Tolksdorf, Stefan2018-10-012018-10-0120090012-1045https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/8248http://dx.doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-7399Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich.This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.The paper explores insights and limits of Davidson’s minimalistic approach to the problem of the unity of proposition. It argues that the minimalistic way to explain the unity, namely that an object satisfy a predicate, remains at the surface grammar. The author tries to show how Wittgenstein’s later philosophy of language opens up a second level of unity, i. e. a unity of the speech action (depth grammar). It follows that we have to differentiate two kinds of unity-problems, so that Davidson only offers an answer to the first one. The paper ends by drawing some ramifications for the principle of compositionality, theories of meaning and semantic non-factualism.de100 Philosophie und PsychologieDavidsonFregesemantic non-factualismunity of propositionWittgensteinArticle2192-1482