

Franziska Paizs

# Urban Planning after Terrorism

The case of Oslo with focus on the impacts of the terrorist attack on the consideration of security, memorialisation and conservation in urban planning





Franziska Paizs

## **Urban Planning after Terrorism**

The case of Oslo with focus on the impacts of the terrorist attack on the consideration of security, memorialisation and conservation in urban planning

**Die Graue Reihe des Instituts für Stadt- und Regionalplanung**

an der Technischen Universität Berlin wird herausgegeben vom

Forum Stadt- und Regionalplanung e.V.

c/o Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung

Sekretariat B7

Hardenbergstraße 40a

10623 Berlin

[www.isr.tu-berlin.de](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de)



Franziska Paizs

## **Urban Planning after Terrorism**

The case of Oslo with focus on the impacts of the  
terrorist attack on the consideration of security,  
memorialisation and conservation in urban planning

**Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek**

Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über <http://dnb.dnb.de/> abrufbar.

*Die Beiträge der Grauen Reihe dienen der zeitnahen Publikation von Arbeiten im Internet, die aktuelle wissenschaftlich oder planungsbezogen relevante Themen angehen und sich mit unterschiedlichen Positionen in Politikbereichen der Stadt- und Regionalplanung, Stadtgeschichte und Stadtentwicklung, des Wohnungswesens und des Planungs- und Baurechts auseinandersetzen. In dieser Reihe finden Sie u. a. Diplomarbeiten, Tagungs- und Veranstaltungsdokumentationen oder Forschungsberichte.*

**Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin 2013**

<http://www.univerlag.tu-berlin.de>  
Fasanenstraße 88 (im VOLKSWAGEN-Haus), 10623 Berlin  
Tel.: +49 (0)30 314 76131 / Fax: -76133  
E-Mail: [publikationen@ub.tu-berlin.de](mailto:publikationen@ub.tu-berlin.de)

Das Manuskript ist urheberrechtlich geschützt.

**Verfasser des Bandes**

Franziska Paizs

**Layout**

Franziska Paizs

**Satz & Umschlaggestaltung**

Thomas Rutschke  
Publikationsstelle  
Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung  
E-Mail: [publikationen@isr.tu-berlin.de](mailto:publikationen@isr.tu-berlin.de)

**Titelbild**

Oslove – Streetart in Oslo as a response to the terrorist attack  
Franziska Paizs, 2012

**ISSN 1864-8037 (online)****ISBN 978-3-7983-2619-4 (online)**

Online veröffentlicht auf dem Digitalen Repositorium der Technischen Universität Berlin:  
URL <http://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-tuberlin/frontdoor/index/index/docId/4068>  
URN [urn:nbn:de:kobv:83-opus4-40689](http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:83-opus4-40689)  
[<http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:83-opus4-40689>]

# Acknowledgement

At this point I want to thank Prof. Dr. Dietrich Henckel for advice and the opportunity to write about this topic.

Also sincere thanks are given to Dr. Carsten Paludan-Müller and the team of the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research for the interesting talks and the many insights I got into Oslo and Norway.

Special thanks are given to Berit Skarholt (PBO), Elisabeth Seip (AHO), Pål Henry Engh (LPO), Knut Felberg (Statsbygg), Knut Grønntun (MD), Guri Voss Gabrielsen (Norsk Form) and Petter Molaug (NIKU) for sharing their expert knowledge and time with me.

Last but not least I want to thank my family and friends, especially my Norwegian friends, for the emotional backup. For you I wrote this thesis.

The happenings on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 2011 are stated to be the most horrible events ever happened to Norway since the Second World War. This includes the bombing in the Regjeringskvartalet, but more over the shooting spree on the island Utøya. Due to the objectives of the thesis I am going to focus on the bombing and its impacts, neither forgetting nor disparaging about the 69 children and teenagers who lost their lives on that day, a day which brought tragedy and pain to Norway, its population and the whole world.



# Abstract

Terrorism is a targeted way to hurt a population but also to destroy and annihilate a part of the civilization by attacking the built environment, especially iconic and symbolic buildings with its values of collective memory and cultural heritage, which is at the latest created by the iconic act of destruction. The resilient city with its integrated plans and programs but also technical, personal or physical security aims to reduce the probability and the dimension of terrorist attacks. However attacks cannot be precluded and they leave behind open questions about their impacts on urban planning – in general and with regard to the impacted sites and their burden as tragedy sites. Terrorist attacks on symbolic buildings in Oklahoma City (United States, 1995), Manchester (United Kingdom, 1996) and – more recent - Oslo (Norway, 2011) prove that fact. The research on that cases shows, that terrorist attacks, their impacts and the overcoming do have a very individual character and will always remain a unique and incisive event where individual redevelopment prove the abnormality of those attacks, even though they increased in number in the last years. The consequence is a trend to hardened architecture and changes in urban design with impacts on public space and the appearances of cities nowadays. However the legal framework and general urban planning policy does not seem to be affected by the attacks. Terrorism is in general a reaction on the policy of the targeted country. The reasons for terrorist attacks are not to be found in the urban planning policy of a country – urban planning therefore is not in charge for combating terrorism, that is to say prevent or ward off terrorist attacks. The balance between security measures and the qualities of “freedom” and “urbanity” depends on the national politic attitude and grown self-image.

This publication can give a certain contribution to the topic of terrorism and its impact on urban planning. The comprehensive analysis of Oslo gives a summary about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet with regard to the consideration of factors such as security, cultural heritage, memorial values, economic aspects and planning process design. Although an explicit result of Oslo’s future is not quite clear yet and possible further impacts on urban planning in Oslo are not evident at this time certain tendencies could be identified with the help of the experts. Also the combined reflection of three, under certain points of view similar cases shows different ways of overcoming a traumatic shock.



# Table of Content

<b>List of Figures</b>	<b>XII</b>
<b>List of Tables</b>	<b>XIV</b>
<b>List of Abbreviations</b>	<b>XV</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 Objective of this Paper	2
1.2 Structure	3
<b>2 State of Current Research</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 Disambiguation	5
2.2 Fields of Research – Where Terrorism and Urban Planning meet	7
2.3 Resilience	8
2.4 Security in Architecture and Urban Design	9
2.5 Tragedy Sites, Memorials, Conservation Values	11
2.6 Contextualisation	12
<b>3 Methodology</b>	<b>15</b>
3.1 Paper Objective and Research Design	15
3.2 The Case Study of Oslo	16
3.3 Oklahoma City and Manchester	18
3.4 Analysis, Comparison & Conclusion	20
3.5 Objectivity, Validity & Reliability	21
3.6 Limitations	21
<b>4 The Case Study of Oslo</b>	<b>23</b>
4.1 General Information	23
4.2 Urban Planning in Oslo	24

4.3	Regjeringskvartalet – The Site	29
4.4	The 22 <sup>nd</sup> of July and Its Consequences	33
4.5	The Future of the Regjeringskvartalet	36
A.	Security	37
B.	Cultural Heritage, Conservation, Lieu de Memoire	39
C.	Future Use	41
D.	Economic Aspects	42
E.	Process Design	42
4.6	Impacts on Urban Planning	47
4.7	Preliminary Results	49
<b>5</b>	<b>Oklahoma City &amp; Manchester</b>	<b>51</b>
5.1	Oklahoma City	51
5.2	Manchester	58
5.3	Preliminary Conclusion	61
<b>6</b>	<b>Comparison, Combination, Consolidation</b>	<b>65</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Results and Outlook</b>	<b>71</b>
	<b>List of References</b>	<b>XVII</b>
	<b>Personal Communication</b>	<b>XXIV</b>

# List of Figures

Figure 1: Streetart in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 15.03.2012	1
Figure 2: Structure of the Thesis. Source: Own Figure.	3
Figure 3: Moaning at the Security Fence in the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: Nobel Peace Prize Forum (2011): Oslo Memorials. A Photo Set. Available at <a href="http://nobelpeaceprize-forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Barricade-near-bomb-site.jpg">http://nobelpeaceprize-forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Barricade-near-bomb-site.jpg</a> [Accessed 10.12.2012]	5
Figure 4: NOGO. Source: [FEMA 2007: 4-46]	10
Figure 5: Y-Blokka and Høyblokka. Source: Own Photo, 17.12.2011	15
Figure 6: Security-Fence around Høyblokka. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012	23
Figures 7, 8: Oslo Opera House and Barcode-Development in Bjørvika. Source: Own Photos, 15.11.2011	25
Figure 9: Location of the Regjeringskvartal in Oslo. Source: Own Figure, Own Picture, 26.03.2012.	29
Figure 10: Map of the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: Own Figure, based on Google Maps.	30
Figure 11, 12: Bollards and Surveillance in the Regjeringskvartalet. Own Photos, 25.02.2012, 12.11.2012.	32
Figures 13, 14: Damages on the R4 (left) and the Høyblokka (above). Source: Statsbygg 2011, Available at <a href="http://www.statsbygg.no/Aktuelt/Tema/Bilder-fra-Regjeringskvartalet/">http://www.statsbygg.no/Aktuelt/Tema/Bilder-fra-Regjeringskvartalet/</a> [Accessed 10.12.2012]	33
Figure 15, 16: Streetart in Oslo in respond to the terrorist attack. Source: Own Photos, 15.03.2012	35
Figure 17: Security fence around the Regjeringskvartalet. Wholes made by Vulkan-Architects. Source: Photo by Falk Hanisch, 17.02.2012	35
Figure 18 : Timeline of the happenings in the Regjeringskvartalet after the terrorist attack. Source: Own Figure.	36
Figures 19, 20 : Barriers on Akersgata to exclude the motorized traffic. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012.	38
Figure 21 : Public Moaning at the Domkirke. Source: Photo by Irene Eskedal, July 2011.	39

Figure 22 : Showcase in front of the VG-Newspaper. Source: Own Photo, 25.02.2012.	39
Figure 23: One Nation Under CCTV, Banksy-Art in London. Source: Photo by Kristian Kotilainen, 2009	51
Figure 24: The effects of the Oklahoma City Bombing. Source: [FEMA 2007: 1-22]	52
Figure 25: The destroyed Alfred P. Murrah Building. Source: [FEMA 2007: 1-5]	53
Figure 26: The Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum. Source: Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, available at: <a href="http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=1">http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=1</a> [Accessed 10.12.2012]	53
Figure 27: Map of the Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum and the new Oklahoma City federal Building. Source: Own Figure, based on Google Maps., GSA 2001, Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum.	53
Figure 28: The destroyed Arndale-Shopping Centre. Source: [Fema 2007: 1-24]	58
Figure 29: The new Arndale-Shopping Centre. Source: Chapman Taylor (2012), available at: <a href="http://www.chapmantaylor.com/en/projects/detail/manchester-arndale/en/">http://www.chapmantaylor.com/en/projects/detail/manchester-arndale/en/</a> [Accessed 10.12.2012]	60
Figure 30: CCTV at the Y-Blokka in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012	65
Figure 31: Street Art in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 27.03.2012	71

# List of Tables

Table 1: List of Experts. Source: own data.	18
Table 2: Recognisable Terrorist Attacks in the Western Hemisphere. Source: Wikipedia (2012): List of terrorist incidents. Available at: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents</a> [Accessed 11.08.2012]	19
Table 3: Criteria for the comparison of the three case studies. Source: own data.	20
Table 4: Possible Alternatives for the Future Urban Design of the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: own figure, based on [FAD 2012a]	45



# List of Abbreviations

AEDP	Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law (US)
AHO	Arkitektur- og designhøgskolen i Oslo (NO)
Ap	Arbeiderpartiet (Norwegian Labour Party)
BMBF	Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (GER)
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
DSS	Defense Security Service (NO)
DOJ	Department of Justice (US)
ETA	<i>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</i> , Basque separatist group
FAD	Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet (NO)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (US)
FD	Forsvarsdepartementet (NO)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency (US)
GSA	General Services Administration (US)
IBC	International Building Code (US)
IRA	Irish Republican Army (UK)
IRS	Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Strukturforschung (GER)
ISC	Interagency Security Committee (US)
KS1	Kvalitetssikking 1 (NO)
KVU	Konseptvalkutredning (NO)
MD	Miljøvernedepartementet (NO)
NTB	Norsk Telegrambyrå (NO)
PBE	Plan- og Bygningsetaten Oslo (NO)
PBL	Plan- og Bygningsloven (NO)
PBS	Public Building Sector (US)

PST	Politiets Sikkerhets Tjeneste (NO)
R 4,5,6	Regjeringsbygg 4, 5, 6 (NO)
RAF	Rote Armee Fraktion (GER)
SWOT	Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
US	United States (of America)
UK	United Kingdom



Figure 1: Streetart in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 15.03.2012

# 1 Introduction

Holmenkollen Skijump. The Opera House. The Nobel Peace Price Awards. Henrik Ibsen. Aker Brygge. The Oslo Fjord. These are keywords linked to the capital of Norway. Since the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July in 2011 one more keyword has been added to the list: Anders Behring Breivik and his terrorist massacre. The pictures of the bombing in Oslo and the killing spree at Utøya were broadcasted and printed in the media all over the world, causing a worldwide incomprehension for what had happened and sympathy for the victims. The consequences are not yet to be seen, but it was obvious that the physical damage of the bombing paled beside the psychological wounds of a whole nation. “Vi mistet noe denne dagen – vi mistet vår uskyldighet [...]” [We have lost something on that day, we have lost our virginity] [Wright 2012]. This act of terrorism was the first attack of this magnitude in almost 70 years of peaceful post-war history in Norway.

Over the last decades, acts of terrorism have more and more become a phenomenon of the Western nations and 9/11 became a symbolic number, associated with terrorism in its cruelest forms. New York, but also London, Madrid,

Manchester or Oklahoma, have had to face an unbelievably difficult challenge. Without speaking of the human tragedy, the terrorist acts impacted society and the political actions of the nations and caused physical damage to the settlements. The affected sites had and still have to carry a burden; they are the evidence of the tragic events. Those towns had to face the challenges, each in their own ways - a way which still lies ahead of Oslo.

### **1.1 Objective of this Paper**

The objective of this paper is to understand how urban planning responds to terrorist attacks. The question about how a town should or can deal with its wounds is to be answered. This is discussed on two spatial levels – the local level of the impacted site and the level of the town itself.

In order to further specify the objective of this paper, the following research questions are raised:


- How is the future of the impacted site discussed and which kind of futures can be identified?
- How have the factors security and memorial and conservation values been discussed after the terrorist attack, especially at the impacted site? Is there a change in the consideration of those aspects in general and if yes, is this a shock reaction or will it be a long-term impact?
- Does an act of terror affect only the impacted site or does it impact the whole urban planning policy? If there is a change in the urban planning policy – how can this be detected and characterised? How does the (new) urban planning policy respond to the socio-political approaches of national politics and the post-terrorism reactions?

These research questions lead to the three core hypotheses which this paper will try to answer:

- ! Sites directly affected by the terrorist attacks pass through a different renewal planning process than “usual sites” due to their sensible past.
- ! Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites, the aspects security, and memorial and conservation Values are undergoing a long-term change in general consideration.
- ! The urban planning policy changes after terrorist attacks based on the national socio-political response to the attacks.

## 1.2 Structure

This paper is divided into seven chapters [fig 2]. After the introduction, the state of the current research is outlined, defining the most important terms and showing a general overview of research which deals with different aspects of terrorism. The methodology which is used in this paper is described in chapter three. The fourth chapter consists of the main part of the paper – the case study of Oslo. Both Oslo's urban planning and the impacted site are investigated with regard to changes after the terrorist attack. This chapter is followed by the analysis of the cases of Oklahoma City and Manchester. In the sixth chapter, the three cases are compared with regard to similarities and differences. Finally, chapter seven tries to answer the research questions and examines the hypotheses and discusses questions for further research.



- |                              |                                       |
|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. Introduction              | 5. Manchester & Oklahoma              |
| 2. Current state of research | 6. Comparison                         |
| 3. Methodology               | 7. Conclusion, outlook, open question |
| 4. Case Study Oslo           |                                       |

Figure 2: Structure of the Thesis. Source: Own Figure.







**Figure 3: Moaning at the Security Fence in the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: Nobel Peace Prize Forum (2011): Oslo Memorials. A Photo Set. Available at <http://nobelpeaceprizeforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Barricade-near-bomb-site.jpg> [Accessed 10.12.2012]**

## 2 State of Current Research

### 2.1 Disambiguation

Acts of terrorism are not a new phenomenon of modern times but have long been an instrument of asymmetrical warfare. It is interesting to note, that terrorism is a quite young field of research and researchers have not been able come up with a general definition of terrorism. Noam Chomsky [2002] uses the definition of the United States Army, describing terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.” The German political scientist Münkler [2006: 1] states that terrorism “is the application of violence by actors, who are clearly inferior towards their opponents regarding resources and who try to achieve political goals by using the psychological effects of physical violence”. A more detailed definition is posed by the European Centre of Security Studies [Bockstette 2008: 8]: “Terrorism is defined as political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed

to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols)." The role of the media these days is also quite influential, because "the symbolism originating from terrorist acts and media marketing thereof is intended to address the public, to use them as a vehicle and a communication channel to influence the political representatives/decision makers and other target audiences. Terrorists fight with limited resources from the underground against an adversary unbeatable by military means" [ibid.: 8]. The motives for terrorist attacks can differ; though the main ones are political or religious. Some sources define different types of terrorism by the background of the responsible group: right wing terrorism (like in Oslo and Oklahoma), left wing terrorism (RAF), religiously inspired terrorism (Al Quaida), ethnic-national/separatist terrorism (IRA, ETA) and single issue terrorism [Europol 2012]. Terrorism should not be confused with terror, which describes the violence towards and suppression of the population by the own government (dictatorships, the war in Kosovo etc.) [Münkler 2006: 1]. All definitions point out, that the instrument of terrorism is used by an inferior group to achieve (political) goals by using threat and violence towards the public. Especially the role, influence and possibilities of the media nowadays guarantees a high degree of attention, not only at the impacted site but worldwide.

The question is, if terrorist attacks have in fact increased worldwide within the last decades, or if this is only a subjective perception due to the increased coverage of media today. It is almost impossible to illustrate the trend of terrorism of the last decades. Several statistics are carried out by national or international security agencies, e.g. the National Counterterrorism Center or Europol (cf. [Europol 2012]), though reliable and generally valid statements can hardly be made. The reasons can be found in the different definitions of terrorism or terrorist organisations [Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2007]. Consequently, the motives of terrorist attacks are not always clear as well – whether they are e.g. politically motivated or religiously inspired. Therefore, a widely accepted list of all terrorist attacks is non-existent (cf. chapter 3.3). However, awareness of terrorist attacks in the Western civilisation has increased over the past decades, be it due to their actual increase in number, their media perception or due to broader definitions, which are instituted by different security agencies. When speaking of the Western civilisation the majority view typically speaks of Europe and the Americas, based on their common history and the same origins of their ethics system. According to Europol [2012: 22ff, 36] the majority of the terrorist attacks in the European Union in 2011 were carried out by separatist groups, namely the IRA (Irish Revolutionary Army), the ETA and the PKK (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan). The National Counterterrorism Center [2012: 9], which



has carried out worldwide analyses of terrorist attacks, states that the number of “Terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere rose nearly 40 percent from 343 in 2010 to 480 in 2011”, with the highest numbers being stated for Russia and Turkey but also South America, due to Guerilla attacks. Looking at the history of terrorism in the Western Hemisphere in the past decades, the most memorable attacks were those in Oklahoma City (1995), Manchester (1996), New York (2001), Moscow (2002, 2010), Madrid (2003), London (2005) and Oslo (2012).

Research on this topic is carried out across different disciplines. Scientists have investigated causes, types and methods, the impacts of or reactions to terrorism. Impacts of terrorism can be understood as the physical collision on e.g. the building material or the significant influence, the effect, on a certain matter. The reaction on the other side includes the respond to terrorist attacks, on an intellectual, behavioural, strategic or objective level. Therefore, research on terrorism can be found in the academic fields of political and security sciences (“counterterrorism”), psychology, sociology, media and communication and in architecture and spatial studies like urban planning. All fields of research are integrated and cross-linked, which can be seen in the Symposium “Architectures of Fear”, held at the Centre de Cultura Contemporània Barcelona (CCCB) on the 16th and 17th of May in 2007. The conference gathered interdisciplinary scientists and researchers who discussed the impacts of terrorism on all aspects of Western societies [Graham, 2007].

## **2.2 Fields of Research – Where Terrorism and Urban Planning meet**

Research in spatial sciences, like urban and regional planning, architecture and urban design can be a direct aftermath of terrorist attacks. This research is mainly focused on case studies emphasising the individual character of each attack and its discussion with regard to different aspects, like impacts on politics (in general), redesign of the site, memorial values etc. afterwards. For instance, this can be seen in the case of 9/11 (cf. [Hofmann 2008; Eisinger 2004]). It also can be a response to the change in environment, like an increased need for security, which most likely originated from a change in the legal and political conditions. However, the academic, mainly case-related research and the development of theories usually follow a terrorist attack [Sarreiter 2007]. General theories about the impacts of terrorism on urban planning policies, concerning the hypotheses of this paper, cannot be found. Since the academic discussion on that topic is relatively young [Bockstette 2008: 8] publications have focused on different aspects of terrorism and only few theories have been developed yet.

While speaking of the responds of the city and its society towards violence or threat of violence the term of “antiterrorism” is applied. Antiterrorism defines “[d]efensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts” [Department for Defense 2010: 20]. This includes material and strategic measures in order to create a safer environment or to respond to terrorist attack. In the United Kingdom these measures are mentioned within the strategy of “counterterrorism” [Home Office], a term which is used by the United States as well, but in a more military character [Department of Defense 2010: 75]. However different measures for responding to the threat of terrorist attack can be applied, mostly with regard to military defense, security intelligence and security architectures. An antiterrosim concept, which is more focused on urban structures is the concept of resilience.

## 2.3 Resilience

Resilience origins from the field of ecology, describing the adaption of an ecosystem to changing external conditions [Christman et al. 2012: 2]. Also used in social sciences and psychology (cf. [Solheim Vigmostad 2010]), Resilience is applied in the context of urban studies as well. Here resilience towards “natural hazards” has been in the focus of research, but “In addition to this, security issues also play a role – especially terrorist threats [...] and crime.” [Christmann et al. 2012: 2]

The current research program of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung BMBF) discusses the topic of resilience also in the context of “civil security” [BMBF 2012]. The program focuses on security research and the identification of solutions, which balance both the approaches of freedom and security in a society [ibid.: 8f]. Next to research fields like social aspects of security or security of infrastructures the research program also covers the field of “urban security” and the creation of a resilient city. Resilience in a spatial context is defined as the adaption of a city, its infrastructure and built environment towards the threatening and consequences of crime but also of terrorism as an extreme case scenario. The objective of a resilient city is its consecutive functioning due to transport and supply of the population in or after a case of conflict and danger. Instruments are - amongst others - integrated urban development and protection plans [ibid.: 14f]. Other major subjects next to resilience are security in public buildings, neighborhoods or public transport [ibid.: 15ff]. The research program started in 2007, is now in its second phase and scheduled till 2017; results and solution strategies are highly expected.



A major contribution to the research on resilience in context with terrorism is achieved by Jon Coaffee, Professor of Urban Geography at the University of Warwick, UK. In his publication “Terrorism, Risk and the City” (2003) he investigated the impacts of the terrorist attacks in London between 1992 and 1997, especially the perceived risk and its effects on the appearance of the city and the institutional security [Coaffee 2013a]. Coaffee states [2013b] that the definitions of resilience differs between both the disciplines and the country-specific perspective. Even though the global action plan “UNISDR” tried to converge the understanding of resilience, its divergency is still reality. Coaffee also points out [ibid.] that resilience is an outcome of different disciplinary instruments and strategies and he defines a resilient city as an “urban area’s ability to anticipate, absorb, respond and recover an array of disruptive challenges and change”. The guiding principles behind the creation of a resilient city are “preparedness, anticipation, subsidiarity, integration, communication and co-operation” [Ibid]. Resilience includes therefore the capacity of responding to incidents like terrorist attacks, especially since exclusive security cannot be guaranteed [Coaffee 2013c].

Different levels of resilience can be achieved in different periods of time. Short-term resilience includes the immediate, emergency respond to e.g. terrorist attacks like taking care of the victims of the attack and the safeguarding of the site to preclude further danger and the restoration of transit. Mid-term resilience includes the restoration of a functioning city e.g. by restoring the lost functions via interim solutions. The redevelopment of the affected sites and the installation of remembrance are long-term goals of resilience. [Vale, Campanella 2005: 337 ff]

Resilience in urban planning covers the strategic aspects of responding towards terrorism and violent conflicts. A physical way to respond to terrorism in the built environment and create an (alleged) resilient city can be realised by architecture, urban design and security technology itself.

## 2.4 Security in Architecture and Urban Design

*“Not terrorism, but the way the threat of terrorism is used, is what will have the biggest impact on the shape of cities and urban life in our day.” [Marcuse 2007]*

Security in architecture and urban design is not a new phenomenon. Since war and territorial fights have always been a part of human mankind cities and settlements used to be built with protection and security architecture, just to mention walls, watchtowers, forts or ditches [Engel 2007]. In the course of history

those needs have changed in the western world and aspects like protection in case of natural hazards became more important. Buildings should be resistant towards earthquakes or hurricanes. As mentioned above the awareness of the threat of terrorism increased in the western civilization in the last decades – latest since the incident of 9/11 - and therefore the need of terrorist related security grew stronger in national politics [Silverberg/Rogers 2011]. The objectives of security in architecture and urban design are to “effectively and efficiently reduce the likelihood of a terrorist act” [Marcuse 2007]. The framework for those measures is given by the legislation; building codes in particular, the security policy and other, informal guidelines of each country. Therefore it is “all to be seen in a cultural context”, but nearly the same security measures can be found all over the world, especially in the western hemisphere. This is not only caused by globalization, but “Customers expect the same level of security everywhere” [Silverberg/Rogers 2011].

The first step of safeguarding should be the evaluation of which buildings, infrastructures or areas in general are likely to be a target of a terrorist attack. Due to the goals of the terrorists – to gain media attention and awareness for their motives – certain sites are more likely to be attacked than others. The higher the public interest in the target is the higher the media attention will probably be. Targets are therefore often public, administrative and iconic buildings, infrastructure hubs, crowded places or commercial and industrial centres [Marcuse 2007; Bockstette 2008: 8; Coaffee et al. 2009: 501; Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012: 55]. In order to realise the need for a higher security level different organisations and stakeholders have published guidelines and references which deal with the security of those buildings and areas in particular (cf. [FEMA 2007; FEMA 2012; Home Office 2012]). The security in architecture and urban design can be realised by technical and personal security measures, like surveillance evidences, guards or detectors [Engel 2007; Silverberg/Rogers 2011]. Moreover it can be realised by the architecture and urban design itself. The used materials can be more robust concrete or break-proof glass. Also the buildings can be set back from property lines, without any context to its urban environment and in that way not “perceptible” and non-descript for the population [Engel 2007]. Also there is the possibility of the installation and integration



Figure 4: NOGO. Source: [FEMA 2007: 4-46]

of particular active and passive security elements like tiger traps, turnarounds, NOGOs, jersey barriers, ditches, obstacles, bollards or else in order to fend terrorist (or crime related) attacks [fig. 4][FEMA 2007: 142ff]. These elements can be implemented in a visual way or relatively hidden, e.g. covered with greening and plantation [Silverberg/Rogers 2011; Coaffee et al. 2009: 499]. Graham [2007] speaks in the consequence of the increasing of those elements and measures of the “palpable militarization and securitization of urban space in many Western cities”; Silverberg [Silverberg/Rogers 2011] also detected a “security creep”, though there are of course differences between each countries. As mentioned above the aim is to find a balance between “legitimate” ([Marcuse 2007], that is to say measures which evidently decrease the threat of terrorism) measures and freedom and democracy. Otherwise the safety measures will impact the freedom of a country more than a terrorist attack will ever be able to achieve it [Graham 2007, Marcuse 2007, Engel 2007].

## 2.5 Tragedy Sites, Memorials, Conservation Values

Tragedy sites, sites which faced e.g. a terrorist attack, are usually becoming “realms of memory” (cf. “lieu de memoire” by Pierre Nora [Bevan 2006: 16]) and the “[t]he worth of such places increases where efforts to destroy them remind communities of this value” [ibid.: 16]. Those memorial values play a significant role in the discussions of the redesign of these sensitive sites. As stated before targets of terrorist attacks are often symbolic buildings, buildings and areas with a special function or a high recognition value. “Terrorism, it has been said, is an act of violent propaganda. [...] The more general the target, the less precise the message” [Bevan 2006: 62]. Which means in reverse: the more specific the target, the more specific the message. The cases of 9/11 and Oslo can prove this statement. In conclusion those former symbolic sites with values of cultural heritage are overlaid with memorial values as well after facing a terrorist attack. The latest research on this topic is executed by a research project called “CRIC Identity and Conflict – Cultural Heritage and the Re-Construction of Identities after Conflict” [CRIC]. Although the term of Conflict does focus on post-war regions and not terrorism the same questions are discussed. “War adds further layers to heritage sites, whether it physically damages them or not, as, for instance, the memory of siege becomes part of the fabric of a city, its inhabitants, its memorials, and its ruins.” [Viejo-Rose, 2011: 54] This can be stated for terrorist attack on heritage sites as well.

The redesign of tragedy sites is ambivalent. On the one hand “construction can be used [...] to weave a fabric of a former life back together. Doing so creates

new touchstones for collective memory” [Bevan 2006: 176]. On the other hand “Rebuilding, whether carried out by perpetrators or their victims can also serve to mask the past; to erase the gaps, the voids, to ruinations that bear witness in history” [ibid.: 176]. However the redevelopment of the site and especially the installation of a place for remembrance is part of the long-term resilience of a city [Vale, Campanella 2005: 337ff]. They are the tangible result of the “psychological recovery” [“human resilience”, ibid: 334] of the citizens and usually linked to the national understanding of *restige*, the national self-awareness the national self-image. The reconstructed site and the place of remembrance therefore have a “wider ideologic significance” [ibid: 342] and can reach beyond the actual limits of the incidents, e.g. the terrorist attack.

Memorials are not only important for the victims of e.g. a terrorist attack *per se*, but for everybody who is conscious about the tragedy and wants to be reminded “of not just of who the heroes are, but why we consider them heroes”, that is to say to be reminded of the “ideals that are always on the periphery of our awareness, but shape our values”. Therefore “Dark Tourism”, the touristic use of tragedy sites, is reasonable and should be considered in the redesign of the sites as well. [Hetter 2012]

Under these special circumstances it is obvious that memorial values have to be considered in the redesign process in particular. It is also obvious, that this process is not comparable to other “usual” sites, even other usual heritage sites. The conservation process of tragedy sites craves for quicker responses and more stakeholders due to more intractable conflicts and a wider range of memorial responses [Mason 2012]. In this context the danger of creating a “false” memory should be mentioned. Not only the design of the memory is important, but also its perception and interpretation. Bevan [2006: 199] refers here to the Ground Zero planning, which design concepts fits perfectly into the built environment but its memorial values are questionable, for they are not addressing the victims of the 9/11 incident but proclaim the values of the United States of America, without reflecting the background for the attack. The same “absence of context” can be stated for the Oklahoma City-memorial [Doss 2010: 147]. “When history is not understood it is more likely to be repeated” [Bevan 2006: 199].

## 2.6 Contextualisation

Terrorism is a targeted way to attack a population but also to destroy and annihilate a part of the civilization by attacking the built environment, especially iconic and symbolic buildings with its values of collective memory and cultural heritage, which is at the latest created by the iconic act of destruction. In a case

of conflict and terrorism - moreover their prevention - antiterrorism is the strategic concept for a civilization and its built environment to maintain its functions. Instruments can be integrated plans and programs but also technical, personal or physical security measures. With those measures the probability and the dimension of terrorist attacks can be reduced, however they cannot be precluded. In case of an attack, a city has to prove its resilience and face the challenge of healing its wounds, especially the physical ones on site of the terrorist attack.

Considering this background the paper will review the hypotheses on the basis of the case of Oslo in Norway, a country which has never experienced terrorism in such dimension before. The paper analyses in how far the attack impacts the urban planning policy, especially the consideration of security and protection and conservation of symbolic buildings. Also the reactions on a urban planning level to the terrorist attack in order to support the creation of a resilient city are investigated, both on a citywide scale and on-site. The site had already a symbolic significance before the attack which is now overlaid with the prominence as a tragedy site. The paper will give answers about the redesign process and the integration of the factors security, memorialisation and conservation into the new redevelopment. The two similar cases Oklahoma City and Manchester have faced these questions more then 15 years ago and the answers can contribute to the hypotheses as well.







Figure 5: Y-Blokka and Høyblokka. Source: Own Photo, 17.12.2011

## 3 Methodology

### 3.1 Paper Objective and Research Design

The objective of this paper is to understand how urban planning can respond to threats and impacts of terrorism, both in its general course and at the explicit impacted site. The hypotheses, as mentioned above, are:

- ! Sites of terrorist attacks are passing through a different renewal planning process other than “usual sites” due to their sensible destiny.
- ! Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites, the aspects security, and memorial and conservation values are undergoing a long-term change in general consideration.
- ! The urban planning policy changes after terrorist attacks in dependency of the national socio-political respond on the attacks.

In order to answer the hypotheses and the implied research questions and to

achieve the objective of this paper the objects of investigation have to be operationalised, that means the objects of the paper have to be defined in an empiric measurable way [Atteslander: 46]. This step is followed by the data collection, which is realised by qualitative interviews and a literature research. This method is chosen due to the fact that research on the terrorist attack in Oslo is sparse and this explorative, inductive approach can help to develop an understanding for the object. Especially case studies are used in order to collect qualitative aspects, evaluations and relations with regard to a subject [Atteslander: 61]. "A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident." [Yin: 18]. The analysis of the case of Oslo and the terrorist attack on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July in 2011 should give distinct answers to the research questions. Additionally two other cases are investigated as well in order to increase the validity of the hypotheses.

The detailed research design consists of three main steps, using a combination of different qualitative research methods:

- 1) The case study of Oslo
- 2) The cases Oklahoma City and Manchester
- 3) Analysis, Comparison & Conclusions

### **3.2 The Case Study of Oslo**

The attack in Oslo is one of the most recent terrorist attacks in the Western civilisation. More than one year has passed since the attack, which allows a first analysis and evaluation of this case on the basis of the research questions. In order to answer them, they have to be parameterised and transferred to the special case of Oslo first. The approximation to the objective of the paper can be realised by analysing urban planning in Oslo. It is needed to look at two levels of discussion, the general urban planning course and the redevelopment process on the impacted site. On order to identify possible changes and impacts the the urban planning policy before the terrorist attack has to be characterised and compared with the policy nowadays after the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 2011. The detailed questions for the case studies are:

... with regard to the general urban planning:

- What are the general characteristics of urban planning in Oslo, before and after 22/07? Have there been changes in the legal framework?



- What does the socio-political background look like and how has it been impacted by the terrorist attack?
- Which kind of projects were done and which overall concepts were guiding? Have the projects changed after the terrorist attack due to a change in the overall concept? Are there new projects due to the attack?
- Which role played the factors security, memorialisation and cultural heritage/conservation in urban planning, that is to say in the projects, development plans and general mentality? Is there a change detectable after the terrorist attack?
- How can the role of participation be characterised? On which level are urban development projects and plans discussed in general?
- In what way is urban planning in Oslo inspired by international trends and influences?

...and with regard to the impacted site:

- Which factors are discussed in the process of the future of the site and which role play the factors security, memorialisation and conservation?
- Who is part of the process, how is the process structured?
- Which solutions on the sensitive site are suggested and discussed – “tabula rasa” or reconstruction?
- Where other cities with similar history consulted?

The data collection is realised by using primary and secondary data. The primary data collection is based on non-standardised, partly structured expert Interviews in order to collect qualitative aspects on that topic [Atteslander: 133]. Responsible urban planning authorities in Oslo, representatives of the projects, experts for cultural heritage and responsible governmental authorities have been interviewed face-to-face, by telephone or written. In addition to the interviews the presentations and the discussion results from the seminar “Regjeringsskvartalets fremtid: arkitektur & verdier” which took place at the AHO on the 12<sup>th</sup> of March in 2012 were used [OCCAS 2012]. The secondary data source consists of relevant written documents. The used data is based on articles in newspapers and professional journals, project documents, official, formal and informal concepts and strategy papers on urban planning and the socio-political approaches and legal documents if necessary.

<b>Expert / Authority</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>	<b>Interview form</b>
Berit Skarholt Oslo Plan- og Bygningsetaten (Oslo Planning Authority)	27.03.2012	Face to Face interview at the Plan- og Bygningsetaten, Oslo
Knut Grønntun Miljøvernedepartementet (MD) (Ministry of Environment)	09.08.2012	Written interview, Email-respond
Knut Felberg Statsbygg (Directorate of Public Construction and Property)	12.08.2012	Written interview, Email-respond
Pål Henry Engh LPO Arkitekter	11.09.2012	Telephone interview
Elisabeth Seip AHO (Institute of Architecture and Design Oslo)	12.09.2012	Telephone interview
Guro Voss Gabrielsen Norsk Form (Foundation for Design and Architecture)	19.09.2012/ 30.10.2012	Written interview, Email respond / Face to face, Berlin
Petter Mohaug NIKU	12.11.2012	Face to face
Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet (FAD) (Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs)	-	No respond

**Table 1: List of Experts. Source: own data.**

### 3.3 Oklahoma City and Manchester

As mentioned above two other cases are analysed as well in order to draw conclusions regarding the verification of the hypotheses.

For this paper the cases of Oklahoma City and Manchester have been chosen. As already illustrated above there is no comprehensive “classification” of terrorist attacks. The following table shows a list of recognizable terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere of the last decades.

Incident	Country	Date	Target	Motive	Attack Type	Victims (dead/injured)
Oklahoma City Bombing	USA	19.04.1995	Building (Federal Government)	Right-wing	Car bomb	168/>680
Budyon-novsk hospital hostage crisis	Russia	14.-19.06.1995	Building	Separatist	Hostage taking	140/415
Manchester	England	15.06.1996	Building	Separatist (Provisional IRA)	Car bomb	0/212
New York "9/11"	USA	11.09.2001	Buildings	Religious-inspired	Airplane hijack	2996/>6000
Moskow Theatre Siege	Russia	23.-26.10.2002	Building	Separatist	Hostage taking	170/>700
Madrid Train Bombings	Spain	11.03.2004	Infrastructure	Religious-inspired	Back-pack bombs	191/2050
London Bombings "7/7"	England	07.07.2005	Infrastructure, General Public	Religious-inspired	Back-pack bombs	56/700
Moskow	Russia	29.03.2010	Infrastructure	Separatist	Back-pack bombs	40/102
Oslo*	Norway	22.07.2012	Building (Government)	Right-wing	Car bomb	8/209

\*consideration of the bombing only in the Regjeringskvartalet

**Table 2: Recognisable Terrorist Attacks in the Western Hemisphere. Source: Wikipedia (2012): List of terrorist incidents. Available at: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_terrorist\\_incidents](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_terrorist_incidents) [Accessed 11.08.2012]**

Examples which are religious-inspired, like 9/11, Madrid or London, have not been chosen consciously in order to avoid the discussion about different cultural areas and the sensitive topic of religious conflicts, which would overcharge the possibilities of this paper.

Among the remaining cases Oklahoma City and Manchester are most comparable to the case of Oslo due to the target of the attack (public buildings) and the attack type (car bombings). Especially the case of Oklahoma City shows a high similarity to the case of Oslo.

However certain questions should be answered due to the hypotheses:

- How have Oklahoma City and Manchester dealt with the challenge, especially on the impacted site?
- Which factors were important for reuse of the site (cultural heritage vs. security)?
- Has there been a change in their urban planning policy? Are there detectable effects on urban planning policy?
- Did they consult other cities?
- Which conclusions can be drawn in general?

In order to answer those questions secondary data is used. Relevant written documents, dealing with the impacts of the terrorist attack and the redesign of the impacted site is to be consulted.

### 3.4 Analysis, Comparison & Conclusion

As mentioned above the third step in the research design is the analysis of all cases, the comparison and the conclusion. The questions here are: What have the cases in common, what is different and why is that? Are there similar or comparable patterns in the decision making and the dealing with terrorist impacted sites? Is there a general respond to terrorism in urban planning? Conclusions should be drawn with regard on the research questions. The criteria on which the comparison is based can be seen in table 3.

<b>Criteria related to the attacked site and redevelopment process</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Redevelopment goals</li> <li>• Consideration of the factors security, memorialisation and conservation values</li> <li>• Role of participation</li> <li>• Level of discussion (local, national etc.)</li> <li>• Used instrument for the redevelopment process</li> <li>• Duration</li> <li>• Consultation of other cities with similar experiences</li> </ul>
<b>Criteria related to possible reactions of urban planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning related legislation</li> <li>• influences of security requirements on urban planning, e.g. guidelines, manuals, handbooks etc.</li> </ul>

**Table 3: Criteria for the comparison of the three case studies. Source: own data.**

### **3.5 Objectivity, Validity & Reliability**

Objectivity, validity and reliability are harder to achieve in case studies and qualitative methods compared to cross case or quantitative studies. Due to the small number of statistic cases, the results are difficult to transmit and compare and the object of research is strongly focussed [vgl. Atteslander: 61; Diekmann: 142]. In this paper the objectivity is limited because the interviewer, that means the author of the paper, is emotionally involved in the topic. Yet it is a question of defining the term. For this case study the quality criteria of inter-subjectivity is more pertinent. Also the results are restricted in their reliability due to the fact, that the measuring instrument – the interview – reflects personal opinions, which are neither right nor wrong but give a subjective evaluation of the topic. Moreover the validity is not guaranteed as the results are dependent on the experts, who were interviewed. It is questionable, if they are qualified as experts and if they were able and willing to answer the questions appropriate. [Diekmann: 543; Atteslander: 61]

### **3.6 Limitations**

There are also certain limitations connected to this analysis. Since the case of Oslo is just something over one year ago not enough time has passed in order to give final answers. So the information and results which are presented are just a preliminary result, which will only be able to show a certain tendency. The results for the cases of Oklahoma City and Manchester however are more definite but the possibility of incompleteness is given due to the research method. A more extended qualitative research on those two cases would have overburdened the paper.







Figure 6: Security-Fence around Høyblokka. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012

## 4 The Case Study of Oslo

This chapter consists of the case study of Oslo, focusing on the impacts of the terrorist attack both on the site of the attack and on the urban planning policy.

### 4.1 General Information

Oslo is the capital of Norway, a country with 4.9 million inhabitants in the north of Europe. Norway is a unitary state, ruled by a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system. Heads of the nation are King Harald V and the Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg. Leading party is the social-democratic “Norske Arbeiderparti (Ap)”, the Norwegian Labour Party. Due to the local self-government the most important governmental units are the counties and the municipalities, which is enshrined in the legislative. [Königliche Norwegische Botschaft 2009]

With its 600.000 inhabitants Oslo is the biggest town in Norway, situated in the south of the country, surrounded by the Oslo-Fjord and the “Oslo-Marka”, the recreational area [Utenriksdepartementet 2012: 11]. Besides the form of govern-

ment the Norwegian Constitutions also promotes core values, which are based on the Christian and Humanist inheritance. Moreover the constitution should guarantee democracy, constitutional legality and human rights. These values include freedom, freedom of speech, tolerance, solidarity, security and openness. [Justis- og Beredskapsdepartementet 1814: §2; Harald V 2011; Stoltenberg 2011]

Since the Second World War Norway has hardly been exposed to terrorism. Though there has been a few number of violent actions, mostly motivated by right-wing extremist, but seldom with serious impacts on both the population and policy. Due to the involvement of Norway in the war in Afghanistan and in context with the happenings in New York, London and Madrid a certain threat by especially religious-inspired terrorism was stated by the police. The general threat level however was stated as low [Bech Gjørsv 2012: 46]. Norway therefore does not have explicit experiences with terrorism or violent attacks in a bigger dimension. Neither the population nor the government felt a certain threat [Johansen/Sæther 2011].

## **4.2 Urban Planning in Oslo**

Urban Planning in Norway is, according to § 3-3 of the Planning and Building Act (Plan- og byggningsloven PBL [Miljøverndepartementet 2008]), executed by the municipalities. The supreme planning authority in Norway is the Ministry of Environment (Miljøverndepartementet MD) [Grønntun 2012]. The agency in charge for urban planning in Oslo is the Agency for Planning and Building Services (Bygg- og Planetaten PBE). The three main departments of the agency are dealing with Urban Development, Area Development and Building Construction Projects. The Department for Urban Development is working on a municipal master plan (Kommuneplan, [MD 2008: Kapittel 11 PBL]) for Oslo, which will be completed in 2013. The municipal master plan will include thematic plans (Kommunedelplaner), e.g. for cultural heritage or green spaces as well. The Department for Building Construction Projects is basically in charge for building permissions. The Department for Area Development is working on zoning plans (Reguleringsplan, [MD 2008: Kapittel 12 PBL]) for bigger areas of the city. The work also includes the planning and development of public buildings, like social infrastructure or cultural buildings. Furthermore the department takes account for a development which is planned in context with the urban planning guidelines and overall concepts. It usually provides different alternatives for a planned project. Due to the regulations of the Planning and Building Act the process for the development of plans is long and formal. [Skarholt 2012, City of Oslo 2006]



The site related urban development is mostly initiated by private investors and developers by so called project plans (Tiltak [MD 2008: §1-6 PBL]) – “in-fill development plans tailor-made for small building projects in urban areas”. They can be approved without the steps of the planning process if they are in line with a zoning plan or the municipal master plan [Falleth/Hansen 2011: 2; MD 2008: §1-6 PBL]. The role of the planner in the planning process is reduced to moderation between the private developers and the politicians. They guide through the formal planning steps until the final approval is reached. [Skarholt 2012; Falleth/Hansen 2011: 2] Urban planning in Norway is highly characterised by the neo-liberal influences and their shift from government to governance, which can be clearly seen in the role allocation between planners and private investors [Falleth/Hansen 2011: 2ff].

Planning in Norway should, according to the Planning and Building Act [MD 2008: §1-1 PBL] promote a sustainable development for the benefits of individu-



**Figures 7, 8: Oslo Opera House and Barcode-Development in Bjørvika. Source: Own Photos, 15.11.2011**

als, the society and future generations. In addition the overall concept for urban planning in Oslo refers to the location of the capital. Situated between the Oslo Fjord and the Marka the urban development is in line with the slogan “Oslo, the city between the blue and the green” [Skarholt 2012]. This concept has to be balanced with the challenges of Oslo nowadays. The capital has been growing in the last decades and will continue to grow by around 100.000 people within the next ten to 20 years. This growth is restricted by the city limits, which puts a high pressure on the municipal area. Suburbanization or incorporation is not wanted and is not in line with the overall concept due to the conservation of the surrounding landscape. Therefore development strategies are focusing on a better connection to the satellite towns (e.g. Groruddalen) and the densification/agglomeration of the city (e.g. via wasteland transformation). Especially the last strategy requires the integration of traffic solutions and the maintenance of urban quality into the compact development. [Seip 2012; Skarholt 2012]

The big projects consequently show these strategies, namely the “Fjordbyen”-

project and “Groruddalen”, which are realised in Oslo in responsibility of the Department for Area Development in the last years. “Groruddalen” is a project of wasteland transformation, in order to create new space for traffic, dwellings and the appendant infrastructure without destroying the landscape. Groruddalen is a suburban area where four districts of Oslo are located. The development of Groruddalen focuses on more functional traffic solutions which will improve and connect the whole area [Oslo Kommune 2012]. The “Fjordbyen”-project includes the conversion of the abandoned industrial harbor area into a waterfront development with dwellings, leisure, commercial and cultural buildings. It consists of subprojects, like Aker Brygge or Filipstad. The project “opens the town to the Fjord” and implies the agglomeration and densification within the city. “Bjørвика” with the new Opera House is the latest subproject which transforms the area close to the main station in the east of the town. [Seip 2012, Skarholt 2012]

Especially the Fjordbyen-Project and its waterfront development reflects the international influences, not only because international architects designed the buildings but also because the focus on open public spaces and squares as a new influence on the Norwegian building tradition [Seip 2012]. This international influence is also visible in older developments of the town. Oslo is a small city in the European context, but as Norway’s capital it is a representative city and influenced by other (European) architectural styles. Not all of the planned projects have been realised which resulted in a mixture of different styles and epochs. This can be seen all over the town, also in the Regjeringskvartalet, where the German Jugendstil (G-blokka) and LeCorbusiers Functionalism (Høyblokka) meet. This mixture is part of Oslo’s identity. [Engh 2012]

The Planning and Building Act [MD 2008: § 1-1 PBL] requires that “Planlegging og vedtak skal sikre åpenhet, forutsigbarhet og medvirkning for alle berørte interesser og myndigheter” [Planning and decision making shall ensure transparency, predictability and participation of all interested parties and authorities.]. This is explained more detailed in chapter five of the Act as the general regulation allows for the participation in every kind of plan, whether it is executed by the municipality, authorities or private investors. The municipality has to ensure the participation; especially for groups who cannot participate directly, like children and teenagers. The participation includes both the consultation of all affected local, regional and national authorities and public or private organisations, and the public review process. This is also mentioned in the regulations of the different types of plans [MD 2008: § 5-1, §5-2]. In reality the fact that the formal participation process usually starts after the most important decisions are already made between planners and investors reflects the huge influence of private investors on urban development. Plans do usually have a certain prog-

ress before the formal planning steps of the Planning and Building Act applies. The interaction between planners and investors is very intense from begin on, aiming to gain formal approval of the plan. In contrast the public is contacting their local politicians for participation in and opposition against certain plans. Because when they are formally allowed to participate, too many decisions have already been made. It is then the task of the planners to negotiate between the politicians (that is to say the public) and the private developers. Participation – in particular of the population – therefore tends to have a negative image. On the other hand, an early involvement of the population could probably avoid conflicts like the design for the new Munch Museum (Lambda Building) which was refused by the public, after the design competition took place. Berit Skarholt [2012] points out that transparency and information of plans are important before decisions are made, since “the interest of the population in urban development grew within the last years”, even it can be difficult to make them understand the whole context of a decision. [Skarholt 2012; Falleth/Hansen 2011: 15f]

As mentioned above, the planning authorities should grant that urban planning is realised with regard to several aspects which are explicit mentioned in the Planning and Building Act or are a consequence of other subordinate plans and programs. This is supported by the regulations for participation and consultation of all affected authorities and organisations. With regard to the objective of the paper the consideration of cultural heritage and conservation values and security aspects in urban development projects will be further analysed.

The Planning and Building Act promotes the conservation of “verdifulle [...] kulturmiljøer” [valuable cultural environment] [MD 2008: § 3-1 PBL], which includes cultural heritage sites and listed buildings in the urban development. Conservation values are in fact a factor of consideration, but of course next to other aspects like green structures and economy [Skarholt 2012]. Buildings, which are not listed but collected in an informal yellow list (“gul liste”), are taken into consideration as well, but reality shows, that there is no priority of cultural heritage, especially next to economic aspects [Seip 2012, Molaug 2012]. Evidences for this statement are given by the new design plans for the Deichmann- library, the Munch Museum and the Bislett Bath or the alteration in use of the Eldorado-Cinema or the old Opera House [Askedal 2012, Molaug 2012]. The tendency of dislocating former cultural sites in Oslo (Munch Museum, Opera House, Deichmann Library) and replacing them by modern constructions due to political reasons. This is usually connected with urban development strategies and the upgrading of decayed areas [Molaug 2012].

Security aspects have not been a prior consideration in urban planning until the events of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 2011 [Skarholt 2012, Seip 2012]. Their consideration is

though enshrined in the Planning and Building Act [MD 2008: § 3-1f; 3-1h PBL] with regard to crime prevention and the promotion of safety for health, environment, infrastructure and material values. A more pertinent regulation is given by § 4-3 PBL [MD 2008], which deals with the “Samfunnssikkerhet og risiko- og sårbarhetsanalyse” [Societal safety and risk and vulnerability assessment]. This regulation promotes, that every development plan should include an assessment, which analyses the possibilities of any “fare, risiko eller sårbarhet” [danger, risk or vulnerability] [ibid.] of the planned development to the environment and the society. If a certain issue is detected the area and its special considerations should be marked in the plans, including the subsequent prohibitions and restrictions. According to the Planning and Building Act and with focus on security those areas should be indicated as “Sikrings-, støy- og faresoner med angivelse av fareårsak eller miljørisiko” [Safety, noise and danger zones, with an indication of the cause of danger or environmental risk] [MD 2008: § 11-8a PBL] in a municipal master plan. Those zones should then be itemised in a zoning plan, visualising the special requirements or restrictions connected to that area, based on the Planning and Building Act or other pertinent regulations [ibid.: § 12-6 PBL]. As a consequence, areas with a potential exposition to terrorism due to their functions or values could be identified in development plans and connected to special restrictions. This could contribute to improve security on a public level, for instance by the restriction on access to streets, used building materials, distances and so on. The identification ought to be realised by the legally fixed consultation of experts, like the National Security Agency (Nasjonal Sikkerhetsmyndighet NSM) or the Police, especially the Norwegian Police Security Service (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste PST). The PST publishes an annual threat assessment (trusselvurdering), which gives advices both on the strategic level and in terms of risks of attacks on specific government officials, objects and events [Bech Gjørvi et al. 2012: 72]. Those experts could give advices in order to decrease the vulnerability of the planned area, which should be considered in the design of the development plans.

Security measures on a building level are regulated in the Security Act (sikkerhetsloven [Forsvarsdepartementet FD 1998]), in particular in chapter Five. This Act promotes the declaration of “skjermingsverdige objekter”, buildings which should be safeguarded against security imperiling threats due to their sensitive functions or values [ibid.: § 3-12 Sikkerhetsloven]. The owners of the buildings are in charge of proposing for this security status by illustrating the reasons for and level of protection. The National Security Agency is in charge of approval and supervision of those buildings [ibid.: §17; Bech Gjørvi 2012: 419, Grønhaug/Buset, 2012]. Moreover the Act empowers the owner of the building to take care of its safeguarding against security imperiling threats. Security



measures, which should be used, are “en kombinasjon av barrierer, deteksjon, verifikasjon og reaksjon” [a combination of barriers, detectors, verification and respond][FD 1998: §17b Sikkerhetsloven]. The application of the law with regard to existing sites includes an identification and classification of those building until 01.01.2013 and the following safeguarding in line with §17b until 01.01.2014 [Grønhaug/Buset, 2012]. Both the Planning and Building Act and the Security Act shape formal conditions in order to create a certain security level connected to buildings and public areas. Consequently a certain amount of security measures, especially in governmental and public buildings, can be found in Oslo [Skarholt 2012].

### 4.3 Regjeringskvartalet – The Site

The Regjeringskvartalet is situated in the heart of Oslo, in walking distance to the central station and the parliament [Fig. 9].



Figure 9: Location of the Regjeringskvartal in Oslo. Source: Own Figure, Own Picture, 26.03.2012.

Its history began in 1883, when the area, consisting of wooden houses in traditional Norwegian building design called “Empirekvartalet” became the governmental quarter of Oslo. In order to give the new governmental quarter an appropriate and modern urban design a design competition was held. [Jensen 2012] The oldest governmental building, the building on Akersgata, also called

“G-blokka” or “Gamle Regjeringsbygg”, was the first building erected in 1904 in Jugendstil-design by Henrik Bull. It was part of a larger ensemble, which has never been finished [Seip 2012a, Engh 2012]. In 1939 another design competition for the governmental area took place, which this time was won by Erling Viksjø. With the construction of the high rise, the “Høyblokka”, in 1956 the new Regjeringskvartalet was founded. The development was followed by the construction of the “Y-Blokka (1969), the “S-Blokka” (1978), the “R4” (Governmental building number Four, 1988), the R5 (1996) and finally the R6, which was finished in June 2012 [Jensen 2012]. While the early buildings are connected to the architectural epoch of functionalism the buildings R4, R5 and R6 are constructed in a post-modern, ordinary office block design [Engh 2012]. However the Regjeringskvartalet gave the town a very new look and great parts of the Empirekvartalet were demolished to make way for “the new symbol of the growing welfare state” [Morten 2011]. The Regjeringskvartalet concentrates all governmental functions and ministries except the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet) and the Ministry of Defense (Forsvarsdepartementet), which are located close to the Akershus Festning [FAD 2012a]. The area inherits important administrative capital functions.




Figure 10: Map of the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: Own Figure, based on Google Maps.



Up to the 22nd of July a national conservation plan (statlige verneplan) was in process assessing the conservation of parts of the Regjeringskvartalet due to their cultural, architectural and historical values. The buildings which were planned to be covered – though to different extends - by the Riksantikvarens [Norwegian Directorate for Cultural Heritage] advice are the Høyblokka, the Y-, G- and S-blokka, the building on Grubbegata 1, the R5, the building on Møllergata 19 (M 19) and the old alley of trees - “Regjeringsparken” [Fig. 10]. [Riksantikvaren 2011]

The heart of the area is the Høyblokka, the high rise. The Riksantikvaren [2011] underlines the importance and value of the building due to its architecture and its significance for Norway. It is attested to be a good example for Norwegian engineering and constructions. Both the used material – breccia - and the applied construction process were unique and innovative. The design was influenced by LeCorbusier and it was the first high rise in Oslo. The sandblast art on the walls inside the building were designed by Pablo Picasso and Carl Nesjar and were a new way to present art in public space. The whole building is the example for the post-war architecture and a symbol for modernism in Norway. In terms of conservation values it stands in line with the castle (Det Kongelige Slott) and the Parliament (Stortinget). [Riksantikvaren 2011, Hagberg 2012, Jensen 2012, Holme 2011]

In charge for security matters in the Regjeringskvartalet is, according to the regulations [FD 1998: §17b Sikkerhetsloven], the owner of the buildings; the Ministry of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs (Fornyings-, administrasjons- og kirkedepartementet FAD). This includes the prevention of damages of the buildings, camera surveillance, entrance control and restrictions to streets. The execution is mainly realised by the subdivisions Statsbygg (the Norwegian Directorate of Public Construction and Property) and the Defense Security Service (DSS). Statsbygg is in charge for security measures connected to building structure and DSS supplies guards and security services to the ministries [Bech Gjørø 2012: 417]. Already before the incident of 22/7 there have been discussions security aspects in the area of the Regjeringskvartalet. The area is considered as the most symbolic and central administration unit in Norway [ibid: 57, 425]. The annual threat assessment (trusselvurdering) of 2004 by the PST said, that a threat for the Regjeringskvartalet by islamist or right wing terrorists could be reasonable though the general threat level in Norway is quite low, but. This statement was confirmed in 2009 due to the terrorist attacks which happened in Europe after 2004. [ibid: 57]

The results of the report, especially the vulnerability analysis, showed, that the area was poorly protected against terrorist attacks, especially car bombings.

The police suggested to restrict the public access to the Grubbegata permanently and for the Akersgata temporarily with movable bollards. Moreover they suggested improved object surveillance, break-proof windows and transit restrictions for the entrance area of the Høyblokka. Similar results were made by the National Security Agency. They also identified the Regjeringskvartalet as a sensitive, shield-worthy object (skjermingsverdig objekt), which should be protected against bombings by distance regulations, stronger building structure and break-proof windows. However the Agency was neither involved in the work on security improvement in the Regjeringskvartalet nor did it carry out a list of shield-worthy objects at all. Consequently the supervision of the FAD and the security works could not be realised, which might be the reason why the works have taken so long. [Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012: 423ff, 441f.]

The blocking of Grubbegata was planned from 2004 on, initiated by Staatsbygg and based on the legal framework of a zoning plan (reguleringsplan). The plan was approved by the PBE in October 2010, its realisation was planned for September/October 2011. [Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012: 433f.; Døvik 2011] To the time of the 22/7 incident, the street was not restricted at all, not even by temporary measures [Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012: 437]. However it is questionable if a blocked street would have prevented the terrorist attack [ibid.: 439].



Figure 11, 12: Bollards and Surveillance in the Regjeringskvartalet. Own Photos, 25.02.2012, 12.11.2012.

In June 2011 the government carried out a risk- and vulnerability analysis (risiko- og sårbarhetsanalyse) for the Regjeringskvartalet. The results showed that the governmental quarter does not fulfill the latest security standards and does also lack a modern infrastructure system, just to mention the staircases, emergency exists, ventilation or energy standards. Especially the Y-blokka caused concerns due to its architecture and the pathways which are crossing beneath the building [FAD, 2012a]. The security system with its 200-300 CCTVs [Closed Circuit Television] of the area was installed in 1990. This was part of the construction works on the Høyblokka, where the building was extended by two additional floors on the top. These were used by the head of the state, the Prime Minister.

The first floor of the Høyblokka is made of glass and until 22/7 everybody could pass this floor. In 1989 bollards were installed in front of the entrance after a confused man drove his car straight into the entrance hall. [Jensen 2012]

However the transit by passengers was still possible until 22/7, despite the police`s suggestions [Bech Gjørsv 2012: 423ff.]. Though the police has detected several lacks in the security system and therefore a certain vulnerability of the Regjeringskvartalet, measures in order to reduce the vulnerability have not been handled with a high priority and their application took a lot of time – too much time in terms of the event of 22/7. Reasons are the lack of strategic communication between the FAD and the responsible security authorities [Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012: 441f.] and the general “manglende erkjennelse av risikoen” [lack of awareness of the risk] [ibid.: 443f.; Johansen/Sæther 2011]. Due to Rig-mor Aasrud, Council of the FAD, the perceived sense of threat or danger did not exist among the employees of the Regjeringskvartalet, no one believed that an act of terrorism could ever happen in Norway. [Johansen/Sæther 2011]

#### 4.4 The 22<sup>nd</sup> of July and Its Consequences

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July, at 15:25 a car exploded in the centre of the Regjeringskvartalet at the back door of the Høyblokka. The car was equipped with a 950 kg explosive device, dropped by the 32 year old Anders Behring Breivik. The bomb caused the death of eight people and wounded more than 30. The area is the workplace for more than 2600 people, but fortunately only 190 were at work on that Friday afternoon. [Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011]



Figures 13, 14: Damages on the R4 (left) and the Høyblokka (above). Source: Statsbygg 2011, Available at <http://www.statsbygg.no/Aktuelt/Tema/Bilder-fra-Regjeringskvartalet/> [Accessed 10.12.2012]

The pictures of the demolished area were broadcasted and printed all over the world – pictures of broken windows, collapsed walls and ceiling plates, pieces of glass and concrete wide spread across the area (cf. [NTB 2011B]). The Høyblokka, the Y- and S-blokka and the R4- building were hit hardest; all in all there has been a loss of 1500 working places and an area of 5.000m<sup>2</sup> has been destroyed by the blast [Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011].

Breivik acted as a “lone wolf“, without being connected to a terrorist organisation. He has been planning the attacks, both on the Regjeringskvartalet and the massacre on Utøya, for nine years. The motives for the attack are political. Breivik is a right-wing extremist; he intended to attack the political leadership of Norway, expressing his hate towards the social democrats (Arbeiderpartiet) and the ongoing “Islamization” of Norway. The attack on the Regjeringskvartalet as the symbolic and actual head of the state was targeted. [NTB 2011a]

Immediately after the incidents in Oslo and Utøya both King Harald V and the Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg expressed their sympathy for the victims, thoughts and conclusions connected to the terrorist attack. King Harald was first and spoke to the Norwegian nation and the world already the day after the attack. He [Harald V 2011] interprets the happenings as an attack on the Norwegian society and democracy. Norway has been exposed to the challenge of showing strength and solidarity towards the Norwegian society and its values.

*“Jeg holder fast ved troen på at friheten er sterkere enn frykten.*

*Jeg holder fast ved troen på et åpent norsk demokrati og samfunnsliv.*

*Jeg holder fast ved troen på våre muligheter til å leve fritt og trygt i vårt eget land.”*

[I cling to the belief that freedom is stronger than fear. I cling to the belief in an open Norwegian democracy and society. I cling to the belief in our ability to live freely and safely in our own country.] [ibid.]. Jens Stoltenberg held his speech in front of the city hall in the evening of the 25<sup>th</sup> of July to front of a crowd of 200.000 people. In his speech [Stoltenberg 2011] he states that the people, the Norwegian society, choose with their reactions how to continue after such a horrible incident. They chose a way of openness. “Erobrer gatene, torgene – det offentlige rom med samme trassige budskap: Vi er sønderknust, men vi gir oss ikke.” [We conquer the streets and squares - the public space with the same defiant message: We are broken, but we will not give up.] He wants to continue the course with the same, strong weapons Norway used before – free speech and democracy. Even more he proclaims “mer åpenhet, mer demokrati” [more openness, more democracy][ibid.]. Both King Harald and Jens Stoltenberg, as the representative and political leaders of Norway, have framed how Norway should react



on the terrorist attack, an attack which motives were political. The reactions of the population were strong and diversified, social platforms like Facebook and twitter drowned in feedback of their users. The trademark “Oslove”, a souvenir company founded in the 80ies [Hytten 2012], gained new attention and a new meaning. The money which is earned through the sale of shirts and wristbands with the logo of Oslove is supporting the Norwegian Red Cross [Oslove]. The logo of Oslove, which is now a synonym for “kjærlighet til hovedstaden vår, samhold, likeverd og respect” [the love to Oslo, solidarity, equality and respect] [Hytten 2012], can be found on walls all over the town as well. These drawings, which appeared after the 22nd of July, serve as visual memories, expressing the sympathy for the victims and the support for Oslo, Norway and its policy [Fig. 15, 16].




Figure 15, 16: Streetart in Oslo in respond to the terrorist attack. Source: Own Photos, 15.03.2012

After the first shock was settled in August, the clean-up of the area began under the responsibility of Statsbygg [Seip 2012b]. The Regjeringskvartalet was surrounded by a high, wooden fence and closed for the public [Fig. 10, 17] [Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 2011]. This impacted the behavior of the population of Oslo in this very area. Due to its location in the middle of the city the Regjeringskvartalet was frequently used as a transit area. One of the main bus lines in Oslo (line 37), which was passing Akersgata and stopped right in front of the Høyblokka, had to be detoured in a large scale. The ministries and other governmental functions which were located in the quarter were moved to other buildings in interim solution. All in all twelve new addresses had to be found and checked on security issues by the police [FAD 2012a]. This has consequences for the workflow and daily routine of the employees, impact-



Figure 17: Security fence around the Regjeringskvartalet. Holes made by Vulkan-Architects. Source: Photo by Falk Hanisch, 17.02.2012

## TIMELINE of the REGJERINGSKVARTALET



**Figure 18 : Timeline of the happenings in the Regjeringskvartalet after the terrorist attack. Source: Own Figure.**

ing the efficiency of governmental tasks. The terrorist attack caused not only the life and health of people and severe damages on the building structure. In the aftermaths it also cut the mobility of the inhabitants of Oslo and their city, expressed by large detours and more required time to move through the city. The area of the Regjeringskvartalet, which used to be a transit area [Seip 2012b; Engh 2012] was now hidden by a fence, not giving insight into the ongoing clean ups, just like an abandoned fortress which does not belong to the city any longer. Moreover can the terrorist attack be understood in a way that it was an attack on the building structure and therefore an – though unintended – attack on the heterogeneity, diversity and density which is expressed by the built environment and which is characteristic for the perceived urbanity and quality of a

town. The future development of the Regjeringskvartalet will show, if the historically grown heterogeneity will disappear or if it will be preserved.

The work on the conservation plan was paused due to the damages on the building structure [Riksantikvaren 2011].

## 4.5 The Future of the Regjeringskvartalet

After the ministries were moved to interim offices and the clean up in the Regjeringskvartalet was started, the discussion about the future of the area began. In charge of this development is the FAD [Seip 2012] under the guidance of Rigmor Aasrud. In order to generate an idea how a future development of the Regjeringskvartalet can look like after those traumatic happenings, FAD



requested expert opinions from the Riksantikvaren, the Police and Statsbygg already in October 2011 [Statsbygg 2012: 4]. Statsbygg [ibid.: 4] was requested to analyse aspects like security, psychological affects connected to the terrorist attack, working methods and the need for coordination between the ministries and last but not least the assessment of architecture, art and conservation. Special considerations should be taken into the possible concentration of the governmental functions in the area of the Regjeringskvartalet, including the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to fulfill this task, Statsbygg on its part requested the relevant documents from experts such as architects or psychologists. Also the responsible authorities in Germany and England were asked about their security standards for governmental buildings. Additionally a calculation about the costs of both demolition and reconstruction was made. The documents have been handed in in December and January 2012 and will be part of the process of decision making. [Statsbygg 2012]

Meanwhile a discussion about the future development broke out in the media, caused by an article, which was published in VG. It obviously cited Rigmor Aaserud who was supposed to plan the demolition of the Regjeringskvartalet, especially the high rise [Johansen/Sæther 2011; Seip 2012b]. According to the article she did not want to make a solution without the experts' advice, though her personal opinion speaks for the demolition due to economic and security aspects. This article was followed by a flood of statements by architects, the Riksantikvaren, researchers, security experts and others. They discussed the future of the Regjeringskvartalet – supporting either its reconstruction or its demolition. The aspects which were mainly named in this context are security and cultural heritage/memorial values, but also the functions and usage of the area, economic aspects and the process of the decision making itself. All factors are highly linked to each other; the future usage of the area determines the dimension of applied security measures, which influences the available space and impacts the urban design.

### **A. Security**

The majority states that security should be an important aspect in the future of the Regjeringskvartalet, but there are differences about the priority of that aspect. The one side argues for a high amount of security, which – accordingly to the current building structure with its tunnels and outdated infrastructure - is not possible to realise at the current location. This justifies the dislocation of the governmental functions, for example close to the castle, where a security infrastructure is already installed [Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011; Listerud 2012; Kristiansen 2012]. The other side argues for the concentration of all governmental functions

in the current area of the Regjeringskvartalet, but only with regard to improved security standards, which is a requirement by most of the employees of this area anyway (Fuglehaug/Mjaaland 2011; Kristiansen 2012]. The concentration of all those functions, which is also suggested by the police [Seehusen 2012a], allows more effective security solutions. Discussed in this context should also be the public access to the area, which has been used as a transit area for traffic and pedestrians. After the reopening of the area in August 2012 it is used as a transit area again, though motorised traffic is still excluded [Fig. 19, 20] [Larsen 2012].



Figures 19, 20 : Barriers on Akersgata to exclude the motorized traffic. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012.

The closing of Grubbegata and Akersgata has already been discussed before and can be a strategy for the new development. This will, of course, have consequences for the city and its population, as it already can be detected today (Wang-Narveen/Sandberg 2012]. Architects and experts on that field are afraid that the development of the Regjeringskvartalet will be similar to the developments of Ground Zero in New York, with the result of a fortress or over-secured castle in the middle of the town, which cannot be entered or passed between 16 and 9 o'clock [Strand/Storvik 2012]. The security approaches have to be balanced with an open and lively urban design, such as the whole city is based on. The architects of Snøhetta, a company which planned parts of Ground Zero in New York and the new Opera House in Oslo explained that "Denne grusomme handlingen bør ikke føre til at vi bygger festninger i stedet for et sivil og human samfunn." [This cruel attack should not lead to the construction of fortresses instead of a civil and human society] [Jensen 2012]. Anders Grønli [Strande 2012] points out that security does not necessarily have to mean the opposite of openness and refers to invisible security solutions, like the NOGOS, tiger traps and so on.

## B. Cultural Heritage, Conservation, Lieu de Memoire

The initial statement of Rigmor Aasrud, who wanted to see the Høyblokka torn down [Johansen/Sæther 2012; Seip 2012b], encountered high resistance from experts such as architects and conservators. The conservation plan has not been assigned yet; there is no legal force for reconstruction from the conservations perspective. Moreover the Riksantikvaren [Roede 2012] states that a demolition of one or all buildings can be discussed, if the building structure is irreparably damaged. The investigations of the experts on the area showed that the buildings are damaged to different amounts. However the buildings which were on their way to be listed- Høyblokka, Y-blokka, G-blokka, R5 - are not damaged as severe, as a demolition would be necessary [Drevon 2012]. An exception is the S-blokka. Its conservation was planned as well, though restricted on the facades and only in line with second class conservation. The terrorist attack however caused such damage that a reconstruction seem to be unviable [Riksantikvaren 2011; Seehusen 2012b]. In exception of the S-blokka the conservation values of the affected buildings have not changed [Holme 2011]. Even more, experts diagnose a certain symbolic significance which was gained after the attack. "I kraft av at det har overlevd, er det blitt et livskraftig symbol for det motsatte av terror" [By the power of the fact that it has survived, it has become a viable symbol of the opposite of terror.][Jensen 2012]. A destruction of the area – that means the finishing of the terrorists plan - could create an even worse testimony [Jensen 2012; Østrem 2012]. It can be discussed, that the symbolic significance today is not only positive [Ekland 2012]. On the other hand other buildings in



Figure 21 : Public Moaning at the Domkirka.  
Source: Photo by Irene Eskedal, July 2011.




Figure 22 : Showcase in front of the VG-Newspaper.  
Source: Own Photo, 25.02.2012.

Oslo – or Norway in general – were exposed to cruel and negative actions as well, especially by Nazi-Germany in the Second World War. Those buildings have not all been torn down either but had gotten a new, positive function and image instead [Ulstein 2012].

When looking back in history the Empirekvartalet was demolished in order to make way for the new Regjeringskvartalet [Engh 2012]. Cultural Heritage had been destroyed and was replaced by – nowadays – historical and architectural important buildings. Yet another demolition of the area implies another loss of cultural heritage. Furthermore the whole area around the new and modern Regjeringskvartalet is unique itself. The old governmental building, the G-blokka, is listed and reconstruction goes on due to its former state. The old alley (Regjeringsparken) is a memorial for the Empirekvartalet. Right across the Y-blokka is the Trefoldighetskirke which was built in “Berlin Architecture”. The whole area merges 200 years of history [Drevon 2012]. The most important building, the Høyblokka, has never been a touristic sight at all, just like the whole governmental quarter, especially due to the lack of quality of public and green spaces [Skarholt 2012; Felberg 2012]. However the building is a symbol for Norwegians, at least on a political level. It is a symbol for political power due to the fact, that the building hosts the Prime Minister’s Office and has always been a meeting place for the heads of the states or other important politicians [Engh 2012; Seip 2012b; Riksantikvaren 2011]. It is a symbol for the Norwegian social democratic welfare state after the Second World War [Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 2012]. After the terrorist attack it can now also be a symbol for democracy: “etter 22.juli kan den også bli et symbol på demokratiet som ikke lot seg rive ned av terror” [Ulstein 2012]. The discussion about a memorial for the terrorist attack can be mentioned in this context as well. The originally suggested location for the memorial was the Slottsparken, the Palace Park, but due to the missing linkage between the happenings of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July and the very location the site has been rejected. The latest discussion states that the location for the memorial should be close to the site of the attack, in the Regjeringskvartalet [Seip 2012a; Bjørdal 2012].

This place has become a place of remembrance (“Lieu de Mémoire” [Seip 2012a: 20]), a place of collective memory focused on a – in this case – geographic space. This applies especially for the population of Oslo and the Norwegians in general, but also for international visitors and tourists due to the broadcasting of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July [Ekland 2012]. The showcase in front of the VG-Newspaper-Agency gained memorial values as well. The glass bursted due to the explosion, but has not been replaced until now, still showing the newspaper of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July [Fig. 22].



The awareness of the Regjeringskvartalet increased due to its symbolic significance as *the* place, where the bomb exploded [Seip 2012b; Roede 2012]. It gained a memorial value [Ebbesen 2012], whether an actual memorial will be placed there or not and whether the area will be listed as cultural heritage or not [Ekland 2012]. This should be considered in the discussion about demolition or reconstruction. Even when some or all of the damaged buildings are going to be reconstructed, the usage of the area does not necessarily have to be the same as it has been before the attack [Seip 2012b].

### C. Future Use

The discussion about the future usage of the area is mainly fed by security aspects and the emotional consternation of the employees of the area. The reconstruction under the latest security and infrastructure requirements will lead to the loss of offices and workplaces [Jensen 2012]. If the current use should be kept up, this will require the construction of new buildings or the alteration in use of other buildings in the area [FAD 2012a]. Also it is questionable, if the head of the state should still be located in the top of the building in the middle of the town [Johansen/Sæther 2012]. However there are advantages for keeping up the current use as a governmental area. Even more, the concentration of more governmental functions is discussed [Statsbygg 2012], irrespective of the urban design. This could send out a clear message, especially towards the terrorist and his aim to attack the Norwegian head of the state. The government will not back down and hide in an over-secured fortress under the threat of a cruel murderer but conquers back their workplaces at the terrorist site. The employees have been asked about their feelings of going back to a workplace which has been exposed to terrorism. The opinions are diversified; some do not want to go back, others want to go back if security is up to date. [Kristiansen 2012]. However the reconstruction (or new construction) of the area will take at least ten years: It should be considered how many of the employees will still be at work and if their opinion might not have changed over the years [Seip 2012b]. Under consideration of those aspects a new usage of the Regjeringskvartalet has been discussed. The alteration in use of especially the Høyblokka into a museum is among the ideas [Knap 2012]. It could become a political-historic museum for the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July, but also the moving of the highly disputed Munch Museum into this building has been discussed [Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 2012]. The top of the building could be used as a conference center or a restaurant [Knap 2012]. Also the usage for university facilities, student dorms or small apartment was recommended [Knap 2012; Listerud 2012; Ravnaas 2012]. Other voices do not support a change of functions and recommend a further administrative use [Jen-

sen 2012].

As mentioned above the Regjeringskvartalet has become a place of remembrance and therefore a higher frequency of visitors and tourists in this area seems likely for the future. This requires special consideration for the usage, security level and design of the quarter.

#### **D. Economic Aspects**

Economic aspects do also play an important role in the discussion about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet and the question of conservation or demolition [Seip 2012b]. Both alternatives will cost round about five to ten billion Norwegian kroner [700 Mio – 1,4 Mrd. Euro] [FAD 2012a]. The reconstruction and renewal cause high costs due to the current security and infrastructure standards and moreover due to the removal of the asbestos [FAD 2012a; Roede 2012]. If the area is supposed to be used as a governmental quarter again, new offices and buildings have to be bought or built, additionally causing financial expenses.

In comparison the demolition will probably not be much cheaper also, since the art has to be removed carefully and transported to a museum. The building itself cannot be blasted down because of the built environment and needs to be demolished floor by floor. [Roede 2012]

The usage of the area will impact the economic possibilities and influence the decision- making of the Regjeringskvartalet's future.

#### **E. Process Design**

There have also been statements how the process of decision making should look like. It seems obvious, that this special case requires special treatment since the decision will impact the face of Norway's capital and will be watched not only by experts but also by the Norwegian population [Ebbesen 2012; Seip 2012b], if not worldwide. In order to avoid overhasty, myopic or too emotional decisions the responsible authorities in charge should take all the time which is needed and involve as many stakeholders as necessary [Stige 2012; Ebbesen 2012]. Stoltenberg's demand for "More openness, more democracy" should also be visible in this process [Klem 2012]. The decision which is going to be made is not only about the damaged buildings, but also about the whole area in context. Especially the design of the public space will be important, since it connects the rest of the city with this special area [ibid]. If the quarter is used as governmental quarter again, the public space needs an appropriate design to merge



both the special security requirements and the representative capital functions. Particular emphasis should be given to the “touristic” use due to the memorial functions. The wish for a design competition in order to guarantee a reasonable and transparent decision is huge among the experts [NTB 2012; Klem 2012]. The first step to open the area to the public and reduce its “fortress character” was made by the architects of Vulkan, who cut holes into the fences [Fig. 11] [Wang-Naveen/Sandberg 2012].

After this discussion in the media Rigmor Aasrud [FAD 2012a; FAD 2012b] finally held a presentation on the 26<sup>th</sup> of January 2012 about the governmental ideas about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet. After a short overview about the history of the Regjeringskvartalet and the impacts of the terrorist attack she points out, which aspects should be taken care of in the future development. Those are security aspects, with special regard to the employees, conservation aspects (symbolic significance) and economic aspects. Further she defines the process of decision making and presents the chosen instrument – a central government land use plan (statlig reguleringsplan), which is based on § 6-4 PBL [MD 2008; Grøntunn 2012]. This instrument was chosen due to the fact, that the government has a certain interest in the project and because the significance of that project reaches far beyond the city limits [Seip 2012b; Engh 2012]. The Ministry of Environment (MD) will be in charge of the final decision making, but an intense cooperation with the urban planning authority of Oslo is legally fixed (§ 6-4 , para. 2 PBL).

Before the work on the central government land use plan is going to be started, the government decided to initiate a concept study (Konseptvalgutredning KVVU) first in order to illustrate which future developments are possible [Fad 2012a]. This kind of study is usually applied in advance to bigger projects, in particular when projects have a financial volume of at least 750 Mio kroner, which is the case here [Felberg 2012]. The concept study includes an analysis of the future needs of the departments, a SWOT-Analysis, a feasibility study and the development of an overall concept, including security and economic aspects. This concept should include at least three different alternatives of how the new Regjeringskvartalet could look like. It should analyse the demolition and new construction of the area, the reconstruction of the damaged buildings and a solution in between, but with the restriction of the concentration of all governmental functions in the area. Also the inclusion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Environment into the new Regjeringskvartalet should be discussed within the concept study. By that the government has made its decision to maintain the governmental function in the current area and to keep the Regjeringskvartalet's use. This decision is made with regard to security aspects, but also due to work organisation of the ministries. Both the police [Politi-

direktoratet 2012] and Statsbygg [Statsbygg 2011] are supporting this decision. [FAD 2012a]

Before the concept study is handed to the authority in charge, the FAD, it will be appraised by an extern independent expert for quality management (Kvalitetssikring, KS1) [Grøntunn 2012]. The call for proposals to carry out this concept study was won by Metier AS, OPAK AS and LPO Arkitekter, who will work on the study until June 2013 [Engh 2012]. Pål Henry Engh, architect of LPO Arkitekter, explains [ibid.] that the concept study is done in “several thematic groups”, whereby one group deals with “references”: international case studies and investigations of other cities and their solutions for governmental functions and security. Moreover he defines the three objectives of the concept study: “the creation of secure working places, the creation of an open urban situation and finally the integration of the historical-symbolic values and capital functions”.

A final solution for the development of the Regjeringskvartalet - the basis for the central government land use plan - by the FAD is expected for summer 2013. It is not anticipated that the final result will be appreciated by all stakeholders, but an open, transparent and democratic process may lead to a higher acceptance by all who are affected [FAD 2012a]. The documents, which were handed in to FAD by Statsbygg, the Police and the Riksantikvaren, are public and will be part of the concept study. In order to involve the population and non-experts into the process as well, a blog [FAD 2012c] was established online until April 2012.

	<b>Complete recon- struction</b>	<b>Partial recon- struction and demolition</b>	<b>Demolition of all damaged buildings</b>
<b>Usage</b>	Regjeringskvartalet: governmental and capital functions		
<b>Urban design</b>	Complete recon- struction of the Regjeringskvar- talet, as it has been before the terrorist attack	Some buildings will be recon- structed, some will be demol- ished due to their architectural value and grade of damage, Re- placement of the demolished buildings by more functional and efficient buildings	Complete demolition and new construc- tion, new architecture with environmental friendly and more ef- ficient and integrated infrastructure and security solutions, increased functional- ity, improved work organisation

<b>Security</b>	more buildings with governmental functions, more restrictions on access of public space and streets due to security measures, Y-Blokka and its lack of security has to be solved	Integration of security system in existing buildings and in new buildings, area itself has same expansion, restrictions for access to public space and streets will be small	Modern and integrated security systems, space saving, less restrictions on access to on public space and streets
<b>Cultural Heritage</b>	Listed as planned before 22/07, architecture as a milestone for post war functionalism, art of Y- and H-blokka will be conserved, Viksjø's most important buildings will stand	Keeping of the most important buildings (e.g. conservation class 1), conservation of Viksjø's idea and symbolic buildings, demolition of minor valuable buildings and replacement by new, modern architecture	No conservation, loss of cultural heritage and important and familiar buildings, loss of Viksjø's idea, reuse of single elements in new design possible
<b>Economy</b>	Renovation and modernization of technical and security infrastructure, due to special capacities: construction or buying of new offices	Renovation and modernization, demolition and construction of new offices and workplaces	Complete demolition step by step due to the dense built environment, removal and conservation of the art pieces, new construction under new standards

**Table 4: Possible Alternatives for the Future Urban Design of the Regjeringskvartalet. Source: own figure, based on [FAD 2012a]**

Table 4 shows the alternatives with regard on security, cultural heritage and economy which should be analysed within the concept study.

The first alternative will be the complete reconstruction of the Regjeringskvartalet as it has been before the terrorist attack. The cultural heritage will be taken care off in its most comprehensive way, with the consequence that new buildings will be necessary in order to concentrate all the governmental functions in the area. This will require more space to fulfill the safeguarding with significant restrictions in the public space for the mobility of the passengers, both by car, public transport or by foot. Also the work organisation for the governmental functions will fall off in quality due to longer communication channels. The employees also might have emotional concerns by going back to the "same" workplace where nothing appears to have changed. The interpretation of this alternative could be negative; the urban design shows that the terrorist has nev-

er been here but the security measures might create a negative, fortress-like perception. The visible restrictions due to security will maybe make everyone over-aware of the obvious need for security due to the horrible event of the past and will therefore remind of the terrorist attack in an even more negative way, instead of showing, that the terrorist was not able to fulfill his cruel intentions.

In contrast the most radical alternative includes the whole demolition of the Regjeringskvartalet and the constructions of new buildings. With this solution modern security and infrastructure systems can be integrated into the buildings. The buildings will be designed environmentally friendly, space saving and efficient, which will also have positive synergies for the work organisation of the employees. However this solution will also mean the complete loss of the cultural heritage, with its identity and architectural and symbolic significance, especially for the Høyblokka. The area, which is now familiar to the population who is passing it every day, will get a complete new design which maybe will be followed by the loss of its memorial values. Buildings, which were about to be listed, are going to be demolished. This implies a big cut from a conservations point of view, which can be traced back to a terrorist attack. This alternative will destroy the grown heterogeneity of the area and include the creation of a new, in somewhat homogeny governmental quarter. It could mean a loss of diversity and therefore a loss of urban quality. It is questionable if this should be the answer given to the happenings of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July.

A good solution seems to be a compromise between a complete reconstruction and a complete demolition of the Regjeringskvartalet. The most historical and architectural valuable buildings, Viksjø's design idea, can be conserved; among those the Høyblokka with its political – and now memorial – significance. Unfunctional, damaged and less valuable buildings, like the S-blokka or the R4, can be demolished and replaced by new, environmental friendly, space saving solutions. This architecture can respond to security requirements and the loss of workplaces, which will be the result of the renewal of the Høyblokka. This compromise balances all the aspects, which were discussed in the aftermaths of the terrorist attack. The memorial significance will remain thus as the area shows that it has faced a horrible incident but has tuned into something positive without forgetting or ignoring the past. Security aspects will be taken care of but to an amount that both the governmental employees and passengers or visitors can feel comfortable. The interpretation of the area can be positive though something that cruel and negative had happened.

The costs for all three alternatives will be around five to ten billion Norwegian kroner. Such a huge project should be designed most efficient for sustainability's sake. This should be considered within the decision making as well. The chal-

lenge will be balancing conservation values, memorial values, security and economic aspects [Seip 2012b; Engh 2012].

## 4.6 Impacts on Urban Planning

What has changed in the aftermaths of the terrorist attack with special to urban planning? Since the 22/7-incident happened just one year ago, it is not possible to name specific changes [Seip 2012; Voss Gabrielsen 2012; Skarholt 2012]. Therefore this will be an attempt, to illustrate the urban planning's` respond to the attack and possible changes in its course which can be detected already now. The focus here will lay on security aspects and the role of cultural heritage/conservation values in urban development.

From the experts point of view a change in the regulations, that implies the Planning and Building Act, is not planned, or initiated, neither by the Planning Authority nor by the superior ministry in charge [Skarholt 2012, Grøntunn 2012]. Therefore a change in the planning process, which is fixed in the Planning and Building Act is hard to identify. The fact that a reconsideration of current projects with regard to new security requirements did not happened so far supports this statement. [Engh 2012; Skarholt 2012; Seip 2012]

However security in general became more important. This is not only detectable in the discussion and plans of the new Regjeringskvartalet but also in the discussions between the police and the government about the future security policy, which focuses on the prevention of terrorist attacks and the improvement in reacting on such an attack [Engh 2012; Seip 2012]. This is to be seen in connection to the report, which was published by the 22.July Commission (cf. [Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012]) and which diagnosed a lack of security by analysing the happenings of the 22<sup>nd</sup> of July. An increased appearance of security (guards, surveillance, entrance controls) can now be identified around governmental buildings; that is to say around Akershus Festning, the interims office for Jens Stoltenberg, and the other compensatory offices for the departments and ministries, which were located in the Regjeringskvartalet. Besides that, there is no higher security level in public spaces, at least not perceptible for the citizens.[Seip 2012]. It is assumed that considerations will be carried out where the report identified deficiencies. In matters of urban planning the report states that an appropriate legal framework is at hand, covered by the Planning and Building Act and its possibilities to regulate certain security needs and the Security Act (object security). Also the risk and vulnerability of the Regjeringskvartalet was clearly expressed by the Police`s risk assessment. Moreover the report diagnosed a lack of application of the available instruments [Bech Gjørsv et al. 2012: 444]. No

building has been identified as “skjermingsverdig” [sensitive, shield-worthy] until 22/7 and therefore its appropriate protection against e.g. terrorist attacks could not have been checked by the National Security Agency [ibid.: 441f.]. Reasons were – next to others – the lack of awareness of threat by the departments in charge. Now, after the incident of 22/7, this awareness will change most likely. It already changed for the Regjeringskvartalet, which can be seen in the discussion about the future development. Moreover the decision to apply the instrument of a central government land-use plans will in accordance to the Planning and Building Act include the implementation of the risk and vulnerability assessment. Also advices made by the police or the National Security Agency will most likely be included in the plan due to the regulations for consultation.

If this priority of security is only applied because the development deals with the very site of the attack or if this is a priority which will be considered in urban planning developments in general is a question, which cannot be answered at this point. The report [Bech Gjørvi et al. 2012: 442] points out, that Norway did not apply visual security measures and physical barriers so far, which is an “expression for an open, democratic society”. On the other hand the aspiration for “more openness, more democracy” should not mean that the protection of certain buildings and their functions is not important. In contrast its protection guarantees a resilient society, even in events of threat or crisis. In fact, an increased security in general is wanted by both architects and citizens. [Jensen 2012; Wernersen 2012, Molaug 2012]

Also the active role of urban planning in this context is to be analysed. As mentioned before the actual identification of sensitive, shield-worthy buildings and the definition of their level and art of protection are the tasks of the experts on security issues, like the NSM or the police – either in general or together with the owners and investors of the buildings to be planned or areas to be developed. The interface between this sectoral planning and the urban planning is reduced to the compilation of development plans. As mentioned above the role of urban planners under the neo-liberal influence is not very active, that is to say that plans are in general not initiated by the planning authority but by investors. If security matters have not already been considered in the early, pre-formal planning stadium they will first be considered within the consultation of public agencies. This can lead to long planning processes.

Just because the terrorist attack impacted a cultural heritage it is questionable, if this will lead to a significant change in the future urban planning policy. and its attitude towards cultural heritage. The discussion about the Regjeringskvartalet has shown the different opinions about the consideration of conservation values in general. According to the experts [Seip 2012, Molaug 2012] cultural



heritage always had an inferior role to e.g. economic aspects in urban planning development. The latest news from the ministry in charge of cultural heritage – the Ministry of Environment (MD) – stated [Nipen 2012] that a change in the consideration of values or cultural heritage is most likely in the next years. That includes especially the increased listing of buildings, which are witnesses of the industrial, international and urban Norway, even when local authorities and owners do not support this [ibid.]. If this new attitude is a result of the terrorist attack on a cultural heritage is not evident.

The future will show how strong the neo-liberal influence on Oslo's urban planning really is, how a decision between planners, politicians and investors can look like and how this will impact the overall planning concept.

## 4.7 Preliminary Results

Today, urban planning is characterised by a strong neo-liberal influence, where most of the development projects are initiated by investors. Therefore participation of the population, which is basically realised through the consultation of politicians, takes place at a very advanced state of the planning process and is – in spite of its recognised importance – negatively perceived by planners and investors. The cities overall concept refers to Oslo's location between the Fjord and the Marka and promotes an urban development of agglomeration/densification within the city limits. The biggest projects today reflect this concept, and also the international influence which is detectable in the urban design all over the town. Both security and cultural heritage played an inferior role in urban planning especially in comparison to economic aspects.

If this terrorist attack has impacted or will impact the urban planning is questionable. Most likely security considerations will get more weight in future projects. However the urban planning authority is dependent on the consultation of security experts like the NSM or the police, when it comes to the identification of buildings and areas which need more protection than others due to their values and functions for the society. Finally the realization of security measures connected to buildings is not the task of the urban planning authority but of the owners, who are supervised and guided by the NSM. The regulations to ensure a certain level of security had already been at hand before the terrorist attack. Therefore changes in the legislation or the course of urban planning are not likely and no tendencies towards this direction can be identified now. Neither have the current projects been reconsidered so far. Even with an increase in security measures, especially connected to public, "shield-worthy" buildings a "fortification" of Oslo it not likely. Both the urban planning authority, the politi-

cians, the architects and the experts on security refuse an over-secured public space and emphasis the balance between reasonable security measures and an open, accessible urban space. This refers to the socio-political background of Norway, which is enshrined in the constitution, promoting strong human rights and solidarity. The attack has impacted this background in so far as both the King and the Prime Minister emphasise those values and – even more – proclaim a more open and democratic society.

The discussion about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet has shown that both security and memorial and conservation values are important aspects, which should be considered in the future design. Whereas cultural heritage values have always been a matter of discussion in Oslo, the discussion about security is new. It is connected to the terrorist attack, which was the first incident of that kind that has happened in Norway's post-war history. In how far these aspects are considered and integrated in the final design will be an open question until at least summer 2013. The design will be realised on basis of a central governmental zoning plan, expressing the national importance of the development. Also a consultation and hearing of as many public authorities or other impacted persons is underlined. This includes also the consultation of other countries and their safeguarding solutions.



Figure 23: One Nation Under CCTV, Banksy-Art in London. Source: Photo by Kristian Kotilainen, 2009

## 5 Oklahoma City & Manchester

In this chapter the two cases of Oklahoma and Manchester will be analysed. As stated before, the cases were chosen due to the high level of similarity with the Oslo case. Both cities had to deal with terrorist attacks, targeted at public buildings and carried out by car bombs.

This chapter will analyse the impacts the incidents had on both the urban planning and the site. Special consideration will be given to the redesign of the site and the integration of security and memorial and conservation values.


### 5.1 Oklahoma City

Oklahoma City is the capital of the state of Oklahoma, located in the south central region of the United States of America. Oklahoma City is inhabited by 540.000 citizens and governed by a Republican mayor. [City of Oklahoma City 2012b]

On the 19th of April in 1995 the right wing extremist Timothy McVeil drove his van straight into the entrance hall of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. After McVeil left the area, the bomb placed in the van exploded causing the death of 168 citizens and injuring more than 680. Among the victims were governmental employees and nineteen children. Half of the building was destroyed due to the blast, many buildings in the near environment

were affected as well [Fig. 24, 25]. McVeil targeted this building, which among others hosted the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, due to personal anti-government reasons. [Lewis 2000: 201; Gabriel 2010: 133]

As stated before the Alfred P. Murrah building was heavily damaged due to the explosion. The building was constructed in 1977 and covered an area of 3.3 acres (13.355m<sup>2</sup>). The remained building structures were demolished on the 23rd of May in 1995 by implosion. [Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum 2012]



**Figure 24: The effects of the Oklahoma City Bombing.**  
Source: [FEMA 2007: 1-22]

Shortly in the aftermaths of the attack the decision fell to erect a me-

memorial on site. The wish for creating a place of remembrance arose not only because the site, turned into a “makeshift memorial”, surrounded by a fence and covered with flowers, stuffed animals, pictures and letters already in the first hours after the attack. However the Mayor of Oklahoma City established the Oklahoma City National Memorial task force, who carried out a Mission Statement in March 1996, including elements and aspects which should be considered in the design of the memorial. This report included broad participation from the victims and their families, to acknowledge their wishes of what the memorial should express. [Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum 2012]

In order to find an appropriate design for the memorial a design competition was carried out. Hans and Torrey Butzler won the competition in 1997 out of 624 international competition entries. The memorial costed 29 Million dollars and was paid for by governmental contributions together with private donation. The memorial covers the whole 3,3 acres, but also the next block which was



**Figure 25: The destroyed Alfred P. Murrah Building.** Source: [FEMA 2007: 1-5]



**Figure 26: The Oklahoma City National Memorial and Museum.** Source: Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, available at: <http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=1> [Accessed 10.12.2012]



**Figure 27: Map of the Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum and the new Oklahoma City federal Building.** Source: Own Figure, based on Google Maps., GSA 2001, Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum.

also affected by the attack. The street, which is located between the two blocks (Fifth Street) is closed for traffic as well as integrated into the design concept – despite public protest. The area of the former street is now covered with the “reflecting pool”. The entrance and exit of the memorial are marked by the two giant “Gates of Time”. The site where the Alfred P. Murrah building once stood is framed by a grassy footprint. Placed on this footprint are 168 chairs made of bronze and glass and illuminated at night. They symbolise the 168 victims of the terrorist attack. Parts of the makeshift memorial – the construction fence, are also integrated into the design. Other elements of the memorial are the “Survivor Tree” and the museum, which is located in the neighboring block of the former Alfred P. Murrah building (Journal Record Building) [Fig. 26, 27]. Exactly 5 years after the attack, the memorial was inaugurated by President Bill Clinton who declared the whole site as “sacred ground”. The Oklahoma City National Memorial is designed in a minimalistic way, similar to many other memorials in the United States and worldwide. The reason for using this design element is the “participating and experiential dimension” of this style. Audience participation in the Oklahoma City National memorial is a way of dealing with the trauma of the attack. The visitors can “work through” their feelings which arose through the attack. The memorial, like many memorials, is a touristic anchor. [Doss 2010: 123ff, 137f]

The history of terrorism against the United States is characterised by attacks on embassies in Africa or the Middle East. Terrorist attacks on US soil were an infrequent occurrence before the first attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 [FEMA 2007:1-21]. The Oklahoma City Bombing is claimed to be the largest attack on solid ground within the United States of America since the Second World War and until the incident of 9/11 in 2001 [Gabriel 2010: 133]. Especially those two terrorist attacks – The Oklahoma bombing and 9/11 – increased the awareness of domestic terrorism, causing vehement discussion of the topic both in politics, media and public. Although, the biggest impacts can be seen on the politic level. In the aftermaths of the Oklahoma City Bombing the running President, Bill Clinton, brought the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law (AEDP) into action. This equipped the security agencies in charge with more terrorism fighting rights – e.g. expanded surveillance etc. The Law was first refused due to the concerns about “curtailing civil liberties” [Gabriel 2010: 135ff]. In order to pass this law threat-raising instruments were used, just because the public awareness did not see a necessity for the law. Consider revising above two sentences to make clearer. “The governmental accent on counter-terrorism reflects the concern of government officials, rather than the public’s concern”. [Lewis 2000: 207f]

The law is to be seen in the bigger context of the U.S. Counter-terrorism Policy,



approved in “PDD 39”, which includes the use of “all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks. PDD 39 directs all federal departments and agencies to take measures to (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism, (2) deter and respond to terrorism, and (3) develop effective capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorism” [The White House 1995]. The incident of 9/11 led to the “Global War on Terrorism” – an even more interfering policy of the United States. Terrorism is seen as a threat to “freedom”, “democracy” and “civilization” and the answers are a “radical securitization of cities and aggressive military action across the world” [Graham 2007].

Though the Oklahoma City National Memorial is supposed to help to deal with the traumatic effects after the attack it does hardly discuss questions of how and why all those people had to die. The absence of context is relevant for the Oklahoma City National Memorial, but also for other US memorials. Bevan [2006: 199] speaks in this context of “false memorials”, which are used by the US government to demonstrate the existence of a terrorist threat and to promote and justify governmental security measures. The people who died due to terrorist attacks, like in Oklahoma or 9/11, are in fact innocent, but “their deaths were manipulated to sustain politicized assumptions of American national innocence and to legitimate national security narratives of revenge and retribution” [Doss 2010: 153]. The Oklahoma City bombing was called an “insane act of a social deviant, not the rehearsed performance of a decorated Gulf War veteran” [ibid.:122]. Due to the missing “reflection on issues of historical responsibility” [ibid.: 122], the attack is claimed to be a national attack against America, which further fuels the fear of terrorism [ibid.:147]. However there is a discrepancy between the perceived threat of the government and the perceived threat of the population. The terrorist attack of Oklahoma City raised in fact the “awareness of an insecurity about domestic terrorism”. However, “the public’s apparent risk assessment” [Lewis 2000: 202f] shows, that this awareness does not necessarily have to result in a changed personal behavior or life routine. Also it is expressed that the personal vulnerability in case of a terrorist attack is evaluated as high, however the actual risk of an attack in contrast is perceived as low and unlikely. The same can be stated for the population’s behavioral reaction after the incident of 9/11. E.g. people still use the subway despite the federal government labeling this activity with high risk potential. [Lewis 2000: 202f; Marcuse 2007]

This US Anti-Terrorism policy was applied in matters of urban planning as well. Before 1995 there have been no standards for the construction of federal buildings. In charge “for the design and construction of [federal] buildings, and for alterations and repairs to existing facilities” is the General Service Administration with its Public Building Sector (PBS). “One of its primary goals has always been to assure the physical safety of federal employees who work in, and the private

citizens who visit, government-owned or leased buildings” [Smith 2007: 2]. After the incident of Oklahoma City the government assigned the Department of Justice (DOJ) to carry out a vulnerability study (“Vulnerability Assessment report”) for federal buildings in order to develop minimum security standards. Two commissions have been established; the Professional Commission, which analysed the current security state of federal buildings and the Standard Commission, among others composed of the GSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the Secret Service. The Standard Commission carried out a classification of security levels for governmental owned buildings due to their size, number of employees and public access and in addition with special national security considerations. Moreover they defined a list of minimum standard security measures according to the required security level [ibid.: 2ff]. The list includes physical security measures and urban design advices, all in all “52 security standards dealing with such items as perimeter parking, lighting, physical barriers and closed circuit television monitoring. Standards were also recommended for security at entrances and exits, employee and visitor identification, and the operation of day care centers” [Department of Justice 1995]. Many of the measures which are mentioned in chapter 2.4 (Security in Architecture) were already developed in the aftermaths of the Oklahoma City bombing and can be found in this guideline. The destroyed Alfred P. Murrah Building was classified as a Level IV-building, which would have justified higher security measures, than it had been applied [ibid.]. However the guideline addresses the modernization and alteration of existing facilities. In order to cover the new design of federal buildings as well the GSA carried out a guide about “Draft Security Criteria” in 1997. This work then was overtaken by the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) and its “Security Design Criteria for New Federal Buildings and Major Modernization Projects” from 2001 [Smith 2007: 2ff.]. The ISC was founded also in 1995, six months after the Oklahoma City Bombing, with the purpose “to enhance the quality and effectiveness of physical security in, and the protection of buildings and nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States. The ISC standards apply to all nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States; whether government-owned, leased or managed; to be constructed or modernized; or to be purchased” [Department of Homeland Security 2012].

The biggest impacts which followed the bombing and consequently the new requirements in urban design can be seen in the design of surface parking lots, freestanding parking garages and the setback (“stand-off”) of federal buildings [Dixon 2012: 3]. The new Oklahoma City Federal Building was erected close to the site of the terrorist attack [Fig. 27], considering the new security guidelines, introduced by the GSA. The new building is a “national symbol of strength and resilience”, combining both security and an “open, accessible and invit-

ing” architecture in line with “the democratic principles” of the United States [GSA 2012]. Security measures which were implemented into the new design included elements such as; “building mass and setbacks, bollards, and glazing inside the courtyard” [GSA 2001].

The work of GSA and later on ISC addresses federal buildings and other national icons. The coverage of public-private developments was not too developed until the incident of 9/11. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and the traumatic results of this incident increased the awareness of risk and vulnerability of terrorism in the United States and also worldwide. Among others the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which mainly dealt with the mitigation of natural hazards, so far have published guidelines in their Risk Management Series (RMS) in order to mitigate terrorist attacks as well. The first publication was released in 2003, called “FEMA 426 – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks” (updated in 2012, cf. [FEMA 2012]), which was detailed in “FEMA 430 – Site and Urban Design for Security” (cf. [FEMA 2007]). These guidelines are based on the design criteria made by the GSA and ISC but also include strategic concepts for risk and vulnerability assessment. Besides the mitigation of terrorist attacks, the guidelines aim to balance the security needs with the “site amenities and aesthetic quality in urban and semi-urban areas” in order to avoid design mistakes which were performed in the very aftermaths of 9/11. Nevertheless the guidelines are not mandatory and not implanted in building codes. [FEMA 2007: i; 1-1ff]

The enacting of building codes is a matter of the federal states. However there is an “International Building Code”, which should work as a role building code for the single states. The ICB does not regulate explicit elements of urban design or site perimeter with regard to security [Thompson/Bank 2007: 66] but promotes the establishment of “the minimum requirements to safeguard the public health, safety and general welfare through structural strength, means of egress facilities, stability, sanitation, adequate light and ventilation, energy conservation, and safety to life and property from fire and other hazards attributed to the built environment and to provide safety to fire fighters and emergency responders during emergency operations.” [State of Oklahoma 2006: §103] In fact, most federal building codes do not modify the IBC on many points. Urban Planning in Oklahoma, including Oklahoma City, is based on the IBC with only few modifications [City of Oklahoma 2012; State of Oklahoma 2006]. As it appears no explicit changes were implemented after the Oklahoma City Bombing. The current amendment of the ICB deals with the lessons learned out of the 9/11 incident. Security considerations with regard to the construction of tall buildings will be implemented in the 2012-edition of the ICB. [Drengenberg/Coley 2011: 32ff]

The consequences for urban design which are detectable after the terrorist attacks – not only Oklahoma but also 9/11, are a “militarization and securitization of urban space” [Graham 2007], coming along with “hardenen architecture” and the “restrict[ed] [...] use of public space” [Marcuse 2007, also Savitch 2008:134f.]. This stands in contrast to the behavior of the citizens in the American cities. Their “fundamental character [...] - open, free-wheeling, striving, competing, diverse—is very much as it was before [the attacks][Eisinger 2004: 127]. Though it is questionable if this behavior is realised because or in spite of the increased safeguarding in urban designs [Lewis 2000: 207].

## 5.2 Manchester

Manchester is located in the northwest of England, and with a population of 500.000 and a metropolitan region of about 2.3 million people, it is one of England’s most important cities. As the world’s first industrial city, urban planning in Manchester in post-modern times was characterised by the challenge of dealing with both the change of the economic basis and the consequences of urban growth. In order to succeed in this challenge the private and the public sector have been working together. In order to meet the urban development goals under the term of “Urban Regeneration” the instrument of public private partnerships is proven to be most effective [William et al. 2000: 295f; Kitchen 2001:332].

On the 15th of June in 1996 this development was interrupted by the bombing of the city centre. Responsible for this act of terrorism was the IRA. It was their second attack on Manchester within four years. The IRA placed a van, filled with 1.500kg of explosives (the biggest bomb since the 2nd World War) close to the “Arndale” shopping centre and subsequently detonated the payload. As a result of the IRA warning media and hospitals 75 minutes in advance, some 80.000 people were successfully evacuated by the police and responsible emergency organisations. No fatalities were reported, although more than 200 people were injured mainly due to broken glass [Kitchen 2001: 328; Moss 2011]. The blast could be felt kilometers away and glass broke within a half kilometer radius [William et al. 2000: 298]. The consequences for the surrounding building structure were immense. The Arndale Centre was com-



Figure 28: The destroyed Arndale-Shopping Centre. Source: [Fema 2007: 1-24]

pletely destroyed with nearby buildings also receiving damage. A total of more than 100.000m<sup>2</sup> of retail and office square was lost, with major consequences for the economy. More than 627 businesses were displaced, with substantial consequences for employees and employers due to the loss of workplaces. The centre has been the city's most important source of income since the transformation to the post-industrialism system. Consequently the insurance claim is about 700 million dollars. [Savitch 2008: 162; Kidd 2004: 69]

The IRA maximised the bombs impact by specific timing and placement, intentionally targeting the popular civilian Saturday morning shopping period. The effectiveness of the bomb was further increased due to a large influx of people into town which were attracted by events of the European football championship [Kitchen 2001: 327].

Terrorist attacks of the IRA have the longest history in domestic urban territory bombing worldwide. Since the 1960's the targets of the IRA were focused on infrastructure and the "symbol of UK economic might" [Bevan 2006: 69f]. Such symbols included the City of London, the London Docklands and shopping centers in Warrington – and Manchester [ibid.]. The city centre of Manchester contains various significant functions, making it particularly vulnerable to terrorist attack. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack, the main tasks were to restore those significant functions both in short and in long term. In order to support the retailers in the short term during the time of no business activity, the Lord Mayor's Appeal Fund was raised [Kidd 2004: 68]. The City Council being the authority responsible for Urban Planning in Manchester, established the "Manchester Millennium Ltd.". This consisted of a public private partnership which was supposed to guide the long term redevelopment process [Kidd 2004: 68; Jessen/Walther 2008: 159f].

As mentioned above the main issue in the redevelopment process was the restoration of the economic functions, although security considerations also played an important role. Since it was the second attack on Manchester a certain risk could be stated [Bevan 2006, 69]. The task was therefore to find a balance between security measures and the qualities of a shopping based city centre. A city centre without a certain "quality" will not attract customers, but nor will a centre which is perceived as unsafe [Kitchen 2001, 330]. In order to satisfy the personal risk assessment of the customers and to maintain the desired "quality", no physical security measures [like barriers or restricted access as applied in London] were prioritised. Instead CCTV- devices were installed. [Kitchen 2001: 330, 337]

The most important factor in the discussion about the redesign was the "sur-



vival” of the retailers and the maintenance of the city centre functionality. This approach increased due to the fact that suburban shopping areas became more attractive. It was most likely that customers would change their habits, since many shops in the centre were closed down. It was clear that the more time that passes before the city centre was reconstructed, the more effort it would take to make people utilise the area again [Kitchen 2001: 338]. On the other hand this “opportunity” could be seen in the bigger context of Urban Regeneration. The possibilities which were necessarily given by the bombing provided an enhancement for an already decayed city centre with outdated and non-functional building structures. [Jessen/Walther 2008: 159f; Williams et al. 2000: 298]



**Figure 29: The new Arndale-Shopping Centre.**  
 Source: Chapman Taylor (2012), available at:  
<http://www.chapmantaylor.com/en/projects/detail/manchester-arndale/en/> [Accessed 10.12.2012]

The mission therefore was to realise a very quick redevelopment process on the one hand and to integrate a new and attractive urban design on the other hand. In order to realise both approaches, existing plans were used in order to form the development goals. Also an “International Urban Design Competition” was carried out on 17th June 1996, shortly after the attack. Participation of the public was also realised, though only after the five final designs were chosen. Only 19 weeks after the terrorist attack the final design was chosen. Other instruments which were used to reach the goals were certain marketing and promotion strategies and the step-by-step reopening of the stores (instead of a common reopening at the end of the redevelopment process)[Williams et al. 2000: 300; Kitchen 2001: 333, 337ff; Jessen/Walther 2008: 159f]. The instrument which was used to set the redevelopment into practice was a masterplan. The objective was to create a “living city”, which was in line with the city’s Urban Regeneration program. The integration of heritage sites was also included into this development, not without conflicts and the loss of several sites [Kidd 2004: 69]. The redevelopment was financed with insurance payments and funds, e.g. by the European Union. Characteristics of the new design were public squares and green spaces, dense architecture, the integration of public transport and representative buildings, and a mixed use of commercial, residential, touristic and cultural functions and designs by international architects [fig. 29]. [Jessen/Walther 159ff; Moss 2011]

The integration of memorial elements into the redevelopment process was basically limited to a pillarbox, which survived the attack and which was marked with a sign, remembering the terrorist attack [Moss 2011].



It is of significance to note that an explicit change in local or national policies, especially with regard to urban planning, cannot be detected. Since it was not the first attack on UK soil, a certain anti terrorism policy had already been established before the terrorist attack in Manchester, but with no explicit impacts on urban planning policies [Coaffee 2004: 202]. The counter terrorism policy gained momentum after the attacks on New York's 9/11 and even more after the London Bombings in 2005. The Home Office [2012] states that the biggest threat for the United Kingdom is to be seen by international terrorism. The Home Office is in charge for the counter terrorism strategy, making the United Kingdom to one of the key players in "the Global War on Terror" [Graham 2007]. With regard to urban planning and site design, a guideline has been published under the responsibility of the Home Office and in cooperation with the Local Planning Authorities (cf. [Home Office 2009]). This guideline is dedicated to the safeguarding of public spaces and sites against terrorist attacks, focusing on the new development of buildings but also including the adjustment on existing sites ("Retro-fitting") [Home Office 2009:12]. It includes urban design principles, physical security measures and the integration of heritage Sites. The guideline is in line with the planning legislation of England and can therefore be easily applied in planning processes, though it is not mandatory. The main focus of the guidelines are security in crowded places and the application of risk levels. Main instrument is surveillance via CCTV. [Home Office 2009, Coaffee 2004]

### **5.3 Preliminary Conclusion**

Oklahoma and Manchester have faced terrorism, both under different circumstances. Consequently, they have solved the challenge of handling this tragedy in different ways.

Oklahoma turned the site into a large memorial, due to the fact that many people lost their lives in the attack. Also it was the biggest attack on solid ground of the United States since the Second World War and therefore a milestone in history. The target was a governmental, political representative building. The attack was also interpreted as an attack on America's principal values. The most important issues for the redesign of the site were memorial and representative values. Participation of the population, especially of the victims' families played a superior role and was a key element in the design of the site. The destroyed building with its governmental functions was re-erected close to its former location and with high security standards.

Manchester, being exposed to terrorist attacks due to the long history of the

IRA, used the strategy of redevelopment of the site. This strategy was also chosen due to the fact that the target was not a political symbol, but an economic one and its functions as centre of retail were and still are elementary for the city of Manchester. Memorial values did not play a superior role due to the fact that no fatalities were stated. There is now only a small sign which can be found, erected to remind people of the attack.

Security issues played an important role in the redesign discussion. The redevelopment aimed to create a high quality city centre which was also safe. In order to guarantee a certain degree of security, the installation of CCTVs was favoured over the installation of other physical security measures e.g. barriers. The participatory process was also applied, but only in a very advanced state of planning due to the time factor, which played the biggest role in the process. Irrespective of the different redesign strategies, both site designs were results of international design competitions and both cities established a special task force which was in charge of guiding through the process. Whether or not either Oklahoma or Manchester consulted other cities with regard to experiences with terrorism is not detectable.

The incidents had different impacts on the particular urban planning policies, though the legal framework did not change in Manchester/ in the United Kingdom or Oklahoma / the United States. Manchester's urban planning policy does not seem to have been impacted by the terrorist attack at all. In the aftermaths of the terrorist attack on Oklahoma the agency in charge, GSA, developed a guideline regarding how to secure governmental buildings, which was mandatory for both the new constructions of governmental buildings but also for the retrofitting of existing buildings. Also, a new organisation called the ISC was established. This organisation deals with safety in governmental owned public buildings. The design criteria were updated regularly and essentially influenced the urban design of public sites in the United States. The stand-off of buildings, the usage of barriers and the design of parking lots are just a few results.

With regard to both cases the following facts can be stated:

The redesign strategy seems to be dependent on the target of the attack and its dimension (number of fatalities), expressed by the memorial values. The memorial values in Oklahoma were overwhelming due to the politically symbolic nature of the building and the number of victims, turning the site into a tragedy site for the whole nation. Also the functions of the target and their meaning for the organisation of a city are essential for the length of the redesign process. The governmental functions of the destroyed building in Oklahoma could be replaced easily. This is in stark contrast to the retail centre of a city and the

shopping habits of the population, which are more difficult to relocate and are connected with long term impacts.

Effective instruments in the redesign process seem to be the establishment of a special dedicated task force and the realization of an international design competition. The redesign of the attacked site and the impacts on urban planning are strictly to be seen in context with the historic background, the experiences with terrorism and the resulting self image. Whereas the United States felt “personally attacked” with the domestic terrorist attack, the United Kingdom seemed to be more resistant due to their long history with the domestic IRA-terrorism. This changed essentially after the 7/7 incident. Both the United Kingdom and the United States are “key player in the Global War on Terrorism” [Graham 2007]. This affects both the foreign policy and the internal policy. However it should be mentioned, that a certain critical reflection of the backgrounds and reasons of the terrorist attacks remained undone [Marcuse 2007, Bevin 2006, Doss 2010, Graham 2007].

This socio-political attitude is reflected in matters of urban planning as usual. It does not necessarily lead to a changed legal framework, but obviously to a changed urban design of public spaces and buildings. Security measures being, architectural, physical, technical or all three, are implemented generously in the United States and the United Kingdom in the aftermath of the attacks. This does not seem to impact the behavior of the population, which did not change e.g. after the Oklahoma City Bombing – and obviously also not after 9/11 [...; Marcuse, Eisenberger]. The question remains, if this is due to, or in spite of the implemented security measures.





Figure 30: CCTV at the Y-Blokka in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 12.11.2012

## 6 Comparison, Combination, Consolidation

This chapter aims to consolidate the different results which were gained through the case studies with focus on the research questions. A comparison per se is not purposive due to the different frameworks, backgrounds, circumstances and, moreover, individual effects of every terrorist attack. Instead this chapter should aim to give an understanding how reactions to terrorist attacks can look like and if there are lessons to be learned. Is there a common output? Where are differences and why? Which factors do play a role for the determined results?

- How is the future of the impacted site discussed and which kind of futures can be identified?

Both the final replacement of functions and the reconstruction can be a solution



for those sites [Bevan 2006: 176]. The discussion on the future of the attacked site depends on the former use. Manchester's attacked city centre needed a fast redevelopment solution because the loss of this site had deep financial impacts in the first place. The economic factors of this site were most relevant and guiding for the redevelopment process. A replacement of these functions with other functions was not at all considered due to the relevance of the centre in the city. The final redevelopment was not only the reconstruction of the former functions, but also the enhancement of this area due to new and functional urban design and architecture. The sites in Oslo and Oklahoma City were governmental areas, with political and symbolic values. The interim relocation of the particular functions did and does not have such long term impacts as e.g. the replacement of a shopping area. The reasons are to be seen in the frequency of the usage of the area by every single person (irregularly vs. daily/weekly). Both Oklahoma City and Oslo had and have more time to derivate an appropriate design solution for the future. Due to the socio-political framework and the American self-image Oklahoma City decided to establish a memorial instead and relocated the former governmental functions. Oslo in contrast will go back to the former use as a governmental quarter, also with the integration of a memorial and – most likely – the consideration of the cultural heritage values of the buildings. In consequence the redesign processes require different durations. Participation is therefore considered to different amounts. Manchester carried out a very fast process, where the final design solution was found already 19 weeks after the attack. Participation was reduced to a minimum and only carried out for the five final design ideas. The design of the memorial took more time and was inaugurated five years after the attack. Participation, especially of the victims / their families was part of the process from on beginning. Participation also plays a big role in the process in Oslo, not only fueled by the discussion which took place in the media, but also initiated by the municipalities (questionnaires, blogs, and consultations). Instruments which seem to be popular for the redesign of attacked sites are the establishment of special task forces, which coordinate the process, and the execution of international design competitions. Those instruments were used both in Manchester and Oklahoma City and the execution of an international design competition is sought in Oslo; too. Even though the redevelopment strategies and durations differ among those three case studies, a certain similarity in the used instruments and can be seen.

- How have the factors cultural heritage / memorial values and security been discussed after the terrorist act, especially at the impacted site? Is there a change in the considerations of those aspects in general and if yes, is this a shock-reaction or will it be a long-term-impact?

A change in the consideration of the factor cultural heritage cannot be detected

for Manchester or Oklahoma, neither site related nor city wide. It though is a factor in the discussion about the Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo, but only because it has been a point of discussion before and plans to conserve some of the buildings had been on the way. A change of the city wide consideration is not detectable as well.

Due to the few victims of the Manchester bombing memorial values did not play a significant role in the aftermath of the attack. In contrast memorial values played the most important role in the discussion about the redesign of the terrorist attack in Oklahoma City. The final design of the site, a memorial, expressed the importance, though there is a discrepancy between the individual, “personal” moaning in the direct aftermath of the attack and the public, institutionalised moaning in context with the memorial. Memorials in the US, either for attacks on their own solid ground or for the mark of happenings overseas, are an instrument to express the American self image, proclaim their values or to promote their anti-terrorism policy. The Oklahoma City National Memorial is therefore to be seen in the context of the tradition of “memorial mania” in the United States [Doss 2010: 117, Bevan 2006: 199]. Memorial values played a role in the discussion about the redesign of the attacked site in Oslo as well, especially when it came to the location of the memorial. The decision now fell and the memorial will be located in the new Regjeringskvartalet, integrated into the new governmental quarter. This area is a realm of memory because it was the target of the attack. There is also an even though small discrepancy between the individual, “personal” moaning in the direct aftermath (which happened at the Domkirke and Youngstorget) and the now institutionalised public moaning.

Since a terrorist attack is a matter of security, the discussion has to take place in the aftermath of attacks one way or another. In the discussion about the redevelopment of Manchester’s city centre different security measures were considered and several CCTVs were installed to balance the need for security and the quality and attraction of the city’s most important shopping area. Security measures played a role in the discussion of the new design of the attacked site in Oslo as well, especially because the area will host governmental functions again. They will be an important criterion in the new development but no final decision about the extent of the measures is made so far. The most input will probably be given by the security experts, NSM, PST, and Statsbygg. In the design process of the memorial in Oklahoma City security measures did not play a significant role, at least not with regard to urban design. This is probably because the memorial did not contain any new buildings. However the security discussion was moved onto a higher, national level. Results of that discussion were applied in the new Oklahoma City Federal Building, which was erected close to the site.

Since conservation values or memorial values just have been discussed with regard to the impacted site security became a national matter of interest. Without going deep into the discussions about the particular security politics it can be stated that especially the United States and the United Kingdom have passed several laws after experiencing terrorist attacks, which are promoting antiterrorism or counterterrorism. Especially after the 9/11- and 7/7-attacks the "global war on terror" [Graham 2007] was proclaimed. Those attacks did not influence the urban planning policy (such as building codes) but the national security policies. The interface between the national security policy and urban planning is not always easy to identify. First of all, the analysis of Oklahoma City / United States and Manchester / United Kingdom shows, that one consequence of terrorist attacks is the development of guidelines for security measures and in urban design. These aim to create a more defensive and resistant architecture and urban design. The guideline which was developed in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing was mandatory for all governmental owned buildings in the United States. Also a special organisation, the ISC, which combines security and urban planning matters, has been established. Other guidelines, like those from FEMA or the Home Office, are not mandatory and can be applied on public or private owned buildings. The guidelines also consists a risk and threat assessment in order to derive a classification for different security needs of buildings. Those guidelines are not published by the urban planning authorities but by the security authorities (GSA, FEMA, Home Office, NSM). They are based on the legal framework for security regulations in the particular countries and in cooperation with researchers or the municipalities. The national socio-political tenor is reflected in those guidelines. Especially the mandatory guideline of the GSA for all governmental owned buildings in the US affected the appearance and urban design of US cities. An outstanding example for the connection of security and urban design is the National Capital Security Design Plan in Washington.

Besides that the security usually is site related, like in Manchester (CCTVs). There are no indicators for overall security plans or integrated security measures in urban development plans. On governmental owned buildings, like the new Oklahoma City Federal building, or the financial and governmental district in London or Washington the security measures are increased in general due to the functions of the area and due to the bigger influence of the national security organisations on those public buildings (Home Office, GSA). Oslo does show tendencies towards this trend as well, but at this moment it is not clear if this can be traced back to a change in the urban design mentality towards security or the still ongoing construction work. Also an interface between security requirements and urban planning can be realised in the planning process. As

enforced laws security acts have to be considered in the development of urban development plans and so forth. Security measures in urban planning, which can be applied by building codes, are distances and the stand-off of buildings, the location of parking lots (or location of functions in general), restriction of access to streets or mandatory building materials. This was set into practice in the masterplan in Manchester and was planned for Grubbegata in Oslo. Usually the professional input of experts is required (GSA or ISC in the US; Home Office in UK, NSM/PST in Norway). The consultation of security experts in the formal planning process is therefore one possibility to ensure a certain security level, but if not initiated by the developers this step comes quite late and at a point, where the design is usually fixed.

The aspects security, memorial values and conservation values have been discussed differently in all three cases, dependent on the particular circumstances and the national socio-political background and national self-image. A change of the considerations of those aspects after terrorist attacks in the general course of urban planning cannot be stated per se. However the appearance of cities nowadays in western societies, characterised by a certain amount of hardened architecture shows [Savitch 2008:134ff; Marcuse 2007; Silverberg/Rogers 2011], that security measures to different amounts have been implemented in the urban design, especially on public and governmental owned sites.

- Does an act of terror affect only the impacted site or does it impact the whole urban planning policy? If there is a change in the urban planning policy – how can this be detected and characterised? How does the (new) urban planning policy respond to the socio-political approaches of the national policy and after-terrorism-reaction?

Without question the biggest impacts are visible on the site of the terrorist attack; not only when speaking of the damages but also when it comes to discussions about the aftermaths and the redevelopment of the site. In order to verify a change in the urban planning policy as well, certain aspects, which characterise the urban planning, are taken into consideration. Those are, among others, the legal framework, the overall concepts, the significance of participation and consultation, the planning process and the role of the urban planners – both before and after the terrorist attack. The case studies show results, which will help to show tendencies of changes, if existent.

A change in the legal framework cannot be detected in the cases of Oklahoma/US, Manchester/UK and Oslo/Norway. The national building codes usually already included objectives like “security” or “safe communities” but terrorism is not especially mentioned. That does not imply that the prevention of terrorism

is not an objective of urban planning, but aspects like crime protection, social security, environmental security, fire safeguarding and so on are more evident. This seems reasonable since the risk of terrorist attacks in the Western World is quite low in contrast to those basic life quality approaches. Consequently a change in the planning process with regard to its formal structure did not take place as well. Moreover with regard to the research design of the paper there are no indications that the other named factors are impacted as well. The analysis of Oklahoma City and Manchester did not allow such a deep insight but the case of Oslo showed no tendencies in a changed urban planning policy. Both municipalities and experts on urban planning did not detect such a change, neither a reconsideration of ongoing projects nor a changed overall concept for future projects. In the times of neo-liberal influence the role of urban planners in the municipalities in England or Norway is not essentially based on the design of e.g. site related zoning plans but on overall municipal urban development plans. Urban planners usually have a consultant role by guiding the private investors or stakeholders through the formal planning process. The carrying out of international design competitions, especially after the attacks, promotes this statement even more.





Figure 31: Street Art in Oslo. Source: Own Photo, 27.03.2012

## 7 Results and Outlook

After the analysis of the particular cases and the compilation of them, the last chapter of this paper aims to point out general results about the impacts of terrorism on urban planning. Due to the results of the paper the hypotheses, which were raised at the beginning, have to be revised under consideration of the given limitations and the restrictions of objectivity, validity and reliability. Moreover an outlook on the topic, also with regard to remaining questions will be given.

- ! Sites of terrorist attacks are passing through a different renewal planning process other than “usual sites” due to their sensible destiny.

This hypothesis can be generally validated. On the one hand, the site related renewal process is in line with Ibsen’s “Når utgangspunktet er galest blir tidt resultatet originalest” – special circumstances accomplish special measurements. On the other hand even if similarities can be seen in the renewal planning processes, each process is individual and hardly comparable, due to different redevelopment goals, general circumstances and the national self-image. However

the planning process of the sites of terrorist attacks differs from the planning process of “usual” sites in all three cases speaking of the duration, the used instruments and the participation of stakeholders.

- ! Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites, the aspects security, and memorial and Conservation values are undergoing a long-term change in general consideration.

This hypothesis cannot be explicit validated. As explained above memorial/conservation values are not necessarily the most significant aspects in the redesign discussion. Economic aspects, the reuse strategy and the redevelopment process itself do also play an important role. The discussion about memorial values depends on the number of victims, the meaning of the attack in a bigger context and the functions and significance of memorials in the particular country. The instrumentalisation of memorials for profiling or self-manifestation and the resulting discrepancy between personal affected and public moaning in the United States is not comparable to memorials in the United Kingdom or Norway [Doss 2010].

Conservation values are only discussed when (soon to be) listed buildings or cultural heritage has been the target of the attack. Moreover a change in the general considerations of those aspects in matters of urban planning cannot be detected at all.

However security is a main issue in the aftermath discussion of the attack, not necessarily with regard to the redesign of sites of terrorist attacks but on a general political level. The appearance of today`s cities in the western society show increased hardened architecture and security measures, which could mean that security aspects increased in weight in the urban design.

Consequently the hypothesis should rather say: Due to their significance in the redesign of terrorist sites security aspects are undergoing a long-term change in general consideration.

- ! The urban planning policy changes after terrorist attacks in dependency of the national socio-political respond on the attacks.

This hypothesis cannot be validated. The analysis of the cases showed that no change in the legal planning framework and in consequence in the general urban planning policy can be detected, neither in theory nor in practice. Due to the reasons explained above the hypothesis should rather be drafted as: Even though the national (security) policy can alter after terrorist attacks, the urban planning policy does not undergo a significant change.

The paper shows that speaking for the three case studies no significant changes in urban planning policies can be detected. The legal framework seems to remain the same and so does the general structure of the planning process and the used instruments.

The impacted sites instead experience a special and different planning process due to their sensitive destiny as tragedy sites. The site design and the importance of certain values, like security or memorialisation, differs in dependency on the target and its functions, the victims, the economic situation and significance of the building and – moreover – the national self image and self awareness. Terrorism, as a targeted instrument used in order to gain certain, in these cases political goals impacts the site in the first place. Consequently security is discussed after the attacks in particular, but not only with regard to the site. In the US the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law was passed after the attack on the Oklahoma City Building. The security policy also impacts the appearance of cities, that is to say their urban design, nowadays. The security agencies in the United States and in the United Kingdom published guidelines in order to bungle both security and urban design, in line with their “global war on terror” [Graham 2007]. This resulted in hardened architecture, restricted public space and surveillance – a not always appropriate shrinkage of urban space [Savitch 2008: 136, 168f]. If Oslo will follow this trend is hard to say at this moment; at least the experts do not anticipate such a tendency. The political guidance in Norway also does not seem to choose this way, not only because their socio-political respond to the terrorist attack is “more openness, more democracy”. But measures which go beyond the limits of the actual security - and Planning and Building Act are not planned or applied yet. Also it is quite obvious that public or governmental used buildings are equipped with higher security standards than other, maybe public used buildings. This is because the influence on security authorities on “their” properties is higher than on buildings or areas, which are developed by private investors and private stakeholders. Therefore it is questionable, in how far guidelines, like those published by FEMA and Home Office are applied in reality. This question cannot be answered here, as this requires further qualitative research.

Moreover those security measures should aim to create a “resilient” city, a city which can continue its normal daily life after terrorist attacks as soon as possible. The fact that the urban planning policy did not change after the attacks in the United States, United Kingdom and Norway can state, that these cities or at least their planning policies are resilient in a way.

*“Resilience might also be achieved if an attack had not changed fundamental conditions or had no significant effects on normal life. This would*

*mean a city had seen no adverse change and withstood an intended shock. A city meeting these criteria could be seen as resilient.” [Savitch 2008: 153]*

The same can be stated for the population and their behaviour in the city. Shortly after the particular attack the citizens of Manchester, Oklahoma City and New York fell back to their usual daily routine, obviously not been intimidated by a certain terrorist risk [Eisinger 2004: 127; Marcuse 2007]. This could be an expression for a resilient population and as a consequence of their personal risk assessment. Since not every attack can be avoided, it is more important how a city and its population deals with the consequences in the aftermath. On the other hand it is not quite clear if this personal risk assessment originates from or in spite of the increased security measures.

All three cases show that terrorist attacks, their impacts and the procession do have a very individual effects. Terrorism is in general a reaction on the policy of the targeted country. The reasons for terrorist attacks are not to be found in the urban planning policy of a country – urban planning therefore is not in charge for combating terrorism, that is to say prevent or ward off terrorist attacks. However urban planning should create “safe” communities. Urban planning can contribute to create safer environments and minimise the consequences of terrorist attacks on citizens, the building structure and the functioning of a city, although other approaches are more likely and more prior, like crime prevention, environmental health and general safeguarding. This can be realised in the building codes through different perimeters, access, mandatory materials or other requirements. The balance between those security measures and the qualities of “freedom” and “urbanity” depends on the national political attitude, the grown self-image and the very history of terrorism. Differences between the appearance of cities in the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway, but also between the cities within a country are therefore reasonable. New York or London had to face a higher number of terrorist incidents than the investigated cases. This affected the appearance of the cities, based on local decisions, but also on basis of national guidelines. London for example implemented the “Ring of Steel”, a 10km long barrier, which secured private and public spaces as well as entrances of economic and political buildings via 1500 CCTVs. In addition roads were closed or transformed into one-way-streets. London turned “into the most surveilled space in the UK and perhaps the world” [Graham 2007; Coaffee 2004:205].

One question which could not be answered in this paper is if the reuse strategy of tragedy sites, which is applied after the terrorist attack, can be an expression of how to deal with the attack and the aftermaths as Bevan [2006: 198] argued that “rebuilding may be an act of resistance to some; but to others disturbing a

site where such a massive loss of life has occurred is a sacrilege". The line between resilience that is to say rebuilding a realm of memory and still keeping the possibility of moaning is quite thin. The future of the Regjeringskvartalet will show, if and how this balance will be found.

Another unanswered question is the interface between security and urban planning or urban design. As to be stated by experts a hardened architecture can be found in nowadays cities. Though it is not quite clear who actually promotes this trend, who is behind these decisions and how huge the role of urban planners in this process is.

Risk and threat assessments are implemented in both the GSA- and FEMA- and Home Office guidelines and in both the Planning and Building Act and Security Act in Norway. The risk and threat assessment is an useful instrument to analyse and identify the actual risk an area is exposed to. This helps to apply useful and appropriate security measures. Unclear to this point is in how far this instrument is applied in reality, who applied it and who controls or double-checks the results of the assessment: In short, how this instrument is set into practice.

The same can be questioned for the participation and consultation of security experts in the planning process. How much are they involved in urban development projects or site-related plans and projects? Who controls if their input is necessary or not?

Despite these unanswered questions the paper could give a certain contribution to the topic of urban planning and terrorism. The comprehensive analysis of Oslo gives a summary about the future of the Regjeringskvartalet with regard to the consideration of factors such as security, cultural heritage, memorial values, economic aspects and the planning process design. Although an explicit result of Oslo's future is not quite clear yet and possible further impacts on urban planning in Oslo are not evident at this time certain tendencies could be identified with the help of the experts. Also the combined reflection of three, under certain points of view similar conditioned cases shows different ways of dealing with a traumatic shock. This states that terrorist attacks do have a very individual effects and despite measures for prevention it will always remain a unique and incisive event where individual redevelopment prove the abnormality of those attacks, even though they increased in number in the last years. The consequence is a trend to hardened architecture in architecture and changes in urban design with impacts on public urban space and the appearances of cities nowadays though the general urban planning policy does not seem to be affected by the attacks.





# List of References

- Anheier, Helmut; Isar, Yudhishtir Raj (2011): *Heritage, Memory & Identity. The Cultures and Globalization Series No 4.* Sage, Los Angeles, London, New Dehli, Singapore, Washington DC.
- Askedal, Johanne (2012): ødelegger Oslo som kulturby. In: VG, 19.02.2012, 38
- Atteslander, Peter (2006): *Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung.* 11., neu bearb. und erw. Aufl.. Berlin, Schmidt.
- Bech Gjørsv, Alexandra et al. (2012): 22-julikommisjonens rapport. In: Norges offentlige utredninger. 2012:14. Available at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/pages/37994796/PDFS/NOU201220120014000DDDPDFS.pdf> [Accessed 04.10.2012]
- Bevan, Robert (2006): *The Destruction of Memory. Architecture at War.* Reaktion Books, London.
- Bjørndal, Sondre (2012): Minnested i regjeringskvartalet. In: NRK, 22.06.2012. Available at: <http://www.nrk.no/kultur-og-underholdning/1.8216223> [Accessed 28.09.2012]
- BMBF (2012): *Forschung für die zivile Sicherheit 2012 – 2017. Rahmenprogramm der Bundesregierung.* In: [http://www.bmbf.de/pub/rahmenprogramm\\_sicherheitsforschung\\_2012.pdf](http://www.bmbf.de/pub/rahmenprogramm_sicherheitsforschung_2012.pdf) [Accessed 30.08.2012]
- Bockstette, Carsten (2008): *Jihadist Terrorist Use of Strategic Communication Management Techniques.* European Center of Security Studies, Occasional Paper Series No. 20. Available at: [http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublishweb/MCDocs/files/College/F\\_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper\\_20-en.pdf](http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublishweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_20-en.pdf) [Accessed 30.08.2012]
- Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2007): *Definition von Terrorismus.* Available at: <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-geschichte/geschichte-der-raf/49218/definition-von-terrorismus?p=0> [Accessed 24.10.2012]
- Chomsky, Noam (2002): Who are the Global Terrorists? In: Booth, Ken; Dunne, Tim [eds.]: *Ken Booth & Tim Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order,* Palgrave Macmillan, New York. 128-140. In: <http://www.chomsky.info/articles/200205--02.htm> [Accessed 30.08.2012]
- Christmann, Gabriela; Ibert, Oliver; Kilper, Heiderose; Moss, Timothy et al. [2012]: *Vulnerability and Resilience from a Socio-Spatial Perspective. Towards a Theoretical Framework.* Working Paper no. 45, Erkner, Leibniz Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning. Available at: [http://www.irs-net.de/download/wp\\_vulnerability.pdf](http://www.irs-net.de/download/wp_vulnerability.pdf) [Accessed 30.08.2012]
- City of Oklahoma City (2012a): *Development Center.* Available at: <http://www.okc.gov/pw/devcen.html> [Accessed 29.10.2012]
- City of Oklahoma City (2012b): *About Oklahoma City.* Available at: <http://www.okc.gov/about/index.html> [Accessed 21.11.2012]
- City of Oslo (2006): *The Agency for Planning and Building Services.* Oslo.
- Coaffee Jon, O'Hare Dr. P., Hawkesworth Dr. M. (2009): The visibility of (in)security: The aesthetics of planning urban defences against terrorism. In: (2009) *Security Dialogue*, 40 (4-5), pp. 489-511.
- Coaffee, Jon (2004): *Rings of Steel, Rings of Concrete and Rings of Confidence: Designing out Terrorism in Central London pre and post September 11th.* In: *international*

al Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Volume 28, 1 March 2004, p. 201-11.

Coaffee, Jon (2013a): Terrorism, Risk and the City. In: urban resilience. Available at: <http://urbanresilience.net/research/risk-insurance-and-the-built-environment/> [Accessed 14.06.2013]

Coaffee, Jon (2013b): What do we measure in assessing urban resilience? In: urban resilience, weblog post, 13 June. Available at: <http://urbanresilience.net/2013/06/13/what-do-we-measure-in-assessing-urban-resilience/> [Accessed 14.06.2013]

Coaffee, Jon (2013c): Security cannot be guaranteed but resilient responses can... In: urban resilience, weblog post, 17 April. Available at: <http://urbanresilience.net/2013/04/17/security-cannot-be-guaranteed-but-resilient-responses-can/> [Accessed 14.06.2013]

CRIC - Cultural Heritage and the Re-construction of Identities after Conflict. Collaborative project funded by the European Commission, project duration: 2008-2012. Available at: <http://www.cric.arch.cam.ac.uk/index.php> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Department of Defense (2010): Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02. Available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new\\_pubs/jp1\\_02.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf) [Accessed 28.09.2012]

Department of Homeland Security (2012): Interagency Security Commission. Available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/interagency-security-committee> [Accessed 29.10.2012]

Department of Justice (1995): Justice Department issues Recommendations for Upgrading Federal Building Security. Available at: [http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre\\_96/June95/365.txt.html](http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/Pre_96/June95/365.txt.html) [Accessed 23.10.2012]

Diekmann, Andreas (2010): Empirische Sozialforschung : Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen. -Ausg., vollst. überarb. und erw. Neuausg., 4. Aufl., [21. Aufl. der Gesamtaufl.]. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt-Taschenbuch-Verlag.

Dixon, David (2012): Is Density Dangerous? The Architect's Obligations after the Towers fell. In: *Perspectiveness on Preparedness*, October 2002, No. 12, p. 1-12. Available at: <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/is%20density%20dangerous.pdf> [Accessed 23.10.2012]

Doss, Erika (2010): *Memorial Mania. Public Feeling in America*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London.

Døvik, Olav (2011): vil stenge bombegata allerede i 2004, In: NRK, 03.08.2011 <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.7737287> 25.09.2012 [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Drengenberg, David; Corley, Gene (2011): Evolution of Building Code Requirements in a Post 9/11 World. In: *Council of Tall buildings and Urban Habitat Journal*, 2011, Issue III, p.32-35. Available at: <http://www.ctbuh.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=%2BYb7cly6880%3D&tabid=2684&language=en-US> [Accessed 23.10.2012]

Drevon, Fredrik (2012): Høyblokka tilhører byrommet. In: *teknisk ukeblad*, 15.03.2012, 8-9

Ebbesen, Christian (2012): Introduction. In: "Tragedy Sites, Architecture and Values" Seminar, 12.03.2012, AHO, Oslo.

Eisinger, Peter (2004): The American City in the Age of Terror. A Preliminary Assessment of the Effects of September 11. In: *Urban Affairs Review*, September 2004, Vol. 40, No. 1, p.115-130. Available at: <http://uar.sagepub.com/content/40/1/115.full.pdf+html> [Accessed 31.10.2012]

Ekland, Mattias (2012): Site of heritage and Site of Memory. In: "Tragedy Sites, Archi-

ecture and Values” Seminar, 12.03.2012, AHO, Oslo.

Engel, Ulrike (2007): Architectures of securisation in Berlin. In. *“Architectures of fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West” CCCB Conference, 17-18 May 2007, Barcelona*. In. <http://www.publicspace.org/en/text-library/eng/b036-architectures-of-securisation-in-berlin> [Accessed 31.08.2012]

Europol (2012): TE-SAT 2012 - EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Available at: <https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf> [Accessed 19.10.2012]

FAD (2012a): Regjeringskvartalets framtid. Presentation by Rigmor Aasud on 26th of January in 2012. In. [http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/aktuelt/taler\\_og\\_artikler/minister/taler-og-artikler-av-fornyings--og-kirke/2012/regjeringskvartalets-framtid.html?id=670601](http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fad/aktuelt/taler_og_artikler/minister/taler-og-artikler-av-fornyings--og-kirke/2012/regjeringskvartalets-framtid.html?id=670601) [Accessed 08.09.2012]

FAD (2012b): Regjeringskvartalets framtid. Presentation by Rigmor Aasud on 26th of January in 2012. In. [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/120126\\_RAA\\_regjeringskvartalet.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/120126_RAA_regjeringskvartalet.pdf) [Accessed 08.09.2012]

FAD (2012c): Fremtidens regjeringskvartal. In. <http://blogg.regjeringen.no/regjeringskvartalet/> [Accessed 08.09.2012]

Falleth, Eva Irene; Hansen, Gro Sandkjær (2011): Participation in planning; a study of urban development in Norway. Refereed article No. 42, August, 2011, European Journal of Spatial Development. Available at: <http://www.nordregio.se/Global/EJSD/Refereed%20articles/refereed42.pdf> [Accessed 01.10.2012]

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (2012): FEMA-426 / BIPS-06: Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings. Building and Infrastructure Protection Series. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Available at: <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/st-bips-06.pdf> [Accessed 28.09.2012]

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)(2007): FEMA 430: Site and Urban Design for Security. Risk Management Series- Guidance Against Terrorist Attacks. Available at: <http://www.fema.gov/library/file;jsessionid=71BC73108CF40F5FDC7FD73CDC0CE109.Worker2Library?type=publishedFile&file=fema430.pdf&fileid=8b2475f0-d0db-11dc-af98-001185636fb7> [Accessed 28.09.2012]

Forsvarsdepartementet (1998): Lov om forebyggende sikkerhetstjeneste (sikkerhet-sloven). Available at: <http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19980320-010.html#map005> [Accessed 08.10.2012]

Fuglehaug, Wenche; Mjaaland, Ola (2011): Riksantikvaren krever at Høyblokka blir stående. In: Aftenposten, 21.12.2011, <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/Riksantikvaren-krever-at-Hoyblokken-blir-staende-6725518.html> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Graham, Stephen (2007): Architectures of fear: Terrorism and the future of urbanism in the West. In. *“Architectures of fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West” CCCB Conference, 17-18 May 2007, Barcelona*. In. <http://www.publicspace.org/en/text-library/eng/b026-architectures-of-fear-terrorism-and-the-future-of-urbanism-in-the-west> [Accessed 30.08.2012]

GSA (2001): New Oklahoma City Federal Building: Groundbreaking Set for Tuesday. Available at: <http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/100275> [Accessed 05.11.2012]

GSA (2012): Oklahoma City Federal Building. Available at: <http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101562> [Accessed 05.11.2012]

Hagberg, Thore (2012): Et unikt byggverk. In: Dagens Næringsliv, 19.01.2012, 63

Harald V, King of Norway (2011): Kong Haralds tale. Available at: <http://www.konge->

huset.no/c26939/nyhet/vis.html?tid=92852 [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Hetter, Katia (2012): Memorial tourism bears witness to tragedy. In: CNN, 28.05.2012. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/24/travel/memorial-tourism/index.html> [Accessed 24.10.2012]

Hoffmann, Heike (2008): **Post World Trade Center Planning** - Der Kampf um New York City's Ground Zero. Berlin: Univerlag TU Berlin.

Holme, Jørn (2011): Høyblokka – et nasjonalt monument. In: Aftenposten, 21.12.2011 <http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/Hoyblokken--et-nasjonalt-monument-6725426.html> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Home Office (2009): Safer Places - A Counter-Terrorism Supplement. Available at: [http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/safer\\_places\\_CT\\_supp.pdf](http://www.designforsecurity.org/uploads/files/safer_places_CT_supp.pdf) [Accessed 08.11.2012]

Home Office (2012): Protecting Crowded Places - Design and Technical Issues. Available at: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/crowded-places/design-tech-issues?view=Binary> [Accessed 28.09.2012]

Home Office: Protect. Available at: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/protect/> [Accessed 28.09.2012]

Jensen, Hugo Lauritz (2012): Maktens Høyblokk. In: D2, 17.02.2012, 12-24.

Jessen, Johann; Walther, Uwe-Jens (2008): Großstadtpolitik in England das Beispiel Manchester. In: Raumforschung und Raumordnung, Band: 66, Heft: 2, p. 152-167

Johansen, Alf Bjarne, Sæther, Anne Stine (2012): Høyblokka blir trolig revet - uansett utfall av rapport. In: VG nett, 18.12.2011 <http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10016866> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Justis- og Beredskapsdepartementet (1814): Kongeriget Norges Grundlov. Given i Rigsforsamlingen paa Eidsvold den 17de Mai 1814. Available at: <http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-18140517-000-002.html#2> [Accessed 17.10.2012]

Kidd, Alex (2004): Manchester in Prospect. In: Oswalt, Philipp (edit.): Shrinking cities - Manchester/Liverpool II. p. 65-74.

Kitchen, Ted (2001): Planning in Response to Terrorism: the Case of Manchester, England. In: Journal of Architectural and Planning Research, 18:4, Winter, 2001, p.325-340.

Klem, Cecilie (2012): Rom for gode byrom i Regjeringskvartalet, in. Arkitektnytt, 31.01.2012. Available at: <http://www.arkitektnytt.no/rom-for-gode-byrom-i-regjeringskvartalet> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Knap, Anne Merete (2012): minnesmerke og Museum. In: Aftenposten Aften, 18.01.2012, 33

Königliche Norwegische Botschaft (2009): Die Lokalverwaltung. Available at: [http://www.norwegen.no/About\\_Norway/policy/political/local/](http://www.norwegen.no/About_Norway/policy/political/local/) [Accessed 12.10.2012]

Königliche Norwegische Botschaft (2012): Fakten und Zahlen. Available at: [http://www.norwegen.no/About\\_Norway/Fakten-und-Zahlen/](http://www.norwegen.no/About_Norway/Fakten-und-Zahlen/) [Accessed 12.10.2012]

Kristiansen, Bjørn S. (2012): Jeg ønsker at høyblokka skal rives, slik at den ikke blir stående som et monument over terroren 22. juli. In: Dagbladet, 03.02.2012, Available at: [http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/02/03/nyheter/politikk/innenriks/terrorangrep\\_i\\_oslo/regjeringen/20065483/](http://www.dagbladet.no/2012/02/03/nyheter/politikk/innenriks/terrorangrep_i_oslo/regjeringen/20065483/) [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Larsen, Marius Helge (2012): Regjeringskvartalet åpnes for publikum. In: NRK, 28.06.2012, Available at: <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.8225701> [Accessed 25.09.2012]



09.08.2012]

Lewis, Carol W. (2000): The Terror that Failed: Public Opinion in the Aftermath of the Bombing in Oklahoma City. In: Public Administration Review, May/June 2000, Vol. 60, No. 3, p. 201-210.

Listerud, Gunnar (2012): Høyblokk for studenter. In: Aftenposten, 04.01.2012, 24-25.

Marcuse, Peter (2007): The threat of terrorism and existential insecurity: Urban policy responses. In: . *"Architectures of fear. Terrorism and the Future of Urbanism in the West"* CCCB Conference, 17-18 May 2007, Barcelona. Available at: <http://www.public-space.org/en/text-library/eng/b027-the-threat-of-terrorism-and-existential-insecurity-urban-policy-responses> [Accessed 31.08.2012]

Mason, Randall (2012): Values-Centered Conservation and Tragedy Sites. In: "Tragedy Sites, Architecture and Values" Seminar, 12.03.2012, AHO, Oslo.

Miljøverndepartementet (2008): LOV 2008-06-27 nr 71: Lov om planlegging og byggesaksbehandling (plan- og bygningsloven). Available at: <http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-20080627-071-010.html#6-4> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Miljøverndepartementet (2009): LOV 2009-06-05 nr 35: Lov om naturområder i Oslo og nærliggende kommuner (markaloven). Available at: <http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20090605-035.html#6> [Accessed 04.10.2012]

Moss, John (2011): The IRA Bombing of City Centre Manchester - June 1996. Available at: <http://www.manchester2002-uk.com/buildings/bombing.html> [Accessed 07.11.2012]

Münkler, Herfried (2006): Die Strategie des Terrorismus und die Abwehrmöglichkeiten des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Akademievorlesung am 1. Juni 2006). Available at: [http://edoc.bbaw.de/volltexte/2009/1214/pdf/II\\_01\\_Muenkler.pdf](http://edoc.bbaw.de/volltexte/2009/1214/pdf/II_01_Muenkler.pdf) [Accessed 30.08.2012]

Nipen, Kjersti (2012): Skal gjøre kulturminnevernet urbant. In: Aftenposten Morgen, 23.09.2012, p.8

NTB (2011a): -Jer er ikke alene. In: abc nyheter, 25.07.2011. Available at: <http://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/110725/politiet-vil-lukke-fengslingsmotet> [Accessed 24.10.2012]

NTB (2011b): Rigor Aasrud – Jeg følte meg aldri utrygg. In: VG nett, 20.12.2011 [www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10024622](http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/22-juli/artikkel.php?artid=10024622) [Accessed 25.09.2012]

NTB (2012): Vil ha idèkonkurranse om regjeringskvartalet. In: Aftenposten Aften, 28.03.2012, 10

OCCAS (2012): "Tragedy Sites, Architecture and Values" Seminar, 12.03.2012, AHO, Oslo. Available at: <http://occas.aho.no/events/tragedy-sites-architecture-and-values/> [Accessed 31.08.2012]

Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum (2012) History & Mission. Available at: <http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=1&catid=193> [Accessed 03.11.2012]

Oslo Kommune (2012): Plankontoret for Groruddalen - Om Groruddalssatsingen. Available at: [http://www.prosjekt-groruddalen.oslo.kommune.no/om\\_groruddalssatsingen/](http://www.prosjekt-groruddalen.oslo.kommune.no/om_groruddalssatsingen/) (Accessed 01.10.2012).

Oslove, internet presence, Available at: <http://www.oslove.no/om> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

Østrem, Olav (2012): utsettelse = bevaring?. In: klassekampen, 05.01.2012, 27

- Politidirektoratet (2012): Gjenoppbygning av Regjeringskvartalet – sikkerhetsmessige vurderinger. Notat til FAD 25.01.2012, Available at: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/RKV\\_politiet.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/RKV_politiet.pdf) [Accessed 08.09.2012]
- Ravnaas, Niels Ruben (2012): Vil flytte alle til Østkanten. In: NA24, 01.02.2012. Available at: <http://www.na24.no/article3325929.ece> [Accessed 25.09.2012]
- Riksantikvaren (2011): Regjeringskvartalet og Høyblokka — statlig verneplan og verne vurdering – Notat til FAD, 22.12.2011. Available at: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/RKV\\_Riksantikvaren\\_vedl.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/RKV_Riksantikvaren_vedl.pdf) [Accessed 25.09.2012]
- Roede, Lars (2012): Høyblokken må stå. In: Klassekampen, 19.01.2012, 21
- Rubin, Gabriel (2010): Balancing Fear. Why Counter-Terror Legislation was blocked after the Oklahoma City and London Bombings. In: *Historia Actual Online*, Spring 2010, No. 22, p. 125-142.
- Sarreiter, Benedikt (2007): Terror-Schutzwälle – Architektur der Angst, in: *süddeutsche Zeitung*, 10.04.2007. Available at: <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/terror-schutzwaelle-architektur-der-angst-1.893860> [Accessed 30.08.2012]
- Savitch, Hank V: (2008): *Cities in a Time of Terror. Space, Territory, and Local Resilience*. Sharpe, Armonk, London.
- Seehusen, Joachim (2012a): Politiet vil samle Regjeringskvartalet. In: *Teknisk Ukeblad*, 27.01.2012. Available at: <http://www.tu.no/bygg/2012/01/27/politiet-vil-samle-regjeringskvartalet> [Accessed 25.09.2012]
- Seehusen, Joachim (2012b): Regjeringskvartalet er fortsatt terrorutsatt. In: *Teknisk Ukeblad*, 29.06.2012. Available at: <http://www.tu.no/bygg/2012/06/29/regjeringskvartalet-er-fortsatt-terrorutsatt> [Accessed 25.09.2012]
- Seip, Elisabeth (2012a): Regjeringskvartalet etter 22.07.2011. Available at: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/Statsbygg\\_vedl5.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/Statsbygg_vedl5.pdf) [Accessed 25.09.2012]
- Silverberg, Susan; Rogers, Robert (2011): *Architecture, Public Planning, and Security*. Interview on The Leonard Lopate Show, WNYC, 06.09.2011, AVAILABLE AT: <http://www.wnyc.org/shows/lopate/2011/sep/06/architecture-public-planning-and-security/> [Accessed 25.09.2012]
- Smith, Stephanie (2007): The Interagency Security Committee and Security Standards for Federal Buildings. In: CRS Report for Congress. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homsec/RS22121.pdf> [Accessed 23.10.2012]
- Solheim Vigmostad, Nina Christin (2010): Resiliens i møte med katastrofer og terror. Et litteraturstudium av faktorer som har betydning for resiliensutvikling etter eksponering for katastrofer og terror. Available at: <http://www.duo.uio.no/publ/isp/2009/98061/MasterxNCSVigmostad%5B1%5D.pdf> [Accessed 30.08.2012]
- State of Oklahoma (2006): Oklahoma Building Code. Available at: [http://archive.org/stream/gov.ok.building/ok\\_building#page/n3/mode/2up](http://archive.org/stream/gov.ok.building/ok_building#page/n3/mode/2up) [Accessed 29.10.2012]
- Statsbygg (2011): Regjeringskvartalet – Føringer for videre arbeid. Available at: [http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/RKV\\_Statsbygg\\_rapport.pdf](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FAD/Vedlegg/RKV/RKV_Statsbygg_rapport.pdf) [Accessed 08.09.2012]
- Stige, Morten (2011): Unngå ny rivetabbe, in: *Dagens Næringsliv Morgen*, 23.12.2011, 70
- Stoltenberg, Jens (2011): Statsminister Jens Stoltenbergs tale på Rådhusplassen, in: *Aftenposten*, 25.07.2011, <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/iriks/.T8d0DsX4IzQ> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

cessed 25.09.2012]

Strand, Arne; Storvik, Kaia (2012): Ikke riv Høyblokka. In: Dagsavisen, 27.01.2012, 2

Strande, Mona (2011): Britiske rådgivere: Slik bør regjeringskvartalet sikres. In: Teknisk Ukeblad, 11.08.2011. Available at: <http://www.tu.no/bygg/2011/08/11/britiske-radgivere-slik-bor-regjeringskvartalet-sikres> [Accessed 25.09.2012]

The National Counterterrorism Center (2012): Report on Terrorism 2011. Available at: [http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2011\\_NCTC\\_Annual\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](http://www.nctc.gov/docs/2011_NCTC_Annual_Report_Final.pdf) [Accessed 22.10.2012]

The White House (1995): Presidential Decision Directive 29, 21<sup>st</sup> of June in 1995. Available at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm> Accessed 29.10.2012]

Thompson, Benjamin P.; Bank, Lawrence C. (2007): Risk Perception in Performance-Based Building Design and Applications to Terrorism-Resistant Design. In: Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, February 2007, p.61-69.

Ulstein, Hege (2012): La stå!. In: Dagsavisen, 07.01.2012, 3

Utenriksdepartementet (2012): minifakta om Norge 2012. Available at: <http://www.ssb.no/emner/00/minifakta/no/mf2012-nor-web.pdf> [Accessed 12.10.2012]

Vale, Lawrence J.; Campanella, Thomas J. (2005): Conclusion – Axioms or resilience. In: Vale, Lawrence J.; Campanella, Thomas J. (ed): The Resilient City: How Modern Cities Recover from Disaster. Oxford University Press, USA, p.335 – 352.

Viejo-Rose, Dacia (2011): Destruction and Reconstruction of Heritage: Impacts on Memory and Identity. In: Anheier, Helmut; Isar, Yudhishtir Raj (2011): Heritage, Memory & Identity. The Cultures and Globalization Series No 4. Sage, Los Angeles, London, New Dehli, Singapore, Washington DC.

Wang-Naveen, Mala; Sandberg, Lotte (2012): Munch til Høyblokken, in. Aftenposten Morgen, 28.01.2012, 3-4

Wernersen, Camilla (2012): Nordmenn vi ha mer overvakning. In: NRK, 24.09.2012. Available at: <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/norge/1.8329605> [Accessed 12.10.2012]

Williams, Gwyndaf; Batho, Stuart; Russel, Lynne (2000): Responding to urban crisis - The emergency planning response to the bombing of Manchester city centre. In: Cities, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 293–304.

Yin, Robert K. (2009): Case study research: design and methods. 4. ed. .Los Angeles, Sage.

# Personal Communication

Engh, Pål Henry (2012): Interview with Experts on “Urban Planning after Terrorism – Case Study Oslo”. Interview by Franziska Paizs. [telephone], Oslo/Berlin, 11.09.2012. together with transcript.

Felberg, Knut (2012): Interview with Experts on “Urban Planning after Terrorism – Case Study Oslo”. Interview by Franziska Paizs. [Email], Oslo/Berlin, 12.08.2012. together with transcript.

Grønhaug, Vigdis; Buset, Dagfinn (2012): Sikkerhetslovens forhold til plan- og bygningsloven. [Letter], 08.11.2012.

Grøntunn, Knut (2012): Interview with Experts on “Urban Planning after Terrorism – Case Study Oslo”. Interview by Franziska Paizs. [Email]. Oslo/Berlin, 09.08.2012. together with transcript.

Hytten, Fredrik (2012): Bakgrunnen til ”Oslove”. [Email], 24.09.2012.

Molaug, Petter B. (2012): Talk about the consideration of Cultural Heritage in Oslo. Interview by Franziska Paizs. [face to face], Oslo, 12.11.2012. together with transcript.

Seip, Elisabeth (2012b): Interview with Experts on “Urban Planning after Terrorism – Case Study Oslo”. Interview by Franziska Paizs. [telephone] Oslo/Berlin, 12.09.2012. together with transcript.

Skarholt, Berit (2012): Interview with Experts on “Urban Planning after Terrorism – Case Study Oslo”. Interview by Franziska Paizs. [face to face], Bygg- og Planetaten Oslo, 26.03.2012. together with transcript.

Voss Gabrielsen, Guro (2012): Hjelp for masteroppgave om Regjerigskvartalet. [Email], 19.09.2012.

Wright, Ole (2012): Tanker om Utøya. [Email], 11.05.2012.

**Weitere Publikationen aus dem  
Institut für Stadt- und  
Regionalplanung**





Nr. 77

Ragna Körby & Tobias Kurtz

## Das Parlament der Visionen

Entwurf für einen partizipativen Stadtplanungsprozess

Kann Bürgerbeteiligung Spaß machen? Bring Beteiligung in der Stadtplanung überhaupt was? Erreicht man immer nur die gleichen Leute? Machen Politik und Verwaltung am Ende doch nur das, was sie für richtig halten? Bürgerbeteiligung ist aktuell ein stark strapazierter Begriff. Alle wollen sie, weil sie eine stärkere Legitimation für die Entscheidungsträger und eine Annäherung zwischen Politik und Bürgern verspricht aber keiner weiß so genau, wie das gehen soll. Die etablierten Formate der Beteiligung werden zunehmend in Frage gestellt, formalisierbare neue Methoden sind rar. Das Parlament der Visionen ist eine Annäherung an dieses Feld mit dem Ziel, Stadtplanung mit anderen Mitteln zu kommunizieren, anders darüber zu reden und vor allem, die dahinter liegenden Vorstellungen von einer guten und richtigen Stadtentwicklung offen zu diskutieren.

2012, 146 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2415-2

14,90 €



Nr. 76

Sylvia Butenschön (Hrsg.)

## Frühe Baumschulen in Deutschland

Zum Nutzen, zur Zierde und zum Besten des Landes

Ein zunehmendes Interesse an ausländischen Gehölzen, die Beschäftigung mit der Pomologie und die Verbreitung des Landschaftsgartens führten in der 2. Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts zur Gründung zahlreicher Baumschulen in Deutschland, über die bislang wenig bekannt ist. Dieser Tagungsband gibt einen Einblick in das Forschungsfeld der frühen Baumschulen. Die Beiträge behandeln die Entstehung der verschiedenen Typen von Baumschulen im Überblick sowie die theoretischen Anforderungen an ihre Organisation und Gestaltung. Als ausgewählte Beispiele werden Anlagen in Hannover, Kassel, Harbke, Schwöbber, Hamburg und Eldena im Detail vorgestellt.

2012, 195 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2414-5

14,90 €



Nr. 75

Michael König

## Regionalstadt Frankfurt

Ein Konzept nach 100 Jahren Stadt-Umland-Diskurs in Berlin, Hannover und Frankfurt am Main

Die Suburbanisierung führt in Großstadtreionen zu erheblichen Stadt-Umland-Problemen, die erforderliche regionale Koordination scheitert aber meist an politischen Widerständen. Diese Arbeit untersucht die Probleme, Konflikte und Lösungen, mit dem Ergebnis, dass Großstadtreionen in einer Gebietskörperschaft existent werden müssen. Drei solcher Vereinigungsprojekte (Berlin 1920, Frankfurt 1971, Hannover 2001) werden vorgestellt und der politische Wille der Landesregierung als entscheidender Faktor identifiziert. Aus den Fallbeispielen wird ein Entwurf für eine vereinte Stadtregion Frankfurt abgeleitet. Denn nur durch innere Befriedung und staatliche Unterstützung kann die Region ihre Energien auf den internationalen Metropolenwettbewerb konzentrieren.

2009, 224 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2114-4

12,90 €



Nr. 74

Mathias Güthling

## Innerstädtische Brachflächen

Untersuchungen zur Umgestaltung von innerstädtischen Bahnflächen am Beispiel des Reichsbahnausbesserungswerkes Potsdam

Obwohl flächenhafte Bahnliegenschaften weit verbreitet als Potenziale der Stadtentwicklung gelten, haben zahlreiche Kommunen Schwierigkeiten bei der Umstrukturierung ehemaliger Ausbesserungswerke. Diese sind aufgrund ihrer früheren Nutzung und der zugehörigen Bebauungsstruktur gegenüber anderen entbehrlichen Bahnflächen von besonderer Charakteristik. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, ob die brachgefallenen Flächen der Ausbesserungswerke für die betroffenen Städte doch eher Risiken und Belastungen als Chancen und Potenziale darstellen. Sind sie lediglich eine von vielen Flächenreserven oder kann dieser Typus von Bahnbrache einschließlich der prägenden Bebauung als wichtiger Baustein für die Stadtentwicklung fungieren?

2009, 221 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2107-6

12,90 €

# Sonderpublikationen



Sylvia Butenschön (Hrsg.)

## **Garten – Kultur – Geschichte** **Gartenhistorisches Forschungskolloquium 2010**

Der Tagungsband des Gartenhistorischen Forschungskolloquiums 2010 gibt einen aktuellen Einblick in das von WissenschaftlerInnen verschiedener Disziplinen aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven beleuchtete Forschungsfeld der Gartengeschichte. So behandeln die 20 Textbeiträge Aspekte der Gartenkultur aus einem Zeitraum von über 400 Jahren und einem Betrachtungsgebiet von ganz Europa - von den Wasserkünsten in Renaissancegärten über das Stadtgrün des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zu Hausgärten des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts und Fragen des denkmalpflegerischen Umgangs mit Freiflächen der 2. Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts.

2011, 134 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2340-7

**14,90 €**




Ursula Flecken, Laura Calbet i Elias (Hg.)

## **Der öffentliche Raum** **Sichten, Reflexionen, Beispiele**

Der öffentliche Raum ist zugleich konstituierendes Element und Gedächtnis der Stadt. Er ist in höchstem Maße komplex und unterliegt ständigen Veränderungen. In der Entwicklung der Städte muss er deshalb immer wieder neu verhandelt werden. Raumwissenschaften und Stadtplanung haben als integrale Disziplinen den Anspruch, unterschiedlichste Perspektiven zum öffentlichen Raum zusammen zu führen. Dieser Sammelband bietet ein vielschichtiges Bild der Funktionen, Aufgaben und Bedeutungen des öffentlichen Raumes. Er versteht sich als Beitrag, der die aktuelle Debatte bereichern und voranbringen soll.

2011, 250 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2318-6

**19,90 €**



Stephanie Herold, Benjamin Langer, Julia Lechler (Hrsg.)

## **Reading the City** **Urban Space and Memory in Skopje**

The workshop "Reading the city" took place in Skopje in May 2009 and followed the hypothesis that every historical, political, and social development and trend is mirrored in the city's built environment. Cities, accordingly, consist of a multitude of layers of narratives and thus become an image of individual and collective memory. Investigating different sites of the city under this focus, the publication shows, how history is mirrored in the urban space of Skopje today, how it is perceived and constructed, and which historical periods influence the city's current planning discourse.

2010, 153 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2129-8

**13,90 €**



Adrian Atkinson, Meriem Chabou, Daniel Karsch (Eds.)

## **Stratégies pour un Développement Durable Local** **Renouvellement Urbain et Processus de Transformations Informelles**


This document contains the output of a conference and action planning workshop that took place in Algiers over five days in early May 2007. The theme of the event was urban renewal with a focus on sustainable development. 62 participants attended the event from 13 countries in the framework of the URDN, sponsored and supported by the École Polytechnique d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme of Algiers. Academics, professionals and government officials from architecture, planning and including the private development sector presented papers and discussed both the technical and institutional issues as to how planning systems and the redevelopment process can be more effective in addressing sustainability issues ranging from the supply of resources, through urban design to concern with appropriate responses to climatic and geographical considerations.

2008, 223 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2086-4

**13,90 €**

Das vollständige Programm finden sie unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de)

# Diskussionsbeiträge



Nr. 59

Isabella Haidle, Christoph Arndt

## Urbane Gärten in Buenos Aires

Im Zuge der Modernisierung und Industrialisierung im letzten Jahrhundert geriet die Praxis des innerstädtischen Gemüseanbaus jedoch weitgehend aus dem Blickfeld der Stadtplanung. In der Realität verschwand sie niemals ganz, sondern bestand informell weiter. Erst die Krisen der Moderne bzw. das Ende des fordistischen Entwicklungsmodells haben weltweit zu einer intensiveren theoretischen Beschäftigung mit kleinteiligen, vor Ort organisierten, informellen Praxen geführt. Die Interaktion der GärtnerInnen mit der Stadtentwicklung und Stadtplanung rückt seit einigen Jahren ins Zentrum des Interesses. Die AutorInnen versuchen zwischen der Planung und den Ideen der GärtnerInnen zu vermitteln, indem sie mögliche Potenziale und Defizite der einzelnen Projekte aufzeigen und Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten formulieren.

2007, 204 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2053-6

9,90 €



Nr. 58

Guido Spars (Hrsg.)

## Wohnungsmarktentwicklung Deutschland Trends, Segmente, Instrumente

Die Wohnungsmarktentwicklung in Deutschland ist zunehmend von Ausdifferenzierungsprozessen auf der Nachfrage- und der Angebotsseite geprägt. Die Teilmärkte entwickeln sich höchst unterschiedlich. Die Parallelität von Schrumpfung und Wachstum einzelner Segmente z.B. aufgrund regionaler Bevölkerungsgewinne und -verluste, der Überalterung der Gesellschaft, der Vereinzelung und Heterogenisierung von Nachfragern, des wachsenden Interesses internationaler Kapitalanleger stellen neue Anforderungen an die Stadt- und Wohnungspolitik, an die Wohnungsunternehmen und Investoren und ebenso an die wissenschaftliche Begleitung dieser Prozesse.

Mit Beiträgen von Thomas Hafner, Nancy Häusel, Tobias Just, Frank Jost, Anke Bergner, Christian Strauß, u.a.

2006, 313 S., ISBN 3 7983 2016 0

9,90 €



Nr. 57

Ulrike Lange/Florian Hutterer

## Hafen und Stadt im Austausch Ein strategisches Entwicklungskonzept für einen Hafenbereich in Hamburg

In den zentral gelegenen Hafenbereichen von Hamburg hat in den letzten Jahren ein Umwandlungsprozess eingesetzt, der noch immer andauert. Allgemein zurückgehende Investitionstätigkeit und die unsichere wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, sowie räumliche Besonderheiten des Ortes lassen Zweifel aufkommen, ob die viel praktizierte Masterplanung für eine Entwicklung der Hafenbereiche am südlichen Elbufer geeignet ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit schlägt daher eine Strategie der Nadelstiche vor. Für die Umstrukturierung dieses Hafenbereichs soll eine Herangehensweise angewendet werden, die sich die sukzessiven Wachstumsprozesse einer Stadt zu eigen macht. Durch Projekte als Initialzündungen und ausgewählte räumliche Vorgaben soll unter Einbeziehung wichtiger Akteure ein Prozess in Gang gebracht und geleitet werden, der flexibel auf wirtschaftliche, soziale und räumlich-strukturelle Veränderungen reagieren kann.

2006, 129 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2016-1

9,90 €



Nr. 56

Anja Besecke, Robert Hänsch, Michael Pinetzk (Hrsg.)

## Das Flächensparbuch Diskussion zu Flächenverbrauch und lokalem Bodenbewusstsein

Brauchen wir ein „Flächensparbuch“, wenn in Deutschland die Wirtschafts- und Bevölkerungsentwicklung stagniert oder sogar rückläufig ist? Ja, denn trotz Stagnation der Wirtschafts- und Bevölkerungsentwicklung wächst die Inanspruchnahme von Flächen für Siedlungs- und Verkehrszwecke. Dies läuft dem Ziel zu einem schonenden und sparsamen Umgang mit der Ressource Boden und damit dem Leitbild einer nachhaltigen Siedlungsentwicklung entgegen. Das Gut „Fläche“ ist vielseitigen Nutzungsansprüchen ausgesetzt und dessen Inanspruchnahme ist aufgrund divergierender Interessen häufig ein Streitthema. Dieser Sammelband soll die aktuelle Diskussion aufzeigen, die auf dem Weg zu einer Reduktion der Flächenneuanspruchnahme von den verschiedenen Akteuren geprägt wird. Dabei reicht der Blick von der Bundespolitik bis zur kommunalen Ebene und von der wissenschaftlichen Theorie bis zur planerischen Praxis.

2005, 207 S., ISBN 3 7983 1994 4

9,90 €

Das vollständige Programm finden sie unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de)



Nr. 49


Gabi Dolff-Bonekämper & Annemarie Rothe

## **Die Kirchenburgenlandschaft Siebenbürgens Strategien zur Erhaltung des europäischen Kulturerbes der Kirchenburgen in Siebenbürgen/Rumänien**

Die einzigartige europäische Kulturlandschaft der siebenbürgischen Kirchenburgen ist durch die Veränderungen seit 1989 in großer Gefahr. Dem über 800 Jahre gepflegten Kulturerbe der Siebenbürger Sachsen droht durch Abwanderung und den demografischen Wandel der Verfall. Neue Ansätze und Strategien zum Erhalt der Kirchen, Wehranlagen und Nebengebäude sind dringend erforderlich. In dem Strategiekonzept werden die Situation der Baudenkmäler und der sie umgebenden Dörfer analysiert und Anregungen für den zukünftigen Umgang aufgezeigt.

2013, 111 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2618-7

**kostenloser download unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe)**



Nr. 48

Henry Wilke

## **Raum ist Zeit Zeitentfernungskarten als Orientierungssystem im städtischen Fußverkehr**

Zeitentfernungskarten bilden das Verhältnis von räumlicher und zeitlicher Distanz ab. Am Beispiel von Webanwendungen und Orientierungssystemen europäischer Städte werden Isochronenkarten im Fußverkehr untersucht. Fokussiert wird dabei der Unterschied zwischen abstrakten Darstellungen, deren Distanzen lediglich Luftlinien entsprechen und realitätsnahen Abbildungen, die alle räumlichen und topografischen Parameter berücksichtigen. Eine nicht repräsentative Umfrage kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Nutzer eine einfache und klar verständliche Karte höher bewerten als eine detailreiche und realistische Darstellung.

2013, 83 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2439-8

**kostenloser download unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe)**



Nr. 46

Michael Färber

## **Energetische und Soziale Problemlagen in Berlin Eine GIS-gestützte Untersuchung von energieeffizienter Wohngebäudesanierung im Hinblick auf sozioökonomisch schwache Gebiete**

Die Arbeit „Energetische und Soziale Problemlagen in Berlin - Eine GISgestützte Untersuchung von energieeffizienter Wohngebäudesanierung im Hinblick auf sozioökonomisch schwache Gebiete“ untersucht vor dem Hintergrund zunehmender Relevanz von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen die Zusammenhänge von Gebäudebeständen, Sanierungskosten und sozialräumlichen Daten auf räumlicher Ebene am Beispiel Berlin. Dabei werden energetische Problemlagen und soziale Problemlagen identifiziert, miteinander verschränkt und darüber eine soziale Dimension der energetischen Stadterneuerung erschlossen.

2013, 177 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2434-3

**kostenloser download unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe)**



Nr. 45

Ursula Flecken, Florian Hutterer (Hrsg.)

## **Public Space in Outer Warsaw: Ideas for the large housing estate Ursynów Urban Design Workshop 2011**

Zwischen dem ISR und der Politechnika Warschau besteht seit 20 Jahren eine Kooperation. Deren Schwerpunkt ist ein jährlicher Entwurfsworkshop, in dem polnische und deutsche Studierende zusammenarbeiten. 2011 widmete sich der Workshop dem öffentlichen Raum in einer Warschauer Plattenbausiedlung. Dieses Heft zeigt die Ergebnisse daraus. Gemeinsam ist ihnen eine intensive Beschäftigung mit Qualitäten des Freiraums, mit der Aktivierung der Bewohner und mit sozioökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen. Mit diesem Fokus leisten die Entwürfe einen Beitrag zur Debatte, wie Großsiedlungen weiter qualifiziert werden sollen.

2012, 65 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2437-4

**kostenloser download unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de/grauereihe)**

# Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung



2012

## 40 Jahre Städtebauförderung – 50 Jahre Nachmoderne

Das Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2012 ist das 20. Jahrbuch, nachdem kurz nach der Wende 1990/91 die erste Ausgabe erschienen war. Zentraler Anlass für die aktuell geleistete Reflexion über Errungenschaften, Standortbestimmung und Perspektiven der Stadterneuerung war das 40jährige Jubiläum des Städtebauförderungsgesetzes, das bis heute als Besonderes Städtebaurecht in weiterentwickelter Form den rechtlichen Rahmen der Bund-Länder-Städtebauförderung und damit die Stadterneuerung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland maßgeblich bestimmt. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Herausbildung der noch immer gültigen Grundprinzipien einer Bestandspolitik, die Zug um Zug auf weitere Quartierstypen und stadtentwicklungspolitische Herausforderungen angepasst und übertragen wurden. Dabei geht es sowohl um die beziehungsreiche Nachzeichnung und Einordnung des historischen Wandels in der Planungs- und insbesondere Stadterneuerungskultur als auch um die Reflexion der Wirkungsmächtigkeit nachmoderner Prinzipien in der Bestandsentwicklung.

2012, 369 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2420-6

20,90 €



2011

## Stadterneuerung und Festivalisierung

Seit zwei Jahrzehnten wird das Thema der Festivalisierung der Stadtplanung und der Stadterneuerung kontrovers diskutiert. Kleine und große Festivals und diverse Veranstaltungen unterschiedlichen Formats sind weiter en vogue, und derartige Events werden gezielt als strategisches Instrument der Stadtpolitik eingesetzt. Auch in den letzten Jahren spielen sie als Internationale Bauausstellungen, Gartenschauen und ähnliche Ereignisse für Stadtbau und Stadterneuerung eine besondere Rolle. Anlass genug, dieses Thema – inzwischen durchgängig Gegenstand von Stadtforschung und Planungstheorie – in diesem Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung schwerpunktmäßig aufzunehmen und in den einzelnen Beiträgen aus verschiedenen Perspektiven kritisch zu reflektieren. Daneben werden auch in diesem Jahrbuch neben dem Schwerpunktthema Lehre und Forschung theoretische und historische Aspekte der Stadterneuerung sowie auch Praxen im In- und Ausland in den Beiträgen thematisiert.

2011, 378 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2339-1

20,90 €



2010

## Infrastrukturen und Stadtbau

Das Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2010 beinhaltet in diesem Jahr den Schwerpunkt „Soziale und technische Infrastruktur im Wandel“. Die Rahmenbedingungen, der Stellenwert und der Zusammenhang von Infrastruktur und Stadterneuerung haben sich in den letzten Jahren gravierend verändert. Schrumpfende Städte, Rückbau, kommunale Haushaltsprobleme und der Niedergang sowie die Schließung von Einrichtungen, die in früheren Stadterneuerungsphasen mit öffentlichen Mitteln gefördert wurden, machen eine Neubewertung und eine differenzierte Bestandsaufnahme erforderlich, um neue Herausforderungen zu reflektieren. Vor dem Hintergrund des demographischen Wandels sind „bewährte“ Strukturen für Bemessung, Bau, Betrieb und Nutzung von Infrastrukturen im Kontext des Stadtbaus in Frage gestellt. Neben diesem Schwerpunktthema werden Lehre und Forschung, theoretische und historische Aspekte der Stadterneuerung sowie auch neue Praxen im In- und Ausland in den Beiträgen thematisiert.

2010, 376 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2230-1

20,90 €



2009

## Megacities und Stadterneuerung

Das Jahrbuch Stadterneuerung 2009 widmet sich dem Schwerpunkt Stadterneuerung und Stadtbau in den rasch wachsenden Metropolen des Südens. Die wachsende Wohnungsnot, Elendsviertelentwicklung, Verkehrschaos, Umweltprobleme und Klimaschutz erfordern ein Umdenken und machen prekäre globale Abhängigkeiten auch für die „Erste Welt“ deutlich.

Die Beiträge in diesem Band beziehen sich neben theoretischen und historischen Aspekten der Stadterneuerung vor allem auf Einordnungen, Fallstudien und Handlungsansätze von Mega-Städten vor dem Hintergrund sehr unterschiedlicher Problemlagen und Akteurskonstellationen. Bisherige Muster und „bewährte“ Konzepte der Stadterneuerung und des Stadtbaus werden durch die epochale Krise in Frage gestellt, und es gilt stärker denn je nach innovativen Konzepten der Bestandsentwicklungspolitik zu suchen, mit denen auf die weltweiten komplexen Herausforderungen reagiert werden kann. „Yes, we can?“

2009, 343 S., ISBN 978-3-7983-2134-2

18,90 €

Das vollständige Programm finden sie unter [www.isr.tu-berlin.de](http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de)



# Portrait des Instituts für Stadt- und Regionalplanung

---

Menschen beanspruchen in sehr unterschiedlicher Art und Weise ihren Lebensraum. Die damit verbundenen Auseinandersetzungen um verschiedene Nutzungsansprüche an den Boden, die Natur, Gebäude, Anlagen oder Finanzmittel schaffen Anlass und Arbeitsfelder für die Stadt- und Regionalplanung. Das Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung (ISR) an der Technischen Universität Berlin ist mit Forschung und Lehre in diesem Spannungsfeld tätig.

## **Institut**

Das 1974 gegründete Institut setzt sich heute aus sieben Fachgebieten zusammen: Bestandsentwicklung und Erneuerung von Siedlungseinheiten, Bau- und Planungsrecht, Denkmalpflege, Orts-, Regional- und Landesplanung, Planungstheorie, Städtebau- und Siedlungswesen sowie Stadt- und Regionalökonomie. Gemeinsam mit weiteren Fachgebieten der Fakultät VI Planen Bauen Umwelt verantwortet das Institut die Studiengänge Stadt- und Regionalplanung, Urban Design, Real Estate Management und Urban Management.

Mit dem Informations- und Projektzentrum hat das ISR eine zentrale Koordinierungseinrichtung, in der die Publikationsstelle und eine kleine Bibliothek, u.a. mit studentischen Abschlussarbeiten angesiedelt sind. Der Kartographieverbund im Institut pflegt einen großen Bestand an digitalen und analogen Karten, die der gesamten Fakultät zur Verfügung stehen.

## **Studium**

Stadt- und Regionalplanung an der Technischen Universität Berlin ist ein interdisziplinärer und prozessorientierter Bachelor- und Masterstudiengang. Die Studierenden lernen, bezogen auf Planungsräume unterschiedlicher Größe (vom Einzelgrundstück bis zu länderübergreifenden Geltungsbereichen), planerische, städtebauliche, gestalterische, (kultur-)historische, rechtliche, soziale, wirtschaftliche und ökologische Zusammenhänge zu erfassen, in einem Abwägungsprozess zu bewerten und vor dem Hintergrund neuer Anforderungen Nutzungs- und Gestaltungskonzepte zu entwickeln.

Traditionell profiliert sich das Bachelor-Studium der Stadt- und Regionalplanung an der TU Berlin durch eine besondere Betonung des Projektstudiums. Im zweijährigen konsekutiven Masterstudiengang können die Studierenden ihr Wissen in fünf Schwerpunkten vertiefen: Städtebau und Wohnungswesen, Bestandsentwicklung und Erneuerung von Siedlungseinheiten, örtliche und regionale Gesamtplanung, Raumplanung im internationalen Kontext oder Stadt- und Regionalforschung.

Internationale Kooperationen, unter anderem mit China, Italien, Polen, Rumänien und dem Iran, werden für interdisziplinäre Studien- und Forschungsprojekte genutzt.

## **Forschung**

Das Institut für Stadt- und Regionalplanung zeichnet sich durch eine breite Forschungstätigkeit der Fachgebiete aus. Ein bedeutender Anteil der Forschung ist fremdfinanziert (sog. Drittmittel). Auftraggeber der Drittmittelprojekte sind die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), die Europäische Kommission, Ministerien und deren Forschungsabteilungen, Bundesländer, Kommunen, Stiftungen und Verbände sowie in Einzelfällen Unternehmen. Eine weitere wichtige Forschungsleistung des Instituts sind Dissertationen und Habilitationen.

Die Ergebnisse der Forschungsprojekte fließen sowohl methodisch als auch inhaltlich in die Lehre ein. Eine profilgestaltende Beziehung zwischen Forschungsaktivitäten und Studium ist durch den eigenen Studienschwerpunkt „Stadt- und Regionalforschung“ im Master vorgesehen.

Sowohl über Forschungs- als auch über Studienprojekte bestehen enge Kooperationen und institutionelle Verbindungen mit Kommunen und Regionen wie auch mit anderen universitären oder außeruniversitären wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen.

Weitere Informationen über das ISR finden Sie auf der Homepage des Instituts unter: <http://www.isr.tu-berlin.de/> und in dem regelmäßig erscheinenden „ereignIS.Reich“, das Sie kostenlos per Mail oder Post beziehen können.