Approval-based apportionment

dc.contributor.authorBrill, Markus
dc.contributor.authorGölz, Paul
dc.contributor.authorPeters, Dominik
dc.contributor.authorSchmidt-Kraepelin, Ulrike
dc.contributor.authorWilker , Kai
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-29T08:16:10Z
dc.date.available2023-03-29T08:16:10Z
dc.date.issued2022-07-26
dc.description.abstractIn the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by casting approval ballots. This approval-based apportionment setting generalizes traditional apportionment and is a natural restriction of approval-based multiwinner elections, where approval ballots range over individual candidates instead of parties. Using techniques from both apportionment and multiwinner elections, we identify rules that generalize the D’Hondt apportionment method and that satisfy strong axioms which are generalizations of properties commonly studied in the apportionment literature. In fact, the rules we discuss provide representation guarantees that are currently out of reach in the general setting of multiwinner elections: First, we show that core-stable committees are guaranteed to exist and can be found in polynomial time. Second, we demonstrate that extended justified representation is compatible with committee monotonicity (also known as house monotonicity).en
dc.description.sponsorshipTU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel – 2022
dc.identifier.eissn1436-4646
dc.identifier.issn0025-5610
dc.identifier.urihttps://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/18690
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-17498
dc.language.isoen
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject.ddc510 Mathematikde
dc.subject.otherapportionmenten
dc.subject.othervotersen
dc.subject.othergeneralizationen
dc.subject.otherapprovalen
dc.subject.otherballotsen
dc.titleApproval-based apportionmenten
dc.typeArticle
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1007/s10107-022-01852-1
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleMathematical Programming
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameSpringer Nature
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceHeidelberg
dcterms.rightsHolder.referenceCreative-Commons-Lizenz
tub.accessrights.dnbfree
tub.affiliationFak. 4 Elektrotechnik und Informatik::Inst. Softwaretechnik und Theoretische Informatik::FG Effiziente Algorithmen (ALGO)
tub.publisher.universityorinstitutionTechnische Universität Berlin

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