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Main Title: The one player guessing game: a diagnosis on the relationship between equilibrium play, beliefs, and best responses
Author(s): Bosch-Rosa, Ciril
Meissner, Thomas
Type: Article
Abstract: Experiments involving games have two dimensions of difficulty for subjects in the laboratory. One is understanding the rules and structure of the game and the other is forming beliefs about the behavior of other players. Typically, these two dimensions cannot be disentangled as belief formation crucially depends on the understanding of the game. We present the one-player guessing game, a variation of the two-player guessing game (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008 ), which turns an otherwise strategic game into an individual decision-making task. The results show that a majority of subjects fail to understand the structure of the game. Moreover, subjects with a better understanding of the structure of the game form more accurate beliefs of other player’s choices, and also better-respond to these beliefs.
Subject(s): cognitive sophistication
guessing game
strategic thinking
equilibrium play
belief formation
Issue Date: 11-Feb-2020
Date Available: 4-Mar-2021
Language Code: en
DDC Class: 330 Wirtschaft
Sponsor/Funder: TU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel – 2020
DFG, 5486220, SFB 649: Ökonomisches Risiko
DFG, 280092119, TRR 190: Rationalität und Wettbewerb: Die ökonomische Leistungsfähigkeit von Individuen und Unternehmen
Journal Title: Experimental Economics
Publisher: SpringerNature
Volume: 23
Issue: 4
Publisher DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09642-2
Page Start: 1129
Page End: 1147
EISSN: 1573-6938
ISSN: 1386-4157
TU Affiliation(s): Fak. 7 Wirtschaft und Management » Inst. Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsrecht (IVWR) » FG Makroökonomik
Appears in Collections:Technische Universität Berlin » Publications

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