

**A Commentary on the *De predestinatione et
prescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome on the
Basis of MS Cambrai BM 487 (455)**

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To My Father Karl Heinz Holstein

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Abbreviations

AN	Archives Nationales Paris
BM Cambrai	Bibliothèque Municipale Cambrai
BNF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France Paris
<i>C.U.P.</i>	H. Denifle, A. Chatelain, <i>Chartularium Universitati Parisiensis</i> [...], vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), vol. 2 (Paris, 1891), vol. IV (Paris, 1897).
CCSL	Corpus Christianorum Series Latina
Gallia Christiana	<i>Gallia Christiana in provincias ecclesiasticas distributa</i> [...] (Paris, 1715-1865).
PG	Patrologia Graecae
PL	J.P. Migne (ed.), <i>Patrologia cursus completus. Series latina</i> (Paris, 1844-64).
ST	Thomas Aquinas, <i>Summa theologiae</i>

Abstract (German)

Thema der Dissertation ist "A Commentary on the *De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome on the Basis of MS Cambrai BM 487 (455)". Es handelt sich um einen historischen Kommentar des theologisch-philosophischen Traktates 'De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno' (1287-90), der sich zum Ziel gesetzt hat, die Denkansätze von Aegidius von Rom, als auch seine Standpunkte bezüglich der Glaubenslehre auszuleuchten. Der Kommentar zeigt auf, wie ein einzelner theologischer Traktat im Kontext der 1285 wiederaufgenommenen Universitätslaufbahn von Aegidius und seinem besonderen Interesse an der Studienorganisation seines Ordens zu beurteilen ist, und in welcher Weise sein Verhältnis zu kirchlichen und universitären Amtsgewalten zu sehen ist.

De predestinatione ist ein vielseitiger Traktat, der in seinen drei Hauptteilen im argumentativen Aufbau große Unterschiede aufweist. Es ist ein bis heute unerforschter Text, dessen Analyse weitere Aspekte von Aegidius' Denkstruktur und seines theologischen und philosophischen Standpunktes im Zusammenspiel mit seinen Zeitgenossen, darunter vor allem der Kirchen- und Universitätsautoritäten, aufzeigt. Sehr auffällig ist seine häufige und umfassende Bezugnahme auf Augustinus, allerdings nicht in der Art und Weise der neoaugustinischen Schule des 14. Jahrhunderts. *De predestinatione* entstand 1287-90 kurz nach Wiederaufnahme von Aegidius' Universitätskarriere und ist für zukünftige Theologiestudenten des Augustinereremitenordens an der Universität Paris gedacht und erfüllte sicherlich den wachsenden Bedarf seines Ordens an einem Lehrbuch. Die Auswahl der behandelten Themen ist, soweit bekannt, einzigartig. Obwohl es sich bei diesem Text nur um ein Lehrbuch für angehende Theologiestudenten handelt, schmälert dies Aegidius' Leistung als Scholastiker nicht. Der Text ist ein wichtiges Zeitdokument und ein möglicher Wegbereiter für die 'augustinische Schule' des 14. Jahrhunderts.

Abstract (English)

This dissertation "A Commentary on the *De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome on the basis of MS Cambrai BM 487 (455)" provides a historical commentary of the theological and philosophical treatise *De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno* by Giles of Rome, written ca. 1287-90. It aims to show how Giles presents and structures his argument and how he tackles the combination of theological and philosophical questions and his viewpoints concerning predestination, paradise and hell. The commentary demonstrates the importance and standing of a single theological treatise within the context of Giles's resumed university career (1285), his particular interest in the educational organisation of his own Order and his relationship with Church or university authorities.

De predestinatione is a mainly theological treatise that to date has passed by modern scholarship, which is not unusual for Giles's theological oeuvre. It covers a wide-ranging number of topics whose arrangement of questions is unique amongst contemporary works. These are related to the conditions of human existence before and after death. It is a compilation of texts, some of which Giles took from previous works such as his *Sentence* commentaries and his quodlibetal questions. Its style considerably varies between the three main sections and points towards prospective theology students of Giles's Order, the Hermits of St Augustine, as the audience for whom he intended the treatise. Its date of composition c. 1287-90 places it at a point of Giles's career when he received widespread recognition and respect. Although *De predestinatione* is only a textbook for future theology students this does not diminish Giles's achievements as a scholastic. The text is an important historical document and possibly paved the way for the 'Augustinian School' of the 14th century.

Key Words (German)

Abbild des Körpers (Seele), Aegidius Romanus, Anselm von Canterbury, Aristoteles, *auctoritas*, Augustinereremiten (OESA), Barmherzigkeit, Baum der Erkenntnis von Gut und Böse, Baum des Lebens, Bernhard Gui, Boethius, Bonifaz VIII., Celestin V. , Claudius Ptolemäus, Colonna, *Constitutiones Ratisbonenses*, Dämonen (Hölle), *De Genesi ad Litteram*, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, Determinismus, Engel, Erkenntnis Gottes, Erzbistum Bourges, Etienne Tempier, Fall, *fatum*, Fegefeuer, Flüsse des Paradieses, Gerechtigkeit (göttlich), Giles of Rome, Godfrey von Fontaines, Gottes Barmherzigkeit, Gottes *notitia*, Gottes Vorhersehung, Gottes Vorherwissen, Gottes Wissen, Heinrich von Friemar, Henrich von Ghent, himmlisches Paradies, Hölle, Hölle (körperlich), Hölle (nicht körperlich), Intellekt, irdisches Paradies, Jordan von Sachsen, Kardinaltugenden, kontingente Gründe, Kontingenz, Leiden der Seele (Hölle), *licentia docendi*, *locus*, Neo-Augustinismus (14. Jahrhundert), notwendige Ursachen, Notwendigkeit, Paradies, Philipp IV. von Frankreich, Schriftsinne, *scientia*, Seele (entkörperlicht), Seelenkräfte, Seligkeit, Sinne, Thavene von Thalomeis, Universität Paris, Verurteilungen von 1277, *virtus* (göttlich), *virtus animae*, Vorherbestimmung, Willensfreiheit, William von Nangis, William von Tocco.

Key Words (English)

1277 condemnations, Aegidius Romanus, angels, Anselm, Archbishopric of Bourges, Aristotle, *auctoritas*, Augustine, beatific vision, beatitude, Bernard Gui, Boethius, Boniface VIII, cardinal virtues, celestial paradise, Celestine V, *caritas*, Claudius Ptolemaeus, Colonna family, *Constitutiones Ratisbonenses*, contingency, contingent causes, corporeal fire, corporeal paradise, *De Genesi ad Litteram*, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, demons (hell), determinism, disembodied soul, divine justice, divine *virtus*, Etienne Tempier, Fall (human), *fatum*, four rivers of paradise, four senses of Scripture, future contingents, Giles of Rome, Gilles de Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, God's foreknowledge, God's grace, God's knowledge, God's *notitia*, God's providence, hell, hell's corporeality, Henry of Friemar, Henry of Ghent, Hermits of St Augustine, human free will, images of the body, incorporeal hell, intellect, intellectual appetite, Jordan of Saxony, *licentia docendi*, *locus*, necessary causes, necessity, new Augustinian movement (14th century), paradise, Philip IV of France, powers of the soul, predestination, purgatory, science, secondary causes, sense perception, separated soul, soul, soul's suffering in hell, spiritual paradise, spiritual vision, suffering of disembodied spirits, terrestrial paradise, Thavene of Thalomeis, tree of life, tree of the knowledge of good and evil, University of Paris, *virtus animae*, vision of God, William of Nangis, William of Tocco.

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General Introduction

Giles of Rome (c. 1243-1316) has long been recognised as one of the prominent thinkers of the generation after Thomas Aquinas. He is the author of over sixty treatises in the fields of theology, philosophy and Church politics. An Augustinian Hermit from early adolescence he soon moved to his Order's recently established study house at Paris (c. 1258). As a member of a recently founded mendicant Order he was amongst the first Augustinian Hermits to pursue his studies at the University of Paris. In 1277 shortly before Giles was due to obtain the *licentia docendi*, an enquiry by a commission established by the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, resulted in Giles's censure on the grounds that some of his teachings were judged to be erroneous. In 1285, after an eight-year absence from the academic world during which time Giles occupied several positions in his Order's Roman province, his case was re-examined. This resulted in Giles's retraction of a modified list of erroneous articles and in his being granted the *licentia docendi*. In 1287 the Augustinian Hermits took the unusual step of declaring his teachings the doctrine of his Order. In 1295 Giles left Paris to take up the position of Archbishop of Bourges, which he had obtained mainly because of his good relationship with Pope Boniface VIII. Giles died at Avignon in 1316.

Many facets of Giles's thought have yet to be discovered, which then, set into the context of an unconventional and remarkable career, will contribute to a comprehensive interpretation of an important scholastic author. An assiduous and exhaustive analysis of Giles's work, especially of the treatises written after 1277 and of those written after his reinstatement in 1285, is likely to provide further evidence for the interpretation of the events of 1277 which is a decisive moment in Giles's (academic) career. This is the case for a number of Giles's political and philosophical works, but these are mostly related to specific historical circumstances and events for which they were commissioned (the political struggles of Boniface VIII and the council of Vienne, to name but two examples). Nonetheless there are many of his works that still await a comprehensive investigation.

This thesis attempts to contribute to the need for further research. It provides an historical commentary on a theological and philosophical treatise in an attempt to reveal Giles's patterns of thought, as well as his doctrinal standpoints. Giles's work cannot be seen without taking into account external factors such as his professional relationship with his contemporaries, especially Church and University authorities. Thus, this thesis

aims to place a single theological treatise into the context of Giles's resumed academic career and his pronounced interest in the educational organisation of his Order. The analysis of doctrinal issues – philosophical, theological and scientific – hopes to contribute towards a better understanding of the origin and (contemporary) setting of Giles's thought and teachings.

Giles's *De predestinatione et prescientia, paradiso et inferno* particularly fits the exigencies of this project. This mainly theological treatise is an intriguing text because of its date of composition, style and content. Written c. 1287-90, it stems from Giles's time as a teacher at the Faculty of Theology at Paris, after his teaching had been declared the doctrine of his Order. *De predestinatione* covers a wide range of topics, which suggests that Giles did not only have an academic audience in mind, but wrote the treatise for the theological education of prospective students of his Order. Large and extensive paraphrases of Augustinian texts together with long quotations confirm this impression. Since Giles took an active role in organising his Order's educational system, his Order needed textbooks to ensure such teaching. Section two of *De predestinatione*, on paradise, shows its practical implementation. A lengthy and textual presentation and explanation of Augustine would not have benefited the academic audience of the Faculty of Theology at Paris, who were well acquainted with his works, and would have regarded parts of *De predestinatione* only as a minor academic contribution. Also, most of the predominantly 'academic' chapter twelve was already known as part of Giles's second *Quodlibet*, question nine: a mere repetition adds little to current theological debates. Yet there was the students' need of a textbook, a demand the treatise certainly fulfilled, in particular those most advanced who were shortly to begin their studies of theology at the University of Paris. It also constitutes a prestigious work for Thavene of Thalomeis to whom the treatise is dedicated.

The treatise's content covers a wide-ranging number of topics that are related to the conditions of human existence before and after death and it is divided into three main sections containing fifteen chapters on predestination and foreknowledge (chapters one to three), paradise (chapters four to seven) and hell (chapters eight to fifteen). The lack of an explicit rationale for the treatise's composition is noteworthy: Giles refrains from transitions between the different sections as well as between the chapters: each section is separate. The combination of issues seems to be unique amongst contemporary works and begs the questions whether Giles followed any contemporary

or previous model for the structuring of *De predestinatione*. Moreover, in the introductory part of chapter fifteen, Giles himself alludes to a shorter title of the work called *De predestinatione et prescientia*, which might indicate that the first three chapters originally formed an independent work, to which Giles later added his thoughts on paradise and hell. This, however, is no proof for the publication of the treatise in two versions, and I do not believe Giles published these chapters individually.¹

The first section on predestination touches upon an issue that forms a central part of the Christian tradition, but does not belong to the core of Christian theology. Giles is part of that tradition, and defends the existence of human free will, maintaining that God's foreknowledge does not put any constraint upon free human decisions. Giles holds mainly an Augustinian position, combined with fitting elements of other authors such as Boethius and Anselm, not, however, Thomas Aquinas. Giles presents no own doctrine, his positions are conventional, but there is not enough extant documentation to point out the reasoning behind it. A formal discourse, mostly in philosophical terms characterises the most difficult part of the treatise, the distinctions given on necessity. Giles's position did not close the discussion of the question (even at the resurfacing of the issue in the late twentieth century Giles's analysis did not reappear). Only one point is noteworthy: the original if embryonic discussion of the metaphysical quality of an event, which, however, does not have any (known) continuation in others of Giles's works.

Giles's second part on paradise shows a considerable variation in both rhetoric and style to the other two sections, using the well-established formal structure of the interpretation of the four senses of Scripture. Its main characteristic is the preoccupation with setting down well-established Church doctrine without commenting upon it, quite reminiscent of a sermon, in contrast to the dialectical form of the argument in sections one and three. Giles reflects the predominantly theological nature of the topic, which was not subject to academic disputes but was an accepted part of orthodox Church doctrine, which in the judgement of scholastic authors did not need any further proof or explanation. Giles's choice of argumentation is also influenced by the textual basis of part two, Genesis 2. Since Giles accepts that it is impossible for a living human being to

¹ See the preface of *De predestinatione*, which contains no such mentioning: Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione*, preface, MS Cambrai Bibliothèque Municipale 487 (455), called thereafter MS Cambrai, fol. 28^{va} l. 10-39.

attain certain knowledge of the divine (in this case paradise), any human speculation is pointless and he consequently refrains from it: Giles only elucidates the subject as far as possible. The subject probably well fitted the exigencies for pre-academical theological education at the Parisian Augustinian convent, more than the requirements of academic discussions at the Faculty of Theology at Paris. The composite structure of part two might also point towards a different use of the sections, but does not help to elucidate Giles's motivation in structuring the treatise. Section two also follows Augustine very closely, in particular his *De Genesi ad Litteram*, and again points towards the use of *De predestinatione* as a textbook.

Giles's interpretation of hell offers an argumentation presented in no particular or reasoned order and reverts to the dialectical style of section one. The topics cover hell's corporeality, the extent of God's pity towards the damned, the mechanism of suffering in hell, purgatory and the question of eternal punishment. There is no internal or external logic for the section's composition, which makes it sometimes difficult to follow Giles's discourse. The placing of some arguments within the section seems to be arbitrary. In this section the argumentation reflects the current debates on hell in the late thirteenth century. Repeated references to orthodoxy point out the treatise's use as a textbook rather than Giles's past experiences with Church authorities. Again, some chapters contain extensive paraphrases of Augustine, which compared to other passages of *De predestinatione*, are closest to the original Augustinian text. Differences in style between the different chapters stem from the style of the works they are taken from. This applies in particular to chapter twelve, which is in parts taken from Giles's second *Quodlibet*, question nine.

It should be noted that *De predestinatione* is the proof that there was no serious eclipsing of Augustine's influence amongst Paris intellectuals of the late thirteenth century. Giles's positions are not yet part of the Neo-Augustinian movement, since his work is more committed to presenting Augustine's standpoints rather than to take them as a starting point to develop an independent Neo-Augustinian concept. *De predestinatione* presents the essential knowledge Giles is likely to have expected from his students, confirming the view that it was a teaching tool for his own Order.

This thesis is divided into four chapters, beginning with a survey of Giles's biographical details, and continuing with an analysis of the three sections of *De predestinatione*: predestination, paradise and hell.

1 Giles of Rome: A Biographical Background

1.1 Introduction

Giles of Rome (c. 1243-1316), sometime Prior General of the Order of Augustinian Hermits, eminent theologian at the University of Paris, and Archbishop of Bourges, was the author of over sixty treatises in the fields of theology, philosophy and Church politics. His opinion was valued and discussed by his contemporaries, amongst them Pope Boniface VIII, who frequently sought his advice. Despite his temporary exclusion from the University of Paris from 1277 to 1285 as a consequence of the Tempier condemnations, he was nevertheless acclaimed as the first university teacher in theology of the Augustinian Hermits. In an unusual move – in his own lifetime – Giles's teachings were declared the doctrine of his Order. His choice to defend his teachings but nonetheless ultimately to retract his contested positions in order to be granted the *licentia docendi* provides the background for a career, which was turbulent at times. It was his close relationship with Boniface VIII that earned him the appointment as Archbishop of Bourges. Although this formally ended Giles's university career at Paris, he was yet to write some of his important treatises in theology and philosophy, as well as in matters of the Church temporal. A general study of thought for Giles of Rome is still missing. For the time being individual studies of his treatises allow an appreciation which school of thought Giles adhered to, or else, whether his positions constitute an independent school of thought. Giles's contemporaries certainly valued his work and thought, not only those belonging to his own Order bound to follow his teachings which were declared binding for the Augustinian Hermits in 1287.² It is difficult to date Giles's works, since in most cases a chronology depends upon cross-references in his writings. It is not the primary aim of this chapter to establish such a chronology, except in those cases where this contributes to placing *De predestinatione* into the context of Giles's career, or to elucidate his whereabouts.³

² C.U.P. II, no. 539, p. 10: "[Aegidius] qui modo melior de tota villa in omnibus reputatur". On the Order's decision of 1287 see below, pp. 36-7.

³ The most comprehensive attempts of dating Giles's works are G. Bruni, *Le opere di Egidio Romano (catalogo critico)* (Florence, 1936); S. Donati, 'Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I. Le opere prima del 1285 – I commenti aristotelici. II. Note sull'evoluzione della struttura e dello stile dei commenti', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*: Part I: I,1 (1990), pp. 1-111; Part II: II,1 (1991), pp. 1-74; P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie à Paris au 13^e siècle* (Paris, 1933-34), pp. 293-308; P.W. Nash, 'Giles of Rome and the Subject of Theology', *Mediaeval Studies* 18 (1956), pp. 61-92; D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the 14th century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions

Modern scholarship has contributed towards a better understanding of Giles's origins and some aspects of his career at the University of Paris, yet his life cannot be based upon a comprehensive critical biography. There are very few recent works that outline his life and career. The majority date from around the turn of the century, but their reasoning more often than not is speculative; in some cases they are little more than an eulogy to Giles.⁴ In the chapter that follows I shall attempt to outline the major developments of Giles's career as a frame of reference to place *De predestinatione* in its historical context. This bio-bibliographical study is necessarily preliminary to an in-depth discussion of the doctrinal issues discussed in the treatise in chapters two to four. It supplies an assessment of the conditions under which Giles worked, and the priorities he chose in the pursuit of his career. This in turn will allow a better understanding of his thought and doctrine. In particular, this survey shows that *De predestinatione* fits in with one particular stretch of Giles's career in the years 1287-90. This is also reflected in the treatise's internal characteristics – the resumption of his formal teaching at Paris which coincides with his efforts to help his Order's preparation for academic studies.⁵

1.2 Sources

In contrast to a number of his contemporaries, such as Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent, Giles's life and work is fairly well documented by contemporary sources, with the exception of his early life and his studies at Paris. The *Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia* series currently seeks to establish the extent and nature of Giles's auto-references, some of which are known already, and gives some insight into his teachings and whereabouts. Unfortunately very few volumes of the project have been published – Wielockx's *Apologia* and Luna's *Repertorio dei sermoni* are the notable exceptions – and further references have to be sought in widely scattered modern research on Giles.

and Book-Lore', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 146-274; R. Wielockx, *Apologia*, Aegidio Romani Opera Omnia III,1 (Florence, 1985), p. 240.

⁴ B. Burgard, 'Un disciple de Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Gilles de Rome', *Revue Augustinienne* 52 (1906), pp. 151-60; J.R. Eastman, 'Das Leben des Augustiner-Eremiten Aegidius Romanus (ca. 1243-1316)', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 4th series, 38, 100.3 (1989), pp. 318-39; P. Glorieux, *Répertoire*; M.A. Hewson, *Giles of Rome and the Medieval Theory of Conception. A Study of the De formatione corporis humani in utero* (London, 1975); F. Lajard, 'Gilles de Rome. Religieux Augustin, Théologien', *Histoire littéraire de la France* [...], B. Hauréau (ed.), vol. 30 (Paris, 1888), pp. 421-566; P.F. Mandonnet, 'La carrière scolaire de Gilles de Rome', *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 4 (1910), pp. 480-99; N. Mattioli, *Studio critico sopra Egidio Romano Colonna arcivescovo di Bourges dell' ordine romitano di Sant' Agostino*, Antologia Agostiniana, vol. 1 (Rome, 1896).

⁵ See chapter two, pp. 49, 64-5, 67 and chapter three, pp. 79, 117.

Some of Giles's near-contemporaries and members of his Order sought to gather information about the history of the Order from the early years since the foundation of the Order in 1256, and Giles was a prominent figure to be included in such efforts. These works were also prompted by a dispute erupting in the late 1320s between the Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine and the Augustinian Canons over which Order was most genuinely the true heir of Augustine.⁶ Jordan of Saxony and Henry Friemar the Elder provide some information about Giles's life and work. Both were members of the Hermits of St Augustine and their writings have to be assessed in view of their allegiance to this Order. Henry Friemar (c. 1245-1340) was the first to write about the origin and development of his Order in his *Tractatus de origine et progressu Ordinis Fratrum Eremitarum S. Augustini et vero ac proprio titulo eiusdem*, c. 1334, which can be seen as the Order's first historical legitimization.⁷ Judging by his date of birth he might have met Giles, which is probably not the case for Jordan of Saxony (c. 1299- c. 1380), who was Provincial of the Saxon-Thuringian province, and was later appointed by the pope to conduct visitations of the French houses of his Order. He wrote *Vitasfratrum*, a history of the Augustinian Order, completed in 1357, which is an extensive commentary on the Order's Rule and *Constitutio*.⁸ William of Tocco, a Dominican, offers details of Giles's studies under Thomas Aquinas, having been one of Thomas' students himself.⁹ General Inquisitor of the kingdom of Naples from 1300, he was charged in 1295 by the first provincial of Naples to gather documents for a *legenda* of Thomas, and in 1317 by the chapter of the Sicilian province to prepare for Thomas' canonisation.¹⁰ Their evidence has to be viewed in the context of their allegiance to their canonical origins, which is likely to have influenced the choice and presentation of information. Both Henry and Jordan, as the earliest annalists of the Augustinian Hermits, refrain from mentioning Giles's difficulties with Church authorities at Paris in 1277 and only state his achievements. These are his works, the *licentia docendi* at Paris, various posts within his Order and the position as Archbishop of Bourges.

⁶ A.D. Fitzgerald (OSA, ed.), *Augustine through the Middle Ages. An encyclopedia*, s.v. 'Late Scholasticism', pp. 754-9, esp. p. 755. See also E.L. Saak, 'The Creation of Augustinian Identity' I, *Augustiniana* 49 (1999), pp. 109-64, II, pp. 251-86.

⁷ Saak, II, p. 275.

⁸ Saak, II, p. 269.

⁹ William of Tocco, *Life of St Thomas Aquinas, Acta Sanctorum quotquot toto orbe coluntur* [...], J. Bollandus (ed.) (Antwerp, 1643), vol. 1, *Martii*, 663.

¹⁰ R. Aubert, *Guillaume de Tocco*, *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques*, ed. R. Aubert, vol. 22 (Paris, 1988), col. 1027.

The cartulary of the University of Paris (*C.U.P.*) includes the letter of Pope Honorius IV which settled the problems raised by the refusal of the *licentia docendi* to Giles in 1277. It also gives extracts of Giles's donations of 1315 and 1316.¹¹ The *Acts* of the Roman province of the Augustinian Hermits as well as those of General Chapters and their decisions have been preserved and provide precise dates for biographical details mentioned in *Vitasfratrum*. They also help to establish an itinerary of Giles's whereabouts and his steady rise within his Order between 1277 and 1285, the date of his return to the University of Paris. The registers of Popes Boniface VIII, Benedict IX, Clement V and John XXII contain valuable contemporary references to Giles's time as Archbishop of Bourges. Various permissions for *procuraciones* reflect his changing relationships with these popes. Complementary to this is the *Continuatio* of the Chronicle of William of Nangis, an older contemporary of Giles. He recalls Giles's differences with Clement V and his involvement in the enquiry about the teachings of Peter Olivi.¹² Again, his evidence has to be contrasted with parallel information contained in the register of Clement V on payments made by Giles. On Giles's death and burial, a list established by Bernard Gui, provides valuable information such as the date and place of his burial.¹³

A survey of the primary sources shows that there are few inconsistencies in the information they provide. Nonetheless, not all biographical details are trustworthy, but these can be followed back to misreadings and editorial errors in the sources and documents these authors had at their disposal, combined with a keenness to embrace their most positive interpretation. Giles's origins are a prime example for this selective presentation.

1.3 Origins and Formative Years

Giles's date of birth is uncertain. He was born in Rome in the second half of the thirteenth century, but there is no extant documentation concerning the exact day and

¹¹ AN Paris, S 3634 n° 1, 2.

¹² J. Koch, 'Das Gutachten des Aegidius Romanus über die Lehren des Petrus Johannes Olivi. Eine neue Quelle zum Konzil von Vienne (1311-1312)', in: *Scientia Sacra. Theologische Festschrift zugeeignet Seiner Eminenz dem hochwürdigsten Herrn Karl Joseph Kardinal Schulte, Erzbischof von Köln zum 25. Jahrestage der Bischofsweihe 19.3.1935* (Cologne-Düsseldorf, 1935), pp. 142-68.

¹³ Bernard Gui, *Nomina episcoporum Lemoviciensium, auctore Bernardo Guidonis, Lodovensii episcopo*, Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France, vol. 21 (Paris, 1855), p. 756.

year of his birth.¹⁴ It is most likely that Giles was born c. 1243, which fits in with the age requirements for his entry into the Order of the Hermits of St Augustine and for his degrees at the University of Paris. The absence of contemporary information on his date of birth is quite usual. His name, attested by thirteenth-century manuscript references as *frater Egidius Romanus* and by his contemporary Henry Friemar as *venerabilis pater et dominus magister Aegidius Romanus* suggests that he was born in Rome.¹⁵ Henry makes no reference to his family origins, a fact that suggests that he was not a member of one of the powerful Roman noble families. No allusion is made to his membership of the Colonna family until Jordan of Saxony, an assumption that was widely accepted by biographers and scholars until well into the twentieth century.¹⁶ It is possible that the inaccuracy is based upon an editorial error either in the *Acta* of the Roman province of the Augustinian Hermits or in another document, now lost, that Jordan consulted.¹⁷ Whether Giles was a Colonna or not is of central importance in the interpretation of his political works and action at the end of the thirteenth century, especially in the conflict which opposed Pope Boniface VIII and King Philip IV of France. Giles wrote *De renunciatione papae* refuting a tract written by Boniface's opponents, to challenge his election. These opponents were members of the Colonna family. Were Giles a member of this family, his attitude and motivation in opposing his family would need explanation. Dyroff has shown that documents contained in the *Acta* of the Roman province of the Augustinian Hermits served a conscious distinction between *Aegidius Romanus* and other members of the Colonna family: whenever a family name occurs, it is always used. This proves that Giles was not known by his family name but only by his Roman origins, which indicates that he was not a member of the Colonna family.¹⁸ This evidence, other papal documents and manuscripts of Giles's own works render it

¹⁴ The year 1247 is suggested by some (Lajard, p. 422; Mattioli, p.1; G. Boffito, *Saggio di bibliografia egidiana. Precede uno studio su Dante, S. Agostino ed Egidio Colonna (Romano)* (Florence, 1911), p. XX; Scholz, p. 32) following the assumption of early modern biographers such as Rocca that he was sixty-nine years old at his death (F.A. Rocca, *Opera Omnia*, II (Rome, 1719), p. 10). 1247 is succinctly dismissed by F. Mandonnet, 'La carrière scolaire de Gilles de Rome', *Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 4 (1910), pp. 480-99, (followed by U. Mariani, *Scrittori politici Agostiniani del secolo XIV* (Florence, 1949), p. 10 and Eastman, p. 318).

¹⁵ See BNF MS Lat. 14568; MS Lat. 15863; Cambrai, MS BM 487 (455); R. Arbesmann, 'Henry of Friemar's "Treatise on the Origin and Development of the Order of Hermit Friars" and its true and real title', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 37-56, esp. p. 114, l. 98-102.

¹⁶ "frater Aegidius Romanus, de nobili genere Columnensium ortus", *Vitasfratrum*, p. 236.

¹⁷ This is the solution offered by Eastman, p. 318.

¹⁸ A. Dyroff, 'Aegidius von Colonna? - Aegidius Coniugatus?', *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 38 (1925), p. 27, explaining that Jordan might have confused Giles with Jacobus de Columpna, whose early career was comparable to that of Giles, and who became *lector* when Giles became Prior General in 1291 (pp. 23, 27).

most likely that he was not a Colonna. In the context of the present edition and commentary his family origins are of less importance in the evaluation of his philosophical and theological thoughts since his family origins are unlikely to have influenced his judgement in these fields.

There is no indication why Giles, or indeed his parents, chose the Order of the Hermits of St Augustine. Founded close to Giles's own birth, Pope Alexander IV confirmed the Order in 1256 in his bull *Licet ecclesiae catholicae*, uniting five congregations of hermits in order to solve the problem of itinerant preachers.¹⁹ In March 1256 the first general chapter was held in the church of St Maria del Popolo in Rome. Giles probably joined the Order around 1258 in Rome at the convent of St Maria del Popolo when he had reached the statutory age of fifteen. Jordan of Saxony records that Giles entered the convent of the Augustinian Hermits but does not explicitly say that it was their Roman convent. He states that after a short period of time Giles was sent to Paris to continue his studies at the Faculty of Theology²⁰. Giles's donation of 1316 recalls that he was a member of the Parisian convent of the Augustinian Hermits from early childhood.²¹ This presumes that he went to Paris soon after 1259 at the age of sixteen or seventeen: the earliest possible date of entry is 1259 when the study house was founded. His later involvement in the Roman province of the Order points towards long-standing links with the Roman region, possibly through the Roman house where he first joined the Order. According to Jordan's narrative, Giles made immediate and astonishing progress and was sent to Paris to continue his studies there. Modern biographers have tried to explain Giles's early itinerary, arguing that an entry into the Order in early adolescence is likely to have precluded a move from Rome to Paris at that age (Mandonnet). In this view, Giles remained in the Roman convent until the beginning of his formal studies at Paris.²² This solution would explain Giles's Roman origins (*Romanus*) but contradicts the evidence from Giles's donation which clearly refers to his early membership of the Parisian convent. In my opinion, Giles joined the Augustinian Hermits at their convent in Rome and was sent shortly afterwards to the new study house in Paris. Only a few documents attest to Giles's studies at Paris and

¹⁹ D. Gutiérrez, *Die Augustiner im Mittelalter 1256-1356, Geschichte des Augustinerordens*, vol. 1 (Würzburg, 1985), p. 26. See also Saak, 'The Creation of Augustinian Identity' I, pp. 110-27.

²⁰ "et post modicum tempus ad sacrae theologiae studium Parisius destinatur", Jordan of Saxony, [...] *Vitasfratrum* [...] (Rome, J. Martinellus, 1587), p. 236.

²¹ "Fratr Aegidius, Bituricensis archiepiscopus, Ordini fratrum Heremitarum S. Augustini et specialiter conventui Parisiensi de cuius uberibus a pueritia nutritus fuit", Paris, AN S 3634, n. 4.

nothing is known about his earlier studies.²³ Presumably, Giles followed the usual course, receiving a thorough instruction on the Bible at his convent. As a friar he probably did not read for an Arts degree, since he was supposed to cover the material for such a degree in his house. Eastman assumes that Giles obtained the Master of Arts in 1266 but does not give any documentation.²⁴ He would then become a biblical bachelor (*baccalaureus biblicus*), the minimum age limit being twenty-five years of age; this was probably *c.* 1267. Then, for about one or two years, he would have heard lectures and disputes on the *Sentences* under a master belonging to the Faculty of Theology.²⁵ Based upon the assumption of a regular progression of Giles's studies he obtained the *baccalaureus sententiarius* in *c.* 1269. He would then continue to read for the *baccalaureus formatus*, which he could obtain after having taken part in ordinary and extraordinary public disputations (*quodlibeta*) and after having given a university sermon. A large number of Giles's sermons are extant and have been edited but unfortunately they cannot be dated except within the Church calendar.²⁶

No documents attest to the Master of Theology Giles was assigned to, following the regulations of the Statutes of the University.²⁷ It is not known whether he chose his master. Courtenay argues that the brief regencies of masters in the mendicant Orders and their system of selecting students for the baccalaureate in the late thirteenth century discouraged if not prohibited the development of strong master-pupil ties. This may well have been the case for Giles, explaining why there is no extant information on this for Giles.²⁸ In his case it is likely that there was an 'arrangement' between the Dominicans and the Augustinian Hermits, since there was no master of his own Order he could work with: Giles would be the first from his Order. According to the testimony of William of Tocco, biographer of Thomas Aquinas, Giles was Thomas' pupil for thirteen years,

²² Mandonnet, 'La carrière scolaire', p. 481.

²³ On the situation at the University of Paris in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century see W.J. Courtenay, 'The Parisian Faculty of Theology', in: J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, A. Speer (ed.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte (Miscellanea Medievalia*, vol. 28) (Berlin, 2001), pp. 235-47.

²⁴ Eastman, p. 320, following Gutiérrez, *Dictionnaire d'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques*, vol. 6 (Paris, 1967), col. 385.

²⁵ Mandonnet, 'La carrière scolaire', p. 482.

²⁶ C. Luna, *Repertorio dei Sermoni*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia I.6 (Florence, 1990).

²⁷ "Nullus sit scholaris Parisius, qui certum magistrum non habeat", *C.U.P.*, I, p. 79, n. 20.

²⁸ Courtenay, 'The Parisian Faculty', p. 245.

including Thomas' second stay in Paris from 1269 to 1272.²⁹ This span of time has been called into question by modern scholarship, since it implies that Giles followed Thomas to Italy³⁰, which is a view I concur with.³¹ The treatise *Liber contra gradus et pluralitatem formam*, written by Giles during the years 1277-78, offers a vigorous defence of Thomas' doctrine on the unicity of substantial form in creatures. It shows that Giles was impressed by Thomas' teaching on this matter.³² However, calling Giles an authentic disciple of Thomas Aquinas is going too far.³³ Nash qualifies this statement as a legend that originated in the fifteenth century when the authorship of the *Correctorium Quare* was attributed to Giles by the editor.³⁴ Eardley shows that Giles further develops Thomas' intellectualist action theory³⁵, showing his indebtedness to Thomas at the same time as making several crucial adjustments to Thomas' theory by openly claiming that the will is able to move itself independently of the intellect.³⁶ Brett explains that Giles holds positions contrary to Aquinas, such as on the qualities of nature after the Fall, which in his view has no intrinsic goodness in terms of natural or moral legitimation.³⁷ Gossiaux holds that Giles was no Thomist although Giles's works show Thomas' influence on many points, and criticises Thomas where he thinks it necessary.³⁸ Olszewski states that Giles not only criticizes Averroes in his treatise *De plurificatione intellectus possibilis*, but that he equally refutes Thomas' opinion in no uncertain terms.³⁹ At the same time Olszewski maintains that Thomas and Giles belong to the

²⁹ "quidam Magister Eremitarum Frater Aegidius, qui postmodum fuit Archiepiscopus Bituricensis, qui tredecim annis iustum Magistrum audiverat", William of Tocco, *Acta Sanctorum*, p. 672.

³⁰ Mandonnet, p. 483; Lajard and Mattioli assume that Tocco exaggerates his estimate.

³¹ This view is backed also by P.S. Eardley, 'Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Will', in: *The Review of Metaphysics. A Philosophical Quarterly* 56.4 (2003), issue 224, pp. 835-62, esp. p. 850: "I depart, then, from modern exegetes who have implied that because Giles was a pupil of Aquinas, he must therefore have been an intellectualist". Eardley thereby calls into question the very statement that Giles was a pupil of Aquinas.

³² R.W. Dyson, *Giles of Rome on Ecclesiastical Power. The De ecclesiastica potestate of Aegidius Romanus translated with introduction and notes* (Woodbridge, 1986), p. IV.

³³ Mandonnet even calls him "le fidèle disciple de Thomas d'Aquin", P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle. Première partie: étude critique*. Les philosophes belges (Louvain, 1911), p. 248.

³⁴ P.W. Nash, 'Giles of Rome', *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 6 (Washington D.C., 2003), p. 220.

³⁵ Eardley, pp. 838-9.

³⁶ Eardley, pp. 858, 860-1.

³⁷ A.S. Brett, 'Political Philosophy' in: *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 276-99, esp. p. 289.

³⁸ M.D. Gossiaux, 'Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Existence of God as Self-Evident', in: *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* (formerly *The New Scholasticism*) 77:1 (2003), pp. 57-81, esp. pp. 64, 77.

³⁹ M. Olszewski, 'De plurificatione intellectus possibilis of Giles of Rome. Two historical questions', *Studia Mediewistyczne* 32 (1997), pp. 123-35, esp. p. 125: "Instead, Giles proposes his own refutation of Aquinas' antiaverroistic objections. The author of *De plurificatione* says that St Thomas neglected the original position of Averroes so his arguments aimed at him missed their target".

same philosophical school, sharing the same set of Aristotelian key ideas and basic peripatetic definitions. It should be noted that Olszewski refers here to Giles's viewpoints in one of Giles's Aristotelian commentaries, where findings are different from that of Giles's other treatises.⁴⁰ A thorough positioning of Giles's thought within late thirteenth century thought is only possible once all of his treatises have been properly commented upon. No documents attest to Giles's presence in Italy at that time, and a prolonged absence would have been incompatible with his studies at Paris. Yet it is clear from Giles's works that he had an intimate knowledge of Thomas' teachings – the third part of *De predestinatione* on hellfire reveals this – with which he agreed in some points but not in others.⁴¹ Although Giles's writings on the unicity of the substantial form use mostly Thomistic terminology Giles nonetheless develops his own thoughts and theories. This is evident for his teachings on *esse* and *essentia*, which was recognised at the time of its composition as a new and independent theory.⁴² Del Punta claims that although Giles almost constantly refers to Thomas' views, he nonetheless develops his own independent theology, criticizing Thomas on many occasions.⁴³ In conclusion, the absence of documentation precludes conclusive opinions about the identity of Giles's master at Paris, but it can be assumed that Giles heard Thomas' lectures – or just read his works – at Paris.⁴⁴ As for the degree of 'formed' bachelor (*baccalaureus formatus*) Denifle quotes the decisions of the provincial chapters of the Augustinian Hermits that mention Giles holding this status in 1285.⁴⁵ This possibly

⁴⁰ Olszewski may well be justified in stating that consequently Thomas and Giles share the principal directions of their arguments, the general structure of reasoning, resulting in the fact that their ultimate conclusions are identical. He nonetheless points out that those points where Thomas and Giles differ are then of a very subtle and detailed nature, concluding that he managed to unveil a significant difference between Giles and Thomas, thereby adding something new to the discussion with Averroism. Olszewski, pp. 128; 132.

⁴¹ See E. Hocedez, 'Gilles de Rome et Saint Thomas', in: *Mélanges Mandonnet. Etudes d'histoire littéraire du Moyen Age*, vol. I, pp. 385-409, esp. pp. 403-9. See G.J. McAleer, 'Sensuality: An Avenue into the Political and Metaphysical Thought of Giles of Rome', *Gregorianum* 82.1 (2001), pp. 129-46, esp. pp. 130, 133 on Giles's knowledge and criticism of Thomas.

⁴² Nash, p. 220.

⁴³ F. Del Punta, S. Donati, C. Luna s.v. 'Egidio Romano', *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, ed. F. Barroccini, M. Cavale (Rome, 1993), vol. 42, pp. 319-41, esp. p. 329: "Il pensiero teologico di E. è caratterizzato, come quello filosofico, da un costante riferimento, più o meno critico, alle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino, nel senso che egli non manca mai di confrontarsi con le dottrine dell'aquinato, le quali costituiscono la base sulla quale egli costruisce la propria speculazione teologica".

⁴⁴ Hewson, p. 6. Mandonnet assumes that Thomas was the *magister theologiae* to whom Giles was assigned, p. 483. Lajard is the only biographer who suggests that Giles studied under another master: Augustin Trionfo of Ancona, following Curtius and Miraeus, early modern biographers, p. 423. There is no evidence for Mattioli's presumption that Giles attended lectures of St Bonaventure who had already left Paris in 1257, p. 6.

⁴⁵ "An. 1285 adhuc (non tantum an. 1281 in Capitulo generali Paduae celebrato) aderat in capitulo provinciali Romanae provinciae Toscellanae celebrato ut vicarius generalis et *baccalaureus Parisiensis*",

refers to the highest bachelor's degree at Paris, the *baccalaureus formatus*, which Giles probably obtained c. 1273. In between 1268 and 1274 he wrote the *Erroribus Philosophorum*.⁴⁶ By 1275 Giles was in Bayeux, writing one of his commentaries on Aristotle, the *In libros posteriorum analyticorum*.⁴⁷ Between c. 1271 and c. 1278 he wrote his commentaries on the first book of the *Sentences* (1271-73) given as a bachelor and *Super Elenchos* (1274), the treatise *Theoremata de Corpore Christi* (1274), the commentaries on Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione* (1274),⁴⁸ the commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* (1275) and *De anima* (1276) and the treatise *Contra gradus* (1277-78).⁴⁹ At the same time Giles wrote *De plurificatione intellectus possibilis*.⁵⁰ In 1277, after the statutory four years, and at the age of thirty-five, the minimum age, Giles was due to obtain his master's degree in theology as well as the *licentia docendi* at the University of Paris.⁵¹

Seen in the context of late thirteenth century scholastic thought some of Giles's teachings are strikingly Augustinian, as is the case of *De predestinatione*. 'Augustinian' is defined here in the sense of extensive quotations and paraphrases of Augustine's works and the adherence to his views by complementing it with the findings of Aristotle.⁵² It is a view which becomes apparent in *De predestinatione*. Other works of Giles might offer a different picture once they are edited and commented upon. Nonetheless one should bear in mind that the reception of Aristotle's work had

quoting L. Torelli, *Secoli Agostiniani ovvero Historia Generale del Sacro Ordine Eremitano del Gran Dottore di Santa Chiesa S. Aurelio Agostino* [...] (Bologna, 1659), vol. 5, p. 38.

⁴⁶ G. Pini, 'Being and Creation in Giles of Rome', in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 390-403, esp. p. 395.

⁴⁷ Hewson, p. 6 n. 20, based upon Giles's *De causis* which bears the note "datum a Baiocis D.MCCXC die Mercurii ante Purificationem b.m.v. editat sunt et scripta et data a fratre Aegidio de Roma OESA comment. in libr. de causis in fine". Giles's *Super libr. post. analyt.* bears the note "completa baiocis".

⁴⁸ S. Donati, '*Utrum, corrupta re, remaneat eius scientia*'. Der Lösungsversuch des Aegidius Romanus und seine Nachwirkungen auf spätere Kommentatoren der Schrift *De generatione et corruptione* in: *The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle's De generatione et corruptione. Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern*, ed. J.M.M.H. Thijssen, H.A.G. Braakhuis (Studia Artistarum. Etudes sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales, vol. 7) (Turnhout, 1999), pp. 103-31, esp. p. 105.

⁴⁹ R. Wielockx, *Apologia*, p. 240. On the difference between the oral and the written version of the *Sentences* commentaries see C. Luna, 'La reportatio della lettura di Egidio Romano sul Libro III delle Sentenze (CIm 8005) e il problema dell'autenticità dell'ordinario, Parte II', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* II,1 (1991), pp. 75-146, esp. p. 115.

⁵⁰ See Olszewski, '*De plurificatione*', p. 124: "*De plurificatione intellectus possibilis* appeared just in this moment of the discussion".

⁵¹ See Donati, 'Studi', pp. 2-70.

⁵² The term 'Augustinianism' encompasses a wide variety of definitions. In Saak's view it does not say much at all about the actual adherence to the teachings of St Augustine. Saak, 'The Creation of an Augustinian Identity I', p. 109. See below the General Conclusion, pp. 159-60.

progressed so much in vast areas of research by the end of the thirteenth century that leaving Aristotle out altogether was no longer reaching required standards: quoting only from the Bible, Augustine or other Fathers of the Church was no longer sufficient.⁵³ Dyson highlights another aspect: in his view Giles's *De ecclesiastica potestate* written in 1301 or 1302 shows little of the marked influence of Aristotle's works on earlier works such as the *De regimine principum* so much so that Dyson states that "it is often not easy to remember that the same author is responsible for both".⁵⁴ According to Nash Giles was conscious of being a professional defender of Augustine's doctrine and at the same time an important witness to the unique position of Thomas Aquinas at that time.⁵⁵ Eastman identifies a "platonico-stoic tendency" in Giles's works, referring to his findings in Giles's *De renunciatione pape*, characterizing Giles's position in this treatise furthermore as having a strong tendency towards neo-platonism whilst applying legal means and an Aristotelian presentation of evidence.⁵⁶ Giles's extensive use of the works of Augustine is noteworthy, although it is difficult to establish a general view on this matter, without taking into account all of his writings, especially the Aristotelian commentaries.⁵⁷ Prassel remarks upon Giles's indebtedness to Augustine when he analyses Giles's references to Bonaventure, whose works he had probably read: Prassel sees the Augustinian influence as essential.⁵⁸

Giles uses the findings of Aristotle to his ends: they often complement the Augustinian viewpoint.⁵⁹ Since the rediscovery of Aristotle in the early thirteenth

⁵³ Walther, 'Aegidius Romanus und Jakob von Viterbo': "Jedenfalls legen seine Selbstcharakterisierung als Theologielehrer und einige Bemerkungen im Traktat selbst es nahe, daß er [James of Viterbo] einen solchen Verzicht auf Aristoteles als nicht mehr den wissenschaftlichen Standards der Artisten und Theologen an den *studia generalia* für angemessen erachtet hat. Die Aristoteles-Rezeption war inzwischen auch im Bereich der Sozialphilosophie soweit vorangeschritten, daß es für einen in politische Kontroversen eingreifenden Theologen eines Studiums problematisch erscheinen konnte, sich neben der Bibel allein autoritativ auf Augustin und andere Kirchenväter zu berufen, allerhöchstens kanonistische Autoritäten partiell zu mobilisieren, aber Aristoteles zu vernachlässigen", pp. 167-8.

⁵⁴ Dyson, *Giles of Rome on Ecclesiastical Power*, p. V.

⁵⁵ Nash, p. 221.

⁵⁶ Eastman, p. 7: "während wir bei Aegidius einen starken Hang zum Neoplatonismus mit der Anwendung juristischer Mittel und aristotelischer Beweisführung beobachten".

⁵⁷ See P. Prassel, *Das Theologieverständnis des Ägidius Romanus O.E.S.A. (1243/7-1316)*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, Reihe XXIII Theologie, vol. 201 (doctoral dissertation University Trier 1978/79) (Frankfurt/M., 1983), p. 91: "Eine der wichtigsten Quellen des Ägidius für seine Auffassungen zur theologischen Wissenschaftslehre ist der Kirchenvater Augustinus [...] so finden sich die Berufungen auf Augustinus fast ausschließlich an Stellen, die theologisch relevant sind."

⁵⁸ Prassel, p. 99.

⁵⁹ See Hewson, p. 235 "[Giles] accepting unreservedly the vitalism of Aristotle". Hewson goes further in his assessment of Giles's adherence to Aristotelian viewpoints: "Giles of Rome was carried out on the full flood of this Aristotelian revolution. He tasted it at its most mature and effective, and he touched it at every level of its depth. There is no question of his merely using Aristotelian notions or an Aristotelian

century, at first through Arabic translators and commentators, later directly from Greek sources, scholastic thought was challenged by its implications on theology.⁶⁰ As Hewson puts it, "in a predominantly theological atmosphere, the Aristotelian rationale began to work as a ferment, ultimately fruitful, but at first producing heat".⁶¹ Aristotle's findings could not be ignored and found their way into scholastic debate despite several official condemnations, such as in 1210, 1231 and 1270, effective only until a new translation became available.⁶² Another factor complicated the situation: the increasing independence of the Parisian arts faculty where Aristotelian metaphysics and psychology were taught as part of the logic and ethics courses resulting in controversies between the Faculties of Arts and Theology. Members of the Faculty of Theology often stated that they were dealing with the higher, divine science as opposed to the human science studied at the Arts Faculty. These factors contributed to the tense climate at the University of Paris around 1270/1277. The assertion (put forward by Mandonnet) that there were at least three independent schools at that time, the Augustinian school adhering to the teaching of traditional orthodox theology, the Aristotelian school of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas combining Aristotelian elements with traditional theology and a radical Averroist school led by Siger of Brabant has been called into question by later works (Gilson, van Steenberghen).⁶³

In my view, these classifications are too rigid and narrow. They do not allow for a subtle enquiry into the thought of each involved party. Giles of Rome is a prime example for this. Placing him into inflexible categories such as philosophical or theological 'schools' does not do him justice, especially when many of his treatises still

cast of thought in the process of rationalising theological issues", p. 241. And further "again like Aquinas, he was able to achieve an accommodation between this and the main body of Christian belief [...]. Though he may occasionally disagree with Aristotle on particular points, Giles is still capable of writing such phrases as 'secundum philosophum et veritatem', although he retains an independence of mind", p. 242. See also P. Prassel, p. 88: "Vor allem von den Theologen wird Aristoteles herangezogen, um die Theologie als Wissenschaft bezeichnen und betreiben zu können. So auch von Ägidius."

⁶⁰ For a succinct study on the reception of Aristotle from the twelfth century onwards see P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle. Première partie. Etude critique* (Louvain, ²1911), pp. 1-63.

⁶¹ Hewson, p. 40.

⁶² Hewson, p. 41.

⁶³ See in particular F. van Steenberghen, *Aristotle in the West. The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism*, translated by L. Johnston (Louvain, 1955), esp. pp. 147-225.

await a modern scholarly analysis.⁶⁴ Hewson holds that in the case of *De formatione corporis humani in utero* Giles's work appears "in a new mode, a study of a branch of natural philosophy with scant reference to theological implications", thereby emphasizing the "trend towards a separation of philosophy from theology".⁶⁵ Giles stands at a crucial moment in the history of scholastic theology, at a time when the consequences of non-Christian thought, especially that of Aristotle needed to be reconciled with theology.

As Ratzinger has put it in the introduction to his study on Bonaventure's understanding of the theology of history, the bitter controversies of the 1260s and 1270s handled the basic question as to whether faith could be translated into understanding.⁶⁶ There were different ways to achieve this. Ratzinger uses Bonaventure (c.1217-1274) as a prime example of how differently modern scholarship sees the place of one of the most important scholastics in the mid- to late-thirteenth century theological debates: from seeing him as a strict Augustinian with anti-Aristotelian views to the creator of a new synthesis on the same basis as Aquinas, to those who hold that Bonaventure was simply ignorant of Aristotle's works – the latter view certainly does not apply to Giles of Rome.

Giles, as the commentator of Aristotle had a high reputation amongst his contemporaries, comparable only to that of Albert the Great or Thomas Aquinas. His Aristotelian commentaries were widely read in the late thirteenth century and beyond.⁶⁷ McGrade qualifies his commentaries on Lombard's *Sentences* as "taking a provocatively Aristotelian line", a view that seems exaggerated.⁶⁸ Giles of Rome, just like Bonaventure, cannot be placed into one simple line of philosophical thought, for the simple reason that this line does not exist.⁶⁹ According to Van Steenberghen the correct classification of Bonaventure would be "aristotélisme éclectique néoplatonisant et surtout augustinisant"⁷⁰. This judgement was later called into question by those following Gilson who see Bonaventure as primarily Augustinian. There are parallels in

⁶⁴ Cf. Hewson, p. 44 "It is, however, probably no longer desirable to see a dichotomy between 'Augustinian' and 'Aristotelian' schools".

⁶⁵ Hewson, p. 241.

⁶⁶ J. Cardinal Ratzinger [Pope Benedict XVI], *The Theology of History in St Bonaventure* (translated by Z. Hayes) (Chicago, 1971), p. XIII.

⁶⁷ Donati, 'Utrum', p. 130 and n. 99.

⁶⁸ A.S. McGrade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 356.

⁶⁹ Ratzinger, pp. 121-2, 124.

⁷⁰ Ratzinger, p. 126, n. 44.

the case of Giles's use of both Aristotle and Augustine: on the basis of *De predestinatione* Van Steenberghen's verdict is valid. It depends to which of Giles's treatises one refers to: his Aristotelian commentaries certainly show much closer references to Aristotle. Eastman explains that Giles, having commented almost every then existing Aristotelian work by the end of the 1270s he uses Aristotle in *De renunciatione papae* mostly in paraphrases, where the source text is more often than not not easily discernible.⁷¹ This is a feature that also appears in *De predestinatione* but does not prove that Giles is adhering more to either of Aristotle or Augustine. Eardley argues that although Giles (concerning the question of the will) was sufficiently loyal to preserve Aristotle's views he nonetheless develops his own thoughts.⁷² Ratzinger rightly asks what exactly constitutes the formal Augustinian element to form a distinctive Augustinian way of analysis. His answer, close to that of Gilson is a radically Christian philosophy, centred on Christ and worked out from Christian Revelation. Nonetheless it is a categorization which is incomplete, since it would miss out multiple other intellectual influences.⁷³

As far as Giles's works have been analyzed, they do not contain a proper anti-Aristotelian stance, which stands in contrast to Bonaventure. Giles of Rome certainly presents his own and independent views. Whether or not they form an original 'school of thought' will only become clearer when more of his works have been edited and commented upon, although some have claimed (Eastman amongst others) that during the fourteenth century the *schola aegidiana* with members like Augustine of Ancona, James of Viterbo and Thomas of Strasbourg was more influential⁷⁴ before the Augustinian Order "began to develop a certain independence and intellectual vigour which enabled it to defend doctrinal positions that would not have been those advocated by Giles".⁷⁵

In my opinion we still know too little about the exact positions of Giles as well as his successors. In the case of Giles this thesis will show that his oeuvre is more differentiated than previously assumed. By pressing existent findings into a necessarily coherent 'school of thought' the result is likely not to do Giles's work enough justice,

⁷¹ Eastman, *Aegidius Romanus*, *De renunciatione papae*, p. 130.

⁷² Eardley, p. 850.

⁷³ Ratzinger, pp. 132-3.

⁷⁴ Eastman, '*De renunciatione papae*', p. 367.

⁷⁵ Eastman, '*De renunciatione papae*', p. 367.

neither is it to attribute to him the designation 'Aristotelian' or 'Augustinian' exclusively. Giles is one of the most prominent thinkers of the generation after Thomas Aquinas, with an independent mind unwilling to generally bend itself to any 'school of thought', remaining true to himself.

1.4 The Years 1277 to 1285

The interpretation of this chapter of Giles's life and career posed a number of difficulties and uncertainties until the groundbreaking study of Wielockx, editor of the *Apologia* of Giles with the additions by Godfrey of Fontaines, which considerably supplemented previous work by Mandonnet, Hocedez and Siemiatkowska.⁷⁶ The background to the Parisian condemnations in 1270 and 1277 was the conflict during the thirteenth century over the increasing influence of Aristotle, at first in the Faculty of Arts, later in the Faculty of Theology at Paris.⁷⁷ A number of Aristotle's works, especially his *Metaphysics* and his *Liber sextus naturalium* and *De anima* became available via Arabic and Syriac translations, often embedded in the commentaries of Muslim and Jewish thinkers such as Averroes, Avicenna and Maimonides. In many instances, Aristotle's thoughts were gradually assimilated to Christian doctrine, but in some cases – the unicity of the substantial form or the intellective soul – this proved impossible and resulted in several condemnations by the local bishop at the universities of Paris and Oxford.⁷⁸

On 3 March 1277 Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, condemned 219 articles which were associated with Aristotelian and Averroist teachings, although in many cases it is not possible to trace the works from which they were taken.⁷⁹ Giles was subject to a

⁷⁶ E. Hocedez, 'La condamnation de Gilles de Rome', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 47 (1932), pp. 34-58; Z. Siemiatkowska, 'Au sujet d'une texte sur les *Theoremata de esse et essentia* de Gilles de Rome', *Medievalia Philosophica Polonorum* 2 (1958), pp. 19-21; and by the same: 'Avant l'exil de Gilles de Rome. Au sujet d'une dispute sur les *Theoremata de esse et essentia* de Gilles de Rome', *Medievalia Philosophica Polonorum* 7 (1960), pp. 3-67.

⁷⁷ On the political background of the 1277 condemnations at the Papal curia see: G.-R. Tewes, 'Die päpstliche Kurie und die Lehre an der Pariser Universität', in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 859-72.

⁷⁸ See the succinct study of L. Bianchi, *Il vescovo e i filosofi. La condanna parigina del 1277 e l'evoluzione dell'aristotelismo scolastico* (Bergamo, 1990) on the role of the bishop in the 1277 Parisian condemnations. Cf. also G.J. McAleer, 'Disputing the Unity of the World: The Importance of *res* and the influence of Averroës in Giles of Rome's Critique of Thomas Aquinas over the Unity of the World' (forthcoming), pp. 1-62.

⁷⁹ R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277*, *Philosophes Médiévaux*, vol. 22 (Louvain-Paris, 1977); M. Grabmann, *Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung. Mitteilungen aus ungedruckten Ethikkommentaren*,

separate censure in 1277, which, as Wielockx shows, was linked to the Tempier condemnations of 7 March, but constitutes a different procedure. Wielockx establishes a chronology of the events, setting the *terminus a quo* in the last months of 1276 and the *terminus ad quem* in the first months of 1278.⁸⁰ Shortly after the condemnation of 7 March, in Wielockx' chronology before 28 March, the meeting of the commission installed by Bishop Tempier about Giles took place, a definite list of articles was drawn up and Giles was called to retract them within five days.⁸¹ The *Apologia* was written soon after this meeting, in a very short space of time, before the preliminary meeting of the Masters of Theology,⁸² including Henry of Ghent, who neither condemned nor endorsed Giles's position.⁸³ Henry was then summoned before the Papal Legate, Simon de Brion, to explain Giles's (doctrinal) position. Then the Bishop of Paris and the Legate ordered another meeting of the Masters at which some of Thomas' teachings were criticised, this time also by Henry. The condemned articles cover a list of Aristotelian / Averroist teachings which were judged not to be conform with orthodox theology, such as on the nature of philosophy, God's knowledge and the question of the eternity of the world. The censure of Giles was not a direct result of the disciplinary measures imposed by the decree of 7 March, but a complementary measure taken in the same frame of mind.⁸⁴

Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jg. 1931, Heft 2 (Munich, 1931), p. 19.

⁸⁰ Wielockx, p. 72; p. 29.

⁸¹ J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200-1400*, The Middle Ages Series (Philadelphia, 1998), p. 28 claims that Giles was given only one day.

⁸² W.J. Courtenay explains the function of the Regent Master as follows: "Regency in a sense covered all the official activities in which one engaged as *magister in actu regens*. [...] Specifically "reigning" meant (1) the right to ascend to a magisterial chair (*cathedra magistralis*) and conduct a school, (2) the right to promote candidates for licensing and inception, and (3) the right to sit in congregation with other regent masters and vote on issues that came before the nation, faculty or university. [...] "Magisterial chair" understood as office expressed the right to reign and promote in the schools. It also implied authoritative teaching and orthodox doctrine. It did not imply income, either from church or state.", 'Teaching Careers', pp. 13-4.

⁸³ Wielockx, p. 92.

⁸⁴ J.M.M.H. Thijssen puts forward a different interpretation of the events. In his view Tempier was ordered by the *curia* to drop the charges against Giles. Consequently the case was dropped, but Giles was refused the *licentia docendi* because he had become unacceptable to the community of scholars at Paris. In my view the evidence for this view is not conclusive. See J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy*, pp. 28, 35, 54, 173; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, '1277 Revisited: A New Interpretation of the Doctrinal Investigations of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome', *Vivarium* 35 (1997), pp. 72-101, esp. pp. 93-101.

Etienne Tempier, Jean des Alleux,⁸⁵ the Chancellor of the University, and Simon de Brion were at the centre of the commission and initiated the condemnations. Ranulph of Houblonnière, Tempier's successor as Bishop of Paris, was also present as part of Tempier's circle.⁸⁶ The internal divisions of the Faculty of Theology and Henry of Ghent's personal involvement resulted in a further enquiry about Giles's teachings and eventually in his censure. Henry was then called by the Legate to explain his positions on the unicity of the substantial form, since he had based his teachings on Giles's conclusions about this issue. Wielockx points out that the retraction of criticised positions did not damage Henry's reputation within the university, and did not curb further his career prospects: Henry remained a Regent Master of the University.⁸⁷ In many instances Henry's teachings substantially differed from Giles's doctrinal standpoints. Giles, whilst only a bachelor, had criticised, and on some occasions even ridiculed some of Henry's positions.⁸⁸ This circumstance points towards an interpretation of Giles as a victim of an internal quarrel within the Faculty of Theology. Their personal and doctrinal differences contributed to Giles's censure, but cannot be seen as their predominant cause. Wielockx interprets the censure as a reaction of the *esprit de corps* of the Faculty of Theology against a young bachelor 'peu docile'.⁸⁹ It is difficult to establish why Giles was condemned: in my view he was caught between Faculty politics and the then prevalent climate which favoured a reduction of the influence of Aristotelian and Averroist teachings on the interpretation of theology. Courtenay calls the events of 1277 a turning point especially in the terms of the power relationships within and outside the University of Paris, in which the traditional philosophical issues were equally important as the powers within the institutional context.⁹⁰ Giles's censure certainly reflects what McAleer calls Giles's 'complex and ambiguous relationship to authority'.⁹¹ Giles's case might have served as a warning to other masters, such as Boethius of Dacia and Godfrey of Fontaines, to remain within the accepted doctrine. A higher degree of cooperation with the authorities – retraction –

⁸⁵ Tempier had tried to impose Jean des Alleux as a Regent Master of the University in 1264, but without success (Wielockx, p. 98).

⁸⁶ Wielockx, p. 99.

⁸⁷ Wielockx, p. 83. Henry of Ghent was a Regent Master of the University 1276-92 except for 1283-84.

⁸⁸ See Giles's *Réputations sophistiques* (1274-75): R. Wielockx, 'La censure de Gilles de Rome', *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 22 (1980), pp. 87-8, esp. p. 88.

⁸⁹ Wielockx, pp. 171;121. Mandonnet attributes to Giles "le zèle et les impatiences d'un néophyte", *Siger de Brabant*, p. 250.

⁹⁰ W.J. Courtenay, 'The Parisian Faculty of Theology', p. 246.

⁹¹ G.J. McAleer, 'Political Authority in the *Sentences*-Commentary of Giles of Rome', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 60.1 (1999), pp. 21-36, esp. p. 23.

could have defused the situation, but Giles's perseverance did nothing but aggravate his case.⁹² Insufficient documentation makes it more difficult to evaluate his case, especially since the exact circumstances are not known.⁹³

It is not clear whether Giles had to fear excommunication as a result of his refusal to retract, as this procedure was usually only employed in cases of heresy or suspected heresy. The case of John of Paris 'Quidort' in 1304 proves otherwise, as he was threatened with excommunication if he dared to teach. Giles's decision not to retract immediately in 1277 is difficult to explain. Some of it certainly has to do with internal Faculty politics: in 1285 Giles's retraction did not contain all the articles which were condemned in 1277. This shows that these articles were no longer considered heterodox and that the commission in 1277 might not have been justified on a doctrinal level, a view Giles himself put forward years later.⁹⁴ Then, the majority of masters were against Giles; their reasoning, however, can only be conjectured. By 1285 the situation had changed and Giles's request for a reopening of his case turned out to be successful. It is not possible to say what exactly prompted him to retract in 1285. A marked shift of authority within the Faculty and the moderating influence of both Pope Honorius IV and the Bishop of Paris possibly caused Giles's retraction. The role of the Augustinian Hermits in the whole affair remains obscure.

When Giles left the University of Paris, possibly shortly after Easter 1277, it is uncertain whether he remained in Paris, or whether he returned to Italy. In 1279, at the provincial chapter he was nominated as *diffinitor* of the Roman province for the following general chapter held at Padua.⁹⁵ This position entailed that he was one of the four pro-provincials for the Roman province of the Augustinian Hermits. He was also present at the provincial chapter of the Roman province at St Martin of Campiano.⁹⁶ During this time, probably between 1277 and 1279, Giles wrote *De regimine principum*,

⁹² As Hewson puts it "Despite his necessary indebtedness to the authorities that he uses, Giles is not slavish in his attachment to their views. He is willing to go to some trouble to find a reasonable accommodation, but he is not reluctant to criticise them when he sees fit", pp. 235-6.

⁹³ G.J. McAleer, 'Disputing the Unity', n. 8.

⁹⁴ See below, p. 35.

⁹⁵ "Item pro futuro capitulo generalissimo Paduano pro dicta Romana provincia [...] prope Capitulum generale: fecit frater Egidium Romanum, Bacellarium parisiensium", *Analecta Augustiniana*, II (1907), p. 229.

⁹⁶ *Analecta Augustiniana*, vol. II (1907), p. 245.

a work he dedicated to the future King of France, Philip IV.⁹⁷ In 1281, at the general chapter of his Order held in Rome, Giles's Roman province unanimously conferred upon him the responsibility to oversee the future elections of provincials, *diffinitores* and visitors, and other aspects of its administration. Under his authority the election of Jacob of Rome as new *lector* took place.⁹⁸ Giles returned to Paris in 1285, possibly after the provincial chapter of Tuscanella. He was not present at any further provincial chapters in 1286, which concurs with the evidence of his retraction in Paris and his absence from further provincial chapters in 1286. It might be the case that Giles made a conscious choice in getting involved with the administration of his Order. At a time when the academic circles were no longer open to him, the development of a young and growing Order was a task Giles took in his stride, acquiring administrative skills he later put to use as an Archbishop. That it should be the Roman province points towards his links with that region and perhaps even towards his membership of the Roman convent of the Augustinian Hermits before moving to Paris. In an effort to enable and facilitate their members' studies and to establish the Order's academic reputation next to the Dominicans and Franciscans, the Augustinian Order developed their Parisian house. Once Giles's academic career was put on hold his geographical origins became more important. There are no extant documents that attest to his Order's motivation to send him to Italy but it seems a natural preference in view of his origins and his restrictions at Paris, where he was not allowed to teach. For this same reason Giles was not sent to another university, as the refusal of the *licentia docendi* was effective everywhere else.⁹⁹ Giles's absence from the University of Paris did not result in Giles abandoning his research: between 1277 and 1285 he published his *Theoremata de esse et essentia*.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Del Punta holds that he composed *De regimine principum* before 1280 at the request of the then still quite young Phillip, the future Phillip the Fair, King of France, but points out at the same time that these findings are not quite reliable. Del Punta, 'Egidio Romano', p. 320.

⁹⁸ "Et fratres dicte provincie Romane compromiserunt in venerabilem virum fratrem Egidium Romanum, Bacellarium parisiensem, unanimiter et concorditer de futuro eligendo priore provinciali et diffinitoribus et visitatoribus, et de omnibus aliis fiendis in dicto capitulo. Qui frater Egidius auctoritate dicti compromisi elegit fratrem Jacobum de Roma, lectorem novum, in Provinciale Priorem Romane provincie", *Analecta Augustiniana* II (1907), pp. 246-7.

⁹⁹ This was the rule since 1233 when a papal decree created the *ius ubique docendi*, originally to protect student enrolment at the newly founded *studium generale* at Toulouse. See W.J. Courtenay, 'Teaching Careers', p. 17. In 1292 Paris claimed this rule for itself. Courtenay, p. 18.

¹⁰⁰ G. Pini, 'Being and Creation', pp. 390-409, esp. p. 405.

1.5 Giles in Paris: 1285-1295

Giles submitted his request to be granted a new enquiry into his censure to Pope Honorius IV before 1 June 1285.¹⁰¹ Those who were involved with his condemnation were either dead – Tempier died on 3 September 1279, Simon de Brion on 28 March 1285 – or had retired, as had Jean des Alleux, who was now in a Dominican convent in Flanders. One uncertain factor in the outcome of the second enquiry into Giles's doctrine was Ranulph of Houblionnière, Bishop of Paris, who had been close to Bishop Tempier in 1277. In 1285 Ranulph established a second list of articles to confirm the validity of Giles's censure.¹⁰² Henry's influence, however, was diminished by the orders of Honorius IV who decreed that he had to follow the decisions of the Masters of Theology in the new enquiry on Giles's censure. Another unknown quantity was Henry of Ghent, a current Regent Master, who in many questions held views opposite to Giles, and whom Giles, before his censure, had often criticised.¹⁰³ His influence, despite maintaining his position as Regent Master, had considerably diminished since 1277, and the majority of the Faculty no longer agreed with him.¹⁰⁴ This is an interesting development and shows that disagreement on doctrinal matters was possible without censure; it also confirms the political character of the 1277 condemnations. Following the *determinatio magistrorum* of 1285, Giles had to retract a certain number of the articles condemned in 1277, except for thirteen articles which were either omitted or declared to be orthodox. In a rare comment on the events of 1277 Giles says that not all articles were correctly condemned: this appears in his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*.¹⁰⁵ This constitutes a notable change and again highlights the mixture of political and doctrinal factors in Giles's censure. Wielockx gives the example of the *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, which circulated in Paris before 1304, where Giles upholds the majority of his positions before 1277, but is more subtle and careful in their presentation. He also refrains from ridiculing Henry's positions, and simply points out

¹⁰¹ "nuper tamen apud sedem apostolicam constitutus humiliter obtulit se paratum revocanda que dixerat sive scripserat revocare pro nostre arbitrio voluntatis", *C.U.P.*, I, n. 522, p. 633. Honorius IV was elected on 2 April and crowned on 20 May 1285.

¹⁰² *C.U.P.*, I, n. 522, p. 633. See Wielockx, pp. 17, 78.

¹⁰³ Wielockx, chapter VI, esp. pp. 148-9, 178.

¹⁰⁴ Wielockx, p. 122.

¹⁰⁵ "Cum hoc sit articulus damnatus Parisiis, licet possit esse opinabile apud multos omnes illos articulos non esse bene damnatos. Nam nos ipsi eramus Parisiis et tamquam de re palpata testimonium perhibemus quod plures de illis articulis transierunt con concilio magistrorum sed captiositate paucorum", Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3.

deficiencies in taking Aristotle's positions into account.¹⁰⁶ The procedure of Giles's examination in 1285 substantially differed from Tempier's action in 1277 as shown by the letter Honorius IV addressed to Ranulph of Houblonnière. The enquiry of 1285 is an examination and does not contain an order (*ut iacent*) to retract a list of articles.¹⁰⁷ Giles's case now depended upon a special convocation of all masters of the Faculty of Theology, deciding by a simple majority.¹⁰⁸ After Giles's retraction the Faculty decided to grant him the *licentia docendi*, which reflects a larger change in the relation between the University of Paris, the bishop of Paris and the papacy. In 1285, the decision on matters of doctrine no longer primarily involves the bishop of Paris. In this context I think that Giles's decision not to retract in 1277 was entirely justified. It would have entailed a submission to Faculty politics rather than to orthodoxy. A more sophisticated approach was not possible in 1277 (taking out the thirteen orthodox articles) and consequently retractation was unacceptable to Giles. Also, Pini's research on the issue of creation in Giles's work shows that the events of 1277 did not make Giles change his mind about his positions – Pini only concludes that Giles readjusted his teachings to avoid potentially contentious issues. This may well be a key indicator to his reaction to the condemnations: once he was reinstated Giles only avoided difficult issues but did not alter his beliefs, minded to give his conclusions the frame of a sophisticated doctrine.¹⁰⁹ Giles received the licence to teach from the Chancellor of the University and with his inception, comprising the inaugural lecture and attendant ceremonies, obtained the right to practice.¹¹⁰

In May 1287 the general chapter of the Augustinian Hermits took the unusual step of declaring all Giles's writings and teachings to be the doctrine of his Order, a judgement that was binding for all Augustinian masters, lecturers and students.¹¹¹ It is a ruling that was not always observed: Osborne shows that James of Viterbo, Giles's

¹⁰⁶ Wielockx, p. 173.

¹⁰⁷ "examinare faciens [...] Stephanus censuit revocanda [...] per se ipsum examinans", *C.U.P.*, vol. I, n. 522, p. 633; Wielockx, pp. 110-1.

¹⁰⁸ *C.U.P.*, vol. I, n. 522, p. 633.

¹⁰⁹ G. Pini, 'Being and Creation', p. 409.

¹¹⁰ W.J. Courtenay, 'Teaching Careers', p. 13: "the *licentia docendi* made one a master *de iure* by granting the possession of a right, *inception* made one a master *de facto* by initiating the exercise of that right".

¹¹¹ "Quia venerabilis magistri nostri Egidii doctrina mundum universum illustrat, diffinimus et mandamus inviolabiliter observari ut opiniones, positiones et sententias scriptas et scribendas predicti magistri nostri omnes nostri Ordinis lectores et studentes recipiant eisdem prebentes assensum, et eius doctrine omni qua poterunt sollicitudine, ut et ipsi illuminati alios illuminare possint, sint seduli defensores", *C.U.P.*, vol. II, n. 542, p. 12. See Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology', pp. 146-274, for an overview of how Augustinian theologians of the fourteenth century quoted and followed Giles's teachings.

successor in the same chair at the University of Paris, deliberately attacked Giles of Rome's arguments on the natural love of God.¹¹² James of Viterbo also held different views regarding the question of papal resignation. Walther shows that this does not stem from different intentions and aims of their argument; rather, it shows the range of variety of opinions within the Order of the Hermits of Saint Augustine.¹¹³ Several factors might have influenced the Order's decision to declare Giles's teaching the doctrine of the Augustinian Hermits. The Order could have been anxious to recognise its first member who had risen to prominence at Paris. Giles was the first member of the Augustinians to have obtained the *licentia docendi*, albeit with a delay of seven years as a consequence of his censure in 1277. His difficulties with the authorities and with the Faculty of Theology might have contributed to the unusual step of declaring the writings of a living person as doctrine. His retractation in 1285 showed that he had returned to orthodoxy; the Order's main motivation then could have been to recognise their first member who had obtained the *licentia docendi*. Thomas Aquinas' teachings received the same only centuries after his death in 1274. The decision reflects both Giles's eminent standing within his Order, helped by both his engagement in its administration and his recently acquired position at Paris. Yet it remains unclear why the Augustinian Hermits wanted an official doctrine for the Order.

Giles's involvement in the Order's administration is echoed in his influence in the organisation of studies for members of the Augustinian Hermits. At the general chapter of Ratisbon on Whitsunday 1289, the *Constitutiones Ratisbonenses* were established, which regulated in detail the studies in the different houses of the Order as well as the *studium generale* at Paris.¹¹⁴ It can be assumed that Giles took an active part in establishing the constitutions, since it is known that he was present at Ratisbon and was given his expenses.¹¹⁵

¹¹² T.M. Osborne, 'James of Viterbo's Rejection of Giles of Rome's Arguments for the Natural Love of God over Self', *Augustiniana* 49: 3-4 (1999), pp. 235-49, esp. p. 249.

¹¹³ H.G. Walther, 'Aegidius Romanus und Jakob von Viterbo – oder: was vermag Aristoteles, was Augustinus nicht kann?': in: M. Kaufhold (ed.), *Politische Reflexion in der Welt des späten Mittelalters / Political Thought in the Age of Scholasticism. Essays in Honour of Jürgen Miethke*. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions. History, Culture, Religion, Ideas, vol. 103 (Leiden-Boston, 2004), pp. 151-69, esp. p. 159: "Die argumentativen Differenzen spiegeln nicht nur die generelle Spannweite auf der papalistischen Seite bei der Erörterung der Problematik *De potestate papae*, sondern auch die Spannweite innerhalb des Augustinereremitenordens, formuliert von dessen prominentesten intellektuellen Vertretern."

¹¹⁴ Edited at Venice in 1508. *C.U.P.*, vol. II, p. 41 gives a list of manuscripts. See Hewson, p. 15, Lajard, pp. 473-4.

¹¹⁵ *C.U.P.*, vol. II, n. 567, p. 40.

It is at this point that Giles probably wrote *De predestinatione*. Its date mainly rests upon a reference Giles makes in chapter twelve of *De predestinatione* to another of his works, his second *Quodlibet*.¹¹⁶ Therefore the *terminus post quem* can be fixed at Easter 1287.¹¹⁷ The inclusion of *De predestinatione* on the list of books academic booksellers at Paris had to have in stock in 1304 provides the *terminus ante quem*.

De predestinatione covers a large range of topics, a factor that suggests that Giles did not only have an academic audience in mind, but might have written the treatise also for the theological education of prospective students of his Order. Giles extensively uses long quotations and paraphrases of Augustinian texts, mainly in the third section of the treatise. It is possible that he intended and used the 'Augustinian' chapters and passages as a teaching tool within his own order. This presumption narrows the date for *De predestinatione* to the years 1287-88 when Giles took an active role in organising his Order's educational system in the *Constitutiones Ratisbonenses*. These educational interests are mainly reflected in the second part of *De predestinatione* which might have been aimed at a pre-university audience, most likely at students of Augustinian houses preparing their studies at Paris.¹¹⁸ A lengthy textual presentation and explanation of Augustine's works would not have befitted the academic audience of the Faculty of Theology at Paris. Their members were well acquainted with the works of Augustine and would have regarded parts of the treatise only as a minor academic contribution. Most of the predominantly 'academic' chapter twelve was already known as part of a quodlibetal question: a mere repetition of this equally adds little to current theological debates. Yet there was the students' need of a textbook, a demand the treatise certainly fulfilled. Many of the treatise's extant manuscripts come from Augustinian houses, which might indicate that *De predestinatione* served as a compilation of Giles's theological teachings (some of it at pre-university level) on the topics of predestination,

¹¹⁶ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{ra}, l. 55.

¹¹⁷ P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, Bibliothèque Thomiste, vol. 1 (Paris, 1925), pp. 140-8. It should be noted that Hewson doubts Glorieux' dating of the second *Quodlibet*, on the basis that Giles had already been a master in 1285. In Hewson's opinion this is contradicted by Godfrey of Fontaines, who names Giles as a master in connection with the meeting in Paris on 22 December 1286 of bishops with secular and regular theologians to discuss Pope Martin IV's decretal *Ad fructus uberes* (Hewson, pp. 10-1). Although Hewson does not accept Glorieux' dating of Giles's second *Quodlibet*, he uses that same dating later in his exposition: "An indication in *De formatione corporis humani in utero* which points to its being written before 1287 is a passage at the end of Question 16 of the second *Quodlibet* of that year", Hewson, p. 39. I do not see how Godfrey of Fontaine's record contradicts the dating of the second *Quodlibet* of 1287, and even if Hewson's dating was taken into account, this would only put back the *terminus post quem* one further year, at 1286.

¹¹⁸ See chapter two pp. 64-5 and chapter three, p. 79.

foreknowledge, paradise and hell. Since his positions were declared the doctrine of his Order in 1287 such a compilation could have satisfied Giles's superiors, served his Order and provided Thavene of Thalomeis with a prestigious work.¹¹⁹

Students of the Order of Augustinian Hermits who were sent to Paris had first to be examined by the vicar or the provincial and the *diffinitores*, as well as two lecturers. They could not be older than thirty-five unless it was in the Order's interest that they pursue their studies at Paris.¹²⁰ The Order's ruling also recalls that the students were to follow Giles's teachings at Paris.¹²¹ In 1291 once again Giles has his annual expenses paid, which suggests that he had obtained a responsible position within his Order, on the basis of his administrative experiences in the Roman province since 1279 and his educational engagement at Paris for the University and his Order.¹²² According to Courtenay, the Parisian Augustinian convent housed three groups of 'residents'. Firstly, those who had professed there or had been transferred there; secondly, those who were chosen by the Prior General and the Order to go to Paris and complete their university requirements for the baccalaureate and / or the doctorate in theology. Thirdly, those younger students in the lectorate programme who had been sent to Paris by their provinces to study theology for five years and thus prepare themselves for positions as lectors in the schools of their province or region. Some of these might be chosen later to return to Paris for the university degree; the majority, however, would not.¹²³ Courtenay estimates that the third group was the largest and geographically diverse: their OESA province of origin financed its members.¹²⁴ Bearing these characteristics of the Parisian Augustinian convent in mind, *De predestinatione* most likely served as teaching material for the more advanced members of the third group and quite possibly for the

¹¹⁹ P.S. Eardley holds that in 1287 Giles was also appointed Regent Master of Theology, thereby becoming the first Augustinian Hermit to hold a chair at the University of Paris. Eardley, 'Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Will', p. 847. He follows F. Del Punta, who in turn refers to Ypma. "Nel periodo in cui fu *magister regens* allo Studio agostiniano di Parigi, E. si adoperò per ottenere agli agostiniani un certo numero di privilegi all'in interno dell'università", F. Del Punta, S. Donati, C. Luna s.v. Egidio Romano, *Dizionario biografico degli italiani*, ed. F. Barroccini, M. Cavale (Rome, 1993), vol. 42, pp. 319-41, esp. p. 322.

¹²⁰ "Et ideo volumus ut qui Parisius ad studium est mittendus, prius per vicarium vel provincialem et diffinitores et duos lectores ad minus examinetur tam de scientia quam de vita. Statuimus etiam et precipimus inviolabiliter observari ut nullus qui tricesimum quintum annum etatis attigerit, vadat Parisius ad studendum", *C.U.P.*, vol. II, n. 567, p. 40.

¹²¹ "Precipiat insuper omnibus regentibus et studentibus ut opiniones et positiones venerabilis fratris nostri Egidii ubique teneant, et secundum eius scripta legant", *C.U.P.*, vol. II, n. 567, p. 40.

¹²² *C.U.P.*, vol. II, n. 542, p. 12.

¹²³ W.J. Courtenay, 'The Augustinian Community at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century', *Augustiniana* 51 (2001), pp. 219-22, esp. p. 220.

¹²⁴ Courtenay, 'The Augustinian Community', p. 221.

second group as well. Giles's patron, Thavene of Thalomeis may well have been a lay benefactor of the Parisian convent, interested in supporting and promoting the theological education at pre-university level.

In 1290 Giles met the future Boniface VIII, who was then Cardinal Legate, at the council of Ste Geneviève. The purpose of Boniface's visit to Paris was to arbitrate in the quarrel over the Mendicants' right to hear confessions of seculars.¹²⁵ This meeting could have been the beginning of the close relationship between Giles and Boniface, but there is no direct proof for this. On 6 January 1292 Giles was elected Prior General of his Order at the general chapter held at St Maria del Popolo in Rome.¹²⁶ He occupied this post for three years until his election as Archbishop of Bourges in 1295 and was responsible for the foundation of a number of new houses in England and Flanders.¹²⁷ In 1293 Giles negotiated for the Augustinian house in Paris to move into the former convent of the Friars of the Sack. The donation of King Philip IV, confirmed in 1296, was partially illegal, since the Friars of the Sack had no permission from the pope to dispose of their property. Consequently the Bishop of Paris opposed the transaction but Giles finally obtained authorisation to move the convent there.¹²⁸ Giles's time of office as Prior General was in no way remarkable. His administrative skills, acquired since 1277, certainly helped the Order, and his appointment is another proof of the Augustinians' effort to support Giles's standing and reputation.

1.6 Giles in Bourges: 1295-1316

On 23 April 1295 Giles was appointed Archbishop of Bourges by Boniface VIII, who had been elected pope the previous year. The election to Bourges was carried out with some difficulty as Pope Celestine V had intended to appoint Jean of Savigny for a see which had been vacant since 1294, after the translation of the previous Archbishop as a cardinal to Penestrina.¹²⁹ Boniface annulled this decision, as well as many other

¹²⁵ Eastman, p. 326.

¹²⁶ *Analecta Augustiniana*, vol. II (1907) [not vol. 4 as quoted by Hewson], p. 339.

¹²⁷ Hewson, p. 15.

¹²⁸ *C.U.P.*, vol. II, n. 586, pp. 61-2.

¹²⁹ "Venerabili fratri Egidio archiepiscopo Bituricensi. Apostolatus officium. Sane Bituricensis ecclesia per translationem venerabilis fratris nostri S. episcopi Penestrini, olim archiepiscopi Bituricensis, pastoris solatio destituta, licet frater Petrus de Morrone, tunc Celestinus papa V, predecessor noster, eidem Bituricensi ecclesie de dilecto filio magistro Johanni de Savigneyo duxerit providendum", G. Digard *et alii*, *Les registres de Boniface VIII, bulles publiées ou analysées*, Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2nd series, vol. 4 (Paris, 1884-1939), vol. I, n. 70, col. 30.

appointments Celestine V had made.¹³⁰ It is quite rare that a member of a mendicant Order received a nomination to one of the wealthier sees in the north of France. A parallel case is that of Gauthier of Bruges, a Franciscan, who was elected bishop of Poitiers in 1280. After Giles's successor was elected Prior General of the Augustinian Hermits at the general chapter of Siena, Giles was installed in his seat at Bourges.¹³¹ As early as 4 and 11 July 1296 Giles obtained permission to appoint three vicars to represent him in his province with expenses paid by the pope.¹³² This provision points towards Boniface's intention to benefit from Giles's presence at the curia without causing unnecessary administrative difficulties at Bourges. Further such permissions on 12 March and 23 June 1297 prove his continued presence in Boniface's immediate circle; on the latter date he was also granted the right to appoint suitable persons for the *cimiteria violata* and vacant churches.¹³³ For the first time another permission of 14 July 1297 expressly states the reason for Giles's prolonged absence 'in order to remain at the curia'.¹³⁴ These papal provisions indicate his quasi-permanent presence at the curia, except for the representation of his province at the council of Clermont in 1296.¹³⁵ In view of the agenda, the taxation of the clergy by King Philip IV, this was an important event Giles probably attended rather than leaving the task to one of his deputies.

The pope evidently regarded him as one of his close counsellors and ordered him to write a treatise on the question of papal abdication. *De renuntiatione papae* opposed the first Colonna manifesto of 10 May 1297, and was probably written in the summer or early autumn of 1297.¹³⁶ From 1297 to 1299 Giles was in Rome, was granted further *procuraciones* on 1 August 1299, and returned to Bourges in September 1299.¹³⁷ Despite his extensive commitments at the curia and his archiepiscopal duties, he was

¹³⁰ On the question of Boniface's revocation of Celestine's decisions and appointments see K. Ganzer, *Papsttum und Bistumsbesetzungen in der Zeit von Gregor IX. bis Bonifaz VIII.* (Cologne-Graz, 1968), p. 377.

¹³¹ *Analecta Augustiniana*, vol. II (1907), pp. 367-8.

¹³² "Possit, non obstante contradictione, tres personas ydoneas in Bituricensis ecclesia, in qua receptio canonicorum et collatio prebendarum ad archiepiscopum et decanum ac capitulum eiusdem ecclesie noscitur communiter pertinere, in canonicos et in fratres recipere ac providere eorum singulis de singulis prebendis", Digard, vol. I, n. 1138, col. 406.

¹³³ Digard, vol. I, n. 1798, col. 680; n. 1863, col. 705.

¹³⁴ "Cur ei [Aegidius] apud sedem moranti", Digard, vol. I, n. 1893, col. 718-9.

¹³⁵ "quarta quartagesimae ad deliberandum de subsidio quod Philippus cognomentus Pulcher a clero petebat", *Gallia Christiana*, vol. II, col. 281. Cf. also *Gallia Christiana*, vol. II, col. 77.

¹³⁶ J.R. Eastman, *Papal Abdication in Later Medieval Thought*, Texts and Studies in Religion, vol. 42 (New York, 1990), p. 71. See also J.R. Eastman, 'De renuntiatione papae', p. 379 where Eastman fixes the dating in between 10 May 1297 and 3 March 1298.

¹³⁷ Digard, II, n. 3162, col. 460. Hewson, p. 34, n. 101, Eastman, p. 331.

probably present in March 1300 at the general chapter of his Order held in Naples.¹³⁸ In 1301 he was back at the curia and Boniface granted the appointment of suitable persons to convents in the province of Bourges.¹³⁹ During this stay he wrote the treatise *De ecclesiastica potestate*, probably in 1301 or 1302, before the promulgation of *Unam sanctam*, a text to which Giles also contributed.¹⁴⁰ Giles was at the centre of the political struggle between Philip IV and Boniface and his opinion and intellectual capacities played an important part in providing Boniface with the theoretical foundations for his claims.¹⁴¹ The events of Agnani and Boniface's death deprived Giles of an ally, perhaps also of a career as a cardinal.¹⁴² Giles's itinerary during the years from 1295 to 1303 shows that Boniface sought Giles's presence at the curia, rather than relying on his residence in an important French province.

Giles returned to Bourges after the death of Boniface at the beginning of the winter in 1303. It has been suggested that Giles was present at the election of the new pope, Benedict XI, on 22 October 1303.¹⁴³ This, however, seems unlikely as Giles had no part in the election, as he was not a member of the College of Cardinals. He probably briefly returned to Bourges and came back to Rome in January 1304 to preside at the inception of the Augustinian theologian James of Horta at the Lateran.¹⁴⁴ Benedict XI granted *procuraciones* to Giles on 1 February 1304; on 16 March 1304 he granted permission to appoint the abbot of a Benedictine monastery in the province of Bourges. These facts attest to Giles's presence at Rome at least until March 1304. According to the *Continuatio* of William of Nangis, Giles was consulted in 1304 in the affair of John

¹³⁸ Mattioli, p. 32.

¹³⁹ "Conceditur E[gidio], archiepiscopo Bituricensi, quod possit providere tam in cathedrali Bituricensi quam in singulis ecclesiis collegiatis Bituricensis civitatis ac diocesis hac vice de singulis personis ydoneis", Digard, vol. III, n. 4107, col. 110.

¹⁴⁰ R. Scholz, *De ecclesiastica potestate* (Weimar, 1929), p. X fixes the dates between February and August 1302, possibly even earlier, depending upon Giles already being present in Rome. R.W. Dyson, *Giles of Rome on Ecclesiastical Power*, p. X and n. 48.

¹⁴¹ Digard, I, n. 1864; See J. Miethke, 'Die Traktate *De potestate papae*. Ein Typus politiktheoretischer Literatur im späten Mittelalter, in: *Les genres littéraires dans les sources théologiques et philosophiques médiévales. Actes du Colloque International de Louvain-la-Neuve*, 25.-27.5.1981 (Louvain, 1982), pp. 193-211; R.W. Dyson, *Giles of Rome*, p. 115.

¹⁴² There are no surviving documents which attest to Boniface's intention to elevate Giles to a cardinalate. Whether Boniface had intended this for some time in the future has to remain speculation: see Mattioli, p. 29. Nonetheless some of the early modern editions of Giles's works, notably his commentary on *II Sentences* attributes to him the title of cardinal. Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum* (Venice, 1581), title page.

¹⁴³ Eastman, p. 331.

¹⁴⁴ "tuque postmodum de mandato nostro sub venerabili fratre nostro Egidio, archiepiscopo Bituricensi, in aula nostri palatii Laterani in facultate predicta solemniter incepisti", Grandjean, *Les registres de Benoît XI*, n. 361, col. 254.

of Paris's teachings on the real presence of Christ during transubstantiation. He took part in the commission summoned by the Bishop of Paris, which threatened John with excommunication if he failed to preserve silence on the issue.¹⁴⁵ Whether Giles followed the pope to Perugia until Benedict's death on 7 July 1304 is not known. No documents attest to Giles's whereabouts until 29 June 1306, when he was fined for not fulfilling his duty of visiting the curia by Pope Clement V. It can be assumed that Giles was at Bourges during the long interregnum before the election of Clement V on 5 June 1305.

Giles's relations with Clement V were not very good, which probably stems from the differences between the adjacent Church provinces of Bourges and Bordeaux during Clement's time as Archbishop of Bordeaux, coinciding with Giles's term of office at Bourges. Bertrand de Got, later Clement V, had tried to obtain the title of Primate of Aquitaine, a move Giles at first successfully prevented.¹⁴⁶ Consequently the Archbishop of Bordeaux had to agree to visitations from the Archbishop of Bourges.¹⁴⁷ The *Continuatio* of William of Nangis records that as soon as twelve days after Bertrand's election as pope, he proceeded to exercise his right of visitation, passing through Mâcon, Bourges and Limoges, thereby causing some discomfort.¹⁴⁸ Whether this is an accurate account is not sure, and it is possible that this constitutes a piece of propaganda directed against the new pope. Giles however lost his claim to the primacy of Aquitaine when Clement V ended the dispute between the provinces of Bourges and Bordeaux on 26 November 1306, granting this position to the Archbishop of Bordeaux.¹⁴⁹ The *Continuatio* of William of Nangis claims that as a consequence of this decision Giles was compelled to attend the canonical hours in order to qualify for canonical

¹⁴⁵ "Examinata [...] a Guillermo Parisius episcopo, de consilio fratris Aegidii Bituricensis archiepiscopo [...] perpetuum super hoc silentium dicto fratri sub poena excommunicationis impositum, a lecturaque pariter et praedicatione privatur", William of Nangis, I, p. 348.

¹⁴⁶ The dedication of *De ecclesiastica potestate* to Pope Boniface VIII shows quite clearly the status before the election of Clement V: "Brother Giles, his humble creature, by the same Mercy Archbishop of Bourges and Primate of Aquitaine", Dyson, *Giles of Rome on Ecclesiastical Power*, p. XXIV.

¹⁴⁷ Lajard, p. 437, referring to *Histoire littéraire de la France*, vol. 25, p. 305.

¹⁴⁸ "Papa Clemens circa Purificationem beatae Virginis a Lugduno recedens, Burdegalis per Matisconum, Biturices [...] et Lemovicis iter faciens, tam religiosorum quam secularium ecclesias et monasteria tam per se quam per suos satellites depraedando, multa et gravia intulit eis damna", William of Nangis (*Continuatio*), vol. I, p. 352.

¹⁴⁹ "Dudum siquidem occasione Primaciae, quam olim contendebant Bituricensis archiepiscopi in Burdegalensis provincia se habere, gravis inter eos et Burdegalensis, qui fuerunt pro tempore, extorta extiti materia questionis, ex qua dissensiones quam plurime, scandala gravia multaque pericula provenerunt", *Tables des Registres de Clément V*, Y. Lanhers (ed.), Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 3^e série, vol. 2 (Paris, 1948), n. 4601.

distribution.¹⁵⁰ This picture of Giles as a needy clergyman seems exaggerated since Bourges was a fairly wealthy see. There are other pieces of evidence for the strained relationship between Clement and Giles. On 29 June 1306 Giles had to pay a fine of 300 *livres tournois* for not having fulfilled his obligation in visiting the papal curia for two years, which includes the fine for the first year of 150 *livres tournois*.¹⁵¹ These sums, however, are not excessive, as the taxation of revenues of the see of Bourges totalled 4000 florins. Its yearly income therefore can be estimated at roughly three to four times this amount. In relation with this the sum of 300 *livres tournois* is minimal and represents *c.* two to three percent of the see's annual income.¹⁵² Similar documents are preserved in the registers of Clement V for 20 December 1307 and 22 January 1310.¹⁵³ These documents suggest that Giles restricted himself to the affairs of his province and of his Order and did not spend much time at the papal curia. On 30 August 1310 he declared his intention to leave a sum of money to a domain in Italy which after his death should be given to the Augustinian house in Paris to support members of the Order during their studies in Paris.¹⁵⁴

In 1308 Giles was the co-author of a letter to Clement V on the subject of the Templars, whilst at the papal curia in Poitiers.¹⁵⁵ In 1309 Giles was asked by the Franciscan Order to write a report on the allegedly heretical teachings of Peter Olivi, which took its final form in the treatise *De erroribus philosophorum* (1309), which ensured that Olivi was not condemned as a heretic.¹⁵⁶ In 1311-12 Giles was present at the council of Vienne for which he wrote *Contra exemptos* (1310). It is a work on the question of exemption, defending the bishops' right of control and investigation into the affairs of exempt Orders. It is an indication that Giles saw himself mainly as an archbishop, rather than a member of an exempt Order. He was opposed by the

¹⁵⁰ "unde et frater Aegidius Bituricensis archiepiscopus huiusmodi depraedationes ad tantam devenit inopiam, quod tanquam unus de suis simplicibus canonicis ad percipiendum quotidianis distributiones pro vitae necessariis, horas ecclesiasticas frequentare coactus sit", William of Nangis (*Continuatio*), vol. I, pp. 352-3.

¹⁵¹ "Quictatio visitationis Archiepiscopi Bituricensi [...] Cum dictus Archiepiscopus teneatur sedem apostolicam in 150 libro turon. parvorum in florenis auri, computato floreno pro 10 sol. cum dimidio di biennio in biennium visitare, testatur Arnaldus quod dominus frater Egidius Bituricensis archiepiscopus pro transactis duobus biennis completis die 5 Novembris anni 1303 et anni 1305 proxima prateritis per Angelucium nuntium suum dictam visitavit sedem, solvens 300 libros turonensium", *Reg. Clement V*, vol. I (Appendix), n. 284, p. 275.

¹⁵² I would like to thank Prof. V. Tabbagh (Dijon) for this data.

¹⁵³ *Reg. Clément V*, vol. I, n. 326, p. 283; n. 474, p. 306.

¹⁵⁴ Lajard, pp. 438-9 quoting a document in the AN Paris, S 3634, n. 1.

¹⁵⁵ Mattioli, p. 34; Eastman, p. 334.

¹⁵⁶ J. Koch, 'Das Gutachten', pp. 142-3, 146.

Cistercian Abbot of Pontigny, Jacques of Thérines.¹⁵⁷ Both works prove Giles's continued interest in writing, covering both judicial and philosophical matters whilst fulfilling his duties as archbishop.

In 1315 Giles made two donations: one dating from 27 March, the other on 29 March 1315.¹⁵⁸ The first text names brother John of Verdun, Prior of the Augustinian house in Paris, as the recipient of Giles's archiepiscopal ring. This gift is intended to provide for the needs of members of the Order studying in Paris and institutes four daily masses to be said for Giles and his family.¹⁵⁹ The second donation recalls Giles's early years spent at the Augustinian house in Paris, and was formally proclaimed in Bourges in the presence of the Prior of the Augustinian house there. Giles left some precious objects to the Roman Augustinian convent, and some other precious objects to the convent of Bourges and his library to the Augustinian convent in Paris.¹⁶⁰ It is not known how these wishes were carried out, as no trace survives in the registers of the Augustinian convent in Paris after 1315.

Giles presented himself to the new Pope John XXII at Lyons on 5 September 1316.¹⁶¹ He died at Avignon on 23 December 1316 and his body was later transferred to the Augustinian convent in Paris.¹⁶² Bernard Gui, the author of a list of the bishops of Limoges, records that Giles was buried eight days before the nomination of his successor at Bourges, on 24 December 1316, in the Augustinian convent at Avignon.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ For the council of Vienne and the impact of *Contra exemptos* see E. Müller, *Das Konzil von Vienne, 1311-1312. Seine Quellen und seine Geschichte*, Vorreformationsgeschichtliche Forschungen, vol. 12 (Münster i.W., 1934), p. 495.

¹⁵⁸ AN Paris, S 3436, n. 1, 2.

¹⁵⁹ AN Paris, S 3436, n. 1.

¹⁶⁰ AN Paris, S 3436, n. 2; Lajard, p. 439, who records that the objects left in Paris were destroyed by a fire in 1487, but does not give any proof for this.

¹⁶¹ "In e.m. archiepiscopo Bituricensi eiusque suffraganeis", *Lettres des papes d'Avignon se rapportant à la France. Lettres secrètes et curiales du pape Jean XXII (1316-1334)*, A. Coulon (ed.), vol. I (Paris, 1906), n. 10, col. 9. Eastman, p. 337 is wrong in saying that Giles presented himself to John XXII at Avignon and there is no evidence that Giles was seriously ill at that time.

¹⁶² Lajard, p. 441; *Gallia Christiana*, vol. II, col. 77; Ossinger, p. 242.

¹⁶³ "Hic dominus Reginaldus [de Porta] fuit postmodum translatus de Lemovicensi sede et factus archiepiscopus Bituricensis per provisionem domini Johannis papae XXII. in Avinione, ubi cui morabatur, in vigilia Circumcisionis Domine, pridie kalendas Januarii, scilicet octava die a sepulta praedecessori sui, domini fratris Aegidii, qui in vigilia Nativitatis dominicae in Avenione, in ecclesia fratrum sancti Augustini extiterat tumulatus, anno Domini MCCCXVI", Bernard Gui, *Nomina episcoporum Lemovicensium*, p. 756.

1.7 Conclusion

Two of the main characteristics of Giles's career – and output in writing – are his perseverance and readiness to adapt himself to new tasks and appointments. Yet, in 1277, he refused to comply and incurred an eight-year absence from the academic community at Paris. It is possible to interpret his perseverance and adaptability as contradictory facets of the same personality. It is difficult to discern his motivations because of the lack of comprehensive documentation. He was able to rise to prominence in such various environments as his Order, the University of Paris, the papal curia and the archdiocese of Bourges, whilst pursuing his intellectual activities in theology, philosophy and Church politics.

His wide-ranging interests are reflected in over sixty treatises, of which *De predestinatione* represents particularly challenging characteristics in its formal composition, style and content, whilst placing original arguments, basic theological doctrine and long paraphrases of Augustine's works next to each other. Such a composite treatise begs some fundamental questions: what was the audience Giles had in mind, how did his difficulties with Church authorities affect his judgement, and why did he choose to write a treatise whose composition was unique amongst his predecessors and contemporaries? The commentary on *De predestinatione* in the three chapters that follow attempts to find an answer to these matters. Its aim is to present and discuss a variety of doctrinal positions contained in that treatise, placing it in the context of late thirteenth-century scholastic debates.

2 Predestination, Contingency and Necessity

2.1 Introduction

The question of divine predestination forms a central part of the Christian tradition, but does not belong to the core of Christian theology.¹⁶⁴ Its status derives from the interplay of two related, but distinct theological tenets: the doctrine of God's perfect providence, and His foreknowledge.¹⁶⁵ The traditional definition of predestination that God foreordains the final salvation of some of mankind from eternity,¹⁶⁶ only appears simple at its surface. Several questions ensue from this definition. What are the reasons behind God's choice? Is His choice compatible with human free will? Put in philosophical rather than theological terms, the central issue is whether God's foreknowledge can be reconciled with the contingency of what is known through it.¹⁶⁷ This question, however, cannot be treated alone, because of the special qualities of God's being: theological doctrine holds that God is perfectly provident. This entails that whatever happens in the created world, is either specifically decreed or knowingly permitted by Him. Divine providence both encompasses the divine will and divine knowledge. As Zagzebski has shown, the problem of divine foreknowledge is harder to solve than the problem of the foreknowledge of an infallible but non-divine being. God as the providential creator of everything outside of Himself is assumed to be much more than the passive recipient of the objects of knowledge.¹⁶⁸ Contingent events, free human decisions, for example, however, stand in apparent contrast to God's perfect providence: since God is perfectly provident, nothing exists outside His will and influence. Divine knowledge, in contrast to simple human knowledge, entails a causality that further complicates the question of predestination. It prompts the strong argument that all events are necessary, since God as the First cause cannot be mistaken in His (fore)knowledge: consequently these events are beyond the influence and scope of

¹⁶⁴ Predestination is not part of the Nicene Creed, for example.

¹⁶⁵ A.J. Freddoso, *Luis de Molina On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the Concordia), translated, with an introduction and notes* (Ithaca-London, 1988), p. 2.

¹⁶⁶ R. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, Great Medieval Thinkers Series, ed. B. Davies (New York-Oxford, 1999), p. 101. See also *Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford, 1989), vol. 12, p. 330. In Islam the issue of predestination vs. freewill was also vividly discussed: for a short introduction see M.A. Rayyah Hashim, 'Free Will and Predestination in Islamic and Christian Thought', *Kano Studies* 3 (1967), pp. 27-34.

¹⁶⁷ Freddoso, *Molina*, p. 1.

¹⁶⁸ L.T. Zagzebski, *The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge* (New York, 1991), p. 10.

human free will.¹⁶⁹ God as the ground of all truth creates tensions with human freedom and puts a constraint upon a solution of the divine foreknowledge problem.¹⁷⁰ Contingent events have no place in this argument, yet orthodox Christian tradition consistently defends their existence. Giles of Rome is part of that tradition, and tenaciously holds that God's foreknowledge does not put any limitation upon the contingency of created things.¹⁷¹ Giles's solution holds that the created world is determined by antecedent causes (fundamentally by God as the First Cause), yet remains uncoerced. God has chosen some beings to be saved, prior to their foreseen merits, whilst granting them freewill to follow the way He has previously decided for them. Giles holds that contingency and freewill are perfectly compatible with determinism.¹⁷² It should be noted that the 1277 condemnations apart from Giles's own censure were concerned with a number of theses that touched upon the will.¹⁷³ His theological solution to the long-standing problem of fatalism vs. divine foreknowledge is mainly Augustinian. This is not surprising in a treatise that constantly refers to Augustine, using and presenting his views in either direct quotations, paraphrases or implicit references. Giles himself states that he follows the *via media* between the two contradictory positions held by Cicero and the Stoics, as presented by Augustine in *De civitate Dei* V.9.¹⁷⁴ In contrast to Augustine, Giles explicitly formulates the aforementioned theological solution to the problem, regardless of its inherent problems.¹⁷⁵ Giles does not present any conclusive proofs for his position, and it is probably for this reason that his solution did not achieve the status of a definite and irrefutable answer of the problem. I would therefore qualify Giles's position as mainly Augustinian, combined with elements by other authors. In particular, this applies to the

¹⁶⁹ Freddoso, *Molina*, p. 2: "the problem of *divine* precognition runs far deeper than the problem of simple precognition [...] the doctrine of providence carries with it a causal dimension that virtually guarantees that no solution to the problem of *simple* precognition, even comprehensive and infallible precognition, will constitute a full and adequate solution to the problem of *divine* precognition".

¹⁷⁰ Zagzebski, *Dilemma*, p. 11.

¹⁷¹ The contingency of created things was an issue in the 1270 condemnations. See K. Emery, 'The Continuity of Cognition according to Henry of Ghent', in: J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, A. Speer (ed.), *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte* (Miscellanea Medievalia, vol. 28) (Berlin, 2001), pp. 59-124, esp. pp. 86-7.

¹⁷² In some ways, Giles's theory on predestination resembles that of Duns Scotus (God decides salvation for some prior to His knowledge of their action). See Cross, *Duns Scotus*, pp. 101-2.

¹⁷³ See M.W.F. Stone, 'Moral Psychology after 1277', in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 795-826; p. 797 for a complete list of theses.

¹⁷⁴ "Oportet hic ergo viam mediam ambulare, ut non teneamus alterum extremum cum Cicerone [...] nec alterum extremum cum Stoicis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}, l. 21-4.

¹⁷⁵ According to Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 66, Augustine does not openly decide in favour or against fatalism.

Boethian idea of God outside of time and the Anselmian definitions of necessity. In respect of the problem of fatalism, Giles is certainly no Thomist, since Thomas believed in the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge of future events and their simultaneous contingency.¹⁷⁶

Giles's discourse is an encyclopaedic overview on the question of predestination and foreknowledge, probably written as a textbook for pre-academical students of his own Order. At this point several questions arise: does this mean that Giles was not terribly interested in the issue – or rather the contrary? Why did he not venture a solution, since he was certainly ambitious enough (see his involvement in the 1277 debate and his many Aristotelian treatises). Could it be that the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 made him wary of discussing a potentially controversial issue at a high academical level within his peers rather than leaving the issue at a pre-university textbook level? Seen from this perspective, it is then not surprising that Giles's positions are not only conform with the Christian tradition and theology, but also present the standard views of previous authors. This is particularly apparent in the section on the different kinds of necessity, which otherwise might be seen as rather confusing and cumbersome.¹⁷⁷

This chapter will show how Giles constructs his argument to explain the apparent contradiction between God's providence – His influence as the First cause – and human free will. Giles sensibly divides his enquiry on predestination and foreknowledge into three main areas, explaining at first the 'mechanism' of predestination in its interplay with divine grace. He then moves on to the central philosophical difficulty posed by God's foreknowledge of future contingents, and demonstrates how he understands the coexistence of both concepts. Giles concludes his analysis of predestination with a discourse on necessity, which he constructs as a corroboration of his averment that contingency exists.

In thirteenth century scholastic thought, the analysis and interpretation of predestination usually form part of the first book of the *Sentences* commentaries.¹⁷⁸ The

¹⁷⁶ Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 99. The crucial point of difference is Thomas' belief on the unalterability of God's knowledge in the past.

¹⁷⁷ Necessity is discussed in Giles's *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{va}, l. 57-fol. 32^{ra}, l. 19.

¹⁷⁸ See W. Pannenberg, *Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Skotus im Zusammenhang der scholastischen Lehrentwicklung. Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte*, vol. 4 (Göttingen, 1954), pp. 29-54,

topic also appears in commentaries on *Romans*, especially concerning two passages: 8.29-30 and 9.16-24, where St Paul gives his definition of predestination. Until the composition of *De predestinatione*, Giles's work was no exception: his exposition of the subject in distinctions 39-40, 41, 43 and 47 of the first book on the *Sentences* is extensive, yet only very partially overlaps with the interpretation in *De predestinatione*. Related questions, as they appear in I *Sentences*, such as the number of the elect, the predestination of angels and the precise nature of divine election, do not appear in *De predestinatione*, written some fifteen years later than the commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*. Giles's *Romans* commentary equally does not constitute a model for his exposition of predestination and foreknowledge in *De predestinatione*.¹⁷⁹ Some of the quoted definitions are the same, such as Peter Lombard's definition of predestination as a preparation of grace. Also, on one occasion, Giles uses the same image, already widely used in antiquity, the arrow placed by the archer, to illustrate the effects of God's providence.¹⁸⁰ Yet, these are rare occurrences, and do not point towards a previously existing, fully developed discourse on predestination. The concluding remark of Giles's analysis of predestination at the end of chapter three of *De predestinatione*, referring to his previous enquiries into separate aspects of predestination, confirms this impression. There he refers to his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, his *Romans* commentary and to several of his *Quodlibets*.¹⁸¹ It endorses the view that *De predestinatione* was intended as an independent work, rather than just as a compilation of previous material.¹⁸² Giles's choice to treat the issues of predestination, paradise and hell – especially predestination – in a separate treatise, together with the questions on paradise and hell, is unique in the scholastic tradition. No other extant scholastic work,

for a summary exposition of the positions of Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas on the subject of predestination, usually in their *Sentences* commentaries.

¹⁷⁹ Giles's *In Epistolam ad Romanos* was probably written at some point between 1274-85: it is likely therefore that it precedes *De predestinatione*.

¹⁸⁰ Giles of Rome, *In Epistolam ad Romanos*, I.2 (Rome, 1555), fol. 7^{rb}.

¹⁸¹ "Diximus autem multa et varia circa istam materiam in postillis nostris super epistolam ad Romanos, et in opere nostro super primum sententiarum, et in aliis questionibus a nobis quesitis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{rb}, l. 23-7. The quodlibetal question Giles refers to here, equally does not overlap with the topics of *De predestinatione*; it concerns the effect of prayers of the saints: "Utrum in praedestinatio possit iuari precibus sanctorum", Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta*, I.2.

¹⁸² Only one other passage of *De predestinatione* gives a different impression: it is closely related to Giles's second *Quodlibet*, question nine: "Utrum daemones possint pati ab igne inferni", which dates from Easter 1287. Giles quotes other passages of the second *Quodlibet* in chapter twelve of *De predestinatione*, which proves that *De predestinatione* was written after the second *Quodlibet*. See chapter one, p. 38 (and note 117), and also chapter four, pp. 142-3.

written up to the end of the thirteenth century, combines these three topics in one treatise. Giles himself gives no explanations for his selection, and it is difficult to establish possible reasons. Thavene of Thalomeis, the unidentified client of the treatise, might well have been the driving force behind the treatise's composition.¹⁸³ Giles's positions are conventional, and *De predestinatione*, especially in its working patterns, may be the result of what he thought an educated layman like his patron, Thavene, needed to know about predestination, paradise and hell. At present, the lack of conclusive proofs does not allow for any further speculation.

2.2 Foreknowledge, Contingency and Necessity: an Overview

In the first three chapters of *De predestinatione*, Giles's main interest lies in the philosophical and theological analysis of the implications of the interplay between God's perfect providence and His foreknowledge. The following section will give a short overview of Giles's main arguments in chapters one to three of *De predestinatione*. In this first part of his treatise Giles builds his argument on the two fundamental tenets of predestination: God's providence and the extent of his (fore)knowledge. An introductory first chapter defines predestination; in the following two chapters Giles builds his argument to show that God's perfect providence does not preclude contingent events.

In his analysis in *De predestinatione*, chapter one, Giles uses the customary thirteenth century definition of predestination: those who are good are called predestined, whereas those who are evil are called foreknown.¹⁸⁴ This definition both avoids double predestination, a doctrine which holds that God predestines to good as well as to evil, and points towards the crucial issue behind predestination: the extent and quality of God's foreknowledge. Giles's argument first denies that God is responsible for the existence of evil and thereby rules out any reference to the Manichaean heresy,

¹⁸³ Nothing is known about Thavene of Thalomeis and the circumstances of the dedication. See M.A. Hewson, *Giles of Rome and the Medieval Theory of Conception. A Study of the De formatione corporis humani in utero* (London, 1975), p. 38. It may be that Thavene belonged to the same family mentioned in the *Regestum Volterrannum* in the second half of the thirteenth century. See F. Schneider, *Regestum Volterrannum* (Rome, 1907), reprint Rome 1990 (Regestum Chartarum Italianum, vol. 1), Cambrai, fol. 28^{vb}.

¹⁸⁴ "prescientia de dampnandis dicitur prescientia tamen, de salvandis vero predestinatio nuncupatur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 28^{vb}, l. 30-1. This definition already formed part of Giles's commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, d. 47, q. 3, fol. 238^{va}.

which holds the dual existence of a good and evil principle.¹⁸⁵ Giles, following Augustine, is careful to point out that God is the *auctor* of His creation, but does not actively carry out evil actions (as an *actor*); rather, He punishes them as a just avenger (*iustus ultor*).¹⁸⁶ A careful and traditional distinction between predestination and foreknowledge opens the argument, which Giles then expands with an analysis of God's *scientia* (knowledge) to show that God only predestines the good (to salvation) and punishes evil, but does not create evil. In accordance with the customary thirteenth century understanding of predestination, Giles explains at the end of chapter one that predestination can only be seen in the context of divine grace. This is a view that stems from Augustine, and is later taken up by Peter Lombard. Hence it is not surprising that Giles ends his argument with three definitions of grace customarily quoted by thirteenth century schoolmen: two by Augustine and one by Peter Lombard.¹⁸⁷ By pointing out this theologically essential link between predestination and grace, Giles pulls predestination more closely towards the core issues of orthodox Christian theology.

In chapter two of *De predestinatione*, Giles moves on to show that God's *scientia*, His knowledge, does not entail that God's *prescientia*, His foreknowledge, precludes future contingents. The argument begins with a discussion of the term *fatum* (fate), which Giles takes from Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, V.9. Giles presents the diverging views of Cicero and the Stoics on the subject of fate on the basis of Augustine's summary of that classical debate.¹⁸⁸ Although the context of the controversy is decidedly non-Christian, since Cicero wrote *De fato* in 44 BC, it nevertheless offers a challenge to Christian theology, because of its denial of the divine in favour of the existence of human free will.¹⁸⁹ Augustine takes up this challenge and continues the debate by refuting Cicero's arguments and states the Christian orthodox standpoint that God exists, and that He has a will, supreme power and foreknowledge.¹⁹⁰ Giles, whilst subscribing to the same principles, puts his arguments differently. A scientific

¹⁸⁵ 'Manichaean' is taken here in the sense of what current research thinks they were, not what Augustine explains who and what they were, and argued.

¹⁸⁶ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 28^{vb}, l. 38.

¹⁸⁷ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 32-40.

¹⁸⁸ For an overview of the Stoics' position on fate see D. Frede, 'Stoic Determinism', in: *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, ed. B. Inwood (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 179-205, esp. pp. 180-1.

¹⁸⁹ On Cicero's *De fato* see R.W. Sharples, *Cicero: On Fate (De fato) and Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Philosophiae Consolationis) IV.5-7, V*, Edited with an Introduction, Translation and Commentaries (Warminster, 1991), pp. 6-8.

¹⁹⁰ "nos, ut confitemur summum et verum Deum, ita voluntatem summamque potestatem ac praescientiam eius confitemur", Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, V.9, CCSL 47, p. 137, l. 27-9.

digression, a rare occurrence in *De predestinatione*,¹⁹¹ associates the term *fatum* with the influence of stars (*vis siderum*) and also defines it as a series of secondary causes. On the basis of Augustine's definition that the term fate encompasses both the divine will and God's providence, Giles explains that fate – that is, secondary causes – does allow for contingent events. His demonstration draws upon another standard reference in scholastic works: Ptolemy's astronomical system, dating from the second century AD. The ensuing discussion about the influence of God's *scientia* upon contingent events constitutes Giles's first attempt to prove that his so-called *via media*,¹⁹² the coexistence of God's foreknowledge and contingent events, is valid. The key to Giles's argument is the concept of causality: God's separate intellect foresees all, but does not exert a causal influence that would impose necessity, or, put the other way, deny contingency. It should be noted that Giles refrains from merging theological fatalism with the question of God's foreknowledge of future contingents: he clearly separates the discussion of *fatum* from his subsequent analysis of God's foreknowledge.¹⁹³

With chapter three, Giles attempts to solve the apparent contradiction between God's perfect providence and the existence of contingent effects. Said in Giles's words, God's foreknowledge does not impose any necessity upon contingent events.¹⁹⁴ In contrast to the previous two chapters, Giles constructs his arguments quite formally, predominantly in philosophical terms. His line of reasoning, subdivided into distinctions, offers eight individual proofs for the coexistence of God's foreknowledge and future contingents.¹⁹⁵ Necessity, as the main counteracting element as opposed to contingency, is discussed in four of these distinctions: Giles examines necessity both by itself, and, through God's foreknowledge, in its consequence upon the created world. Chapter three is a central piece of Giles's enquiry into the consequences of God's foreknowledge upon the created world. As such, it is significantly longer than any other chapter of *De predestinatione*. Giles's first proof, based upon Augustine, states that God

¹⁹¹ The other example is the opening section of chapter nine of *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 36^{vb}-37^{ra}. See chapter four, pp. 125-8, 132-3.

¹⁹² Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}.

¹⁹³ On the question of theological fatalism in conjunction with divine foreknowledge in modern research see W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine foreknowledge and human freedom. The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 19 (Leiden, 1991), pp. 226-9. H. Anzulewicz, 'Das Phänomen des Schicksals und die Freiheit des Menschen nach Albertus Magnus', in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 507-34, esp. p. 508.

¹⁹⁴ "divina prescientia aliquam necessitatem imponit rebus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}, l. 38-9 (chapter heading).

¹⁹⁵ The division into *distinctiones* is unique in *De predestinatione*.

foreknows the human free will within this human being: in Giles's opinion this increases rather than annihilates human free will (and the existence of contingency). The second proof is built on the widely used scholastic distinction between the divided and the composed sense and *de re* and *de dicto* facts: in the composed sense, the apparent contradiction between God's unfailing foreknowledge and the existence of contingency is cancelled. Distinction three, taken from Aristotle and Anselm, evaluates the difference between simple and conditional necessity: Giles shows that future contingents coexist with conditional necessity. The fourth proof, again based upon Anselm, distinguishes between antecedent and consequent necessity, and shows that God's foreknowledge of future contingents can only be a necessity of consequence: no event is predetermined by God's antecedent knowledge. With distinction five, Giles introduces the Boethian concept of God's eternal existence outside the created world, where everything is present to Him at once. In Giles's view, this knowledge does not put any necessity upon (future) contingents.¹⁹⁶ The sixth proof examines necessity by itself (*in se*) and in its relation with the outside world, especially contingency. In relation to God, especially His intellect, contingent things possess some kind of necessity, but in relation to the created world they preserve their contingency. The causality of necessity, particularly its link to the extent of God's *scientia*, stands at the centre of distinction seven: Giles explains that God's knowledge is infallible, but that His thought does not touch either *esse* or contingency of an event.¹⁹⁷ Finally, distinction eight combines the results of distinctions three, four and seven: God foresees both contingent and necessary events, but does not confer any necessity upon contingent incidents.¹⁹⁸ With his conclusion of chapter three (which is not a conclusion on the whole section of predestination) Giles reaffirms the Boethian notion of God outside of time, giving a different example to illustrate it. For Giles, this particular quality of God's (pre)vision is the central and final proof of the existence of contingency in a determined universe.

¹⁹⁶ According to the Boethian / Egidian understanding, there are no 'future' events from God's point of view.

¹⁹⁷ "divina scientia non fallitur; quod non falli, non cogit rem esse, nec tollit contingentiam a rebus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{vb}, l. 48-9.

¹⁹⁸ "secundum quod sue fuit beneplacitum voluntati: et sicut ordinavit et previdit sic res evenient, ut que ordinavit, vel previdit evenire sic res evenient ut que ordinavit, vel previdit evenire contingenter, que necessario, necessario: ut in ipsis rebus contingentibus nulla necessitas inferatur ex divina prescientia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{ra}, l. 13-7.

2.3 Predestination, Foreknowledge, Providence and Grace

Giles, conscious of the inherent difficulties of the doctrine of predestination (especially its coexistence with divine foreknowledge and freewill), is careful to place a stringent set of definitions at the outset of his discourse on predestination and God's foreknowledge. He defines foreknowledge as the general term, the *nomen commune*, which comprises predestination as a specific term, a *nomen proprium*. The term 'predestination' therefore only applies to the saved, whereas the term 'foreknown' refers to both the saved and damned.¹⁹⁹ This 'common manner of speech', as Giles calls it,²⁰⁰ sets the tone of the short introductory chapter one of *De predestinatione*, which presents an exposition of the interplay between God's providence, His (fore)knowledge and His grace. Giles primarily examines the particular case of predestination, and uses some references to God's treatment of those who are evil to illustrate God's conduct. Giles's formal distinction between foreknowledge and predestination avoids double predestination, and lays the foundation for his exposition of how God acts towards mankind, especially towards those whom He intends for eternal life. Giles tackles this problem at first in its theological dimension, and presents the relationship between God's providence and grace.²⁰¹

Giles's view of God's influence upon the created world is deterministic, with the reservation that the predestination of the blessed to heaven is consistent with their freedom. Since he understands freedom merely in the sense of being uncoerced, not in the sense of being undetermined by antecedent causes, this argument holds. He explains predestination as the combination of God's knowledge (*notitia*), His will (Giles calls it the *divinum propositum*, the divine plan) and His grace.²⁰² God is the primary cause and therefore His knowledge is universal: His knowledge of the future is immediate and not a result of God's perception of something, once it occurs in time.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ "Attamen quia prescientia salvandorum habet nomen proprium, et dicitur predestinatio, ratio ut alibi diximus prescientia dampnandorum retinuit sibi nomen commune extra, et dicta est prescientia tamen.", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{ra}, l. 30-3.

²⁰⁰ "usus loquendi", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 28^{vb}, l. 47.

²⁰¹ See Freddoso, *Molina*, pp. 5-6.

²⁰² "Sed predestinatio non potest dicere simplicem notitiam [Dei] tamen, sed semper includit divinum propositum, [...] et dare eis gratiam in presenti", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{ra}, l. 49-53.

²⁰³ "scientia Dei est causa rerum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{ra}, l. 13. The quotation reflects Giles's own discourse in his commentary on the *I Sentences*, d. 40, art. 3, using Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics: Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri XIV cum Averrois*

Giles uses two terms to denote slightly differing aspects of God's knowledge: His *scientia* and His *notitia*. He introduces the term *scientia* with a quotation from Averroes, who defines God's knowledge in the context of God as the primary cause: *scientia Dei causat res*: God's knowledge causes things.²⁰⁴ Giles adopts this definition: God is the infallible First cause,²⁰⁵ and applies it to define God's predestination of the blessed: God mercifully predestines some prior to their foreseen merits. Giles further describes the mechanism of predestination with the etymological explanation of the word *predestinare*. He recalls the meaning of *destinare* as a synonym of *mittere* ('to send') and consequently defines *predestinare* as *premittere*: 'to send in advance'.²⁰⁶ It should be noted that Giles already used this etymological explanation in his discourse on predestination in his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*; this is one of a few direct quotations of that work in the first chapter of *De predestinatione*. As shown, Giles employs the term *scientia* to describe predestination. The term *notitia* appears in a different context and defines God's knowledge that is directed towards the foreknown, those who reject God. In *De predestinatione*, the term of God's *notitia* defines that part of God's knowledge, which governs God's relations with the foreknown.²⁰⁷ Giles's definition of God's *notitia* can be translated as God's perception of the created world, which only observes and does not exercise any determining influence. Giles's distinction between God's *scientia* and His *notitia* serves to emphasise God's infinite

Cordubensis in eosdem commentariis et epitome (Venice, 1562-74), vol. 8 (Venice, 1572, reprint Frankfurt/M., 1962), fol. 337^{ra} A-C.

²⁰⁴ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 28^{vb}, l. 39, quoting Averroes, *Metaphysics*, textus 51, fol. 337^{ra} A-C: "ipse [Deus] scit omnia, que sunt hic, scientia universali, non scientia particulari. Et veritas est, quod primum scit omnia, secundum quod scit se tamen scientia in esse, quod est causa eorum esse. vg. qui scit calorem ignis tamen, non dicitur nescire naturam caloris existentis in reliquis calidis: sed iste est ille, qui scit naturam caloris, secundeum quod est calor. [...] sua scientia est causa entis: ens autem est causa nostrae scientiae. Scientia igitur eius non dicitur esse universalis, neque particularis, ille enim cuius scientia est universalis, scit particularia, quae sunt in actu in potentia scita. Eius igitur scientia necessario est scientia impotentia, cum universale non est nisi scientia rerum particularium. Et, cum universale est scientia in potentia: et nulla potentia est in scientia eius: ergo scientia eius non est universalis. Et magis manifestum est, quoniam scientia eius non est particularis, particularia enim sunt infinita, et non determinantur a scientia. Ille igitur primus non disponitur per scientiam, quae est in nobis, nec per ignorantiam, quae est ei opposita: sicut non disponitur per istas illud, quod non est innatum habere alterum. Declaratum est igitur ali quod en esse sciens, de quo non erit fas dicere sibi." Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 1074b13-1075a10.

²⁰⁵ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, "propter infallibilitatem divine scientie", fol. 29^{vb}, l. 48-9; "sic que scit Deus fienda sunt fienda", II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{ra}, l. 6-7.

²⁰⁶ "destinare enim illud est quod mittere [...] predestinare idem est quod premittere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 28^{vb}, l. 46-50.

goodness. It rejects any claim that God might be responsible for evil: God only allows evil, foreknows and avenges it.²⁰⁸

Giles sees God's grace as the means that accomplishes the predestination of the good.²⁰⁹ Grace is an essential auxiliary which guides the good individual's way towards salvation. Giles uses the term *gravitas*, God giving goodwill, to describe it: the good renounce sin and misery and move towards eternal life.²¹⁰ A good human being would not be able to accomplish that way without God's grace. Giles illustrates this with an image borrowed from antiquity: the arrows (the predestined) placed in the target (salvation) by the archer (God).²¹¹ Four traditional definitions, scholastic commonplaces, one taken from each of Augustine, Fulgentius and Peter Lombard, conclude Giles's discourse on predestination. According to these authorities God's grace is defined as a gratuitous gift (Fulgentius), the preparation for divine benefits (Peter Lombard), the preparation for eternal life (Augustine), and called grace in the created world and glory in eternal life (Giles).²¹² With this theological classification Giles sets the foundation for his subsequent enquiry upon the consequences of God's actions: is determinism compatible with contingency and freewill? In modern terminology, this is a philosophical rather than a theological question. This distinction did not exist for the schoolmen of the late thirteenth century, yet it is interesting that Giles treats the 'theological' aspect of predestination separately in the first chapter of *De predestinatione*. In some ways, chapter one serves as the introduction to the central

²⁰⁷ "potest dicere duplicem Dei notitiam, quam habet de dampnandis [...] Ut dicamus quod divina prescientia et notitia, quam Deus habet de dampnandis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{ra}, l. 37-43.

²⁰⁸ "vel si similiter cum huiusmodi notitia dicit divinum propositum, hoc non est secundum quod Deus agit, vel secundum quod proponit agere, sed secundum quod cessat ab actu, vel secundum quod proponit ab actu cessare", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{ra}, l. 38-42.

²⁰⁹ "quia est destinatio in finem [...] ab auxiliis per quem tendit in finem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 11-3.

²¹⁰ "destinatio [...] ut si grave recedit a loco sursum et tendit deorsum. Oportet dare aliud per quod hoc faciat ut per gravitatem, sic et si boni recedunt a culpa et miseria, et tendunt in vitam eternam et in gloriam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 11-8. Thomas also uses this term, although not in the exact same context: see Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, *Prima Secundae*, q. 36, art. 2.

²¹¹ "sagitte mittuntur in signum a sagittante", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 1-2. This is a common image in Thomas Aquinas as well. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, *Prima Secundae*, q. 23, art. 1c.

²¹² "Respectu dantis est gratuita donatio, respectu recipientis est preparatio ad beneficia divina, respectu finis est preparatio ad vitam eternam, secundum se vero ut est initiata dicitur gratia, ut est consummata dicitur gloria", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 23-7.

issue related to predestination: necessity and contingency, which Giles subsequently discusses in two protracted chapters.²¹³

2.4 Contingency

Giles's understanding of contingency is the following: a contingent state of affairs obtains some of the time. In his view contingency is compatible with determinism, a doctrine that holds that all events including human actions and choices are fully determined by preceding events and states of affairs, and therefore that freedom of choice is illusory. Giles's main interest lies in defending the view that contingency coexists with God's foreknowledge and that contingency exists in its own right.²¹⁴ Implicitly, Giles draws upon the Aristotelian three-fold distinction of different types of events: a) An event happening as a result of necessary causes which cannot be impeded; b) an event happening as a result of causes which can be impeded [Giles's definition of a contingent event]; c) an event happening by chance. Stone has shown that this concept of the three-fold division of events was used by another thirteenth century philosopher, Boethius of Dacia, albeit in the practical context of jurisdiction.²¹⁵

Although Giles frequently uses Aristotelian concepts and quotations in *De predestinatione*, he predominantly draws upon Augustine to build his argumentation. In the case of contingency, Giles's starting point is a quotation from *De civitate Dei* V.9, a well-known and widely used text, where Augustine summarises the classical debate between Cicero and the Stoics on the subject of future contingents.²¹⁶ According to Augustine, Cicero did not believe that God's providence could coexist with contingent events; on the other hand the Stoics held that everything is governed by fate, that is, everything happens necessarily, and contingency cannot exist. Giles sees their positions as two extreme opinions on the possibility of the coexistence between contingency and God's foreknowledge. Augustine's text provides Giles with some of the commonplace major counter-arguments against the existence of contingency within the Christian orthodox understanding of God's influence upon the created world, which he then places

²¹³ Chapter three, on necessity, is by far the longest chapter of *De predestinatione*.

²¹⁴ "Deus est sic prescius omnium futurorum [...] rebus [...] evenire permittit agentia contingenter", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 41-3 (chapter heading).

²¹⁵ M.W.F. Stone, 'The Origins of Probabilism in Late Scholastic Moral Thought: A Prolegomenon to Further Study', *Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales* 67 (2000), pp. 114-58, esp. pp. 119; 124.

²¹⁶ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.9, CCSL 47, pp. 136-40. Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 53-fol. 29^{va}, l. 1. .

within the scholastic context of the late thirteenth century. It is noteworthy that the first part of Giles's argumentation takes the form of a scientific discourse, particularly that of astronomy. This is one of two instances in *De predestinatione* where Giles refers to the findings of science (in the modern sense) to support his theological and philosophical conclusions.²¹⁷

Giles begins his enquiry into contingency with an analysis of the classical term *fatum* employed by the Stoics. He shows that contrary to the Stoics' view, *fatum* does not entail that everything happens necessarily.²¹⁸ Rather, Giles defines fate two-fold: it is the force of the stars, and, by extension, a sequence of secondary causes.²¹⁹ This expository passage on fate is one of very few instances in chapter two of *De predestinatione* where Giles draws upon material already used in his first commentary on the *Sentences*.²²⁰ Yet it is only Augustine's quotation and Giles's definition of fate which appear in I *Sentences*: the totality of the remaining scientific exposition on the movement of stars and the working of secondary causes is unique to *De predestinatione*. This passage shows that in this case Giles uses *De predestinatione* as an opportunity to expand a line of enquiry started in a much earlier work.²²¹

Giles's etymological explanation of *fatum*, deriving from *for, faris* ('to speak'), again stems from Augustine, and it is concordant with modern etymology.²²² Giles's and Augustine's definition of fate as a system of secondary causes goes beyond the principal meaning of the term in antiquity, which saw fate as the position of the stars at the time of conception or birth.²²³ Giles's further combination of *fatum* with the concept of God's providence also rests upon a passage of *De civitate Dei* where Augustine aimed at assimilating pagan terms to fit Christian theology.²²⁴

²¹⁷ See above, pp. 52-3.

²¹⁸ "Stoici [...] dixerunt omnia ex necessitate contingere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 58-29^{va}, l. 1.

²¹⁹ "Sed sive per fatum intelligamus vim syderum, vel quamcumque ordinationem secundarum causarum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{va}, l. 1-3.

²²⁰ Giles of Rome, *In primum librum sententiarum* (Venice, 1521), d. 39, q. 2, fol. 207^{rb}. See Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 2.

²²¹ Giles's commentary on I *Sentences* probably dates from 1271-3. See R. Wielockx, *Apologia*, Aegidio Romani Opera Omnia III,1 (Florence, 1985), p. 240.

²²² Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.9, CCSL 47, p. 138, l. 84-5: "neque negamus neque fati vocabulo nuncupamus, nisi forte ut fatum a fando dictum intellegamus".

²²³ "Qui vero non astrorum constitutionem, sicuti est cum quidque concipitur vel nascitur vel inchoatur, sed omnium conexione seriemque causarum, qua fit omne quod fit, fati nomine appellant", Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.8, CCSL 47, p. 135, l. 1-4.

²²⁴ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.8, CCSL 47, p. 136, l. 32-5.

Giles divides his enquiry into contingency into two parts: firstly, a scientific survey of the astrological background to fate defined as secondary causes; secondly, a theological explanation of fate which is defined in the context of divine providence. With both parts Giles aims to prove that the Stoics' understanding of fate as ruling everything by necessity is false.

Giles's exposition of fate defined as secondary causes sets out his understanding of the distinction between necessary and contingent causes. In his view, a necessary being or state of affairs is one which obtains all the time, and a contingent one is one which obtains some of the time. Equally, a necessary cause is one that produces the same effect for as long as it is causing, whereas a contingent cause is one that does not, because it can be prevented by extrinsic circumstances. Giles uses an example taken from astronomy to illustrate this idea: one star causes humidity and rain, but its effect might be hindered by another star, whose influence is superior and causes dryness.²²⁵ The passage is probably inspired by Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*, which contains detailed explanations of the physical influence of the motions of the celestial bodies.²²⁶ Giles directly quotes from another work of Ptolemy, his *Centiloquium*, where Ptolemy explains the final result of the different levels of causality brought about by the judgement of secondary elements.²²⁷ Giles shows that a particular position of a star does not always bring about the same effect, and therefore proves the existence of contingent states of affairs.²²⁸ He illustrates this with the correction of an erroneous position he ascribes to Plato, who claims that in a great year (*magnus annus*) every star returns to the same point. Although Giles does not directly quote his source, the passage refers to Plato's *Timaeus*,²²⁹ where Plato defines a *perfect year* as the time period it takes each of the planets to return to the same position again. The term *magnus annus* denotes a complete cycle of the equinoxes and comprises about 25,800 years (36,000 years according to Ptolemy).²³⁰ Plato does not attempt an estimation of the length of time of a

²²⁵ "stella, cuius est causare humiditatem, existente in signo, ubi habet hoc facere, fiet pluvia humiditas, quia forte impediatur ex aspectu alterius syderis, cuius est causare siccitatem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{va}, l. 19-22.

²²⁶ Claudius Ptolemaeus, F. Boll, A. Boer (ed.), *Tetrabiblos* (Leipzig, 1957), esp. book 1.

²²⁷ Claudius Ptolemaeus, *Liber quadripartiti [...] Centiloquium eiusdem* (Venice, 1493), n. 4.

²²⁸ "Ex huiusmodi itaque defectu, cause patiuntur effectus, respectu causarum, multa eveniunt contingenter", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{va}, l. 32-4.

²²⁹ Plato, *Timaeus*, 39 c-d.

²³⁰ In modern science this shift is called the precession of the equinoxes. It is the slightly earlier occurrence of the equinoxes each year due to the slow continuous westward shift of the equinoctial points along the ecliptic by 50 seconds of arc per year. The phenomenon which causes this shift is the precession

great year, possibly because he does not wish to implicate his enquiry with the astronomically more exacting theories of Eudoxus.²³¹ Giles refutes the statement that after a great year, everything returns to the same point. His example of Plato teaching in the schools illustrates this: it cannot be the same Plato who teaches the same pupils after 36,000 years.²³² This is the only scientific argument Giles offers and as such it is not very convincing. It is a brief section that seems to be a conglomerate of opinions Giles had come across in his readings but lacks the conclusive development into a coherent original argument. Giles states that he takes his proof from the twelfth century Arab-Spanish astronomer and mathematician Djabir ibn Aflah, the author of *De astronomia libri IX*, who refutes the calculations of Ptolemy.²³³ Giles takes the discrepancy between Djabir and Ptolemy to prove the lack of uniformity in celestial motion, showing that the supposedly cyclical movements are not identical.

Giles briefly refers to a further question within the context of contingency: human freewill. In his view, freewill is contingent merely in the sense of being uncoerced, not in the sense of being undetermined by antecedent causes.²³⁴ The quote shows that freewill is not subject to antecedent physical causes. However, the real problem remains whether it is subject to antecedent divine causes. From the latter standpoint it is possible to speak of an uncoerced defence.

This whole section sets up an analogy of what exactly is the point of this analysis of the actions of stars and fate: God's providence cannot be reduced only to the operations of secondary causes. Also, the discussion about fate just clarifies that the previous discussion is not yet the theological issue of God's providence. Above all it ensures that people will not get confused and blur fate and providence. As he stated

of the earth's axis. Oxford English Dictionary, ²1989, p. 314. See N. Campion, *The Great Year: Astrology, Millenarianism and History in the Western Tradition* (London, 1994), appendix 4: "The beginning of the great year", pp. 516-9.

²³¹ F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary* (London, 1937), p. 116.

²³² "in fine magni anni, quod dicebat esse post 36 milia annorum, erit idem Plato in eisdem scholis, et docebit eosdem scholares: quod omnino ridiculum est dicere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{va}, l. 39-42.

²³³ Djabir (Geber) was born in Sevilla c.1100 and died c.1160. See *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, s.v. Gabir ibn Aflah, vol. 4, col. 1071. For a discussion of his origins and biography see: R.P. Lorch, 'The Astronomy of Jabir ibn Aflah', *Centaurus* 19 (1975), pp. 85-107, esp. pp. 85-7. Giles probably read Djabir's work in the translation by Gerard of Cremona, completed in 1175. Lorch, p. 91.

²³⁴ "multa contingenter eveniunt, quod liberum arbitrium virtuti syderum et celesti motui directe nec potest esse subiectum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{vb}, l. 14-6.

before, only God could make things happen again exactly as they were at the beginning of a previous great year.²³⁵ Giles's notion of freewill is important for the understanding of his second definition of *fatum* in the context of divine providence.

In accordance with Augustine, Giles is careful not to directly identify *fatum* with divine providence because of the implications of God's infallibility.²³⁶ Understood from the Stoics' point of view, God's infallibility precludes both contingency and freewill, which is a position that contradicts the orthodox Christian standpoint. Giles solves the problem by referring once again to the qualities of God's perception of the created world, his *notitia* and *scientia*. He already referred to and explained these terms in chapter one of *De predestinatione*, and recapitulates in this passage of chapter two that God has an infallible perception of the created world, where everything appears to him presently.²³⁷ Implicitly, he refers to the Boethian understanding of God outside of time, which he later analyses at length in chapter three.²³⁸ As Giles shows, God's *notitia* – his perception – cannot fail, but does not have any influence upon the created world: he perceives contingent events as contingent and necessary events as necessary.²³⁹ God's perception, however, is not the decisive factor: God knows the future not by being somehow receptive of it. God's *scientia* is a slightly different matter: by Giles's definition it encompasses both the divine knowledge and the divine plan: *scientia Dei est causa rerum*: God knows the future merely by being the primary cause of it.²⁴⁰ The key to understanding Giles's position is the idea that God causes my actions, but if I will as God would have me will there can be no coercion here since I am in harmony with the deepest logic of existence as it were: hence both contingency and freewill are compatible with determinism. God's predestination of the blessed to heaven is consistent with their freedom. Giles adopts an Augustinian term to illustrate God's role towards the created world, *administrare*, which takes into account both God the First

²³⁵ "Solut enim Deus et hoc facere, ut redeat idem numero quod est corruptum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{va}, l. 45-7.

²³⁶ "Sed si per fatum intelligatur divina providentia, quamvis non sit hoc propria locutio", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{vb}, l. 23-5.

²³⁷ See above, p. 54. Cf. Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{vb}, l. 36-8: "cursus rerum qui per vicissitudines temporum successive peragitur in Dei notitia presens existit".

²³⁸ See below, pp. 73-4.

²³⁹ "totus [...] est Deo presens: in nullis fallitur, et in omnibus est infallibiliter certus: sum [sive] necessario, sive contingenter evenient", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{vb}, l. 45-7.

²⁴⁰ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{ra}, l. 13. This position, reflecting Averroes' commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* also appears in Giles's commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, d. 40, art. 3, fol. 211^{rb}: "scientia Dei causat res".

Cause and his allowing contingent events happening contingently: everything follows its own course.²⁴¹

Giles's concluding section of chapter two is illustrated by his own remark that his position is a *via media* between the Stoics and Cicero.²⁴² As shown above, Giles refutes the Stoics' position because of their negation of contingency. He equally refutes Cicero's position denying the existence of God's providence, which in Giles's view is even less acceptable, because it denies a fundamental tenet of Christian theology. Giles's vocabulary, taken from Augustine, reflects this: to deny God's foreknowledge is 'the most open madness'.²⁴³ Giles's *via media* is his understanding of the coexistence between contingency and free will and determinism.²⁴⁴

2.5 Necessity

Giles devotes the whole of chapter three to the subject of necessity and presents a list of various distinctions, all of which are scholastic commonplaces. In contrast to Siger of Brabant, for example, Giles omits any prolonged and in-depth discussion of contemporary or near-contemporary authors.²⁴⁵ Giles's list of distinctions aims to complement the previous chapter on contingency, as he puts it, because of yet insatiated human curiosity.²⁴⁶ On the basis of a long-standing tradition in Christian doctrine and thought Giles sees it as his obligation to show in detail eight distinctions, some of which are closely related.²⁴⁷

²⁴¹ "Quantumcumque ergo Deus disposuit de rebus et aliud administret res, huiusmodi dispositio et administratio sunt res agere proprios cursus. Et invicem eas evenire secundum exigentiam sui generis, quorum itaque proprius cursus est, et quorum sui generis exigentia est quod contingenter eveniant, contingenter fient, quorum necessario, necessario", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{ra}, l. 31-7. Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* VII.30, CCSL 47, p. 212, l. 38-9.

²⁴² "Oportet hic ergo viam mediam ambulare", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}, l. 21.

²⁴³ "apertissima insania est", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{ra}, l. 58. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.9, CCSL 47, p. 136, l. 13-4.

²⁴⁴ "Simul ergo stant divina prescientia et futurorum contingentia, nec prescientia contingentiam tollit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}, l. 35-7.

²⁴⁵ J.J. Duin, 'La Doctrine de la Providence dans les Ecrits de Siger de Brabant', *Philosophes Médiévaux* 3 (Louvain, 1954): *De necessitate et contingentia causarum*. See M.W.F. Stone, 'Moral Psychology after 1277', in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, p. 799.

²⁴⁶ "quia intellectus hominis non quiescit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}, l. 43.

²⁴⁷ "Fecimus ergo octavas distinctiones [...] ad intelligendum dictam doctorum [...] quia per eas [distinctiones] melius intelligi poterunt que doctores et sancti de divina prescientia conscripserunt", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{va}, l. 39-45.

Giles aims to find out whether necessity, as he puts it, 'destroys' contingency or whether they can both exist.²⁴⁸ As shown above, a necessary being or state of affairs is one which obtains all the time, in contrast to a contingent being or state of affairs, which only obtains some of the time. Giles's eight distinctions present the views of five authors whose works were widely used in late thirteenth century scholastic writing. Typically, Giles begins with Augustine (distinction one), the author the most used in *De predestinatione*, continues with Aristotle (distinctions two and three), Anselm (distinctions four and eight), Boethius (distinction five) and Averroes (distinctions six and seven). The distinctions do not directly build upon each other, which is a feature that is also apparent between the different chapters of *De predestinatione*. In many ways, the treatise gives the impression of being an academical textbook, presenting a comprehensive overview of divine foreknowledge, paradise and hell. This is a further indication that the treatise was probably intended for use in pre-academical teaching at the Parisian house of the Augustinian Hermits.²⁴⁹

Giles's first distinction is based upon Augustine's position on God's power, his *potentia*. Augustine's central point is that the impossibility of God's death or fallibility does not entail a decrease of God's power.²⁵⁰ According to the traditional theological standpoint, God's death does not form part of God's power but rather denotes a weakness, a lack of power. By denying God any form of weakness and fallibility, God's power is supreme and untouchable. Giles transfers this definition to God's foreknowledge of contingent events. According to Giles, contingent events acquire a special quality as they are foreknown by God: their contingency is reinforced.²⁵¹ In accordance with Augustine's position of *De civitate Dei* V.10, a passage Giles includes into his argumentation, God's foreknowledge allows free action of the human will: God foreknows any future decision of the human mind.²⁵² This concurs with Giles's understanding of freewill: human freewill is contingent merely in the sense of being

²⁴⁸ "quod necessitas imposita rebus prescitis, rerum contingentiam minime destruat", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{rb}, l. 56-7.

²⁴⁹ See chapter one, pp. 17, 38.

²⁵⁰ "cum ergo dicimus Deum non posse mori, non excludimus a Deo potentiam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{va}, l. 50-1. Cf. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.10, CCSL 47, p. 140, l. 18-9.

²⁵¹ "Propter quod sicut non posse mori, non est impotentia, sed valida potentia, sic necessaria contingentia, non est non contingentia [...] sed expressior contingentia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 1-4.

²⁵² "Deus prescit aliud quod esse futurum in voluntate tamen", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 6. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* V.10, CCSL 47, p. 141, l. 40-5.

uncoerced. God's foreknowledge is not coercive, although He is the primary cause. In this sense God can be an antecedent cause determining the course of human actions, but this, in Giles's view, does not contradict his definition of contingency and freewill. Giles's conclusion of the first distinction also appears in his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*: God's foreknowledge does not preclude contingency.²⁵³ It should be noted that his final remark that God's foreknowledge reinforces and underlines contingency is unique to *De predestinatione*. At present, this seems to be the only occurrence in this treatise where Giles goes beyond his conclusions of a prior work, which is another indication that Giles's primary interest consisted in writing an academical textbook.

Giles's second distinction stems from Aristotle's I *Analytics*, chapter nine, and also from his *Sophistici elenchi*, although he does not directly quote his source.²⁵⁴ The distinction between the understanding of the divided / composed sense of a modal proposition (the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction) is a widely used topic in scholastic literature. *De re* relates to the individual rather than to the expression of a belief; in contrast, *de dicto* relates to the expression of a belief rather than to the individual.²⁵⁵ Within a modal proposition, the composed sense is true when the proposition expresses (in affirming or denying) the union of two forms in one same subject. The divided sense is true when the proposition does the same, but at different moments of time: it is related to different and successive moments of time.²⁵⁶ Giles uses Thomas' example of Socrates sitting down / walking for an explanation of the coexistence of God's omniscience and human freewill.²⁵⁷ If God knows that Socrates is sitting down, is it then not necessary that Socrates is sitting, that is, that he would not be free not to sit at that moment of time?²⁵⁸ This is unacceptable both to Giles and Thomas: God necessarily foreknowing and thereby precluding the contingency of Socrates sitting down, and by extension precluding Socrates' freewill to do otherwise. By explaining

²⁵³ "Sic secundum Dei prescientiam et secundum necessitatem aliquid contingenter evenire, et aliud in nostra voluntate et libertate esse, non est contingentiam et libertatem arbitrii tollere, sed magis est eas ponere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 11-4. Giles of Rome, *In primum librum sententiarum*, d. 40, art. 2, fol. 213^{ra}.

²⁵⁴ Aristotle, I *Analytics* I.9; Aristotle, *Sophistici elenchi* 166a22-30.

²⁵⁵ Craig calls *de dicto* the propositional belief. W.L. Craig, *Divine foreknowledge*, p. 231.

²⁵⁶ S. Knuuttila, 'Modal Logic', in: N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, J. Pinborg, *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 342-58, esp. p. 347. Cf. also P. Precht, F.-P. Burkard (ed.), *Metzler Philosophie Lexikon. Begriffe und Definitionen* (Stuttgart, 1999), pp. 95-6.

²⁵⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* I, 67; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, q. 14, art. 13. Cf. P. Precht, F.-P. Burkard (ed.), *Metzler Philosophie Lexikon*, p. 96.

this matter with the help of the modal propositions *de re* – *de dicto* / the divided – composed sense, Giles aims to show that God's foreknowledge and contingent events as well as freewill are not mutually exclusive. According to Giles, the meaning of the statement 'Socrates sitting down could walk' changes according to whether its elements are understood in the composed or divided meaning.²⁵⁹ The sentence's meaning is false when the possibility of Socrates walking is understood to qualify the conjunction of two mutually exclusive predicates with the same subject at the same time: the composed sense or *de dicto* meaning.²⁶⁰ The same sentence is true when seen in the divided sense or *de re* meaning: in this way those previously mutually exclusive predicates happen at different times and no longer contradict themselves.²⁶¹ Accordingly, both modal propositions essentially consist of a temporal distinction between the simultaneity or unsimultaneity of the actualisation of two predicates.²⁶² Giles then transfers the example of Socrates to the main question of whether God's foreknowledge entails that what is foreknown happens necessarily, precluding contingency, and, although Giles does not mention it in this particular context, impeding human freewill. He holds that a foreknown event must happen, and concedes that this precludes contingent events.²⁶³ Seen in the composed sense, the existence of a contingent event contradicts necessity. It is only in the divided sense that both can coexist, or, in Giles's words, contingency is even reinforced.²⁶⁴ Giles's transfer of the example of Socrates to the problem of God's foreknowledge is a simple statement, not a proof. In particular, Giles does not discuss the basis of the modal preposition – time – which differentiates between the composed and the divided sense. Time is the only discerning factor and becomes problematic when it is considered in the context of God, an entity Giles later defines as timeless and eternal. God's timelessness does not remove the modal distinction between the

²⁵⁸ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 29-32.

²⁵⁹ "sortes sedens potest ambulare", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 17-8, a passage that also appears in Giles of Rome, *In primum librum sententiarum*, d. 39, q. 3, fol. 209^{ra}, in the context of divine providence.

²⁶⁰ "in sensu autem composito quod sortes dicendum est existens sub sessione possit existere sub ambulatione, est locutio falsa", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 25-7.

²⁶¹ "In sensu ergo diviso quod sortes secundum se consideratus, possit esse sub ambulatione, est locutio vera", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 24-5.

²⁶² Knuutilla, *Modal Logic*, p. 347.

²⁶³ "res contingens a Deo prescita, necessario eveniet", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 28-9.

²⁶⁴ "prescientia itaque Dei [...] in sensu composito contingentiam a rebus minime tollit [...] sed magis est causa ponere et asserre adaptabimus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 30^{vb}, l. 46-56.

composed and the divided sense on all levels, since two orders are relevant temporal as well as eternal. The conclusion of distinction five is crucial to this issue: the concept of eternity reveals the impossible simultaneity of an event within time.²⁶⁵ Presenting the issue of the *de dicto* / *de re* propositions is symptomatic of the whole discourse of *De predestinatione*: it shows the essential aspects of the main subjects (God's foreknowledge, paradise, hell) without going into too many details as part of a 'scientific' discourse at top level. It is possibly another indication of Giles's pre-academical audience at his Parisian convent: his students needed to know the essential authors and arguments on the subject, but were not yet advanced enough to be presented with a more thorough and difficult analysis. Giles certainly does not give any elaboration of nuances of the complex issues he presents. His apparently contradictory conclusion of distinction two is resolved once it is seen in the divided sense: God necessarily foreknows contingent events. It points to Giles's fundamental understanding of necessity: a necessary state of affairs obtains all the time, in contrast to a contingent state of affairs that obtains some of the time. In this way, the central issue is clear, except when seen in the timelessness context: then the proposition seen in the divided sense is deprived of its essential temporal aspect.

Distinction three on the difference between simple and conditional necessity again derives from Aristotle. In this case the textual basis is his *De interpretatione*, chapter nine, one of the most disputed passages of the work.²⁶⁶ Giles does not specifically define simple necessity, probably assuming his readers' knowledge. This, however, is odd if it really is the introductory text which, seen from other indications, is probably the case. This prompts the suspicion that the text was not intended for beginners as such, but beginners in theology, in fact the third category of students at the Paris *studium*.²⁶⁷ Giles probably uses the term according to Grosseteste's understanding: simple necessity is what could not be otherwise no matter how the history of the world had gone.²⁶⁸ Aristotle holds that real contingency exists in the universe and Giles holds

²⁶⁵ See below, p. 70.

²⁶⁶ Aristotle, *De interpretatione* 9, 19a23-7. W.L. Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez*, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, vol. 7 (Leiden, 1988), p. 47.

²⁶⁷ See chapter one, pp. 17, 38.

²⁶⁸ C. Normore, 'Future Contingents', *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 357-81, esp. p. 364.

the same: things can be necessary and contingent.²⁶⁹ A conditional necessity characterises things that exist when they exist. This necessity does not remove contingency, for it is consequent only upon their existence: when they exist, they exist necessarily.²⁷⁰ What then is necessity, is it temporal? According to Craig's view, Aristotle's main concern is temporal and not conditional: temporal necessity characterises things that have been actualised and for which no possibility of being otherwise any longer exists. Consequently, future contingents do not possess this kind of necessity for they are merely potential. Everything is necessary when it exists, for the past cannot be changed, but not everything is unconditionally necessary, as for example heavenly bodies or processions of the seasons.²⁷¹ Giles recognises the difficulties of temporal implications, which he already alluded to in distinction two. He equally acknowledges that conditional necessity does not apply to future contingents, quoting Anselm that everything foreknown by God necessarily is future, a quotation Giles had already used in his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*.²⁷² Giles rightly concludes that conditional necessity coexists with contingency and also with God's foreknowledge.²⁷³

The fourth distinction on antecedent and consequent necessity is based upon Anselm, his *De concordantia prescientie et predestinationis* as well as his *Cur Deus homo*.²⁷⁴ Giles does not directly quote from either work, but Anselm's use of a dialogue between A and B in *Cur Deus homo* is reflected in Giles's constant reference to 'A' in the second part of distinction four.²⁷⁵ Giles's definition of antecedent necessity is something that cannot fail but be the case. Necessity is the basic notion: some situation is antecedently necessary just in case some force compels or constrains it to obtain, or in case there is no power which can prevent or undo it.²⁷⁶ Both Anselm and Giles use the

²⁶⁹ "possunt esse necessaria quecumque contingentia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 2.

²⁷⁰ Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 49.

²⁷¹ Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 51.

²⁷² "Nam quod prescitur a Deo, oportet quod illud sit futurum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 6. Anselm, *De concordantia prescientie et predestinationis* I.1, F.S. Schmitt (ed.), *S. Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia* (Edinburgh, 1946), vol. 2, pp. 245-88. Giles of Rome, *In primum librum sententiarum*, d. 40, art. 2, fol. 212^{va}.

²⁷³ "Necessitas ergo conditionata simul stat cum contingentia rerum, et quia talem necessitatem imponit divina prescientia: ideo simul stabit prescientia Dei cum contingentia rerum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 14-7.

²⁷⁴ Anselm, *De concordantia prescientie et predestinationis* I.1, *S. Anselmi Opera Omnia*, vol. 2, pp. 245-88. Anselm, *Cur Deus homo* II.17, F.S. Schmitt (ed.), *S. Anselmi Opera Omnia*, vol. 2, pp. 122-6.

²⁷⁵ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 50-1: "Cum ergo dicitur A." .

²⁷⁶ Normore, 'Future Contingents', *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, p. 360.

example of the rising sun to illustrate antecedent necessity: if there is no other condition attached, the rising of the sun is antecedently necessary.²⁷⁷ According to Giles, consequent or subsequent necessity is relative. It is the consequent clause of certain conditionals. If A obtains, then B obtains necessarily (as the *necessitas consequentis*) only if it is impossible that A obtain and B not obtain.²⁷⁸ Again, Giles does not explicitly define either antecedent or consequent necessity: he assumes that his readers are sufficiently acquainted with the matter to understand the difference on the basis of the examples given in the text. The only passage that comes close to a definition also appears in Giles's commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*: an antecedent event must exist whereas any consequent necessity deriving from it exclusively depends upon a condition which is linked to it.²⁷⁹ In the context of God's foreknowledge Giles agrees that whatever He foreknows will necessarily come to pass, yet this necessity is not strong enough to endanger contingency. A future event is only necessary in both antecedent and consequent senses if it was either originally necessary (*de se*) or once it has taken place. Hence Giles correctly sees antecedent necessity as the only problem since it is a necessity that cannot fail.²⁸⁰ This answers the crucial question of distinction four: is it possible that an event foreknown by God can possess both antecedent and consequent necessity? The answer is yes, but only when the event is necessary *de se*. A contingent event remains unchanged by God's foreknowledge, because God's will antecedently defined it as contingent.²⁸¹ Equally, God's infallibility does not preclude contingent events: they happen according to their inherent contingency. Also, future events foreknown by God only carry consequent necessity, which does not influence their contingency.²⁸²

²⁷⁷ "Ita quod si non plus adderetur, sed solum diceretur sol orietur, intelligeretur hoc esse necessarium, quam necessitatem notat", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 38-40.

²⁷⁸ Cf. Normore, 'Future Contingents', *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, p. 360.

²⁷⁹ "duplex necessitas, una antecedens, que cognoscit rem esse, et alia consequens, ut ex conditione consequenter apposita que nihil cogit esse", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 44-7. Appears also in Giles of Rome, *In primum librum sententiarum*, d. 40, art. 2, fol. 212^{vb}.

²⁸⁰ "si est a Deo prescitum, poterit ibi esse duplex necessitas [...] quod ponitur futurum esse, de se sit necessarium, propter quod erit ibi voluntas antecedentis [...] et consequentis ex conditione consequenter adiecta [...] si est a Deo prescitam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{ra}, l. 51-6.

²⁸¹ "quia necessitas consequens nihil circa esse variat, talis necessitas permittit res esse, quales secundum se sunt", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 3-5.

²⁸² "de contingenti enim et necessario potest infallibiliter dici quod hoc erit, si erit, et quia talis est necessitas divine prescientie, qualibus res permittit esse in suo esse", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 8-11; "futurum, si est a Deo prescitum, nihil est aliud dicere quam dicere [...] ex ista conditione adiecta solam necessitas consequens que nichil cogit, ipsis rebus secundum prescientiam apponetur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 15-8.

Giles's fifth distinction examines a classical solution to the divine foreknowledge dilemma, Boethius' understanding of God seeing everything as present. It is his answer to the problem of temporality raised by some of the previously examined distinctions of chapter three.²⁸³ God recognises everything that happens temporally in the created world as present in eternity, and nothing escapes his attention.²⁸⁴ According to Craig, God's 'now' is a unity which embraces past, present and future, never coming or passing away, in contrast to the fleeting 'now' of the temporal process.²⁸⁵ This is concordant with Giles's understanding of Boethius, but Giles nevertheless brings up the one crucial objection: if things appear presently, they cannot happen and not happen at the same time.²⁸⁶ This also potentially excludes freewill and contingency. Giles holds that neither simple nor conditional necessity solve this problem since they are causally influenced.²⁸⁷ As Giles recalls, a contingent event which only depends upon itself and happens within time, is not influenced by necessity brought about by external causes.²⁸⁸ God's perception, however, happens in eternity, and in that case, it does not matter whether an event could happen and not happen simultaneously. Giles differentiates between different measurements (*mensura*) to describe the present time of the created world and eternity: *propria mensura* primarily describes the relation of a thing to itself but also within the created world; *mensura ad alteram partem* refers to 'the other part', eternity.²⁸⁹ Eternity is a concept that avoids the contradiction of something existing or not existing simultaneously: in God's perception a temporal differentiation does not exist.²⁹⁰ Hence, the impossible simultaneity of an event within time is repealed by eternity. Giles's main concern, however, is not the problem of the simultaneity of an

²⁸³ Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* V.6.10, H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand (ed.), The Loeb Classical Library (London-Cambridge, Mass., 1973), pp. 399-421.

²⁸⁴ "quecumque [...] secundum cursum temporis successive peragitur, totum in eternitate presentialiter [...] nichil ibi accrescat [...] comparata ad eternitatem et ad Deum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 20-7.

²⁸⁵ Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, p. 93.

²⁸⁶ "res presentialiter fiunt, non possunt simul fieri, et non fieri", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 36-7.

²⁸⁷ "nec oporteat eas esse necessitas simpliciter nec ex conditione. Sed cum cause sint presentes licet non oporteat eas esse necessitas simpliciter", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 46-9.

²⁸⁸ "Res itaque contingentes, relate ad propriam mensuram, secundum quam sunt future, et vicissitudinibus temporum peraguntur, non sunt determinate ad alteram partem, ut ex hoc nullam necessitatem habere dicantur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{rb}, l. 54-8.

²⁸⁹ "contingentia, relata ad mensuram propriam, ut ad tempus: sint omnia contingentia relata ad mensuram aliam, ut ad eternitatem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 11-3.

²⁹⁰ "omnia presentialiter relucet", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 1.

event within time: his aim is to show that God's eternal and intuitive perception of temporal contingent events does not preclude their contingency.²⁹¹

Giles's sixth distinction derives from Averroes, and examines the difference between necessity *de se*, necessity in itself, and necessity that only applies in relation to something else, *ad aliud relata*. Giles holds that particular contingent things are not necessary in themselves, but that they are, when related to some mind that understands them.²⁹² He uses the Averroean concept of understanding as a universal concept,²⁹³ showing that such concepts are necessary in the sense that they cannot be other than they are.²⁹⁴ In Giles's definition 'universal' is everlasting, everywhere, and separate from time and place.²⁹⁵ A thing considered only by itself always remains contingent, but Giles asks what happens if that thing is related to something else, the divine intellect. According to his previous definition of necessity related to something else, God's foreknowledge fits the case of *necessitas relata ad aliud*. Nonetheless, according to Giles, this kind of necessity does not contradict a fundamental *de se* contingency of the thing foreknown, which is Giles's proof for the premiss that God foreknows contingent things.²⁹⁶ This is a fascinating metaphysical point he makes here. So far I have not been able to trace where Giles deals with this more thoroughly.

Giles's seventh distinction partially also draws upon Averroes, and shows the difference between general necessity in contrast to necessity in a particular way (*necessitas omnimodis – quaedam*). Giles starts with presenting necessity and contingency as mutually incompatible when they are seen generally: something cannot both approach and leave.²⁹⁷ The concept of *terminus*, probably best translated as 'point of reference' is essential to Giles's explanation of the issue. If seen from two points of reference, something may approach and leave, as is illustrated by the example of a stone

²⁹¹ "qui simplici intuitu Dei presentialiter in eternitate cognoscit [...] contingentiam rerum non tollere, est perhibita materiam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 14-7.

²⁹² "Omnia enim quantumcumque contingentia, et particularia, relata ad intellectum, dicuntur esse necessaria", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 23-4.

²⁹³ "intellectus facit universalitatem in rebus. Res ergo relate ad intellectum considerantur sub esse universali", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 25-7.

²⁹⁴ "aliqua vero solum ad aliud relaxabimus quidem necessitatem per relationem ad aliud", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 20-2.

²⁹⁵ "universale autem dicitur esse semper, et ubique, quia est abstractum a tempore, et a loco: et non considerantur sub esse hic, et nunc", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 27-9.

²⁹⁶ "talis tamen sempiternitas et talis necessitas que est per relationem ad aliud, contingentiam non evacuat [...] in nullo contingentiam non minuit [...] quia sic sunt a Deo prescita quod contingenter eveniant", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 37-47.

falling or rising, depending upon the perspective from which it is observed.²⁹⁸

Transferring this example to the explanation of the coexistence of necessity and contingency, Giles identifies the system of (secondary) causes as the point of reference: each thing can be either contingent or necessary, depending upon the causes that apply in each case.²⁹⁹ This passage again repeats Giles's understanding of the difference between contingency and necessity: a contingent state of affairs is one which obtains some of the time, whereas a necessary state of affairs obtains all of the time. *Necessitas omnimodis* does not allow for contingency: the causes that govern contingent events in this particular constellation apply all the time. Once this definition is accepted, the crucial question remains whether God's foreknowledge, especially his providence and infallibility also belong to the category of *omnimodis* necessity: if this were the case, neither contingency nor freewill existed. Viewing the matter from different points of reference does not solve the problem: the example of the rising sun seen from only one standpoint presents a circular movement, which is determined by simple, that is, absolute necessity.³⁰⁰ Transferring the example to God's knowledge, his *scientia*, Giles explains that God's perception (*speculatio*) does not influence either contingency or necessity, a view he already referred to in previous chapters of *De predestinatione*. God's knowledge seen as a cause of things only matters insofar as He influences events by secondary causes. God as the primary cause determines whether an event is contingent or necessary; God's influence via secondary causes is able to influence a contingent or a necessary event to be the opposite.³⁰¹

Giles's eighth and last distinction is closely related to Anselm's distinction between antecedent and consequent necessity, and Giles accordingly refers to it at the

²⁹⁷ "loquantur de necessitate, et contingentia, que videntur sibi invicem obviare, sicut loquimur de accessu et recessu que sibi invicem obviant", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 50-2.

²⁹⁸ "uno modo habeat accessum, alio modo recessum [...] lapis ascendendo sursum, recedit deorsum [...] simul habet accessum, et recessum [...] respectu terminorum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{va}, l. 56- fol. 31^{vb}, l. 1.

²⁹⁹ "sic respectu diversarum causarum eadem res habere poterit necessitatem, et contingentiam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{vb}, l. 4-5.

³⁰⁰ "videmus unum et idem aliter et aliter accedere et recedere, ut stella orbiculariter mota recedendo ab oriente, accedit ad oriens [...] simpliciter recedit [...] dicitur simpliciter accedere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{vb}, l. 13-24.

³⁰¹ "mediantibus secundis causis res producit ad esse, secundum quam modum est causa entis, et differentiarum entis, et quia differentiale entis, sunt contingens, et necessarium ipsius contingentie, et ipsius necessari causa", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{vb}, l. 32-6.

beginning of his explanation.³⁰² Giles distinguishes between the necessity of the consequent (*necessitas consequentiae*), which is called by modern philosophy the necessity of an inference. Giles defines it as the way in which the antecedent of a necessary conditional necessitates its consequent. In his definition the *necessitas consequentiae* as just shown differs from the necessity of the consequent clause of certain conditionals (*necessitas consequentis*).³⁰³ Giles again refers to the example of Socrates running: here the antecedent is the fact of Socrates running. Socrates' running then is necessary in the sense of the consequent which is implicative necessity: Socrates' act of running makes it necessary.³⁰⁴ Once this distinction is transferred to the problem of the coexistence of divine foreknowledge, divine providence and contingency, Giles explains that what is foreknown by God does not happen because of the *necessitas consequentis* of the consequent clause of certain conditionals: that kind of necessity precludes contingency.³⁰⁵ Giles stresses that a thing itself can or cannot happen.³⁰⁶ This passage is another indication of Giles's position, holding that both contingency and freewill are compatible with God's foreknowledge,³⁰⁷ since freewill is contingent merely in the sense of being uncoerced, not in the sense of being undetermined by antecedent – necessary – causes. Giles appears to have a metaphysical view that events have an essential quality – free or contingent – prior to and separated from a 'later' (metaphysically speaking) inclusion in a connected world of event happenings. It is perhaps also essential that events have a metaphysical character prior to time.³⁰⁸

Giles's final conclusion on predestination and foreknowledge at the end of chapter three reaffirms the coexistence of contingency, God's foreknowledge, His infallibility and His providence as a perception of everything as present in eternity. Giles's

³⁰² See above, distinction four, pp. 68-9, fol. 31^{vb}, l. 51: "ut dicamus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 31^{vb}.

³⁰³ "necessitas consequentie: quia ex hoc antecedente [...] inferitur hoc consequens quod hoc res eveniet", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{ra}, l. 10-2.

³⁰⁴ "est ibi necessaria consequentia, ut si currit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{ra}, l. 3-4.

³⁰⁵ "sic hoc est prescitur a Deo, ergo eveniet, in hoc quod dicitur ergo eveniet, non est necessitas consequentis, ut quod oporteat istud consequens esse necessarium", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{ra}, l. 6-9.

³⁰⁶ "Res tamen in se potest evenire, et non evenire", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{ra}, l. 12-3.

³⁰⁷ One might be tempted to use the modern terminology of "determinism" here, which relies on a metaphysico-scientific construction which Giles does not accept. It is for this reason that I prefer to use the theological expression of God's foreknowledge.

³⁰⁸ I have not been able to trace a text where Giles draws out on this or even explains further the character of this metaphysics.

understanding of the Boethian concept of God outside of time³⁰⁹ in eternity is essential to the argumentation of *De predestinatione*, setting the premiss for his summary enquiry into eight scholastic commonplaces on the subject of necessity. God's infallibility, one of the most difficult aspects of orthodox theology when seen in the context of contingency and human freewill coexists with both contingency and necessity.³¹⁰ As a final example, Giles contrasts the vision of a human being with that of God: neither imposes any necessity upon that which is seen: contingent events remain contingent, and necessary events necessary. Giles closes his enquiry into necessity with his survey on predestination: since God's foreknowledge does not entail necessity, it is the responsibility of every human being to ensure his or her predestination by good works in order to be saved by God. At the same time a human being should know that bad works entail damnation.³¹¹ God, in any case, sees it all, just as He sees a human being eating: which is Giles's example to illustrate the case. At the very end of chapter three Giles recalls that divine foreknowledge of salvation or damnation does not imply that God foreordains to damnation, an important remark with which Giles distinguishes himself from the Manichaean position, albeit not in the sense of Augustine's explanation of who and what the Manichaeans were and argued. The argument recalls the position of the monk Gottschalk of Orbais (806/8-866/70), who was the first to argue for double predestination.³¹²

2.6 Conclusion

As shown, Giles embraces a predominantly Augustinian position on the question of divine foreknowledge and contingency. Since Augustine's texts do not contain a definite conclusion on the matter, but only present the extreme positions of Cicero and the Stoics, Giles formulates his position as the *via media*. His solution is mainly theological, and the absence of conclusive proofs of a problem with far-reaching philosophical implications (on the matter of the unalterability of God's knowledge of the

³⁰⁹ See above, p. 71 on Giles's metaphysical understanding of events.

³¹⁰ "stat infallibilitas cum necessitate et contingentia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{ra}, l. 34.

³¹¹ "Quilibet ergo certam faciat predestinationem suam, quilibet bene agat ut salvetur, sciens quod nullus dampnabitur nisi per culpam suam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{rb}, l. 1-4.

³¹² "vel vidit te dampnandum, quia debebas aspernari et non facere divina beneplacita, divinas ergo iussiones sequens, et adimplens salvaberis, non sequens et non adimplens dampnaberis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* III, Cambrai, fol. 32^{rb}, l. 20-3. See PL 121: *Confessio Gotteschalci monachi post heresim damnatam*, col. 347-50; *Gotteschalci confessio prolixior*, col. 349-60; *Fragmenta omnia quae extant, libelli per Gotteschalcum Rabano archiepiscopo Moguntino in placito Moguntiae oblatis, anno 848*, col. 365-8.

past – Thomas' focal point) may have contributed to the fact that Giles's position did not close the discussion on this question. Later medieval authors, such as Duns Scotus or Ockham, were interested in the question, but focused much more on its philosophical implications.³¹³ It should be noted that in the second half of the twentieth century the problem resurfaced and generated a vigorous discussion. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to include a full discussion on this aspect, but Giles's position even then was not seen as a solution to the problem, probably because of the absence of conclusive proofs.³¹⁴ I have not been able to trace whether Giles's theory has been elaborated; this is certainly not the case in his first commentary on the *Sentences*. Giles's presentation in this text is still summary: he does not develop a more elaborated position there – or elsewhere as far as I have been able to trace. This fact also joins the question of the metaphysical theory behind Giles's argument on the (metaphysical) quality of an event,³¹⁵ which may constitute an original metaphysical conception albeit embryonic. The question remains whether Giles develops this issue further in other texts (the fact that nothing has been found so far supports this view) or whether he was not fundamentally interested in this problem.

³¹³ For Duns Scotus see Cross, *Duns Scotus*, pp. 101-1; Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, pp. 127-45; for Ockham see Craig, *The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge*, pp. 146-68; P. Boehner, *The Tractatus de Praedestinatione et Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of William of Ockham. Edited with a study on the Mediaeval Problem of a Three-valued Logic*, Franciscan Institute Publications, vol. 2 (St Bonaventure, 1945).

³¹⁴ For an overview on modern and contemporary discussion on the subject see Freddoso, *Molina*, pp. 2-8.

³¹⁵ See above, p.71.

3 Giles of Rome on Paradise

3.1 Introduction

Giles's choice of rhetoric and style shows considerable variation between the sections. This becomes most apparent in his treatment of the subject of paradise, where he uses a well-established formal structure of interpretation, the four senses of Scripture, to explain the nature and name of paradise. My employment of the term 'rhetoric' in the context of this treatise serves to enquire into the specific circumstances of the section's content and form. It is normally employed for spoken language, not for written arguments. This ties in with one of the main characteristics of Giles's discourse on paradise, his preoccupation with setting down well-established doctrine without commenting upon it, which is reminiscent of a sermon. This stands in contrast to the dialectic form of argumentation in the first and third parts where Giles examines several questions related to his main topic and successively eliminates their possible solutions to arrive at the one solution he considers correct (and orthodox). Giles probably chooses this form of rhetoric rather than the more common form of dialectic used in academic treatises of the time because of the nature of the topic itself. Ratzinger mentions that there was a lack of unanimity in the thirteenth century as to how far dialectics should enter into theology.³¹⁶ In the section on paradise, Giles avoids the issue and sticks to the traditional method of enquiry. Usually, the subject matter of paradise forms part of a commentary on Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, book two, distinction eighteen, and it is from his own commentary on this text that Giles takes the basic structure and large sections of the text in chapters four to seven of *De predestinatione*. With the exception of one subject, the creation of Eve, none of the material covered in this treatise appears in the *reportatio* of the commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*.³¹⁷

In his commentary on the *Sentences* Giles refers to the literal and spiritual interpretations of paradise.³¹⁸ There the term is explicitly defined as the terrestrial paradise but there he does not engage in any formal discourse on the allegorical and anagogical interpretations of paradise. This stands in contrast to *De predestinatione*,

³¹⁶ J. Cardinal Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St Bonaventure* (Chicago, 1971), p. 124.

³¹⁷ See C. Luna, 'Problemi di *reportatio*: Goffredo di Fontaines e la lettura di Egidio Romano sul libro II delle *Sentenze*', in: *Les problèmes posés par l'édition critique des textes anciens et médiévaux*, J. Hamesse (ed.), Université Catholique de Louvain, Publications de l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales, Textes, Etudes, Congrès, vol. 13 (Louvain, 1992), pp. 237-90, esp. p. 239.

³¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 18, q. 1, art. 1, p. 58.

where such a definition is absent from the argument. The only brief reference to the allegorical and analogical definitions appears at the beginning of Giles's interpretation of distinction eighteen, where he says that paradise is a corporeal and a spiritual *res*, and signifies the Church as well as mankind's eternal felicity and joy.³¹⁹

The treatment of the subject of paradise in *De predestinatione* serves a different purpose, which is reflected in the choice of rhetoric and style, namely to set down fundamental Church doctrine rather than to speculate about it. Giles's choice of a formal exegetical explanation of paradise, especially the use of *exempla*, reflects the predominantly theological nature of the topic. The characteristics of paradise were not subject to academic disputes, but rather an accepted part of orthodox doctrine, which in the judgement of scholastic authors did not need any further proof or explanation. Hence, Giles presents the definition of paradise in a concise and formal structure that is reminiscent of a lecture in 'dogmatics' (in contemporary and not medieval usage) or a sermon. *Sermo* is the term Giles employs himself in chapter fifteen.³²⁰ The section on paradise, however, does not form part of Giles's sermons. The subject of paradise is only reflected in occasional and scattered references in his sermons. In these, Giles alludes to topics related to paradise such as the question of the vision of God or an allusion to the cardinal virtues in sermons 17, 47, 58 and 60.³²¹ The topic of cardinal virtues also appears in Giles's *De regimine principum*, but in a different context than the human soul.³²² *De predestinatione* did not form part of Giles's homilies and confirms the impression that it was intended as a treatise in its own right.

In my view, another factor that influenced Giles's choice of the four-fold exegetical structuring is the nature of a Scriptural extract as his textual basis, namely Genesis 2. The choice of rhetoric also conveys the limitations of the human mind to comprehend the divine, of which paradise is but one expression. Paradise, certainly after the Second Coming, is a concept that is beyond human comprehension and beyond all categories human language is able to invent, which is an element medieval authors were conscious of. This affects the explanation of the beatific vision, for example, for it is

³¹⁹ "Dicemus ergo quod paradisus, de quo loquitur scriptura Genesis est quod corporale, et significat rem spirituale, quia significat ecclesiam, vel significat illam felicitatem nostram aeternam, quia quiescimus in Deo", Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, pars secunda (Venice, F. Zilettus, 1581), p. 58.

³²⁰ "longum sermonem fecimus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{rb}, l. 23.

³²¹ C. Luna, *Repertorio dei sermoni*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, vol. I.6 (Florence, 1990).

³²² Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* I.2 (Rome, 1556), reprint (Frankfurt/M., 1968), ch. 1, fol. 26^v-28^v; ch. 5, fol. 34^v-36^v.

accepted doctrine that no living human being can physically sustain the experience of seeing God.³²³ Giles holds that the beatific vision is only possible under limited aspects: God is infinite, whereas human perfection can only be finite.³²⁴

Giles was aware of the impossibility for a living human being to attain certain knowledge of the divine in the case of paradise, and, in contrast to other questions, for example the extent of the separated soul's suffering, accepts these limitations. This entails the absence of speculation on Giles's part and explains his choice of the four senses as the governing principle of the section. Since Giles aims to explain the meaning of paradise and does not recount a visionary experience, the adoption of the four senses as the structuring principle to gradually arrive at an extended meaning of the text (Genesis 2) is a straightforward choice. Each sense in turn offers a deeper meaning and reality than the previous one for pointing towards the divine and heavenly truth. Yet human reasoning cannot attain the absolute truth of the concept of heaven, but only approximations; these approximations evolve in theological and academic concepts but ultimately cannot replace revelation (or Dante's poetry), which is the only way a human being is able to attain the full implications of the divine. This is granted by God to the elect after their death. Giles's aim to elucidate as far as possible the meaning of paradise links this section to the first one on predestination by comprehensively explaining the conditions the blessed are exposed to in the afterlife. The result of this is a text which is difficult to comment upon. Giles's explanation of paradise is a rather dull enumeration of its main characteristics and avoids, with a very few exceptions, all reference to potentially contentious questions. It attempts to describe the divine – this is, as said above, difficult because of the intrinsic limitations of the human condition – which is an exercise that by definition must fall short of a more profound, and, in Giles's terms, a more excellent reality.³²⁵

The question that immediately arises from this is why Giles chose to devote a third of *De predestinatione* to this subject. A number of his contemporaries include the

³²³ J.B. Russell, *A History of Heaven. The Singing Silence* (Princeton, 1997), p. 8. It should be noted, however, that this point is debatable, especially in view of varying interpretations of Paul's rapture to heaven.

³²⁴ See P.W. Nash, 'Giles and the subject of theology', *Mediaeval Studies* 18 (1956), pp. 61-92, esp. p. 91; P.W. Nash, 'Intention in knowledge according to Giles of Rome', in: *L'homme et son destin d'après les penseurs du Moyen Age. Actes du premier congrès international de philosophie médiévale*, Louvain-Bruxelles 28.8.-4.9.1958 (Louvain-Paris, 1960), pp. 653-61, esp. p. 654.

³²⁵ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{vb}, l. 45-6: "Beatitudo enim nostra supra naturam est".

interpretation of paradise in the commentary on the *Sentences*, without regrouping them in one treatise. It is only possible to speculate about the answer to this question, and this is the more difficult mainly because Giles refrains from giving his own view on the matter, but also because the date (c. 1287-88) and the circumstances of the treatise's composition are obscure. As said above, it is most likely that Giles wrote the treatise after his return to Paris, possibly after his teachings were declared the doctrine of his Order in 1287. This time bracket leaves open a variety of possible audiences: Giles's own Order, in particular prospective students of the University of Paris or the Faculty of Theology at Paris.

There is the possibility that *De predestinatione* was aimed at an academic audience, but also that Giles might have written it mainly for the benefit of his own order, the Hermits of St Augustine. The latter possibility is endorsed by the widespread diffusion of the surviving manuscripts, many of which, especially the ones now kept at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich, belonged to Augustinian foundations.³²⁶ Giles's works were declared the doctrine of his Order in 1287, which was an unusual step.³²⁷ He might have felt obliged to write a treatise that would have served the purpose of disseminating his explanation of doctrine. However, a straightforward if rather dull recapitulation of orthodox Church teaching on the destiny of the elect after death seems better to serve the didactic purpose of educating those friars who subsequently were sent to the University of Paris to continue their theological and philosophical formation.

Giles further emphasises the formal exegetical structure by a choice of five examples, which he systematically analyses according to each scriptural sense. This allows for a clear and easily accessible text, but has the drawback of frequent repetitions, and contributes to the impression that *De predestinatione* is a compilation of previously written sections of other works that had to be fitted into a different concept, and perhaps adapted to a different audience. Its place in the academic context of the University of Paris is more difficult to determine, and this applies in particular to the second section of the treatise on paradise. It should be noted, though, that his working out of the pain of hellfire after 1277 is very peculiar in this context, since it is a

³²⁶ Bayerische Staatsbibliothek Munich, MSS Clm 2689, 6942, 7507, 8395, 8434, 8999, 9727, 12389, 18619, 28126.

³²⁷ *C.U.P.*, vol. II, p. 12, n. 542.

philosophical contribution. This confirms the impression that the composition of the entire text of *De predestinatione* is rather mysterious.³²⁸ Again, the use of *exempla* points towards the possibility of a non-academical or pre-academical audience, and the frequent repetition their use entails can be seen as either a shortcoming of its author's faculty of argumentation or as an educational tool to facilitate the reader's comprehension of the text. Giles makes no reference to contemporary works, for example the *Sentences* commentaries of his fellow academics at the University of Paris. It should be noted that none of the works of Godfrey of Fontaines, Siger of Brabant and Henry of Ghent contain any extensive exposition on the subject of paradise, which enhances the impression that this section of *De predestinatione* is little more than just a recapitulation of Church doctrine. It also strengthens the possibility that this section of *De predestinatione* was perhaps not even aimed at an academic audience, but for members of the Augustinian Order. In my view, Giles intended *De predestinatione* as an academical textbook for students of his own order who were preparing for further studies at the University of Paris. This solution explains the unusual composition of the treatise, its conservative presentation of well-established theological doctrine, and the absence of scholastic speculations, except the section on hellfire. Yet the treatise's composition is unusual, which is difficult to explain. Giles gives no indication as to why he chooses these five examples for his enquiry into paradise. Consequently, the answer to this question has to come from the fundamental characteristics of the text and the topic itself. Already in his exposition on foreknowledge and predestination, Giles implicitly alludes to the difference between God's and mankind's perspectives. It is possible to phrase this in another way as the difference between God's incorporeality and mankind's corporeality – or the Christian world spanning two different metaphysical orders, the community stretched across the eternal and temporal. This issue, I believe, is the underlying principle of *De predestinatione*, as it appears implicitly in sections one and explicitly in sections two and three of the treatise.

3.2 Giles's Introduction to Paradise

At the beginning of his discourse on paradise Giles sets out a number of different interpretations of paradise, in particular the two classic views, that of Augustine in *De Genesi ad litteram* and of John of Damascus in *De fide orthodoxa*. Giles uses Augustine

³²⁸ M. Foucault, *Die Ordnung des Diskurses* (Frankfurt/M., 2003), p. 21 where he points out that the reality of the discourse is not always accepted.

to sum up the then current ways of interpretation: there are those who see paradise as a corporeal place, those who see it as a spiritual place, and those who explain it in both ways.³²⁹ John of Damascus confirms this division amongst individual authors but puts a different emphasis on the issue: paradise is seen as either linked to the senses, rather than the body, or to the intellect or both.³³⁰ These possibilities set down the fundamental difficulty of an interpretation of paradise: an explanation and definition of the corporeal and incorporeal qualities of the saved when they enter paradise. Their status is interdependent with the status of paradise, but, in contrast with the section on hell, Giles does not define the condition of the blessed and concentrates instead on the different interpretations of the concept of paradise. It is a definition of the concept rather than of the individuals that experience it which is prevalent in Giles's discourse. In his introduction to the literal interpretation of paradise Giles follows up the two parts of the argument with an analogy borrowed from John of Damascus. He borrows the division of corporeal and spiritual from Augustine, saying that just as man, put in paradise, is governed by both the senses and the intellect, paradise itself can be interpreted as both spiritual and corporeal.³³¹ Giles also quotes Peter Lombard to underline his exposition, although Lombard refers to the corporeal and sensate, not the spiritual readings of Genesis 2.8 in his second book of the *Sentences* where he follows Augustine's preference for the literal meaning in his (Augustine's) later works.³³² A parallel passage is Giles's commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*, distinction eighteen. Giles comes to the conclusion that the (terrestrial) paradise physically exists, which does not exclude its spiritual significance if seen in the context of the senses of Scripture.³³³

Giles attempts to dissociate the literal and the spiritual interpretation in chapters four and five of *De predestinatione*. He shows at once that it is not possible to interpret the passage (Genesis 2.8) separately in either the corporeal or the spiritual sense,

³²⁹ "Non ignoro de paradiso multos multa dixisse; tres tamen de hac re quasi generales sunt sententiae. Una eorum qui tantummodo corporaliter paradysum intelligi volunt: alia eorum qui spiritualiter tantum; tertia eorum qui utroque modo paradysum accipiunt, alias corporaliter, alias autem spiritualiter", Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII.1, CSEL 28.1, p. 229, l. 2-5. Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{rb}, l. 42-6.

³³⁰ "Quidam igitur sensibilem paradysum imaginati sunt [...] intelligibilem", John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Corbenus*, ed. E.M. Buytaert (New York, 1955), II.1 / 25.3., p. 108.

³³¹ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{rb}, l. 53-6: "paradysus utroque modo accipi possit, videlicet quod uno modo sumitur paradysus sensibilis et corporalis, alio vero modo intelligibilis et spiritualis". The quotation implicitly refers to Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.1, CSEL 28.1, p. 231, l. 3-5.

³³² Peter Lombard, II *Sententiarum*, dist. 17, ch. 5, vol. 1, pp. 413-4.

because this would imply a number of erroneous conclusions regarding the spiritual sense. His example is the creation of Adam: an exclusively spiritual interpretation would be that he was created inside paradise.³³⁴ Giles's choice to separate the different ways of interpretation, which results in a partly obscure and partly repetitive discourse, is curious. It is difficult to explain why he should have made that choice, especially in view of his straightforward analysis in distinction eighteen of the commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*.³³⁵ This passage highlights Giles's preoccupation with *auctoritas*, when placing his argumentation nearly exclusively in the patristic tradition of exegetical interpretation. This preoccupation should be seen as essentially educational: a teaching tool for his students. Although it is a common feature of medieval texts, Giles's extensive recapitulation of both Augustine and John of Damascus puts an emphasis on proving to the reader that his (Giles's) method of enquiry is congruent with accepted Church tradition. Giles systematically separates the different ways of interpretation but at the same time is anxious to point out that none should be taken exclusively on their own, which further proves that *De predestinatione* was mainly intended as a textbook for students. The example of the creation of Adam serves to show the possible and perhaps inevitable shortcomings of the four-fold formal exegetical system of analysis, whose structure might lead to taking one part of the argument as exclusively valid. It might be for this reason that Giles takes five well-established examples to define paradise, which serve to emphasise the coherence of the concept of paradise as a whole. Giles had the choice of organising his discourse in two ways: the first is to give priority to the four senses, the second is to systematically analyse each of the five examples. Giles chose the first possibility, a more formal if repetitive choice. This chapter will interpret Giles's discourse on the basis of the second choice, to arrive at a more concise view of his doctrine and to show the coherence of his concept of paradise.

The five examples Giles uses also stem from his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*. One of them forms part of his introductory passage in chapter four,

³³³ "Resolutio. Paradisus terrestris, quamvis corporeus re ipsa existat, rem tamen spiritualem significat. [...] Item ex modo loquendi, sensibusque Scripturae sacrae", Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, p. 58.

³³⁴ "paradysus corporaliter, et sensibiliter sumatur: quod si vellemus paradysum sumere [...] pro quocumque alio spirituali bono, non diceretur Adam extra paradysum conditus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{va}, l. 6-10.

and is the question whether Adam was created outside paradise or not.³³⁶ The other four concern the tree of life, the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the four rivers of paradise, and God's intention to put man (Adam) in paradise to till and care for it. Giles's choice of examples – in the commentary on the *Sentences* and in *De predestinatione* – forms part of a widely used pattern in Genesis exegesis since Augustine, which Peter Lombard takes up in his *Sentences* and later commentators of the *Sentences* continue. It contributes to the impression that for the section on paradise Giles had in mind a lecture in theology rather than a theological disputation; his findings are well established in orthodox teaching and doctrine. This becomes obvious by a short comparison with Thomas Aquinas who, in question 102 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, briefly explores the question of whether paradise is a corporeal place. There, Thomas refers to two of Giles's five examples: the four rivers of paradise and the tree of life; both (amongst other examples) serve to show that paradise should be interpreted in both the literal and spiritual senses,³³⁷ which is the view Giles subscribes to.

Both Thomas and Giles take their selections from Augustine, both from his literal commentary on Genesis as well as from his earlier work *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, although they do not acknowledge their indebtedness to the latter work. In particular, parts of Giles's allegorical and anagogical interpretations of paradise implicitly draw upon the latter work. This applies to the passages relating to the significance of the *Verbum* in the post-lapsarian world, the allegorical reading of the tree of life and the anagogical interpretation of paradise as the beatitude of man, and of the rivers of paradise as the four cardinal virtues. Giles's five examples appear in the text of Genesis 2 and are common themes in Genesis commentaries, for example in Ambrose's *De paradiso*.³³⁸ Four of the five sections appear in Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX-XI: the two trees of paradise, the river of four streams and man's task to till and guard paradise.³³⁹ It is likely that Giles's choice of structuring his argument stems from this text, which allows him to present a succinct if commonplace analysis of the concept of paradise especially in the allegorical sense. Augustine's literal

³³⁵ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 18, dub. VI lateralis, (Venice, 1581), pp. 63-4.

³³⁶ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 18, cub. VI lateralis, pp. 63-4.

³³⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, art. 1, ed. S.E. Fretté, P. Maré (Paris, 1871), pp. 618-20.

³³⁸ Ambrose, *De paradiso* I.1-VIII.38, CSEL 32.1, pp. 265-94.

³³⁹ Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX-XI, CSEL 91, pp. 131-7.

commentary on Genesis, however, is the major source for Giles's discussion of paradise, and it is an obvious if commonplace choice.

It should be noted that Giles only quotes directly from *De Genesi ad litteram* and not from *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, although parts of his interpretations only appear in the latter work. A possible explanation for this omission can be seen in Augustine's choice to explicitly refrain from any extensive digression in his interpretation in the direction of the figurative, allegorical or anagogical meaning. Giles, in turn, might have felt obliged to justify his choice departing from the later Augustinian model, staying as close as possible to the historical meaning of Genesis, and the absence of any reference to *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* may be seen as a deliberate omission. References to other authors are rare, and since they mostly also appear in Thomas' *Summa* can be taken as part of the classic scholastic frame of reference (a case in point would be Bede, but also John of Damascus).

3.3 The *exemplum* of Jerusalem

Giles's reference to mainly well-established classical references is further emphasised by his choice of the example of Jerusalem, which he uses as an introduction to his four-fold explanation of paradise. Indeed, Jerusalem appears as a synonym for paradise and it serves to illustrate that the various senses or meanings can and should be seen together and not separately. Giles's extensive explanation of Jerusalem in the four senses is set out as an illustration to how he intends to analyse the concept of paradise. The decision to take a very common example reinforces the resemblance of this part of the treatise to a lecture or to a sermon, where the audience's attention is captured and held with the help of an *exemplum*. In this case it is closely linked to the concept of heaven, and originates from the Jewish tradition of the afterlife, which is later taken up by the Apocalypse of St John (Rv 21, in the Vulgate), where Jerusalem is another dwelling place of the blessed.³⁴⁰ The example is taken from Cassian's *Conlatio*, an author who already differentiates between one literal and three spiritual senses, each based upon the previous.³⁴¹ Giles explains it as follows: Jerusalem in the literal sense signifies a corporeal place; in the spiritual or mystical senses³⁴² the meaning, according

³⁴⁰ Russell, *A History of Heaven*, p. 31. J. Daniélou, 'Terre et paradis chez les pères de l'Eglise', *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 22 (1953), pp. 433-72, esp. p. 439.

³⁴¹ Cassian, *Conlatio* XIV.8, CSEL 13, pp. 404-7.

³⁴² Giles takes the formulation from Augustine, who not yet differentiates in the clear-cut structure of the four senses. See Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* I.1, CSEL 28.1, pp. 3-5.

to Giles who is directly following Augustine, can be 'adapted' to a number of interpretations.³⁴³ Giles emphasises the double significance of paradise in both the literal and the spiritual sense with the example of Adam and Eve who, in his argumentation, must have the same spiritual goods.³⁴⁴ It should be noted that Giles takes the second half of the quotation from both Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* (the first half sentence) and his *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (the second half sentence).³⁴⁵

In this context, Giles refers to the figurative meaning of paradise as the *visio pacis*, the vision of peace, which Augustine mentions in *De Genesi ad litteram*, XII.24 in relation to Paul's vision of the third heaven.³⁴⁶ Augustine takes this example from Jerome's *Liber de nominibus hebraicis* 73 and Eusebius' *Commentaria in psalmos* 75.3.³⁴⁷ In contrast to Augustine, Giles directly links Jerusalem to paradise and defines it as paradise in the literal sense, whereas Augustine only implied this in the aforesaid passage. In order to justify his subsequent interpretation of paradise according to the moral, allegorical and anagogical senses, going beyond the literal sense preferred by Augustine in his later works, Giles quotes two passages from the Bible: Judges 9.8-15 and Psalm 55. He shows that the events recounted there – the trees that institute themselves as kings and rulers and the melting hands and feet of David – cannot be read in the literal and historical sense, but only in a figurative sense.³⁴⁸ Thus the 'spiritual sense', here employed in the singular, Giles's denomination of the figurative meaning (at times, he also refers to this as the 'spiritual and mystical sense') is divided three-fold.³⁴⁹

After the first level, the literal sense, comes the second, the moral sense, which is what human actions encompass. The third level is the allegorical sense, concerning that which is hoped for. Explaining the matter further, Giles gives an etymological definition of the allegorical and anagogical senses. The meaning of allegorical derives from

³⁴³ "Ierusalem secundum sensum litteralem significat locum illum corporalem, et secundum sensum spiritualem et mysticum, potest ad multa adaptari", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{rb}, l. 38-40.

³⁴⁴ "cum ergo nullum fuerit spirituale bonum quo fuisset predicta mulier, quo non fuerit predictus vir: cum vir sit caput mulieris", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{va}, l. 13-6.

³⁴⁵ "quo non fuerit perditus vir", Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI.20, CSEL 28.1, p. 194, l. 17; "caput mulieris vir", Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.XI.15, CSEL 91, p. 136, l. 14-5.

³⁴⁶ "Ierusalem interpretatur visio pacis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{rb}, l. 44-5, quoting Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.28, CSEL 28.1, p. 423, l. 15-6.

³⁴⁷ See G.A. Anderson, 'The Cosmic Mountain. Eden and its Early Interpreters in Syriac Christianity', in: G. Robbins, *Studies in Women and Religion*, 27 (New York, 1988), pp. 187-224.

³⁴⁸ "non potest esse sensus litteralis quod voces significant", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 3-4.

something that is pulled to something else, that is, to what ought to be believed; the meaning of the anagogical alludes to something that is above and what is hoped for.³⁵⁰ This well-established progression of meaning through the four senses is a means of helping the limited human capacities to attain a higher level of understanding. The hierarchical structure is obvious: at the highest level is the divine, the absolute truth, which can only be disclosed to the human mind through revelation. The progressive levels of interpretation show the way in which a human being should construct his own path towards eternal life: from the outset, on the basis of given conditions (the literal, corporeal level), then towards the possibilities and choices a human life offers (the moral sense, mainly corporeal). From this the path a human being is to be taken to the higher principles which ought to be achieved: the Christian ideal of a life that more closely resembles God's precepts (the allegorical, spiritual meaning). Finally it is drawn to the highest level, which is an object of hope: the divine (the anagogical sense, wholly spiritual). In itself, this is the complete structure of a model of a good human being, and it serves to describe completely and exhaustively the principles of the life of the predestined. This passage serves as the fundamental explanation for Giles's discourse and discloses the aim of the composition of this section, which then, in Giles's view, does not need to be repeated afterwards. It also sets his interpretation within the neoplatonic hierarchy of beings: beings of a lower realm are drawn to those at a higher level.³⁵¹

In what follows, he simply gives the final interpretations of each of the five examples, without any further reasoning. The *exemplum* of Jerusalem, according to this division, serves as the first proof as to how the system works: in the literal and historical sense Jerusalem is a corporeal place – the city of Jerusalem as human beings know it, with a precise geographical location. In the moral sense it signifies the holy soul (the individual), in the allegorical sense the present, militant Church (the community), and in the anagogical sense the heavenly homeland (the community after the individuals' death

³⁴⁹ "Sensus [...] spiritualis [...] tripliciter assensum possunt ad significandum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 9-11.

³⁵⁰ "sensus allegoricus, ab aliori quod est aliud, et goge, quod est ductio [...] [sensus] anagoricus, ab ana, quod est sursum, et goge, quod est ductio [...] ad ea, que sursum sunt, et que speranda sunt", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 16-21.

and their judgement).³⁵² In the introduction to the anagogical interpretation of paradise Giles for the first time merges the two *exempla* of Jerusalem and paradise. In Giles's words the celestial homeland, a most powerful thing,³⁵³ is the place to where human beings on earth are led by the hand (of God); this is also called Jerusalem. Giles refers here to the sphere of the divine which is beyond the imagination of human comprehension, limited because of its corporeal character. The divine encompasses both the corporeal and the incorporeal and yet transcends both categories that were hitherto presented as separate entities; in the anagogical sense they represent the same place and meaning. Transposed through the word, the literal meaning of a wooded paradise in the anagogical sense becomes the region in which the soul is comfortable and well, which is a position Giles directly takes from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.34.³⁵⁴

Giles refers to Paul's description of heaven in 2 Corinthians 12.2 when he was taken to the third heaven, which he also calls paradise. Paul refers to this incident as something that either took place inside or outside the body, but says that only God can be sure about where it actually took place.³⁵⁵ It is possible that Giles here also alludes to the *Vision of Paul*, a visionary text translated into Latin in the fourth century AD. He certainly refers to the discussion of Paul's concept of the third heaven, which takes up book twelve of *De Genesi ad litteram*.³⁵⁶ Augustine points out that the passage in 2 Cor. 12.2 is obscure, and without the comparison to other passages of Scripture, cannot be sufficiently understood.³⁵⁷ Giles, following Augustine, interprets the event as a vision of

³⁵¹ See J.R. Eastman, 'Giles of Rome and his fidelity to sources in the context of ecclesiological political thought as exemplified in *De renuntiatione papae*', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* III.1 (1992), pp. 145-65, esp. p. 160.

³⁵² "Ierusalem igitur secundum sensum litteralem significat illum corporalem locum: secundum sensum morale, animam sanctam: secundum allegoricum ecclesiam, et secundum anagogicum, celestem patriam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 21-4.

³⁵³ "ad superna [...] que potissime sunt res sperande et illa celestis patria sive illa que sursum est Ierusalem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{va}, l. 56-8-34^{vb}, l. 1.

³⁵⁴ "omnis spiritualis regio, in qua bene est anime, potest dici paradysus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{vb}, l. 5-7, quoting Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.34, CSEL 28.1, p. 430, l. 13-4.

³⁵⁵ "scio hominem in Christo anno quattuordecim sive in corpore nescio sive extra corpus nescio Deus scit raptum eiusmodi usque ad tertium caelum et scio huiusmodi hominem sive in corpore sive extra corpus nescio Deus scit quoniam raptus est in paradysum", 2 Cor. 12.2-4 (Vulgate).

³⁵⁶ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.1, CSEL 28.1, p. 379, l. 21-3; p. 380, l. 1.

³⁵⁷ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.1,2, CSEL 28.1, pp. 379-82.

the divine essence, which he takes to be the place of mankind's beatitude.³⁵⁸ This is another passage which Giles takes from Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* without acknowledging his source. In contrast to Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*, Giles does not go into further detail about the third heaven, or the different characteristics of visionary experiences, but sums up the characteristics of paradise in the anagogical sense which he defines as the celestial homeland and mankind's future. This, in his words, is not simply paradise, but the paradise of paradises, which is the end and final destination of all desires.³⁵⁹ This, as shown below, is one of the rare instances where Giles implicitly refers to a different kind of paradise than the terrestrial paradise.

At no point in his explanation of paradise does Giles give a clear definition of the characteristics of the terrestrial paradise as opposed to the celestial paradise. Both concepts are present in his interpretation, the terrestrial paradise in conjunction with the literal sense and the celestial paradise in conjunction with the spiritual senses. Giles however does not explain whether and what changes the terrestrial paradise undergoes after the Second Coming. It might be argued that he only refers to the celestial paradise since this is the final destination of the elect, a formulation that appears in the *incipit* of *De predestinatione*.³⁶⁰ This, however, is not congruent with Giles's extensive discussion of the text of Genesis, which explicitly concerns the terrestrial paradise of Adam and Eve. The second section of the treatise on paradise shows a conglomerate of interpretations that concern both the terrestrial and celestial paradise, and the lack of definition of both contributes to a sometimes incomplete argumentation. There is no explicit distinction of the two and Giles only uses the term *paradisus* throughout chapters four to seven. One reason for this might be seen in the patristic tradition which mostly assumed paradise to be the terrestrial paradise as the garden of the elect and the dwelling place of Adam and Eve.³⁶¹ Giles uses the example of Adam and Eve to illustrate that paradise must be understood in both a literal and spiritual sense. Both Adam and Eve must have the same spiritual goods at their respective creation by God: Adam, when God made him from dust and breathed life into him; Eve, when God

³⁵⁸ "visio divine essentie, ubi est beatitudo nostra", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{vb}, l. 19-20. The second part is a quotation of Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX.12, CSEL 91, p. 131, l. 1-2.

³⁵⁹ "paradysus paradysorum [...] finis desideriorum suorum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{vb}, l. 24-7.

³⁶⁰ "de paradyso ubi predestinati [...] sunt finaliter collocandi", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione*, preface (*incipit*), Cambrai, fol. 28^{va}, l. 5-7.

³⁶¹ J. Delumeau, *Une histoire du paradis. Le jardin des délices* (Paris, 1992), p. 11.

created her from one of Adam's ribs.³⁶² The essential part of Giles's example stems from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* and *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, but is not identified as such by Giles, which is another indication of Giles following the Augustinian standpoint.³⁶³ The example serves to show that no exclusive interpretation of paradise either in the literal sense or the spiritual sense is sufficient: as human beings Adam and Eve encompass both corporeal and spiritual qualities. This fundamental tenet, both the amalgamate and differentiation of the corporeal and the spiritual underlies Giles's argumentation in the second and third part of *De predestinatione*.

In the following section, I will briefly set down Giles's interpretation of each of the five examples according to the four senses. This breaks up the formal structuring of chapters four to seven, where Giles successively examines the four senses on the basis of the five examples. This analysis will show that the argument is centred on the distinction between the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of Creation, framed in the exegetical structure of the four senses. This allows Giles to set down a succinct if in parts sometimes repetitive theological explanation of paradise centred on the classical references from Augustine's Genesis commentaries. Giles's interpretation of creation in *De predestinatione* is entirely theological and does not include any reference to his scientific interpretation on the basis of Aristotle's *Physics* or his own *De causis*.³⁶⁴

3.4 The *exemplum* of Adam's Creation Outside Paradise

The first example, the question whether man was created outside paradise – already used by Giles to illustrate the distinction between the exclusively spiritual and the corporeal interpretation of paradise (see above) – is answered affirmatively.³⁶⁵ Giles takes the example from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.3, a work he only indirectly acknowledges.³⁶⁶ It is a view that is congruent with the reading in Genesis 2.7-8, provided that the sequence of the narrative signifies also a sequence of time. A

³⁶² "nullum fuerit spirituale bonum quo fuisset predicta mulier, quo non fuerit predictus vir, cum vir sit caput mulieris [...] mulier in sua productione fuerit aliquo spirituali bono ornata, quo non fuerit ornatus vir", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{va}, l. 13-20.

³⁶³ "quo non fuerit perditus vir", Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VI.20, CSEL 28.1, p. 194, l. 17; "cum vir sit caput mulieris", Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.XI.15, CSEL 91, p. 136, l. 14-5.

³⁶⁴ See G. Pini, 'La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino nelle *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (qq. 1-7) di Egidio Romano, Parte 1', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* III,1 (1992), pp. 271-304, esp. pp. 288-300.

³⁶⁵ "non fuit ibi [in paradysum] creatus homo, sed positus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{va}, l. 38-9.

³⁶⁶ "de quo multa dicens", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{va}, l. 38. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.3, CSEL 28.1, p. 233, l. 25.

passage in his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences*, the sixth *dubitatio* of distinction eighteen, sheds some further light on the matter of the underlying principle of corporeality and incorporeality, as well as the compilatory character of *De predestinatione*. Here, Giles examines at length the question whether Adam was created outside of paradise or not; he concludes (in accordance with Scripture) that he was.³⁶⁷ The argument moves from a distinction between human beings and animals (taken from John of Damascus), the Scriptural statement that God chose mankind to rule over the animal world, to a comparison between humankind and God. Giles affirms that God created man in an inferior place and later transferred him to paradise in order to do good, to avoid evil and to recognise the divine *beneficium*.³⁶⁸ A transfer is possible because the place of creation is a space rather than a point; the natural movement, as for animals, is towards a better place; similarly, God transferred Adam to a place with superior qualities in relation to his place of creation: the terrestrial paradise.³⁶⁹ It appears that the passage in chapter four of *De predestinatione* stems from Giles's findings in his commentary on the *Sentences* and – without directly referring to it – alludes to that text. It may also refer to Thomas Aquinas, who briefly treats the issue in question 102, article IV of his *Summa theologiae*.³⁷⁰

A reading that is based upon the literal and historical meaning is likely to adhere to a temporal sequence, a view that patristic literature already assumed, for example Ambrose.³⁷¹ Giles moreover refers to more recent authorities, such as Peter Lombard. The question appears also in the work of Thomas Aquinas, in question 102 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*, where Thomas exclusively argues on the basis of Scriptural reference. Giles does not explicitly refer to this work. In *De predestinatione* he once again alludes to a quotation he had previously used, where Peter explains that man had to leave paradise when he disobeyed God's order, but that he had not been

³⁶⁷ Genesis, 2.15 (Vulgate).

³⁶⁸ "homo comparatur ad Deum [...] homo est positus in paradiso [...] formatus est in loco minus nobili, et magis infimo, et translatus est ad paradysum, tanquam ad locum magis nobilem, et supremum [...] ut ex hoc magis cognoscat divinum beneficium, qui eum ad nobilem locum transtulit: ut ex magis inardesceret ad faciendum bonum [...] ut cautius vitaret malum [...] tulit igitur Deus hominem et posuit eum in paradiso, ut operaretur, supple bonum bene vivendo [...] gustans bonum, et perdens ipsum malefaciendo ardentior efficitur, ut peniteat de malo", Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 18, dub VI lateralis, p. 64.

³⁶⁹ "locus generationis alicuius non est punctualis, sed est magnae latitudinis [...] possent se transferre de loco ad locum ubi melius possunt vivere [...] unus locus potest esse melior alio [...] omnia magis erant in paradiso", Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, p. 64.

³⁷⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, art. IV, pp. 622-3.

there since his creation. Giles also follows Peter Lombard in attributing the existence of man in paradise to God's grace.³⁷²

It should be noted that Giles uses the reference to man's existence in paradise because of God's grace not only as part of his literal, but also his moral interpretation of paradise. God did not place man in paradise because of his nature but from grace, as part of a gracious gift freely given.³⁷³ In his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences* Giles more fully explains the change from Adam's rule *per naturam* to *per gratiam* in a restricted sense: grace is no longer freely given.³⁷⁴ It is also a clear reference to the terrestrial, not the celestial paradise. Seen in the larger context of the holy soul, which is the moral interpretation of the concept of paradise, the soul is not only good and holy on account of freely given grace, but rather because of grace that has been sought after and accepted. This permits the possession of a good conscience and a partaking in the joy of sanctity.³⁷⁵ This argument ties in with Giles's brief reference to grace in chapter one, where he holds that God's choice of a human being for eternal life does not come from good works, faith or nature. Firstly there is God's purpose, then, as a result, humankind's good works and then God's choice of the person to eternal salvation.³⁷⁶

The passage of chapter five explains that neither faith nor good works have any value without the willing acceptance of God's gracious gift of grace. Giles does not resolve in either passage the precise relation between God's grace and human action, which is crucial to a rational understanding of the issue, and it is one of the more obvious shortcomings of the treatise. Giles resolves the contradiction between God's foreknowledge of contingent or necessary events, but this philosophical explanation

³⁷¹ "Ergo positus est in paradiso vir, facta est in paradiso mulier", Ambrose, *De paradiso* 4.25, CSEL 32.1, p. 281, l. 10-1.

³⁷² "Quod homo extra paradisum creatus, in paradiso sit positus, quare ita factum sit. Hominem autem ita formatum tulit Deus, ut Scriptura docet, Gen. 2, et posuit in paradiso voluptatis, quem plantaverat a principio. His verbis aperte Moyses insinuat quod homo extra paradisum creatus postmodum in paradiso sit positus", Peter Lombard, II *Sententiarum*, d. 17, c. 5, pp. 413-4. Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 38-9: "sicut ergo non fuit nature, sed gratie quod homo fuit in paradyso".

³⁷³ "Adam fuerit in paradysus positus dicur fuisse gratie, quia fuit quoddam donum gratuitum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, fol. 33^{va}, l. 41-3.

³⁷⁴ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 33, q. 1, dub. 2, p. 493. Cf. G.J. McAleer, 'Political Authority', pp. 135-6.

³⁷⁵ "esse in bonitate conscientie et in letitia sanctitatis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 45-6.

³⁷⁶ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 23-7.

does not provide an exhaustive solution of the issues raised by theological doctrine. This becomes most apparent in the interpretation of paradise, resulting in an enumeration of doctrinal issues rather than in a critical analysis. Giles explains that which ought to be believed in the moral sense, is not valid without grace and both the giving and acceptance of grace therefore is a prerequisite of humankind's existence in paradise. This passage puts forward another of Giles's key views: the importance of the will in respect of mankind's destiny after death; without it the realisation of either good or evil actions is impossible.³⁷⁷ His interpretation of the role of the will in the context of human cognition as a necessary preliminary to knowledge is an Augustinian concept.³⁷⁸ Indirectly, this is an affirmation of human free will, although Giles does not explicitly refer to this concept in both his discourse on paradise and hell.

The allegorical interpretation of the issue is a straightforward analogy: just as Adam was created outside paradise mankind was not created within the Church but outside of it.³⁷⁹ It is not the matter of birth that makes a human being a member of the Church, because his birth, since the Fall, is tainted by sin. It is only by grace, given through the sacrament of baptism, that a spiritual renewal can take place to permit humankind to enter the Church.³⁸⁰ This renewal is the absolution of sins (including original sin) that allows the participation in the community of the Church, in analogy to Adam who was not put in paradise on account of his intrinsic qualities (*ex sua conditione*) but because of God's free gift of grace.³⁸¹ Initially, the first example serves as an illustration of how God's grace works during the lifetime of a human being, from his birth to his baptism and the full acceptance into the Church. In all these stages God's grace is present, but it only has an effect upon the salvation of that human being through the exercise of (free) will³⁸² actively to turn to God. The sacrament of baptism answers the purpose of taking away original sin and allows for a spiritual renewal. Giles emphasises the free choice God has given to mankind to form part of the elect or else to

³⁷⁷ "in huiusmodi statu vivendi est liberum arbitrium, per quod quamdiu sumus in vita ista possumus bene et male agere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{vb}, l. 4-6.

³⁷⁸ See P.W. Nash, 'Intention in Knowledge', p. 653.

³⁷⁹ "sumus conditi et generati extra ecclesiam, sicut et Adam fuit extra paradysum conditus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{ra}, l. 30-2.

³⁸⁰ "nascimur in originali peccato [...] per divinam gratiam et per regenerationem baptismalem in ecclesiam collocamur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{ra}, l. 28-33.

³⁸¹ "Adam non ex sua conditione, sed ex dono Dei habuit quod esset in paradiso positus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{ra}, l. 33-5.

³⁸² *Voluntas* as opposed to *liberum arbitrium*: this indicates the predominance of theological rather than philosophical terminology and interpretation in the section on paradise.

reject Him. It is an argument that follows up his discussion of foreknowledge, necessity and contingency: God knows the outcome, but does not hinder a human being's choice of either leading a good or a bad life. Giles gives a theological rather than a philosophical interpretation of God's grace and the sacrament of baptism as factors that can help a human being's path towards salvation, in which ultimately *voluntas* is the deciding factor.

The anagogical interpretation takes up the point that, at birth, mankind's condition lacks purity and that this can only be acquired with the help of God's grace.³⁸³ This puts a very different emphasis on the matter of grace than the previous interpretation and posits God rather than the will of the human being as the decisive factor for salvation. No human being can strive for the vision of God and beatitude simply on account of their membership of the Church, or, indeed the intrinsic qualities of their nature, since God lives within an inaccessible light. Any previous knowledge about the extent of the good that God prepares with the help of his saints is insufficient when gained through the senses or the perfection of faith, even though faith and Scripture provide a greater extent of understanding. Giles explains that even the angels do not have the full vision of God although their nature is more perfect and excellent than that of a human being.³⁸⁴ It is only in the event of the vision of God itself that a human being will comprehend the extent of the good.³⁸⁵ This passage shows a shift from the terrestrial to the celestial paradise and centres on the main aspect of knowledge (*scientia*). It is mainly a philosophical term and Giles only briefly uses it here; yet it is essential in explaining the difference between the human (corporeal) nature and the divine.³⁸⁶ As said above, the limited capacities of human nature do not allow for a full vision of God with the possible exception of Paul's rapture to the third heaven. Full knowledge about the conditions of the elect after the Second Coming is impossible for a living human

³⁸³ "nullus purus homo a sui nativitate, est in hoc paradysus conditus, sed solum per gratiam positus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{vb}, l. 43-5.

³⁸⁴ On Giles's interpretation of angels see B. Faes de Mottoni, 'Un aspetto dell'universo angelologico di Egidio Romano: *Utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum*', in: *L'homme et son univers au Moyen Age. Actes du 7^e congrès international de philosophie médiévale*, 30.8.-4.9.1982, ed. C. Wenin, vol. 2, Philosophes Médiévaux, vol. 27 (Louvain, 1986), pp. 911-20; B. Faes de Mottoni, '*Mensura* im Werk *De mensura angelorum* des Aegidius Romanus', in: *Miscellanea Medievalia. Veröffentlichungen des Thomas-Instituts der Universität zu Köln*, ed. A. Zimmermann, vol. 16.1: *Mensura, Maß, Zahl, Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter* (Berlin-New York, 1983), pp. 86-102; P. Porro, 'Ancora sulle polemiche tra Egidio Romano e Enrico de Gand: Due questioni sul tempo angelico', *Medioevo* 14 (1988), pp. 107-48.

³⁸⁵ "talis cognitio ad notificandum tamen hominem, si tunc plene innotescet nobis, quantum sit illud bonum, quando videbimus eum facie ad faciem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 3-6.

being, and by analogy the Church can only provide a limited set of explanations of the extent of their beatitude. On a different level Giles shows that the concept of God's grace acquires a particular importance in enabling a human being to attain the final step towards salvation: it is the combination of corporeal factors such as the will and the senses with God's approval; He takes the final decision, as well as the first decision, of course, in His providence.

Giles does not discuss the possible implications of this for the concept of human free will, possibly because, as part of the divine, the final judgement is beyond the (human) concept of free will. Giles explains that the senses prevent a full knowledge of God, which underlines his fundamental preoccupation with the distinction between the corporeal and the incorporeal.³⁸⁷ The discussion of the senses as an obstacle in attaining the (full) vision of God is represented in his subsequent discussion in part three of *De predestinatione* of the extent of the suffering of separated souls and demons in the fire of hell.³⁸⁸ It highlights Giles's preoccupation with the faculties of the soul, a point he discusses at length in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, and that places *De predestinatione* in the context of the scholastic debates in the last third of the thirteenth century. In this section of *De predestinatione*, however, Giles refrains from any discussion of the soul's characteristics, but contents himself with the sole enumeration of the meanings of paradise according to the senses of Scripture.

Another parallel passage is Giles's sermon seventeen where he explains that the full vision of God is only possible through an earthly life of *caritas*, the highest level of divine *miserericordia* and goodness and through consummated grace. He distinguishes this from the human and corporeal condition, which only allows for a partial vision on the basis of natural and obscure light, faith and the sacraments (defined as *corporaliter quantum ad humanitatem*). The absence of a direct link between God and humankind since the departure from the terrestrial paradise entails the limited (corporeal) capacity of mankind to strive for beatitude. It is only once this distinction ceases to exist – in the event of eternal salvation in the celestial paradise – that the full vision of God becomes

³⁸⁶ Giles's definition of God's *scientia*: see chapter two, pp. 52-6, 62.

³⁸⁷ "cognoscere [...] de Deo [...] quam habemus per naturam, et ex sensibus insufficiens est", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 34^{vb}, l. 58-35^{ra}, l. 1-3.

³⁸⁸ See chapter four, pp. 141-5.

a reality. Once it is attained, God will not take it away: *et gaudium vestrum non tollet a vobis*: eternity is an essential characteristic of the celestial paradise and distinguishes it from the terrestrial paradise.³⁸⁹ Giles's commentary on the second book of the *Sentences* distinction 21 contains a political interpretation of the loss of *caritas* in the Fall.³⁹⁰

In conclusion, Giles's first example serves to determine the place of the human beings on earth in relation to their final destination. It takes into account the corporeal limitations that accompany a journey towards the divine that can only be achieved by unconditionally and freely accepting grace. It is a theological explanation of orthodox doctrine, which avoids all philosophical lines of enquiry and all reference to contingent or necessary events, which dominated the first section of the treatise.

3.5 The *exemplum* of the Tree of Life

The second example concerns the tree of life (*lignum vite*) that Genesis 2.9 briefly refers to: a tree that God planted in the middle of paradise. In contrast to the patristic and medieval interpretations, modern exegesis claims that the narrative of Genesis shows that there is only one tree in paradise which is characterised in two ways.³⁹¹ Giles uses the Genesis commentary of Bede and the *Glossa ordinaria* to show that the fruit of this tree conveys the divine force that gives perpetual good health to the person who eats it.³⁹² This, again, is commonly accepted in scholastic literature, as shown for example by Thomas Aquinas' conclusions in question 102 of the *Summa theologiae*.³⁹³ Augustine, in *De Genesi ad litteram*, refers to the tribulations of the prophet Elias who spent forty days in the wilderness and only survived because God fed him with bread. Augustine interprets this bread as the fruit of the tree of life, which he defines as material food that nonetheless has the power to give lasting health and strength to the

³⁸⁹ Luna, *Repertorio*, sermon 17, p. 158.

³⁹⁰ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 21, q. 1, dub. 4, p. 189. See G.J. McAleer, 'Political Authority', p. 25.

³⁹¹ So for example Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX.12, CSEL 91, pp. 131-3, where Augustine distinguishes between the significance of the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. For modern exegesis see C. Westermann, *Genesis 1-11. A Commentary* (Minneapolis, 1984), p. 212. Westermann also gives a comprehensive bibliography on the trees of paradise, pp. 211-2. In dist. 18 of *II Sententiarum*, dub. V lateralis Giles discerns the names and characteristics of all three kinds of trees in paradise. There are, however, no direct overlappings (or indeed cross-references) with *De predestinatione*; Giles does not use the method of analysis of the four senses in *II Sententiarum*. Cf. Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 18, dub. V lat., pp. 62-3.

³⁹² "lignum illud divinitus accepit hanc vim, ut qui ex eius fructu comederet corpus eius stabili sanitate, et perpetua soliditate firmaretur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{va}, l. 54-6. Bede, *Hexameron. Libri quatuor in principium Genesis* I (PL 91: 44B). Walafridus Strabo, *Liber Genesis* II.6 (PL 113: 86), II.23-4 (PL 113: 232-3).

body.³⁹⁴ Its contents therefore contain both the material aspect (earthly, human food) and an undefined divine aspect, which Augustine calls 'something more' – neither corporeal or incorporeal – and that preserves the human being from infirmity and decay in old age.³⁹⁵ Vico calls it a divine gift which disappears at the Fall and is then perceived by human beings as a privation of direct communication (corporeal and spiritual) with the divine.³⁹⁶

Giles's choice of Augustine's text is classic and common, yet it shows Giles's interest in the distinction between the corporeal and the incorporeal. This emerges more clearly from the subsequent argument where Giles explains that God wants to preserve Adam and Eve both formally and materially, provided that they do not sin.³⁹⁷

Formaliter affects the whole creation that God willed from nothing and constitutes the formal law, which is original justice. *Materialiter* refers to the laws that derive from formal law and its dependent material clauses. The concept of original justice comes from the patristic tradition, which assumed that God had originally 'inscribed' his law upon Adam's heart, which was then compromised by the Fall and compensated for by an external written law.³⁹⁸ In contrast with his commentary on the second book of the *Sentences* distinction 21 Giles does not distinguish Adam's rule *per naturam* – *per gratiam*. The tree of life, according to Giles, is not only a symbol but a vehicle for the decision to connect the soul to the body. Both are linked to Adam's and Eve's minds (*mens*), which, in Giles's words, for a long time were under the protection of their superior which is an allusion to God.³⁹⁹ Giles takes this example as the background to a short discussion of the superiority of the soul over the body, a concept he takes from Augustine. The reference to the term *mens* is unusual in the treatise. Giles habitually refers to the term *intellectus*, but does not give a clear definition of either concept in *De*

³⁹³ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, art. 102, pp. 618-20.

³⁹⁴ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.5, CSEL 28.1, p. 239, l. 1-2.

³⁹⁵ "An forte credere dubitabimus, per alicuius arboris cibum, cuiusdam altioris significationis gratia, homini Deum praestitisse ne corpus huius vel infirmitate vel aetate in deterius mutaretur, aut in occasum etiam laberetur", Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VIII.5, CSEL 28.1, p. 239, l. 4-7.

³⁹⁶ Vico, 'La dottrina', p. 239.

³⁹⁷ "voluit enim Deus quod et formaliter, et materialiter, possent se Adam et Eva, si non pecassent, in corporales preservare. Formaliter quidem ex originali iustitia. Materialiter vero, ex ligno vite", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 9-12.

³⁹⁸ E. Jager, *The Tempter's Voice. Language and Fall in Medieval Literature* (Ithaca, 1993), p. 64. See also Ambrose, *Letters*, 73.5 (PL 16: 1252).

³⁹⁹ "mens Ade vel Eve subdita erat suo superiori", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 13-4.

predestinatione which contributes to the lack of clarity in differentiating between the respective roles of the soul and the body. In both Augustine's and Giles's view, Adam's and Eve's souls are superior to their bodies, and their sensuality inferior to their faculty of reasoning. This argument ties in with the findings of the statement in the previous example that it is the body's senses that impede its faculty of directly seeing God, which is the condition imposed upon living human beings who are governed by the corporeal and therefore limited conditions of their existence.

The passage shows a conglomeration of varying attributes of both the corporeal and the incorporeal, which does not contribute to a clear argumentation, but to a confusion of both aspects. Giles only says that old age, decay or any other inequality could not touch it and that its sensuality was subject to reason and nothing allowed it to be subject to any predicament.⁴⁰⁰ The passage is an indirect description of the conditions of the terrestrial paradise before Adam and Eve's expulsion from it: the soul and the body formed a union in which the spiritual totally dominated the corporeal.⁴⁰¹ Consequently the predominant characteristic of life in the terrestrial paradise did not depend upon the shortcomings of the body, which ultimately would have been responsible for ending the existence in paradise. Giles emphasises this by the hypothetical case that had not Adam sinned he would have been able to perpetuate himself formally by original justice (his body being subject to his soul) and materially by eating the fruit of the tree of life. This is contradicted by the fact that man cannot and does not perpetuate himself. At this point the argument departs from the characteristics of the terrestrial paradise and compares it with the conditions of living human beings. It shows the progression from the terrestrial to the celestial paradise. Giles's explanation for this draws on the difference between the corporeal and the incorporeal: the reason for man's failure to perpetuate himself is to be found in the impurity of his nourishment, which is instrumental in his downfall (*deperditio deperditi*).⁴⁰² In addition to the first example which centred on the place from which humankind began its journey towards the divine the second example stresses the concomitant conditions that accompany it. The conglomerate of the physical and spiritual existence of humankind in the terrestrial

⁴⁰⁰ "corpus [...] nec cogitur per senectutem, vel per morbum, vel per quamcumque inequalitatem corporis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 17-22.

⁴⁰¹ On the mechanism of original justice and body/soul see Vico, 'La dottrina della giustizia', pp. 240-5. On the conflict between nature and the supernatural gift of justice see G.J. McAleer, 'Sensuality: An Avenue into the Political and Metaphysical Thought of Giles of Rome', in *Gregorianum* 82,1 (2001), pp. 129-47, esp. pp. 131-2.

paradise nonetheless needed nourishment, which the tree of life provided. Once Adam and Eve had had to leave paradise, they were physically unable to eat from the tree of life, which had provided them with the pure knowledge of God and its ensuing protection from any physical decay and degradation.⁴⁰³ The divide between the human and the divine sphere entailed that nourishment no longer provided both the corporeal and spiritual link between God and his creation, and became exclusively corporeal. Detailed analysis of this passage shows that Giles's argument constantly switches between the concept of the terrestrial (corporeal) sphere and mankind's hope for a celestial paradise. He contrasts the conditions for mankind before and after leaving paradise and emphasises that paradise in the literal sense refers to the terrestrial paradise at the beginning of Creation, rather than to the celestial paradise after the Second Coming. The predominantly physical character of the nourishment by the tree is emphasised in the reference to the act of eating and its immediate effects of providing the necessary prerequisite for a healthy body. Nonetheless, both Giles and Augustine refrain from the notion of man's immortality in the context of the terrestrial paradise and only refer to the (conditional) perpetuity of mankind's perpetual good health.

Taking the concept of the tree of life to the level of the moral sense, it signifies charity: just as Adam was physically nourished by it to escape death, so charity spiritually sustains the soul to protect it from its spiritual death.⁴⁰⁴ In this sense the fruit of the tree of life is the living works of charity, since works done without charity are dead. This interpretation reflects common orthodox teaching: although Giles does not openly acknowledge it, his argument is closely linked to Augustine's notion of *caritas* encompassing his doctrine of Redemption, the so-called 'rule of charity'.⁴⁰⁵ The progression in the argument is consistent: the insufficient physical nourishment of the body has to be complemented by the spiritual nourishment provided by good works. Compared to the first example, where they formed one of the necessary conditions for

⁴⁰² Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 29.

⁴⁰³ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 30-1.

⁴⁰⁴ "lignum vite: quod potest dici caritas, nam sicut illud lignum vite corporale refecisset Adam, ut potuisset per illud se preservare a morte, sic caritas refecit spiritualiter animam ut possit spiritualiter per eam preservare a morte", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{va}, l. 48-53.

⁴⁰⁵ Jager, *The Tempter's Voice*, pp. 6, 12. See also D.W. Robertson, 'The Doctrine of Charity in Medieval Literary Gardens: A Topical Approach through Symbolism and Allegory', *Speculum* 26 (1951), pp. 24-49, esp. p. 24, and Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* III.VI.10, CCSL 32, pp. 83-4; III.X.14, CCSL 32, p. 86.

salvation, Giles here takes good works as the central aspect of his definition of the way towards salvation.

In the allegorical sense, the tree of life signifies Christ as the virtue and wisdom of God.⁴⁰⁶ The idea stems from Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX.12, a quotation Giles does not explicitly acknowledge.⁴⁰⁷ Then, openly following Augustine's *De civitate Dei* XIII.20, Giles explains that the tree of life not only serves as a nourishment God provides in paradise, but is also a mystery (*sacramentum*) which comprises the tree of life, the books of life, wisdom, and virtue contained in Christ.⁴⁰⁸ Phrased differently, Christ is the Word and the Wisdom of the Father, who neither increases nor decreases.⁴⁰⁹ This quotation of Augustine's *De trinitate* is inspired by a passage of the *Acts of the Apostles* 6.8. In this paragraph, Giles primarily refers to the beginning to the Gospel of St John, and also alludes to the Trinity, but without any reference to the Spirit. It is the only passage in *De predestinatione* that explicitly refers to Trinitarian theology.⁴¹⁰ Giles also implicitly draws upon Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, where Augustine refers to the significance of the *Verbum* in the post-lapsarian world. There, the divine Word, the absolute truth, is concealed from the human mind through human words (*verba*).⁴¹¹

Giles's anagogical interpretation takes the aspect of the nourishment that is necessary for salvation to the level of the divine.⁴¹² His choice of both Augustinian and Scriptural references emphasises the well-established character of his findings. It also shows the logical progression of his argument, which explains that nourishment in the divine realm is provided by divine language (the Word), complemented by the less well defined entity of *virtus*. It is a term Giles extensively uses in his interpretation of the characteristics of the soul in hell, which enables the soul's movements and actions. In both instances Giles does not define *virtus*, except in distinguishing it from the

⁴⁰⁶ "Nam lignum vite est ipse Christus qui est Dei virtus et Dei sapientia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{ra}, l. 39-41.

⁴⁰⁷ Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX.12, CSEL 91, p. 132, l. 20-1.

⁴⁰⁸ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{ra}, l. 46. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIII.20, CCSL 48, p. 403, l. 39-40.

⁴⁰⁹ "nichil accrescit vel decrescit divino verbo vel divine arti", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{rb}, l. 9-10. Augustine, *De trinitate* XV.11, CCSL 50.1, p. 487, l. 25-7.

⁴¹⁰ On Giles's teaching on the Trinity see C. Luna, 'Essenza divina e relazioni trinitarie nella critica di Egidio Romano a Tommaso Aquino', *Medioevo* 14 (1988), pp. 3-69.

⁴¹¹ Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, II.XXI.32, CSEL 91, pp. 154-6.

⁴¹² "ipsam sapientiam divinam in huiusmodi paradyso dicit esse lignum vite", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 20-1.

corporeal sphere.⁴¹³ He adds an example to expand his argument: the distinction between wine and non-wine in its quality of liquidity is an image that illustrates that wine has a principle of life within it, since it constantly lives in ever fresh ways. This is linked to Christ carrying the qualities of the tree of life, which is wisdom.⁴¹⁴ In this sense, according to Giles, Christ is not only the wisdom of the Father but also his *virtus* and his arm, and it is through Christ, signifying the tree of life, that mankind turns into the children of Christ in the Church. The term *virtus* stems from Giles's interpretation of the act of knowledge and designates an ability. This indicates that Giles presupposes the knowledge of his commentary on the soul, especially book three, which he quotes in the third section of *De predestinatione*.⁴¹⁵ It is an aspect that again prompts the question for which audience Giles intended this treatise.⁴¹⁶ A brief reference in chapter seven to the intellect emphasises the absence of the distinction between the corporeal and the spiritual in the divine sphere. Giles explains that his interpretation of the tree of life is based upon the action of the intellect, because it determines life.⁴¹⁷ In *De predestinatione* he omits to link the intellect to either the body or the soul, and the reference in conjunction with the anagogical interpretation of the tree of life would allow the concept to be linked to both body and soul.⁴¹⁸ This also indicates that Giles presupposes a familiarity of the reader with his discourse on the intellect, or indeed that he was prepared for further explanations in the case of the use of *De predestinatione* as a teaching tool. Interestingly, Giles makes no reference here to his treatise *De plurificatione intellectus possibilis* which extensively treats the question also in conjunction with Averroes' and Thomas' views on the matter. There Giles explains that the intellect is immaterial, in Olszewski's words "for it is not reduced from the potentiality of matter with respect to essence, however, it multiplies according to the

⁴¹³ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{ra}, l. 53- fol.40^{va}, l. 19; XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{va}, l. 26; 58, fol. 41^{rb}, l. 13.

⁴¹⁴ "vinum distinguitur a non vino, quia vinum habet in seipso principium, unde se moveat", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{rb}, l. 16-8.

⁴¹⁵ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{vb}, l. 52.

⁴¹⁶ See A.D. Conti, 'Intelletto ed astrazione nella teoria della conoscenza di Egidio Romano', *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico italiano per il medio evo e archivio Muratoriano* 95 (1989), pp. 123-64, esp. p. 145.

⁴¹⁷ "non esset nisi actio intellectus diceretur vita", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{rb}, l. 23-4.

⁴¹⁸ This brief reference to the *intellectus* places Giles's work in the context of the late thirteenth century scholastic debate on the characteristics and definition of the intellect. It is a philosophical concept Giles treats in its different aspects in his *Quodlibets*, for example in I.17, II.22, III.13,14, V.8 and VI.24, but that he does not expand in the context of a theological and doctrinal exposition. See Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* (Venice, 1504).

number of men since it is reduced from the potentiality of matter with respect to disposition".⁴¹⁹

Giles's reference to the intellect reflects the link to body and soul: it is responsible for human actions, in paradise as well as in the fallen world. Elsewhere and much later than *De predestinatione* Giles defines the relationship between the soul and the body: the soul is a spiritual substance joined to a corporeal substance and both are different in essence.⁴²⁰ Its allegorical significance in what ought to be believed is the divine truth, which only exists in two spheres: in the terrestrial paradise (before the loss of paradise) and in the celestial paradise (after the Second Coming). The anagogical interpretation of the tree of life is an expansion of the allegorical: the tree signifies Christ in both the present Church and the celestial homeland.⁴²¹ Giles sees the tree of life as the Church (a mother) and a foundation of all that is blessed as well as of the wisdom of Christ (God) as the holy of holies.⁴²² In this section, Giles attempts to combine his philosophical understanding of the intellect with the orthodox theological understanding of Christ's significance and the reading of the tree of life as *sapientia*.⁴²³

The emphasis of the second section lies in the various and changing aspects of nourishment, which takes on different roles in the corporeal and the spiritual spheres. It serves to show the progress from the terrestrial paradise to the divine, and yet fails to define the precise limits of the corporeal and the incorporeal. Also, Giles's rhetoric in this last section gives the impression that his text consists of a compilation of notes rather than of a reflected, carefully constructed argument.

⁴¹⁹ M. Olszewski, 'De plurificatione intellectus possibilis. Two Historical Questions', *Studia Mediewistyczne* 32 (1997), pp. 123-35, esp. p. 126.

⁴²⁰ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 32, q. 2, a. 3, p. 479; q. 24, q. 2, a. 1, pp. 281-3. See G.J. McAleer, 'Sensuality', pp. 143-4.

⁴²¹ "lignum vite in presenti ecclesia, et in celesti patria", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 17-8.

⁴²² "lignum vite, ipsa bonorum omnium mater, et sapientia, sive ipse Christum sanctum sanctorum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 23-4.

⁴²³ This is taken from Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*. There, Augustine explains that the soul sees itself in the centre of the ordered *res*, where it has the command over the body and knows that God's *natura* is above. "Lignum autem vitae plantatum in medio paradisi, sapientiam illam significat, qua oportet ut intelligat anima, in meditullio quodam rerum se esse ordinatam, ut quamvis subiectam sibi habeat omnem naturam corpoream, supra se tamen esse intelligat naturam Dei", Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.IX.12, CSEL 91, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}.

3.6 The *exemplum* of the Tree of the Knowledge

The third example presents the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. According to Giles, this is not evil in itself.⁴²⁴ This must be so: the act itself is not intrinsically evil, because God could use this tree, but, of course, humans ought not: God does take innocent human life but humans must not. If this were not the case, the fact of God actively creating evil would have to be addressed, which is a potentially heretical position. This view concurs with that of Augustine who, in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.6. says that he is strongly attracted to the opinion that this tree did not produce harmful fruit; Giles paraphrases large parts of the Augustinian text.⁴²⁵ It is an opinion that Augustine takes from Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum*.⁴²⁶ God warns Adam not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, which is the only ban that he issues to humanity in paradise.⁴²⁷ Judging by the sequence of the narrative in Genesis 2, God announces this precept to Adam before He creates Eve, an order that Giles reflects on in his conclusion. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil contains the potentiality of mankind's future transgression of God's order. Human beings will grasp and learn by their own experience what constitutes the difference between the good of obedience (*obedientie bonum*) and the bad of disobedience (*inobedientie malum*).⁴²⁸ The transgression happens physically: the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is a corporeal occurrence, and therefore paradise has corporeal qualities. In order to emphasise this physical aspect Giles concludes with a passage from Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, saying that this is as visible, and therefore corporeal, as other trees.⁴²⁹

Giles's reading of the moral sense of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is taken entirely from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.6. His interpretation is

⁴²⁴ "non quod illa arbor de se mala esset", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 38-9.

⁴²⁵ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.6, CSEL 28.1, p. 239, l. 15-25.

⁴²⁶ Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autolyicum* 2.25: A. di Pauli (ed.), *Des Theophilus von Antiochien Drei Buecher an Autolykus. Hermias' des Philosophen Verspottung der nichtchristlichen Philosophen [u.a.]*, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, Reihe 1, vol. 14; *Fruehchristliche Apologeten und Maertyrerakten*, vol. 2 (Kempten, 1913), pp. 55-6.

⁴²⁷ "dicens de omni ligno paradisi comede de ligno autem scientiae boni et mali ne comedas in quocumque enim die comederis ex eo morte morieris", Gen. 2.16-17 (Vulgate).

⁴²⁸ "in qua homo per experimentum didicit, quid interesset inter obedientem hominem et in obedientem malum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 43-5.

⁴²⁹ "hoc lignum et erat quod visibile ac corporale, sicut et arbores cetera", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 33^{ra}, l. 33-4. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.6, CSEL 28.1, pp. 239-40.

therefore congruent with Augustine's, stating that the tree as such is not evil.⁴³⁰

However, tasting from its fruit, thereby openly disobeying God's explicit order not to eat from it, is defined by both Giles and Augustine as *transgressio*, an evil act.⁴³¹ As a consequence of their inobedience, Adam and Eve experience a serious diminution of the capacity for freedom – to be able to distinguish between good (obedience) and evil (disobedience) does not constitute greater freedom – since they now perceive concupiscence.

Giles's allegorical reading of the tree is rather short and states that in the Church it represents the transgression of an order: the tree signifies God's order, and its fruit the transgression of that same order.⁴³² This interpretation closely follows the moral interpretation of paradise and is a direct quotation from Augustine's *De civitate Dei* XIII.21.⁴³³ The similarity of both arguments rests upon the principle that the holy soul (paradise in the moral sense) and the present Church (paradise in the allegorical sense) only differ in number: the soul is the individual and the Church the collective expression of the same meaning. In the anagogical sense the tree indicates the *speculatio*, the contemplation and vision the saints have of good and evil.⁴³⁴ Since the saints, once they have attained their state, lose the memory of evil (their sins and punishments), there arises the question of the intellect and full cognition. Rather than a racing, active memory, God protects the saints from evil thoughts and memories, and they remain grateful to God for being protected from them. Eating from the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in the case of an ordinary human being constitutes a sin and allows for the awareness of good but also implicitly of evil. In contrast to this, the saints do not commit a sin when they eat of this fruit, because the good immediately manifests itself to them and shows them the difference between the state of goodness they enjoy and the misery they avoid. In both cases their action is governed by God's grace, which they act upon, leading to their glory.⁴³⁵ This passage is one of the few references to the

⁴³⁰ "non quod illa arbor de se mala esset", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 38-9. Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.6, CSEL 28.1, p. 239, l. 15-25.

⁴³¹ "in illa [arbor] erat precepti futura transgressio", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 32^{vb}, l. 42-3. Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.6, CSEL 28.1, p. 239, l. 15-25.

⁴³² "Arbor autem scientie boni et mali in ecclesia est transgressi mandati experimentum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{rb}, l. 40-2.

⁴³³ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XIII.21, CCSL 48, p. 404, l. 19-20.

⁴³⁴ "Lignum autem scientie boni et mali, cognitio speculativa, quam habent sancti de bonis, et malis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 24-6.

⁴³⁵ "gustare de arbore boni et mali, quia gustando tamen bonum manifeste, sciunt quid interest inter bonitudinem quam habent, et miseriam quam evaserunt, ut utroque modo agant gratias creatori, et quia

conditions of existence in the celestial paradise. Its interpretation is difficult, mainly because of the reference to a form of nourishment which belonged to the terrestrial paradise.

Although Giles's aim is to confirm his statements with a quotation from Augustine, saying that the blessed are liberated from sins and evil and imbued with goodness, lacking nothing in the delectation of eternal joy, this contradicts the previous description. Augustine implies that the vision of God is sufficient nourishment for the blessed, who no longer need to eat from the fruit of the tree of life. Giles's view is different in emphasising the corporeal quality of the celestial paradise, thereby partly contradicting his earlier statement that its predominant characteristic surpasses the human categories of corporeal and incorporeal. Giles explains that the blessed retain the rational knowledge of their sins, but have no sensible recollection of them. Here Giles refers to the importance of the (corporeal) senses in the case of human beings and the changes they sustain when transferred to a higher and divine level. At the divine level corporeality is replaced by a different system of perception. It is a view that does not match his previous description of the saints' nourishment. Giles refrains, however, from a prolonged enquiry into this matter, which might have resolved some of the argument's contradictions, as well as from a discussion of the Augustinian concept of free will. Seen in conjunction with Giles's discourse on predestination and free will this is remarkable, especially since Giles follows Augustine's judgement that the blessed are unable to sin.

In comparison to Augustine's treatment of the question of eternal felicity in the last chapter of *De civitate Dei*, Giles's treatment is brief and summary. He does not mention Augustine's solution to this apparent paradox. He explains that the blessed are the freer because they are freed from sin and are immovably fixed in the delight of not sinning. Augustine shows that this kind of free will is more powerful than that of a mortal human being, because it is a gift from God.⁴³⁶ Giles's argument in this section

tantam evaserunt miseriam, et quia tantam adepti sunt gloriam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 33-8.

⁴³⁶ "Nec ideo liberum arbitrium non habebunt, quia peccata eos delectare non poterunt. Magis quippe erit liberum, a delectatione peccandi usque ad delectationem non peccandi indeclinabilem liberatum [...] Servandi autem gradus erant divini muneris, ut primum daretur liberum arbitrium, quo non peccare posset

remains fragmented and does not evolve into a coherent set of definitions, especially of the conditions of existence in the celestial paradise. Interestingly, Giles does not draw upon any of the visionary texts which describe paradise after the Second Coming; his main frame of reference is Augustine, whose main field of enquiry is the terrestrial paradise.

3.7 The *exemplum* of the Four Rivers of Paradise

The fourth section analyses the river of paradise, which is divided into four streams, and which is mentioned in Genesis 2.10-14.⁴³⁷ In his description of paradise as a most pleasant place in which God placed man Giles quotes John of Damascus.⁴³⁸ The classic description by John of Damascus elaborates on the text of Genesis where the only particular characteristics of paradise appear in connection with the immediate surroundings of one of the four streams. One of these tributaries, Phison, encircles the land of Havilah that contains gold and gemstones.⁴³⁹ Neither the main stream nor one of the other three rivers offers any further physical depiction of paradise. Giles has nothing to add to the account given by John of Damascus, whose sources are the Apocalypse of St John and various other apocalyptic texts, such as the apocryphal Apocalypse of Peter and the *Vision of Paul*. Giles's conclusion rests upon the physical and corporeal character of the names that are given to the four streams, which he quotes from *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.7.⁴⁴⁰ Again, this is a hidden reference to Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* where Augustine identifies the river Phison as the Ganges, and the river Geon as the Nile. He also recognises that the regions through which they flow physically exist, since they form part of Arabia, Africa and India, and are well known,

homo; novissimum, quo peccare non posset: atque illud ad comparandum meritum, hoc ad recipiendum praemium pertineret", Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXII.30, CCSL 48, pp. 863-4, l. 49-52, 59-63.

⁴³⁷ "fluvijs egrediebatur de loco voluptatis ad irrigandum paradisum qui inde dividitur in quattuor capita [...] Phison [...] Geon [...] Tigris [...] Euphrates", Gen. 2.10-14.

⁴³⁸ "est divisus paradysus, Dei manibus in Eden plantatus, gaudium et exultationis universae promptuarium. Eden enim 'voluptas' interpretatur. In oriente quidem omni terra excelsior positus, temperato vero et tenuissimo et purissimo aere circumfulgens; plantis semper floridis comatus, et bono odore plenus, lumine repletus, pulchritudinis universae et horae sensibilis superexcedens intelligentiam; divina vere regio, et digna eius qui secundum imaginem erat Dei conversatio", John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa*, 25.1 = 2.11, p. 108.

⁴³⁹ "Phison ipse est qui circuit omnem terram Evilat ubi nascitur aurum et austrum terrae illius optimum est ibi invenitur bdellium et lapis onychinus", Gen. 2.11-12 (Vulgate). This is possibly the basis of Bernini's Roman fountain "Four Rivers".

⁴⁴⁰ "[paradysus] corporale et sensibile, quia ut ait nomina illorum fluviorum, in qua dividitur fons paradysi, videlicet Phison, Gyon, Tigris et Euphrates", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 33^{ra}, l. 38-40. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.7, CSEL 28.1, pp. 240-1, l. 23-5, 1-7.

partly because of their notorious inhabitants.⁴⁴¹ This description also appears in Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which is a likely source for Giles, but there is also a strong possibility that he took it directly from *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, a text he frequently although implicitly refers to in the second section of the treatise. Giles makes no reference to his commentary on *II Sentences*, where in distinction 18, dub. III lat. he discusses the names, origin, and destination of the four rivers.⁴⁴²

In contrast to his treatment of the question of paradise in the second book on the *Sentences*, Giles refrains here from entering into an extensive discussion of the geography of paradise, such as the question whether the limits of paradise touch the lunar circle.⁴⁴³ In comparison with the scientific passages of chapters one and two of the treatise, the omission of a discussion of the position of paradise (both the terrestrial and the celestial) is curious. Giles's argumentation in the other sections does not refrain from a scientific discourse, and the section on paradise might have been considerably improved by such an enquiry. In chapter two Giles refers to the system of stars; in chapter three he discusses the implications of the Boethian concept of time. Giles makes no allusion to his extensive interpretation of time in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (IV.10-14), and in particular refrains from a precise definition of celestial time.⁴⁴⁴ In combining both aspects his explanation of paradise could have solved a number of questions that remain unanswered: what is the notion of time in paradise and does it change after the Second Coming? What are the 'geographical' locations of paradise and hell in relation to the human world? Can paradise be defined as a (corporeal) place? Giles's allusion to a paradise that transcends all limited human concepts as something that is more excellent than those is only partially satisfying. Giles also omits any reference to previous (unnamed) authors who had attempted to locate paradise on earth and to include it in maps of the world; these have yet to be identified.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴¹ "Dicitur autem Phison ipse est Ganges, Geon autem Nilus", Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, II.X.13, CSEL 91, p. 134, l. 6-7; "illa flumina non sunt figurate dicta cum et in regionibus per quas fluunt ut ait notissima fuit sicut et omnibus fere gentibus diffamata", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 33^{ra}, l. 41-4. See G. Westermann, *Genesis*, pp. 217-8. On pp. 214-5 he offers an extensive bibliography of paradise.

⁴⁴² Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 18, dub. III lat., pp. 61-2.

⁴⁴³ Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, d. 18, q. 1, art. 1, dub. IV lat., p. 61.

⁴⁴⁴ On these issues see C. Trifogli, 'La dottrina del tempo in Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* I,1 (1990), *Aegidiana* I, pp. 247-76.

⁴⁴⁵ "multi intromiserunt se de mappa mundi, et multi fuerunt historiographi narrantes gesta mundi", Giles of Rome, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 18, q. 1, art. 1 (Venice, 1581), p. 58.

Interestingly, Giles excludes the moral interpretation of the four rivers of paradise, which would have been part of chapter five of *De predestinatione*. It is the only instance in the analysis of the five examples where Giles does not follow his set frame of analysis. At no point in his argument does he give an explanation as to why he chose to leave out this section. None of the three manuscripts chosen for the working edition includes this section, and the question of whether it is a deliberate omission or a passage which is missing in the manuscripts can only be answered after an examination of other surviving copies of the treatise. Peter Lombard does not mention the four rivers in the moral sense, II. d. 17 only contains a brief reference to the *magnum fons fecundum*. This work also contains no reference to the Trinity and Mary as a possible reading of the four rivers.⁴⁴⁶

The allegorical reading of the four rivers is brief and consists of a single statement: the river signifies the evangelical doctrine of the Church, its division into four streams signifies the four Gospels that irrigate the Church.⁴⁴⁷ Again, Giles directly but implicitly takes his view from Augustine's *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*.⁴⁴⁸ It is a classic view in the medieval Church, closely linked to its preoccupation with the symbolism of numbers. Interestingly, Giles seems to avoid the kind of number analysis one finds in St Bonaventure. I have not been able to trace any such extensive analysis in Giles's works. Perhaps Giles omits such a detailed treatment because he does not favour the number metaphysics of someone like St Bonaventure and the Franciscans. It serves as an easily comprehensible *exemplum* to explain the mechanism of the distribution of God's precepts amongst the Church. Giles expands this explanation in his anagogical interpretation: it is the most detailed analysis of any of the previous interpretations of paradise. In Giles's view, the water from the river of paradise represents God's fertility with which he impregnates the soul.⁴⁴⁹ Both the river and God's fertility are divided into four streams, which indicate the four positions of strength of the soul, ready to receive

⁴⁴⁶ See Peter Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 15, c. 4; II. d. 19. See C. Luna, 'Essenza' on Giles's trinitarian interpretations.

⁴⁴⁷ "Fons autem qui dividebatur in quatuor capita significat in ecclesia doctrinam evangelicam, que dividitur in quatuor evangelia per quam doctrinam irrigatur tota ecclesia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{va}, l. 2-5.

⁴⁴⁸ Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.XXIV.37, CSEL 91, p. 162, l. 37.

⁴⁴⁹ "uberitas Dei a qua tota inebriatur anima", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 49.

the (four) virtues with the help of the intellect and the irascible and concupiscent will.⁴⁵⁰ Giles implicitly refers here to his discussion of the soul's characteristics, which he examined at length in his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*. It is also a reference to his enquiry into the capacities of the intellect, which, as seen above, frequently appears in his *Quodlibets*.⁴⁵¹ Giles merges this aspect with Augustine's symbolical interpretation as the life of the blessed, saying that the four streams of paradise represent the four cardinal virtues: prudence, courage, temperance and justice. Augustine is not the first author to refer to these as cardinal virtues: Ambrose, in his *De paradiso*, associates each of the four rivers with one cardinal virtue.⁴⁵² The reference in *De predestinatione* refers to a short passage in *De civitate Dei* 13.22 where Augustine briefly justifies the validity of the spiritual interpretation of paradise and sums up the interpretation of the four rivers as the four Gospels and the four cardinal virtues. A more elaborate Augustinian reference is to be found in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.X.13-14, but Giles does not quote it as such.⁴⁵³ It is less surprising that he should not quote Philo either, whom he probably would not have read, whose *Questions and Answers on Genesis* is one of the first texts to establish a link between the four rivers and the four cardinal virtues.⁴⁵⁴ The link between the virtues and the soul's powers is well-established in late thirteenth-century philosophy and extensively treated. The fundamental differences of interpretation stem from the question whether the powers of the soul are separate entities (*res*) or not: this is at the centre of the debate on monopsychism. Giles discusses this issue at several instances in his works: his *Quodlibets*, the commentary on the second and third book of the *Sentences* and *De regimine principum*.⁴⁵⁵ This recurrent

⁴⁵⁰ "fontem et hanc uberitatem dividi in quatuor capita, idest, in quatuor perfectiones virium anime susceptivarum virtutum, cuius sunt intellectus, voluntas irascibilis et concupiscibilis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{ra}, l. 50-3.

⁴⁵¹ Giles of Rome, *De anima* III, fols. 60^{va}-84^{rb}, esp. fols. 65^{rb}-68^{ra}; *Quodlibet* VI, q. 2 (fol. 78^{vb}-79^{va}, q. 13 (fol. 87^{vb}-88^{va}); III, q. 10 (fol. 36^{rb}-37^{rb}).

⁴⁵² "hic fons qui irrigat paradysum, hoc est, virtutes animae [...] Phison igitur prudentia est [...] Geon [est] temperantiae [...] Tigris est [...] fortitudo [...] Euphrates [est] iustitia", Ambrose, *De paradiso*, 2.13-18. On the cardinal virtues see A. Michel, 'vertu', *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 15.2 (Paris, 1947-50), col. 2739-99.

⁴⁵³ Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.X.13-4, CSEL 91, pp. 133-5.

⁴⁵⁴ Philo, *Questions and Answers on Genesis* 1.12, R. Marcus (ed.), The Loeb Classical Library, *Philo*, Supplement I (London, 1961), pp. 7-8.

⁴⁵⁵ J.J. Murphy, 'The scholastic condemnation of rhetoric in the commentary of Giles of Rome on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle', in: *Arts libéraux et philosophie au Moyen Âge. Actes du 4^e congrès international de philosophie médiévale, Université de Montréal, Canada, 27.8-2.9.1967* (Montreal-Paris, 1969), pp. 833-41, esp. p. 838; M. Grabmann, *Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung. Mitteilungen aus ungedruckten Ethikkomentaren*, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1931, Heft 2 (Munich, 1931), pp. 1-86, esp. p. 7; J. Koch, 'Das Gutachten des Aegidius Romanus über die Lehren des Petrus Johannes Olivi. Eine neue Quelle zum Konzil von Vienne (1311-1312)', in: *Scientia Sacra*.

theme in Giles's writings is discussed under varying aspects: political, philosophical and theological. *De predestinatione* is the only instance in which Giles combines the philosophical definition of the soul's powers with the concept of the four rivers of paradise. This is an interesting aspect and raises the question why. Does this pose the general issue of to what extent Giles was a biblical theologian? Giles seems to have been less concerned with biblical exegesis than Thomas for example, who wrote large commentaries on Scripture.

Giles adapts Augustine's interpretation to the allegorical and anagogical meanings of paradise as the present and the triumphant Church. The difference between the two lies in the degree of accomplishment the virtues attain: they are more perfect in the triumphant Church, but not in the present Church, which is still a part of the human world and fighting for souls.⁴⁵⁶ Giles continues his argument with Augustine's recollection of Marcus Varro's *De philosophia*, where Varro discusses four virtues that mankind desires naturally, without exterior influence. Augustine assumes these to be learned, which is a reference to a widely debated issue, taken up amongst others by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics.⁴⁵⁷ Giles, quoting Augustine, names these virtues that constitute mankind's beatitude as the wholeness, the health and the sound condition of the organism, which together form the primary natural blessings. Augustine adds to this docility, in respect of the body's first nature, and perspicacity, in respect of the first nature of the soul, and continues with a different numbering system for these virtues. Giles, on the other hand, adds enjoyment and quietness, as well as complacency, to the primary natural blessings.⁴⁵⁸ In his view, this division presents two virtues that are *res* and two that are their conditions; the argument, however, lacks any further

Theologische Festgabe zugeeignet Seiner Eminenz dem hochwürdigsten Herrn Karl Joseph Kardinal Schulz, Erzbischof von Köln zum 25. Jahrestage der Bischofsweihe 19.3.1935 (Cologne-Düsseldorf, 1935), pp. 142-68, esp. p. 165 (article 22); C. Marmo, 'Hoc autem etsi potest tollerari... Egidio Romano e Tommaso d'Aquino sulle passioni dell'anima', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* II,1 (1991), pp. 281-315; A.D. Conti, 'Intelletto ed astrazione'.

⁴⁵⁶ "Prout vero considerantur sub esse non sic perfectio, figurantur per eundem fontem sic quadrifarie divisum, et hoc in ecclesia militante, vel possumus dicere quod tota nostra beatitudo consistit in quatuor, quae diversi modo assignari possunt", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{rb}, l. 10-4.

⁴⁵⁷ "Quod ut breviter ostendam, inde oportet incipiam, quod ipse advertit et posuit in libro memorato, quattuor esse quaedam, quae homines sine magistro, sine ullo doctrinae adminiculo, sine industria vel arte vivendi, quae virtus dicitur et procul dubio discitur, velut naturaliter appetunt, aut voluptatem", Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, 19.1. See Plato, *Meno*, 86ff., Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a1-1103b2.

⁴⁵⁸ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{rb}, l. 18-20.

explanation.⁴⁵⁹ Giles's initial exposition of the four virtues of beatitude is not very clear and partly confusing because it lacks his reasoning for his final choice. According to his subsequent discourse, these are the intellect, the will, tranquility and security, which are not congruent with those presented in the first part of the argument.

Giles continues with a discussion of each of these virtues and states that no beatitude is possible without these four virtues. The intellect causes the cognition of the Word, without which mankind cannot achieve the state of the blessed. The will is responsible for the fruition and the adoption of the good, and tranquility and security, the conditions for both the intellect and the will, provide the *habitus*, the Aristotelian notion of the necessary exterior circumstances.⁴⁶⁰ Beatitude requires that cognition exists, because if it were assumed that once beatitude is reached, this would entail the end of the will. This, in turn, would render the grasp of truth and goodness impossible, because the will no longer enables the human being actively to turn to God. The cognition of the truth and the adoption of the good are an essential part of beatitude, and without them beatitude would not exist, nor would a human being merit being called blessed. Equally, tranquility is indispensable for enjoying the fruits of the good, and a human being constantly hurt by mishaps and calamity cannot enjoy beatitude. Security is necessary to keep the human being from the fear of in time lapsing from the state of blessedness and losing his happiness. In addition to these requirements, mankind needs the persevering and continuous certitude of enjoying God (*fruitio Dei*) in order to reach beatitude. In this context Giles again refers to Augustine, who, in *De civitate Dei* XI.12, compares the blessedness of the just before their reward with the primal happiness before the Fall. The first human beings were in a state of happiness, but might not have had the assurance (security, see above) of how long this would last: this might prevent an unailing desire of mankind to persevere in good actions.⁴⁶¹ According to Giles, the

⁴⁵⁹ "quod hoc sunt quatuor quarum duo sunt res, et duo sunt conditiones rerum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{rb}, l. 27-8.

⁴⁶⁰ "cognitio veri que pertinet ad intellectum, et fruitio, et adoptio boni que pertinet ad voluntatem; dicunt quid rei tranquillitas et securitas, magis dicunt modos rerum habitare, qualitercumque tamen se habeant", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{rb}, l. 30-4. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 2.1, 1103 a 1-25: "moral excellence comes about as a result of habit".

⁴⁶¹ "Quis enim primos illos homines in paradiso negare audeat beatos fuisse ante peccatum, quamvis sua beatitudo quam diuturna vel utrum aeterna esset incertos (esset autem aeterna nisi peccassent), cum hodie non impudentur beatos vocemus, quos videmus iuste ac pie cum spe futurae immortalitatis hanc vitam ducere sine crimine vastante conscientiam, facile inpetrantes peccatis huius infirmitatis divinam misericordiam. Qui licet de suae perseverantiae praemio certi sint, de ipsa tamen perseverantia sua reperiuntur incerti. Quis enim hominum se in actione propectuque iustitiae perseveraturam usque in finem

correct proposition of the intellectual nature demands that mankind is impregnated by God's unchangeable goodness, without interference from any difficulty. This would enable mankind to be eternally free from any disturbing doubts and deception through errors and mistakes. In the absence of the deception of any error, perfect cognition of truth is possible by the adoption of good through God who is the unchanging good.

Giles's choice to link the cardinal virtues to the soul's *virtus* can be seen as an attempt to give living human beings a guideline for how to attain salvation. This is a parallel to his guideline for the ideal prince: *De regimine principum* II.1.⁴⁶² In *De predestinatione* the aim is to show the issue on a far more general level which concerns every human being and its action and not only the exceptional case of a ruler. With the exception of his discussion of the soul's powers, it reinforces the impression that the second section of *De predestinatione* might have been intended as a sermon. To support the argument that Giles intended *De predestinatione* as an edition for students the text of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium* is useful: this was also a sermon publicly delivered. Giles's text would probably require a lot more polish, especially before a university audience, to have been used as such. In view of the impossibility of a precise definition of the existence of the blessed – or indeed of the divine – this is an alternative solution to give at least some indications of the conditions of salvation. Giles takes up Augustine's quotation of 1 Cor. 4.5, saying that in an eternal life of blessedness, God will be all in all, the end of man's desires, whom man will praise and love without end. This is a classic Scriptural reference and emphasises Giles's preoccupation in his analysis of paradise to detail the fundamental Church doctrine on this point. Giles's interpretation of the four rivers of paradise sees in them the abundance of beatitude that enable the restoration of the soul; the four virtues are linked to the intellect as well as the affect. The cognition of truth is associated with the intellect, whereas the adoption of the good is linked to the affect; peace and security are attached to both.

At this point Giles introduces the concept of the powers of the soul, and he implicitly refers here to Aristotle's *De anima* and his own commentary of this treatise,

sciat, nisi aliqua revelatione ab illo fiat certus, qui de hac re iusto latentique iudicio non omnes instruit, sed neminem fallit?", Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XI.12, CCSL 48, p. 333, l. 2-15.

⁴⁶² Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum* II.1 (Rome, 1556), fol. 26^v-28^v.

where he gives an account of Aristotle's five powers of the soul.⁴⁶³ Mankind's beatitude belongs to both the intellect and the affect, and since both express themselves through the intellective appetite (*appetitus intellectivus*). These are the nutritive, appetitive, sensory, locomotive and intellectual *potentie*. Underlying this argument is Giles's preoccupation with the distinction of the corporeal and the incorporeal in the different stages of human existence: the final destination for (good) human beings entails different conditions for the soul. In contrast to his discussion of the separated damned soul in hell (chapters eight to fourteen), Giles refrains in this passage from an extensive enquiry into this matter and contents himself with combining the five powers of the soul with the four cardinal virtues.⁴⁶⁴ He states that beatitude concerns all *potentie* of the soul, those which are sensitive and intellectual as well as those who are organic and non-organic. these four powers also possess the four cardinal virtues,⁴⁶⁵ and the virtues that are hinged upon them: prudence is linked to the intellect, justice to the will, fortitude to the irascible will and temperance to the concupiscent will.

Giles sees beatitude as more than just a supplementary virtue, and in the final part of this section attempts to argue that beatitude is an integral part of the four cardinal virtues, a position that Aquinas does not argue. It is the first reward of good works of charity given through grace, because it goes beyond the simple existence of unchangeable goodness and truth represented by God. Equally, the simple disturbance of sensitive and organic (the irascible and concupiscent) cannot affect the good, which is a Platonic, even more Stoic position. Consequently, it is both the intellect and the will which are susceptible to the highest degree of blessedness, just as the blessed soul is ready to be absorbed into God as his spouse, which is a very common reading. It is through all four powers of the soul that beatitude is first given to the whole soul and then by the soul to the whole body, on the (Augustinian) principle that the superior influences the inferior in matters of perfection. God's superiority to the powers of the human soul and his influence, felt as beatitude and happiness, supersedes the intellect and the will, softening conflicting desires of the soul and the body itself. Giles's final theological conclusion is that man's inner part (the soul), receives beatitude until it

⁴⁶³ "se extendit ad omnes potentias cause, tam sensitivas, tam organicas, quam non organicas", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{va}, l. 44-6. Giles of Rome, *De anima* III, fol. 60^{va}-88^{rb}, esp. fol. 65^{ra}-68^{ra}.

⁴⁶⁴ See O. Hieronimi, *Die allgemeine Passionenlehre bei Aegidius von Rom*, Doctoral dissertation (Bonn, 1929; Würzburg, 1934), esp. p. 9, following the generally accepted scheme in scholastic literature.

overflows into the exterior part (the body) where he will know the divinity of Christ together with the Father and the Holy Spirit.⁴⁶⁶

This section is the central passage of Giles's explanation of the soul's condition in the divine sphere. Taking the argument directly from the corporeal to the spiritual sphere, he omits to define the soul's progress on earth and solely concentrates on its existence in the terrestrial paradise. One possible explanation for the omission might be the previously analysed confusion in the relation between body and soul: in this way Giles avoids having to further discuss the matter. The fourth section finally establishes the relationship between the soul, the intellect and the will: although they are at different hierarchical levels, all are equally influenced by the state of beatitude. The discussion of the corporeal and the incorporeal reaches its temporary conclusion: the incorporeal, or rather a divine concept that is beyond both aspects is the superior and determining factor in the progression towards salvation. Ultimately, the distinction between both aspects ceases to exist, to be replaced by the divine that cannot be defined in human terms. The findings of the anagogical interpretation of the four rivers constitute Giles's indirect definition of the celestial paradise.

3.8 The *exemplum* of Mankind Put in Paradise

The fifth and final section analyses the passage of Genesis 2.15 which says that God put man in paradise to till and care for it. It is an example that Thomas Aquinas takes up in question 102 of the first part of the *Summa theologiae*.⁴⁶⁷ Like Giles he uses Scriptural quotation as well as Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* to endorse his argument, stating that before the Fall any work of Adam that had to do with agriculture was a pleasure rather than hard labour.⁴⁶⁸ The passage echoes Augustine in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.8.15, where he affirms that man was not condemned to labour before he

⁴⁶⁵ See J. Pieper, *The Four Cardinal Virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance* (Notre Dame, 1954).

⁴⁶⁶ "secundum utrasque potentias quasi de se delectatur in pascuis erit refectus perfectus, et plenius gaudio, vel ingreditur, quantum ad beatitudinem anime, et egrietur, prout illa beatitudo redundabit in corpus, et pascua inveniet, quia utroque modo delectabitur. Vel ingreditur, cognoscendo Christi deitatem, que est contrarius, et una, et eadem cum patre, et spiritu sancto, et egrietur videndo eius humanitatem; et pascua inveniet, quia utroque modo delectationem habebit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 35^{vb}, l. 43-52.

⁴⁶⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 102, art. III, pp. 621-2.

⁴⁶⁸ "ante peccatum fuisset agricultura ad delectationem non ad laborem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IV, Cambrai, fol. 33^{ra}, l. 6-7.

sinned, and that he was able to enjoy to a greater extent the cultivation of the land.⁴⁶⁹ Mankind's sinning meant that they lost paradise and were expelled from it, because no proper care was given to it; God's grace and his gift was disregarded. Consequently, everything that is related to agriculture after the Fall (Giles does not employ this term) is not pleasurable, the ground will not yield easily any more, and God's grace, whilst still being there, is no longer immediately apparent to man. God put his bounty into a second stage, which mankind only attains through hard work and a greater effort.

Giles's (and Thomas') literal interpretation concentrates on the terrestrial paradise and its loss, and its essential qualities are seen as corporeal. Giles's moral reading of this section links it to the sanctity of life and the joy of a good conscience, since God put a just man to till and care for paradise in goodness and sanctity.⁴⁷⁰ The principal argument of this section is twofold: God put man in paradise that he should not lose it by sinning, that is, by disobeying God's command not to eat of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Provided that man does not commit this sin, his activity of tilling and guarding paradise should not be considered as labour. The two-fold division comes from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.10 (in contrast to Giles, Thomas directly quotes this passage), but also from *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*. There he shows that man after the Fall is not only subject to physical, agricultural labour because of the nature of his corruptible body, but that he is also subject to constant intellectual efforts, because of the now indirect and difficult communication with God.⁴⁷¹ In Giles's view it was within mankind's capacity before the Fall to recognise the extent of God's gifts (*beneficia*) living in a most agreeable place, to experience an increasing love for God and not to commit sin. Humankind, however, chose to disobey God (to sin), thereby showing his ingratitude and his incapacity to guard his fellow human beings – a reference to Eve – and to do good and conduct a life in justice and sanctity. Giles is careful to point out that this is not God's fault.⁴⁷² This is another link to his previous

⁴⁶⁹ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.8, CSEL 28.1, p. 243, l. 4-5.

⁴⁷⁰ "ut homo custodiret sibi ipsi huiusmodi paradysum, ne per peccatum perderet illum", Giles of Rome IV, Cambrai, fol. 33^{ra}, l. 46-8.

⁴⁷¹ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.10, CSEL 28.1, p. 245, l. 15-24 "in hac vita maledictionem terrae suae in omnibus operibus suis habet", Augustine, *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* II.XX.30, CSEL 91, p. 153, l. 33. On language before and after the Fall see Jager, *The Tempter's Voice*, part one, pp. 23-145.

⁴⁷² "homo sic sit positus ut operetur et custodiat paradysum sibi ipsi, ne per peccatum amittat illum: sic homo positus est in paradyso bone conscientie, ut operando custodiat sibi huiusmodi paradysum, ne per peccatum amittat illum, idest, perdat huiusmodi sanctitatem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* V, Cambrai, fol. 33^{vb}, l. 27-31.

discourse on predestination: it is man who rejects the good of his own volition. Giles's concluding reading of the sanctity of life as the holy soul and the joy of a good conscience as signifying paradise is taken from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*.⁴⁷³

In the allegorical sense the Church (paradise) in this sense is a vineyard into which God placed two workers (Adam and Eve) to cultivate and tend it.⁴⁷⁴ Giles takes the image of Adam and Eve as gardeners from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.8.16, combining it with the text of Matthew 20, where the kingdom of heaven is compared with a householder who in the morning hires labourers to tend his vineyard.⁴⁷⁵ The image of the vineyard conveys the figurative meaning of God's word as a seed which produces fruit; the image of the paid labourers signifies the destiny of humanity, which, in case of committing a sin, does not get the recompense of eternal life. Similarly, a human being who commits sins is separated from the Church and cannot participate in its acts of devotion. Giles consequently concludes that God put man in paradise – the Church – to work and guard it for him, and man in turn is protected and justified by God.⁴⁷⁶ Taken one step further, the anagogical meaning sees paradise as eternal joy, and mankind therefore experiences only joy in tilling and guarding it.⁴⁷⁷ To explain the conditions in the celestial paradise Giles employs the following analogy. Just as the angels have the office of ministry to man on earth to guard him, they always enjoy the vision of God which cannot be interrupted by any works they perform, so too man in paradise is not interrupted in his enjoyment of beatitude by any work he performs. All these actions happen spiritually, since human beings are the children of God, whose divine affiliation begins in their life on earth.⁴⁷⁸ The fifth section describes the conditions of existence of the elect in the celestial paradise: the drawbacks of corporeal activities cease to exist (hard labour), and provided the choice of actively turning to God is carried through, the ultimate recompense is the unending vision of God.

⁴⁷³ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.10, p. 247, l. 10-24.

⁴⁷⁴ "vineam Dei, ad quam continue Deus suos operarios mittit, ut reddat singulis singulos denarios, et ut cuilibet reddat mercedem suam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{va}, l. 13-6.

⁴⁷⁵ "Simile est enim regnum caelorum homini patri familias qui exiit primo mane conducere operarios in vineam suam [...] cum sero autem factum esset dicit dominus vineae procuratori suo voca operarios et redde illis mercedem", Matthew, 20.1,8 (Vulgate).

⁴⁷⁶ "Deus operatur hominem ut sit homo et ut sit iustus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VI, Cambrai, fol. 34^{va}, l. 32-3. Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.10, CSEL 28.1, p. 247, l. 13-5.

⁴⁷⁷ "dicetur paradysus futura beatitudo", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{ra}, l. 27.

3.9 Conclusion

Giles concludes his analysis of paradise with a concise summary of his argument. Paradise is not only a corporeal place in the literal sense, the holy soul in the moral sense, and the Church in the allegorical sense, but finally it is – in the anagogical sense – mankind's future beatitude and celestial homeland, which is absolutely standard interpretation. Giles's careful argument accepts both the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of paradise, without clearly referring to or defining the difference between the terrestrial and the celestial paradise. The text only implicitly alludes to the nature of the divine, thereby acknowledging that it cannot be defined in human terms which can only describe it as something that is 'more excellent'. The subject of paradise did not form a part of the scholastic debates of the late thirteenth century; Giles adheres to this tradition and refrains from any further speculation on the matter. Consequently, this section of *De predestinatione* appears as a catalogue of the Church's (orthodox) teachings. Giles does not enter into any specific discussion of the soul's characteristics, nor does he explicitly define the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of paradise. Giles closely follows the interpretation of Augustine's commentaries on Genesis, a widely used classical reference in the Middle Ages. The overall structure of his argument is convincing, but there are a number of passages that remain obscure and convoluted; in some cases the reader has the impression that the different parts of the argument were put together rather hastily, without regard to the general cohesion of the whole treatise. Thus, Giles does not give explicit cross-references to his discourse on predestination and foreknowledge when he discusses paradise as the dwelling place of the elect, in particular with regard to the sections on the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The argument quite often presupposes prior knowledge of other works of Giles without which it is not easily accessible. Giles's audience might have been canonical (members of his own Order), but would certainly have needed complementary explanations and guidance.

In conclusion, Giles's exposition of paradise is substantially different from his treatment of either predestination or hell in style as well as in the internal coherence of

⁴⁷⁸ "paradysus [...] celestis patria, quia ille quinque que fuerunt in paradyso corporali, competentur adaptantur ad huiusmodi paradysum spirituale", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{ra}, l. 27-30.

his arguments. Giles refrains from cross-references to either section, and also frequently repeats himself which contributes to the impression that *De predestinatione* might not have been primarily addressed to an academic audience. Section two in particular gives this impression, especially because of its lack of any prolonged discussion of potentially contentious issues, and its enumeration of orthodox theological standpoints. Equally, the fact that the topic of paradise did not form part of the core subjects of discussion at the University of Paris – in contrast to some topics of the third section on hell – points towards a canonical audience, at least for this section. There are some very interesting themes in the third section of *De predestinatione*, which might indicate that parts of the text were just working notes, but then why would Giles publish them? In this sense, *De predestinatione* is a quite perplexing text.

4 Giles of Rome on Hell

4.1 Introduction

In the final part of *De predestinatione*, chapters eight to fifteen, Giles explores several questions related to hell. In the internal structure of the treatise they complement the second section on paradise in explaining the final destination of the damned.⁴⁷⁹ In contrast to the previous two sections the argument on hell is not presented in any particular or reasoned order and reverts to a style of rhetoric Giles used in the first section. The discourse is presented in dialectical form on a specific question that resolves into a doctrinal statement. The topics covered range from hell's corporeality to the extent of God's pity towards the damned, the mechanism of suffering in hell, purgatory and the question of eternal punishment. The variety of questions and the notable absence of a comprehensive structuring of the argument beg the question of Giles's reasoning for the overall composition of the treatise. The absence of an internal or explicit logic for his choice of topics makes it sometimes difficult to follow his discourse. Also, the position of chapter thirteen on the suffering of separated souls and demons seems to be arbitrary. The internal rationale of Giles's argument would suggest its occupying the position held by chapter ten on the extent of God's pity towards the damned.

Giles's enquiry into these various aspects of hell reflects the current debates in the late thirteenth century.⁴⁸⁰ Various factors indicate that *De predestinatione* was written after 1277, possibly between 1287-90: Giles is very careful in his argumentation and explicitly says in a number of places that a particular standpoint conforms to Church doctrine.⁴⁸¹ This is less an indication of Giles's exercise of caution in relation to Church authorities after the initial refusal of the *licentia docendi* in 1277 and his reinstatement at the University of Paris in 1285. Rather, it shows that Giles conceived of *De*

⁴⁷⁹ As Giles puts it: "ad maiorem elucidationem [...] miserie dampnatorum", *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{rb}, l. 24-5.

⁴⁸⁰ See article 219 of the condemnations of 7 March 1277, in which Giles was not directly implicated: R. Hissette, *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris en 1277*, Philosophes Médiévaux, vol. 22 (Louvain, 1977), p. 311. See R. Wielockx, *Apologia*, Aegidii Romani Opera Omnia, vol. III.1 (Florence, 1985), pp. 49-59, for a list of Giles's condemned articles. See A. Bernstein, 'The Invocation of Hell in Thirteenth-Century Paris', in J. Hankins, J. Monfasani, F. Purnell (ed.), *Supplementum Festivum. Studies in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller*, Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, vol. 49 (New York, 1987), pp. 13-55, esp. p. 17.

⁴⁸¹ See C. Luna, 'La lecture de Gilles sur le 4^e livre des *sentences*. Les extraits du Clm 8005', *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 57 (1990), pp. 183-255, esp. p. 200.

predestinatione as a teaching tool for prospective students at the University of Paris of his own Order. A designation of orthodox theological positions may well have been intended as an indication of the essential knowledge Giles expected of his students. Giles's discourse on hell only refers to one contentious issue in the 1277 context: the suffering of separated souls. As shown below, this passage dates from 1287 and maintains the position held by Tempier and the commission. It also draws on Thomas Aquinas' *Quaestiones de anima*, which probably date from 1269-72.⁴⁸²

Another characteristic of the third section in chapters eight, ten and eleven is the use of an extensive paraphrase of Augustine's positions. In each case the textual basis is a widely used passage in medieval and scholastic literature in the relevant subject. To some extent, this is similar to the second section, but in the case of the third section the paraphrases are far more extensive and close to the original Augustinian text. In some instances Giles's paraphrase obscures Augustine's views rather than clearly presenting them. A discourse on hell would have been possible without an extensive paraphrase of Augustine's views. As in the first section on contingency and necessity, brief references to other authors would have been sufficient to set down a succinct argument. It is difficult to explain Giles's decision to include these chapters: it might be due to his concern to show his close adherence to *auctoritas*, the well-established doctrinal tradition. In refraining from extensive speculation, he avoided possible conflicts with Church and University authorities. Another more likely possibility is the use of these chapters as a teaching tool within his Order. In this case a thorough textual explanation of Augustine might have been a priority in his composition of the treatise.⁴⁸³ The passages where Giles departs from the Augustinian pattern and model of analysis are those that go beyond the interpretative tools to which Augustine had access. This applies in particular to the extensive enquiry into the soul's characteristics, which forms part of the Aristotelian *corpus*.

The rationale that governs the composition of the third section is not easily accessible. Its main characteristic is the juxtaposition of loosely related topics which are treated in two distinctive fashions: as a paraphrase of several Augustinian texts and as

⁴⁸² Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de anima*, art. 21, J. Robb (ed.), Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Studies and Texts, vol. 14 (Toronto, 1968), p. 270.

⁴⁸³ On Giles following Augustine see G.J. McAleer, 'Political Authority in the *Sentences*-Commentary of Giles of Rome: A Case of the Waning of Augustine's Political Thought after Aquinas', *The Journal of the History of Ideas* 60 (1999), pp. 21-36, esp. pp. 22, 24.

an independent and original set of interpretations, possibly one of the most original parts of the text.⁴⁸⁴ In part this is due to Giles's use of his own second *Quodlibet*, question nine, aimed at an academic audience.⁴⁸⁵ This, however, does not apply to Giles's discourse on purgatory.

This chapter will give an overview of the four main issues that appear in the third section of *De predestinatione*. These are the corporeality of hell, the extent of God's pity towards the damned, the extent of the soul's suffering and the implications of divine justice and retribution on the concept of purgatory. Its aim is to show to what extent Giles follows the classic texts in the context of a well-established academic tradition.

4.2 Hell as a Corporeal Place

The first question about whether hell is a corporeal place or only the image of a body appears in chapters eight, nine and fourteen of the treatise.⁴⁸⁶ It tackles the fundamental problem of human cognition in the special context of the separated soul in hell. As the soul is a spiritual entity prior to general resurrection the question arises of defining its environment as corporeal or incorporeal. Defining hell as incorporeal might entail its non-existence or at least its reduction to a fiction (another viewpoint is that incorporeal is still real, taking into account for example God and angels): openly to maintain this would contravene Church doctrine. On the other hand the case of angels proves the existence of incorporeal entities. Giles divides the subject into three parts. The first is an exposition of Augustine's position with some additional references, mainly to Aristotle (chapter eight). The second part is Giles's commentary of Augustine's text (chapter nine) and, ultimately, his own views on the subject (chapter fourteen). This disposition of chapters represents the classic three-fold dialectical structure of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. In the first part Giles takes books eight and twelve of *De Genesi ad litteram* as the principal source of Augustine's teachings on the matter of hell's corporeality. It is a classic and commonplace choice, which sets the main points of reference for later authors. The exact textual references are chapters twenty to twenty-seven of book eight and chapters thirty-two and thirty-three of book twelve.

⁴⁸⁴ Chapter two of *De predestinatione* also contains an original, if embryonic theory: see the commentary, chapter two, pp. 71, 75 on the metaphysical nature of events.

⁴⁸⁵ Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* (Venice, F. Burana, 1504), fol. 17^{ra-vb}: it dates from Easter 1287.

⁴⁸⁶ C. Trifogli, 'La dottrina del luogo in Egidio Romano', *Medioevo* 14 (1988), pp. 235-90.

4.2.1 Hell Can Be Both Corporeal and Incorporeal

In the first part Giles clearly only intends to give a brief summary of the issues raised by Augustine in the light of the advancement of methods of enquiry available to the late thirteenth century, especially in relation to Aristotle's *De anima*. The rediscovery of this text opened up a broader range of purely philosophical thinking on the human soul. This material then had to be adapted to the theological premises of the relationship of the human soul to God and the conditions of its final destination. It serves as an introduction to his own enquiry into the question and shows his continued preoccupation with *auctoritas* in theological questions linked to the afterlife which ultimately only Revelation is able to prove. The central viewpoint of Giles's summary of Augustine is not hell itself, but the condition and experience of the soul, depending upon its sins (*propria culpa*).⁴⁸⁷ I agree with Giles that Augustine allows for both possibilities and does not have a final proof for the incorporeality of hell.⁴⁸⁸ In fact Augustine says that it is a large question that should be considered on its own, but for which at present he cannot give a definite answer.⁴⁸⁹

Giles discerns a three-fold differentiation of the concept of *locus* in Augustine: it is either corporeal, or an image or both at once.⁴⁹⁰ This may be a hidden reference to a letter of Augustine to Consentius, written in 410, where he distinguishes between things that are corporeal, those that resemble corporeal things and things that bear no resemblance to corporeal things.⁴⁹¹ The passage is a direct reference to Augustine's lengthy discussion on the different kinds of vision, which Augustine describes in book twelve of *De Genesi ad litteram*. In this work, Augustine distinguishes between the

⁴⁸⁷ "inferno: ad hoc loca [...] presciti per propriam culpam tendunt", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{ra}, l. 41-2.

⁴⁸⁸ See A. Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell. Death and Retribution in the Ancient and Early Christian Worlds* (Ithaca, 1993), p. 327.

⁴⁸⁹ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.5, CSEL 28.1, pp. 237-9. According to O'Connell, uncertainty is a common feature in *De Genesi ad litteram*. R.J. O'Connell, *The Origin of the Soul in St Augustine's Later Works* (New York, 1987), p. 202.

⁴⁹⁰ "trimembrem distinctionem de loco, quia vel dicit quid corporale, vel quid simile, vel quid excellentius non solum corpore, sed etiam similitudine corporis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{ra}, l. 58-36^{rb}, l. 1-2.

⁴⁹¹ "Cum igitur tria sint rerum genera quae videntur; unum corporalium...alterum simile corporalibus...tertium ab utroque discretum, quod neque [...] ullam habeat similitudinem corporis", Augustine, *Epistolae* 120.II.11 (PL 33: 457). Cf. B. Bubacz, *St Augustine's Theory of Knowledge: A Contemporary Analysis*, Texts and Studies in Religion, vol. 11 (New York-Toronto, 1981), p. 97.

corporeal, spiritual and intellectual vision.⁴⁹² According to Giles, the differences of location stem from the status of the soul whether it is united with the body or separated from it. Giles presents the questions whether the destination of the evil separated soul is an image of a corporeal place; the destination of the good separated soul is a *locus* beyond the categories of corporeality or its image.⁴⁹³ This concerns the period before general resurrection, since by general theological agreement after general resurrection the saints must go to a corporeal place. Giles concentrates here on a theological explanation based upon Augustine's findings. He refrains from giving his own definition of *locus*, defined in his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* IV, *lectio* 7. There he distinguishes between the material and the formal aspects of *locus*, which he determines as the limits of the extension of a localised body and as a place occupying the distance between the located body and the fixed points of the universe.⁴⁹⁴ It is an interpretation that combines Augustine's definition of the perception of the physical world with the Aristotelian understanding of the physical world. This emphasises that Giles's primary aim is to explain the Augustinian standpoint, which he complements with the findings of Aristotle, who in *De anima* 2.1, 413a4-9 explains that the soul preserves the faculty of experiencing the likeness of sensation. Augustine's definition of the corporeal sense-perception combines sensing through the five bodily sense-organs (seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching) with the intention of perceiving on the part of the subject (*intentio animi*): what the bodily senses perceive is referred to an interior sense (*sensus interior*).⁴⁹⁵ Corporeal sense perception, according to Augustine, implies a mutual co-operation between the intention of the soul and the bodily sense organs.⁴⁹⁶ The 'inner sense' is a concept that is quite close to Aristotle's *sensus communis*, although it should be noted that Augustine did not have any exposure to Aristotle's works.⁴⁹⁷ In this context, Giles refers to his own commentary on *De anima* and does not question the validity of the argument that the separated soul keeps its sensate powers. Giles does not

⁴⁹² Cf. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, CSEL 28,1, pp. 379-435. Cf. L. Hölscher, *The Reality of the Mind. Augustine's Philosophical Arguments for the Human Soul as a Spiritual Substance*, Studies in Phenomenological and Classical Realism (London-New York, 1986), p. 91.

⁴⁹³ "anima de corpore exierit utrum ad alia loca corporalia feratur, an ad incorporalia corporalibus similia, an vero nec ad ipsa, sed ad illud quod et corporibus et similitudinibus corporum est excellentius", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{ra}, l. 51-5.

⁴⁹⁴ See C. Trifogli, 'La dottrina del luogo', p. 237.

⁴⁹⁵ Augustine defines the senses as well-known messengers of the body: "quinque notissimis nuntiis corporis", Augustine, *De utilitate credendi* I.1, A. Hoffmann (ed.), *Fontes Christiani*, vol. 9 (Freiburg i. Br., 1992), pp. 79-80 (PL 42: 65).

⁴⁹⁶ Hölscher, *Reality*, pp. 92; 95-6.

⁴⁹⁷ R. Schneider, *Seele und Sein. Ontologie bei Augustin und Aristoteles* (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 160-84.

directly refer to Augustine's position on sense perception in the incorporeal soul. Augustine holds that the sense perception of the soul implies an attentiveness (*intentio*) that is proper to the mind alone: sense perception therefore contains features that go beyond the bodily senses.⁴⁹⁸

Giles's interpretation goes further than the Augustinian text, and states that at death and afterwards the soul does not recognise a real body, but only its image, which he calls the 'imagination of the soul'.⁴⁹⁹ It is interesting that Giles at this point does not refer to the superiority of the image Augustine emphasises in *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.16.33. In this view the spirit takes precedence over the body, and the image of a body in spirit is more excellent than the body itself in its own substance. Instead he accepts Augustine's analogy of the soul carrying a likeness of the body not going to a place but to its similitude, but he also asks the crucial question of how this is possible. In order further to advance Augustine's argument he refers to his commentary of Aristotle's *De anima*. There he shows that the soul's properties encompass two sets of characteristics that make up the action of carrying a likeness: cognition and affection, and intellect and will.⁵⁰⁰ To illustrate this he employs the example of the image of a stone that does not exist in the soul as a body, but only as an image.⁵⁰¹ Giles, however, does not touch upon Augustine's standpoint that the body is unable to produce any effect in the spirit, since the spirit cannot be subjected to the body. This statement has an affinity with the one Giles omitted earlier: the superiority of the spirit over the body. It illustrates his preoccupation in seeking to define a relationship between the body and the soul in the terms of the Aristotelian interpretation of the soul. It should be noted that the addition of the 'more precise' Aristotelian definition does not add any clarification to the question. It exemplifies that Augustine's theological and Aristotle's philosophical models of explanation cannot be easily combined. Giles indirectly acknowledges this when he refers to Augustine's statement that he (Augustine) is not able to exactly classify the image produced in the soul: in his view they are not corporeal, but he is

⁴⁹⁸ Hölscher, *Reality*, p. 100.

⁴⁹⁹ "omnia sic se habent in ipsa imaginatione nunc habeat huiusmodi corpora, sed similitudines corporum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{rb}, l. 40-2.

⁵⁰⁰ "anima exuta potest apud se ferre similitudinem corporis [...] per cognitionem et affectionem [...] delectionem et voluntatem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{va}, l. 8-11.

⁵⁰¹ "Nulli enim dubium est quod lapis non est in anima, sed similitudo lapidis, ut in tercio de anima traditur: ergo per intellectum et cognitionem potest habere apud se anima similitudines corporum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{va}, l. 11-4. Cf. Giles of Rome, *Expositio super libros de anima* (Venice, Tholentinas, 1504), fol. 68^{ra}.

unable to give a more precise definition.⁵⁰² Augustine, in a passage of *De trinitate* Giles does not directly refer to, only goes as far as saying that corporeal sense perception is mixed with an undefined, perhaps indefinable spiritual entity.⁵⁰³ Also, Giles only alludes to Augustine's explanation of the (separated) soul's perception and vision: the soul creates an image (*imago*) of what it perceives.⁵⁰⁴

Giles does not develop the argument further, being preoccupied with primarily presenting Augustine's views. Instead he continues with an introduction of one of the classic Scriptural passages on hell, the parable of Dives and Lazarus of Luke 19. This is an example Augustine discusses at length in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII.5. Augustine's aim is to show that 'hell', a term that the passage of Luke 19 does not use, only applies to the abode of the rich and not the poor man. Giles, however, is interested in whether the immersion of the poor man's fingertip into water in order to cool down the rich man's tongue burning in hell constitutes something corporeal or spiritual.⁵⁰⁵ He concludes that it is the likeness of something corporeal, on the basis of an argument that works in a cycle without offering substantial proof, linking this to the Augustinian explanation that no spiritual vision can exist without a corporeal vision. This again refers to the mechanism of perception in the case of the soul which is not yet separated from the body: the sense organ sees something of which it generates an impression, which together with the intention of the perceiver is then embedded in his memory.⁵⁰⁶ The crucial point in this appears at the very end of Giles's exposition of Augustine in the final paragraph of chapter eight and concerns Church doctrine. The fire of hell is corporeal, and it remains for the theologian as well as the philosopher to show how this relates to the separated soul.⁵⁰⁷ Giles agrees with Augustine's explanation of Augustine's theory of perception of the soul linked to the body. The case of the separated soul, however, necessitates a further enquiry into the mechanism of perception, since from

⁵⁰² Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.18, CSEL 28.1, pp. 406-7.

⁵⁰³ "visio quae fit in sensu habet admixtum aliquid spirituale", Augustine, *De trinitate* XI.5[9], CCSL 50.1, p. 345, l. 50-1.

⁵⁰⁴ "in se ipso facit", Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.16, CSEL 28.1, p. 402, l. 14. Cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.11, CSEL 28.1, pp. 392-5; VII.1, CSEL 28.1, pp. 200-1.

⁵⁰⁵ "habebat enim illa in anima apud se similitudinem talem corporalem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{va}, l. 34-5.

⁵⁰⁶ "sensus [...] accipit speciem ab eo corpore, quod sentimus, et a sensu memoria, a memoria vero acies cogitantis", Augustine, *De trinitate* XI.8.14, CCSL 50.1, p. 351, l. 70-1. Cf. U. Wienbruch, *Erleuchtete Einsicht. Zur Erkenntnislehre Augustins*, Abhandlungen zur Philosophie, Psychologie und Pädagogik, vol. 218 (Bonn, 1989), pp. 46-7.

the moment a human dies this mechanism can no longer rely upon bodily sense organs, from which it is then separated. Giles treats this question in chapters twelve, thirteen and part of chapter fourteen, focussing on the particular condition of the suffering of disembodied spirits. Giles's emphasis on the Catholic standpoint at the end of chapter eight of *De predestinatione* primarily serves as a teaching tool to alert prospective Augustinian students to fundamental tenets of Christian orthodox theology.

4.2.2 Hell Can Only Be Corporeal

In chapter nine Giles gives his own three-fold interpretation on the corporeality of hell. This is prefaced by a scientific explanation of its geographical location.⁵⁰⁸ It includes a paraphrase of Augustine's views on the resurrected and glorified body in *De civitate Dei* XXII.11 which serves to prove the similarities of the corporeal aspects of heaven and hell. In order to prove hell's corporeality, he partly refers to a scientific explanation of the earth's composition, partly to the theological and dogmatic principle of Christ's destiny after death and partly to a paraphrase of the Augustinian views on the possibility of existence of a terrestrial body in heaven. None of these issues directly refers to hell. Giles's argument rests upon an analogy between the corporeal conditions of heaven and hell, which is only partially valid. As shown in the second section of *De predestinatione* on paradise, its characteristics go beyond the human concept of corporeality or incorporeality. It should be noted that Giles does not acknowledge the limitations of the analogy, except in leaving open the final conclusion on the subject.

The introduction to the chapter is the second instance in *De predestinatione* where Giles uses a scientific explanation to illustrate a theological position. The other example occurred in chapter two on the influence of the stars.⁵⁰⁹ It shows his interest in combining scientific ways of thinking with theological and philosophical issues. In this case he explains the composition of the earth of six elements.⁵¹⁰ This stands in contrast

⁵⁰⁷ "verus dolor potest esse in inferno, dato quod infernus non dicat nisi similitudines corporum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* VIII, Cambrai, fol. 36^{vb}, l. 10-2, referring to Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.14, CCSL 28.1, p. 399, l. 4-5.

⁵⁰⁸ The enquiry into the geographical location of hell does not mirror the section on paradise. See chapter three, pp. 105-6.

⁵⁰⁹ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* II, Cambrai, fol. 29^{va}, l. 1- fol. 29^{vb}, l. 23. See chapter two, pp. 59-60.

⁵¹⁰ "terra est sex elementorum omnium", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 36^{vb}, l. 48-9.

to Plato's theory of the four elements which Augustine quotes in *De civitate Dei* XXII.11, a chapter Giles uses as the basis of his arguments for a corporeal hell.⁵¹¹ Giles does not acknowledge this discrepancy or give any cross-reference between the two paragraphs; also, in contrast to Plato, he refrains from naming the elements. His introduction uses the example of a barrel of wine to illustrate that the heavier elements gather at its bottom.⁵¹² Arguing by analogy he says that the heavier elements in the universe gather at its centre – hell – which is the destination for the damned souls.⁵¹³ Giles concludes that the elements are corporeal, as is, by implicit analogy, the place to which they go. The passage stands out in an argument that is predominantly theological and it is not clear whether the author intended it as further proof for the corporeality of hell or merely as an unconventional introduction to a disputed question. A precise definition of the elements is notably absent and confirms the impression of an oddly assorted number of ideas which only loosely hang together and do not form a coherent whole.

Giles's first way to prove the corporeality of hell is a statement of orthodox theology, which is accordingly identified by him as concordant with the Catholic faith and truth (*fides catholica et veritas*).⁵¹⁴ Christ's glorified body dwells above all the heavens, a place that Ephesians 4.12 names as the Empyrean. Medieval authors identified this place as the highest part of the supposedly spherical heavens, which is thought to contain the pure element of fire and is accepted as the abode of God and his angels. It is a concept Giles does not refer to in his discourse of paradise, possibly because he did not use this particular reference from Scripture. Another explanation is his refraining in that section from any definition of the celestial paradise, which Ephesians refers to in this description.⁵¹⁵ In chapter nine, Giles continues with the statement that Christ descended to hell as a soul, which is the orthodox position.⁵¹⁶ His

⁵¹¹ Plato, *Timaeus*, 32 A. See also F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary* (London, 1937), pp. 188-90.

⁵¹² "in dolio vini, sex [elementorum] vadit ad inferiorem locum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 36^{vb}, l. 50-1.

⁵¹³ "sex est in medio collocata [...] sub terra sive infra terram, sic carcer ille, ad quam tendunt anime dampnatorum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 36^{vb}, l. 57-fol. 37^{ra}, l. 1-2.

⁵¹⁴ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 11.

⁵¹⁵ See chapter three on Giles's lack of differentiation between the terrestrial and the celestial paradise, pp. 87-8, 91, 94-5, 97-8, 104-6, 114-5.

⁵¹⁶ "descendit [Christus] ad locum corporalem, ut ad infernum qui est locus inferior, licet descenderit in anima", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 16-8.

aim is to explain the characteristics of both body and soul in relation to its possible destinations of heaven and hell.

The definition of hell as an inferior place – an allusion to its geography rather than to its function – entails that it is the body's natural destination on account of its heaviness (*grave*), which is a Platonic concept.⁵¹⁷ Giles shows that this argument cannot be upheld because of Church doctrine. It holds that in the case of the damned, body and soul separate at death and that the soul alone descends to hell. The argument stands in contrast to Giles's physical definition of movement (the so-called quantitative law) where heavy bodies follow a downward motion and light bodies an upward motion.⁵¹⁸ He explains this paradox resulting from the contrast between scientific analysis and theological truth with an analogy. The resurrected body, reunited with the soul, moves upward to heaven. It is a movement that the rules of nature would prohibit were it not for the influence of divine *virtus* (capacity) which draws them upward to God.⁵¹⁹ Giles does not address the issue of the Resurrection and mainly stays within the framework of the neo-platonic philosophy as Augustine expresses it. Nolan highlights the difficulties of accepting the neo-platonic doctrine which prohibits any further enquiries into the subject unless they were to depart from orthodox theology.⁵²⁰ This contributes towards explaining why Giles in this question extensively draws upon Augustine instead of developing his own views. Another view, however, should also be considered: if *De predestinatione* was intended as a teaching tool for the pre-academical studies of prospective Augustinian students at the University of Paris, then it presented a complicated and potentially controversial discourse on the validity of the Augustinian approach of theology.

The second part of the analogy is the exercise of divine justice which keeps the soul in hell, an inferior place, even without the natural weight of the body attached to

⁵¹⁷ "corpus, quod est nature sue derelictum, grave cui sic considerato debetur inferior locus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 19-21.

⁵¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Physics* 4.6-9, 213a12-217b28. See C. Trifogli, 'Giles of Rome on natural motion in the void', *Mediaeval Studies* 54 (1992), pp. 136-61, esp. pp. 138-9.

⁵¹⁹ "virtute divino potest esse in excellentissimo loco: anime etiam a corporibus exute, quibus secundum naturam, non debetur aliis corporalis locus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 21-3.

⁵²⁰ K. Nolan, *The Immortality of the Soul and the Resurrection of the Body According to Giles of Rome. A Historical Study of a Thirteenth-Century Problem*, *Studia Ephemerides "Augustinianum"*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1967), p. 65.

it.⁵²¹ The concept of divine justice entails the submission of the inferior to the superior, which is its universal criterion. In the case of the separated and damned soul its existence in hell is determined by its submission to God's decision to keep it there.⁵²² The idea of natural weight (*gravitas*) is reminiscent of two other passages of *De predestinatione*. Firstly, Giles uses the concept of *gravitas* in chapter one where he uses the term in the context of the good and living human being (body and soul) who is drawn to God.⁵²³ This theological argument stands in contrast to the scientific usage in chapter nine, where *grave* has a physical meaning that keeps the body away from God and drags it towards an 'inferior place', i.e., hell. The difference in terminology might be an indication that some parts of *De predestinatione* constitute a compilation of other texts of Giles, where its components were not adjusted to form a coherent whole and where cross-references are notably absent. Secondly, the passage recalls the discussion of the celestial paradise in the second section of the treatise, and especially its reference to divine *virtus*, a capacity that is distinct from the corporeal sphere and is only mentioned in conjunction with the person of Christ. Giles concludes this passage with a more precise and detailed description of hell and explains that it contains a barrier (*determinatio*) that differentiates what is within and beyond hell, depending on the nature of the entity in question.⁵²⁴ It is possible that this is an allusion to the passage of Luke 16 which describes the separation of heaven and hell by a great divide (*chasma magnum*).

The central section of the proof of the corporeality of hell is an extensive paraphrase of Augustine's discussion of the existence of terrestrial bodies in heaven in *De civitate Dei* XXII.11.⁵²⁵ Giles uses seven of Augustine's examples to show the analogies between the unlikely yet possible existence of Christ's body in heaven and of a soul in hell, despite their natural movements prescribed by the laws of nature. The

⁵²¹ "per divinam iustitiam esse poterunt in inferno, in corporali quoddam inferiori loco", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 23-5.

⁵²² R.M. Vico, 'La dottrina della giustizia originale e del peccato originale nel trattato *De peccato originali* di Egidio Romano', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* I, 1 (1990), pp. 227-46, esp. p. 234.

⁵²³ "ut si grave recedit a loco sursum et tendit deorsum. Oportet dare aliud per quod hoc faciat ut per gravitatem, sic et si boni recedunt a culpa et miseria, et tendunt in vitam eternam et in gloriam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{rb}, l. 14-8.

⁵²⁴ "quam quod indifferentur secundum naturam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 27.

⁵²⁵ Giles here refrains from a discussion of the nature of celestial bodies on the basis of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* or his *De caelo*. See S. Donati, 'La dottrina di Egidio Romano sulla materia dei corpi celesti

section also exemplifies Giles's treatment of Augustine, whose conclusions he follows as far as they are coherent with the recently rediscovered Aristotelian works. *De civitate Dei* XXII.11 contains a detailed discussion on the assumption of terrestrial bodies to heaven at the Resurrection.⁵²⁶ Giles takes seven examples from XXII.11, which do not correspond to the total number of cases or to the sequence used by Augustine. This shows that Giles did not simply copy Augustine's positions, but chose to present them in a more concise form, suited to his subsequent argumentation. Giles quotes extensively from the text and in some cases adds his own commentary, which mostly relies upon analogy as a method of proof. Giles's choice to use Augustine's findings on a related topic, instead of proving the soul's existence in hell on his own highlights his educational concern to present Augustine's views to a non-academic audience, rather than to write a separate academic essay. Nonetheless Giles's composition of the treatise as a rather loose conglomerate of stylistically variant texts cannot as yet be fully explained. In particular the absence of Giles's own reasoning for the structure of *De predestinatione* precludes a definite answer. Also there is insufficient evidence to determine the exact role Giles played in the educational organisation – and teaching – of the Augustinian Hermits.⁵²⁷

The first example refers to the capacity of some terrestrial bodies to fly in the air and explains that consequently God is able to elevate the immortal body of a human being to heaven, having provided it with the necessary qualities to live there.⁵²⁸ Giles combines this example with a passage of Aristotle's *De anima*. The passage explains that the soul is not a body and that it does not belong to either heaven or hell. It can exist in a corporeal place because, on account of its nature, it is indifferent to the body.⁵²⁹ The common ground of the example and its commentary lies in the ability of either soul or body depending upon the circumstances to exist in an environment that *a priori* would seem hostile and threatening to its existence. Their fundamental difference

discussiona sulla natura dei corpi celesti alla fine del tredicesimo secolo', *Medioevo* 12 (1986), pp. 229-80.

⁵²⁶ See below for a discussion of the limits of Augustine's enquiry into the Resurrection and its consequences upon later authors, p. 142.

⁵²⁷ See chapter one for Giles's educational activities and a possible audience for this treatise, p. 39.

⁵²⁸ "corpora que terrestria sunt eleuantur in aere [...] corporibus hominem immortalibus factis [Deus] poterit donare virtus, quod possint habitare in celo", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 31-7, quoting Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXII.11, CCSL 48, p. 829, l. 7-8.

lies in specifying the moving force behind the soul's conditions of existence. Augustine names God as the cause for the resurrected body's adaptation to a different dimension; Aristotle names nature as the deciding factor. Giles's solution emphasises the theological dimension in saying that the reason for the soul's punishment has to be seen in the offences it has committed, which results in the just punishment in a corporeal hell.⁵³⁰ The gist of the argument is directed towards the soul and its retribution, which links it with Giles's exposition of the soul's suffering in chapter twelve and thirteen, but the text does not contain any cross-reference.

The second example is added without commentary and complements the first: according to Augustine, living human beings cannot exist below the earth – they die if they are put there – which stands in contrast to their existence in heaven as glorified bodies.⁵³¹ The example corroborates the different conditions of existence in heaven and hell and particularly points towards hell as the abode of (damned) souls. The third example logically follows, since it describes how an entity can adapt to varying principles of existence, despite external appearances which suggest the contrary. Augustine uses the example of lead that can float in water when it is assembled in a concave form, and argues that therefore, by analogy, glorified bodies can exist in heaven and the soul in a corporeal environment.⁵³² Here Giles finally implicitly refers to Augustine's fundamental classification of the spiritual as superior to the corporeal – an argument that is missing from chapter eight – and adapts it to the description of the human being.⁵³³ There the body belongs to the smaller and inferior segment and the soul to the greater and more excellent one. In the case of the predestined the weight of the body is minimal and allows an enjoyment of beatitude; in the case of the foreknown and damned, the corporeal element is weighty and pulls them down towards hell.⁵³⁴ It is

⁵²⁹ "secundum naturam indifferenter se habet ad corpora", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 40-1.

⁵³⁰ "ratione perpetrati delicti ad maiorem suam miseriam esse poterit et erit in infimo", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 41-3.

⁵³¹ "[hominem] immortale factum, possit esse in celo", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 50-1, quoting Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXII.11, CCSL 48, p. 829, l. 17-24.

⁵³² "[Deus] poterit facere dos sive dotes agilitatis, date corpori beneficiato, quod possit esse in celo", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 58-37^{rb}, l. 1-2.

⁵³³ "Anima est pars hominis excellentior, et corpus pars inferior", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 10-1.

⁵³⁴ "boni enim et predestinati gaudebunt tanta beatitudine, preter corpora corporumque sunt infima pars in eis erunt in tam excellenti loco, ut in celo empireo", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 11-4.

one of the rare instances in the second and third section of *De predestinatione* where Giles expressly refers to the predestined and the foreknown as the main subject of the treatise. It shows that the three sections form part of a greater whole, although the particular organisation of the treatise's structure might indicate the contrary.⁵³⁵ Giles's argument is consistent, and the sequence of examples from Augustine serves to explain step by step the questions that arise.

The fourth example explains how the separated soul is weighed down by its body, which is an issue that the previous examples were not able to resolve.⁵³⁶ Giles's reading of Augustine posits that if the terrestrial body is capable of keeping the soul on an earthly level, then the glorified soul should have the power of elevating the body to a life in heaven. His interpretation adds to the Augustinian text the importance of God's power invested in the soul. *De civitate Dei* XXII.11.2 only states that it is the soul's *natura* and its merits that enable it to act: God's influence may well be implicit, but is not explicitly mentioned. In effect, the passage is a discussion of the relationship between body and soul. The reason why Giles introduces this example is his preoccupation with the Aristotelian notion of *essentia*, which he employs instead of the Augustinian *natura*, in whose (Augustine's) time the term 'essence' had not yet entered the Latin language. Both definitions are close: essence is the characteristic or intrinsic feature of an entity which determines its identity and fundamental nature; it is in itself unchangeable, unchanging and necessary to its being.⁵³⁷ Nature on the other hand designates the fundamental qualities of an entity, its identity or essential character. Giles employs the term essence because of his continuous and consequent use of the Aristotelian frame of reference whenever the argument permits.

The difference between *essentia* and *natura* is the aspect of unchangeable necessity, and Giles's choice not only shows his emphasis of the strong link of the soul to the corporeal sphere but also his acceptance of the Aristotelian interpretation of the soul. In Aristotle's terms the soul is that 'which cannot be without a body, which cannot be a body, that is not a body but something relative to a body'.⁵³⁸ On the basis of the

⁵³⁵ See the introduction to chapter two for a discussion of the treatise as a compilation, pp. 47-51.

⁵³⁶ "corpus terrestre, cui coniuncta est anima per essentiam, sic potest deprimere animam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 20-1.

⁵³⁷ See E. Hocedez (ed.), *Aegidii Romani. Theoremata de esse et essentia. Texte précédé d'une introduction historique et critique*, Museum Lessianum, section philosophique, vol. 12 (Louvain, 1930).

⁵³⁸ Aristotle, *De anima*, 2.2., 414a19-21; in Giles's words "corpus terrestre cui coniuncta est anima per essentiam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 20-1.

soul's definition Giles presents his argument of the soul's existence in heaven and hell. In the case of the good the corporeal forces obey the soul and reason (*ratio*), which in turn obey God. For this reason the separated souls of the good ascend to heaven where they will be ultimately reunited with their resurrected bodies. Seen more generally, the corporeal forms follow the spiritual and celestial movement, and their ascension is spiritual.⁵³⁹ This is orthodox Church doctrine, and as before in the case of the discourse on paradise, Giles does not comment upon it.

The explanation of the soul's descent to hell is more expansive and reflects the greater need for an integration of the Aristotelian set of ideas into a subject with a stronger link to the human and terrestrial dimension and experience. Giles explains that every corporeal movement in the case of the separated (damned) souls is suspended, and that their *affectio* is directed to the inferior rather than to the superior spheres – to hell rather than to heaven.⁵⁴⁰ The term *affectio* is difficult to translate into English and reflects Giles's understanding of the soul's functions. However, as in previous passages, he refrains from a comprehensive definition of the term, which would have put his thoughts into a wider context. *Affectio* is also linked to *virtus*: both determine the soul's existence in hell and its relationship with a corporeal environment, but the text does not allow for a clear view into the matter. It leaves the reader with a conglomerate of statements which do not provide an exhaustive systematic insight. Giles states simply that after the Last Judgement the souls obtain a body similar to the one they possessed during their lifetime.⁵⁴¹

The next two examples from *De civitate Dei* XXII.11 combine the theological arguments of the existence of demons with a recapitulation of the previous point that it is possible for an entity (soul or body) to exist in an environment to which 'normally'⁵⁴² they would not be suited. The last example returns to a scientific manner of arguing,

⁵³⁹ "anime resumptis corporibus, sicut ipse vires corporales sequebantur spirituales et celestes motus, sic huiusmodi corpora, sicut cum suis spiritibus eleventur ad celum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 29-32.

⁵⁴⁰ "anime [...] affectiones suas non ad superiora, sed ad inferiora ordinare voluit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 32-5.

⁵⁴¹ "anime vero malorum, quia secute sunt corporales motus, et affectiones suas non ad superiora, sed ad inferiora ordinare voluit, dignum est, quod etiam exute a corpore, ad inferna descendant et post iudicium resumptis corporibus, simile cum illis corporibus in quibus talia gesserunt, in inferno demergantur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{rb}, l. 32-9. "Similis" is a term taken from Augustine's *De Genesi ad litteram*, which Giles referred to at length in chapter eight, esp. *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.12, CCSL 28.1, p. 395, l. 20-1. Aquinas puts this more strongly: see his *Summa contra Gentiles* IV, ch. 84, 85, 86; see also ch. 32, 37.

which Giles used in the introduction of chapter nine and in the first example. As such, it does not refer to any of hell's aspects, but discusses the variant qualities and categories of fire, one of Plato's four elements. Interestingly at this instance Giles does not make the connection to the fire of hell, but simply gives a three-fold definition of fire: the terrestrial fire of charcoal, the (undefined) fire of flame within smoke and the (supposedly celestial) fire of light.⁵⁴³ He again combines this with Aristotle's findings – an unidentified passage – of the location of fire in order to prove that a terrestrial body can receive the gift of subtlety to ascend to heaven, where it would coexist with the celestial fire in the higher spheres. Curiously Giles refrains from establishing an analogy with hell, which immediately suggests itself. It is another instance where the argument is not carried further to form a coherent whole instead of an enumeration of examples that are not all woven together to form a comprehensive discourse. Giles concludes by introducing a term he had not previously employed to show the separated soul's destination to hell. Its *impetus*, which depends upon the previous corporeal and terrestrial condition of the soul leads it to hell.⁵⁴⁴ As with the terms of *affectio* and *virtus* Giles eschews giving a definition,⁵⁴⁵ and the reader is left to draw his own conclusions: the soul's destination depends upon the good or bad deeds of the living human being of which it was a part. Giles explains this in chapter one of *De predestinatione* and does not deem it necessary to repeat it at this point.⁵⁴⁶

Giles's second way to prove the corporeality of hell concentrates upon the connection of the universe, where Giles introduces the well-known argument of Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 12.7 on the principle of the unmoved mover.⁵⁴⁷ Giles transposes this to theology and states that God is the mover of the whole universe which He initiates and conserves. Since there is only one universe whose principle is the connection (*connexio*) of all that it contains and which does not allow for the existence

⁵⁴² This refers to the laws of nature, not to the Divine.

⁵⁴³ "triplex sit ignis, scilicet ignis carbo, et ignis flamma, et ignis lux", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 12-3.

⁵⁴⁴ "infernus [...] eo quod huiusmodi anime secute sunt corporales impetus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 32-4.

⁵⁴⁵ "terrenas affectiones", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 34.

⁵⁴⁶ "predestinatio [...] describitur a remissione culpe, nam idem est tendere in propositum, et recedere ab opposito. Idem ergo est destinare in finem et in gloriam, et recedere a culpa et miseria", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* I, Cambrai, fol. 29^{tb}, l. 3-7.

⁵⁴⁷ "connexitate universi", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 37. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.7, 1072a19-26.

of a vacuum, all bodies are connected to each other.⁵⁴⁸ Giles applies this general statement to the relationship between body and soul, and concludes that the spirit exists in union with the body, either by essence, by virtue or by some other unspecified quality to allow for the universe's cohesion.⁵⁴⁹ For Giles the unity of the universe is of prime importance. It is a concept he constantly affirms and which seeks to refute Averroes' distinction between the matter of terrestrial and celestial bodies.⁵⁵⁰ In Giles's view the principle of the universe's connection has precedence over all other possible destinations of the separated soul. The corporeality of hell therefore depends upon the *connexio* between corporeal and spiritualized matter.⁵⁵¹ This does not entail that the universe is corporeal: the argument only posits that spiritual matter on its own cannot exist. In my view this is not a clear proof of the corporeality of hell, since Giles's definition of the universe allows for both possibilities. Its only restriction applies to the necessary link between the corporeal and spiritual, and does not clearly define of any particular part of the universe.

The third proof of the corporeality of hell is nothing more than the recapitulation of the issue Giles set down at the beginning of his argument. It depends upon the soul's merits whether it goes to either heaven or hell.⁵⁵² He also refrains from establishing any link between the damned soul's merits and its punishment, possibly because this is a question he discusses later. Giles defines both destinations as corporeal, which in the case of heaven is a potentially controversial statement: it has to be a place where bodies exist, although this is not the same as saying it is itself corporeal. This is followed by no further thoughts or explanations, despite the apparent contradictions once this text is placed besides the section on paradise. There, Giles had explained that heaven's characteristics are beyond the human categories of corporeality and incorporeality.⁵⁵³ Giles's analogy between heaven and hell largely depends upon the principle that different entities, the body and the soul, can exist in an environment that seems to prohibit their very existence. It is an argument from the human perspective, whose

⁵⁴⁸ "unus principatus Deus [...] totum universum cui principatur, sit unicum et connexum, ut sicut corpora sunt coniuncta corporibus, ut non sit ibi dare vacuum, sic et spiritus habeant aliquam unionem ad corpora, sive per essentiam, sive per virtutem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 38-44.

⁵⁴⁹ "sit totum universum connexum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 44-5.

⁵⁵⁰ McAleer, 'Disputing the Unity', pp. 4-5.

⁵⁵¹ 'Spiritualized' rather than 'spiritual', since Giles is not adopting the Franciscan position.

⁵⁵² "Nam si animabus beatis damus propter meritum quod ascendant ad superiorem, corporalem locum, ut ad celum, animabus dampnatis dabimus, propter de meritum, quod descendant in inferiorem corporalem locum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{vb}, l. 15-9.

⁵⁵³ See chapter three, pp. 134-5.

contradictions find their resolution at a much later stage of the treatise. In chapter fourteen of *De predestinatione* Giles presents a brief definition of both heaven and hell. Heaven, in the Aristotelian sense, is neither a place nor the similitude of a place, but something that lies beyond those concepts and that possesses more excellent and superior qualities. Hell on the other hand, is defined as corporeal, containing a corporeal fire.⁵⁵⁴ This is the view of Augustine, expressed in *De civitate Dei* XXI.10, but Giles in this case does not acknowledge his source in his text. It is a position which is also taken up by Thomas Aquinas in *Quaestiones de anima*, in contrast to John of Damascus, who in *Dialogus contra Manichaeos* 36 holds that hellfire is not corporeal.⁵⁵⁵ The place of this definition begs the question of why Giles did not place it at the beginning of his discourse on hell. The answer is difficult to establish. It could indicate that chapter fourteen is a later revision of chapters eight and nine, which the author added towards the end of the compilation of materials for *De predestinatione* to complement his earlier views. It also could, as suggested earlier, be the synthesis of two conflicting views presented in chapters eight and nine.

4.2.3 Hell Is the Image of a Corporeal Entity

In chapter fourteen Giles returns to the question of hell's corporeality and gives his final verdict on the question. His approach, however, is fundamentally different from that of chapters eight and nine because it leaves out any prolonged reference to Augustinian texts and concentrates on the issues, which were only briefly mentioned in chapters eight and nine. A possible reason for this is that Augustine's works do not contain a detailed analysis of this question, and Giles's treatment therefore mainly reflects the positions commonly used in late thirteenth century scholastic thought. In his synthesis of the corporeality of hell, Giles for the most part concentrates on the question of how the soul as a spiritual substance exists in a corporeal environment. Two terms are central to his explanation: *commensuratio* and *virtus*. Both are not explicitly defined. Giles had previously made use of the *virtus* in conjunction with the intrinsic qualities of

⁵⁵⁴ "Est itaque infernus, corporalis locus, qui est infimus locus: et ignis ille est corporalis ignis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 41^{va}, l. 29-31.

⁵⁵⁵ John of Damascus, *Dialogus contra Manichaeos* 36 (PG 94: 1542-3). Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de anima*, art. 21, *S. Thomae Aquinatis, Quaestiones disputatae*, vol. 2 (Rome, 1820), ed. P. Bazzi, pp. 359-62 ["Vicesimoprimum quaeritur utrum anima separata possit pati poenam ab igne corporeo"].

the soul;⁵⁵⁶ in chapter fourteen he also uses it in the description of angels.⁵⁵⁷

Commensuratio is an expression that only appears in this chapter of the treatise and probably stems from Aquinas' work where it denotes the relationship of an object with the place in which it exists. In this sense, judging by the context they appear in, *virtus* and *commensuratio* are closely related and serve to explain the link between the spiritual and the corporeal. Their difference lies in what kind of spiritual entity they designate: *commensuratio* applies to angels, *virtus* to (separated) souls. It is a distinction which does not appear in Aquinas' *Quaestiones de anima*, where he invariably refers to *virtus divina* as the essential quality that links the soul to hellfire.⁵⁵⁸

Giles's enquiry into the matter is further complicated by Augustine's statement that God moves spiritual creatures only within the dimension of time and not of space, and it is with this quotation that Giles begins his discourse.⁵⁵⁹ None of the soul's movements is spatial, and its movements are performed only in time.⁵⁶⁰ *De predestinatione* contains other references to the question of time in relation to both the human and divine dimension, especially in the first section on predestination, chapter three, distinction five where Giles presents and adheres to the Boethian solution of God being outside of time.⁵⁶¹ In this passage of chapter fourteen the emphasis of the argument lies in the spatial rather than the temporal dimension. A comparison between the movement of angels and separated souls – both spiritual entities – shows that their movements are measured in time and not in space. Giles defines movement in general terms as the

⁵⁵⁶ Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* IX, Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 21: "virtute divino", Cambrai, fol. 37^{ra}, l. 36: "donare virtus", Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 6: "virtute divina", Cambrai, fol. 37^{va}, l. 44: "per virtutem".

⁵⁵⁷ "non est in loco localiter, idest, per commensurationem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 41^{va}, l. 32-3. On Giles's use of *commensuratio* in conjunction with angels see B. Faes de Mottoni, 'Voci, "alfabeto" e altri segni degli angeli nella quaestio 12 del *De cognitione angelorum* di Egidio Romano', *Medievo* 14 (1988), pp. 71-105; *Idem* 'Un aspetto dell'universo angelologico di Egidio Romano: *Utrum sit unum aevum omnium aeviternorum*', in: *L'homme et son univers au Moyen Age. Actes du 7^e congrès international de philosophie médiévale* (30.8.-4.9.1982), C. Wenin (ed.), vol. 2, Philosophes Médiévaux, vol. 27 (Louvain, 1986) pp. 911-20; *Idem* 'Mensura im Werk *De mensura angelorum* des Aegidius Romanus', in: *Miscellanea Medievalia*. Veröffentlichungen des Thomas-Instituts der Universität zu Köln, A. Zimmermann (ed.), vol. 16.1: *Mensura, Maß, Zahl, Zahlensymbolik im Mittelalter* (Berlin-New York, 1983), pp. 86-102.

⁵⁵⁸ "Et sic verus est quod illis igne, in quantum virtute divina debeat enim alligatam, agit in animam", Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de anima*, art. 21, p. 271. Cf. Bernstein, 'Invocation of Hell', p. 25.

⁵⁵⁹ "Deus movet spirituales creaturas per tempora, non per loca", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 41^{rb}, l. 52-3, quoting Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.12, CCSL 28.1, p. 395, l. 20-1. Cf. also Augustine, *Epistola* XVIII.2 (PL 33: 85) "Est natura per locos et tempora mutabilis, ut corpus. Et est natura per locos nullo modo, sed tantum per tempora etiam ipsa mutabilis, ut anima. Et est natura, quae nec per locos nec per tempora mutari potest, hoc Deus est". Cf. also Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* II.XVI.42, CCSL 29, pp. 265-6.

⁵⁶⁰ Hölscher, *Reality*, p. 25.

⁵⁶¹ See chapter two, pp. 73-4.

adaptation to a succession of different places, thereby excluding the possibility of being in two places at once.⁵⁶² This definition stems from his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* IV.8 where he defines natural motion as a multiplicity of successive instants which are not separated by time.⁵⁶³ The mechanism that allows this is in the case of angels is *commensuratio*, the application of a spiritual entity to the spatial dimension. In the case of separated souls, the application to the corporeal dimension of hell is governed by *virtus*, not *commensuratio*. There is no apparent connection between the passages of *De predestinatione*, especially chapters three and fourteen, which is another indication of the missing overall structuring of the treatise.

There is a subtle difference between the two terms that concerns the perspective from which their mechanism is seen to be working. Spatial conformity, the closest possible translation for *commensuratio* emphasises the dimension to which the entity adapts itself. *Virtus*, on the other hand, is an intrinsic feature of the (separated) soul, which allows its communication to a dimension outside: in one case the determining factor is the external environment, in the other the internal disposition. In modern terms *virtus* can be defined as ability. The argument is congruent with Giles's previous discourse on the responsibility of the soul for its destination: the qualities of the human being determine its salvation or damnation. Consequently, the determining factor is not the environment of the soul's destination, albeit corporeal or not, but its intrinsic qualities. It should be noted that Giles presents his arguments in a far less accessible and comprehensive form than in the previous two sections of the treatise. He also refrains from any cross-references to previous conclusions that are directly linked to the issue he examines. As before, this gives the impression of a complicated, sometimes obscure exposition, which rarely allows to discern the author's governing ideas on the matter in question. In this section, Giles frequently draws upon analogies between heaven and hell, although both destinations of humankind considerably vary in the characteristics of dimension, corporeality and appearance.⁵⁶⁴

The closing section of chapter fourteen contains a brief discussion of the destination of human freewill in the case of the separated soul. It is one of the rare

⁵⁶² "per loca, quia non moventur sub hac ratione quia moventur successive, sunt in uno loco, nunc in alio", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 41^{va}, l. 7-9.

⁵⁶³ Trifogli, 'Giles of Rome on natural motion', p. 160.

⁵⁶⁴ At this point in chapter fourteen Giles gives a summary of his exposition of chapter twelve on the mechanism of the suffering of the separated soul. See below, pt. 6.3, pp. 138-41.

instances in the treatise where Giles refers to the question of freewill, and which indirectly provides a link between the first and final sections of *De predestinatione*. Giles explains that just as a living human being, when left (only) with his liberty, could by free will spatially conform himself to one place, then to another.⁵⁶⁵ If, however, that human being were put in prison he would lose his freedom and could only spatially conform himself to a single place.⁵⁶⁶ By analogy the (separated) soul, when it is imprisoned in hell, can apply its *virtus* only to that place because Christ prohibits it from doing anything else.⁵⁶⁷

Giles's proof of the corporeality of hell rests upon a combination of theological and epistemological explanations of the soul and its interaction with its environment. He combines the Augustinian concept of the activity of the intellect contemplating God with the Avicennian idea of the formal principle of reality which the intellect perceives. The absence of an extensive paraphrase of Augustine in the final part of the argument shows Giles's capacity to formulate an original concept of the soul's existence in hell. It is not, however, a direct proof of the corporeality of hell, since the soul's perception could also apply to a non-corporeal reality. The discourse shows once again Giles's prudence in avoiding a potentially controversial standpoint. His decision first to present Augustine's views and then to add his own views may be a proof of his sense of precaution to show his adherence to *auctoritas*. It seems, however, more likely that this argumentative structure was chosen because of the educational role of *De predestinatione*. A particular emphasis on presenting the Augustinian standpoint may well stem from the Order's close adherence to their patron, St Augustine, and the consequent need for a careful interpretation of his works for the benefit of the Order's students.

4.3 The Extent of God's Pity Towards the Damned

This section of *De predestinatione*, chapters ten and eleven, is almost entirely taken from Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI.17-22, and offers little more than a

⁵⁶⁵ The Latin term is *commensuratio*, and it is the sole instance when Giles employs it in conjunction with a living human being and not an angel – an inconsistency?

⁵⁶⁶ "homo corporaliter vivens, sue libertati relictus, potest se commensurare nunc isti loco, nonc illi, pro sui arbitrii libertate: sed si poneretur in carcere hanc libertatem perdet, ut non nisi certo loco possit se commensurare", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{ra}, l. 15-20.

⁵⁶⁷ "spiritus maligni timentes recludi in infernum, vel prohabitu a Christo, quod non possent virtutem suam applicare ad quodcumque corpus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{ra}, l. 27-30.

paraphrase. The *City of God* is a commonly used text, and this is yet another instance where Giles extensively uses Augustine as point of reference. Large sections of chapters ten and eleven are not only a paraphrase but extensive quotations from the Augustinian text.

The argumentative structure of chapter ten is comparable to that of chapter eight, where Giles summarises and explains Augustine's position. In this case he selects eight positions on the subject of the extent of God's pity towards the damned of which seven are erroneous and the eighth orthodox. Giles takes these views from Augustine's exposition in successive chapters of book twenty-one of *De civitate Dei*.⁵⁶⁸ It is a book that is mainly concerned with the issue of the punishment of the wicked. His division of the seven points follows the sequence of Augustine's argument.

Giles begins with what Augustine identifies as the Platonists' position in his refutation in *De civitate Dei* XXI.13, which holds that there are no eternal but only temporary punishments in hell.⁵⁶⁹ He combines this with another passage in XXI.17 where Augustine summarises Origen's position that God grants a place in heaven to the devil and fallen angels after they have suffered (temporal) punishment in hell. Before going into any further details Giles is careful to state that it is not within his judgement to say whether these positions come from Origen or whether they are later additions to the text.⁵⁷⁰ This possibly refers to the differences between the Greek text and the Latin translation established by Rufinus. As a result of the Church's condemnation of Origen, the Greek original was lost from the sixth century onwards and the text had to be reconstructed from Rufinus' translation and other fragments.⁵⁷¹ This throws an interesting light on the question of which texts Giles might have had access to. Since he continually refers to the passages in *De civitate Dei* where Augustine explains these issues, in many instances extensively quoting them word-for-word, it is unlikely that he had access to a Latin translation of Origen's *De principiis*. Giles sees himself unable to reconstruct a reliable version of Origen's argument and he is careful only to refer to errors he says are ascribed to Origen. This stands in contrast to Augustine who in *De*

⁵⁶⁸ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI.17-22, CCSL 48, pp. 783-6.

⁵⁶⁹ Augustine probably refers to Plotinus, *Ennius* III.2.8, S. MacKenna (transl.), *Plotinus. The Enneads* (London, 1991), pp. 167-8; P. Henry, H.-R. Schwyzler (ed.), *Plotini Opera*, vol. 1, *Porphirii Vita Plotini, Enneades I-III*, Museum Lessianum Series Philosophica, vol. 33 (Paris-Brussels, 1951), pp. 279-82.

⁵⁷⁰ "sed suis [Origenis] libris fuerunt ab aliis suis emulis, tales errores inserit vel infert", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* X, Cambrai, fol. 37^v, l. 39-40.

⁵⁷¹ For a brief introduction to Origen's views on hell see A. Bernstein, *The Formation of Hell*, pp. 307-13.

civitate Dei XI.23, and also in XXI.17, gives a detailed account of why the condemnations of some of Origen's doctrines were justified.

The topic of God's mercy essentially impinges upon the question of whether punishment in hell is eternal or not. Augustine emphatically defended its eternity, especially against the challenges proffered by Origen, which is a standpoint Giles unquestioningly embraces. Again, he is careful to point out that eternal damnation is a true and catholic opinion which is concordant with Scripture, since not all punishments are purgatorial.⁵⁷² In this case, unless he chose to argue against the Church council that condemned Origen's teachings, Giles does not have any choice but to agree with the doctrine of eternal damnation. Chapter ten concludes with a list of the seven erroneous and one orthodox sentences of the extent of God's mercy. All centre upon various cases where God's mercy might be applicable. Chapter eleven contains the refutation of these errors, opening with the affirmation that there is no redemption in hell. Instead of a recapitulation of Augustine's examples, the following section will highlight some passages where Giles departs from Augustine's text and interpretation. Giles illustrates his view on the absence of redemption in hell with a quotation from Fulgentius (whom he takes to be Augustine, as did his contemporaries): it is impossible to die well after an evil life, just as it is impossible to die badly after a good life.⁵⁷³ The quotation sets the tone for his belief in the differentiation of punishments administered in hell (their severity, not their duration) whilst emphasising its eternal character. The discussion of various degrees of punishment goes beyond the Augustinian frame of enquiry in *De civitate Dei* XXI, and it is Giles's ulterior concern to show that God's justice is variable and flexible, and adapted to the degree of evil He encounters at the Last Judgement. Giles corroborates this view with a quotation from Isidore of Seville who says that both the good and evil are governed by God's justice and mercy.

Another point that departs from the Augustinian exposition is the notion of time: in concordance with his previous references in *De predestinatione* Giles affirms that the notion of time will cease to exist after the Last Judgement, when there is no more

⁵⁷² "opinio vera et catholica concordans scripture sacre", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* X, Cambrai, fol. 38^b, l. 50-1.

⁵⁷³ "impossibile est bene mori, qui male vixerit, vel male mori qui bene vixerit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XI, Cambrai, fol. 38^{va}, l. 11-2, quoting Fulgentius, *De regulae verae fidei*, ch. 40 (PL 40: 776).

opportunity for acquiring merits or indeed for mercy.⁵⁷⁴ Giles contrasts this with life on earth where it is possible for a human being to change after having been punished, and to exercise works of mercy in order to convert to a new life.⁵⁷⁵ In this passage Giles's notion of time is based upon the Boethian concept, whereby the divine is situated outside of time. A full discussion of this appears in the first section of *De predestinatione*. In the context of hell this notion serves to distinguish between the (temporal) conditions between the time after death and after the Last Judgement. Giles stresses the overruling principle of eternal punishment, depending upon the gravity of wrongdoing of the human being which allows for no mercy at the Last Judgement. Giles contrasts the severity of God's just punishment of evil with the free choice of the individual human being during his lifetime: an active turning towards God contributes to the participation in God's mercy and to salvation, which again is a passage taken from Augustine.⁵⁷⁶ God's grace always accompanies His judgement, once the person sinning repents of his deeds.⁵⁷⁷ As in previous chapters, Giles concludes his argumentation with the traditional theological conclusion on the matter examined, which is a further indication for *De predestinatione* intended as a teaching tool rather than Giles's preoccupation with conformity to orthodoxy and Church authorities.

4.4 The Suffering of Disembodied Spirits in Hell

Giles presents this question as a learned and thorough investigation of the consequences of good and evil acts. He mainly takes his ideas from Augustine, Gregory the Great, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, and combines them in a complex psychological framework which is based upon the classic scholastic dialectical way of argumentation. Giles does not refer to the fact that Bishop Tempier had condemned in 1270 (and extended in 1277) the position that the separated soul cannot suffer a corporeal hellfire.⁵⁷⁸ Also, no reference is made to the opposite position of Avicenna

⁵⁷⁴ This is the notion of *tempus celeste* where everything happens simultaneously. See Trifogli, 'Giles of Rome on natural motion', p. 153.

⁵⁷⁵ "quamdiu sumus in vita ista, quia possumus penitentiam agere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XI, Cambrai, fol. 39^{ra}, l. 30-1.

⁵⁷⁶ "Deus miseribitur fidelibus, non omnibus, sed qui se exercitaverunt in operibus miserie", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XI, Cambrai, fol. 39^{va}, l. 33-5; Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI.21, CCSL 48, p. 786, l. 1-3.

⁵⁷⁷ "Iudicium ergo sine miseria fiet ei, qui non fecerit miseriam [...] convertat se a via sua mala, et fiat particeps gratie Dei", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XI, Cambrai, fol. 39^{va}, l. 44-50.

⁵⁷⁸ "Quod anima post mortem separata nullo modo patitur ab igne corporeo" (1270), *C.U.P.*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), p. 487; "Quod anima separata non est alterabilis secundum philosophiam, licet secundum fidem alteretur", prop. 135, Mandonnet (*C.U.P.*, p. 113).

and Al Ghazali who saw hellfire as a simple privation of eternal felicity, thinking that the burnings only had a metaphysical and spiritual significance of the soul's sufferings.⁵⁷⁹ Large parts of his discourse are taken both directly and indirectly from question nine of Giles's second *Quodlibet*, which explains the formal rhetoric and style especially of chapter twelve. As A. Bernstein has shown, the question of the corporeality of hellfire was not one of the major issues until the time of William of Auvergne and usually did not exceed the framework of short *sententiae*.⁵⁸⁰ This might explain why Giles, but for one exception, refrains from any direct quotation of other authors in chapter twelve. Unsurprisingly, the exception is a reference to Augustine, in a chapter that otherwise substantially differs from any other chapter of *De predestinatione*. The second part of Giles's explanation of hellfire, chapter thirteen, presents a similar structure, and only refers to Gregory the Great for one of the issues of Gregory's psychological explanation of hellfire. In contrast to William's exposition, Giles does not take his idea of the soul's suffering from Avicenna, since he is careful to emphasise that this mechanism has God as the final cause: Avicenna holds that the soul's torments take place entirely within the soul.⁵⁸¹ Giles's treatment of hellfire also closely resembles passages of his commentary on *De anima*, chapter twenty-four, and his *Quaestiones de resurrectione mortuorum*, question seven.⁵⁸² Both works were written previously: *De anima* in c. 1276-85 and the *Quaestiones* in c. 1274-77.⁵⁸³

In contrast to other chapters of the third section of *De predestinatione* Giles's enquiry into the suffering of disembodied spirits constitutes an area Giles had worked on before. Large sections of chapter twelve and some passages of chapter thirteen of *De predestinatione* are either direct quotations or close paraphrases of question nine of Giles's second *Quodlibet*. Hence, his arguments presented in *De predestinatione* XII and XIII had already been put before the academic public at the University of Paris at Easter 1287. Usually, a quodlibetal question arose from some scientific controversy in the University, or from an issue which was considered to be of general interest. A master of the University was then entitled to organise a public discussion in connection with his

⁵⁷⁹ F.-X. Putallaz, 'L'âme et le feu', in: *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 889-901, esp. p. 890.

⁵⁸⁰ The major example is Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio disputata de anima*, art. 21, *Quaestiones disputatae*, vol. 2, ed. Bazzi, pp. 359-62. See Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology', p. 522.

⁵⁸¹ Bernstein, 'Esoteric Theology', pp. 527-8.

⁵⁸² See Luna, 'La lecture', p. 202.

⁵⁸³ S. Donati, 'Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romano. I. Le opere prima del 1285 – I commenti aristotelici. Parte II. Note sull'evoluzione della struttura e dello stile dei commenti', *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* II.1 (1991), pp. 1-74, esp. pp. 3, 48.

course, where he presented the *quaestio*, the disputed issue together with his own solution.⁵⁸⁴ It is also notable that Giles's introduction to chapter twelve contains a reference to 'those who consider angels to be corporeal', which is a reference to a position condemned in 1277.⁵⁸⁵ This reference, together with Giles's quotations of his *Quodlibet* II.9, his *De anima* and *De resurrectione mortuorum* is another indication of the date of *De predestinatione*: it is very likely that the treatise was written after Giles's reinstatement at the University of Paris in 1285, more precisely after Easter 1287, the date of *Quodlibet* II.9.

The enquiry on the mechanism of suffering of disembodied spirits is central to Giles's argumentation in chapters twelve, thirteen and part of chapter fourteen.⁵⁸⁶ The nature of disembodied spirits is obviously far different to that of the soul-body entity of a living human being. Consequently, it is not possible to accept the same mechanism of sense perception for both a living human being and his separated soul: after death the separated soul is incapable of receiving sensations by way of bodily organs. It is a position Giles takes from Augustine, who reaches this conclusion in letter eighteen as well as in his *Tractatus in evangelium Iohannis* XX.10.⁵⁸⁷ As Hölschel has shown, a soul, especially when it is separated from the body no longer possesses a corporeal predicate, nor can it be understood in terms of bodily images.⁵⁸⁸ Augustine's theory of sensation depends upon the existence of a body: sense knowledge may be a work of the soul, but only by means of the body.⁵⁸⁹ Giles is aware that the condition of the separated soul constitutes a case apart, which calls for a different explanation of the mechanism of

⁵⁸⁴ John Duns Scotus, *Lectura. I.39. Contingency and Freedom: Introduction, translation, and commentary* by A. Vos Jaczn [et al.], The New Synthese Historical Library, vol. 42 (Dordrecht, 1994), p. 13, quoting L.M. de Rijk, *Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte* (Assen, 1981), p. 130.

⁵⁸⁵ "Dixerunt enim quidam angelos esse corporeos", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, p. 164.

Hissette, *Enquête*, article 44, Cambrai, fol. 39^{vb}, l. 21-3.

⁵⁸⁶ "quomodo anime in inferno patiantur, et crucientur vere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 39^{vb}, l. 20-1. On the mechanism of cognition in the living soul according to Henry of Ghent see K. Emery, 'The Image of God Deep in the Mind: The Continuity of Cognition According to Henry of Ghent', in *Nach der Verurteilung von 1277*, pp. 59-124, esp. pp. 85-6 on human freedom and God's will: "The wholly undetermined freedom of God's will is reflected in his image, the human soul. The good known by the intellect, of course, ordinarily influences and penetrates the choice of the will, but it cannot determine that choice necessarily. For "virtually" and thus often actually, the will is wholly autonomous from the intellect and self-motivating. So likewise Henry eliminates any possible notion of psychological determinism."

⁵⁸⁷ Augustine, *Epistola* XVIII.2 (PL 30: 178-9); *Tractatus in evangelium Iohannis* XX.10 (PL 35: 1561-2): "multum interest inter corpus et animum".

⁵⁸⁸ Hölschel, *Reality*, p. 25.

⁵⁸⁹ R.A. Markus, 'Marius Victorinus and Augustine', ch. 24: 'Augustine. Sense and imagination', in: A.H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (London, 1967), pp. 374-80, esp. p. 374.

sense perception. Giles's point seems to be that the mental correlate (*intentio*) of a physical suffering can exist even in the absence of its physical cause. The disembodied spirit would feel pain indiscernible from physical pain, even though its cause would not be straightforwardly physical. Giles states at the beginning of chapter twelve that disembodied spirits burn in hell, and that this entails suffering, even in the case of a soul already separated from its body.⁵⁹⁰ Once hellfire is defined as corporeal, the main difficulty becomes apparent: how is it possible to explain the influence of a corporeal entity on a spiritual one, in this particular case the relationship between a physical cause and its effect on a spiritual substance? In letter 137, Augustine asks a similar question in a correspondance with Volusian: how can the soul perceive, when it does not live? In this letter he avoids the question by pointing out that it forms part of the mysterious secrets the human mind cannot grasp.⁵⁹¹ A partial Augustinian solution, however, is the concept of transcendence: even the living human being transcends the boundaries of his body when he gets in real contact with the being outside of himself.⁵⁹² Augustine's concept of the *intentio anime* provides a further clue to Giles's understanding of the separated soul's suffering. Both transcendence as well as the intending and attending to the perceived object (the *intentio anime*) constitute Augustine's definition of sense perception of a spiritual entity.⁵⁹³ Giles combines this Augustinian definition with his own description of the soul's intellective power capable of receiving with the concept of *intentio*. In the Augustinian understanding the term is perhaps best translated as 'attention' given to an exterior object.⁵⁹⁴ *Intentio* is also a concept that appears in the writings of Al-farabi and Avicenna. Their understanding of *intentio* further develops the Augustinian position, and Avicenna in particular defines as intention that which is immediately before the mind, whether the object of the intention is outside the mind (the first intention) or itself an intention (the second intention).⁵⁹⁵ Once again this supports the view that the Augustinian standpoint is central to Giles's thought, and, as in

⁵⁹⁰ "anime in inferno patiantur, et crucientur vere [...] poterit pati ab igne", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 39^{va}, l. 20-9.

⁵⁹¹ "quam hoc sit latebrosum [...] miratur hoc mens humana, et quia non capit, fortasse nec credit", Augustine, *Epistola CXXXVII* [II].5 (PL 33: 518).

⁵⁹² Hölschel, *Reality*, p. 98, referring to W. Heinzelmann, *Über Augustins Lehre vom Wesen und Ursprung der menschlichen Seele* (Halberstadt, 1868), p. 18.

⁵⁹³ Hölschel, *Reality*, p. 99.

⁵⁹⁴ Hölschel, *Reality*, p. 39.

⁵⁹⁵ C. Knudsen, 'Intentions and Impositions', *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 479-95, esp. p. 479. Al-Farabi, *De intellectu et intellecto*, quoted by E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 4 (1929-30), pp.

previous instances, Giles combines and actualises Augustine's views with that of other authors, without however fundamentally departing from Augustine.

Giles's position reflects a long-standing debate in the Christian Church on the issue of hell. The definition of hellfire as corporeal dates from 543, when the emperor Justinian, declared Origen's position of a spiritual hellfire as heterodox.⁵⁹⁶ This edict prompted a renewed interest into the afterlife, especially after the Christian church was declared state religion by Constantine. The works of Augustine and Gregory the Great are of particular importance in setting up a comprehensive theology of hell: book twenty-one of *De civitate Dei* examines eternal punishment in hell; book four of Gregory's *Dialogues* further illustrates Augustine's positions, describing the punishment administered in hell in greater detail.⁵⁹⁷ Giles's argumentation also reflects the rediscovery of Aristotelian texts during the second half of the thirteenth century, in particular of his *De anima*. The assimilation of the Aristotelian theory of the intellect, developed in his *De anima* becomes apparent in Giles's definition of the process of cognition as the possible intellect (*intellectus possibilis*). By this intellectual cognition,⁵⁹⁸ which Augustine distinguishes from the sense cognition, the intellect immediately and directly grasps a reality outside of itself.⁵⁹⁹ The assimilation of Augustine's theory of sensation and Aristotle's definition of the possible intellect provides the key to understanding Giles's position on the suffering of disembodied spirits.

Giles holds that disembodied spirits are capable of real suffering, feeling the adverse effect of hellfire.⁶⁰⁰ Giles distinguishes between the terms *pator* and *dolere*. *Pator* designates the capacity to recognise the effects of hellfire, *dolere* signifies the specific act of suffering caused by hellfire. Giles uses Augustine's example of a stone to

5-149, esp. pp. 118, 119, 144; Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I.2 (*Avicennae perhypatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera* [...]) (Venice, 1508), (reprint Frankfurt/M.), 1961, fol. 70^{ra}.

⁵⁹⁶ Cf. Origen, *De principiis* II.10.4-6, H. Görgemanns, H. Karpp (ed.), *Origenes vier Bücher von den Prinzipien*, Texte zur Forschung, vol. 24 (Darmstadt, 1976), pp. 427-34. T. Rasmussen, 'Hölle', *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, ed. H. Balz et al. vol. 15 (Berlin, 1986), pp. 445-55, esp. p. 449.

⁵⁹⁷ Rasmussen, 'Hölle', p. 450.

⁵⁹⁸ "cognitio intellectualis", Augustine, *De trinitate* XII.15.25, CCSL 50.1, p. 379, l. 42-3. Cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.7, CSEL 28.1, p. 387, l. 27: "intellectuale genus visionis".

⁵⁹⁹ "cogitatione sapimus, aut sensu aut intellectu capimus", Augustine, *De immortalitate animae* VI.10 (PL 32: 1026). Cf. *Retractationes* I.1.2 (PL 32: 586): "est enim sensus et mentis".

show that inanimate objects only experience heat as an adverse effect of fire, but are incapable of suffering.⁶⁰¹ The soul properly suffers because of the intentional change (*immutatio intentionalis*) brought about by hellfire, which is a position that mirrors Augustine's definition of the spiritual vision.⁶⁰² Giles also sets apart the kind of suffering experienced by the body: it is affected both by the real and the intentional change, whereby what Giles calls the *immutatio realis* heats the body whereas the *immutatio intentionalis* affects the senses: both *intentiones* do not affect a stone since it lacks the capacity of sensation.⁶⁰³

Giles uses the Augustinian position of the superiority of the spiritual over the corporeal to show that spiritual entities are susceptible to the influence of a higher entity.⁶⁰⁴ In this case the possible intellect is influenced by impressions and memories outside itself, the *fantasmata*, with which the intellect is unified through action of the active intellect.⁶⁰⁵ Giles combines the Augustinian position with the Aristotelian definition of the intellect. Giles argues that since the form follows upon the action, God's *virtus* causes a corporal entity (hellfire) to generate its likeness in the spirit, which then causes an adverse effect and real pain.⁶⁰⁶ God's action does not cause the soul to be heated – this only happens as an *immutatio realis* to a living body – but nonetheless causes hellfire to burn and hurt the soul as an *immutatio intentionalis*.⁶⁰⁷ Giles even holds that this intentional change of the disembodied spirit causes greater pain than both real and intentional change would cause to a living human being: in the latter case the

⁶⁰⁰ "pati dolorem, hoc est, sentire dolorem, pati enim ab igne, hoc est, sentire nocivam impressionem ab igne factam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 39^{vb}; l. 34-6, Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* II.9, fol. 17^{ra}.

⁶⁰¹ "patiuntur enim lapides positi in igne [...] sed lapides sic patiuntur quod non dolent", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 39^{vb}, l. 52-4. Cf. Augustine, *De trinitate* XI.II.[2], CCSL 50.1, p. 334-6.

⁶⁰² "dolor formaliter sit ex intentione intentionaliter", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 39^{vb}, l. 51-2. *Formaliter* is an indication that Giles consciously employs the Augustinian terminology.

⁶⁰³ "Est ergo in carne duplex passio. Una realis, in quantum realiter calefit, alia intentionalis, in quantum immutatur sensus, quamvis et non immutatur sensus lapidis, quia caret sensu", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{ra}, l. 34-8.

⁶⁰⁴ "non esse inconueniens corporalia immutare intentionaliter spiritualia in virtute spiritualis agentis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{ra}, l. 56-8, quoting his own *Quodlibet* II.9, fol. 17^{va}.

⁶⁰⁵ "unio ipsius possibilis ad fantasmata [...] in virtute intellectus agentis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{rb}, l. 9-14.

⁶⁰⁶ "accio sequitur formam [...] in virtute superioris agentis, ut in virtute Dei corporalia possint aliquam imprimere similitudinem in spiritu, displicentem, et verum dolorem causantem", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{rb}, l. 16-39.

immutatio realis eventually destroys the capacity of sensation and consequently will minimise the total amount of pain.⁶⁰⁸

In chapter thirteen, Giles further expands his views on the suffering of disembodied spirits by means of their intellect. An introductory passage briefly examines how the senses can be influenced by an immaterial entity.⁶⁰⁹ Giles holds that it is possible for something material to be influenced by an immaterial entity, exercising an *immutatio intentionalis*. Conversely, Giles is more interested in the case of something material – in this particular case hellfire – influencing an immaterial entity, a disembodied spirit.⁶¹⁰ The first part of chapter thirteen is little more than a mere repetition of the respective passages of chapter twelve: the separated soul suffers from corporeal hellfire because God's action through His divine virtue as an intentional change.⁶¹¹ Giles identifies the intellect as the central relay, transmitting the adverse effects of hellfire to the soul's attention and immaterial sensation.⁶¹² Giles combines his findings with a commonly used quotation of Gregory the Great, who explains that the soul sees and feels its sufferings in hell.⁶¹³ Chapter thirteen continues with a detailed distinction of material and immaterial entities, explaining that some entities are exclusively material, such as stones or trees. Other material entities additionally participate in immaterial conditions, which is the case of sense organs of the body. The soul and the spirit are exclusively immaterial, and any immaterial change they sustain, involves no physical link. In other words, the mental correlate of a physical suffering, the *intentio*, can exist even in the absence of its physical cause. The disembodied spirit

⁶⁰⁷ "poterit ignis inferni in virtute Dei, aliquam intentionem horribilem causare in spiritum, qua magis cruciabitur [...] spiritus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{rb}, l. 44-6.

⁶⁰⁸ "sed et plus dolet anima et plus cruciatur quam caro, quia plus dependet anima a Deo, in cuius virtute agit ignis inferni quam dependeat caro a que qualitatibus sensibilibus", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{va}, l. 7-11.

⁶⁰⁹ "quomodo sensus et subiectivus specierum sine materia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{va}, l. 31-2.

⁶¹⁰ "non est inconueniens materialia agere in immaterialia", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione*, XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{va}, l. 46-7.

⁶¹¹ "Ignis ergo inferni in virtute Dei, agit in animam, intentionaliter immutando ipsam: secundum quam modum eam affliget, et cruciabit", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{va}, l. 47-50.

⁶¹² "ignis inferni in virtute Dei causabit in intellectu anime separate sed causat in intellectu spiritus maligni immutationem quamdam intentionalem: per quam vere affligitur anima", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{va}, l. 58-40^{vb}, l. 1-4.

⁶¹³ "anima crematur in inferno, quia viderunt se cremari: ut exponatur, videlicet, pro sentit, et sit sensus anima crematur, quia videt et quia sentit se cremari", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 40^{vb}, l. 8-11, quoting Gregory the Great, *Dialogues* IV.40, U. Moricca (ed.), *Gregorii Magni Dialogi*

feels pain indiscernible from physical pain, even though its cause is not straightforwardly physical. Whereas for the living human being both intentional and real *immutatio* apply, the separated soul is only touched by the *immutatio intentionalis*.⁶¹⁴ According to Giles, *virtus divina*, God's will and influence, is the core element of the mechanism of suffering of disembodied spirits.⁶¹⁵ Giles concludes chapter thirteen with a reference to the parable of Dives and Lazarus, which he has already discussed in chapter eight of *De predestinatione*. This time he uses the parable to illustrate the mechanism of suffering: had Dives been exposed to hellfire with both body and soul, his suffering would happen exactly according to Augustine's theory of sensation: the pain would pass from the body to the soul.⁶¹⁶ If, however, Dives were exposed to hellfire already separated from his body – which is the case in hell – he would suffer through his intellect through the intervention of divine power. God as the First Cause, in Giles's terms *causa causarum*, enables the suffering of disembodied spirits even in the absence of a physical cause.⁶¹⁷ Chapter fourteen recapitulates the findings of both chapters twelve and thirteen in the matter of the suffering of disembodied spirits. In the context of this question, Giles mainly focuses on the question whether the pain felt as a result of an intentional change in the separated soul is equal to the pain felt in the case of a soul still linked to its body.⁶¹⁸ In the final paragraph of chapter fourteen, Giles explicitly adapts Augustine's theory of sensation to his findings on the suffering of

Libri IV (Istituto Storico Italiano, Fonti per la Storia d'Italia) (Rome, 1924), pp. 292-5. Giles uses the same quotation in *Quodlibet* II.9, fol. 17^{vb}.

⁶¹⁴ "Mors ergo illa anime, que est afflictio, et dolor, quam habet in inferno numquam morietur, nec finietur, quia numquam talis passio abiciet a substantia [...] et semper affligetur in illo igne, ut et plene appareat illius vite miseria", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 41^{ra}, l. 19-25.

⁶¹⁵ "virtute divina facit ignis inferni in intellectu", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 41^{ra}, l. 35-6.

⁶¹⁶ "Si ergo dives ille dum vivebat in corpore, fuisset positus in igne, et cruciaretur lingua eius in flamma, pervenisset dolor ad animam per corpus, mediante sensu lingue", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 41^{rb}, l. 3-6.

⁶¹⁷ "Deus enim est causa causarum, et quicquid facit mediantibus causis secundis, potest facere sine illis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIII, Cambrai, fol. 41^{rb}, l. 19-21.

⁶¹⁸ "quia [...] vera pena est et verus dolor", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 41^{vb}, l. 27-8.

disembodied spirits in hell.⁶¹⁹ Not only does the separated soul suffer the adverse effects of hellfire, but it also endures incarceration, having lost its liberty and free will.⁶²⁰

4.5 Purgatory

Chapter fifteen of *De predestinatione* is the first and only occasion where Giles departs from his strictly dualistic view of heaven and hell, and where he acknowledges for the first time the existence of the 'third place', purgatory. Giles's interpretation of purgatory, in contrast to his interpretation of other issues, does not form part of previous extant works such as his *Quodlibets*. The topic could have been expected to form part of the commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*. Since Giles never completed that work it can be assumed that chapter fifteen either formed part of preliminary studies of the commentary on the fourth book or was written at the time when *De predestinatione* was compiled.⁶²¹

In view of Giles's repeated emphasis on his adhering to orthodox Church doctrine and authority as part of a teaching tool for pre-academic students of his own Order, it is not surprising that he should include a brief discussion of purgatory. As Le Goff has pointed out, the formal acceptance of purgatory amongst the official doctrine of the Church only happened in 1274 at the second Council of Lyons, some ten years before Giles wrote his treatise.⁶²² This acceptance made it impossible for Giles to disregard the issue, especially in connection with topics such as paradise and hell. Rather, purgatory forms an integral part of this educational treatise intended for students preparing for their studies at the University of Paris, teaching them fundamental – if recent – orthodox theology.

⁶¹⁹ "Est enim diligenter notandum ad plenam intelligentiam dictorum Augustini, ut possimus adaptare verba sua ad nostrum propositum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{ra}, l. 8-10.

⁶²⁰ "anima existens in inferno, duplicem passionem habet, vel dupliciter dolet. Primo, quia ibi incarceratur; secundo quia sic incarcerata cruciatur [...] libertatem perdet", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XIV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{ra}, l. 10-9.

⁶²¹ Peter Lombard, IV *Sententiarum*. d. 21 (pp. 379-86), d. 45 (pp. 523-9). The 1516 Basilea edition of Giles's commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences* is spurious: N. Mattioli, *Studio critico sopra Egidio Romano Colonna arcivescovo di Bourges dell' ordine romitano di Sant'Agostino*, Antologia Agostiniana I (Rome, 1896), p. 159. See also J. Le Goff, *Purgatory*, p. 148. See Luna, 'La lecture', p. 183 on Giles's composition of the commentary on the fourth book on the *Sentences*.

⁶²² Le Goff, *Purgatory*, p. 237.

At the beginning of chapter fifteen Giles briefly explains the tripartite structure of the treatise divided in predestination and foreknowledge, paradise and hell.⁶²³ He recapitulates his objective in unfolding the meaning of heaven and hell as the final destinations of the saved and damned. He also refers to Augustine's Latin and Greek etymologies of hell as a place below the earth, a receptacle for the dead (Latin) and a place that lacks pleasantness (Greek).⁶²⁴ From this Giles develops his own definition of hell as containing everything the damned souls dislike and nothing they like. Hellfire provides the light that illuminates the pain the damned suffer but does not enlighten their consolation and joy; it rather increases suffering and pain.⁶²⁵ This is an interesting cross-reference to the example of seeing and feeling pain Giles includes in chapter twelve. Here, the frame of reference is Isidore of Seville's *Sentences* and the passage of Daniel 3 on the Jews at the court of Nebuchadnezzar. The example emphasises that God's justice only applies to those who deserve it: the Jews's guards perished in the furnace, but they escaped unharmed. This is an indirect reference to the concept of 'merit', whereby God's justice applies to everyone, but punishes those who contravene his precepts. By analogy, punishment concerns the damned souls in hell but not the blessed in paradise.⁶²⁶

This well-known Scriptural example serves as an introduction of how divine justice is differentiated according to different degrees of guilt and sin, raising the question of whether eternal punishment may be excessive in some cases. It is a question which is connected to the previously discussed issue of the extent of God's mercy, as well as to the debate in early Christianity of whether divine punishments are purgatorial and therefore temporal or eternal. He combines this with Isidore of Seville's definition (based on Augustine) of the three possible destinations of a human being after death. God intends paradise for those who die in a state of grace, purgatory for those who do not die in a state of grace but want to repent, and hell for those who die without grace

⁶²³ "tractatum, quam intitulare volumus de predestinatione et prescientia, ratione quorum de paradiso ad quem feruntur predestinati, et de inferno, ad quem feruntur presciti", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{rb}, l. 18-23.

⁶²⁴ "latina lingua hoc sonet, ut dicatur infernus locus inferior, subtus terram [...] secundum linguam grecam, origo nominis inferi appellatur, ex eo quod nichil suave habeant", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{rb}, l. 28-35. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII.34, CSEL 28.1, p. 431, l. 10-1, 13-4.

⁶²⁵ "infernum [...] dampnatis displiceat, et nihil quod eis placeat: ut si ignis inferni potest habere lumen ad dampnatorum dolorem, hoc modo lucet, ad eorum autem consolationem et gaudium non lucet", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{rb}, l. 41-5.

and do not want to repent.⁶²⁷ This scheme is completed by the categories of the children's limbo (those infants dying before being baptised) and the limbo of the Patriarchs (having died before the Advent of Christ).⁶²⁸ The categorisation, according to Le Goff, was widely accepted after Gratian restated them in the 1140s.⁶²⁹ Giles recapitulates the basic characteristics of the limbo of the Patriarchs which only exists until the Second Coming when Christ will disband it, paving the way to heaven by his *passio*.⁶³⁰ Another brief reference mentions the location of purgatory, which Giles identifies as the same location, a *locus communi*, as hell. Giles's geographical description is noteworthy and reflects his views on the duration of punishment. In his view, only the temporal aspect of punishments distinguishes hell from purgatory; otherwise, both entities possess the same characteristics.

The second half of chapter fifteen examines a question related to purgatory. It is an enquiry into the question whether divine justice should administer eternal punishment for a temporal (mortal) sin.⁶³¹ This in itself is not an attempt of denying purgatory, since even though every mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, it is a sign of God's mercy that some of these sentences are commuted to temporal punishment in purgatory.⁶³² The question should be seen in the context of the particular and the general divine judgement. Giles, in accordance with fundamental Church doctrine, distinguishes between the two manifestations of divine justice: the particular judgement taking place immediately after the death of the individual and the general judgement at the end of time, affecting all humanity.⁶³³ Purgatory only affects the individual between his death and the final day of God's general judgement at the end of time. Once the general

⁶²⁶ "Est ergo paradisu, locus quomodo sunt anime optime, infernu, in quo pessime, illi itaque, qui sunt in inferno, in eternum erunt dampnati", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{va}, l. 5-8.

⁶²⁷ "triplicem locum, videlicet paradisu, qui est decedentium in gratia, et non habentium aliquid purgatoriu non et infernu dampnatorum, qui est decedentium sine gratia, et non valentium purgationem recipere", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{va}, l. 45-50.

⁶²⁸ "Preter ergo paradisu bonorum, et infernu dampnatorum, et purgatoriu, est dare quare et tamen limbu puerorum. In super, preter hoc omnia quatuor loca, ante adventu Christi erat dare quintum locum, limbu, scilicet sanctorum patrum", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{vb}, l. 6-11.

⁶²⁹ Le Goff, *Purgatory*, p. 220.

⁶³⁰ "ante passionem Christi, clausa erat lamia regni celestis, quia nondum solutum erat precium pro peccato primi hominis", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 42^{vb}, l. 11-4.

⁶³¹ "difficultatem hanc aperire, et declarare quomodo deceat divinam iustitiam, pro peccato temporali infligere eternam penam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 43^{ra}, l. 1-3.

⁶³² "Omnibus autem hiis viis, declarabimus decens esse pro peccato temporali debere infligi penam eternam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 43^{ra}, l. 7-8.

judgement is pronounced, purgatory no longer exists since from thence every individual either belongs to heaven or hell.

Giles divides the question of whether divine judgement should always be eternal into four sections, which in turn examine the kind of punishment administered, the kind of sin committed (eternal or not) and God's part in deciding what sin is awarded which punishment.

Giles's *prima via* lists the possible kinds of punishment, which he takes from Augustine quoting Cicero, as well as from the Bible. Cicero's eight categories of punishment represent the then current Roman law code; the quotation from Scripture is the well-known 'eye for eye etc.'. Giles very clearly states that mortal sin requires eternal punishment, explaining that temporal punishment is not by itself sufficient.⁶³⁴ Giles emphasises, however, that it is not for a human being to criticise God's exercise of justice: His mercy finally decides about the precise nature of the punishment administered.⁶³⁵

Giles's second aspect argues from the point of view of the individual sinning human being: is it just that the individual is punished in eternity for one single, mortal, unrepented sin, even though he has lived the rest of his life without sinning? Giles takes the viewpoint of Gregory the Great to explain that God is right to administer an eternal judgement.⁶³⁶ Again, this is no implicit denial of the existence of purgatory: God is free to show mercy, but it is not within the individual's power to decide whether He is right or wrong in whatever punishment He chooses. Giles further underlines this standpoint in his fourth and final section: a human sin is a fundamental offence to God's infinite goodness. Therefore the only adequate punishment is equally eternal.⁶³⁷ Giles distinguishes between two kinds of punishment: its *acerbitas* (severity) and its duration.

⁶³³ Dictionnaire de théologie catholique VIII.2 (Paris, 1925), col. 1721.

⁶³⁴ "pene, non adequantur in celeritate temporis cum peccatis. Ut si quis per morulam parve delectatus est, si ex hoc puniatur pena dampni; non oportet quod solum per tantam morulam patiatur huiusmodi penam", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 43^{ra}, l. 22-7.

⁶³⁵ "non debemus Deum de iniustitia arguere, sed de iustitia commendare", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 43^{ra}, l. 42-3.

⁶³⁶ Gregory the Great, *Dialogues* IV.41 (5-6), Moricca, pp. 296-7.

⁶³⁷ "cum offendamus infinitum bonum, indignum est quod in infinitum puniamur", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 43^{rb}, l. 25-7.

Since, according to Giles, the severity of a punishment is final, its duration however not, the only just punishment is eternal.⁶³⁸

4.6 Conclusion

The third section of *De predestinatione* differs from the two previous sections in its lack of coherence. Hell serves only as the general frame of reference. The section reflects the then current theological debates of the late thirteenth century with Giles's brief discussion of purgatory as a case in point. Differences in style reflect the fact that its chapters stem from previous works such as Giles's second *Quodlibet*, question nine. Some sections, especially those containing extensive paraphrases of Augustine, might have served as teaching material for members of the Augustinian Hermits. Other sections were written for the academic audience of the Faculty of Theology at Paris. Extensive paraphrases of Augustine's works, marked in italics in the edition are an early proof of the revival of Augustine's works later quite apparent in the fourteenth century. The findings of the third section, but also of the first two sections of *De predestinatione* contradict such claims that with the introduction of Aristotle there was a serious eclipsing of Augustine's influence amongst Paris intellectuals. Giles's positions do not qualify as part of the Neo-Augustinian movement either, since his work is more committed to presenting Augustine's standpoints rather than to take them as a starting point to develop an independent Neo-Augustinian concept. Giles's third section provides the essential knowledge he is likely to have expected from his students.

⁶³⁸ "Non autem potest ibi esse infinitas, quantum ad acerbitem, quia vel non est possibile esse huiusmodi infinitatem: vel si esset possibilis talis infinitas, creatura eam durare non posset", Giles of Rome, *De predestinatione* XV, Cambrai, fol. 43^{rb}, l. 40-4.

General Conclusion

Modern scholarship has, to date, largely passed by *De predestinatione*, which is not unusual for Giles's theological oeuvre. Although the treatise is not an utterly original work, it nonetheless presents an original ordering of the questions treated. Giles does not content himself with only repeating commonplace theological and philosophical knowledge, holding mainly an Augustinian position, combined with elements of other authors such as Boethius, Anselm or Gregory the Great.

The treatise covers a wide-ranging number of topics whose arrangement of questions is unique amongst contemporary works. Its style varies considerably between the three main sections, presenting a dialectical form of argument in the sections on predestination and foreknowledge as well as on hell, and the exegetical analysis according to the four senses of Scripture in the second section on paradise, whose main characteristic is the preoccupation with setting down well-established Church doctrine without commenting upon it. Giles's form of argumentation reflects the characteristics of each of the three topics: in contrast to the dialectical style in the first and third sections, pursuing a mainly philosophical (for section one) and theological (for section three) line of argument, the second part reflects a topic which was accepted orthodox Church doctrine, which in the judgement of scholastic authors did not need any further proof or explanation.

The analysis of the work shows that Giles does not put forward any particular or reasoned order of his topics, a characteristic that is most apparent in the third section on hell. Some of the arguments seem to be placed at random, and since Giles offers no explanation for his line of thought, this makes a final assessment of the treatise's composition quite difficult.

The three topics of the *De predestinatione* are central to the Christian tradition, but do not all belong to the core of Christian theology. This particularly applies to Giles's discourse on divine predestination and its interaction with human free will. A difficult subject throughout the Christian era, Giles firmly places himself within that tradition and tenaciously holds that God's (fore)knowledge is compatible with free human decisions, without, however, presenting a new and original treatment or, indeed, any conclusive proofs for his position. His encyclopaedic overview of the issue fails to provide a definite and irrefutable answer of the problem, which is probably the reason why the treatise did not attain a more prominent status amongst Giles's works, or,

indeed, in the opinion of his contemporaries and successors. The enumeration of different characteristics of necessity in the longest chapter of *De predestinatione* assembles scholastic commonplaces. Here, the treatise offers little originality, and refrains from any prolonged and in-depth discussion of contemporary or near-contemporary works. The only original, if embryonic theory is Giles's position on the metaphysical character of an event, discussed in the fifth distinction on necessity: in his view events have an essential quality, free or contingent, prior to and separated from a later inclusion into a connected world of event happenings. Nonetheless, as is to be observed in many other instances of the treatise, Giles does not develop his argument further and contents himself with presenting his findings, rather than drawing them out into an independent theory, notwithstanding that might touch upon far-reaching philosophical implications such as the matter of the inalterability of God's knowledge of the past.

The second section on paradise is explained within the frame of a formal exegetical explanation, whose emphasis lies on setting down Church doctrine rather than speculating about it. The topic chosen fits in with this characteristic: the characteristics of paradise were not subject to academic disputes, but thoroughly accepted doctrine by scholastic authors. A lecture in orthodox theology is also prompted by the nature of the Scriptural extract chosen by Giles as his textual basis, namely Genesis 2. The inherent qualities of paradise, especially the fact that this concept is beyond the limitations of the human mind which cannot comprehend the divine, further consolidate the internal structuring of the second part, and serve to show that through the analysis of the topic in the four senses the reader is gradually guided towards a deeper meaning and reality pointing towards the divine truth. Theological and academic concepts necessarily depend upon human approximations but nonetheless point towards a more profound understanding of the implications of the divine truth. This does not preclude frequent repetitions within Giles's analysis which is due to the strict and inflexible structure of exegesis according to the four senses.

The third section, although dialectical in its form of rhetoric resolving into a doctrinal statement, does not show any particular or reasoned order of argument. The absence of any internal or external logic for Giles's choice of argument renders it sometimes difficult to follow the section's discourse. The extensive use of paraphrases and quotations of Augustine's texts, even more than in the previous two sections, lead to a reassessment of when Augustine became a proper object of study in the Middle Ages.

An introductory chapter serves to only give a brief summary of the issues raised by Augustine in view of the advancement of methods of enquiry available to the late thirteenth century. Giles concentrates at first upon a theological explanation based upon Augustine's findings, which he combines with the Aristotelian understanding of the physical world, showing, however, that Augustine's theological and Aristotle's philosophical models of explanation cannot be easily combined. As in other instances, Giles then ends his analysis, thereby avoiding having to attempt to elaborate his own theory how to reconcile Augustine's and Aristotle's standpoints. The assimilation of Aristotle's theory of cognition on the basis of Augustine's findings of the soul is a case in point, providing the key to understanding Giles's position on the suffering of disembodied spirits.

As one of the prominent thinkers of the generation after Thomas Aquinas and the author of over sixty treatises in the fields of theology, philosophy and Church politics Giles has long been recognised. His role as a teacher, however, is much more varied than previously assumed. His failure to be granted the *licentia docendi* at the end of a up to then flawless university career has drawn the main interest of modern scholarship to a fascinating if difficult period of Giles's life and work. Inadequate and insufficient documentation renders difficult a thorough and final assessment of the happenings of the 1277 condemnations. Nonetheless it is likely, as has confirmed recent research, that Giles's condemnation was a result of his being caught between Faculty politics and the then prevalent climate which favoured a reduction of the influence of Aristotelian and Averroist teachings on the interpretation of theology. This happened at a time when power relationships within and outside the University of Paris had measurable implications on doctrinal standpoints, and when traditional philosophical issues were equally important as the powers within the institutional context.

The censure certainly reflects Giles's own conflicting and highly complex relationship towards authority, refusing to bow to Faculty politics – not accepting a retraction in 1277 – and persevering instead with his research outside of the university circles, continuing to publish, without however doing any university teaching. It is at this point that an analysis of *De predestinatione* sheds a very interesting light on Giles's equally important role as a teacher for his own Order. Once the usual progress of an academic career was put on hold by the events of 1277, Giles took an active role in structuring and developing not only his Order's administration, but the organisation of studies for members of the Augustinian Hermits. Giles was instrumental in the

elaboration of the *Constitutiones Ratisbonenses*, which regulated in detail the studies in the different houses of the Order as well as the *studium generale* at Paris. At a time when Giles was not allowed to teach at university level, he fully grasped the necessity for a young and growing Order to ensure the best possible education within the Order to allow its members a smooth continuation once they had fulfilled the necessary formal requirements to begin their studies at the University of Paris. The Augustinian Hermits recognised Giles's merits, and declared all of his writings to be the doctrine of the Order, in a judgement that was binding for all Augustinian masters, lecturers and students. Although there is no extant documentation fully to explain this quite unusual step of declaring a living person's doctrine as doctrine for a whole Order, this nonetheless shows that Giles was respected and much appreciated within the Order.

The declaration took place in 1287, which probably coincides with the composition of *De predestinatione* written c. 1287-90. Cross-references of the work with other treatises of Giles (his *Quodlibets*, his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima* to name but a few) allow to narrow down the date of composition. *De predestinatione* bears many characteristics of a teaching tool, a textbook for prospective university students of the Augustinian Hermits. The large range of topics covered by the treatise point towards this usage, and a lengthy textual presentation of Augustine's works would not have befitted the academic audience of the Faculty of Theology at Paris, whose members were well acquainted with his (Augustine's) works and who would have regarded parts of the treatise as only a minor academic contribution. The treatise assembles in one single work the basic knowledge required for beginning a course of theology at Paris University. This contributes to explaining the treatise's shortcomings such as repetitions, the absence of fully developed analyses and conclusions. The orthodoxy of the statements might reflect a conscious decision to exclude any potentially controversial conclusions, but rather points towards Giles's intended audience, predominantly prospective students of theology of his own Order.

Giles's extensive use of Augustine in *De predestinatione* also leads to a reassessment of when Augustine became a proper object of study in the Middle Ages. Since it has long been held that it was the scholars of the Augustinian Order in the middle of the fourteenth century who first went back to examine and discuss Augustine's texts in their own right, Giles's comprehensive use of Augustine provides an interesting insight in a hitherto assumed eclipse of Augustine's influence amongst Paris intellectuals. The treatise presents a sometimes complicated and potentially

controversial discourse on the validity of the Augustinian approach of theology, since Giles follows Augustine's conclusions as far as they are coherent with recently discovered Aristotelian works. Giles does not simply regurgitate Augustine's positions but chooses to present them in a more concise form suited to his subsequent argumentation. In this sense Giles cannot be seen as a precursor of the Neo-Augustinian movement of the fourteenth century: the Augustinian standpoint is central to Giles's thought, but he does not develop an independent Neo-Augustinian position. Neither can he be seen as a precursor of those who in the first half of the fourteenth century combine Aristotle's and Augustine's findings to a new synthesis. Giles's position is much different from that of Marsilius of Padua (1275/80-1342/43) who used the combination of arguments from what Brett calls 'Aristotelianism' and 'Augustinianism' in his *Defensor pacis* (1324): a text written in a turbulent climate to serve concrete political ends,⁶³⁹ where the Augustinian ideas of sin, history and the creation of the human order are fused with the Aristotelian concepts of nature and the good.⁶⁴⁰ Marsilius' position clearly constitutes a new development in the history of ideas. Giles belongs to another era of those scholastics whose synthesis of Augustine and Aristotle rests within the framework of the Augustinian view which is complemented with Aristotle's findings as long as the latter are not called into question by the former. Even more striking in this respect is the position of James of Viterbo, Giles's successor in his chair at the University of Paris. In his *De regimine christiano* dating from 1301-02 James takes up his position in response to Giles's *Unam sanctam* published shortly afterwards. According to Walther James's conclusions do not differ from Giles's but he uses a strikingly different way of argumentation. His combination of the Augustinian and Aristotelian positions shows a pronounced tendency towards Aristotle (Walther describes this as "seen through Aristotle's lens") whilst nonetheless positing Augustine's theology as an unquestionably authority.⁶⁴¹ In this context another factor should be taken into account. At his reinstatement in 1285 Giles became the first Augustinian professor at Paris. In view of his Order's allegiance to Augustine, it is not surprising that Giles should draw extensively on this author, anxious to follow his Order's interests to establish itself amongst the other powerful Mendicant Orders, in particular what

⁶³⁹ Brett calls it "Christian politics", p. 293.

⁶⁴⁰ Brett, pp. 290-1.

⁶⁴¹ Walther, 'Aegidius Romanus', p. 161: "Selbst wenn Jakob meint, Augustinus selbst als unzweifelbare Autorität anführen zu müssen, liest er inzwischen die Ausführungen des Kirchenvaters mit der Brille des Aristotelikers".

concerns its position at the University of Paris. At Giles's time, a particular emphasis on presenting the Augustinian standpoint may well stem from the Order's close adherence to their patron, and the consequent need for a careful interpretation of his works for the benefit of the Order's students, a viewpoint later authors, also Augustinian Hermits like James of Viterbo, might no longer have adhered to that strictly. The reception of Giles's ideas in the fourteenth century went further than just academic circles. John of Paris, John Lemoint, William of Durant, William of Ockham, Peter of Palude, and Thomas Sutton amongst others all responded to Giles's positions, partly agreeing with it, partly refuting it.⁶⁴²

De predestinatione sheds light on a particular stretch of Giles's career, and although it probably only served as a textbook, this should not obscure the fact that Giles was one of the prominent thinkers of the generation after Thomas Aquinas. As the author of highly complex philosophical, theological and political works, *De predestinatione* surprises in its sometimes unusual line of argumentation and presents not expected shortcomings. In some passages the work seems to be a compilation of texts at various finished stages, in others it is little more than a recapitulation of previously published material (this is particularly apparent in chapter twelve of the treatise, which is largely based upon Giles's second *Quodlibet*, question nine). If the treatise's intriguing composition leaves the boundaries of a scholastic academic treatise, sometimes lacking the rigour and precision an academic would expect, this does not diminish its author's standing as a respected academic since it was not written as a scholastic treatise but as a useful preparatory textbook.

Giles's work and thought is an important witness for the theological debates of the late thirteenth century. His oeuvre was widely read and appreciated by his contemporaries, especially his commentaries on Aristotle's works. This does not say, however, that his opinion passed unquestioned. The fact that Giles's teachings were declared the doctrine of his Order even during his lifetime should not obscure the fact that his contemporaries as well as later authors had different viewpoints. Giles's work paved the way for those scholastics of the fourteenth century who developed their own Augustinian 'school of thought', such as Gregory of Rimini. Although research on the

⁶⁴² For a detailed discussion of this see J.R. Eastman, *Aegidius Romanus De renunciatione pape. Texts and Studies in Religion*, vol. 52 (Lewiston, 1992), pp. 14-20, although I do not agree with Eastman's divisions of several 'schools of thought'. As discussed in chapter one, these categories are far too rigid for a comprehensive 'history of ideas'.

question of late medieval Augustinianism⁶⁴³ has progressed over the last twenty-five years our knowledge is still at the beginning, dependent upon more critical editions as well their commentaries.⁶⁴⁴ Giles's thought certainly differs from the new Augustinian school of the fourteenth century as defined by Courtenay, since this developed a new Augustinian doctrine in matters of theology, philosophy and political theory; what Saak and Trapp call "a shift away from the varying accents on the definition of Augustinianism and a drift back towards historical descriptions of the reception of the "original Augustine", divorced from *a priori* concepts of what it entailed".⁶⁴⁵ One example should suffice to demonstrate the difference between Giles's approach to Augustine and changed the fourteenth century attitude. In the fourteenth century Augustine was quoted according to a strict "logico-critical" system (Trapp).⁶⁴⁶ Giles on the other hand contented himself with cursory references to Augustine, sometimes not even giving the precise passage of the work he quotes and sometimes omitting a direct reference at all. It cannot be said that the present work has exhausted the possibilities for research into the *De predestinatione*. A comparison with other treatises of Giles, especially those which are not commentaries of Aristotle's works would contribute to a better understanding of Giles's position in the history of ideas in the late thirteenth century.

⁶⁴³ On the question how to define 'Augustinianism' see E.L. Saak, 'Augustine in the Later Middle Ages', in: I. Backus (ed.), *The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West. From the Carolingians to the Maurists*, vol. 1 (Leiden-New York-Cologne, 1997), pp. 367-405, esp. p. 374.

⁶⁴⁴ Saak, 'Augustine', p. 369.

⁶⁴⁵ Saak, 'Augustine', p. 375. Cf. also W.J. Courtenay, *Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England* (Princeton, 1987), pp. 305-24, esp. 310-1.

⁶⁴⁶ D. Trapp, 'Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore', *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), pp. 146-274, esp. p. 249.

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