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Main Title: Configuration Equilibrium Model of Product Variant Design Driven by Customer Requirements
Author(s): Yang, Qin
Bian, Xianjun
Stark, Rainer
Fresemann, Carina
Song, Fei
Type: Article
Language Code: en
Abstract: In view of the dynamic change of customer requirements (CRs) during the process of product use, in this paper we propose a Bayesian Nash equilibrium configuration model for product variant design driven by CRs. By analyzing CRs, the complete variant requirements of the products can be obtained. Combined with modularization and parameterization variant design methods, a parametric variant instance is proposed. Since cost and delivery time are affected by the product variant design, firms and customers are established as two decision-making bodies, and Bayesian Nash theory is introduced to the product configuration. The theory takes the product cost and customer satisfaction as the payoff function of the game, and based on the threshold value search of the customer satisfaction it determines the strategy set of the two parties. The Nash equilibrium solution equation is established and solved by a simulated annealing algorithm. The optimal product configuration scheme satisfying the interests of both sides of the game is obtained. Finally, the automatic guided vehicle (AGV) is taken as an example to illustrate the effectiveness and practicability of the method.
Issue Date: 8-Apr-2019
Date Available: 26-Aug-2019
DDC Class: 004 Datenverarbeitung; Informatik
330 Wirtschaft
Subject(s): customer requirements
variant design
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
payoff function
simulated annealing algorithm
Journal Title: Symmetry
Publisher: MDPI
Publisher Place: Basel
Volume: 11
Issue: 4
Article Number: 208
Publisher DOI: 10.3390/sym11040508
EISSN: 2073-8994
Appears in Collections:FG Industrielle Informationstechnik » Publications

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