A Theory of Optimal Green Defaults

dc.contributor.authorMeran, Georg
dc.contributor.authorSchwarze, Reimund
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-10T07:26:44Z
dc.date.available2019-09-10T07:26:44Z
dc.date.issued2018-08-16
dc.date.updated2019-08-01T06:45:30Z
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops an analytical framework for studying the Baumol–Oates efficiency of traditional single instrument abatement policies vis-à-vis green defaults in the face of price inertia and passive choice by subpopulations. In this special case of behavioural heterogeneity, command and control approaches can outperform price-based instruments while pure tax/subsidy schemes need to be adjusted in order to achieve politically desired levels of abatement. We also prove that choice-preserving nudges are superior to any single-instrument policy in this case. An average marginal abatement cost rule is developed to optimize the green defaults and traditional policies of standards and prices under different degrees of market rigidity.en
dc.description.sponsorshipEC/H2020/653255/EU/PLAtform for Climate Adaptation and Risk reDuction/PLACARDen
dc.identifier.eissn2071-1050
dc.identifier.urihttps://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/9980
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-8971
dc.language.isoenen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
dc.subject.ddc330 Wirtschaftde
dc.subject.othernudgeen
dc.subject.otherpolicy mixen
dc.subject.otherbehavioural heterogeneityen
dc.subject.otherenvironmental taxes and subsidiesen
dc.titleA Theory of Optimal Green Defaultsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.articlenumber2902en
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.3390/su10082902en
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue8en
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleSustainabilityen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameMDPIen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceBaselen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume10en
tub.accessrights.dnbfreeen
tub.affiliationFak. 7 Wirtschaft und Management::Inst. Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsrecht (IVWR)::FG Volkswirtschaftlehre, Wirtschaftspolitik und Umweltökonomiede
tub.affiliation.facultyFak. 7 Wirtschaft und Managementde
tub.affiliation.groupFG Volkswirtschaftlehre, Wirtschaftspolitik und Umweltökonomiede
tub.affiliation.instituteInst. Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsrecht (IVWR)de
tub.publisher.universityorinstitutionTechnische Universität Berlinen

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