Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation
| dc.contributor.author | Kohár, Matej | |
| dc.contributor.author | Krickel, Beate | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-25T16:17:38Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-02-25T16:17:38Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020-12-03 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Opponents of the new mechanistic account of scientific explanation argue that the new mechanists are committed to a ‘More Details Are Better’ claim: adding details about the mechanism always improves an explanation. Due to this commitment, the mechanistic account cannot be descriptively adequate as actual scientific explanations usually leave out details about the mechanism. In reply to this objection, defenders of the new mechanistic account have highlighted that only adding relevant mechanistic details improves an explanation and that relevance is to be determined relative to the phenomenon-to-be-explained. Craver and Kaplan (B J Philos Sci 71:287–319, 2020) provide a thorough reply along these lines specifying that the phenomena at issue are contrasts. In this paper, we will discuss Craver and Kaplan’s reply. We will argue that it needs to be modified in order to avoid three problems, i.e., what we will call the Odd Ontology Problem, the Multiplication of Mechanisms Problem, and the Ontic Completeness Problem. However, even this modification is confronted with two challenges: First, it remains unclear how explanatory relevance is to be determined for contrastive explananda within the mechanistic framework. Second, it remains to be shown as to how the new mechanistic account can avoid what we will call the ‘Vertical More Details are Better’ objection. We will provide answers to both challenges. | en |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 2468-399X | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-030-54091-3 | |
| dc.identifier.isbn | 978-3-030-54092-0 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1573-4536 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/16481 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-15257 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | en |
| dc.rights.uri | http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | en |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie | de |
| dc.subject.other | mechanistic explanation | en |
| dc.subject.other | completeness | en |
| dc.subject.other | ontic vs. epistemic conception | en |
| dc.subject.other | mechanisms | en |
| dc.subject.other | mechanistische Erklärung | de |
| dc.subject.other | Vollständigkeit | de |
| dc.subject.other | ontische vs. epistemische Auffassung | de |
| dc.subject.other | Mechanismen | de |
| dc.title | Compare and Contrast: How to Assess the Completeness of Mechanistic Explanation | en |
| dc.type | Book Part | en |
| dc.type.version | acceptedVersion | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.booktitle | Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi | 10.1007/978-3-030-54092-0_17 | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.editor | Calzavarini, Fabrizio | |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.editor | Marco, Viola | |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishername | Springer | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplace | Cham | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend | 424 | en |
| dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart | 395 | en |
| tub.accessrights.dnb | free | en |
| tub.affiliation | Fak. 1 Geistes- und Bildungswissenschaften::Inst. Philosophie-, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte::FG Philosophie der Kognition | de |
| tub.affiliation.faculty | Fak. 1 Geistes- und Bildungswissenschaften | de |
| tub.affiliation.group | FG Philosophie der Kognition | de |
| tub.affiliation.institute | Inst. Philosophie-, Literatur-, Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte | de |
| tub.publisher.universityorinstitution | Technische Universität Berlin | en |