The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts

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dc.contributor.authorAmegashie, J. Atsu
dc.contributor.authorRunkel, Marco
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-08T17:30:28Z
dc.date.available2019-01-08T17:30:28Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.descriptionDieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.de
dc.descriptionThis publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.en
dc.description.abstractThe authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The authors construct examples where the equilibrium is such that the self-deterrence effect paradoxically outweighs the value effect and thereby decreases the factions’ aggregate effort below the level exerted in the no-revenge case. This paradox of revenge is more likely, the more elastically the benefit of revenge reacts to the destruction suffered in the past and the more asymmetric is the conflict. The authors discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics, evolutionary stability, and their strategic value as commitment devices.en
dc.identifier.eissn1552-8766
dc.identifier.issn0022-0027
dc.identifier.urihttps://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/8825
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-7954
dc.language.isoen
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc320 Politikwissenschaftde
dc.subject.otherconflicten
dc.subject.otherparadoxen
dc.subject.otherrevengeen
dc.subject.othersubgame-perfect equilibriumen
dc.titleThe Paradox of Revenge in Conflictsen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi10.1177/0022002711420971
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.issue2
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitleJournal of Conflict Resolutionen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishernameSAGE Publicationsen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublisherplaceWashington, DCen
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend330
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart313
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume56
tub.accessrights.dnbdomain
tub.affiliationFak. 7 Wirtschaft und Management::Inst. Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsrecht (IVWR)de
tub.affiliation.facultyFak. 7 Wirtschaft und Managementde
tub.affiliation.instituteInst. Volkswirtschaftslehre und Wirtschaftsrecht (IVWR)de
tub.publisher.universityorinstitutionTechnische Universität Berlinde

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