreational activities in the library and one the programmes offered by World Vision. In both settlements in general, it was the elderly who attended *subotniks* (explained below) and the information events organised by the *khoroo*, as they had the free time to do so, whereas the younger generation had to go to work. Public events were sometimes not properly publicised to motivate residents to attend (UAII05, 57-57). As in Yarmag in 2013, no NGO was active in Amgalan, and the inhabitants reported that

they did not use any services from the organisations. Good Neighbours had just started offering their services, and the Human Development Centre (HDC), the national NGO that introduced the savings programme with family funds in 2005, was no longer actively introducing programmes to the settlement. Just 1% of families were saving with the family funds and only 4% were within the whole of the 5th *khoroo*.

One relic from the socialist era was the ***subotnik***, work ordered from 'above' for the improvement of the neighbourhood. This mainly involved community cleaning work, and all citizens were required to be involved. A nationwide *subotnik* was organised once a year (UAIK1, 53-54); within the settlements, one was organised once a month by the *khoroo* (UYIK2, 37-37). Every inhabitant was required to clean the street area in front of their plot, as far as to the middle of the street. Shopkeepers had to clear a 50m²-area in front of their shop twice a month (UAII05, 53-54). It was the *kheseg* leader's duty to remind families to attend *subotniks*, but, in reality, a mere 30-40% of residents participated. The local government and organisations were more involved than the citizens (UAIK1, 48-49). Two-thirds of the people interviewed in Yarmag were not involved in *subotniks,* but, in Amgalan, all the families interviewed except for one participated. The residents perceived it *'more as duty than a chance to get involved*' (UAII05, 53-54). Due to this low participation rate, the districts organised cleaning campaigns every three months to clear up the unofficial garbage spots, as the inhabitants had the habit of throwing their waste out onto the streets in areas where there was no street lighting (UAIK1, 48-49). Unemployed people were paid by the labour office to do the clean-up. The project's name, translated literally, was 'Mongolian people with income and ownership'. Unemployed people had to register with the *khoroo* administration to do the job (UAIK2, 43-44). The Eco Club was responsible for ensuring that the cleaning was done properly (UYIK6, 36-36).

7.2.2_Existing social sacilities in the neighbourhoods

<u>Cairo - Neighbourhoods</u>

In Khazan, no **social facilities for children, young people, or women** existed. The lack of social institutions offering programmes was a tremendous problem. In Masakin, several institutions existed, such as the **Cultural Palace (CP),** which was built in 1989 by the Ministry of Culture, to which the CP is still linked. All programmes and services offered had to be approved by the ministry, which also paid salaries to the director and the local leader. They also received regular support from the ministry for equipment and activities at fixed rates. Between 2002 and 2007, the CP building was renovated by the GTZ-PDP, as it had

been unused for several years. An open-air cinema, a theatre, a computer lab, a library, and workshop rooms for children were set up, and the children came to play on the computers, as well as to participate in the drama, dance, art, and workshop groups and in the other courses available. The children loved going there and were mostly from Masakin, although also from other parts of MN. Arts and drama programmes for adults were also offered. Once a week, a music and song event for children and adults was performed (CMIK01, 2-2; 10-10; 50-50). However, the CP building was constructed in a vulnerable area, directly beneath the rocks, and, in February 2009, a rockslide killed one person. The Ministry of Defence subsequently banned people from using the open-air cinema and required them stay at least sixty metres away from the cliffs. This meant that the CP would have to be moved (CMIK01, 2-2). Fearing demolition, the director of the CP stopped implementing new programmes in 2009 (CMIK01, 6-6).

Integrated within the Cultural Palace building was the **social centre**, which was linked to the Ministry of Social Solidarity and led by the local leader of female interests, who was responsible for the support of single and divorced women and widows, as well as scholarships. People came to her seeking help with financial problems involving such things as school expenses, and the inability to pay for books and uniforms, resulting in children not attending school. The social centre also helped unemployed young people find work and provided financial support to open a small shop or start some other project. Financial support was to be repaid without interest (CMIK03, 2-2). A great deal of benefits had been provided to divorced women and widows over the previous 10 years. They received benefits from the ministry of 120 LE per month, which was not enough, so the centre tried to offer additional financial support. The women could also work but without insurance (ibid, 4-4). A few NGOs offered support in the cases of social or financial problems.

The **youth centre**, affiliated to the Ministry of Youth, was situated on the premises and managed the sports ground, and so was highly involved in sports activities. Emphasis was also placed on religious and social activities and to the organisation of competitions between MN schools in culture and sports. An MN football team also played regularly in Cairo (CMIK05, 2-2). The youth centre programmes were used most frequently by the sons of 50% of the families interviewed, who played football nearly every week. However, such programmes were rarely offered to the majority of juveniles and did not even reach more remote areas, like Khazan. In general, the problems of young people were paid little attention.

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

The social programmes on offer in the settlements had previously been either established by the community or initiated by Lumanti, and, after the phasing-out of the latter in 2009, they were supervised by Mahila Ekta Samaj, the female off-shoot of SPOUSH Nepal. Before entering a settlement, this organisation had to be invited, after which point they were responsible for deciding which NGOs were allowed to conduct programmes. The **children's club** in Bansighat was established with the aim of improving children's performance at school by offering tuition classes and an extra-curricular programme as an alternative to hanging out on the streets. The youth club gave a helping hand with the development of the children's group. They called meetings and managed the club. The youth club also prepared the programmes and schedules for the children's group. Previously, daily tuition classes had been organised, and, on Saturdays, there had been entertainment programmes for the children, as happened in Sankhamul. The teachers in both settlements were paid by Lumanti. However, during Maoist times, these activities were neglected in Bansighat and remained so until recently, when the women's group took over. Now, once again, tuition classes are held regularly in the community building, with teachers paid by Action Aid Nepal and supervised by the women's group. Leisure time activities and programmes were also organised by the children with the support of the youth club and the women's group (KIBA 1). The **childcare centre** in Sankhamul had its duty to offer recreational activities, tuition classes, and awareness-building programmes and was the seat of the children's club. The childcare centre was established over twenty years ago by Lumanti and SPOSH Nepal, was sponsored by Action Aid Nepal, and had its seat in the community building. Lumanti opened a library there in the community building; it was the first library opened in a squatter area, later managed by community members, and its impact was very positive. A health programme for adults and children was also carried out in the community building. The children's group was run by a board of children (KSIK02, 2-4). In 2008, 25 children regularly attended tuition classes for two hours per day. The childcare centre was passed from generation to generation (KSIK02, 55-56). Also part of the childcare centre was the girls' group, where Shakti Samua (English: Power Group) and CWIN, two national NGOs, conducted the programmes. Seventy per cent of the families sent their children to the childcare centre. Although the childcare centre had previously been extremely active, the children's club as such was no longer running in 2014, due to personnel changes. Therefore, the Mahila Ekta Samaj and the community decided to turn it into a childcare centre to give mothers an opportunity to work. The first day-care centre in Sankhamul was supported by Action Aid and staffed by women from the neighbourhood.

Unfortunately, there was now nowhere for children to attend tuition classes or participate in recreational activities, and they were forced once again to play outside in the street (KISA 1).

The **youth club** in Bansighat was founded by about 20 young people. Its members recounted how they had established the youth club themselves, without any help from Lumanti, although it was one of the tools in Lumanti's neighbourhood development programme. Nonetheless, the young people of Bansighat possessed the confidence to found a youth club, and some of Lumanti's ideas were slipped in. The Nepal Destitute Association Bansighat was an organisation founded by the Maoist Party for awareness-building. After the assumption of power by the Maoists in 2005, the youth club operated under this organisation (KBIK02, 29-29). 'The main aim of the youth club was to instil awareness in the girls and boys of the community so that they developed a good character' (KBIK02, 2-2). The club was divided into juniors and seniors. The seniors provided the juniors with football coaching and collected money to conduct programmes like plays and tree planting. However, the young people became more involved in personal matters, as they had to support their families. Like the children's club, the youth club was reactivated by the leadership of the women's group (KIBA 1). In Sankhamul, the youth club was founded by the community but was not registered and became inactive in 2008. There was no board, and gatherings were informal. The youth club in Bansighat became less active because many members went abroad. A few years ago in Sankhamul, however, the son of the chairperson took over and re-established the youth club as the Youth Resource Centre, with its seat in the former home of the chairperson. In 2014, there was once again a regular board and one permanently employed female staff-member, paid by Action Aid, which also donated the furniture and the workplace. Training programmes were being held again, and, every Saturday, a loose network of seven to eight people met (KISA 1).

In Bansighat, the women's group took over the leadership of the settlement, and the youth and children's club were affiliated with it. The **women's group** in both settlements was closely connected to the **savings and credit group,** which was related to one of the citywide women's cooperatives where the women's savings were administered. The cooperative was responsible for several squatter settlements and also organised awareness-building programmes for the women. The savings and credit scheme was introduced in 2000 by Lumanti. The Bansighat women's group represented the interests of the women in the process of applying for the land ownership papers that were necessary for obtaining citizenship certificates and other important documents. It also financed a well for the whole community,

mainly for washing clothes. Since the savings and credit group was part of the women's group, they tried to increase the number of savers (KBIK04, 15-15). In 2008, 83 women (half the female population over 15 years old) were saving. In 2014, six savings groups with between 20 and 25 members were operating in Bansighat. Thanks to the work of the women's group, women also became more confident within their own families. Before someone could be accepted as a regular saver, the cooperative had to check the family income and whether the family owned the house in which they were living. Things were difficult in the beginning, because people were afraid that their money might be misused. However, the women gradually built trust, and the number of women saving increased. Most of the women were illiterate, so others had to read them their savings and credit passbook. Savings were collected once a month. In every savings group, an evening was reserved when the women would talk about upcoming projects in the neighbourhood (KBIK04, 43-53). The mothers' group, as part of the women's group, collected the money for saving and forwarded it to the cooperative. The savings and credit scheme helped whole families raise their standard of living by improving their economic situation through the establishment of businesses and the sending of family members overseas to work. It also helped them educate their children and, more prosaically, sometimes simply helped them pay the electric bills. There was, however, an undeniably negative side to the business of taking out loans: sometimes women were afraid that they would be unable to repay the loan due to changes in economic circumstances, which would negatively affect the entire savings community, as others might not be able to get a loan because of a consequently restricted budget (KBII06, 38-38). In 2008 in Bansighat, women in 60% of the families interviewed were saving, but, in 2014, almost every family was saving, making the savings and credit group the most successful social group in Bansighat. In 2008 in Sankhamul, the women's group was better organised than in Bansighat and consisted of a board of seven members. They organised training programmes for women in the form of informal classes and ran the savings and credit programme within the community. At first, Lumanti trained the women in how to start the savings and credit scheme and provided technical support for managing the programme on their own for four years (KSIK01, 2-2; 26-26; 47-47). The Sankhamul savings and credit group was divided into five sub-branches and also consisted of a board (KSII04, 37-37). If a woman wanted to take out a loan, three members had to be found to act as guarantors. Over time, the reasons for borrowing changed from business and educational reasons to property-related ones, namely, for the purchase of land or the building of permanent houses (KISA 2). In 2008 in Bansighat, 60% of the families

interviewed saved 100 RS per month, whereas in Sankhamul 80% benefited from the programme, making it the most successful one.

Ulaanbaatar – Neighbourhoods

The social programmes in the settlements were offered either by the *khoroo*, as in the case of programmes for the elderly and sports competitions, or by national and international NGOs. In both settlements, the savings and credit scheme was also offered – in Amgalan, by World Vision and in Yarmag, by HDC, a national NGO. In Amgalan, the services were more diverse; they had the Janjin Club, as well as a number of library programmes. Even before its demolition and transfer to a school near the settlement, the **Janjin Club** offered privately-organised music lessons for children (UAII01, 41-42). However, the fees were too high, and only talented children were accepted, so, none of the people interviewed were able to take advantage of this service. However, some other training programmes were also offered at the Janjin Club. Programmes organised by Amgalan Complex Development, a local NGO, and supervised by World Vision were offered at the **Amgalan library**. These included leisure time programmes and the provision of library books to be used for homework. As World Vision was phased out, the affiliated NGO, Go Help, stepped in to support these programmes and later served tea breaks and helped run the library. Children enjoyed going there to read and play with toys (UAIK6, 2-3). However, only the children of two of the families interviewed went there, and the other interviewees were not aware of the programme. In the two settlements, the **savings and credit scheme** was offered by two different NGOs, so the organisation of the programmes was different. It also differed from the KMC model: in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods, two or three households that were not saving could generally be found scattered amongst the larger group who was saving, whereas, in Yarmag and Amgalan, it was the few saving households that were strewn throughout the different settlements. In the entire 12th *khoroo*, of which Amgalan/Janjin was a part, 10 family funds and 10 business groups existed at the end of 2014 (UAIK1, 8-8), but with members spread over four more *khoroos*, and, in Yarmag, the six family funds were scattered throughout the *khesegs* within the 5th *khoroo* (UYIK5,2-4). In Yarmag, where savers came from just one *khoroo*, the family funds were more often used for projects in public places or for beautification measures, which was not the case in Amgalan. The family funds in Yarmag were introduced by the HDC, which was supported by the Asian Coalition for Community Action (ACCA), like Lumanti in Kathmandu. However, the organisational structure was slightly different, as not many people participated. A family fund consisted of between three and 10 members who had different

responsibilities, like housing, health, control management, advertising, and publishing. The family funds of the 5th *khoroo* were organised within their own cooperative, which was connected to the other cooperatives of the city (UYIK5, 5-6), as was the case in Kathmandu. Public as well as private projects were financed, and both men and women could join. The family funds decided independently which projects they wanted to implement. No one from the randomly selected households in either settlement used this programme, and the director of the cooperative in Yarmag cited the reasons for this as being a deep mistrust that the money would be misused and too much commitment to personal matters. However, these kinds of alternative financing schemes could also have helped people in *ger* settlements who had problems qualifying for bank loans due to the fact that they were unable to provide proof of employment, even though some ran their own businesses. Moreover, bank loans had to be repaid at high interest. Although the same reluctance existed in the beginning in the KMC settlement, that later changed as people gained trust, but this did not happen in Yarmag or Amgalan, where people were initially in favour of the family funds projects, but later dropped out. The work of World Vision changed attitudes in Amgalan to the extent that people gained confidence and even founded their own local NGO to serve the neighbourhood residents. The people involved in family funds in Yarmag were also strongly committed to community projects like the beautification of the fences and entrance gates on three streets, as well as an garden for the elderly in front of the *khoroo* administration building, a sidewalk along a service road, and a roof project (UYIK3, 12-18; UYIK5, 50-57). Although the number of active savers in Yarmag did not increase significantly, numbers within the women's group increased to one hundred in the 5th *khoroo*. Thus, although the director of the cooperative was dissatisfied with the popularity of the family funds, he was pleased with the women's commitment (UYIK5, 57-57). In Amgalan, the director of the local NGO Amgalan Complex Development was satisfied with the level of participation in the training programmes organised by World Vision for the establishment of businesses (UAIK6, 37-37).

7.2.3_Solidarity and self-help

<u>Cairo - Neighbourhoods</u>

With no social centre or sports or children's clubs, the inhabitants of Khazan organised themselves through **self-help initiatives**. In both settlements, residents were organised in informal self-help initiatives to improve technical infrastructure. In the case of the renewed water and sewage systems, the people had little choice but to help themselves, as only the main pipelines had been renewed by the contractors. The connections to the houses had to be

organised by the inhabitants. They accomplished this by soliciting technical help from some NGOs, which then supplied engineers to manage the construction. People sometimes organised themselves with the direct help of the LA or the NGOs (CKII01, 36-36; CMIK06, 36-36). Committed young people founded their own NGOs to support the community. Some informal **solidarity initiatives** not embedded in official NGO volunteer work were conducted by a group of local leaders and affluent entrepreneurs in the position to provide support from their own pockets. These initiatives involved providing clothes and food to the impoverished elderly and schoolchildren (CKII10, 7-8; CKIK02, 9-9). The rockslide in October 2008 overshadowed the community of Masakin, as the incident happened in the neighbouring *shiakha* of Deweika, and many people from Masakin provided first aid and showed solidarity with the people in need. A number of businessmen also extended financial help after the tragedy (CMIK04, 3-3).

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

Both neighbourhoods demonstrated **solidarity** by supporting people in need. Families in distress because of death were supported by the community through charity initiatives conducted in Bansighat by the youth club and, in Sankhamul, by the women's group. In Bansighat, the community also supported families in seriously straitened circumstances, as happened in May 2008 when a group of renting families and migrants – 40 families in total – were awarded a piece of land (KBIK02, 4-4). The consumer committees in both settlements were examples of **self-help-initiatives**. In terms of the physical development of the neighbourhood, the consumer committee was founded in Bansighat initially for the provision of public taps; a drainage project began in 2007 and a project for the construction of a road in 2008. The consumer committee had to be registered once a year at the ward office. It handled all applications to KMC for the undertaking of development projects, and negotiations with KMC, as well as planning, budgeting, and the mobilisation of the inhabitants. Three solidarity or self-help-initiatives aimed at either supporting impoverished families or improving the infrastructure in the settlement for the betterment of sanitary and general living conditions. All these activities were only possible after a certain level of unity of the people had been achieved and after they had received support from the outside. In Sankhamul, even before any NGO entered the community to introduce their programme, things had already been organised by the TDC. The community had also gathered to discuss urgent problems, like the clearance of a corridor for the BLR or improvements required in the settlement (KSII01, 32-33). The coordinator for the drinking water management was also elected by the community, to avoid

conflicts. People in need have been received support and could rely on the solidarity of other families: the coordinator of the savings and credit group collected 60 RS once a month from the women. Women in need have been given money immediately, such as in the event that money was required to pay for medical treatment (KSIK01, 2-2). This degree of self-help was only attainable thanks to the solidarity of the inhabitants and their common commitment to developing the neighbourhood. Strong leadership and the influence of a couple of highly-committed inhabitants also helped.

Ulaanbaatar – Neighbourhoods

Solidarity in both settlements was firm within the families, as documented in the example of the self-constructed houses, where families and relatives were involved in the erection. **Self-help initiatives** for implementing infrastructure could not be found in the settlements, as this was seen as clearly the duty of public institutions. In Yarmag, family funds projects were self-organised by the members. In Amgalan, a few residents founded local NGOs to support children and to recruit additional foreign funding (UAIK1, 44-45). One of these was the local NGO now running the recreational programme for children. In Yarmag, although the HDC had introduced the savings and credit scheme, family funds operated independently, and Mandakh Nar, the oldest of the family funds, had been established without any support from the outside. However, it was integrated into the cooperative.

7.2.4_Summary - Social commitment and programmes within the neighbourhoods

The survey revealed that the local leader as a socially-committed person for the neighbourhood in Cairo mainly operates through his or her own NGOs or political organisations, whereas, in Kathmandu, the chairpersons are elected either by the whole community or by the women's group members. In Ulaanbaatar, the *kheseg* leader is selected by the local administration, which can lead to mistrust when problems occur; this is also the case in Cairo, where NGOs are perceived not necessarily trustworthy. The case is different in Kathmandu, where local leaders are elected by the majority of inhabitants or members, and people come to seek advice. The collective commitment of the community regarding socially active residents or participation in the social programmes offered is highest in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods, where nearly every family has at least one active member or is involved in one or more of the programmes. However, the variety of the programmes offered also seems to meet the people's demands; even if some groups reduce their activity, they might see a revival later. In those neighbourhoods with no programmes offered, as in Khazan and Yarmag, the social commitment is very low, and the motivation for self-help is also slightly

lower than in other settlements. However, the improvement programmes of state and non-state actors rarely intersect, except in Sankhamul, where the organised community is establishing private toilets with the support of Lumanti. In the Cairo neighbourhoods, either formerly self-built infrastructure has just been renewed without using the existing local knowledge, or improvement programmes and self-help have run parallel with different duties, like in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods with the consumer committees for technical infrastructure and the programmes with social emphasis. Self-help in the Cairo neighbourhoods happened in the early stages of settling to provide water and sewage. In Sankhamul, the unity of the people, which led to a mobilisation of inhabitants for improvement, was triggered by external forces. In Ulaanbaatar in general, the implementation of development projects by NGOs within the neighbourhoods led to an increase in awareness of self-help initiatives. Solidarity in the Cairo neighbourhoods has mainly been driven either by the spontaneous actions of private individuals or by external events like the rockslide, whereas, in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods, the solidarity is organised in the form of support when there is a death in the family, with the provision of land, or with costly hospital visits.

Selected board structure of social programmes:

Bansighat
Women's group (TDC), registered
- 11 members, including

- 1 chairperson
- 1 vice-chairperson
- 1 secretary

Consumer committee, registered
- 1 chairperson
- 1 vice-chairperson
- 1 secretary
- 1 treasurer
- 1 clerk

Sankhamul
TDC, registered
- 13 members, including

- 1 chairperson
- 1 vice-chairperson
- 1 secretary

Women's group, registered
- 7 members
- 1 chairperson
- 1 vice-chairperson
- 1 secretary

Yarmag
Family funds, registered
- 3 to 10 members, including
- 1 head accountant
- 2 vice-accountants
- 5 other roles

7.3_The application of the urban improvement programmes

The efforts of the local leaders and some active people within the communities of the three case studies have already been described. Meanwhile, it is necessary to consider neighbourhood development from three sides. In the following section, external support is depicted, including the following: the support of governmental and non-governmental organisations to upgrade the neighbourhood, as well as support offered in some settlements by religious institutions, depicted here as 'other organisations'. At the same time, this chapter gives an overview of the various actors in the settlement.

Khazan was chosen as the neighbourhood to be observed with less support from an organisation and Masakin as that with more support. In Khazan, the international company GTZ supported technical and social infrastructural projects but was less active in awareness-building and in the improvement of social services. In Kathmandu, Bansighat acted as the neighbourhood to be surveyed with less support and Sankhamul as the neighbourhood fully supported by the national NGO Lumanti. In Ulaanbaatar, Amgalan was chosen as the settlement receiving support from the municipality and from the international NGO World Vision (WV), whereas Yarmag received only the basic support given to every *khoroo* in Ulaanbaatar, with the Human development Centre (HDC) providing basic support for the family funds.

7.3.1_The support of governmental organisations

Cairo – Neighbourhoods: The support of the CG, the LA, and the LPC

In Cairo, it was not only district and city governments that provided support. Licenses for industries and workshops, for instance, were issued by the **Ministry** of Industry, and the Ministry of Social Solidarity provided benefits and training programmes in the management of NGOs, among other things. The Cairo Governorate (CG) and its High Council for Women also offered training. After the Masakin rockslide in 2009, the Ministry of Defence actively supervised the demolition of houses within the sixty-metre safety zone above and beneath the cliffs and built a fire station on the opposite side of MN, across the Autostrad (CMIK01, 20-21).

When people in Khazan and Masakin needed official papers, they were required to address the **Local District Administration** (LA) of MN, situated in MN 1, Ezbet Bekhit. Khazan has held legal status since 2008, and Masakin since 2006. The LPC was based in the district office

and was divided into sections for education, the physical condition of buildings, infrastructure, et cetera. Once a month, a meeting was held to discuss current problems and to submit proposed solutions to the CG for approval. If their implementation was agreed upon, subsidisation would be transferred to the LA (CKIK02, 18-18). The **Cairo Governorate** served the community directly through the district administration with an annual budget (CMIK01, 14-14). Therefore, the LA had a purely administrative function and was not entitled to govern. Although the LPC was required to set up and approve plans, decide the budget for the district, and advance the various developmental steps, they used the LA for their own benefit rather than that of the community (Shehayeb and Abdelhalim, 2009). In fact, a governing LPC was nowhere to be seen. Infrastructural projects were carried out by the CG and their contractors. It was therefore no wonder that residents' letters of complaint had little chance of success. In Khazan, the CG supported technical infrastructure like pavements, water, sewage disposal, and the telephone network. The district LPC forwarded suggestions to the CG and later constructed the public facilities (CKIK05, 35-35). The most recent renovation of the water and sewage systems was supported by the GTZ and the KfW; the governorate carried out the projects via contractors. Sixty per cent of the sewage system, from the school to the Autostrad, was completed by May 2009. The Cairo Governorate also supported GTZ initiatives that included the direct involvement of the LA, like the street cleaning campaign conducted in both settlements at the beginning of 2009. In Khazan in 2008 and 2009, with the assistance of the NDP, it mobilised inhabitants, mostly juveniles, for street tree planting (CKIK05, 33-33). The High Council of the Cairo government took measures to rescue children working as child labourers in workshops. This initiative was called Rescue Children (CKIK01, 23-23). Regarding land titles, both private residents and official bodies were required to apply via the LA. In April 2009, the land titling committee was in the process of appraising land in Ezbet Bekhit (MN1). As a corruption prevention measure, the appointed district chiefs of the LA were frequently changed, which rather disrupted the whole process.

Of the inhabitants interviewed, including local leaders, just 35% in Khazan and 22% in Masakin felt supported by public institutions in the provision of new technical infrastructure and the issuing of permits. Two-thirds said that one of the reasons they felt unsupported was because the LA and LPC only helped people with connections within these organisations (CKII01, 38-39). They also cited corruption, ill-treatment during the relocation of inhabitants, a feeling that the LPC did not represent the people (CKIK03, 20-20), and the fact that no solution had been offered for the most severe problem, that is, solid waste collection, despite

residents expressing their anger through a number of letters of complaint (CKIK04, 29-29).
Table 8 gives an overview of the state and non-state institutions and their improvement
measures implemented either citywide or in informal settlements.

Institutions	Khazan	Masakin
Public institutions	National ministries → safety, social programmes, state benefits Cairo Governorate → provision of infrastructure Local District Administration → permits, facility management Local People's Council → approval of local development concepts	
Implementing institutions	(GTZ-PDP → technical infrastructure)	GTZ-PDP → technical infrastructure → social and business programmes
Other active institutions	NDP→ political awareness, training Local NGOs→welfare, education, health, and private events mosques→religious service, support national NGOs→rights for women, support of local NGOs	Local NGOs→ welfare, education, health, and private events National NGOs→ rights for women, support of local NGOs NDP→ political awareness, training Mosques→religious service, support

Table 8: Cairo external state and non-state actors and their duties in neighbourhood development. Source: Own elaboration.

Kathmandu – Neighbourhoods: The support of the KMC Office and Ward Office

When the people of Bansighat needed official papers or to use public facilities, they had to
address themselves to Ward Office Number 11; for the people of Sankhamul, it was Ward
Office Number 10. In both settlements, the ward office issued recommendation letters for the
provision of electricity or water. After a visit from the former mayor of Kathmandu, Keshap
Stapit, two thousand street numbers and family identity cards[38] were issued in Bansighat by
the ward office (KBII07, 37-37). Seventy per cent of eligible residents (over the age of 16)
had citizenship cards (Shrestha, 2008: 53), while just 27% of residents over 18 years old had
election cards allowing them to vote in the nationwide elections in April 2008 (ibid: 55). In
Sankhamul, 85% of eligible residents had citizenship cards and family identity cards (ibid:
53), and 61% of residents over 18 years old had election cards (ibid: 55). Temporary land
titles were issued for 16 plots (pre-talks with Lumanti field worker, 2 Sep. 2008).

In both settlements, the **ward offices** also provided scholarships to pupils from families with
low incomes. However, not all of this money was handed over to the beneficiaries, as some of
it was pocketed by the teachers (KBIK02, 6-7). In Sankhamul, the ward office also
contributed financially to the renewal of the community building, in cooperation with
Lumanti, and assisted active women in organising informal classes and training programmes
in such crafts as candle and incense stick making. By the mid-1990s, the KMC office already

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[38]Family identity cards worked like ownership cards, recognising the family and the property as inhabitants of a squatter settlement. But often people did not know how to use them. However, every landless person had to pay the KMC land revenue department an annual tax for the use of public premises.

had certain projects in mind for Sankhamul and made a visit to distribute a few street numbers. Today, there is scarcely any communication between KMC and the community. KMC's passive approach led residents to remove their street numbers; in the absence of ownership, the street numbers made no sense (KSIK04, 19-19). The main road was finally tarmacked in 2010 after the inhabitants had been importuning the KMC Road Department for 10 years (KSII05, 33-33). Up until 2006, Bansighat barely had any contact with the KMC office. The tremendous success of the Maoists during the people's movement that year meant that they took over the public institutions. Hence, when the Bansighat community received the Maoists' backing, KMC officials started cooperating (KBIK01, 12-12). Since then, KMC has been supporting urban utility projects for water supply, electricity, drainage, and the construction of the BLR with 80% of the budget. There is one possible reason for this close cooperation: the office head in the accounts section was a member of the Maoist Party, and the community forced him to foster KMC support (KBIK02, 16-17). However, the inhabitants of Bansighat often did not realise that public facilities were supported by KMC, and half of the people interviewed claimed that they did not feel supported. By contrast, the ward office in Sankhamul was respected for its support in securing most of the public amenities. However, none of the families felt supported by KMC, who lost the trust of the community due to the clearance of the corridor for the BLR, which destroyed vegetable gardens and family incomes. A further general support mechanism was installed in 2004 at the KMC level: the Urban Community Support Fund, to finance housing projects. This was financially supported in unequal parts by KMC and the ACHR, and later by Action Aid and Water Aid as a revolving fund of 2 million RS (KSIK03, 18-18). Table 9 gives an overview of the state and non-state institutions and their improvement measures.

Institutions	Bansighat	Sankhamul
Public institutions	DUDBC → construction of Bagmati Link Road, development of land KMC-Office → provision of infrastructure, solid waste management Ward office → permits, training programmes, submission of official papers Squatter federations → coordination of social development programmes, cooperatives, squatters' rights	
Implementing institutions	Lumanti → (technical) and social support, squatters' rights	Lumanti → technical and social programme, squatters' rights
Other NGOs	National NGOs → children's education, health, awareness-raising Maoist Party → political awareness Action Aid Nepal → support of local social programmes for children and youth Churches → religious service, children's programmes	National NGOs → children's education, health, awareness-raising Action Aid Nepal → support of local social programmes for children and youth Churches → religious services, children's programmes
Other institutions		Embassy of the Czech Republic, ADB → provision of water tanks

Table 9: Kathmandu external state and non-state actors and their duties in neighbourhood development. Source: Own elaboration

Ulaanbaatar – Neighbourhoods: The municipality, the district, and the *khoroo*

As state and municipality budgets and projects were being operated in a strictly top-down manner, the *khoroos* had no say in their own settlement development. The entire state and welfare system was and still is characterised by socialist pragmatism. In both settlements, all basic services were run by the *khoroo* administration. One official in Amgalan stated that all they did was implement orders and decisions (UAIK5, 23-23). Some state welfare services, such as pensions and financial support for impoverished families, were financed by the government and distributed via the *khoroo* (UYIK6, 28-29). In addition to this, the *khoroo* of Yarmag established an elders' board to deal with issues affecting the elderly. Every February, in Amgalan as well, Elders' Day was held during the Mongolian New Year's celebrations (Mongolian: *Tsagaan Sar*), and *kheseg* leaders and volunteers collected money for the event (UAII01, 52-52). Celebrated during the rest of the year were Children's Day, the national Naadam festival, a citywide competition for who had the best *deel* (traditional coat), and a sports festival. In December, the governor invited the citizens to an 'all-citizens meeting' to present the year's results. In combination with the two national *subotniks*, tree planting was also organised. The purpose of these events was to provide entertainment for the residents and foster community spirit, all while doing nothing to solve the abject problems in the neighbourhood. One programme did greatly benefit Yarmag: that of the Eco Club, organised through the district labour office. Twelve unemployed people from the *khoroo* were hired to clean the streets and the unofficial dumping sites, and they taught pedestrians not to cross on the red traffic light on Airport Road. The people were employed for at least three months (UYIK1, 28-29). In Amgalan, single mothers and the poor were supported with events, food, and clothing (UAII04, 55-55). Food vouchers were given to poor people in the settlements.

Institutions	Yarmag	Amgalan
Public institutions	MUB → development projects, provision of infrastructure, Land Readjustment	MUB → development projects, provision of infrastructure, *Ger* Area Redevelopment
	National Ministries →unemployment benefits, child support, pension District →decision on and distribution of budget from Regional Development Fund, social programmes, solid-waste management, employment (Eco club) Khoroo →permits, social programmes for elderly people, support of poor and single mothers Kheseg leader →mobilising of inhabitants	
Implementing institutions	Human Development Centre (HDC)→ socio-economic programmes, savings & credit scheme, women's groups	World Vision→technical and social programmes, savings and business groups
Other NGOs	'Good Neighbours' socio-economic programmes, support for children, 'Deed Bodi' Monastery →religious programmes	Local NGOs → support for children, social programmes Dolmaling Nunnery →feeding the poor Church →religious and social programmes
Other institutions	Asian Development Bank (ADB) →water supply line	Investment company 'Grandline' →redevelopment of settlement

Table 10: Ulaanbaatar: responsibilities of external state and non-state actors for neighbourhood development. Source: Own elaboration

Amgalan was chosen as the location for the first phase of the *Ger* **Area Redevelopment programme** (GAR). In 2012, before the application of the programme, a rough spatial analysis was performed, and households were interviewed about their preferences for future development of the area, in order to prepare the partial master plan, by the MUB, for zone II development, single- and mid-rise housing. Already in January 2013, the partial master plan was introduced to the citizens, and, for each of the nine determined neighbourhood units, two representatives had to be elected (please find the map in the Appendix, Cities, Ulaanbaatar). This informal election among the residents was already causing problems, as trustworthy and motivated people seemed to be hard to find. A two-month period of uncertainty followed with no information from the municipal office on how to proceed. Suddenly, in the beginning of April, the public hearing about the tender of three competing housing companies was announced. The residents had to decide between three zone I developments, with high-rise blocks, which had not been declared before. Therefore, the uncertainty among the people was rising, and the fear of losing their plots spread, especially in Unit 1. The representatives were accused of acting in their own interest and not in favour of the community. The winning company, Grandline, immediately invited the residents to be informed about their first implementation plans. Later on, an office was put in place, which was barely open. By December 2013, the 18 families of Unit 2 had moved from their plots to stay in temporary rented accommodation paid for by the investor, Grandline (field notes, January-June 2013). At the end of 2014, the first building activities in Units 2, 7, and 6 could be observed. Table 10 gives an overview of the state and non-state institutions and their improvement measures.

7.3.2_The support of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international companies

Cairo – Neighbourhoods: The support of local NGOs and the GTZ

Many international, national, and **local NGOs** were active in both settlements to offer services that public institutions had failed to provide. Either the service offered was insufficient to meet demand, or it was not offered at all. In some cases, the NGOs acted as mediators between residents in need and the LA or LPC. Financial support came from various donors, such as local businessmen, and from abroad through international NGOs. In Masakin, funding was also provided by the ministries responsible and through the GTZ-PDP programme, for example, via the Local Initiatives Fund. In general, NGOs fell into two categories: the first was comprised of one family who organised weddings and other ceremonies; the second connected with all inhabitants (CKIK03, 2-3) by providing financial support (benefits,

scholarships), raising awareness (against female genital mutilation and drug abuse), and offering training programmes and workshops to assist in job finding and opening businesses. Thirty per cent of the people interviewed in Khazan received training from local NGOs, or from the NDP or the public vocational training centre, but no one in Masakin received training. Sewing lessons at the vocational training centre provided women with household skills rather than a job. Masakin's NGOs were mainly education-oriented and offered computer courses or served as learning centres or festivals locations (CMIK05, 17-17). A large number of local NGOs started offering medical care and opened small clinics, as few health facilities existed in MN, with only four medical centres. Some governmental institutions also started offering basic medical services, but no surgeries. In Masakin, some **international organisations and companies** began supporting the work of local NGOs to improve education, among other things (CMIK03, 41-41). However, in both settlements, the services on offer were not managed properly and overlapped. The distribution of services and training programmes needed to be better organised in order to avoid over-serving. This opinion was shared by the female local leader: 'The main problem in MN is that there is no efficient network between NGOs and the local leaders. Someone can be awarded money by two different NGOs for the same purpose, as happened with a woman who accepted scholarships from two NGOs at the same time, leaving no support left for anyone else. So it is money wasted' (CKIK01, 24-24, 38-38).

Projects carried out by the GTZ-PDP were depicted by the local leaders as representing the most important and effective activities, from their point of view. These projects were mainly offered in Masakin. Nonetheless, the **GTZ-PDP** had one soft-skill tool that was also offered in Khazan: the job-training approach, the basis upon which financial support for on-the-job-training was offered to NGOs. The GTZ-PDP also supported technical projects, always in cooperation with the Cairo Governorate, as reported by the local leaders. In the female leader's point of view, the GTZ's main task was to grant financial support to the NGOs (CKIK01, 39-39). In Masakin, provision of a sewage disposal system was the main project mentioned (CMIK04, 43-44; 17-17; CMIK05, 27-27). The renovation of the Cultural Palace, the schools, the youth centre, and the sewage system, as well as the street cleaning campaign and the summer school, were all mentioned by the head of the CP. With the exception of the last two, these were all infrastructural projects. However, a GTZ-PDP field worker clarified the roles of the numerous stakeholders: The water and sewage connections were financed by the KfW and contracted to the German company Dorsh Consult. The role of the GTZ was to facilitate the participation of the residents, and the subsequent outcome was the Local Area

Action Plan (LAAP). At the beginning of the programme, the GTZ called the people to a meeting with the district chief, the LPC, and the NGOs, to set development priorities for Masakin (CMIK06, 14-14). The maps were prepared with the participation of the community, rather than consultants, though those who participated were locally influential people, such as businessmen and politicians. The second priority was the mobilisation of the people, especially the youth. The mobilised core group of residents would not change frequently but sustain. It was an indirect impact to have people to continue the work with the community. Problems arose because of the different backgrounds of the people involved; educated and illiterate people had problems working together (CMIK06, 39-39).

Kathmandu-Neighbourhoods: The support of Lumanti

Firstly, here is a brief overview of the order in which the most influential institutions moved into Bansighat. The first was SPOSH Nepal, the squatter federation founded by the chairperson of Sankhamul TDC in the mid-1990s. Shortly after, the chairperson of today's women's group became the leader of SPOSH and the women's group in Bansighat. Lumanti introduced itself to the settlement in 1998, offering to help and work with the community. After the Maoists entered the community in 2005 and accused these organisations of pocketing the money, the community broke with the organisations. All the members of SPOSH Nepal left the federation and joined the Maoist Party. The leader of SPOSH Nepal for Bansighat was also forced to leave the federation and simply act as chairperson for the women's group. However, when the Maoists joined the government, they needed to cooperate with the organisations once again (KBIK04, 43-53).

The Human Resource Programme was introduced by Lumanti in several squatter settlements, in Sankhamul in 1998 and in Bansighat in 1999. In both settlements, the savings and credit scheme was the most successful of the tools implemented. A women's group was formed for the unity of the women in Bansighat, and Lumanti offered some women the chance to visit Mumbai. For women who had never been outside Nepal, this was a huge step and opened their minds to saving and other development ideas, such as a public well and a community building. As a result, several households provided financial support to realise the two ideas (KBII07, 14-15). Lumanti was also able to inspire children via the children's club and programmes organised in different locations in KMC (KBIK03, 30-30). A temporary break with Lumanti in the mid-2000s occurred when the organisation angered settlers with their announcement that the community needed to leave the area since it was at high risk of flooding. Despite this rupture, Lumanti continued to support the Female Federation of Nepal,

which was related to the savings and credit cooperative (KBIK04, 43-53). The young people of Sankhamul took the opposite stance, claiming it was 'better to have one supporter than none' (KSIK02, 38-38). Sankhamul was the first community where Lumanti implemented the programme. In the early stages, Lumanti offered health awareness-raising programmes and supported the construction of a toilet in every household by providing each with two bags of cement, a disposal pipe, about 500 bricks, and, for the safety tanks, just three concrete rings, with the rest having to be arranged by the families (KSII04, 35-35). The inhabitants had believed that Lumanti intended to fund the whole toilet, but they ended up having to come up with 50% of the costs themselves (KSIK04, 35-35). Moreover, right at the beginning of the implementation phase, the NGO offered three-day programmes at the childcare centre and provided scholarships to children, which were phased out in 2004, after which the children had to manage on their own. Scholarships were awarded in both settlements, but more children in Sankhamul received them. Through their programme, Lumanti also established links with the government, as well as with other organisations and activists, and had a good relationship with KMC. One community worker stated that the savings and credit group, health promotion, the youth group, and the children's group, as well as the children's learning centre, which incorporated the girls' group, were all initiated by Lumanti. The community was supported via training programmes, participation, exposure visits, publications, and financial support (KSIK03, 38-40). Lumanti also supported the federations with training programmes and exposure visits, taking the TDC chairperson on visits to India, South Africa, Thailand, Cambodia, and Kenya; these visits inspired him to coordinate the foundation of the savings and credit group (KSIK05, 31-32; 22-22).

Other organisations, such as the national NGOs CWIN and EHDAG, also provided awareness-raising programmes, scholarships, and training programmes focused on women and girls in both settlements. A very fruitful nurse training programme helped raise awareness among women of health issues. EHDAG provided five years' free treatment with free medicine to the communities, but has since been phased out of Bansighat (KBII07, 18-18). The organisation also offered computer-training programmes for young people. Today, some NGOs, like Action Aid Nepal, have again started operating in Bansighat, and a church has been providing religious services as well as a tuition service in both settlements (KIBA1, KISA1). In Sankhamul, more NGOs have entered the community, for instance, the national NGO Shakti Samua, which used to offer awareness-raising programmes to the two girls' groups. Other donors, like World Vision, also wanted to support the ideas of the Sankhamul residents, but Lumanti denied them permission (KSIK02, 38-38). However, not all support

was deemed helpful, and sometimes people complained about the poor quality of the training programmes. Currently, Mahila Ekta Samaj is coordinating the development programmes in the squatter settlements to avoid over-serving (KIBA 1).

Ulaanbaatar-Neighbourhoods: World Vision (WV) and the Human Development Centre (HDC)

In Amgalan, the most successful parts of the World Vision programme for *ger* settlements were those dealing with local economics and child support. The residents interviewed described how people who attended business training ended up with increased income (UAII04, 42-43). For instance, one successful businesswoman built up her own felt-shoe factory after attending two business-training programmes. World Vision supported her in 2001 with 70% of the seed money; the other 30% she had to invest herself. In 2013, she had 17 workers and was exporting her shoes to neighbouring countries like Kazakhstan and Russia. Previously, she had also undergone training in vegetable growing, when seeds and greenhouses were distributed to the participants (UAII02, 42-43). Amgalan was a traditional vegetable growing area. Training sessions were held in the library and in the botanical garden, with around 10 participants each. Established businesses were grouped according to the skills of their members, for example, doll-making. Members were given instruction in business skills and sales. In addition to these business and savings groups, a mothers' group was also founded. The children of two families interviewed also received scholarships. For children not receiving scholarships, picnics and drawing competitions were organised. Technical infrastructural support was supplied for the construction and renovation of the water kiosks behind the Janjin Club and near the botanical garden (UAIK1, 16-16). As World Vision is to be phased out in 2016, they are currently concentrating more on training programmes and workshops to spread knowledge rather than on providing funds (ibid, 56-56). For instance, a children's union was established, involving the police, the social workers of the *khoroo*, the schools, and World Vision, to help children in cases of domestic violence and alcoholism (UAIK1, 56-57). In Yarmag, the HDC established the family funds. These funds were unstable, so some groups gave up and de-registered. However, new funds were established, and the last one had 10 members in 2013 (UYIK5, 2-4). The previously very active Chandmani family fund was de-registered after five years due to internal problems, when the strong female head moved away from Yarmag. The Mandakh Nar family fund was not influenced by the HDC and had been active for eight years. The women's groups, previously initiated by the HDC, were still growing in 2014. The Good Neighbours NGO had just started

operations but planned to offer business training and educational support for children, including health-awareness classes, recreational activities, and after-school meals. Religious services in both settlements were conducted by the neighbouring Deed Bodi monastery in the 5th *khoroo,* established in 2000, as well as by the Dolmaling convent in Amgalan, which also provided meals for the poor. In Amgalan, **positive outcomes** included the change in attitude of residents involved in the training programmes. Initially, they simply took the help offered, but later were motivated to establish their own businesses. It is too early to draw any conclusions regarding the sustainability of the projects implemented; at the time of this study, in Yarmag, the projects had not been sufficiently established, and, in Amgalan, the second phase of World Vision's distribution of knowledge programme was just starting.

7.3.3 Perceptions by the neighbourhood community – Changes during and after programme application

Cairo – The GTZ-PDP

Since so much effort was being put into the development of the area, it was felt that the demands of all of those who had committed themselves ought to be addressed. Through massive investment, the technical and social infrastructure, and thereby the living conditions, was improved in both settlements, and, in Khazan, 80% of inhabitants interviewed expressed appreciation of the changes. In Masakin, the local leaders said that the improvement in social conditions had made the people more optimistic, more active, and more relaxed and that there were now fewer problems in the settlement (CMIK01, 33-33). However, only a bare majority of the residents and natural local leaders in Masakin were totally satisfied with the GTZ support. Fifty-four per cent were satisfied with their work, particularly with regard to the infrastructural improvements. Nonetheless, many inhabitants felt that the work was still unfinished, because solid-waste collection was a 'mess', streets were not fully paved, and the water supply was of poor quality. However, the GTZ had been phased out by the end of 2009 and subsequently posted within the CG to improve informal settlement policies.

Regarding the **sustainability** of the GTZ programme in Khazan, one local leader stated that the project had been conducted within too narrow a range, and so the measures only had a minor effect (CKIK01, 42-42). Few were optimistic that the Cairo Governorate, with whose cooperation the projects had been carried out, would continue the work (CKIK04, 42-42). In Masakin, a slim majority of 57% of local leaders expressed the hope that the NGOs would continue the work of the GTZ, saying that some of the young people who had been involved had benefited hugely from working with the GTZ, as it had taught them where to get permits

for projects and how to approach and deal with the LA and LPC in order to solve problems. 'The young people are now well-versed in networking' (CMIK05, 34-35). However, some NGOs were directly dependant on the financial support of the GTZ through the projects, and these NGOs will inevitably disappear (CMIK01, 36-36). Further, Elmouelhi et al. concluded in a study, conducted in MN in 2015, that, after the GTZ phased out, no kind of contuation or follow up of coordination between different stakeholders could be observed. Also a facade-painting programme, conducted in 2014 by MURIS to beautify the buildings along the Autostrad, could not satisfy the residents as they argued that the area faces other urgent problems like water supply, garbage, health and education services and expressed their dissatisfaction from the state's interventions (Elmouelhi et al., 2015: 344).

Kathmandu-Lumanti's community empowerment programme

Despite the fact that Lumanti's programme could not be introduced at its full capacity in Bansighat, some **positive changes** were recorded by the interviewees, such as an improvement in the living conditions of families who were active in the savings and credit programme. There was a kind of unity within the community, and the women in particular gained self-confidence. In addition, slight economic and social growth could be observed (KBIK05, 5-5). In Sankhamul, sanitary conditions improved considerably in families who had installed toilets. Awareness of the need to fight for housing rights was fostered, the community became better organised, young people were educated, and small businesses were founded. Regardless, most people in Bansighat were not impressed by Lumanti's support; an overwhelming 70% did not feel supported. The residents interviewed felt that the real, pressing need for education and employment had not been met by the organisations. They also felt that those organisations did not support the community in physical and social development, but simply worked for their own benefit (KBIK01, 28-28). Not surprisingly, in Sankhamul, 62% felt supported, mainly by the savings and credit programme, as it improved their living conditions, and they believed that Lumanti had positively supported the community in negotiations with KMC during the clearance for the BLR in 2005. Before 2009, the residents did not feel supported by Lumanti regarding promotion of land ownership for squatters, but Lumanti did fulfil this on a large scale after being phased out of the settlements. Most of the negative responses were related to the BLR and to an earlier plan from the DUDBC to use valuable land for the benefit of investors, which was set out in their 2008 proposal of a flat system or a land sharing system, neither of which was welcomed by the

residents of Sankhamul. The residents did not feel supported, as neither Lumanti nor the public institutions listened to them when it came to their personal preferences.

The Urban Shelter Policy was another aspect of Lumanti's work in cooperation with the Nepalese Government to bring the rights of landless people into a broader legal discussion and thereby achieve **sustainability** for the projects undertaken in the neighbourhoods. The chairperson of Sankhamul stated clearly that the tools that had been activated could only be sustained through a land ownership certificate for the neighbourhood, in order to prevent the removal of the settlement (KSIK05, 45-45). However, when the active people in Bansighat were asked about the sustainability of Lumanti's projects, all of them stated that, because of personal interests, active members invested less time in the youth club and the children's club. Cooperation between Lumanti, other organisations, and the communities was to be coordinated by such federations as Women Unity Nepal, SPOSH Nepal, and the National Squatter Federation (KSIK05, 24-24). Therefore, together with Women Unity Nepal, it was decided that the children's club, which was hosted in the community building in Sankhamul, should be abolished; however, the youth club saw a revival. A new initiative had the potential to re-establish the children's club and offer tuition classes. In Bansighat, the children's club was reinstituted with the support of the women's group and Action Aid Nepal. However, as the new constitution of Nepal gave settlements the right not to be evicted unless there was an appropriate plan for resettlement, the squatters at least made a first step towards legal status, although recognition in the form of land ownership would be a long process.

Ulaanbaatar - MUB's GAR

The residents interviewed in Amgalan had very divided opinions about the programme. Two-thirds of them were not convinced that the programme followed their interests; many stood to lose their incomes when they moved to their new permanent homes, since they were then working on their premises and no alternative solution had yet been offered to them. In addition, the design of the future settlement had been changed frequently and radically, ranging from adjustments in the provision of infrastructure to changes involving a single-family housing area that was soon to be used for high-rise apartments for 10,000 inhabitants. No relationship was made between the value of the land surrendered and the tiny apartments the people were to be given. Furthermore, neither the government nor the investment company Grandline had any experience in how to implement redevelopment projects; nonetheless, the programme was carried out at the inhabitants' expense. On a positive note, after the construction of the new apartments living conditions will improve, so the promises of

Grandline and the municipality as well as the wish of the inhabitants having no business in Amgalan, the apartments will be equipped with various amenities, and, particularly for retired people, life will be more comfortable. In Yarmag, the field survey for the land readjustment programme was only begun in November 2014, but the resident interviews were carried out in 2013. However, the local leaders all said that they appreciated the programme, as the people would be able to maintain their houses themselves and could keep their own land. It seems that neither *khoroo* administration did much to serve the people of Yarmag and Amgalan, with just one positive answer being given in each settlement to the question of whether the people felt supported by them. In Amgalan, the one positive response referred to the implementation of the GAR. Most people complained that little assistance was offered to ordinary citizens. Especially in Yarmag, people complained that no effort was made to solve the situation of the illegal settlers.

7.3.4_Summary - External actors for neighbourhood development and their perceived success

Besides the daily routine of administrative duties, the state institutions in Cairo and Ulaanbaatar have also provided social programmes and state benefits. In Kathmandu, the ward offices have played a crucial role in granting permits to the communities to install infrastructure. In all three cities, the city governments are generally responsible for providing technical and social infrastructure, which is supplied in the neighbourhoods only to a certain extent. When it comes to the provision of social support, the state is also involved in various ways and to different extents: in Cairo, through individual state benefits and public social facilities, like the Cultural Palace, and, in Ulaanbaatar, also through individual state benefits and events, but this is not sufficient at all. As a result, local and national NGOs especially provide various kinds of social programmes, including awareness-building, education, business, and health programmes, in all six neighbourhoods. Religious institutions, especially in Cairo, offer several support schemes to people in need. Also in Kathmandu, for the last few years, churches have been offering programmes to children, and, in Ulaanbaatar, the monasteries offer religious services and also feed the poor. Raising of political awareness was especially common in Khazan and Bansighat before the political change in 2006. For improvement of infrastructure, NGOs or international companies are either contracted or are allowed to cooperate with national enterprises. In the Cairo neighbourhoods, to a huge extent, water-supply and sewage lines were brought in by the GTZ and KfW. In Ulaanbaatar, especially in Amgalan, the investment company Grandline, with the support of an ADB loan, has brought urban services to each household through the redevelopment process. In

Ulaanbaatar, the programmes have mainly focused on business activities. The applied improvement programmes have all included a technical and social component, except for in Ulaanbaatar, where the participation component barely exists because the programme has been focusing foremost on generating profit for the investment company. GTZ tried to focus during its PDP on its socio-economic components, such as the Local Initiative Fund or cleaning campaigns, but could not reach the majority of the community in Masakin. Lumanti's biggest asset is the socio-economic component; the savings and credit scheme for women has been especially successful in Sankhamul.

However, understanding how the support was perceived by the inhabitants and which components, in their view, brought the highest benefit to the neighbourhood is crucial to the improvement programmes. The people in Masakin and Khazan mainly expressed satisfaction with the technical infrastructure. Since, especially in Khazan, the water supply and sewage system were in a dilapidated condition before improvement, the vast majority of residents were satisfied with the results; in contrast, residents were not satisfied with the quality of results in Masakin. With street cleaning campaigns and NGO work, the youth enabled to be mobilised in Masakin to some extent. In general, the demands of the residents were not fulfilled, and pressing problems like solid waste management remained, even after the phasing out. In Kathmandu, the Sankhamul neighbourhood reaped the positive change of the savings and credit scheme, as many households were then able to improve their living conditions, to give their children a better education, or to send family members abroad for work. The second successful assignment of Lumanti has been the advocacy work to procure more rights of the landless population. In Bansighat, the residents alleged that none of the NGOs supported the community, but, with the change of the local leader and expansion of the savings and credit scheme, the perception of Lumanti's work changed. Even though the GAR had just started to be implemented in Amgalan, the residents were sceptical about the outcome of the programme, since, especially for those who were living off their land, no alternative had been offered. The claim of participation was just lip-service, and no open dialog or transparent decision-making was contributed to reduce uncertainty and fear. Only WV, with its socio-economic approach, was able to reach a few residents to offer business training and savings and credit opportunities; these were also applied in Yarmag in the form of family funds by HRC, but with limited success, since the residents did not see an opportunity for improvement through the programme and mistrusted the coordinators to misuse their savings.

7.4_Actors and negotiation processes in local governance structures

In this chapter, the various actors contributing significantly to the development of the settlement are depicted in terms of their roles and interests and their influence on the development process. The alliances and relationships between them are also described. Influence within the community and on development processes was different in some cases, which is highlighted. It has been measured on a scale of low, medium, or high[39] for comparison between the actors. Development measures and NGO and public institutional programmes were included in the development process. Communication patterns between the community and the implementation of NGOs, as well as between the community and public institutions, are described. For each type of communication, depicted are the actors using this type, with whom and for what they communicated, and which tools were used for communication. The reaction of the inhabitants is also considered. In the Ulaanbaatar cases, communication between the *khoroo* and other institutions was additionally observed. The frequency of communication and the number of actors involved are of course higher in the settlements with programmes. For the communication pattern, only important stakeholders were chosen with medium influence in the development process.

7.4.1_Actors' structures, interests, and affiliations

<u>Cairo - Neighbourhoods</u>

At the **local level**, in the initial stages, residents of the two communities played a decisive role in the development of the settlements and helped shape them, but, as the influence of outside public actors increased, this progressively diminished. The communities' interests were clearly personal: an improvement in the standard of living and the solution of problems within the settlements. The local leaders in Khazan were, with one exception, affiliated with a political party or an NGO. These connections enabled them to extend their network into the LA and LPC in the interests of the wellbeing of their clan's people, thereby gaining prestige and influence in the settlement. In Masakin, however, they were also connected to the LA through their involvement in the GTZ projects, and so their network widened to include influential people who could help them with their problems. Their role during the GTZ-PDP project was more that of supporters and mobilisers, so they had medium influence (see also

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[39]Low influence: little support within the community, no infrastructure or other construction project for upgrading the settlement. A few social programmes were offered, but fewer used.
Medium influence: some support within the settlement, opinions and decisions partially accepted. A few infrastructure and construction projects were implemented; a few social programmes were offered and used.
High influence: high acceptance and support within the community. Most of the infrastructure and construction measures were implemented; a few social programmes were offered and used.

Figure 30). In Khazan, the role of local leaders was different, as almost all of them were affiliated with the NDP to gain more influence and widen their network. They acted more as coordinators and service providers to satisfy their people and therefore had a higher level of influence in the development process via (political) opinion making, this being the usual role of a political party. In fact, the NDP seemed to exert considerable control over the community in Khazan and, through the LPC, who were based in the LA building, had the kind of connections that allowed them to influence the public institutions to make decisions that favoured their interests. The LPC, as well as the members of the NDP, were first and foremost interested in gaining votes in upcoming elections and were therefore highly interested in their status and influence within the community, and consequently also with the development of the neighbourhood. Such political institutions in Masakin had only medium influence within the community, but, in Khazan, their influence was high, also due to the fact that development measures implemented by an independent NGO were missing. In addition, the local NGOs and Community Development Associations (CDAs) had less influence in the development of the settlement, as their primary interest was gaining prestige and influence and providing benefits with their work. In Masakin, by contrast, their influence was greater, as some were also involved in development measures. The businessmen involved were mostly concerned with turning a profit and therefore highly interested in networking with influential people. In some cases, they were the local leaders or affiliated with the NDP. As a result, their influence was high, as infrastructure and accessibility was important to their businesses. They also played a role in the settlements as job providers. As a public service provider, the LA was primarily interested in self-preservation, career building, and executing orders. Financial benefits were decisive in all kinds of community support. Nevertheless, they were of high influence when it came to infrastructure provision, especially in Khazan; however, within the community, they had a very low level of influence. Another actor that should not be underestimated was the mosques, which had high influence within the community, as they provided not only religious but also financial support to the residents; however, they had less interest in and influence on the development of the neighbourhoods.

At **regional and national levels,** the Cairo Governorate and the ministries had the role of decision-makers, as well as service providers. Their primary interest was the provision of security, and, consequently, the Ministry of Defence carried out the relocations of endangered people. Due to the upgrading of the settlements, their land value increased and became attractive to investors. However, their status was also important in that their politicians now held decision-making posts. As a result, they were the most influential actors as far as

infrastructure provision and building codes. The GTZ was represented on all levels, having offices both within the LA and the governorate and their national headquarters at the Ministry of Economy. They saw themselves as facilitators for the neighbourhoods, but were often service providers. They exerted a high level of influence in the development of Masakin and a medium level in Khazan, as the PDP was not fully carried out. As a result, in Masakin, the role and influence of the local actors also changed. The influence of local opinion- and decision-makers and local leaders was higher in Khazan than in Masakin. In general, the usual patron-client network was integral on all levels, with the GTZ also integrated into this network.

The **connections and affiliations** between the different actors were work-, role-, or interest-related in both settlements. In both settlements, the community as such found itself almost marooned between the different actors. Likewise, the mosques were not connected with the local leaders when it came to neighbourhood development. Work-related connections existed between the LA and CG and the ministries, as well as between the LA and the LPC. Role-related connections were between the different service providers: the LA, the GTZ, and the NGOs. Interest-related connections regarding influence, status/prestige, and benefit were strongest between the local leaders, NGOs, politicians, the LPC, and the NDP. The business people's connections were also interest-related, but their interests were different, and they used their connections with influential people to fulfil them. According to Piffero, the greatest beneficiaries of the GTZ-PDP were the local leaders and the politicians (ibid 2009: 182). However, the most connected actors were the LA and the LPC.

The public institutions, namely, the LA, LPC, and Cairo Governorate, were responsible for the overall development of the settlements. The **relationship between the public institutions and the residents** was generally not positive. In Khazan, 73% and in Masakin as many as 82% of residents interviewed had a negative opinion of public institutions—an overwhelming result, considering that one of the tasks of the GTZ was to strengthen connections and trust between the community and the LA. All inhabitants interviewed said they would have preferred to have no relationship with them whatsoever. 'They deeply mistrust people from the district or the government or governorate' (CMII07, 56-56). The shock of the rock accident in 2008 was still very evident. At that time, the people felt abandoned by the public institutions, and this deepened their mistrust. There was no cooperation between the inhabitants and the LA because of this bad sentiment. Some inhabitants wrote multiple letters of complaint, but nothing was done. 'They all take money before providing any service'

(CMII02, 39-39). The people were unsure whether or not they had to move, or whether MN would be demolished (CMIK02, 20-20). A GTZ field worker stated that this lack of trust in the LA had to change: 'If the people don't trust, they won't do anything'. People were afraid to enter the LA building, but all public meetings were held in the district office, so trust shifted to some extent to the district. After the rockslide, this changed because of the incompetent distribution of apartments by the LA (CMIK06, 41-41). During field visits, the anger and tension were palpable, especially in Khazan. Initially, nobody wanted to be interviewed. Because German cooperation was affiliated with the CG and the LA through the PDP, everyone thought that the Germans had been sent by them. The situation eased after introductions were made to some local leaders, but the local leaders, too, had negative opinions regarding public institutions and did not want any support coming from them (CKIK03, 18-18).

Regarding **relationship of the local leaders with the GTZ**, which was active from 1998 to 2009, comments in Masakin were 80% positive. Firstly, however, a relationship had to be built, and it was hard to win the trust of the people of MN when the GTZ-PDP office was located in the LA office. As a result, the GTZ-PDP programme placed particular emphasis on the team leader as a figure with whom the people, especially the local leaders and NGOs, could build trust. Consequently, after phasing out, the situation between the LA, the NGOs, and the community was pretty much the same as before they entered MN.

Khazan   **Masakin**

Figure 30: Actors' structure in Khazan and Masakin relating to their influence in neighbourhood development (biggest/medium/smallest circle corresponds with highest/medium/lowest influence). Source: Own elaboration

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

On a **local level,** the residents in both settlements played an important role through the local leader and the TDC in Sankhamul, and in Bansighat through the local leader and the women's group (previously part of the TDC). This was because the residents were not just passive receivers or consumers, but also their own implementers through their infrastructural self-

help-initiatives, run by the consumer committees. However, the residents were scaled as medium, because, on an individual level, they have had an impact on the appearance of the settlement by working on their houses (see also Figure 31). The communities' interests were clearly stated as being an improvement in the standard of living, with adequate and stable water and electricity supplies (this could apply to the whole of Nepal) as the main priorities. Particularly in Sankhamul, the education of children for the long-term improvement of living standards through access to formal occupations was also highly rated. The *tol* chairman, or local leader, as head of the TDC played a decisive role in Sankhamul as the leading community decision-maker, as well as coordinator of various measures and mediator in cases of conflict. In order to safeguard his status and influence, it was important that he preserved the unity and approval of the community. The *tol* chairman was also required to represent the neighbourhood in negotiations with public institutions and for land ownership. His status and prestige were crucial in deciding his longevity, as the community elected a local leader and his committee every three years. Although there had been constant changes within the TDC, the current chairman had been in power since 1995. Also considered important was networking with other communities, political leaders, and public institutions in order to stay up-to-date. The consumer committees in both settlements had the role of coordinators and managers for the provision of infrastructure, be it the sewage system, street lighting, or tarmacking the road. They were therefore highly interested in implementing measures successfully for the sake of their prestige within the community. Consequently, their influence in upgrading the community was high. Another of their interests was networking. The representatives of the public institutions that they met during negotiations might one day be important.

During the six years of observation, the leading role in Bansighat changed. When the Maoists entered the community, one influential party member assumed the role of mediator, as people sought his advice and he resolved conflicts. The role of the deregistered TDC was to provide infrastructure with the help of the consumer committees and to fight for land ownership. The leading role within the community and for development matters was played by the women's group through their chairperson. They represented the neighbourhood in negotiation processes and in the fight for land ownership. Their interests were the same as those of the TDC and the local leader: the stabilisation of the community largely through the bettering of living conditions, status, and prestige, and the fight for women's rights. The chairperson was selected every two years by the women's group members. The women's group in Sankhamul did not wield such a strong influence, as they did not take a leading role. The women's group

in both settlements were affiliated with the savings and credit groups. These groups, in addition to exerting considerable influence within the community and families, now made their influence felt in the development of the settlement, because they also provided loans for the construction and upgrading of buildings and shops. As a result, thanks to the interest on these loans, they were able to help even more families with loans increase their general standard of living. The ward offices as public service providers had medium influence on the development, as it was their job to issue the recommendation letters for line authorities. However, their interests were similar to those of the CG, with self-preservation, career advancement, and personal benefits playing their part. Political parties and leaders were counted as local actors; in Bansighat, for instance, some members of the Maoist Party lived locally and greatly influenced the community and its development. When NGOs had to move Bansighat, the infrastructure was supported by the members of the Maoist Party when they were at their posts in KMC and, later on, led indirectly to unity within the community. That was also, to some extent, the case in Sankhamul, as the local leader was also a politician. Parties from the outside also tried to convince the community before each election, though not in Sankhamul, where they had only medium influence. The importance of the youth and children's clubs was more social than for physical development. Members of the youth clubs were also often involved in consumer committees.

At **regional and national levels,** the KMC office played a major role in the development of neighbourhoods as decision-makers and service providers. They had an interest in the settlements, as the provision of infrastructure resulted in an increase in the value of land. In addition, these projects enhanced their status and their influence, and they were anxious to keep their seats. However, their influence within the community was considerably lower and often led to mistrust. The squatter federations, with the women's wing as opinion-makers and coordinators of social programmes in the settlements, had low influence in the physical development but medium influence in social aspects and within the communities, since their interests were more in lobbying for squatter's rights and networking, as well as the pursuit of prestige and influence in the settlements. Lumanti had different levels of influence than service providers. In Sankhamul, their level of influence was higher than in Bansighat, as they had to leave the latter settlement during the implementation of the programme, but they brought social programmes to both settlements and, in Sankhamul, supported the programme with individual toilets. Like the GTZ, Lumanti was also interested in prestige and in satisfying the donors in hopes of more follow-up projects; networking was also essential, to keep them current. In general, the various actors exerted high influence in the development of the

neighbourhoods, and, as a result, the interests of the community as consumers were met more often than in Cairo, where influence was concentrated exclusively in prominent people.

Connections and alliances were mostly interest-related, as there was a strong connection with the squatter-related institutions. The leaders of both settlements were politically active in the federations, and the savings and credit groups, via their cooperatives, were also connected with the federation as the umbrella facilitator. The TDC, local leaders, and consumer committees obviously had a work-related connection with such public institutions as the ward and KMC offices, as well as with NGOs such as Lumanti. In addition, the community had more opportunities to make connections within the neighbourhood, for example, with the TDC, the women's group, the savings and credit group, and the consumer committee. In Bansighat, Lumanti was only connected to the women's group leader, but, in Sankhamul, to the local leader and the TDC as well, and, at regional and national levels, with the KMC office and the ministries, namely, the DUDBC. The women's group and the local leader were the most connected actors.

The **relationship with public institutions**, specifically the KMC office, had previously been associated with fear of eviction in both settlements. However, after the KMC issued the inhabitants of Bansighat certificates (i.e., birth certificates, family cards) in 1997, the inhabitants felt more secure and cooperated with the KMC with regard to the BLR corridor in 2014; they were also familiar with the people in the city government. Nonetheless, in spite of this mutual cooperation, because of past incidents, the residents were still reluctant to trust them. The relationship with the ward office in both settlements was more positive, as the ward office paved the way for the introduction of basic urban services by issuing applications and recommendation letters for electricity, drainage, and so on. The inhabitants of Sankhamul had a more negative opinion of the KMC office because of the attempted eviction, though the subsequent agreement protected them. After the negotiations for the BLR, the level of mistrust diminished.

Although relations with the public offices were positive, the **relationships with the NGOs**, especially Lumanti, were, frankly speaking, far from positive during the time of Bansighat's affiliation with the Maoists. Nearly 70% of the inhabitants interviewed expressed negative opinions, saying that the NGOs worked for their own benefit rather than for that of the community. They believed that only with the help of the Maoists would the neighbourhood improve its living conditions. Previously, the relationship had been good. The first NGO to enter the neighbourhood was Lumanti. (KBIK03) The negative opinion vanished as the

Maoists lost the people's trust, and the NGOs were again welcomed to offer services to the inhabitants. In Sankhamul, relations with Lumanti were more or less good. Older people in particular were grateful for the implementation of the projects and for the help Lumanti provided during the flood in 2004. Sixty per cent of the people interviewed had a positive relationship with Lumanti. The local leader preferred to discuss settlement problems with Lumanti rather than with the KMC (KSIK05, 41-41). Younger people were not satisfied with the work Lumanti performed in the settlement (KSIK02, 32-32; 42-43). People had very high expectations when Lumanti began supporting them, but they could not be fulfilled. A further problem was that people did not trust Lumanti; they thought the NGO would use the money coming from abroad for their own purposes. Only later did relations improve, when Lumanti started drafting legal rights for the squatters and advocating them (KSIK03, 40-41).

Bansighat   **Sankhamul**

* including saving&credit group, **Consumer Committee   * including saving&credit group, **Consumer Committee

Figure 31: Actors' structure in Bansighat and Sankhamul relating to their influence in neighbourhood development
(biggest/medium/smallest circle equivalent to highest/medium/lowest influence). Source: Own elaboration

Ulaanbaatar - Neighbourhoods

The structure of the actors in settlement development in Ulaanbaatar could be relatively easily described compared to the other cases where only the main actors were depicted. This is because, in Ulaanbaatar, the state controls much of the development, and *ger* settlements in general were only of interest to political leaders during election season. Consequently, as described above, the residents were less motivated to become active on their own behalf. Through the *Ger* Area Redevelopment programme, the *ger* settlements were made attractive to the investors, the so-called 'construction companies', which is an actor barely described and absent in the other cases so far (see also Figure 32).

Although, on a **local level**, the residents built up their characteristic settlements, their influence on further development, especially in Amgalan, depended to some extent on their willingness to go along with the GAR, something that the investment company Grandline, renters of temporary accommodation, was keen to convince them to do. Therefore, the

inhabitants' influence was assessed as medium-scale, the same as in Yarmag, since they influenced the appearance of the settlement to a great extent. The family funds implemented measures to upgrade public space and therefore had medium influence. The community was primarily interested in private matters: increasing the standard of living and bringing technical infrastructure to each household. The family funds in Yarmag, in some cases, initiated by the HDC, were run more or less independently, and one was even established without any external influence. Their interest was rooted in their role as service providers offering loans to their members and collecting interest on those loans. Their prestige within the settlement was also important for attracting more savers and hanging on to their members. In Amgalan, the local businessmen had a medium influence on the community as possible service and job providers, as well as in the development of the neighbourhood, to make it more attractive in order to maximise profits. Consequently, they had a keen interest in the provision of infrastructure and in making the settlement more accessible. The *kheseg* leaders in both settlements were public service providers and mobilisers for upcoming events. However, their main interest was to carry out orders from above, gain status and influence within the settlement, and broaden their network to keep up-to-date. Because the communities were rather introverted and the *kheseg* leaders were seen as belonging more to the *khoroo,* their influence in the communities was of medium scale while lower in the development of the neighbourhood. The *khoroo*, the next ranking higher public service provider in the hierarchy, was primarily interested in self-preservation, career advancement, carrying out orders, and reaping benefits wherever possible. Nevertheless, their role in the development of the settlement was of medium influence, as they were responsible for issuing recommendation letters for the construction of houses, dealing directly with the residents. However, in state or city-decreed measures, they had no influence. It was through a city decree that the investment company Grandline won the tender for the redevelopment of Amgalan. They had a high influence on the further development of the settlement, but a low influence within the community. Their main interest was in getting the signatures of 75% of the residents, a prerequisite for relocating the residents and demolishing the whole area. A great deal of pressure upon the community was required to convince the residents to exchange their land for apartments. The profits to be made from the sale of the large number of apartments unoccupied by the settlement inhabitants were what motivated the developer. In Yarmag, primarily infrastructure was to be provided through the redevelopment programme.

On a **regional level,** the municipality, along with its related bodies, and the districts were the decision-makers and, thus, the most influential actors in neighbourhood development. Their

interest was in benefiting from the rise in the value of the land after the redevelopment was completed, as some of the politicians were either directly or indirectly involved with the investment companies. In addition, their status and influence within the settlements would increase and help them win the next elections. The municipal authorities were interested in carrying out orders. At the same time, they had little influence within the communities. World Vision in Amgalan and Good Neighbours in Yarmag were the services providing NGOs for primarily social aspects, but they also carried out some improvement measures in the settlement, and so their influence on development was medium-scale. However, as Good Neighbours had only just started their work, their influence within the community was rather low. Their interest was in gaining prestige and widening their network within the neighbourhood, as well as in satisfying their headquarters in order to earn follow-up projects.

In both settlements, the clan or family network was extremely strong within the community, each providing support for its own members. However, their role-related public connections were primarily with the *kheseg* leader, the *khoroo*, and, in specific cases, the district. Inevitably, Grandline established a connection with the residents of Amgalan, to convince them to sign away their land. Some residents also had interest-related contacts with the NGOs. The strongest interest-related connections were between the public service providers and the *kheseg* leader, *khoroo*, and *district*. The NGOs had influence-related contacts with the public institutions, and Grandline made use of their influence within the community. Business people had connections with the residents as consumers and with the *khoroo* and *kheseg* leaders, thanks to the latter's influence within other public institutions. By way of reciprocity, the *kheseg* leaders instrumentalised the shopkeepers to spread information via information boards. The family funds had the same connections as the business people and an additional connection with the NGOs, which provided them with new ideas and ways of thinking from the outside world. Other NGOs and the convent only had low influence within the community and in the development processes and, hence, are not described further. The most connected actor was the *khoroo*, as it was responsible for the settlement and was also the mediator between the regional and local levels; however, the *khoroo* was not a decision-maker.

In Amgalan, the people's **relationship with the public institutions** was divided. One section of the people had good relations with the *khoroo* and the *kheseg* leader, as they felt informed and supported by their projects. However, another section argued that the national elections had resulted in changes in the *khoroo* and, in some cases, even in the *kheseg* leaders, causing the previously positive relationship to change as contact grew less frequent (UAII01, 56-56).

Some even argued that less service was provided and that the leaders simply showed up to collect money for Elderly People's Day (UAII03, 51-51). Seventy per cent of comments regarding the GAR were negative. Business people- feared that the redevelopment would result in the loss of their businesses with no alternatives or compensation offered, and residents were unhappy because the apartments they were to get were much smaller than the houses they had built, and construction costs would not be reimbursed. In general, too few options were offered to cover the population's various situations. In Yarmag, public opinion was split down the middle. Half reported a good relationship with the *kheseg* leader, feeling that she did a good job, but the other half had no contact with the *kheseg* leader or the *khoroo*. A few expressed the opinion that the *khoroo* made money from the project and pocketed it (UYII02, 52-52). They claimed that they only cared about the residents at election time, and, even then, all they were interested in were votes (UYII04, 51-51). No data could be collected on the people's relationships with any of the NGOs active in the settlements. Residents interviewed in Yarmag were not involved in family funds, which, at the time of the interviews, represented the only tool implemented by an NGO. The service was used by families interviewed in Amgalan, but was mainly appreciated for the training programmes offered.

Yarmag   **Amgalan**

Figure 32: Actors' structure in Yarmag and Amgalan relating to their influence in neighbourhood development
(biggest/medium/smallest circle corresponds to highest/medium/lowest influence). Source: Own elaboration

7.4.2_Summary – Influences of actors on neighbourhood development

Looking at the structure of the actors involved, it is helpful to differentiate between the neighbourhoods given full support and those given less support, since influence or share in neighbourhood development shifts as soon as a development programme is implemented. In Khazan, five main actors played a major role in the overall development of the settlement: the CG and the LA along with the LPC, and, on a community level, the local leaders and the local business people who held often various positions (e.g. local leader, member of the LPC and

founder of one or more local NGO(s)) to preserve their influence in decision-making. The GTZ and the NGOs played a middle role, as Khazan was not one of their priority areas, and the GTZ was mainly involved in renewing the technical and social infrastructure. The smallest role in both neighbourhoods was played by the residents and the mosques, whose influence on moral aspects, mind-set, and coexistence within the community was considerable. The interests of the residents should have been addressed by the local leaders, who had a stake in the political and decision-making processes, but instead, to a huge extent, only their own personal interests or those of their clans were pursued. Moreover, in Masakin, the biggest roles were played by five actors, with the roles of the LA and of the local leaders weakened in favour of the GTZ and the local NGOs, which had been strengthened through support programmes and were highly financially dependent on the GTZ. The CG and the LPC as decision-makers on an administrative level, as well as the local business people, used their dominant roles to influence development in line with their own interests. The GTZ greatly influenced the LA in its programme and provided training and exposure visits so that the role of the LA was weakened. Some residents approached the programme leader directly with complaints, and he organised help from the LA. Even though the task of the NGOs as so-called 'civil society organisations' was supposed to be overseeing the welfare of the community, very few honoured this responsibility. In the end, the fulfilment of the demands of the residents through active integration into the development process failed, as there was no lobbying for the communities' interests, even though the five major actors in both Khazan and Masakin were located at all three levels (local, regional, and national) and had the power to do so.

In Kathmandu, the local administrative level was rather weak, as there was no decision-making power. There, the major actors in the development came from the national and regional levels, as well as from the local community. As in Bansighat, the role of Lumanti and other NGOs was weakened by the influence of the Maoist Party, while the consumer committees and the TDC were strengthened. With the rejection of the Maoist Party, the influence of the community women's group witnessed a revival. As a result, four big actors were mainly responsible for the development of the neighbourhood, including the KMC, who distributed the budget. The consumer committees in both settlements played a decisive role in providing infrastructure, as demanded by the community, so that self-organised support simultaneously involved the community in the development process. In both neighbourhoods, the influence of the squatter federations on previous developments had been rather small because Lumanti and the Maoist Party implemented their programmes according to their own

ideologies. However, as a result of their phasing out, the federations' influence increased, at least in socio-economic aspects, allowing the squatter federations to regulate the implementation of social development programmes and to coordinate the cooperatives. In the future, the federations will have much more influence on the development of squatter settlements, as they also fight for the rights of the squatters and could end up being the fifth big actor, or an actor at the local level could lose power. The KMC will retain its major role, as it is the financial contributor to the construction of infrastructure. In Sankhamul, even after the arrival of Lumanti, the structure of the actors involved have been remained unchanged and the political parties wielded much less influence within the settlement, due to the presence of a strong, politically active local leader. The women's group is highly influential, as they run the savings and credit group, which is crucial to the personal improvement of living conditions. Here, five major actors could be identified with the local leader taking precedence over the TDC and the consumer committees. Hence, the community and their interests are represented by three actors: the local leader, the TDC with its consumer committees, and the women's group.

In Ulaanbaatar, the structure of the actors in both neighbourhoods is relatively clear-cut. The state institutions have inherited the largest role in the development process of the neighbourhoods, and the extremely hierarchical structures of the former socialist regime are still very visible, especially in Yarmag, where the MUB and the district as one actor is by far the biggest. The *khoroo*, NGO, family funds, and residents all play a medium role. However, the *kheseg* leader, positioned between the administrative level and the community, has virtually no say in the development process. It is surprising that the residents have a medium role, as they have no lobbyist or institution representing their interests, unlike in Cairo and Kathmandu. This may be because the people tend to organise themselves through their family structure for internal support, and because the socialist regime has forbidden the population from forming organisations; the state is still very strong. In addition, for the regional fund, the residents have to answer official questions about the demands of the neighbourhood. In the following years in Amgalan, the face of the neighbourhood is going to be changed dramatically by two major actors: the MUB and the investor company Grandline. Both local business people and the residents could be playing a bigger role in the GAR if they could be organising themselves and could be fighting together for their demands, but mistrust and individual interests blight every collective initiative. The NGO WV plays a medium role, as the savings and business groups are not locally installed, but are stretched across a few *khoroos*. As a result, the influence on development in the *khoroo* is reduced. The *khoroo*

administrations have no decision-making powers and can only issue recommendations. Consequently, their influence on development is reduced.

The most connected actors in the local governance structure are those with the coordinating functions, regardless of decision-making or executing, or high or low influence in the development process. In Cairo, with the LPC and the LA, both characteristics were combined. In Ulaanbaatar as well, the local level administration, the *khoroo*, are the most connected body, although it are not a decision-maker and was of only medium influence. In Kathmandu, the highly influential, decision-making women's group and the local leader at the community level were the most connected bodies.

7.4.3_Types of communication after Selle's concept within the neighbourhoods

<u>Cairo - Neighbourhoods</u>

As far as the **sending and receiving of information (i.e., procurement, informing)** was concerned, informal talks, either with other residents, the local leaders, or members of the LPC or NDP, were the preferred avenues used by the residents of both settlements for discussing problems, seeking solutions, and receiving news about upcoming projects. This type of communication was particularly common in Khazan, as other alternatives were not available, though it tended to be used more for information procurement than for informing. For informing the LA about problems in Masakin, the residents formed groups and wrote **official letters of complaint**, hoping for a solution. In most cases, these received no response from the LA, so the local leaders had to be convinced to attend to the matter via **informal talks**. However, despite using her connections with the district chief, the GTZ team leader, and the local leader responsible for solid waste collection, the female leader of Masakin was unable to find a solution for the piles of garbage lying uncollected in the streets of MN. When even letters of complaint achieved nothing, both the female leader and the residents were left feeling angry and powerless. In the event of leadership, whether in the LPC, the LA, or the Cairo Governorate, informal talks were considered to be the best way of dealing with things, as well as the best way of keeping up-to-date, recruiting support, and dealing with private matters. The GTZ MN-team liked to spread information about upcoming events, like street cleaning campaigns, via the active young people in the hope of drumming up more participation. The exchange of **information** was not common between institutions and the community, but only among the leadership. Once a month, the LPC invited the local leaders, the LA, and the NDP to an official government meeting to share information and discuss problems that had been reported to the Cairo Governorate for resolution, only to be sent back

to the LPC. As the GTZ-PDP team had its office in the LA building, LA and LPC staff were easily available for problem-solving or information, and vice versa. The GTZ also allowed a few LA employees to participate in the PDP for training and exposure visits outside Cairo.

As Piffero (2009) has already mentioned, **participation** within the PDP was mainly the privilege of influential people. A good example of this was the Local Area Action Plan (LAAP), where stakeholders such as the LA, LPC, local leaders, NGOs, and so on were required to identify the most severe problems in Masakin by pinpointing them on a map in order to facilitate the identification of solutions in workshops and meetings (ibid). Young people were trained as surveyors to collect the necessary information about the settlements. The information gathered was to be shared with residents at the end of 'public days'[40].

Khazan

Masakin

Figure 33: Communication pattern, after the concept of Selle, in Cairo neighbourhoods between the most influential actors. Source: Own elaboration

However, in fact, nothing at all was shared, not even the information gathered. Low-threshold projects for quick results in problem-solving, such as the street cleaning and tree planting campaigns implemented in both settlements and mainly carried out by active young people with the support of the LA, provided residents with a brief sense of satisfaction, as the garbage piles disappeared for a few days and the streets grew green with trees. However, when it came to more severe problems, the LA and the Cairo Governorate were invariably cloaked in secrecy, and no information was shared. In the case of the aftermath of the rockslide disaster, rumours circulated about eviction, leading to fear and mistrust in a community uncertain about its future. Even the GTZ-MN failed to circulate information about

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[40] Public days are days where the inhabitants should work for the communal purposes. They are called by the LA and include works like street cleaning, collecting waste, etc.

their projects and upcoming events, so the people of Masakin were unaware that a participation programme for poverty reduction and trust-building between public institutions and the community was being implemented in their own neighbourhood, as Piffero (2009) has commented. Neither within the GTZ-PDP project nor between any other stakeholders did cooperation in the sense of equal, face-to-face decision-making ever take place, as the Cairo Governorate ensured that the final decision was invariably theirs. Figure 33 provides an overview of the types of communication used in Khazan and Masakin during daily routines and development processes. The arrows visualise who addressed whom.

Kathmandu - Neighbourhoods

A land sharing project and the flat system, two prestigious projects from 'above' to make these prime lands available for investments over the course of the construction of the BLR, were introduced in both settlements by Lumanti and the KMC after the 2008 election. Resettlement to another location in the neighbouring municipality via the Flat System was also discussed, particularly for Bansighat as a flood-prone area. However, this was not a feasible option, as the new location was too far from the people's workplaces and provided a smaller variety of schools. The BLR was supervised by a committee of several ministries and the KMC office and financed mainly by the ADB. Following, an outline of the communication between the actors during this project is described. At least in Sankhamul, all types of communication were used to achieve a positive result on the community and government sides.

In both settlements, **information procurement** was used by the consumer committees in the ward offices when they applied for electricity, water tanks, and tarmacked roads (Sankhamul) or a sewage line (Bansighat) in order to be issued the required recommendation letters demanded by the authorities in question. The consumer committee and members of the Bansighat youth club regularly went to the KMC office to negotiate the budget. In Bansighat, Lumanti presented a draft paper, on behalf of the KMC office and the DUDBC, to the chairperson of the women's group, **informing** them of the aforementioned Land Sharing Project and the Flat System and suggesting that they buy the land in the event of relocation of the neighbourhood. The community rejected the proposal with anger. At that time, the Maoist Party convinced the community through public meetings and informal talks that it was in their common interest to fight for the development of the settlement. This resulted in the rejection of Lumanti's and other NGOs' work and in the division of the community. Before family identity cards were distributed, the KMC office regularly sent eviction notices to both

settlements, pinning them to each door. The reaction in both communities was the same: insecurity, resulting in anger, fear, and mistrust, and anti-eviction demonstrations held in front of the parliament building. This also meant that living conditions did not improve, as the inhabitants were reluctant to invest in their homes.

In Sankhamul, **information exchanges** over the course of informal meetings took place between the local leader and members of the TDC, the youth club, and the residents nearly every morning and evening over tea in one of the teashops. News, activities, problems, and upcoming events or projects were discussed, eventual strategies were formulated, and tasks were distributed for the solution of problems. There was also an official meeting of the TDC once a month, although, in urgent cases, emergency meetings were called.

In Sankhamul, the introduction of the Land Sharing Project and the Flat System resulted in the **participation** of the TDC along with the local leader, who agreed to meet with members of the KMC, the DUDBC, and Lumanti to discuss possible solutions and to make a clear statement on their demands. As no agreement could be reached and other events were coming up, both ideas were rescinded. In both settlements, Lumanti introduced their Urban Community Empowerment Programme for the improvement of living conditions and the reduction of poverty through information presentations, field visits, and formal talks with the leadership. Later, the local leaders and active people were taken on exposure visits, and the

### Bansighat

Sankhamul

Figure 34: Communication pattern, after the concept of Selle, in Kathmandu neighbourhoods between the most influential actors.
Source: Own elaboration

community received intensive training and workshops, especially on the savings and credit scheme. Networking with other squatter settlements for information exchange was also part of

the programme, especially for the women's groups. Nevertheless, in the end, the actual needs of the community were neither considered nor integrated into the programme, which caused some residents to reject it, since they saw it as being delegated from 'above'. When it came to negotiations over a mutual agreement for the construction of the BLR, the stakeholders **cooperated** with each other as equals, because the local leaders and the squatter federations were unified and had gained power amongst the communities. The TDCs, the BLR committee, the federations, and Lumanti were able to find a compromise and build the BLR without evicting the settlements. As a result, the remaining vegetable gardens were destroyed without compensation, and, in Bansighat, the main road leading to the BLR was widened by one metre; the houses along this road had to be rebuilt. In both settlements, negotiations with the federations and local leaders for land ownership certificates were still on-going, with Lumanti, the DUDBC, and other related ministries involved in the discussion rounds. Figure 34 provides an overview of the types of communication used in Bansighat and Sankhamul during daily routines and development processes.

Ulaanbaatar - Neighbourhoods

The communities in both neighbourhoods had two means of **information procurement**, namely, from information boards hanging in shops and in the *khoroo*-building and updated by the *kheseg* leader, and from the *kheseg* leader during home visits **informing** families about upcoming activities and events. These official ways did not always work, as two-thirds of residents interviewed in Yarmag and half of those in Amgalan did not feel informed. Either the *kheseg* leader rarely or never visited, or the information boards were full of other information not from the *khoroo* or the district but from elsewhere. The residents did not know where the information boards were. Another problem was the constant changing of the *kheseg* leaders, which made it hard to build up a relationship. This was particularly felt by the shop owners in whose shops the boards were placed. The *kheseg* leader announced upcoming events or projects by public institutions or NGOs via the two methods described to the residents, the family funds, and other people active as multipliers. Phone calls and text messages were also often used. Public hearings were mostly organised in the school hall in Yarmag and in the Janjin Club in Amgalan to inform the residents and to invite participation or support, such as when the NGO Good Neighbours introduced their programme in Yarmag, or when the GAR was introduced by the municipality in Amgalan. The programme or new NGO was then officially introduced to the community. Mainly elderly people attended these public hearings, as they were at home with free time on their hands. From time to time in Amgalan, the investment company Grandline needed to inform the residents about some

change they were making, in design or finance or in some other important aspect, creating confusion among the residents that later led to mistrust and anger. Via phone calls, letters, and infrequent site visits, information was regularly passed between the *Ger* Area Development Agency and the *khoroo* governor to keep the *khoroo* up-to-date regarding the GAR. The *district* informed the *khoroo* about new orders, regulations, and programmes via the official postal system, and the governor distributed the tasks to the *kheseg* leader for implementation. In Yarmag, the illegal families were also informed. Staff from the district, *khoroo,* and *kheseg* visited them on-site to discuss the need for them to relocate. However, the families had no other option than to wait until the government offered them a solution. When this failed to come, the people's uncertainty turned into mistrust and anger toward the *khoroo* and the district, and their living conditions were not improved.

Information exchange was used solely by the institutions, starting with the *kheseg* leaders and the *khoroo* governor. In Yarmag, they all met three times a week and, in Amgalan, after 4pm 15 days per month to exchange news, upcoming activities, problems and orders, and so on, as well as to provide updates from the administration and community sides and to distribute tasks. The *khoroos* officially met the districts every three months, but almost daily phone calls passed between the governor, the district administration, and the *khural*. The NGOs held meetings in Amgalan once a month where they had to report on their activities, problems, and finances and later distribute tasks or contact the district for clarification. As WV had an office within the *khoroo* building, they met several times a week. In Yarmag, Good Neighbours carried out a constant exchange of information during the construction of a playground, which had been chosen by the residents as the most urgent project to be implemented in the neighbourhood. The inhabitants' council, selected during a public meeting and consisting of 18 people, was required to construct it, and to promote unity and a sense of responsibility. They involved students from the MUST to support them on technical aspects and also got backup from Good Neighbours. This teamwork motivated them to finish the construction of the playground. Once a year, the family funds met officially with the *khoroo* to report on their activities and to discuss upcoming projects and whom to offer support. The family funds helped, to some extent, with public works, and the district supported them with the budget.

Participation from 'above' was expressed in the *subotniks,* which were held by the *khoroo*, the district, or the national government between once a month and once a year. The *kheseg* leader contacted every family and members of the family fund to persuade them to participate.

However, participation in both neighbourhoods was low, as the *subotniks* were seen as an imposition. In both settlements, residents were required by the *khoroo* and *kheseg* leader, acting in the name of the district, to fill out questionnaires for the Regional Development Fund expressing their demands regarding the settlement. However, the district, with the approval of the district *khural*, chose which demands were to be given priority. As happened with the street lighting, the residents could vote later at a public tender meeting for the construction company to carry out the work. In Amgalan, WV also allowed the community to participate in their programme through questionnaires designed to illuminate the community's needs, as well as through workshops and training programmes to establish business and savings groups. Rather striking participation was implemented by the GAR via a public hearing to provide information about the GAR: a questionnaire asked people whether they would prefer adjustment or redevelopment (later altered to comply with the demands of the investors and the municipality) and, via a public tender hearing, were invited to choose an investment company to redevelop their neighbourhood 'for the residents'. Grandline won the tender. In the wake of this tender, tensions rose amongst the community and the staff of the

Yarmag

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
Figure 35: Communication pattern, after the concept of Selle, in Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods between the most influential actors.
Source: Own elaboration

khoroo. The unit leader and the vice unit leader were suspected by the residents of working for their own interests and those of the municipality, and the unit became divided. The *khoroo* staff pretended that everybody was in favour of the GAR, but, in fact, 60% of the residents interviewed either had doubts about the programme or completely rejected it, as they felt betrayed. A door-to-door campaign was conducted to try and convince people. Figure 35

provides an overview of the types of communication used in Yarmag and Amgalan during daily routines and development processes.

Ahead of the tender, the municipality provided **no information**. The inhabitants were not told that their wish for the provision of infrastructure alone, expressed at the first public hearing, could not be met and was to be arbitrarily replaced with the GAR in the form of high-rise apartment housing. Hence, uncertainty, mistrust, and anger were spawned right from the beginning. In Yarmag, during a German-Mongolian student project to construct a square as a meeting place in front of a water kiosk, information was frequently withheld from the residents and family funds, so the residents barely participated and the project was not accepted. No cooperation could be validated.

7.4.4_Summary – Communication pattern among stakeholders in neighbourhood development

The governments of Cairo and Ulaanbaatar introduced as informing tools for the residents the objection letter respectively the information boards. Residents could use objection letters to inform the local governments about demands and deficits within the informal settlements. The local governments in *ger khoroos* use the information board to spread information among the residents assuming that residents procure this information. Both tools had just a small effect because they were not properly used. Moreover, the objection letter, if not answered, spreaded anger. The informing of the residents of Khazan by the local government about any event could not be observed. The residents had to procure information through informal talks with local leaders, the LPC, or political leaders. In Masakin, little information was spread because of the existence of the GTZ-PDP. The programme helped that residents could come into contact with the LA and vice versa. However, information exchange still happened only between the state actors and the local leaders, respectively the NGOs. Participation of population groups just happened within the programme. Nearly the same accounted for the Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods. Residents were not involved in any information exchanges and the participation approach in the GAR was a mere lip service. Eye-to-eye negotiation between the community, state actors, and non-state actors was only possible in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods in the frame of talks for the BLR. Meeting at eye level was possible because the communities themselves were organised and nominated trustworthy leaders to represent and speak on behalf of the majority of the residents. When looking at Figures 32-34, the more grey pillars and arrows occur, the more interaction between several active actors happened, which contributed to the fact that more information was shared and more interests were met. Lack of information or wrong information led to anger, frustration, and uncertainty, which

resulted in the halting or slowing down of the development process in the settlements, and to isolation within urban society and boycott of governmental decisions.

8_Comparison of Empirical Findings in Cities and Neighbourhoods

In this chapter, the various actors of the neighbourhoods and the communication pattern, according to Selle's concept in these local governance systems, as well as internal and external influences of settlement development, are compared with each other. The findings and results of the comparative analysis of the neighbourhoods are described and juxtaposed in opposition. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the various phenomena of the cities and neighbourhoods while, at the same time, identifying possible similarities between the units of analysis, namely, neighbourhood development, actors, and communication. The neighbourhood characteristics currently in evidence, as revealed in the results of the quantitative study section, are depicted in the beginning to illustrate the contrasts. The case-study improvement programmes are used as bridging elements between the neighbourhoods to highlight variations between the units analysed.

8.1_Influences of the urban improvement programmes on neighbourhood development

The chapter on the history of the settlements illustrates how the commitment of the residents and the support of the different institutions acted as internal and external influences. However, these were not the only decisive factors; urban structures and natural influences also played important roles in how the settlements developed in physical, social, and economic terms (see table III.VII in Appendix). Thus at first, general observations of the three development stages will be given and the most influential factors will be outlined.

8.1.1_Neighbourhood development as an interaction of various internal and external actors

The reasons for triggering the establishment of the self-provisioning neighbourhoods are, at first, the overcrowded urban structures and other reasons, like pre-existing building structures, working sites, or natural disasters that led to resettlement in other places. But also political decisions and eviction led to settle on public land in Masakin. At the initial settlement stage, the influence of state actors was already increasing, or was massive like political leaders before elections. But most of infrastructure the residents constructed or led construct at this stage. At the consolidation stage, several actors influenced the development of the settlement and the appearance of it changed to more semi-permanent or permanent building structures, infrastructure was provided or renewed to a huge extent and NGO's found their way to support improvement of living or in social, educational and awareness building issues. At this stage also the self-mobilising activities of residents and local leaders rise for fighting for their

rights to find a place within the urban society (neighbourhoods in Cairo and Kathmandu). This stage can be characterised as the most intense one in improvement of living conditions as well as in terms of social and political movement from within the neighbourhoods. The recognition stage at least for the ger settlements bought a success as the recognition by law via registration, land and property titling, was approved and the population grew rapidly and the appearance of the settlements changed completely from gers to semi-permanent and permanent houses. However, state programmes with massive input of investment companies seek to revalue the ger settlement's land. In this stage in Cairo and Ulaanbaatar the influence of state actors and NGO's is stable in providing improved infrastructure (Cairo) but leaving people out of decision-making processes ending up in political riots (Cairo). In Kathmandu the neighbourhoods are at least on their way towards recognition. This stage can be considered as more diversified as neighbourhoods reached different social, political, and economic statuses.

Consequently, the following paragraphs focus on development efforts achieved and others still outstanding. In order to draw conclusions about the development of the six neighbourhoods, it is important to differentiate between those that enjoyed the full support of institutions and those that had less support. The assumption that the neighbourhoods with full support gained more development benefits than those with less support is an obvious one to make. To condense the linkage between neighbourhood development and the various influences over time, at first a look at the actors' landscape and their achievements will be given before looking at the aforementioned phases of development.

Indeed, the settlements with full support by an urban improvement programme did gain more social and technical infrastructure amenities than those with less support, but not based on the efforts of the implementing non-state actors. Although it was of poor quality, most of the infrastructure already existed. Masakin's many facilities, including schools, sports grounds, and the cultural palace, as well as supply and disposal lines, were all provided by the government. Via a huge financial and administrative effort, the GTZ renewed and improved the quality of the infrastructure and paved all main roads as well as most side roads. Absent health facilities and an almost non-existent solid waste management system either were not significantly improved or got even worse, as the previous efforts of local institutions or inhabitants were dismantled. When looking at Amgalan, the same scenario is evident. The government had already built the Janjin Club entertainment building, also used as a meeting hall, as well as the school, childcare centres, and the library. Later, in a WV initiative, the

hospital was built, the water supply improved, and the school building renovated. The governmental GAR would provide the missing infrastructure, with the provision that the settlement would be completely renewed. The economic and social development of the neighbourhood was supported, to a great extent, by the WV. Thanks to the efforts of the inhabitants, Lumanti's low-threshold programme in Sankhamul brought about significant change. Electricity and some water tanks, as well as a sewage pipeline for the lower settlement area, already existed due to the initiatives of the inhabitants with their consumer committees and the ward offices. Private toilets and a community building were built, and, through the savings and credit scheme, the family living conditions improved thanks to individual effort. The community building was constructed with Lumanti's support. In addition, the neighbourhood chairman initially allowed his house to be used for community meetings; he later moved out, and the house became a meeting place for the local youth and for children's activities. Recently, with the phasing out of Lumanti, the squatter federations have gained a high level of influence over social development.

The neighbourhoods with less support revitalised their own resources, but only to a limited extent and not necessarily in terms of infrastructural provision and improvement. In Khazan, the first sewer pipeline was built via the efforts of the inhabitants and was later renewed by the government and then again by the GTZ. Water and electricity were provided by the government, as were the school and the training centre. However, the neighbourhood, at the time of this study, was sadly lacking in recreational facilities, especially for children. The only public green space was an unused, closed-down park. As many households have been living in cramped conditions, it is expected that renters in particular will move out of Khazan and that more buildings will grow vertically, as there is no space left to provide accommodation. In Yarmag, the situation was similar to that in Amgalan, as all households have electricity supplied by the government but no individual water or heating supplies and no sewage disposal. The water kiosks, as well the school and childcare centres, were set up by the government. Family funds aimed at improving living conditions through the empowerment of the inhabitants and the reduction of poverty were supported by the HDC but failed to gain significant traction within the neighbourhood, although a few community projects, such as the beautification of fences and the park in front of the administration building, have been carried out. In Bansighat, the development of the neighbourhood lagged behind at first, as the community was disjointed and uncommitted, and even support organisations were sent away. However, the community did manage to organise consumer committees for the construction of sewage pipes, electricity lines, and additional water tanks, thanks to the influence of a

winning political party. Before being rejected, Lumanti supported the construction of private and community toilets. During that time, the community building was also installed thanks to the effort of the inhabitants. As many households have been living in cramped conditions, the settlement is expected to expand horizontally to densify the settlement even more. Improved unity and the reopening of the neighbourhood to support organisations, particularly the squatter federation, have led to enhanced social development.

Influences and impacts

Considering the different stages of neighbourhood development, the influences on it, and regardless of whether a settlement enjoyed full support or less support, the more consolidated and recognised the settlement became, the more influence was exerted by the governments and political leaders. However, influences other than the extent or the timing of support received have had an impact on the development of the settlements.

a) Initial stage – basis of conflict: Looking at the influences exerted by governments and political leaders, both boosting and curbing impacts can be observed. A settlement may be recognised by public and political institutions right from the initial stages of its creation and used by political leaders for their own benefits (Kathmandu). At the same time governmental actions could also cause the growth of squatter and informal settlements via offering settlement on unsafe, unauthorised public building land, and thus, lay the basis for conflict (Cairo). However, the establishment and construction of the initial infrastructure in almost all settlements was the effort of the inhabitants.

b) Consolidation stage – Intense actions of improvement: With the consolidation phase, the settlements more or less reached their full extension. Settlements with a higher level of development and more support reached full extension at the beginning of this phase, whereas those with a lower level of development experienced continued migration with little further extension (i.e., Bansighat and Yarmag). There is also in- and out-migration in the settlements with full support, but mostly in tenancy and less in an ownership structure (Sankhamul) where the inhabitants could afford to build extensions on their houses to rent for additional income. A diversification of actors occurs in the consolidation stage due to power struggles between influential state and non-state groups as well as between local leaders. Not only public and political institutions but also civil society institutions now have a stake in the neighbourhood development. NGOs try to fill the service gap left unfulfilled by the public institutions or act as mediators in the construction or improvement of infrastructure and social services and in

the improvement of living conditions. This occurs with differing levels of success and not always to the satisfaction of the community, as is explained in the following chapter. The most influential part is played by the governments and political leaders, especially in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods. The most boosting impact on development is undoubtedly the recognition of the population via the provision of legal documents, including identification documents. However, political change can lead to new governments that threaten eviction or to political parties that divide the community, and so, development comes to a standstill. Nonetheless, not only external influences gain massive weight in the consolidation stage. In Sankhamul, the inhabitants pushed for recognition of its TDC and were strongly unified in the protection of their property against rebelling neighbouring landowners. However, regardless of the level of development, global, natural, and national factors have also brought curbing influences. Globalisation has brought massive unemployment to Cairo, resulting in the further growth of informal areas and increasing crime rates. In Kathmandu, the flood hit the settlements hard; Bansighat had to be partially rebuilt. In Ulaanbaatar, political change brought unemployment and poverty and, along with natural disasters, led to a massive growth in *ger* settlements.

c) Recognition stage – Integration of self-provisioning neighbourhoods: The recognition stage should be understood as the slow social upgrade of the neighbourhood communities as a follow-up to previous improvement measures and authorisation. The Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods especially enjoyed the longest recognition phase of all six of the neighbourhoods. It was reached with the legalisation of land distribution as an administrative procedure and the privatisation of land in *ger* settlements and elsewhere. The *ger* settlements grew rapidly, and the NGOs started implementing their programmes. National economic growth also led to increased incomes in the *ger* settlements, allowing people to improve their own living conditions. However, instead of integration into the urban context, they became more isolated. In Cairo, the informal settlements were recognised by the government, and, in Kathmandu, more rights against eviction were incorporated into the constitution, resulting in the neighbourhoods giving their consent for the construction of the BLR. The influence of state actors in this phase is constant, but not on the same basis as in other formal areas, as the settlements still have the characteristic and are labelled 'informal'. Moreover, improvement programmes with renewed infrastructure were not able to change this image, and so the conflicts sparked at the initial stage remained unsolved. As in Kathmandu, the communities are organised via their own organisations and federations, they have more influence on

measures and outcomes, and they can better steer their own development (with the appropriate support from external actors).

Each phase of neighbourhood development has been influenced by other actors and external factors more or less intensely. To conclude, the various influences from the cities, it should be mentioned that, in Ulaanbaatar, natural disasters have a regular influence on the growth of *ger* settlements as well as the government. Moreover, in Cairo, the government plays the most influential part, and, in settlements without support, the political leaders and religious institutions have a strong influence in the neighbourhood community. In Kathmandu, the government plays an important role alongside other actors, like the political leaders and squatter federations.

8.1.2_Urban improvement programmes and self-organised support for improved living standards – From 'blackening' to 'whitening' and vice versa

The adoption of a programme, or its tools, depends on whether or not it meets the demands of the population. However, the issue of the degree of involvement of inhabitants must also be addressed. In Ulaanbaatar, the work of the NGOs HDC in Yarmag and WV in Amgalan has been concluded, but the GAR has just started, and neither its progress nor its ultimate success can be evaluated at this time. The programmes implemented all have in common that they consist of hard (technical) and soft (socio-economic) tools, with the exception of the HDC-programme in Yarmag, which consists only of the socio-economic tool.

When examining the development programmes, the community was not recognised as being part of the urban society, and, as a result, the programmes have a low share of active inhabitants, even though the programme is labelled 'participative'. Particularly in Cairo and Ulaanbaatar, the involvement of inhabitants in the development programmes was broadly absent. Applying the 'whitening' and 'blackening' processes to the improvement programmes described by Yiftachel, a dramatic change in the implementation of the GAR in Amgalan can be recognised. Legalised 'whitened' *ger* areas turn into a 'blackened' space through total elimination via resettlement and renewal. Instead, in Cairo, through recognition and the land-titling process of the GTZ-PDP programme, the neighbourhoods triggered a whitening process. However, the whitening process by legalisation or recognition alone obviously does not improve the socio-economic conditions of the inhabitants. In the Kathmandu neighbourhoods, the opposite have been observed. While the legalisation process did not turn into real recognition but rather into small concessions to keep the population quiet, Yiftachel called it the 'politics of un-recognition'. Some social groups, especially in Sankhamul, are in a

whitening-process through social upgrading due to better job opportunities via better education. In the first phase, Lumanti's improvement programme contributed to the un-recognition of the neighbourhoods, but the next phase included the advocating of squatter rights and moved towards whitening of the neighbourhoods.

a.) High expectations and unmet demands: The demands of the populations of the Cairo and Kathmandu neighbourhoods were mostly concerned with infrastructural and urban structural issues. In Masakin, the people had the feeling that many problems remained unsolved at the end of the GTZ programme. It seemed that expectations were high, and the results of the programme remained unclear to the inhabitants. Only the local leaders, who participated in the GTZ-PDP, and the GTZ-MN team seemed to be aware of the positive results for the neighbourhoods. As already mentioned in the introduction to the programme, the population in Cairo was barely involved in the programme. In Sankhamul, technical support was just a small part of their low-threshold programme, as their focus was more on socio-economic improvement in the first phase. The fight for squatter rights and land ownership was conducted by Lumanti only after they phased out of the settlements. However, a huge number of residents in Bansighat did not feel supported, as the social programmes in education and income generating in particular did not meet the demands of the residents, and, in the wake of the expulsion of Lumanti and other organisations, the programmes were unable to continue producing positive results. In Yarmag, the same savings and credit programme was introduced as in Kathmandu, but failed to achieve the same success due to fears that the people's hard-earned money would be misappropriated. A pressing demand in Yarmag and Amgalan could be observed for individual water, heating, and sewage systems, but the residents of Amgalan never wanted to be moved to multi-storey housing, as will inevitably happen, thanks to the GAR.

b.) Meeting the communities' demands: In Khazan, a huge part of the population was satisfied that the infrastructure was improved, as they were not even expecting any support from the GTZ-PDP. The fast results in the form of campaigns like street cleaning or tree planting in Masakin and Khazan also brought quick success. In Sankhamul, and later also in Bansighat, the savings and credit scheme in particular was a huge success, as not only were the living conditions of the households improved, but the role of female household members was also enormously strengthened. In Yarmag, two very active family funds were able to visibly change the *khoroo* with their projects. However, family funds seem to require a committed leader and are highly dependent on those who do volunteer work for the

community. In Amgalan, the business tool of the WV programme has had some success, with several inhabitants setting up their own businesses.

c.) Unexpected curbing outcomes: In Cairo city, the 'Arab Spring' initiated by the informal settlements was a highly unexpected result of the demands of low-income groups being unmet by the Egyptian government. In addition, the massive input of foreign investment in the improvement of infrastructure could not help much, as other pressing socio-economic problems were not being addressed or reduced.

d.) Unexpected boosting outcomes: One unexpected outcome from the PDP in Masakin was that the young people were mobilised to found a number of local NGOs that offered social work for the population. Additionally, in Sankhamul, the living standard and the social upgrade of the younger generation rose quickly. The successful negotiation between the Sankhamul and Bansighat communities and Lumanti and the governmental agencies should be mentioned here as well, as this positive outcome would not have been possible without the community and advocating work of Lumanti's programme.

Although the demands of the inhabitants were mainly of a technical nature, it was the social tools that were most widely adopted. A lack of clearly communicated explanations regarding the outcomes of the technical support implemented led to complaints from the inhabitants. In general, efforts to involve the inhabitants in the development programmes and communicate their demands failed in each programme, especially in those with a high threshold, as interests other than those of the population had higher priority.

Self-organised support by the neighbourhood community

Undoubtedly, it was the inhabitants themselves who initially created their neighbourhoods, building houses, roads, and, in some cases, basic infrastructure, even though external actors influenced their development. However, the commitment to self-help is very different in the three cities, being greatly influenced by the local culture and by local community and family structures. The residents of each neighbourhood support one another, but to different extents and with different outcomes with regard to raising the living standard. The international demand for community empowerment to allow people to mobilise their own resources is merely a goal written in the documents of donor organisations and NGOs, since individual cultural characteristics mean that many neighbourhoods are not organised as communities. In the informal settlements, the clan structure and its patron-client network characterises the neighbourhood and sets the frame conditions for actors, communication types, and collective

actions. In *ger* settlements, a strong family structure exists. Only in squatter settlements almost all families were unified as a functioning neighbourhood community, due to the heterogeneity of the residents and a strong leadership, based on collective strucutres. As a result, the understanding of self-help differs crucially from culture to culture, and, as such, the stigmatised SHIs as formation of local residents, demanded by donor institutions, should not be confused with the informal and loosely-structured, neighbourhood support organised by the inhabitants. Although, in an institutionalised environment, formal procedures such as the registration of active groups are necessary, informal support structures should also be recognised. These formally registered and informally formated neighbourhood support groups, initiated by the residents themselves, are referred to as *formally or informally self-organised support*.

a.) Family and clan support in formerly regime-ruled countries: As already implied in the last section, SHIs were barely related to settlements in Egypt and Mongolia, as there were other, strong influences at work in these (formerly) regime-ruled countries. The government and its political supporters denied all local power, with measures being implemented in a strictly top-down fashion. As a result, other means of support were used: in Masakin and Khazan, the pre-existing patron-client network was strengthened. In Ulaanbaatar, the socialist regime exerted a strong influence in all corners of the neighbourhoods, even regulating the formation of neighbourhood living units, today's *khesegs*. Collective commitment was similarly organised through *subotniks*. Family structures are very strong in *ger* settlements, meaning that support is concentrated internally, within the families. However, in Masakin, where more social and recreational facilities are available and where development was fully supported by the GTZ, a diversification of actors developed, and the patron-client network lost its absolute power, as the people were able to seek help from other sources. By contrast, in Khazan, the old system remained strong. Thanks to the GTZ development programme, the youth in Masakin became very active. Their recognition as full members of society led to them found their own NGOs to support not only their own clans but also the whole neighbourhood, thereby weakening the patron-client networks. These young people represent the greatest potential for the social development of the informal neighbourhoods, thanks to their ability to break through persistent traditions without losing touch with their roots. These NGOs were inspired by GTZ activities and are categorised as triggered, formally self-organised support; meanwhile, the self-organised support of the committed inhabitants in Amgalan was triggered by WV.

b.) Formally self-organised support, triggered or self-initiated: In Ulaanbaatar, for external support from NGOs to function, communities or groups have to be formed to act as bridges between these family structures, as happened in the case of the family funds organised by the HDC in Yarmag. The family funds implemented by the WV in Amgalan were not restricted to one neighbourhood and so bore virtually no relation to the local area or its development. Yet, the constant support of the WV led to awareness-raising among some active inhabitants who founded their own NGOs to deal mainly with social and economic demands in Amgalan, so carrying on the work of the WV. Concluding the topic of SHIs in Cairo and Ulaanbaatar, examples of *triggered, formally self-organised support* have mainly been observed in the neighbourhoods with full support as a result of the development programmes having triggered the inhabitants' commitment to being active in the improvement of conditions for the whole neighbourhood community, resulting in a registered local NGO. By contrast, in the neighbourhoods of Kathmandu, a neighbourhood community exists and SHIs were initiated; in *self-initiated, formally self-organised support*, inhabitants organised themselves without a trigger from other institutions and got registered. However, also in Kathmandu, Sankhamul, the neighbourhood with full support, was more active even before the NGO introduced its improvement programme to the community. The community organised itself in an informal TDC, which was subsequently officially registered after Lumanti entered Sankhamul, and so the community was recognised. The self-organised consumer committees had the duty of providing infrastructure. Further on, in order to fight for squatters' rights, the local leader founded the squatter federation SPOSH Nepal, as well as a political party, which had to be recognised nationally by the government. Therefore, the community was unified and well organised when the improvement programme was introduced. In Bansighat, the conditions were different. There was a lack of broad unity in the community, and an external force was able to enter and divide it. Hence, improvement programmes were rejected. However, consumer committees were also founded in Bansighat for the provision of infrastructure, and a TDC was founded but never registered. Therefore, the neighbourhood with less support had more struggles in finding its way due to a lack of unity, but, regarding *self-organised support*, the only difference was the delayed start.

c.) Informally self-organised support in all neighbourhoods: The inhabitants of the neighbourhoods with less support rely on *informally self-organised support* from traditional clan or family structures. Those who are not integrated into these structures are excluded from support. Small-scale social interventions were common, like the support of the elderly through donations of money and goods by more affluent inhabitants in Khazan. General

solidarity with people in need was expressed at the time of the rockslide, with the inhabitants immediately offering help during the emergency. Also in Kathmandu, solidarity with families in need is common and is also supported by the community in the case of a death in the family or health problems. As a common act of solidarity in Bansighat, migrant families are awarded a piece of land from which to make their living. In sum, all clan and family support, individual donations, and acts of solidarity can be counted to informally self-organised support.

To conclude the topic of *self-organised support*, it can be stated that two different types exist: officially recognised (formally) self-organised support and unofficial internal help and solidarity (informally self-organised support), the two types producing different outcomes. Self-help in the sense of infrastructural provision could only be observed in the Nepalese neighbourhoods without external influence. In the Egyptian and Mongolian neighbourhoods with full support, formally self-organised support was influenced by external forces and was mainly concerned with social and economic issues. In all neighbourhoods, including those with less support, informally self-organised support can be either individually driven (via clan or family structure) or collectively supported (via solidarity). Both types focus on social and economic issues.

When categorising self-organised support into strategies for the provision of urban services, as postulated by Mitlin (chapter 3.4), in all neighbourhoods, the individual market-based strategy (1) by each household is evident. In Khazan and Masakin, the dependency-based strategy (3) features in the people's project for the construction of sewer and water connections to the houses, as they collectively organised themselves to seek help from the NGOs. In Masakin, for the establishment of NGOs by the young people for social support, a collective self-help strategy (2) is valid. In Yarmag the dependency-based strategy is employed for the family funds and in Amgalan the dependency-based and the collective self-help strategies are applicable, as in Masakin. In Bansighat and Sankhamul, the collective self-help strategy for the consumer committees and the dependency-based strategy for the provision of toilets by Lumanti are valid. In addition, Sankhamul stands out as the only one to also fulfil the social movement strategy (5) for the foundation of the squatter federation and the political party. Comparing the neighbourhoods with the five other projects analysed in chapter 3.4, the collective SHIs resulting in a social movement strategy, especially the Sankhamul community, followed a similar path as the Indonesian and the Indian communities. They also had strong supporters in influential NGOs and went public. In the Cairo

neighbourhood, at first, collective SHIs were founded, but, due to personal interests, collectivism as an idea was not followed further, as also happened in the Brazilian example. However, none of the projects analysed could reflect the situation in the Mongolian communities, where the cross-family collective commitment needed to first be triggered from the outside.

8.2_Involvement of actors in local governance processes

When improvement programmes are implemented, there are always claims that the demands of the inhabitants have not been addressed. However, this is a matter of the influence wielded by each actor and whether or not the population has a strong lobby committed to its collective welfare. As in the neighbourhoods with support, more actors also try to stake a claim in the development process to save their interests, the actors' structure and their influence also change. The question is to whose benefit the structure changes and for what reason.

a.) Neighbourhoods with full support for the benefit of ruling elites: As decision-makers on the national and city levels, the state actors in all six neighbourhoods have the highest influence in the provision of urban services. However, the difference is determined in what way if the state actors share their influence with other stakeholders or to what extent the local level and other external actors contribute to the development of the neighbourhoods. In the neighbourhoods with programmes, undoubtedly the implementing actors have a heavy influence and also change the local actors' structure, but, in the case of Masakin, the role of the LA as the powerful local organ, they were responsible to play, declined, like in Khazan. In addition, the influence of the local leaders had diminished, as the senior staff of the GTZ acted as temporary local leader. However, as the local leaders are mostly business people and part of the patron-client network, their influence in the provision of infrastructure in Masakin and Khazan was still high. The local NGOs have gained a lot of influence with the support of the GTZ. The actors with the lowest influence in the current development process of both neighbourhoods are the residents and the mosques, even with the participation programme of the GTZ. As a result, the national, city, and local ruling elites, who participated in the development process, have benefited. The residents of the Cairo neighbourhoods have the lowest influence of the six neighbourhoods. By contrast, in Ulaanbaatar, the residents of both neighbourhoods have a medium influence, as they are locally organised through their strong family structures. Because the improvement programme in Amgalan is applied by the city government through an investment company, the influence at the city level had not changed the actors' structure. However, it shows that the overarching power of state actors obstructs

any local collective initiative, and the NGOs have reached only medium or low influence in improvement of the neighbourhoods. The *kheseg* leader in both neighbourhoods had the lowest influence, as the position was not one of decision-making but of executing and coordinating. Thus, the structure of the actors reveals a clear imbalance, top-heavy at the regional level and weak at the local level. As a result, in Amgalan, the benefit was clearly on the side of the investment company. Moreover, in the actor's structure, the (formerly) regime-ruled, and thus strictly hierarchical, ruling structure excludes, even with support programmes of participative intent, wide parts of the neighbourhood communities.

b.) Neighbourhoods with full support and strengthened communities: In the case of Sankhamul, Lumanti diminished the influence of political parties and simultaneously strengthened the local leading organs, such as the TDC, the consumer committees, and the women's group. Although the residents have medium influence, they have been represented as such in their local leading organs. In both settlements, with the reduced influence of the political parties and Lumanti, the squatter federations have gained fast influence, as they now decide which NGOs are allowed to apply programmes. Additionally, in Kathmandu, the ruling structure is strictly hierarchical, but in the sense of caste. Hence, even if the community is strengthened, it is a lengthy process until squatters get their full rights and land titles.

c.) Strong local leaders for collective interests: The role of a natural, *kheseg*, or local leader is decisive in neighbourhood development and can strengthen the unity of a community, or even result in the formation of a community when the leader is accepted by other clans or families. However, this role only functioned in the Nepalese communities. The local leaders of Sankhamul and Bansighat were politically active and carried out constant exchanges with other active people. Sankhamul even acted as a self-governed neighbourhood, with its elected local leader, the TDC board and with the consumer committee as an administrative unit. The leaders in the squatter settlements are, to a great extent, the first contact persons for external parties, such as governmental officers, politicians, donor agencies, and NGOs wishing to introduce programmes and reach a broad audience amongst the inhabitants. In the Cairo neighbourhoods, especially in Khazan, the local leaders mainly serve their own clan and were concerned with their political careers; they have their own 'clients' to serve. In the Mongolian neighbourhoods, the institutionalised, selected *kheseg* leaders tried to bridge the gap between the administration and the inhabitants and had no ruling but guiding functions. In Cairo and Ulaanbaatar, initial approaches were addressed to the administrations which made it difficult to reach the majority of the population because of mistrust.

8.3_Influences of types of communication on local governance processes

The assumption that more actors mean more communication is not necessarily accurate, as a lot depends on the degree of involvement of the actors in the planning, decision-making, and coordination of the development processes. Communication requires networks to keep it alive. The most strongly connected actors have not necessarily been the big actors or the decision-makers, but rather the coordinators for the most part, though they could also be major decision-making actors. In Cairo and Ulaanbaatar, the local governments have been the most connected but have been mainly executers. Only in Kathmandu have the neighbourhoods been represented by their own bodies, which were the decision-makers and coordinators for the neighbourhood projects.

a.) Communication tools as support factors: In each city, a support factor in the form of communication tools was introduced by the governments in an effort either to integrate the residents' demands into the development processes or to provide them with information quickly. With these tools in place, conflicts should have been avoided. In Cairo, the residents' letters of complaint (objection letters) were used to inform the LA about problems and demands; in Kathmandu, the KMC eviction notices informed residents of their imminent eviction, and the *khoroo* information boards informed residents about upcoming events. In reality, all these tools failed. Although the information boards were distributed in the *khoroo* building, the market hall, and some shops, they were hardly ever used by the residents. The letters of complaint were employed regularly by the residents, especially in Masakin, but the LA sabotaged its own governmental tool by ignoring the letters, further deepening the mistrust between the people and the government. Hence, the supporting factors were weak, malfunctioning, or out-dated. Only the eviction notices in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods had the desired effect, given that they could not be ignored by the residents, whose reaction was to stage a protest to convince the government institutions not to evict the settlements.

b.) Inhibiting factors as harmful for development: A lack of a culture of knowledge-sharing related to political and cultural realities was widespread in all context cities and was expressed by an absence of information sharing. A failure to provide residents with information is bad enough, but the unintended fallout is often intense and destructive, with residents reacting by protesting. However, an absence of information sharing was common fare. Especially in Cairo, information and knowledge are treasures to be kept hidden and used only at the right moment, to stay in the game. So, not only did the residents not get information, but neither did the people in the state's own institutions. With the exception of

Bansighat, information regarding even the most pressing questions was frequently withheld from the settlement residents. As a result, in all affected neighbourhoods, rumours spread, one example being the rumour that the whole of MN was to be evicted by the CG with the support of the GTZ—a rumour for which no efforts were made to dispel. Anger, fear, and mistrust grew and tension spread among the residents, resulting in a slowed down development process and the rejection of contact. In Yarmag, the frustration of the informal settlers over the lack of a solution to their situation led to their isolation from the rest of the settlement.

Informing is the most common purpose of communication between the national, regional, and local levels. The act of sharing information could cause adverse reactions when the content of the information is not to the liking of the recipient, or when the information is confusing or not sufficiently transparent. Another inhibiting factor was the informal discussion that took place between selected leading actors and NGOs, but it is also used for information procurement by the residents in Cairo and Kathmandu. An information exchange wherein the actors meet face to face helps to avoid misunderstandings and negative reactions. This kind of information exchange, however, was exclusively used at leading levels and led to exclusion of communities or groups. Only in Kathmandu did the local leaders regularly exchange information with the community, and, in Yarmag, this occurred once during a project being carried out by the NGO Good Neighbours and committed residents. Participation and collaboration led to positive results, such as the participatory street cleaning campaign in MN, the collaboration between the NGO and the local leaders and federations that led to the compromise on the construction of the BLR and the avoidance of evictions in Kathmandu.

c.) Communication gaps between the local and city levels: Communication gaps are caused by a lack of information, which could itself cause adverse reactions, as in the case of Sankhamul and the undeclared evictions. The gaps occured between local and higher levels, but could also happen within a single level, for instance, between administrations and their divisions, as was the case in Ulaanbaatar and Cairo. However, the gaps also occured within the local level between the community and the local administration as a result of deep mistrust and misunderstanding, especially in Cairo but also in Ulaanbaatar. In Kathmandu, the communities had good relations with the ward offices, as they were not decision-makers and issue recommendation letters, identity cards, and so on. Nonetheless, between Sankhamul and KMC, the gap existed because of the eviction case.

PART III

Final Considerations

9_Conclusion - Discussion of research questions

10_Practical conclusions and recommendations

9_Conclusion - Discussion of research questions

This chapter concludes the work with a discussion of the five dimensions of research and their respective questions. The first dimension is about the informality and emergence of self-provisioning settlements in the urban context, followed by questions of what criteria are decisive for the development of so-called 'informal' settlements, and how informal squatter and *ger* settlements differ from each other. The second dimension focuses on the urban improvement programmes implemented by state and non-state organisations and the questions regarding the types of improvement programmes implemented, how the inhabitants adopted these programmes, and how initiatives by inhabitants were integrated into these programmes. The third dimension addresses the community organisation and cultures of self-mobilisation and pursues the questions of what kinds of self-provisioning exist, the reasons behind them, and what functions they serve within the community. The fourth dimension is about the changing roles and the influence of state and non-state actors during different phases of neighbourhood development; it is also engaged in questions of what roles the various actors play in the development phases of the settlements and whether those actors have direct influence on the unauthorised act of people settling. The last dimension covers the negotiation processes between the actors and local governance structures, with questions about the types of negotiation – in the sense of Selle's negotiation concept – that are undertaken in the respective local governance systems and how they affect the participation of the community in decision-making. In the final part, I address some of the myths and misunderstandings that persist with regard to urban informality.

9.1_Policy-driven informality

a.) Informality as urban fabric

The main focus of this study was on such spatial aspects as the distribution of the self-provisioning neighbourhoods within the wider urban fabric and the factors that impacted on the development of informal settlements. Further on, the physical, social, and economic characteristics at work in the development of each neighbourhood type were brought to attention.

The very existence of the self-provisioning settlements within the three context cities depends on predominating urban structures, as well as on political acts of evicting people without

alternative places to live, as happened with the first settlers of MN and Masakin. Looking at the current distribution of self-provisioning neighbourhoods within the urban fabric, in Cairo and Kathmandu, they were seen as scattered around former village centres or across desert land near the city centre, their locations shifting due to urban growth from fringe village locations to peri-urban – suburban – central locations. Informal settlements are located in all parts of Cairo. As a result, the city became fragmented and unrelated to the city that had been traditionally divided (a quartered city) according to profession, religion, and place of origin. Moreover, in Kathmandu, the slum quarters shifted from former fringe urban locations to central locations along the riverbanks. The squatter settlements were founded along the riverbanks near the city centre, as well as in suburban and peri-urban areas. This was due to the availability of public land to settle on, rather than to questions of caste. The work further revealed that, in Ulaanbaatar, the belt-like northern ring of *ger* settlements also broke away from the historical settlement layout. They went from being the lowest rank at the edge of a circle to the southern edge of the fixed city Ikh Khuree to today's peri-urban and suburban locations in a strongly polarised city. As a result, in all three cities, the overall urban development has disconnected from urban historical, traditional settlement layouts. As cities grow in order to adapt to global challenges, so do self-provisioning neighbourhoods as part of the urban fabric. At the same time they are sensitive to the local changes, such as increasing poverty, unemployment, and economic growth.

Squatter and informal settlements are a relatively new phenomenon that first occurred in the 1950s in Cairo and Kathmandu with the change of political systems. However, whereas, in Cairo, informal settlements grew very rapidly, in Kathmandu, the number and size of squatter settlements remained relatively stable. The reasons for the different growth phenomena lie, on the one hand, in insufficient opportunities to participate in the legal housing market due to shortage or monetary constraints, and, on the other hand, in housing traditions and societal acceptance. The rapid growth in Cairo was due to massive migration to the city in search of job opportunities and a state overwhelmed by the throng of people in need of housing. Farmers sold their agricultural land, and people were displaced by public and private building activities or who could not afford to buy public desert land to settle on. At first, these two practices were politically accepted, but later, thanks to a new town policy, they were made illegal, and informal settlements grew when no solution was offered to house the masses. In Kathmandu, farmers also sold their land, but no laws were passed forbidding the conversion

of agricultural land to land for building. Poor urban residents were still used to renting, at best in the city centre with existing urban services, as the social stigma attached to being landless is severe; land ownership is what guarantees a position in Nepalese society. Rather than seeking legal solutions, squatter settlements were consolidated on the strength of political promises, which, so far, have not been fulfilled. By contrast, *ger* settlements were historically a part of the cities and contributed hugely to urbanisation. In 2010, UN-Habitat titled *ger* settlements as informal settlements due to the lack of formal recognition by urban development policies and regulations for the improvement of *ger* areas (UN-Habitat, 2010: i), in spite of the fact that one of their unique characteristics is that they in fact do have official land titles. They give the impression of being informal and excluded, due to neglect on the part of the political body and urban society in terms of urban services. Urban informality in all three cities is the result of urban policies that lead to different forms of neglect, with the difference of being influenced either by a ruling party determining the policies regarding self-provisioning neighbourhoods or by a party using self-provisioning neighbourhoods for their own political advantage.

The different characteristics of informal, squatter, and *ger* settlements have already been compared in detail in the conclusion of Chapter 7.1.4 and are just briefly summarised here. Primarily the physical structures and patterns differ due to the very different local building traditions and state action makes a difference. In terms of physical development, the building structure and condition of the settlements differ depending on whether the settlement had full support or less support, but this is not necessarily due to the upgrading efforts of the institutions. In Ulaanbaatar, the difference is due to historical development and to the differing income levels of the households and is mainly the product of private efforts with small rehabilitation interventions for public buildings. This is also the case in Kathmandu. In Cairo, the difference is the result of a massive upgrading of public buildings and technical infrastructure. In Ulaanbaatar, Kathmandu, and Cairo, the provision of technical infrastructure does not depend on the level of support. However, in Cairo and Ulaanbaatar, there is greater provision of social infrastructure in settlements with full support by NGOs. This has historical reasons, as Masakin and Amgalan were settled earlier, and hence social infrastructure was provided first to those settlements. In the settlements of Kathmandu no social and health facilities were located.

The case studies revealed that social structures across the three case studies differ as follows: a strong internal family structure is dominant in *ger* settlements, while informal settlements are dominated by the clan network with a strong patron-client dependency. Squatter settlements are characterised by a heterogeneous structure with united communities. The nuclear family is the preferred lifestyle in squatter and informal settlements, whereas *ger* settlements are still populated by extended families. Family size depends not only on lifestyle but also on living standards and the awareness of the family's own situation. In general, the settlements that received development support have smaller family sizes and sufficient living space. The smallest family size is to be found in the informal settlements, followed by the squatter settlements, with the *ger* settlements having the biggest family size.

The study further revealed that economic development was significantly greater in supported settlements, as additional income opportunities like renting, farming, and savings and credit schemes were used and invested in the improvement of living conditions, such as the development of more living space, construction of more stable houses, and better equipment of households. Hence, more family incomes also increased in settlements with support, as more occupations with stable incomes were counted. Furthermore, more family members, such as wives and adult children, were contributing to the family income. In the Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods, observable was the special issue that, in Amgalan, more families than in Yarmag used their plots for economic activities, running small enterprises like workshops, groceries, farming, and so on. Observed from the long-term perspective, especially in the Nepalese neighbourhoods, the families also invested in higher education for their children.

b.) Urban improvement programmes implemented by state and non-state organisations

Focal points of this research have been the improvement programmes and their components initiated by public, private, and civil society institutions, as well as if and how the population adopted the programmes or their tools. The involvement of the inhabitants and the ways in which the programmes were incorporated into the inhabitants' daily lives were also investigated.

The improvement programmes and their components in the six neighbourhoods have already been described in the previous chapters. To summarise the upgrading efforts, the case study showed that the low-threshold programme (Lumanti), followed by the medium-threshold one (WV), achieved the greatest success of all the programmes regarding participation and

adaptation by the inhabitants, namely, the savings and credit scheme in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods. These tools were also independently used later by the inhabitants, as they were supported and integrated into cooperatives and into a citywide cooperation network. However, also in low-threshold programmes with its supposed short-distance communication, the inhabitants felt only minimally involved in the decision-making for the programme, especially with regard to the technical infrastructure. Clear communication was lacking between the community and the NGO in their programme set-up. As a result, the inhabitants felt less satisfied with the outcome of the programme.

However, even when the high-threshold programme integrated a measure for improvement of infrastructure in an otherwise participatory programme, the inhabitants had the feeling that demands had not been met. Although a huge effort was made to improve the infrastructure, a large number of demands were still not been fulfilled, and some of the most pressing problems, such as solid waste collection, were not solved. Some inhabitants did not even realise that a participation programme had been implemented in the settlement, placing the degree of outreach to the population in doubt. Most successful, also in the high-threshold programme, were the small-scale campaigns, producing quick, wide-reaching results, involving the local youth and the local administration in a kind of joint activity. As a result, besides having improved social and technical infrastructure, the extent of the benefits for the population of the whole programme was striking. In addition, the recently initiated high-threshold programme in Ulaanbaatar is incapable of garnering the genuine participation of inhabitants, but the inhabitants have to be involved in the programme, pro-forma, simply to satisfy donors and to fulfil the promises made during mayoral elections. The preparation time for the programme was much too short to obtain results from an in-depth analysis, not just in physical and economic terms, but also with regard to social matters. Inhabitants could have been involved from the start instead of being presented with a ready-

Figure 36: Dependence between type of Urban Improvement Programmes and tools in use by the neighbourhood community. Source: Own elaboration.

made plan for their neighbourhood. The locations were too numerous and required low-income housing to be financed by private investment companies seeking the most financial benefit possible. As a result, the socio-economic effects on the resident population from moving and losing their workplaces in *ger* settlements are unknown, and worst-case scenarios have not been developed. The inhabitants of the *ger* settlements did not realise the value of owning a piece of land within the city.

To conclude, examples of high-threshold programmes in this study did not demonstrate the expected success of the participation of inhabitants in helping to meet their demands. However, even though low- and medium-threshold programmes allowed participation and depended on the inhabitants, valuable information about issues related to improving the neighbourhoods' living conditions were either not collected or of no importance. In all three programme approaches, either the infrastructural or the socio-economic measures lagged behind and did not make the space for inhabitants to adapt useful tools for the stable improvement of the living conditions.

c.) Community organisation and self-provisioning measures

The self-provisioning measures were analysed according to the reasons for their establishment and functions within the community. Neighbourhood dynamics regarding collectiveness and solidarity, as well as the usage of social services offered, were integrated into the analysis of self-mobilisation as a driver for neighbourhood development.

The studies show that the self-mobilisation in the six context neighbourhoods turned out to be very diverse and foremost depends on the lifestyle and cohesion of the community and whether the community is empowered. As a result, types of self-provisioning measures can be highlighted depending on if they are authorised to act within a formal environment (as registered organisation) or to remain as informal activities within the neighbourhood. Further it was depending on how the measures were initiated by the community. In the following, self-provisioning measures are labelled as *self-organised support*, as this narration describes a process of discovering a problem, getting together to find solutions, and acting collectively to support the neighbourhood for its improvement. Such initiation could be found in each neighbourhood, but it depends on which groups from the neighbourhoods were involved and by whom it was organised. *Self-organised support*, set up by the inhabitants themselves to fulfil their own demands, could only be observed in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods and at

the initial settlement stage in Khazan. This *self-initiated, formally self-organised support* was mainly provided by the consumer committees to provide basic technical infrastructure. These groups were organised by the community and registered in order to be able to apply for technical infrastructure. *Triggered, formally self-organised support* was either inspired by the actions of external actors or was part of the improvement programme, mainly continuing parts of it, for instance the savings groups in Kathmandu and Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods or the later on established NGOs by the youth in Cairo. *Informally self-organised support* includes all kinds of solidarity, neighbourly help, and family support and is tailored to deal with immediate problems within the neighbourhood or private households. It is organised spontaneously or for recurring shortfalls and therefore cannot really be integrated into urban improvement programmes, which are designed for persistent, long-term problems.

The integration of these kinds of self-organised initiatives was only possible to a lesser extent in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods, as they already existed and could be further utilised, for

Figure 37: The types of self-organised support dependent on self-empowered and support-empowered communities. Sankhamul and Bansighat are self-empowered and Khazan, Masakin, Yarmag and Amgalan are support-empowered communities. Source: Own elaboration.

instance the mother's groups. Lumanti integrated consumer committees to such a degree that they left the task of establishing technical infrastructure to the community and focused more on the social tools in their programmes.

Influencing factors for *self-organised support* are the social composition of the neighbourhood structure and, to some extent, existing urban improvement programmes. The

neighbourhood structure is very important when conducting programmes aimed at resident participation. In Kathmandu, the community has existed more or less as a unit due to the high heterogeneity of the inhabitants; kinship and caste have played a minor role. In Cairo, the clan structure with the patron-client network is very strong and is the dominating influence on how people live together. Along with integrating local leaders, young people, children, women, and other identified target groups should also be involved, if not organised. In Ulaanbaatar, the family bonds are very strong, and support is organised within the families. There, a kind of neighbourhood community could be established. Hence, existing improvement

programmes can be significant to the formation of a community and to mobilising and inspiring inhabitants for *triggered, self-organised support.*

Each self-provisioning neighbourhood goes through certain development phases, as is also discussed in the following point d, starting with the settling phase, with a very high level of collective action. However, whether the *self-organised support* remains high depends on a number of internal and external factors. Internal factors include the style of living together in the neighbourhood community and the existence of a committed local leader or group. The external factors involve a motivating support programme and the commitment of the city government to integrative multi-scale urban policies. The self-empowered communities, like Sankhamul and Bansighat, seem to appreciate, to a certain extent, the absence of a local administration or city government, but welcome low-threshold support programmes to develop social and educational skills further in a more diverse way. It also aids integration into urban society. Less empowered communities, like Yarmag and Khazan, appreciate a trigger from the outside or even guidance to get mobilised.

d.) Influence of state and non-state actors on the development phases of the neighbourhoods

The changing roles and influences of the institutions in the settling process and in further neighbourhood development were analysed, along with which other internal and external influences were acting as drivers for development.

As mentioned already under the bullet point a, the studies revealed that political actors were one of the driving forces behind neighbourhood development, but they also triggered the set-up of unauthorised settlements, as in Masakin, where inhabitants of the old quarters were evicted and were told to settle on public desert land. However, the very existence of self-provisioning settlements was also triggered by existing urban structures. In Khazan and Bansighat, the people left their previous living quarters due to cramped living conditions.

Further external factors like natural disasters can greatly influence the development of self-provisioning neighbourhoods, or even lead to their establishment, as often self-provisioning neighbourhoods have been built in unsafe, flood-prone areas or are vulnerable to rockslides. At the same time, natural disasters elsewhere in the country have led to population growth within self-provisioning settlements, wherein a series of extremely harsh winters and droughts have led people to be forced to move to Ulaanbaatar every several years. The global market,

through rising prices, has also led to the growth of informal settlements in the Cairo informal settlements in the 1990s. Meanwhile, national economic growth has led to a slight improvement in living conditions in *ger* settlements in Ulaanbaatar.

The findings show, that the influence of external institutions on development in self-provisioning neighbourhoods increases in the consolidation stage, while it also leads to greater diversification. In the recognition stage, the influence of external institutions stabilises

Figure 38: Influence of internal and external actors on the neighbourhood development phases. Sankhamul and Bansighat are self-empowered and Khazan, Masakin, Yarmag and Amgalan are support-empowered communities. Source: Own elaboration.

(see also figure 38). By contrast, internal influences decrease as the influence of external institutions increases. The shift of power between internal and external actors can be balanced by *self-empowered* or *support-empowered* internal actors. This work has shown that self-empowered inhabitants in united communities have mobilised themselves without support from the outside. The support-empowered inhabitants were triggered by external non-state actors, such as NGOs, either inspired by the NGOs' actions or through direct support (i.e., training, workshops, and financial incentives). This was observed in all settlements, regardless of the culture.

The internal actors are the inhabitants who initially built up the settlement with their own efforts and play the role of housing providers first for their families and later for tenants. In the Egyptian and Nepalese neighbourhoods at settlement stage, the inhabitants also act as technical service providers. Only in the united communities Sankhamul and Bansighat do the self-organised bodies provide infrastructure, regardless of the development stage. As the settlements become more consolidated, internally-founded organisations take over the roles of social and financial service providers, like the savings and credit groups, the family funds, and the local NGOs. Local businessmen in informal settlements also act as social service

providers through their NGOs and as welfare providers via sponsoring. They are highly influential as local or political leaders and mainly serve their own clan members first. The local leaders in squatter settlements are also politically active and are well connected within their federations to fight for squatter rights.

The external state actors, including the national, city, and local governments and administrations, play a decisive role in all the development stages of the neighbourhoods, although to different extents. In the present research, the government of Cairo acted as a trigger for the creation of settlements through eviction and allowance to settle on public land, though without official permission. Consequently, the government took on the role of land providers and turned the evicted population into squatters, since they had been squatting on public land. Furthermore, the government acted as technical and social service providers. In informal and *ger* settlements, the national governments, through local administrations, also act as welfare providers. This is not the case in the Nepalese squatter settlements, where, in the late consolidation stage, the government stepped into the role of an unsatisfied landowner. This circumstance led to a number of eviction cases, resulting in a slowdown in development. The inhabitants of Bansighat and especially of Sankhamul feared that their own built-up houses and gardens would be demolished again, so they did not invest further in the improvement of their living conditions. Later, several public institutions acted as service providers through the construction of the BLR. Only indirectly, through consumer committees and through approval and financial distribution, the government was involved in providing technical services. They are, however, also legal service providers, responsible for recognising informal settlements. Despite these roles played by the government to develop settlements, their service is basic, fulfilling, only to a very small extent, the demands of the population, who are not included in any of the decision-making regarding their own neighbourhood. In the informal settlements, the military took over the role of safety providers during the resettling process of the population from unsafe locations to public housing.

Other highly influential external actors are the political parties, which, in the run-up to elections, chase votes with vague promises and allow the Nepalese squatter settlements to grow. In the initial settlement stage, political parties actually suggested that people settle there, effectively acting as illegal land providers. Once in power, they sometimes kept their promises and acted as legal service providers by granting the population legal identity documents. However, political parties can also be highly influential in creating rifts in the

neighbourhood community, bringing development to a standstill. This happened in Bansighat, where the isolation of the neighbourhood from state and non-state institutions allowed the influence of the Maoist party among its inhabitants to grow.

Other external actors contributing to development are the national and international NGOs and companies. First and foremost, they act as technical and social service providers to improve the social and technical infrastructure and to initiate self-help activities, like the founding of local NGOs, youth and children clubs, savings and business groups, and so on.

The findings revealed further that the influence of external actors can lead to both intended and unintended outcomes, as happened in the informal settlements in Cairo. Intended outcomes include improvement measures such as a working supply and disposal system, but one unintended outcome was the population boom that followed, as the settlements become more attractive as living quarters, placing increased pressure on public services.

e.) Negotiation processes between actors

The focus in this dimension is on the types of communication as presented by Selle and the reasons and aims behind their use, as well as the reactions they might elicit. The most important communication processes were those between the vertical levels of local, regional, and national institutions and the horizontal local level.

The most commonly used type of communication is the provision of information between various actors, for example, between the inhabitants and the local and city administrations or between the city government and the local administration, in order to update other actors. At this informing level, other communication support tools were also employed in the three cities (Cairo: letters of complaint, Kathmandu: eviction notices, Ulaanbaatar: information tables). However, these informing tools were not used seriously by the government institutions in Cairo or Ulaanbaatar and lost their credibility. Information procurement often takes place in informal talks and is used by actors (especially inhabitants) in the three cities to fill perceived gaps in communication or to gain information that provides an overview of programmes or upcoming events, or about the status of officially submitted papers. Face-to-face information exchange can also occur in official meetings or in informal talks. This type of communication is the most successful, as misunderstandings can be reduced to a minimum, and the actors involved tend to meet on a level playing field.

Participation and cooperation lead to concrete results. The participation of inhabitants in programmes leads to quick results, and, when communities are committed and participation is broad, it is often the case that the tools implemented will be adopted even after the programme has been phased out. Small-scale projects with direct involvement of residents are also among the most successful. Cooperation between actors from the local, city, and national levels in the Kathmandu neighbourhoods resulted in tremendous success and the creation of a win-win situation at both neighbourhood and city levels. The cooperation was used to satisfy all parties involved and to negotiate compromises. Figure 39 shows the dependence between the types of communication and neighbourhood development.

Figure 39: Dependence between the types of communication within the context neighbourhoods and their development. Source: Own elaboration.

Types of communication and how they are used—or not used—can lead to confusion, mistrust, and anger. Failure to provide information can severely change and slow down development and can even lead to the isolation of self-provisioning neighbourhoods due to uncertainty about upcoming negative events and a perceived lack of appropriate alternatives to the current situation. Failure to provide information can result in rumour-mongering, fear, and tension. This means that inhabitants need to be informed and should ideally be involved right at the beginning of the programme. Programmes should be flexible enough to allow for the adoption of residents' demands during the implementation of the programme. Right from the design stage, field visits and talks with local leaders should be organised in order to meet the demands of the residents. A high level of communication between the community and the leading actors requires a democratic setting. A neighbourhood organised as a community, at best, integrated into a wider political network, is able to claim negotiation processes on an equal level. Consequently, the regular use of the various communication types, plus participation and coordination, leads to a high probability of success for a programme. An

informed community is much more committed than one that suffers from fear, anger, and mistrust.

9.2_Comparative analysis of different local governance structures and governance cultures

Informality, from the viewpoint of the various actors, is a relative term, as even governments can trigger the foundation of self-provisioning settlements simply by carrying out their urban policies. Governments and political parties also greatly influence the development of self-provisioning neighbourhoods at every stage, and thus the term 'informality' as such needs to be questioned when applied to supported settlements. Informality produces illegal settlements that, in the eyes of the state actors, should be contained in order to save public-, state-, or city-owned land, and, at the same time, within these illegal settlements, governments build administrative, technical, and social infrastructure and, via these actions, effectively formalise the settlements. In Ulaanbaatar, the situation in the *ger* settlements is the reverse: private plots have been formalised through official land titles, yet the settlements have been excluded from urban development processes. Does this neglect bestow informality?

It is better defined as an ever-widening communication gap that should not be mistaken for informality. In Ulaanbaatar, this communication gap involved two parallel worlds in one city. While excluding the population in the self-provisioning neighbourhoods from the communication processes, a 'perceived informality' is maintained by government institutions in order to preserve the existing hierarchy and power. This is particularly obvious at the local level, where information is not distributed to the population but is instead used to the advantage of those in power. To combine Selle's communication concept and Yiftachel's grey spacing, the communication gap significantly contributes to blackening the self-provisioning settlements by isolating them from official structures and the wider urban society, as the case study has revealed in the Ulaanbaatar neighbourhoods. To fill this communication gap between local actors, external institutions can end up as mediators through their improvement programmes, or even expand those programmes.

These improvement programmes, such as slum upgrading, sites-and-service projects, and even the self-help concept, support the formalisation of self-provisioning neighbourhoods and attract societal and government attention. However, when implemented using a top-down approach, they largely fail to reach their target groups, as many scholars have observed. To

agree with Goethert (Chapter 3.2): the un-formalised character of the low- and medium-threshold programmes met the demands of the population to a larger extent than the high-threshold programmes, as they needed a formal character to fit into the governmental and donor bureaucratic procedures. As a result, the community, with its informal, short-distance and direct communication types, were addressed more efficiently than with deterrent formal procedures.

To use the words of Yiftachel, improvement programmes and the efforts of the government ignore the status of informality and obviously try to 'whiten' these otherwise 'grey' spaces, but, when the community is not considered in these improvement interventions and are furthermore ignored by urban society, these spaces stay 'grey', or even 'blacken'. This could be observed especially in the Egyptian and Mongolian settlements.

Gaventa with his three enabling conditions for participation in governance (strong central state capacity, well-developed society, organised political force committed to social movement; see Chapter 3.1), as well as Heinrichs, Krellenberg, and Fragkias' three aspects for local governance (ability, willingness, and an enabling/disabling context; see Chapter 3), envisaged the active involvement of concerned actors. The two approaches converge in this topic from side of the actors and from that of capability. In none of the self-provisioning neighbourhoods was participative governance by Gaventa a regularly practiced approach. Participation provided mere lip service to satisfy the donor community. The beneficiaries were the highly influential local leaders and politicians in the informal settlements in Cairo, or the investment and building companies in the *ger* settlements of Ulaanbaatar. The commitment of the government, civil society, and NGO actors to focus on public interests rather than on private or clan interests continues to be one of the major challenges. Consequently, an alliance approach in the sense of Sanyal, involving the integration of the neighbourhood community on an equal level with the relevant governmental institutions, neighbourhood organisations, and third parties (market institutions, development agencies, etc.) seems more convincing.

The neighbourhood community's ability to cope with face-to-face encounters is crucial. Not every neighbourhood community is equipped to express their demands in self-organised groups or to get involved in politics like in the squatter settlements of Kathmandu. Certain deeply-rooted cultures in some self-provisioning neighbourhoods make it difficult for people to unite over common interests, for instance, in *ger* settlements, and the withholding of

information sows deep mistrust, as in the informal Egyptian settlements. This means that, in such neighbourhoods where a united community does not exist, similar conditions for unity within a community need to be created. The impact on a neighbourhood community of being labelled an 'informal' part of the city either leads to this desired unity and the will to fight for the right to a piece of the city (squatter federations and the Arab Spring) or leads to lethargy and becoming a pawn to the powerful, who, with the pretence of participation, exploit self-provisioning neighbourhoods for personal gain through their investment machinations.

To conclude, local governance structures in favour of the stable improvement of the social, physical, and economical structure of the neighbourhoods can only be created with negotiation processes involving information exchange and cooperation between the neighbourhood community and state and non-state actors. Local governance structures provide the space for interactions between the actors on an equal level. The outside view of informality, as observed from the inside perspective of the so-called 'informal' settlements, is perceived as a superficial one that does not take into account the manifold efforts of inhabitants to live together collectively.

10_Practical conclusions and recommendations

The following chapter suggests some points for consideration for neighbourhood development actors and further research.

10.1_Recommendations for state actors and local governments

1. So-called 'informality' needs to be discussed further in a wider debate as a political, societal, legal, and economic issue, with the aim of ridding self-provisioning neighbourhoods of the associated stigma. The key characteristic of these neighbourhoods is diversity and the great challenge they have to overcome to accommodate well-established households, as well as migrants, the poor, and the marginalised. No other urban quarter combines these different population groups. Without these neighbourhoods, the cities would have a tremendous housing and economic problem.

2. An appreciation of these facts is largely missing in the political sphere and within urban society. Likewise, the huge efforts and material contributions of the inhabitants, who build the houses themselves, are not valued. Only the poor living conditions in a self-provisioning settlement are perceived. The neighbourhood community and its organisations as potential partners in urban development planning should be seriously recognised by governmental actors, and strategies should be developed to improve the negative image of self-provisioning neighbourhoods.

3. The principle of a triple alliance (after Sanyal) between local and city governmental institutions, self-organised grassroots organisations, and a third mediating external partner should be considered as a possible development project approach for self-empowered, organised neighbourhood communities. Empowered, organised communities are able to express their demands through their CBOs. However, politicians and other decision-makers also need to become more open to direct democratic measures and create the necessary legal backdrop.

4. As such, the processes of the New Urban Agenda should seriously include local actors from self-provisioning neighbourhoods, especially when dealing with local issues. In this regard, the triple alliance for eye-to-eye decision-making and implementation of improvement measures within these settlements should be applied. New Urban Agenda

processes should also be considered in the international development cooperation scene in the future when dealing with participation and empowerment programmes.

10.2_Recommendations for international development cooperation actors

1. Development programmes are, to a great extent, designed as high-threshold programmes involving huge investments, like the Manshiet Nasser infrastructure programme, launched under the slogan: 'Huge settlements with huge problems need high investment'. Low-threshold programmes are rarely followed. Nevertheless, these high-threshold programmes fail to operate on the same human scale as the middle and low ones. Especially at the neighbourhood level, self-organised support from inhabitants, be it triggered or otherwise, is highly accepted among the population, whereas self-help or participation employed using a top-down approach either fails or strengthens only those actors at the local leading level. Moreover, neighbourhood structures and potentials need to be strengthened without necessarily institutionalising them, since the non-formalised, non-bureaucratic projects in particular should support them. As a result, even a high-threshold programme to massively support infrastructure should always have a component that addresses the human scale, namely, a low-threshold part incorporating the broad, active involvement of various target groups of inhabitants.

2. The size of a neighbourhood, in terms of population count, also seems to be decisive. When neighbourhoods are too big, the danger is that only a certain group of people will become actively involved. Therefore, the 'felt' neighbourhood unit should be surveyed before the implementation of programmes. These neighbourhood units should be integrated into an overall programme if more than two units have been surveyed.

3. Consequently, the programme design should be adaptive to the level of social development of the neighbourhood. Flexible development programmes that take into account living patterns and social cohesion in neighbourhoods, plus the willingness to participate and formal and informal self-organised support structures, have to be designed to reach target groups. In order to do that, a social analysis of the neighbourhood needs to be conducted before the development programme is designed, so that rigid programme tools can be avoided.

4. General strategies to foster unity in communities and a guideline for the analysis of the degree of self-organised support should be developed. According to this analysis and the social cohesion of the community, a strategy with a set of mobilising approaches should be developed to trigger the empowerment of the population before implementing the development programme.

5. Furthermore, a general guideline for the analysis of the actors' structure, as well as their types of communication with the neighbourhood community and with each other, should be designed in order to develop strategies for communication before and during programme implementation (see also 'Communication' in the following chapter).

10.3_Recommendations to state and international development cooperation actors regarding communication

1. Communication processes within urban development and neighbourhood programmes should be integrated as a mode of development planning to avoid communication gaps, non-transparent situations, and mistrust. Communication strategies before and during implementation phases should be prepared, including the methods of passing on information, how residents can procure information, and to what extent information exchange, participation, and cooperation are included and with which actors. Development programmes should have a clear formulation of means of support and contributions by the residents, as well as fair and equal programme measures.

2. Communication tools should be developed according to the current involvement needs of various actors. As have been observed in the neighbourhoods, governmental institutions developed communication tools, but they were inappropriate and did not obtain the desired outcome.

3. An analysis (with a communication matrix) of the use of different types of communication within neighbourhoods could be instrumentalised to identify harmful inhibiting factors to the development of communication structures and tools for offering alternative involvement for the population in development programmes.

4. Communication strategies should also be developed to trigger the empowerment of communities through active participation methods in small-scale projects for target groups, according to their demands and interests.

10.4_Recommendations for further research

1. Informal self-organised support in communities should be examined further in terms of community development. Solidarity during crises, support within family structures, and how they organise to find possible solutions should be further observed, as well as how to generate informal self-organised support mechanisms for neighbourhood development.

2. The study revealed that, in neighbourhoods with full support from an urban improvement programme, significantly greater socio-economic development could be observed. The question could not be answered in this study as to whether the neighbourhoods had already had a greater socio-economic standard before the urban improvement measures started. Thus, it is unclear if the inhabitants had a positive opinion towards urban upgrading, or if the general environment of improving the neighbourhood indirectly created a positive atmosphere for creativity in the improvement of living conditions, higher income levels, and further investment.

3. In Kathmandu, the self-empowered squatter communities were able to organise themselves quickly because of their small size. Almost the whole community was involved in one or more collective activity. However, the question of whether the size of the community is decisive for a self-empowered community, given similar surroundings and a heterogeneous neighbourhood, could not be answered in this work, because just two neighbourhoods were selected. To answer this question, a survey would need to include more neighbourhoods of various sizes.

4. In Ulaanbaatar, neighbourhood communities under the socialist regime and their transformation up to the present day have barely been studied. The further process of urbanisation and the dynamics within *ger* settlements should be a focus of urban research in Mongolia.

5. Since the urbanisation process had not even started a hundred years ago in Ulaanbaatar, the process of development in neighbourhoods and the formation of an urban society and its dynamics need to be studied, also with respect to what consequences have been resulting from the GAR.

6. The GAR/LRP itself needs scientific monitoring and evaluation, as the redevelopment programme was insufficiently prepared, especially regarding the possible socio-economic

impacts of the resident population regarding moving out and then in again. The types of communication need to be further monitored, especially regarding involvement of the temporary people's councils and the role they play in the GAR/LRP. Pilot sites for both programmes regarding location within the city, type of measure, and degree of consolidation should be identified, along with the programme processes documented for lessons learnt and improvement of the programmes.

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APPENDIX

I_Categorisation of CBOs and SHIs in underdeveloped neighbourhoods

II_Context Cities

III_Neighbourhoods

I_Categorisation of CBOs and SHIs in underdeveloped neighbourhoods

(Appendix for section 3.4)

Below, five upgrading projects in underdeveloped neighbourhoods are examined. These were selected based on the approaches they used in improving their living conditions and establishing technical and social infrastructure. The table below shows the main actors and their roles in the projects, how the neighbourhoods organised the CBO or SHI before and during the project, and the measures undertaken in the neighbourhood. The "remarks/strategies" column notes special aspects of the project, the neighbourhood organisation and further development of the project. The projects were categorised according to Mitlin's strategies: (1) Individual market-based strategies, (2) Collective self-help strategies, (3) Dependency-based strategies, (4) Exclusion strategies, (5) Social movement strategies.

Table: Examples of CBOs and SHIs (Source: Own elaboration)**:**

Neighbourhood	Type of organisation/ initiation	Role of actors	Role of city government	Role of NGOs	Measures undertaken	Remarks/Strategies
Thailand, Bangkok, Khlong Toei slum, organisation in *chumchons* (neighbourhoods), 80,000 people in Khlong Toei, 40 *chumchons* (ca. 2,000 people) (Wenk 2008, pp. 8, 40-43, 56)	Self-organised and has a community committee that is elected every two years. Partly initiated by NGOs working there, partly through neighbourhood solidarity and strong unity among residents as a result of specific events such as evictions and fires. The community is held together by a strong value attached to being together. There is neighbourhood support for the construction of houses, homework and child care.	Leading roles as elected members: influential.	Communication between government and neighbourhoods through elected local bodies in case of evictions and resettlement for urban infrastructure projects (construction of highways, etc.)	Organisation of residents and provision of information about their rights regarding land ownership and their rights in the case of eviction. NGOs also establish schools and nurseries, and provide education and training on HIV/AIDS	-Neighbourhood presentations to public institutions on issues such as land ownership, -Education and training on HIV/AIDS - Programmes for youth and children - Programmes for support of elderly people - Organisation of solid waste management - Cooperation with electricity and water-supply authorities - Vocational training for women for income-generation.	- Leaders are elected; most leaders are female and local. **Strategies: strong 3 at the beginning of the project, later 2**

Neighbourhood	Type of organisation/ initiation	Role of actors	Role of city government	Role of NGOs	Measures undertaken	Remarks/Strategies
Indonesia, Surabaya, low-income riverside settlements: Bratang, Medokan Semampir and Gunung Sari, with 3,000 families (Some, Hafidz, Sauter, 2009, 463 et seqq.)	Self-organised through their CBO "Paguyuban Warga Strenkali Surabaya" (PWS), which was founded in response to eviction notices.	Residents are members of their organisation.	Parliament enacted a by-law on the future of the settlements with support from PWS and the provincial government. The community was granted five years to upgrade the settlement and to not be evicted. The government supported river cleaning and clearance of a corridor for a riverside street. This followed several attempts by the government to evict the community.	Uplink Surabaya, established in 2002 by the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) encouraged PWS programmes. Universities provide technical and juridical advice and help the children's study group. A network of NGOs, universities and other organisations exists to share information.	- Various programmes, including composting and recycling (as alternatives to rubbish disposal in local waterways and on local land), community savings, the re-introduction of traditional medicine, and children's group activities. - Convincing the government to act to address pollution and other environmental issues. - Encouraging public support through rallies, demonstrations and the press. - Realisation of community development through construction of streets by the government, housing improvements and installation of septic tanks by the residents in joint exercise, and settlement "greening". - Savings groups.	Strongly empowered and self-organised. Confrontation of the city government with own solutions. Benefits: including people in decision-making; close cooperation between government and parliament; feeling of solidarity, unity and togetherness of the residents. Slogan: 'Renovation not relocation' **Strategies: strong 2 before the project, 3 and 5 during project implementation**
India, Mumbai, Janata slum, in 1969, with 70,000 residents (Arputham, 2008, 321 et seqq.)	- Self-organised by Jockin Arputham. Began with the founding of a school in the 1960s. Organisation of initiatives together with teachers and children. - Foundation of several social organizations. In 1969 residents formed the Bombay Slum Dwellers Federation, giving every slum in Bombay its own action committee. -Formation of the National Slum Dwellers Federation.	Jockin Arputham, residents, children, teachers, donations by shop keepers in the slum and by other local people.	- The municipality tried to remove a water pipe. - Eviction in 1976 and relocation to Cheetah Camp, which was equipped with basic technical infrastructure.	The Tata institute for Social Service, and the French NGO Service Civil International in the 1960s, called by Jockin. Support by a church that provided teaching volunteers and small donations.	- Established a school. - Undertook cleaning campaigns (collection of waste, cleaning of public toilets). - Illegal construction of a water supply pipe. - Community organization against eviction. - Action committees in slums organised protests, demonstrations and marches to demand land, water and cleaning of public toilets.	- Strong leaders, networking with other slums and with various NGOs and the church. - Three well-known professionals working under the NGO "BUILD", which supported Janata and were publicly documented in newspapers. **Strategies: strong 2 and 5**

Neighbourhood	Type of organisation/ initiation	Role of actors	Role of city government	Role of NGOs	Measures undertaken	Remarks/Strategies
India, **Karnataka** urban slums, with 23,324 families (Sitaram, 2007, III et seqq.)	The Karnataka Urban Infrastructure Development Project, initiated by ADB, established a Self Help Group and gave financial loans and technical support to slum dwellers. This project was initiated under the women's development and empowerment component of the Community Development Programme, which aimed to alleviate poverty.	The self-help groups were led by women, but men benefited from loans taken out by women. Men retained their traditional role of the household head, and the women were "borrowing for men".	The Directorate of Municipal Administration refused to hand over responsibility to sustain the programme and support maintenance groups.	NGOs provided support in forming 722 Self Help Groups, which were supported by the project. Local NGOs implemented the project. At the completion of the project self-help groups had risen by another 10% in 2007.	- Water supply, sanitation, road improvements, slum improvement, and poverty alleviation. But the Self-Help groups were not involved in this slum improvement programme. Instead: people received credit through internal lending from within the group, formal banks and other financial agencies like microfinance provided through, NGOs. - Money was given for income generation and to increase household income. - Building of self-esteem and social mobility of women. - Political pressure by women led to drinking water supply, clean roads, installation of community taps, and the removal of liquor shops.	Handing over to lending agencies led to disempowerment and breaking up of some groups. - The project failed to bring empowered women into local political bodies and into decision- making, due to constraints such as lack of family support. - The project did not have an umbrella organization to unify the Self Help Groups. **Strategies: strong 3, weak 2 during project implementation**
Brazil, Curibita, Favela 'Vila Formosa', established in the 1970s (Ranke 1997, chapters 4 and 5)	"Associação de Moradores" (Association of residents) also in other Favelas, spontaneous establishment, financially independent.	Regular open general meetings; council of settlers and supervisory council; financed by membership fees; umbrella organization combining all associations in all favelas 'council of representatives'.	"Carta da Favela" was not accepted by residents. - The city government did not meet the demands of residents regarding improvement of technical infrastructure and housing. - Control mechanisms by police and social workers were seen as paternalism. - Little participation of councils in decision-making.	Not mentioned	- Formation of community. - Fostering of solidarity for improvement of living conditions. - Representation of demands to city government. - Services were provided to residents in cooperation with municipality. - Activities were initiated in culture, leisure and education and self-help measures regarding technical infrastructure: - Cleaning campaigns and construction of sewerage systems. - Improvement of residential buildings. - Allocation and occupation of new land.	Formal structures like official associations. - Associations split up as result of following own interests - Little participation in political decisions. - Participation by residents in measures initiated by the municipality, such as the waste purchase programme. **Strategies: weak collective 2 and strong individual 5**

II_Context Cities

II.I_Greater Cairo Metropolitan Area

II.I.I_Brief political, economic and social overview

In 1952, the Egyptian monarchy was abolished and President Nasser introduced Arabian Socialism in an effort to overcome socio-economic gaps, but in fact almost ruined the Egyptian state. In the 1980s, President Sadat opened the state to western-oriented politics. The Soviet army was withdrawn, but the desired direct investment failed to materialise. Export industries, with the exception of oil, stagnated. In 2004, twenty-three years after the assassination of Sadat in 1981, President Mubarak finally undertook a restructuring of the government and the implementation of urgently needed reforms. Egypt is highly economically dependent on SuezCanal revenues, the exportation of oil, tourism and foreign remittances. Economic and political corruption is widespread (Springborg, 2011: 96).In 1989 the country once again became a member of the Arab League, allowing necessary infrastructure measures to be realised. As reported by the BTI, hardly any of the demands of the ever more dissatisfied population were met. High poverty rates, unemployment, especially among the (well-educated) youth, illiteracy, a weak education system, repression of women and a highly unequal distribution of wealth are the most pressing problems (2012: 4). The Muslim Brotherhood served those in urgent need in the informal settlements and so the population became islamised. The mass demonstrations in 2011 forced Mubarak to resign and his almost thirty-year-long regime came to an end. The elections held in 2012 brought in President Mursi of the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood to make peace in the country (Büchs, 2012: 1) but failed when the military toppled him in 2014 and since June of that year the military chief Al-Sisi has been the officially-elected president. The low turnout at the elections suggests that he has little support among the population. (Zeit Online, 2014).

The population is 90% Muslim, with 10%being made up of Christian Copts and other religions. Over the years, there has been growing conflict, mostly directed against the Coptic minority (BTI, 2012: 26). However, all religions cohabit without difficulties because the people feel first and foremost Egyptian. Consequently, there are no spatially separate quarters of Muslims and Christians, although in some areas near where there is a church there may be a higher concentration of Christians. The traditional joint family structure has become increasingly rare due to changes in living and working styles caused by the transformation from an agrarian to an industrial state. The trend since 1990 is the nuclear family (Gado, 1991: 229). However, there is a strong traditional societal engagement in public matters although the socialist period had a negative effect on the self-organisation of the civil society. Especially in informal settlements, clan structure and place of origin organise spatial unity.

Traditional Koranic legacy laws demand the division of agricultural land into equal pieces among all male successors. As a result, plots of agricultural land are now too small to engage in farming for a secure income (Goethert, 1986: 50). According to another Islamic tradition, occupied land becomes owned after 15 years of use. Therefore squatting is relative. (ibid: 78)

In informal settlements there is a higher rate of poverty and un- and under-employment, with people receiving no compensation through state welfare. In order to survive, the zero-income people are forced to invent small jobs, resulting in the emergence of an informal sector, seasonal or daily jobs and child labour (Sabry, 2010: 526). Another striking characteristic of states like Egyptis that the public sector employs a great many more workers than are needed. (Herding, 2008)

II.I.II_Administrative division, administrative structure

As defined in 1982, the Greater Cairo Region consists of the jurisdiction of three Governorates: Cairo to the east of the River Nile, Giza to the west and Qalioubia to the north. Each Governorate is administered by its own local government and headed by an appointed Governor. The Giza and Qalioubia Governorates also include rural areas and small towns with little relation to Greater Cairo. (Antoniou, 2004: 31)

1. The Cairo Governorate includes 28 districts

2. The el-Giza Governorate includes the 6 districts of the town of el-Giza and some parts of Imbaba, el-Badraschin, el-Saff as centre of Giza, including the town el-Hawandeiya.

3. The el-Qalioubia Governorate includes the town of Shoubra el-Chema, the Markas (main villages) Qalioub and el-Kanatr el-Chaireiya, as well as some villages of the two Markas Shibin el-Kanatr and el-Chanka. (Gado, 1991: 63)

In April 2008 the Cairo Governorate was divided and parts of the city integrated into the Governorates of Helwan and 6th of October so that the Greater Cairo Region consisted of five Governorates. But in April 2011, in the wake of political changes, Helwan and 6th of October were reintegrated and the previous structure rebuilt.

Map Development of informal settlements

Core Village 1950
Situation 1977
Situation 1991
Situation 2000

2   0   2   Kilometers

Figure 40: Development of informal settlements in GCR. Source: GTZ, 2009

II.I.III_GTZ-PDP - Participation and outcome

The Five Tools for Participation in the GTZ-PDP:

Participation Tools	Implementing tools	Implementing Examples
1. Knowing Local communities	Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA)	Socio-Economic Survey in 2005, citizen workshops for problem identification and needs assessment
2. Building trust through promoting local initiatives	Empowerment through Support of Local Initiatives (LI) and Local Initiatives Fund (LIF)	Youth clubs organised street cleaning campaigns in Masakin with support of the local administration
3. Sharing available information	Geographical Information System (GIS) - unit of GTZ	Training; Documents, Maps of existing and planned situation in informal areas
4. Participatory action and budget planning	Local Area Action Plan (LAAP)	LAAP for Masakin (MN 2) with Implementation of results from PRA
5. Impact Monitoring	Satisfactory Survey, Monitoring and Evaluation Surveys, Best Practices, etc.	Citizen Satisfaction Survey in Manshiet Nasser in 2007

Table 11: Participation and Implementation tools of the PDP. Source: Own elaboration based on Abdelhalim, 2009: 126-127 and GTZ-PDP, Dec. 2008a

GTZ-PDP results of the Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) approach in MN**:**

Category	Problems	Solutions
Legal	Informal Area Status No Legal Plans No Ownership	Legal status process for the zones 1-5 finished in 2007, Establishment of land titling committee in 2005
Social/Cultural	Early Marriage, tribal-like interrelations, inherited traditions, illiteracy, poor living conditions resulting in: female/child labour, absence of quality culture aspects, violence/apathy	MN Culture Palace renovation with theatre, cinema screen, library, computer laboratory for children and youth activities in 2006, located in MN2 Support of Association of Arab Women in conducting of social activities in MN
Environmental/Urban	High density of houses, piles of garbage, constant water supply failure, pollution, overflow of sewage, poor physical condition of houses	Water&sewage complete networks in 5 Sheiakhat with connecting 90% of HH with water and sewage system
Education	High rate of drop-outs, unqualified teaching staff, illiteracy, private tutorials in schools, lack of awareness, insufficient schools, no facilities/ activities,	Schools rehabilitation for 20 out of 34 schools in MN in 2006 through KfW fund including renewing of facilities and equipment, bathrooms and playgrounds Teachers Capacity building with two training programmes for 'art teachers' and 'scout leaders' in 2006

Table 12: Abstract of problems and solutions identified through the Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA). Source: Own elaboration based on GTZ-PDP, 2008a

II.II_Kathmandu Metropolitan City

II.II.I_Brief political, economic and social overview

Only in 1990 did Nepal become a constitutional monarchy when King Birendra agreed to this after massive street protests and demonstrations for democracy, the Jana Andolan I (English: People's Movement I). Since then, political parties have been allowed and elections were held in 1991 after 34 years with G.P. Koirala of the Nepali Congress. However, a number of fierce internal conflicts, corruption and power games, along with several changes of government and prime minister led in 1996 to the proclamation of "civil war" by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), who went underground to conquer Nepal, from the impoverished, uncared-for western and eastern regions to the capital Kathmandu. In 2001 a massacre in the King's Palace in which the king and a large number of his family were murdered left the country in shock and Gyanendra, the brother of King Birendra, ascended the throne. In 2002 King Gyanendra dissolved parliament and with it all elected bodies in the country and appointed a new prime minister and cabinet. With Jana Andolan II in 2006, called by the major parties and "the Maoists" together, again massive protests on the streets of the major Nepalese cities forced the king to abdicate and so the only remaining Hindu monarchy in the world made way for the Democratic Federal Republic of Nepal, as stated in the Interim Constitution of 2007. A peace agreement was signed between the governing parties and the "Maoists". (Donner, 2007: 154) By the end of the civil war, 14,000 people had lost their lives. (Keck, 2012: 34) In April 2008 elections for a Constituent Assembly were held, with the Unified Communist Party Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN(M)) emerging as the winning party (KELU9). In November 2013, after several delays and an en masse resignation of the government, the Second Constituent Assembly was elected with the winning interim prime minister Khil Raj Regmi from the Nepali Congress. Having failed to keep its promise to be the voice of the disadvantaged, the UCPN (M) suffered heavy defeats, coming inlast out of the four parties in the election. (Krämer, 2014: 1) In general, the ruling elite consist of people belonging to the high castes and the various ethnicities and low castes are more or less excluded from any chance to rule.

Nepal is a state of various ethnicities, languages and scripts. The caste system is prohibited by law, which says that all people should be treated equally. However, the caste system still persists, as was evident from the figures quoted in the UNDP Human Development Report of 2014. Of the four major castes or ethnic clusters, the Brahmin/Chhetri have a higher Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.54 compared to the other clusters. The figure for Janajati (various ethnicities) is 0.48, for Dalit (impure, untouchables) 0.43, and for Muslims 0.42 (UNDP, 2014: 17).With regard to income and poverty, the Nepal Living Standards Survey 2010/11 reveals a similar correlation. Regarding family structure, the Nepali family currently consists of an average of 4.9 members, with that number tending to decrease. The nuclear family in urban areas has replaced the joint family as the new family model (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011: 14). In the traditional homogeneous neighbourhoods of the Newar towns, unity among inhabitants remains strong, but increasing in and out migration reduces stability. Religion is still an integral part of daily life in Nepal. 80% are Hindus, 15% are Buddhists and 3% Muslims. Especially among the lower castes, a desire to escape the restrictions of the caste system have led over the past few decades to people converting to Islam or Christianity (Lumanti, 2001: 20). Among people of Newar ethnicity, the major ethnicity settled in the Kathmandu Valley, Buddhist and Hindu deities are worshipped.

According to the World Bank, compared to other countries, urbanisation has not been strongly related to economic growth. The economy was unable to keep pace with the high in migration from the rural areas, as agriculture still accounts for 38% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Muzzini and

Aparicio, 2013: 19).Post-conflict restructuring is still visible. Nepal is highly dependent on foreign remittances, with almost 56% of households receiving money from abroad, thus helping poverty rates to drop(BTI, 2014: 15). There are high hopes for the tourism industry as Nepal's rich cultural heritage and proximity to the Himalayas attracts more and more tourists.

II.II.II_Administrative division of KMC

KMC is part of the Kathmandu Valley, which consists of KMC, Bhaktapur and Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City, Madhyapur-Thimi and Kirtipur Municipality. KMC is divided into six zones and 35 wards (See figure XLII). Each ward is again divided into *tols*, neighbourhood-like units dealing directly with the citizens but without their own administration. In traditional settlements the neighbourhood itself forms a *tol*, such as AsanTol, the traditional bazaar within the city core area. In squatter settlements a *TolBikasSamiti* (*Tol* Development Committee) can be formed, as happened in Sankhamul and Bansighat. This *tol* consists of committee members with an *attaché* (chairman) and needs to be

Figure 41: Administrative division of Kathmandu Metropolitan City into sectors and wards.
Source: Kathmandu Metropolitan City (without year)

officially registered in order to be recognised by the state offices. The choice of the size of the committee and the general matters for election of itsmembersis left to the neighbourhood. In Sankhamul the committee is elected every three years and consists of 13 members, including the vice-chairman, the secretary and the treasurer. The election is organised by an election committee and two persons from each household in Sankhamul can vote (KSIK5-2014). Usually the *tol* committee deals with all kinds of improvement measures and with the provision of infrastructure. To give an example: for the provision of electricity the *tol* committee applies to the ward office; the ward office gives permission for the electricity supply and the *tol* committee forwards this authorisation to the electricity authority which then constructs electricity pylons, puts up the lines and connects the households to the grid. The ward is also responsible forissuing birth certificates, identity cards, voting cards, land certificates, etc. (KSIK5-2008).

Map of the squatter settlements

Figure 42: Foundation and location of squatter and indigenous settlements (slums) in KMC. Source: Own elaboration based on Shrestha, 2008: 10, Drawing: G. Enkhchimeg, O.Kummel

II.III_Municipality Ulaanbaatar

II.III.I_Brief political, economic and social overview

Until the collapse of the Manchurian Empire in 1911, Outer Mongolia was a backward, feudal region with a ruling Buddhist clergy. Chinese and Russian traders brought goods into the region. The population was mainly dependant on nomadic pasturalism. In 1924 the People's Republic of Mongolia was proclaimed with massive influence from the Soviet Union. In a devastating purge aimed at establishing the principle that "religion is poison for the people" Mongolian cultural values were destroyed, leaving the country without a history. At the same time, subsidised broad-based health and education services were introduced at rural and urban level. Industry and agriculture, as well as the newly-organised organised pasturalism, were drawn into a centrally planned economy. (UNFPA, 2012: 32) In 1989 the Russians left the country and the Mongolians were left with no effective leadership. The collapse of the Soviet system and a peaceful revolution that resulted in political and economic disorientation threw Mongolia into a deep crisis. Although democracy and a free market economy were introduced, corruption and poverty determined the 1990s. In politics, the elections of 2012 marked a milestone in the country's young political history: The Democratic Party won a majority both in the national parliament and at local level. (BTI, 2014: 2)

By end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium the economy started growing due to new orientation on trading partners like China and other industrialised countries. The economy is strongly linked to mining and not much diversified. As a result, it is vulnerable to global mineral crises and internal political changes. Mongolia is one of the ten most resource-rich countries in the world (Sandmann, 2012: 26). The main export mining goods are coal, copper, iron, zinc, gold and molybdenum. Also contributing to the gross national product, though less than mining exports, is the processing of animal products such as skins and cashmere, and yak and camel wool (NSO, 2013: 7). One of the factors in the current economic crisis are contract readjustment struggles with foreign investors in the coalmining sector. As a result, external trade in 2013 decreased by around 6% compared to 2012 (ibid). Despite the economic boom years between 2009 and 2012 that showed around 17% growth (BTI, 2014: 2), unemployment remained at 15.3%, according toa census. If one includes the discouraged workers that figure rises to almost 24%. This implies that economic growth was unable to produce sufficient jobs for those willing to work and consequently socio-economic inequality grew (ibid; UNFPA, 2012: 17 et seqq.).

Mongolia is a relatively homogeneous country with a large majority belonging to the same social and ethnic background. (83% Khalkh) The few minorities, such as the Kazakh-Mongolian (3.8%), are more or less integrated into society, and the different religions, whose practice has been permitted since 1990, are widely accepted amongst the population. After the political change the traditional religions, Buddhism and Shamanism (53% and 2.9%), saw a revival. There are also Muslim and Christian minorities (3% and 2.2% respectively), although 38.6 % of the population follow no religion. (BTI, 2014: 5 et seqq.; CIA, 2014). After the political change, Mongolia returned not only to religious observance but also to traditional values and the historical and cultural legacy of the era of ChinggisKhaan and gave the country a new identity (Janzen, 2012: 7).

II.III.II_Administrative division of Ulaanbaatar

Today the city of Ulaanbaatar is divided into nine *duuregs*, six within the city and three in towns on the periphery (Nalaich, Baganuur and Bagakhangai). In the socialist era the towns on the periphery hadthe task of supplying the main town with coal. Nalaich is currently built up as a new industrial and

commercial area, whereas Baganuur, 70 km south-west of Ulaanbaatar,still produces coal for the three power plants[41] currently working in Ulaanbaatar.

The ***duureg* administration** directs the *khoroo* administrations and is the main unit of cooperation. "The *duureg* acts as the centre and the *khoroo*receives the orders" (UEDB7). The *duureg* itself receives orders from the municipality of Ulaanbaatar. As urban planning units are missing in the *duuregs*, the partial master plans and any urban and community development measures have to be prepared by the Urban Planning Division or the Master Planning Agency of the municipality. The *duureg* administration has no budget of its own to cover any measures undertaken within the *duureg*. It administers the funds provided for the *khoroos*and distributes the funds according to residents'

Countryside	Capital City
Aimag	Ulaanbaatar
Aimag centre	Duureg
Soum	Khoroo
Bag	Kheseg

Table 13: Regional hierarchy levels of Mongolia in the countryside compared to Ulaanbaatar. Source: Own elaboration

demands. The Ministry of Construction is responsible for the provision of infrastructure, such as the construction and maintenance of roads (UEDB7). A *duureg* serves around 300,000 citizens, as in the case of Bayanzurkh Duureg.

The ***khoroo* administration** is led by a governor who is elected for four years and his permanent address should be registered in the same *duureg* (UYIK2). The governor has the duty to implement laws and policies declared by the government, work with the citizens, receive their proposals and make decisions regarding these proposals, provide governmental services, social care, and

Duureg	Total number of *khoroos*	Number of *khoroos* established between 2012 and 2014	Number of *khoroos* in *ger* areas	Number of *khoroos* in apartment areas	Number of *khoroos* in mixed areas
Sukhbaatar	20	0	11	9	0
Bayangol	23	3	3	14	6
Chingeltei	19	1	13	6	0
Khan-Uul	16	1	7	4	5
Songinokhairkhan	32	7	19	9	4
Bayanzurkh	28	4	14	9	5
Total	138	16	67	51	20

Table 14: Administrative division of Ulaanbaatar City. Source: Own elaboration based on Ulaanbaatar Statistical Office, 2015

educational services, prevent crime and carry out census registration (printout during interview with UYIK2). In addition, two employees of the municipality work in the administration, one for organising women and one social worker. They are also responsible for collecting requests for the social and the labour office regarding social problems and unemployment. Usually the kheseg leader passes these requests on to the administration staff (UYIK2). The *khoroo* has no budget for directly implementing projects, but was recently provided with one to cover stationery and cleaning materials (UYIK6). Events such as the elderly people's celebration after the Mongolian New Year (Tsagaan Sar), Children's Day or the *Deel* (traditional Mongolian coat) competition during the national *Naadam* Festival in July, are mainly financed by district funds. The *khoroo* administration was recently set up by the democratic government as a "one-point-service" with the idea of integrating into the khoroo

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[41] The three working power plants have the numbers 2,3 and 4. Power plant number 1, the first power plant in Mongolia, was built in 1931 and decommissioned in 1988. Power plants 2, 3 and 4 are located south-west of the city at Khan-Uul Duureg and are combined heat power plants (CHPP). Power plant number 5 is currently under construction in Bayanzurkh Duureg, Amgalanbaatar,north of the case study area.

administration building a number of additional services, including the health post and the local police branch, as well as the labour and social welfare offices. The *khoroo* administration buildings also house a branch of the duureg khural. A *khoroo* serves between 5,000 and 15,000 citizens.


Figure 43: Administrative division of Ulaanbaatar with the *khoroos* established after 2012. Source: Own elaboration based on manaikhoroo.mn, 2014. Drawing: G. Enkhchimeg

The ***kheseg* leaders** provide the connection between the *khoroo* administration and the residents. They are not officially elected but rather selected by the *kheseg* residents for four years on the basis of their commitment. If the residents are satisfied with their work, their appointment can be extended, otherwise a new leader will be selected (UAIK4). The *kheseg* leaders are employed part time and receive a salary from the municipality (UAIK2). The meetings with the *khoroo* administration are handled differently from *khoroo* to *khoroo.* In Amgalan the *kheseg* leaders are required to check in to the administration daily to see if there is any news and every day two *kheseg* leaders are on duty at the *khoroo* office to serve the citizens. In Yarmag the *kheseg* leaders meet three days a week to discuss upcoming announcements from the district and to organise events (UYIK6).It is their task to announce upcoming events to the people and to report any problems or activities in the *kheseg* to the *khoroo* administration. They are also required to inform young men when they are called up for military service, as well as passing on other announcements from public institutions to the families concerned as the postal service rarely operates and one needs a post box to receive mail. Usually they are also required to take care of poor families, the disabled and orphans and provide them with the social support paid for by the government. Unemployed people should be provided with a job or given training. This is handled by the labour office and the social care offices of the *duureg.* Furthermore, the duureg receives requests for support of disadvantaged residents, collected by the *khoroo* administration. *Kheseg* leaders serve on average between 700 and 1,000 citizens.

II.III.III_How the NGOs and the state serve the urban poor in *ger* districts

National and International Organisations

Also in ger areas national and international NGOs serve the disadvantaged population where the state does not reach. In this chapter only the main NGOs and international institutions relevant to this work will be briefly mentioned. There are many other NGOs working in similar fields. The usual procedure to start working in the ger areas is through the khoroo administrations which manage, register and support the NGO's work. The initial stage in an application is when the NGO presents itsprojected work programme to the khoroo. If the khoroo agrees to this work being carried out the khoroo governor sends an official letter to the NGO welcoming them to come and work in the khoroo.This was what happened with the Korean NGO Good Neighboursthat offered social services to the people in Yarmag 4th, 5th and 6thkhoroo and began operations in spring 2013. In December 2014 their branch opened in 5thkhoroo, offering tuition and leisure activities for children with learning disabilities, as well as health care, measures to improve living standard and training for unemployed residents (UYIK4).

One of earliest operating national NGOs was the UDRC (Urban Development Resource Centre) working in close cooperation with the ACHR which introduced in 2009 their ACCA-programme also in Mongolia. The UDRC was established in 2005 and was one of the NGOs implementing this programme, as already mentioned in chapter 4.1. The formation of communities and community empowerment through small improvement projects are the main targets of the UDRC (UEUD5). In 2009 saving and credit groups were also established, not only in Ulaanbaatar but also in the countryside, and in 2013twenty-four saving groups (or Family Funds) were running nationwide. Through the ACCA bigger projects could also be implemented, such as housing for 17 poor families in Thunkhel in SelengeAimag (Kummel, Oelun, 2013: 677). A saving and credit scheme was also established in Yarmag, 5th khoroo, but through the NGO Human and Development Centre. This national NGO could not be tracked down for an interview and may no longer be operating.

The international NGO World Visionhas been active in Mongolia since 1999 and focuses on four main areas: education, economy, children and health. In Bayanzurkh Duureg they are working in five

khoroos, including 12thkhoroo, Amgalan/Janjin, mainly in family fund schemes and the provision of training in establishing and running businesses for income generation. They also provide scholarships for children. A further explanation of their work will be given in the chapter on Amgalan.

Figure 44: Unur Settlement, construction works for individual water supply, sewage, and heating line. The buildings were insulated during summer time and the fences were replaced. © Olivia Kummel, 2014

These NGOs mainly start mobilising people through the khoroos and the kheseg leaders, through public meetings and the identification of people willing to be active in the neighbourhood and help establish a community network. In contrast to the Nepalese neighbourhoods, where the saving and credit schemes have been adopted by a huge number of families, in Ulaanbaatar, only a few are involved, and not according to street or kheseg, but rather

scattered throughout the khoroo, or even, as in the case of the World Vision programme, scattered throughout all five khoroos (UEUD5, UAIK1).

UN Habitat supported the preparation of the Citywide Pro-Poor "*Ger* Upgrading Strategy and Investment Plan" (GUSIP), which was approved in 2007 by the city *khural*in partnership with the city government and related ministries, and provided financial and technical support for the plan's implementation. A Project Management Office (PMO) was established under the city *khural* (UN-Habitat, 2010a: 11). Visions, strategic goals and objectives for the three defined and above-mentioned *ger* areas, as well as strategic directions and recommendations for upgrading and development, were prepared (UN-Habitat, 2010b: i).From 2009 to 2013 the "Community-led *ger* area upgrading project", with financial assistance from the government of Japan, was introduced in five *ger* areas. Priority was given to community mobilisation, empowerment and awareness building. Residents were involved in primary groups of 10 to 20 households, with a community development council at *kheseg* level as well as a council at*khoroo* level to assure the implementation of the identified projects in community action plans. The 120 small-scale projects included playgrounds, footpaths, street lighting, water kiosks, etc. and bigger projects included community halls, kindergartens and school extensions (UN-Habitat, leaflet, UEUN4). Recently in Unursuch infrastructure as water supply, sewage disposal and heating was initially laid down for 168 households, but due to missing land titlesfor families living along the flood gullies that number was reduced to 140 households. The houses were already insulated. Due to problems of identification of the beneficiary households the construction work will not be finished in December 2014 (see figure V).

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has provided a loan of 163 million US dollarsfor the improvement of infrastructure in *ger* areas through the project Ulaanbaatar Urban Services and *Ger* Areas Development Investment Program. The programme was approved by the city *khural* in May 2013 and a Programme Management Office established under the city *khural* and the mayor with the supervision of the vice-mayor (ADB, 2013: 3). The loan directly contributes to the city government *Ger* Areas Redevelopment and *Ger*AreasReadjustment programmes for the provision of infrastructure (UEAD10).

National Social and Labour Programmes

The **Eco Club** is an **initiative of the labour office**which aims to provide low-income work for the unemployed. These small jobs are not provided on a regular basis, but only on demand. They usually involve such tasks as keeping the khoroo clean or carrying out small improvement measures like tree planting. The people are employed by the *duureg*labour office. (UYIK1) To give an example: every three months the *duureg*labour office organises *Subotniks*for the whole *duureg*. People are hired to clean up huge piles ofwaste and also to do construction work and are paid 22,000 *tugrug* per day before tax(19,200 *tugrug* after tax). Literally translated, the Mongolian project name means:"*persons who have income and they are the owner*" (UAIK2). In the case of problems in the *kheseg*, such as the illegal extension of plots, the *kheseg* leader informs the *khoroo* administration which forwards a complaint to the *duureg* administration, which in the specific case mentioned would be the land office. The*duureg* land office then takes measures, forexampleinstructing the transgressing residents via the *khoroo* and *kheseg* leader to rebuild the original fences. If this request is ignored the land office takes direct action and demolishes the illegal fences, as happened in Yarmag, 8th*khoroo* (UYIK2). The *khoroo*is also responsible for carrying out statistical surveys which are usually done by the *kheseg* leaders (UYIK1).As evidenced in these examples, the *khoroo* administration only has a

control and mediating function and is not obliged to make own decisionsfor improvement measures in the sense of decentralisation (compare also Taraschewski, 2008: 199).

Social Programmes

The provision of broad-based social welfare is arelic from the socialist era. People became used to everything being handled and organised by the state, and also to the provision of social services. The old socialist system was reformed and now new regulations, such as the Social Insurance Law (1994), the Law of Pensions and Benefits (1994), and the Law of Unemployment Benefit (1994) regulate social welfare services. Benefits are allocated from the Social Insurance Fund, which was also enacted in 1994 (UNFPA, 2012: 100). There is in additiona Human Development Fund for children under the age of 18, who get around 20,000 *tugrug* per month, and the Human Development Fund for the elderly and disabled (NSO, 2013: 2). The *khoroo* is responsible for channelling the support to the needy persons and families. Applications for pensions and allowances are made at the *khoroo* administration. For instance, poor families have to apply for allowances and be categorised as poor. This involves filling out a questionnaire with 30 questions. Once a year the *khoroo* also provides food vouchers for poor families. Poor people are mostly the unemployed, single mothers and families with many children (UYIK1).

Another national government programme carried out in the *khoroos* concerns the fight against air pollution, 60% of which is caused by domestic heating (MUB, 2013), through the **provision of subsidised ovens** that burn coal more efficiently with reduced smoke. Different types of ovens at different prices are offered, including a Turkish model, a Mongolian model and a low pressure oven for houses (the model names: Ulzii, Khas and Dul (UAIK5)). The market price for these ovens, or stoves, is 300,000 *tugrug,* but the government provides a 70% subsidy, making the price 55,000 *tugrug* for a big stove and 28,000*tugrug* for a small one. The stoves are also used for cooking (UAIK5). The first phase of this programme was conducted in 2013 and the second phase was launched at the start of the heating period in 2014, with the aim of covering the households which had not be been provided with ovens in the first phase (UYIK1). 80% of households in Amgalan 12[th]were already provided with one of these ovens in 2013 (UAIK5).

II.III.IV_General expenditures per household on infrastructure and services in a *ger* and in an apartment district

Infrastructure and services per month	4-headed household in Yarmag, 5th*khoroo,* self-built single family house and *ger* in Tugrik	2-headed household in Bayangol District, 1st*khoroo*, Altai Town, 12- storey apartment block, built in 2013, in Tugrik***
Water	775 - 1,550*	3,696
Water heating	--	3,638
Electricity	20,000 - 25,000 (277kWh)***	15,000 (163kWh)
Heating	94,000 – 125,000**	20,000
Solid waste	2,500***	3,000
Waste water	--	1,848
Service charge	--	9250
TV/Internet	1,100***	31,900
Maintenance	--	7,900
Elevator	--	5,000
Cleaning	--	4,000
Guard	--	3,000
Lighting	--	2,000
Total:	**118,375 – 155,150**	**110,232**

Source: Own elaboration * based on consumption of water with 5-10 litres/person/day with 5 persons per HH and 1 tugrik per litre per month (Kamata et al., 2010b); ** based on 8 months' heating and 3-4 coal deliveries, each costing250,000 tugrug (750,000 – 1,000,000 tugrug per heating period); *** bills from November 2014

II.III.V_The Regional Development Fund

Previous to the Regional Development Fund the Local Fund regulated the provision of technical, social and cultural infrastructure (Government of Mongolia, 15 December 2006, Article 29.1.4, Local Administration and Administration Unit). The Regional Development Fund is part of the national budget and was established in 2013 for regional development measures by demand of the people. A


Figure 45: Process and Involvement of different actors in projects financed by the Regional Development Fund. Source: Own elaboration, Drawings: G. Enkhchimeg

survey is conducted annually. The fund is mentioned here because it directly affects the development of the settlements. In the case of Yarmag, 5th*khoroo*, around 50% of the 1500 households filled out a questionnaire prepared by the district, to be submitted in June or July to the district administration for the coming year. The amount of funding is calculated by the number of inhabitants. For Yarmag, funding provided was 74 million tugrug (39,960.00 dollars or 31,820.00 Euros)[42] in 2013 and 78 million tugrug in 2014 (about 13,000 tugrug per person) (UYIK2). Funding is provided from the state budget and distributed to the *aimags* and to Ulaanbaatar and administered by the soums (English: villages)in the countryside and by the districts in Ulaanbaatar. The improvement measures are carried out in bags (English: settlements) in the countryside and in the *khoroos* in Ulaanbaatar. Although improvement measures are selected according to the suggestions of a majority of the inhabitants, the final decision is made by the district administration and the *khural* (English: people's representatives council) approves which projects will be carried out in the *khoroo* (UYIK2). Projects to be implemented should be defined one year in advance of funding. The number of projects implemented depends on the amount spent on the first project to be carried out, the one the majority of the residents favoured. If any of the budget is left over, the second and third most desired projects are also implemented (UEDB7).

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[42]Association of German Banks: on 23 October 2014, the exchange rate was 1 US dollar for 1,844.00 Mongolian tugrug (1 Euro = 2,332.14 Mongolian tugrug) (www.bankenverband.de, accessed on 24 October 2014)

Several steps and responsible persons are involved in the spending of the fund's budget. Usually, the residents are involved only at the very beginning, when they vote for the most-needed measures via a questionnaire prepared by the district. The *kheseg* leaders collect the questionnaires and the *khoroo* transfers them to the district. The economy and planning department of the district prepares cost calculation after an engineer from the municipality has conducted a field survey for the prospective site and approved that the projected work is in line with the Master Plan 2030. Companies are then hired to design and monitor the project. As final step before implementation, the district *khural* approves the project. The construction tender is also handled by the district. A construction company is selected by a commission of five to seven members: one director, one or two experts, one or two engineers, one member of an NGO and one specially-trained citizen from the district who is not resident in the *khoroo* where the intervention is to take place. The *khoroo* administration is not usually involved in the tender process. However, the governors of Yarmag, 5th*khoroo* and Amgalan, 12th*khoroo*, reported that the tender for the construction of street lights was carried out in a public hearing where the inhabitants could chose the construction company (UYIK1, UAIK 2). The district and the *khoroo* are responsible for monitoring the construction work. If any problems crop up that are difficult to solve, a conference is called with the executing company, engineers from the municipality and responsible staff from the district and *khoroo* administrations. The residents are not involved in any construction work. Once construction work is completed, the same commission responsible for the tender evaluates the implementation result, then the *khoroo* takes over and reports to the district if any maintenance work needs to be done (UEDB7).

In Yarmag, 5th*khoroo*, the Regional Development Fund budget in 2013, was spent on the garden in front of the *khoroo* administration building, on the installation of three security cameras for crime prevention and on the removal of waste from the public apartment block where new toilets were installed (UYIK1, UYIK 2). Work on the garden in front of the *khoroo* building was carried out by the Chandmani family fund. In Amgalan, 12th*khoroo*, and Yarmag, 5th*khoroo*, street lighting was installed in 2014. In addition, a playground was planned and constructed in the 9th*kheseg* in Amgalan (UAIK2).

Although their votes, via a prepared questionnaire, are responsible for the choice of project, the residents are not involved in its implementation. According to the vice-governor of Bayanzurkh district "*the work would take longer if residents were more involved*" (UEDB7). Thus, no sense of ownership and participation in the improvement process can be built up by the citizens as they are involved in neither the decision-making processes nor in implementation, nor even in the evaluation of their suggested projects. The same is pretty much true for the *khoroo* administration, as they too are not involved in any decision-making. Tendering and evaluation processes are organised in the old socialist manner and are strongly hierarchical, leaving the *khoroo* and the *kheseg* as small urban units with no scope for action in the sense of a self-administered, decentralised local government.

II.III.VI_The implementation steps of the Housing Project, the GAR and the LRP

The GAR and LRP are part of the Ulaanbaatar Housing Corporation Project and contribute to it in constructed housing units.

The Ulaanbaatar Housing Corporation Project in two stages 2014-16/2016-18:

year	Land readjustment Programme (LRP)		GAR
	Scope for MUB	**Housing units**	**Apartment units on 21 locations, 1337.5 ha**
2014	8 locations with temporary citizens councils in 6 districts, in total 96 ha, 1580 land parcels	160 SHU/ 400 AU/ 560 serviced	4,550
2015	10 locations with temporary citizens councils in 6 districts, in total 120 ha, 1960 land parcels	580 SHU/ 1200 AU/ 1740 serviced	14,650
2016	12 locations with temporary citizens councils in 6 districts, in total 144 ha, 2060 land parcels, 220 public meetings with 17,400 inhabitants and 12,500 land owners	780 SHU/ 1600 AU/ 2380 serviced	17,400
2017	15 locations with temporary citizens councils in 6 districts, in total 180 ha, 2950 land parcels	970 SHU/ 2000 AU/ 2900 serviced	18,350
2018	18 locations with temporary citizens councils in 6 districts, in total 216 ha, 3540 land parcels	3660 SHU/ 2400 AU/ 2570 serviced	23,050
	In Total:	1170 SHU/ 7600 AU/ 10150 serviced	80,000

Source: MUB, 2014: No. 17/17

The housing project is financed from the capital's budget, the Regional Fund, the Housing Fund and loans from the government of Mongolia and financial organisations. The housing project also comprises 7,000 renting units for elderly and disabled people (ibid).

Eight rough working steps for the Implementation of the GAR and LRP in 2013:

1. Initiative by residents or legal entity for implementation of GAR
2. Formation of project team
3. Decision by the urban community about locations for implementation of GAR
4. Field survey for agreed locations
5. Formation of working group
6. Tendering for implementation of GAR
7. Approval by administration or government
8. Signing of contractby the three interested parties: MUB, investment company, land owner (MUB, 2013)

Revised nine proposal and planning steps for implementation of the Land Readjustment Programme (LRP) in 2014:

1. Submission of proposal by citizens through application form: the land readjustment research centre sends its staff to the *ger* area *khoroos* to inform the citizens and invite applications

2. Housing Project Unit receives proposal from residents and carries out a basic survey: legal ownership or use of land, registration within the *khoroo* and type of development desired   - Land readjustment
                           - Redevelopment/Reconstruction
                           - Sale of land

3. Setting of boundaries of development site: in accordance with the master plan 2030.Unification of residents

4. Establishment of residents temporary council: groups or units of 20-30 landowners or users are formed within the development area, every landowner or user needs to be part of the group. The temporary council consists of about eight groups and is led by a head, who has to be selected or elected by the citizens. The council acts as control mechanism and is in charge for the duration of the LRP.

5. Cooperation between temporary council and Housing Project Unit: to share knowledge through training, to forward information to other organisation members, and to advertise the process, activities, problems and solutions

6. Preparation of Partial Master Plan based on the field survey and the demands of the residents

7. Discussion of Partial Master Plan with related agencies, such as the master planning agency (which is preparing the Partial Master Plan), the housing project division, temporary councils, line agencies, the disaster prevention office, the district administration, etc.

8. Finalisation of project plan: this consists of the citizens' wishes as regards development and their proposal, and the Partial Master Plan which should be in line with the Master Plan 2030

9. Approval by the city *khural* together with a statement on the amount of funding (MUB, [without year]; UEMP2)

Figure 46: The GAR (red) and LRP (blue) locations of the first and second terms of implementation in 2014. Source: Own elaboration.

Map based on Kamata, 2010a: 11. Drawing: G. Enkhchimeg

III_Neighbourhoods

III.I_ Khazan

III.I.I_Impressions

Figure 47: El Khazan Street besides the public training centre

Figure 48: service road in residential area

Figure 49: service road with buildings in good condition

Figure 50: El Mahgar street market area in front of El Marwa School

Figures on this page by Olivia Kummel

Khazan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Cairo Governorate
District Manshiet Nasser

Khazan Neighbourhood

Land use pattern

Use of Buildings

- Residential Use
- Store/ Commercial Use
- Industrial Production
- Handicraft/ Workshop
- Educational Institution
- Religious Service
- Social Service
- Bakery
- Residential/ Commercial Use
- Residential Use/ Industrial Production
- Public Utility
- Vacant Building/ Plot

Use of open spaces

- Public green open space
- Private open space
- Vehicular road
- Pedestrian path
- Parking Area

- — — Cliffs
- — — Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2009   Scale:

0 10   50   100 m

Source of map: District Administration MN, 2009
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

III.I.III_Building Conditions in 2009

Khazan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Cairo Governorate
District Manshiet Nasser

Khazan Neighbourhood

Condition of Buildings

Good Condition
Medium Condition
Bad Condition

Cliffs
Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2009   Scale:

0 10   50   100 m

Source of map: District Administration MN, 2009
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

III.I.IV_Building Construction types in 2009

Khazan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Cairo Governorate
District Manshiet Nasser

Khazan Neighbourhood

Construction system of
buildings

Concrete Construction
Retaining Wall Construction

Cliffs
Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2009   Scale:

0 10   50   100 m

Source of map: District Administration MN, 2009
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

III.I.V_Building Heights in 2009

Khazan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Cairo Governorate
District Manshiet Nasser

Khazan Neighbourhood

Building heights

Single Storey
2 - 3 Storeys
4 - 5 Storeys
More than 5 Storeys

Cliffs
Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2009   Scale:

0 10   50   100 m

Source of map: District Administration MN, 2009
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

III.II_ Masakin

III.II.I_Impressions

Figure 51: view over Masakin from north

Figure 52: corridor of removed houses on the cliffs

Figure 53: public housing complexes along the main road

Figure 54: El Kabari market street

Figures on this page by Olivia Kummel

Masakin Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

محـــافظة القـــــاهرة
حي منشــأة نـــاصر

الوكالة الألمانية للتعاون الفني

Land use pattern

Residential use
Residential/ Commercial use
Residential/ Service use
Residential/ Handicraft/ Workshop use
Commercial use
District Administration - Social service
Health service
Educational institution
Social service
Leisure facilities
Religious service
Handicraft/ Workshop use
Industrial production
Sports facilities
Public utility
Unbuilt plots

Cliffs
Neighbourhood boundary

Urban Development Project Manshiet Nasser
Masakin Neighbourhood

استشاري التخطيط العمراني
مجموعة التنمية المتكاملة
د/محمد عبد الكريم صالحين
١٤ ش. سيد طه عبد البر   ٠٢-٢٧٢٤٦٤٠

Integrated Development Group

April 2009

N

Masakin Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

محـــافظة القـــــاهرة
حي منشـــأة نـــاصر

الوكالة الألمانية للتعاون الفني

Condition of buildings

Good condition
Medium condition
Bad condition

Cliffs
Neighbourhood boundary

Urban Development Project Manshiet Nasser
Masakin Neighbourhood

استشاري التخطيط العمراني
مجمـــوعة التنمية المتكاملة
د/محمد عبد الكريم صالحين
١٤ شـ سيد طه عبد البر ٠٢-٢٧٢٤٦٤٠

Integrated Development Group

April 2009

N

Masakin Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

محـــافظة القــــاهرة
حي منشـــأة نــاصر

الوكالة الألمانية للتعاون الفني

gtz

Construction system of buildings

Concrete construction
Retaining wall construction
Light construction

Cliffs
Neighbourhood boundary

Urban Development Project Manshiet Nasser
Masakin Neighbourhood

استشاري التخطيط العمراني
مجموعة التنمية المتكاملة
د/محمد عبد الكريم صالحين
١٤ ش سيد طه عبد البر   ٠٢-٢٧٢٤٦٤٠

IDG
Integrated Development Group

April 2009

N

50   0   50   100   150m

Masakin Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

محــافظة القـــــاهرة
حي منشــأة نــاصر

gtz

الوكالة الألمانية للتعاون الفني

Building heights

Single storey
2 - 3 storeys
4 - 5 storeys
More than 5 storeys

Cliffs
Neighbourhood boundary

Urban Development Project Manshiet Nasser
Masakin Neighbourhood

استشاري التخطيط العمراني
مجموعة التنمية المتكاملة
د/محمد عبد الكريم صالحين
١٤ ش سيد طه عبد البر ٠٢-٢٧٢٤٦٤٠

April 2009

50   0   50   100   150m

N

III.III_Bansighat

III.III.I_Impressions

Figure 55: view on southern Bansighat and BLR from the bridge

Figure 56: historical area north of the neighbourhood with pati and ghat

Figure 57: broadened road connecting the BLR and the bridge

Figure 58: water tank and Pipal tree on one of the squares

Figures on this page by Olivia Kummel

Bansighat Neighbourhood

KMC, Ward Number 11

Land use pattern

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Use of Buildings

- Residential Use
- Residential Use/ snack shop
- Residential Use/ corner shop
- Social service
- Toilet
- Unfinished construction site

Use of open spaces

- Private open space
- Green open space
- Open space of different use
- Pedestrian path/ square
- Vehicular road
- Bagmati river, open drain

Technical infrastructure

- Waste water drainage
- Well
- Tube well
- Water tank with tap
- Electric pole

Others

- Walls, 60 cm high
- Tree
- City boundary
- Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:
0 5 10 20 40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Bansighat Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Bansighat Neighbourhood

KMC, Ward Number 11

Condition of buildings

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Condition of buildings

Good Condition

Medium Condition

Bad Condition

Others

City boundary

Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:

0 5 10   20   40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Bansighat Neighbourhood Development

Olivia Kummel

Bansighat Neighbourhood

KMC, Ward Number 11

Construction materials & types

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Construction materials of buildings

- Plastic/ cartoon
- Wood
- Brick/ mud
- Brick/ cement
- Facade plastered
- Number of storeys
- Unfinished construction site

* in case of two-storey houses the upper floor is made of wooden blanks

Materials of open spaces

- Vegetation, vegetable
- Earthen path, road, square
- Open space, bare soil
- Open space, vegetation
- Brick paved path
- Bagmati river, open drain

Others

- Walls, 60 cm high
- Tree
- City boundary
- Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:
0 5 10 20 40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Bansighat Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Bansighat Neighbourhood

KMC, Ward Number 11

Meeting points

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Legends

🔴	Water tanks
🟡	Shops
🔵	Child care centre
🟢	Open space/ Courtyard

Bagmati river, open drain

City boundary

Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:
0 5 10   20   40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Bansighat Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

III.IV_Sankhamul

III.IV.I_Impressions

Figure 59: the upper part of the settlement with the Sankhamul bridge

Figure 60: construction site of the BLR

Figure 61: newly built houses north of the neighbourhood

Figure 62: the lower part of the neigbourhood

Figures on this page by Olivia Kummel

Sankhamul Neighbourhood

KMC, Ward Number 10

Land Use Pattern

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Construction site Bagmati Link Road

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Use of Buildings
- Residential Use
- Residential/ snack shop
- Residential/ corner shop
- Social service
- Toilet
- Cattle shed
- Temple
- Shrine

Use of open spaces
- Private open space
- Green open space
- Open space of different use
- Vehicular road
- Pedestrian path, square
- Bagmati river, open drain
- Tree

Technical infrastructure
- Waste water drainage
- Well
- Tube well
- Water tank with tap
- Electric pole
- Pedestrian walk bridge

Others
- Walls of 30-50 cm
- City boundary
- Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:
0 10 20 40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Sankhamul Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Sankhamul Neighbourhood

KMC, Ward Number 10

Condition of buildings

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Condition of Buildings

- Good Condition
- Medium Condition
- Bad Condition

Others

| | Walls of 30-50 cm
City boundary
Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:
0 10 20   40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Sankhamul Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Sankhamul Neighbourhood
KMC, Ward Number 10
Construction materials & types

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Construction site Bagmati Link Road

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Construction materials of buildings

- Plastic/ cartoon/ bamboo
- Concrete
- Brick/ mud
- Brick/ cement
- Facade plastered
- Facade painted/ white washed
- Facade plastered and painted
- II Number of storeys

Materials of open space

- Vegetation, vegetable
- Open space, spontanous vegetation
- Tarmac road
- Earthen path, road, square
- Bagmati river, open drain
- Tree

Others

- I Walls of 30-50 cm
- City boundary
- Neighbourhood boundary

September 2014

Scale:
0 10 20   40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Sankhamul Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Sankhamul Neighbourhood
KMC, Ward Number 10
Meeting points

Kathmandu Metropolitan City

Patan Sub - Metropolitan City

Legends

🔴	Water tanks	
🟠	Temples	
🔵	Child care centre	
🟡	Shops	
🟢	Open space	

Bagmati river, open drain
City boundary
Neighbourhood boundary
Tree

September 2014

Scale:
0 10 20   40 m

Source of map:
Lumanti Support Group of Shelter, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Sankhamul Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

III.V_Yarmag

III.V.I_Impressions

Figure 63: western main road heading towards north

Figure 64: view on the informal part of the neighbourhood

Figure 65: equipment of a plot in the neighbourhood

Figure 66: Beautification of fences project by the family fund Chandmani

Figure 63 by Mathias Burke, Figure 64 by Renato D'Alencon, Figures 65 and 66 by Olivia Kummel

III.V.II_Land Use in 2013

Yarmag Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Khan-Uul District
5th Khoroo

Yarmag Neighbourhood

Land use pattern

Use of Buildings

- Residential use
- Residential/ Commercial use
- Annex of different use
- Toilet
- Residential/ herding use
- Cattle shed
- Ger

Use of open spaces

- Private open space
- Slope/ underutilised land
- Pedestrian path
- Vehicular road

Technical infrastructure

- Water supply line
- Water kiosk
- Tube well
- Electric pole

Others

- Topography
- Tuul river protection line
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary
- District boundary

September 2013

Scale:
0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013; JICA 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Yarmag Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Khan-Uul District
5th Khoroo

Yarmag Neighbourhood

Condition of buildings

Condition of Buildings

- Good Condition
- Medium Condition
- Bad Condition
- Ger

Others

- Topography
- Tuul river protection line
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary
- District boundary

September
2013

Scale:

0 10 20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013; JICA, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Yarmag Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Khan-Uul District
5th Khoroo

Yarmag Neighbourhood

Construction materials & types

Use of Buildings

- Sandwich board
- Brick/ mud/ cement
- Concrete block/ cement
- Brick/ concrete block
- Wooden structure/ brick
- Facade plastered
- II   Number of storeys

Materials of open space

- Bare soil, vegetation
- Bare soil
- Earthen road
- Pedestrian

Others

- Topography
- Tuul river protection line
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary
- District boundary

September 2013

Scale:
0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013; JICA, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Yarmag Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Khan-Uul District
5th Khoroo
Yarmag Neighbourhood

Meeting points

Legends

Water kiosks
Shops
River side

Gers
Neighbourhood boundary

September
2013

Scale:
0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013; JICA, 2008
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

III.VI_Amgalan

III.VI.I_Impressions

Figure 67: apartment building

Figure 68: road from administration building to Janjin club

Figure 69: construction of new Janjin Club

Figure 70: 2nd redevelopment unit before demolition

Figures on this page by Olivia Kummel

Amgalan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Amgalan Neighbourhood
Land use pattern

Use of Buildings
- Residential use
- Appartment building
- Monastery
- Commercial use
- Hospital
- Cultural building
- Educational building
- Administrative building
- Industrial building
- Ger
- Garage and storage
- Green house
- Annex of different use
- Toilet
- Public shower
- Bus stop

Use of open spaces
- Private open space
- Public open space
- Vehicular road
- Pedestrian path
- Side walk

Technical infrastructure
- Public communal heating plant (CHP)
- Water kiosk

Others
- Topography
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2013
Scale:
0 10 20 40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Amgalan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Bayanzurkh District
12th Khoroo

Amgalan Neighbourhood

Condition of buildings

Condition of Buildings
- Good Condition
- Medium Condition
- Bad Condition
- Uncategorized Condition
- Ger

Others
- Topography
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2013

Scale:
0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Amgalan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Bayanzurkh District
12th Khoroo

Amgalan Neighbourhood

Construction materials & types

Use of Buildings

- Brick/ mud/ cement
- Wooden structure
- Glass/ plastic
- Facade plastered
- II Number of storeys

Materials of open space

- Bare soil/ vegetation
- Earthen road, pedestrian path
- Tarmac road
- Pedestrian pavement

Others

- Topography
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary

May 2013

Scale:
0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Amgalan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Bayanzurkh District
12th Khoroo

Amgalan Neighbourhood

Meeting Points

Legends

- Bus stop
- Public infrastructure
- Water kiosks
- Shops
- Nunnery

○ Gers
- - - Neighbourhood boundary

May 2013

Scale:
0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Cadastral Map, 2013
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

Amgalan Neighbourhood Development
Olivia Kummel

Bayanzurkh District
12th Khoroo

Amgalan Neighbourhood

Demands of residents regarding
the revedelopment (GAR)

Demands of residents

- Local area improvement with active support of the residents
- Convenient single family house
- Apartment
- Reimbursement

Others

- Redevelopment units as declared by the municipality
- Kheseg boundary
- Neighbourhood Boundary

Jan 2013

Scale:

0   10   20   40 m

Source of map: Municipality Ulaanbaatar, 2012
Drawing: Enkhchimeg Ganbaatar

III.VII_Summary – today's physical, social and economic situation of the neighbourhoods (Source: Own elaboration)

Lacking infrastructure	Public open spaces	Living conditions	Building conditions	Additional income generation/saving	Family network/ community	Development demand
Khazan						
-solid waste collection -water quality -internal transportation -health care provision -leisure facilities	-one pocket park, closed	-2.2 persons/room -decreasing living space -50% of families insufficient space	-94% permanent buildings -21% medium condition -5% bad condition	-leasing of rooms -others rarely exist (73% of HH less than 500LE/ month, 2005)	-4.5 persons/family -nuclear family -extended family -strong clan structure	-maintenance of buildings -open public park -provision of infrastructure -extension of living space -self-provision of infrastructure
Masakin						
-solid waste collection -water quality -internal transportation -health care provision	-one square near public institutions and mosque	-1.6 persons/room -decreasing living space -10% of families insufficient space	-58% semi-permanent buildings -57% medium condition -26% bad condition	-leasing of rooms (65% of HH less than 500LE/ month, 2005)	-4.1 persons/family -Nuclear family -extended family -strong clan structure	-rehabilitation of buildings -provision of missing infrastructure
Bansighat						
-street light -sufficient water supply	-two squares -half-public space in front of snack shops -water tanks	-1.6 persons/room -increasing living space -30% of families insufficient space	-31% semi-permanent buildings -69% temporary b. -43% medium condition -4% bad condition	-savings and credit -vegetable planting -leasing of rooms (4.026 NRS income/ month, 2008)	-5.1 persons/family -nuclear family -extended family -family network -community unity	-change of buildings structure to semi-permanent -provision of infrastructure -expansion of living space -self-provision of infrastructure
Sankhamul						
-street light -sewage system for every household	-settlement entrance -temples -half-public space in front of snack shops -water tanks	-1.7 persons/room -increasing living space -30% of families insufficient space	-98% semi-permanent buildings -30% medium condition -9% bad condition	-savings and credit -intensive vegetable planting -livestock breeding -leasing of rooms (5.741 NRS income/ month, 2008)	-4.4 persons/family -nuclear family -extended family -family network -community unity	-change of buildings structure to permanent -provision of missing infrastructure -self-provision of infrastructure
Yarmag						
-solid waste collection -sewage system -individual heating system -individual water supply -kindergarten places	-river bank -half-public space in front of shops -water kiosks	-1.9 persons/room -increasing living space -30% of families insufficient space -illegal families	-98% semi-permanent buildings -64% medium condition -14% bad condition	- leasing rooms/ gers -others rarely existing (60% 500 T – 1 Mio MNT income/month, 2013)	-6.4 persons/family -extended family -nuclear family -strong family structure	-provision of missing infrastructure -insulation of buildings -expansion of living space -housing for illegal families
Amgalan						
-solid waste collection sewage system -individual heating system -individual water supply -kindergarten places	-square in front of Janjin Club -half-public space in front of shops -water kiosks	-1.2 persons/room -increasing living space	-98% semi-permanent buildings -84% medium condition -3% bad condition	-intensive vegetable planting -livestock breeding -leasing rooms/ gers (30% > 2 Mio MNT income/month, 2013)	-6.0 persons/family - extended family - nuclear family -strong family structure	-provision of missing infrastructure -insulation of buildings

III.VIII_Summary - Influences and how they changed Neighbourhood Development (Source: Own elaboration)

Neighbourhood	Khazan	Masakin	Bansighat	Sankhamul	Yarmag	Amgalan
Trigger for settling	**Urban structure**→escape from overcrowded living conditions in MN	**Government**→eviction from old quarter	**Existing structures**→traditional rest house (pati) as shelter	**Economics**→ construction workers of nearby bridge	**Natural disaster**→flood	**Urban structure**→escape from overcrowded living conditions in Naima (Ikh Khuree)
Initial settlement	**Inhabitants**, self-built sewage system→slow population growth	**Government**, provision of technical infrastructure and schools→population growth	-**Political leader**, suggestion of settling -**Political change**, migration to cities →population growth	-**Political leader**, suggestion of settling →population growth -**Government**, first provision of electricity	**Government**, organised, planned settlement, water kiosks, electricity, schools, kindergartens, market, public apartment housing	-**Chinese settlers**, vegetable cultivation -**political change**, escape of Chinese settlers, -**Government**, construction of Janjin Club →migration, population growth -**Government**, construction of infrastructure line → move to other areas → resettlement, construction of schools, kindergarten
Consolidation	**Government**, renewal of infrastructure, construction of school →population growth **Globalisation**, unemployment, increased expenses →increased crime and drug abuse rate, migration → population growth, full settlement size reached	**Government**, renewal of infrastructure, construction of Cultural Palace →population growth -**GTZ-PDP/government**, implementation of programme →renovation of social infrastructure, economical programme	-**political leaders**, Elections → family identity cards, first recognition →partial electricity supply, water tanks -**Lumanti,** implementation of programme →socio-economic growth, improvement in sanitary conditions, change in living conditions -**political leaders**, political power →division of community, exit of NGOs →development process halt -**Political leaders**, election → full provision of electricity, more water tanks, sewage line→population growth -**Government**, eviction of neighbouring settlement, unity →loss of political leader's influence → development	**Inhabitants/government**, Registration as TDC, first recognition →full electricity, water -**land owners**, harassment →unity, peace within settlement → population growth, full settlement size reached -**political leaders**, move to current location →changes in construction of buildings -**political leaders**, elections, founding of squatters' federation (SPOUSH Nepal) → family identity cards, second recognition -**Luman**ti, implementation of programme →socio-economic growth, improvement in sanitary conditions, change in living conditions -**Government**, clearance of corridor, demolition of gardens →development process almost stopped	-**Political change**, unemployment, poverty → migration, population growth → construction of first houses -**Natural disasters**, migration waves → population growth	
Recognition	-**Government**, official recognition of settlements -**GTZ** →complete renewal of water and sewage line, tarmacking of roads	-**GTZ** →tarmacking of roads, land titling	-**Government**, new constitution, more protection for squatters against evictions, construction of BLR → development increased, change of construction style		-**Government**, law for privatisation of land → migration,population growth -**economic growth**, increased income →construction of houses→ full size of settlements reached -Human development Centre (HDC), implementation of programme → unity, economic growth, improvement of living conditions -natural disasters, land pressure → illegal settlement -government, service provision →"one-point-service"	-World Vision, implementation of infrastructure and social programme →water supply, economic growth -Government, implementation of GAR →complete change of settlement and community